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
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July 1, 1963

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Toward a Strategy of Peace

*Address by President Kennedy*¹

"There are few earthly things more beautiful than a University," wrote John Masefield, in his tribute to the English universities—and his words are equally true here. He did not refer to spires and towers, to campus greens and ivied walls. He admired the splendid beauty of the university, he said, because it was "a place where those who hate ignorance may strive to know, where those who perceive truth may strive to make others see."

I have, therefore, chosen this time and this place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived—yet it is the most important topic on earth: world peace.

What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a *Pax Americana* enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace,

¹ Made at commencement exercises at The American University, Washington, D.C., on June 10 (White House press release, as-delivered text).

the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women, not merely peace in our time but peace for all time.

I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost 10 times the explosive force delivered by all of the Allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by the wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.

Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need to use them is essential to keeping the peace. But surely

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as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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the acquisition of such idle stockpiles—which can only destroy and never create—is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace.

I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational end of rational men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war, and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task.

Some say that it is useless to speak of world peace or world law or world disarmament—and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must reexamine our own attitude, as individuals and as a nation, for our attitude is as essential as theirs. And every graduate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward—by examining his own attitude toward the possibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the cold war, and toward freedom and peace here at home.

The Possibilities of Peace

First: Let us examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many think it unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable, that mankind is doomed, that we are gripped by forces we cannot control.

We need not accept that view. Our problems are manmade; therefore they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man's reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable, and we believe they can do it again.

I am not referring to the absolute, infinite concept of universal peace and good will of which some fantasies and fanatics dream. I do not deny the values of hopes and dreams, but we merely invite discouragement and incredulity by making that our only and immediate goal.

Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden revolu-

tion in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned. There is no single, simple key to this peace, no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process, a way of solving problems.

With such a peace there will still be quarrels and conflicting interests, as there are within families and nations. World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor; it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever. However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes in the relations between nations and neighbors.

So let us persevere. Peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it.

Common Interests of U.S. and Soviet Union

Second: Let us reexamine our attitude toward the Soviet Union. It is discouraging to think that their leaders may actually believe what their propagandists write. It is discouraging to read a recent authoritative Soviet text on military strategy and find, on page after page, wholly baseless and incredible claims—such as the allegation that “American imperialist circles are preparing to unleash different types of wars . . . that there is a very real threat of a preventive war being unleashed by American imperialists against the Soviet Union . . . [and that] the political aims of the American imperialists are to enslave economically and politically the European and other capitalist countries . . . [and] to achieve world domination . . . by means of aggressive wars.”

Truly as it was written long ago: “The wicked

flee when no man pursueth." Yet it is sad to read these Soviet statements—to realize the extent of the gulf between us. But it is also a warning—a warning to the American people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.

No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements—in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage.

Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of the Second World War. At least 20 million lost their lives. Countless millions of homes and farms were burned or sacked. A third of the nation's territory, including nearly two-thirds of its industrial base, was turned into a wasteland—a loss equivalent to the devastation of this country east of Chicago.

Today, should total war ever break out again—no matter how—our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironical but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours. And even in the cold war, which brings burdens and dangers to so many countries—including this nation's closest allies—our two countries bear the heaviest burdens. For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to combating ignorance, poverty, and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other and new weapons beget counter-weapons.

In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a

mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interests of the Soviet Union as well as ours, and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.

So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

The Pursuit of Peace

Third: Let us reexamine our attitude toward the cold war, remembering that we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is and not as it might have been had the history of the last 18 years been different.

We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace. Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collective death wish for the world.

To secure these ends, America's weapons are nonprovocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter, and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined in self-restraint. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and purely rhetorical hostility.

For we can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guard. And, for our part, we do not need to use threats to prove that we are

resolute. We do not need to jam foreign broadcasts out of fear our faith will be eroded. We are unwilling to impose our system on any unwilling people, but we are willing and able to engage in peaceful competition with any people on earth.

Meanwhile we seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to make it a more effective instrument of peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system—a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished.

At the same time we seek to keep peace inside the non-Communist world, where many nations, all of them our friends, are divided over issues which weaken Western unity, which invite Communist intervention, or which threaten to erupt into war. Our efforts in West New Guinea, in the Congo, in the Middle East, and in the Indian subcontinent have been persistent and patient despite criticism from both sides. We have also tried to set an example for others—by seeking to adjust small but significant differences with our own closest neighbors in Mexico and in Canada.

Speaking of other nations, I wish to make one point clear. We are bound to many nations by alliances. Those alliances exist because our concern and theirs substantially overlap. Our commitment to defend Western Europe and West Berlin, for example, stands undiminished because of the identity of our vital interests. The United States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, not merely because they are our partners but also because their interests and ours converge.

Our interests converge, however, not only in defending the frontiers of freedom but in pursuing the paths of peace. It is our hope—and the purpose of Allied policies—to convince the Soviet Union that she, too, should let each nation choose its own future, so long as that choice does not interfere with the choices of others. The Communist drive to impose their political and economic system on others is the primary cause of world tension today. For there can be no doubt that, if all nations could refrain

from interfering in the self-determination of others, the peace would be much more assured.

This will require a new effort to achieve world law, a new context for world discussions. It will require increased understanding between the Soviets and ourselves. And increased understanding will require increased contact and communication. One step in this direction is the proposed arrangement for a direct line between Moscow and Washington, to avoid on each side the dangerous delays, misunderstandings, and misreadings of the other's actions which might occur at a time of crisis.

We have also been talking in Geneva about other first-step measures of arms control, designed to limit the intensity of the arms race and to reduce the risks of accidental war. Our primary long-range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament, designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms. The pursuit of disarmament has been an effort of this Government since the 1920's. It has been urgently sought by the past three administrations. And however dim the prospects may be today, we intend to continue this effort—to continue it in order that all countries, including our own, can better grasp what the problems and possibilities of disarmament are.

The one major area of these negotiations where the end is in sight, yet where a fresh start is badly needed, is in a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty—so near and yet so far—would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security; it would decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.

I am taking this opportunity, therefore, to announce two important decisions in this regard.

First: Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan, and I have agreed that high-

level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history, but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind.

Second: To make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on the matter, I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so. We will not be the first to resume. Such a declaration is no substitute for a formal binding treaty, but I hope it will help us achieve one. Nor would such a treaty be a substitute for disarmament, but I hope it will help us achieve it.

Peace and Human Rights

Finally, my fellow Americans, let us examine our attitude toward peace and freedom here at home. The quality and spirit of our own society must justify and support our efforts abroad. We must show it in the dedication of our own lives, as many of you who are graduating today will have a unique opportunity to do, by serving without pay in the Peace Corps abroad or in the proposed National Service Corps here at home.

But wherever we are, we must all, in our daily lives, live up to the age-old faith that peace and freedom walk together. In too many of our cities today the peace is not secure because freedom is incomplete.

It is the responsibility of the executive branch at all levels of government—local, State, and national—to provide and protect that freedom for all of our citizens by all means within their authority. It is the responsibility of the legislative branch at all levels, wherever that au-

thority is not now adequate, to make it adequate. And it is the responsibility of all citizens in all sections of this country to respect the rights of all others and to respect the law of the land.

All this is not unrelated to world peace. "When a man's ways please the Lord," the Scriptures tell us, "he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him." And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights—the right to live out our lives without fear of devastation, the right to breathe air as nature provided it, the right of future generations to a healthy existence?

While we proceed to safeguard our national interests, let us also safeguard human interests. And the elimination of war and arms is clearly in the interest of both. No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can, if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers, offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.

The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough—more than enough—of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just. We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on—not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace.

Bulletin Has New Cover Design

With this first issue of volume XLIX of the Department of State Bulletin, the reader will note a new cover design.

In the 24 years since the Bulletin made its first appearance, the format has been changed five times. The present change involves only the cover; the inside of the magazine, having attained a satisfactory degree of readability, continues with slight variations.

The Department of State Bulletin began publication on July 1, 1939. It replaced two earlier periodicals, one a monthly treaty information bulletin and the other a weekly entitled "Press Releases," which had been a regular publication of the Department since October 1929.

The Economics of Arms Control and Disarmament

by William C. Foster

Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency¹

It is indeed encouraging to observe that a group of distinguished citizens and community leaders of the north Middle West have taken 2 days from their busy schedules to study and discuss the problems of arms control and disarmament. We are grateful to the University of Wisconsin and the Johnson Foundation for sponsoring this conference. In doing so, they are contributing to public understanding of a fundamental problem that confronts us. Peace is the great unfinished business of our generation, as it has been for all preceding generations, and a just and lasting peace will eventually be achieved only if our policy proposals have the benefit of the consideration and counsel of thoughtful men and women in all sectors of our national life.

Some of my ablest associates have come here to discuss with you what we are doing in Washington, at the United Nations, in Geneva, and at research centers throughout the country. They will delve into some of our current problems and in doing so will, I am sure, gain the freshness of insight and clarity of perspective that often result from a trip outside Washington.

They have come to learn, as well as to inform, and they will give eager attention to the ideas, suggestions, and critiques which are expressed in the course of these deliberations. For this

is a developing field and the challenge is vast. We need the assistance of American businessmen and scholars, scientists and professionals. Our door is always open; we welcome new ideas. Last year we spent about \$4 million on contract studies. Over and above these, we received first-rate assistance from published and unpublished material produced under other auspices. We regard these 2 days of discussion at Wingspread as a two-way street; we expect to take home as much as we brought with us.

In discussing some of our problems, you will note that they cannot be isolated compartments but must be faced in relation to many other aspects of our foreign relations and of our defense program. Indeed, one of the reasons an independent agency was created to deal with arms control and disarmament was the fact that the subject matter with which we deal cuts across the concerns of many different Government agencies, each of which has a special responsibility and a special form of expertise. It is our job to coordinate these efforts and to develop for the President's consideration policies and programs which harmonize our long-range national desires with the steps we must take to meet immediate necessities.

I ask you to remember, however, that arms control and disarmament are not only distant and remote goals. They are also subjects of ongoing international conferences which are in the center of the diplomatic stage. These negotiations have an immediate impact upon our relations with our allies, with the nations on the other side of the bargaining table, and with nonaligned countries. Positions taken at these

¹ Address made before a briefing and colloquium on arms control and disarmament sponsored by the Johnson Foundation and the University of Wisconsin, in cooperation with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at Racine, Wis., on June 6.

conferences affect these relations and sometimes affect them dramatically.

Our studies in arms control have current values to us also because they impart new insights into the management of our military resources.

I ask you to remember, too, that the arms race grows more intense every year and that, at each new stage of technology, control and disarmament become more difficult. The need for action, therefore, is urgent.

So that there will be no misunderstanding among us, I should like to make clear that I do not advocate arms control and disarmament at any price. My Agency is as much concerned with maintaining the national security of our nation as any other department or agency in Government. Indeed, the enabling act which established the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency states that arms control and disarmament policy, and I quote, "must be consistent with national security policy as a whole."

Obviously any agreement on measures of arms control and disarmament must be accompanied by those measures of verification that would provide us the assurance that such agreements are being adhered to.

I shall address myself today to the subject of the economics of arms control and disarmament within the framework of that understanding.

Misconceptions on Role of Defense Spending

Regrettably the subject has not often been discussed since our Agency was established. It is one which I believe has a very direct interest to all of us, including individuals and communities in this part of the country. It is my hope that increased discussion will lead to the removal of any doubt that arms reduction and disarmament are strongly to our economic advantage. We should be able as informed citizenry to recognize that adjustment, even though temporarily dislocating, is not to be shunned if it clearly enhances our general welfare.

You will not be deprived of hearing from my associates developments in all other aspects of arms control and disarmament in which the Agency is involved. However, I would urge you in the question-and-response period to feel free to question me at will on any aspects of

the activities of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I will be pleased to try to answer all questions raised in the period allotted me.

One might ask if this is the time to talk about the economics of arms control and disarmament. It has, as you know, very pertinent implications for maintaining demand, production, income, and jobs in the economy.

I think it is the time. When could it be better to consider the role of defense expenditures in the economy than when there is a sort of national searching of the economic soul? It provides a unique occasion to overcome any misconceptions which may be developing as to that role and its meaning for the economic adjustments to disarmament.

I am referring to inclinations to rationalize, in one way or another, our huge defense expenditures as necessary or desirable for the maintenance of production, employment, and incomes in the economy. To those who already may have succumbed to these inclinations, the present debate on taxes and on general economic policy offers the temptation to pose this question: If we cannot fully utilize our resources expending some \$55 billion for defense, how shall we avoid substantial additions to the unemployment of men and machines under disarmament?

This, of course, is a provocative question although it is not yet a matter of public debate or discussion. The economic consequences of disarmament as a question still lie mostly on the surface of men's thoughts and feelings. But to the extent that the issue is raised, reactions often indicate deep concern and skepticism, not relief and optimism. Does this reaction reflect simply fear of painful dislocations of adjustment? Or does it in any way reflect a more deep-rooted fear of longer range economic difficulties? Are we, in other words, in danger of developing a sense of permanent economic dependence upon large defense expenditures?

I believe we could be vulnerable to such danger. There are many reasons for this, including recent economic history. The greatest depression of our country ended only with our entrance into World War II. In the postwar period we have seen—coincidentally with huge

expenditures for defense—levels of production, employment, and income greatly exceeding those of the prewar period. Thus one might conclude that the economy is better off with a large measure of defense spending than without it.

Moreover we have been able to finance our own defense expenditures in such a way that their burden on the individual has not been too apparent. I am not suggesting that we have paid for the defense program primarily by deficit financing. We have been paying for it very largely out of current income. Our taxes are high. But we have not found it necessary or desirable for some time to increase taxes—at least at the Federal level—and we have managed to maintain stability in prices. Finally, we have been able to provide the individual with an increasing real disposable or after-tax income. This has been accomplished even with a less than satisfactory rate of economic growth. In these circumstances it is difficult for our society to sense any profound tangible denial as the result of the defense program. It is not in the nature of man to question too sharply his environment as long as things continue to get even a little bit better.

The magnetic attraction of defense spending as a supposed economic panacea is enhanced also by the extent to which a significant segment of the population has developed a fairly direct economic interest in it. Some 6 percent of the civilian labor force is employed in providing defense goods and services or in defense-related activities in the Government. In addition, in numerous areas of the Nation, the incomes of many persons depend, for the moment, quite directly on the disbursements of local defense facilities. These direct and indirect dependencies are by no means momentary; for many persons they have evolved over a considerable number of years. That these people should find it difficult to envisage an equally satisfactory economic future in a defense-free economy is quite understandable.

The relatively high wages paid in defense industry and the relatively greater prosperity of defense-oriented areas tend further to cultivate the notion that defense business is economically healthy. Geographic competitive in-

terest in defense contracts is intensifying. One can expect that areas now heavily dependent upon defense facilities or installations might find it difficult to perceive opportunities for economic development in directions other than defense.

All this suggests our vulnerability to the danger of developing a sense of permanent economic dependence upon defense spending. That danger is present. Moreover, it is of profound significance for our future welfare. It threatens our sense of economic values. It poses a threat to our capacity to recognize and deal with the real problems of the economy in this new age of supertechnology. It threatens to weaken confidence in our free enterprise system and our resistance to the evils of the so-called "warfare state." These, in turn, threaten our position of prestige and leadership in the world.

Alternatives to Defense Spending

What action shall we take, then, to impede the drift toward a sense of indefinite economic dependence on the arms race? Certainly much greater analysis and public discussion of the real issues are in order. Thought needs to be given to the role arms spending plays in the economy and to the alternatives to such spending in a disarmament environment.

Initially one might inquire whether there is any reason to change the view long accepted by reasonable men—and traditionally accepted in American thinking—that arms and armies do not make good economic investments. It need take no second thought to recognize that weapons and military services do not, by and large, serve our material needs and wants. Admittedly there are surface economic benefits. I certainly do not wish to minimize the contribution to the so-called "state of the arts" that derives from research and development on weapons. On the other hand, current studies suggest that caution is in order in evaluating the actual contribution which military research and development make to the evolution of new products and processes in the civilian sector. In any case, few would argue that the money spent for such research and development plus that spent for procuring and maintaining the weapons—a total amount equal to about one-

third of the entire Federal budget—is at all commensurate with that contribution.

There should be little difficulty in concluding that, if the economic returns on defense spending are marginal, such spending represents a dissipation of resources. Manpower and machines employed on defense could be employed for purposes which would provide economic returns of substance. It clearly is not true, as some of the discussion on defense spending appears to assume, that military programs absorb only manpower which otherwise would be idle. Thus military spending cannot be justified simply as a means of maintaining high levels of production, income, and employment.

For production, income, and employment are a function of demand for goods and services. Such demand arises from a capacity to spend—either by individuals, businesses, or public entities. Our capacity to spend today for non-defense goods and services clearly is limited by what we spend for defense goods and services. As I have noted, we have been financing the defense effort primarily out of current income rather than by the creation of additional debt. In the absence of defense spending we would be disposing that portion of income which goes for defense for some pattern of personal consumption and private and public investment which would create demand for the services of men and machinery. Not only would we create thereby output, income, and employment, but we would also create goods and services which would add to our general welfare.

Some may be disposed to say that the significance of defense demand is that it is certain. The past decade would seem to bear them out, although many defense producers and employees would be inclined to note that that certainty relates only to the total pie and not to its individual parts. As for myself, I see greater possibility for certainty in nondefense patterns of spending than in defense spending. There is no reason why, for example, we could not usefully devote on a continuing basis a higher proportion of our resources to such needs as education, public health and welfare, transportation and communications, natural resources, and urban development. I find a certainty of

continuous improvement in our education, health, and welfare infinitely more significant from the economic and social long-range viewpoint than an improvement in our weapons. Moreover, I see the same certainty in regard to personal consumption. The proportion of personal disposable income going for consumption has been quite consistently in the range of 92 or 93 percent in the years since the Korean war. In the years prior to that war the proportion tended to be slightly higher.

Some may wish to argue that defense spending generates greater employment than other forms of spending. I shall not endeavor to prove otherwise, but I should be interested to listen to any convincing evidence that shows that a billion dollars spent for defense produces greater employment than a billion dollars' worth of the production of nondefense goods.

Limitations of Defense Spending

It would appear, in fact, that defense spending of the type we now have has no intrinsic merit in terms of its ability to create production and income as compared to other forms of demand. For one thing, there is an inherent limitation on the widening of investment in the weapons industry in response to new procurement demands. A substantial portion of the plant and capital equipment used in the industry is already owned by the Government. It can be shifted around in accordance with the dictates of the procurement program. The uncertainty of the defense business mitigates strongly against the willingness of the weapons producer to risk large amounts of his own capital.

Defense demand also absorbs, relative to its contribution to national income, a far too high proportion of skills and talent in the economy. This is particularly true in the case of scientists and engineers, who are drawn to defense work by the higher salaries which are offered. It is unquestionably true that inability to compete for the services of these persons has affected substantially the application of research and development in the industrial sector.

There would also appear to be unavoidable economic waste in the defense effort. This results from the factors of uncertainty and in-

stability in weapons procurement. It is difficult for a weapons producer to gear his labor force to the point of optimum cost. Therefore over-manning tends to be frequent. Large amounts of money also are dissipated in competing for defense contracts. Sums over \$100 million can be spent by the "losing" firms collectively in bidding for a particularly lucrative contract. Sudden changes in military programs result in severe local economic dislocations which may take years to overcome. The geographic distribution of defense contracts itself tends to create imbalance in the economy in regard to the dispersion of employment and income and in regard to economic development.

The discussion thus far might tend to provoke the response, "All that is well and good. Yet how could we manage to replace the defense effort in the economy without serious economic repercussions?" I would reply, first, that if we can apply to the resolution of that problem only a modicum of the talent which we have applied to defense and space problems, we should manage the replacement with only minor and temporary discomforts. Defense spending either is a good thing economically or it is not. If it is not, the sooner our national security interests permit us to reduce or eliminate it the sooner shall we be able to enjoy the benefits of allocating our resources to more productive use.

Our national security interests do not now permit us to rid ourselves of defense spending. Then, how is our attitude toward it pertinent, you may ask. I am not suggesting, of course, that we bear the financial burden of defense ungraciously. Rather, I am suggesting that we should guard ourselves against developing a permanent taste for such spending. There always will be enormous difficulties in surveying our own interests objectively in disarmament. Any self-delusion on the economic aspects could only add significantly to the responsibilities of the Government to insure properly the country's interests.

I should also like to add that the sooner we fully appreciate the long-term economic benefits to be derived from disarmament, the sooner shall we be able to plan intelligently for an

adjustment process. Such a process will involve not only the conscientious efforts of the Government but the imagination, initiative, and foresight of the private sector as well. Much of the success of our post-World War II conversion was due, I believe, to the fact that it was carefully and long planned and it was carried out in an atmosphere of hope and expectation. A buoyant psychology on the part of business and consumers could, in itself, do much to facilitate the transition away from a defense-oriented economy. It is not too early for the private sector to begin serious consideration of how to use effectively the resources released by disarmament. This would be particularly appropriate in those cases where resources are now devoted exclusively to military research and development. Such consideration would facilitate greatly the rapid application of new technology in civilian industry. This, I am sure, would result in substantial improvements in products and processes.

President Kennedy has stated our willingness to engage with the Soviet Union in a "peace race."² Thus far there is little evidence that the Soviets are ready to meet this challenge. But if or when they do, it would behoove us to be adequately prepared on the all-important economic front—prepared psychologically as well as physically to make the economic adjustments such a transition would require and which are within our means to carry out successfully.

Letters of Credence

Korea

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, Chung Yul Kim, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on June 14. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 319 dated June 14.

² For text of an address by President Kennedy before the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

"The Toasted Breadcrumbs of the Future"

by *Harlan Cleveland*

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

Tonight each of us consumed at these tables as much nourishment as is eaten in a day and a half by more than 50 percent of the people of the world. If we were suddenly to join that less fortunate half of the human race, our next meal would be a late lunch on Wednesday. And our menu on that occasion would be one small bowl of cooked rice and perhaps a piece of fish about 1-inch square.

You and I wouldn't stand for such treatment. Neither will the world's hungry people—at least not for long. And that is why, 20 years ago today, men and women from 44 countries, exhausted but exhilarated, met in their final plenary session at a mineral water spa in Hot Springs, Virginia, to approve the Final Act of an historic meeting.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt had set the tone for their labors in his message to the conference:²

We know . . . that each freedom is dependent upon the others; that freedom from fear, for example, cannot be secured without freedom from want. . . . [The nations] must see to it that no hindrances . . . be allowed to prevent any nation or group of citizens within a nation from obtaining the food necessary for health. . . . In this and other United Nations conferences we shall be extending our collaboration. . . . Only by working together can we learn to work together, and work together we must and will.

The short history of how we started to work

¹ Address made at a commemorative dinner in honor of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, at Washington, D.C., on June 3 (press release 296).

² For text, see BULLETIN of May 22, 1943, p. 455.

together, in the midst of a great war, is worth this moment of commemoration. Each nation represented at Hot Springs has its own story of how it got there. Let me tell you the story as it looked from Washington at the time.

Early Planning for Postwar Cooperation

Franklin Roosevelt was mindful of the strictures of John Maynard Keynes that the failure of Versailles and the League of Nations was due to the lack of concrete "ideas . . . for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which [Woodrow Wilson] had thundered from the White House." So a group of planners under Leo Pasvolsky, a special adviser to the Secretary of State, actually began postwar planning as early as the autumn of 1939.

But President Roosevelt early developed the principle—which he practiced but never preached—that an ultimate pattern of peace must be put together over a period of time out of its major fragments. It was too much, he seemed to feel, to build a peace all at once, in a single stroke of diplomacy, from such a ruin as the Second World War might make of the world.

So in the early months of postwar planning the planning was in bits and pieces, reaching into every specialized corner of the Government. The dynamics of specialist enthusiasm would be used to provide motive power for building the peace—out of building blocks which would take the form of international organizations for special as well as general purposes, for technical as well as political functions.

Thus, over in the Treasury Department, the first planning papers that were to lead to the Bretton Woods Conference, and later the World Bank and Monetary Fund, were drafted early in the war. Across town in the Public Health Service, doctors dreamed of a world health organization.

Elsewhere university people began talking about a world education agency. The labor movement worked hard to preserve the International Labor Organization, temporarily exiled from Geneva to Montreal. And the forecasters of weather, already organized for almost 70 years in an international organization, began the rethinking that found expression in the World Meteorological Organization.

And, as a neophyte in Government employed in the Department of Agriculture, I remember working on postwar food planning in 1941, several months before the United States was actually engaged in fighting the war we assumed from the first would be won.

But the idea that food would have to play a central part in the building of the peace, and that in a peaceful world every citizen should have enough of it, was not confined to Washington.

In wartime London was Stanley Bruce, a former Prime Minister of Australia and Australia's representative in the War Cabinet. With him was F. L. McDougall, son of a one-time Lord Mayor of London, who had gone to Australia, experienced a hard time as a farmer, joined Bruce in the League of Nations, and developed a crusading zeal for a global attack on hunger.

In the midthirties, when the League of Nations as a political organization was already on its last legs, Bruce and McDougall were hobnobbing with John Boyd Orr of Scotland and others, promoting an international marriage between health and agriculture—and borrowing words from the 16th-century heretic, Hugh Latimer, to describe their efforts. After one eloquent outburst in the League Assembly, Bruce wrote to Orr that “we have this day lighted such a candle, by God's grace, in Geneva as we trust shall never be put out.”

John Winant was in wartime London also as American Ambassador, his shy manner and

curiously formal handshake obscuring a passion for people—and a hatred of poverty. Shuttling back and forth across the ocean was Paul Appleby, newspaper editor and Under Secretary of Agriculture, later to become a philosopher of public administration—and our guest tonight.

Earlier talks in London about an international wheat agreement led to further talk of a broader food organization; and in the cold of wartime London the Hot Springs Conference was conceived.

The scene shifts now to Washington, where Winant, according to one story, had sold the idea to President Roosevelt. Another version, that of Gove Hambidge in *The Story of FAO*, is that McDougall sold it to Mrs. Roosevelt, who in turn sold it to Mr. Roosevelt. (That there should be conflicting claims to the parentage of a successful idea is not surprising. I personally know 5 people who invented the Marshall Plan and 17 people who first thought of Point 4.) In any event, if Mrs. Roosevelt was the effective courier, it was not the first—or the last—time that she put a bee in the President's bonnet.

But whoever sold him the idea of a world food conference, the President bought it as the first fragment of a still obscure pattern of peace. And on March 19, 1943, the President announced in a press conference that the United States would host a meeting to “deal with long-range problems of the nutritional standards of all countries.”

The Conference at Hot Springs

It is worth remembering that in 1943 it was a much more exotic idea to have a world conference than it is today. During the 19th century our own nation participated in an average of hardly more than one international conference per year. Our career as a nation of conference-goers started in 1826, when a youthful United States, preoccupied with its own internal development, took a wary look at its first invitation—from Simón Bolívar—to attend the Panama congress of American states. This meeting is generally counted as the beginning of our international conference program, but in fact the U.S. delegates were not confirmed by

a suspicious Senate in time to take part in the sessions.

Nowadays Congress and the rest of us take international conferences as part of a familiar landscape. We are attending about 450 of them this year on almost every imaginable subject from atomic energy to zinc. In the last 26 months the United States Government has participated in as many international conferences as we attended in our entire history from the founding of the Republic in 1789 to the Hot Springs Conference in 1943. Few had been more important than that one, and I am confident that few will be more important than the World Food Congress that starts here tomorrow morning.

In any case, when President Roosevelt announced at a press conference on March 19th that we would host a world food conference, it was big news. It was especially newsworthy that day in the State Department, which had not previously known that it was planning a world food conference.

Certainly the 1943 food conference was regarded as news by the newsmen gathered round the President that day, and the resulting questions and answers produced one of those hilarious occasions which President Roosevelt always seemed to enjoy so much. Asked if the conference would be in Washington, the President said he hoped not because it would be dreadful to subject the delegates to Washington. He thought it should be held in some small town, to encourage the delegates to get to know each other.

Asked if newsmen would be permitted to cover the food conference, the President said he hoped not, and laughed. We are seeking efficiency in the food discussions, he said. Then, of course, he was asked whether reporters were not efficient. Sometimes, said the President, they were too efficient and this slowed down the discussions.

If all this sounds rather up-to-date, so does the furor which developed from the President's announcement that he would not permit reporting at the Hot Springs Conference. Under Roosevelt's guidance, said Arthur Krock in the *New York Times* of April 4, 1943, "this Administration has been more assiduous in attempts

to suppress unwelcome news than any other this correspondent has observed in action." Quoting a colleague, he went on: "The President's notion of a free press is quite different from our own. We talk of freedom of information, really, whereas he talks of how to get his point across. His interest is in how a free press can best be used." I remind you that these timeless opinions are from the ancient history of 20 years ago.

But the most eloquent protest came from an Army wife who complained to the President in a letter to the *Kansas City Star* that, "You don't seem to want us housewives, via the newspapers, peeking over your shoulders while you measure in the baking powder and the toasted bread-crumbs of the future. We've got to eat the stuff. . . ."

Whether by design or by accident, the fact that the Hot Springs Conference was surrounded with soldiers resulted in far more publicity than the organizers of a conference generally manage to procure for it by the more normal means of piquing the curiosity of journalists. Newspaper readers and radio listeners were privileged in those weeks to learn something about the postwar food problem because the press corps, outraged at its exclusion from the proceedings, descended on Hot Springs determined to report every scrap of information it could get.

Once the conference got going, the American delegation persuaded the White House to loosen up on security arrangements and let reporters mingle with the delegates in the hotel grounds—though not to attend the conference sessions. But no one ever found out—because no one ever asked—whether President Roosevelt's press conference remarks about excluding reporters were made to keep them out or to excite their interest. My own guess is that the purpose was to get more coverage rather than less.

The State Department may or may not have learned about the Hot Springs Conference first in the newspapers, but it certainly lost no time in getting on with the job. Nowadays we plan a gathering like tomorrow's World Food Congress more than a year in advance. But President Roosevelt's first announcement was in March and the conference was in full swing 2 months later, in May. Judge Marvin Jones,

soon to be United States War Food Administrator, lent his distinction and his political experience to the exacting task of chairing the conference. And buried deep among the technicians in the Canadian delegation was a bright young career diplomat named Lester Pearson.

In the midst of the uproar about news reporting, the Hot Springs Conference got down to business in framing proposals that were news indeed. An Interim Commission, chaired by Lester Pearson, was set up to produce a specific plan for a permanent organization in the field of food and agriculture. Three months after the war was over, the labors of Mr. Pearson and his colleagues had produced, at a meeting in Quebec, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The story of the infancy and the adaptation and maturation of the FAO—the gradual shift from emphasis on the collection and exchange of information to emphasis on executive direction of operational programs over the past 18 years—is too well known to this audience to bear repetition here.

Progress of Civilization by Stages

I think we can agree it is a good thing that the pattern of peace was allowed to develop in a fragmented way. In the first place it is much easier to reach international agreement in the relatively "safe," relatively nonpolitical subjects with which the specialized agencies deal. In the second place the world of the 1940's and 1950's was far from ready for an enforceable peace system, and progress in one field of endeavor could not be made to depend on simultaneous progress in all the others. In the third place the excuse for creating another international organization—adding another fragment to a world pattern for peace—is the very progress of science and technology. Each scientific breakthrough produces international cramp and tension until it is matched by an institutional breakthrough in the same field.

Thus nobody thought of starting a malaria eradication program until, less than 20 years ago, the scientists demonstrated in Sardinia and Egypt and elsewhere that malaria could in fact be stamped out. Then it suddenly seemed ridiculous not to eliminate it from our planet altogether.

Before the invention of the radio there was no need for an international body to divide up the spectrum of radio frequencies. Now so many new uses are elbowing each other in that narrow spectrum that we are to have a big conference in Geneva this autumn to reserve a bloc of frequencies for experimentation in outer space.

Until very recently all the weather bureaus could do in the way of international cooperation was to exchange the information each collected with its own national facilities. But now we can take big strides in combining three new kinds of technology—picture-taking meteorological satellites, communications satellites, and high-speed computers—to collect weather information from all over the world, interpret it, and draw a world weather map fast enough to stay ahead of the quick changes in the weather itself. For the first time a World Weather Watch becomes a feasible proposition. And thus does new technology set new tasks for international organization.

Civilization does progress by stages. It is good that, within the frontiers of specialties like agriculture, health, and the physical sciences, we are beginning to demonstrate that men can get along with each other without an intolerable amount of friction and confusion—just as we are beginning to demonstrate within the frontiers of nations that men can get along with each other without an intolerable amount of bloodshed.

It is good that scientists can speak the same language, even through an interpreter; that physicians can cooperate with each other in a global war on disease; that farmers can teach each other how to get higher yields without politics getting too much in the way.

So we salute the growth of the FAO and its sister agencies, and we shall continue to press for steady improvement in their operations.

All this is good, but it is not enough. The spawning of new technologies is not all beneficent. The technology of atomic fission and fusion can provide electric power for national development; it can also incinerate all life in the Northern Hemisphere.

The parochialism of each major field of knowledge is not necessarily an improvement

on the more familiar parochialism of nation-states, *unless* the demonstration of experts working with each other on food and health leads in fact to nations working with each other to keep the general peace.

A civilization which guarantees people enough to eat and longer life—and then exposes them to lethal radioactivity—is not moving onward and upward. It is moving sidewise toward a precipice. So the ultimate worth of every specialized or functional body must be measured partly by whether it helps develop the general or political bodies charged with peaceful solution of international conflicts. Every step to strengthen the specialized agencies of the United Nations must in conscience be matched with steps to control arms and develop the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations Organization itself. For if a workable pattern of peace must be constructed patiently by building first its component parts, the parts in the end must fit a pattern that makes enough sense to keep us not only healthy but also alive.

Toward a World Free From Hunger

All this was foreseen by the wise men at Hot Springs 20 years ago when they provided that the international food organization aborning there should become a part of the yet-unborn United Nations family of agencies. And it was foreseen explicitly by the founders of the United Nations when they wrote in the preamble to the charter that “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” we must “promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.” Enough food for all, available in fact to all, is the first elemental breadcrumb of a future in larger freedom.

Indeed, the role of the FAO as part of a pattern for peace, including the political agencies, was forecast by the story that Judge Jones told when he came back to his former colleagues of the House Committee on Agriculture to report on the Hot Springs Conference—and it applies just as well to rivalries among the international agencies as it does to quarrels among the nations:

In one of McGuffey's Readers [said Judge Jones] was the story of a man with six sons who were al-

ways quarreling. One day he called them together, showed them a bundle of sticks bound together and offered a prize to any one of them who would break the bundle. They all tried and reported that it could not be done. “That is easy,” said the old man, who then unbound the sticks and broke them one by one. “Anyone could do it that way,” the boys replied. “So it is with you, my sons,” declared the father. “If you stick together no one can hurt you, but if you continually quarrel and fight among yourselves you can be broken separately.”

In a fundamental sense, then, the FAO is more than a food and agriculture organization: It is part of a pattern for peace which is far from completed. Yet we know that when we improve the political machinery for keeping the peace we strengthen the functional agencies—and when we improve the functional agencies we strengthen the prospects for peace. And that brings us back to the business at hand: the FAO's goal of a world free from hunger.

Can we do it? Can we feed 6 billion people by the year 2000? Can we double total farm production and triple the output of milk, meat, eggs, and fish? On the record—the record of miraculous technology—we surely can.

If Ceylonese motorboats can multiply by 10 the fish brought in by boats propelled by oar; if a general use of hybrid corn would double the world's supply of corn; if a dairy cow in one part of Asia can produce 25 times the milk of her counterpart in other parts of Asia; if the Japanese can produce more rice per square inch than anybody else; if only 1 acre of land is now cultivated for each person in the world and another 2½ acres is probably tillable; if the world's most densely populated nation can earn foreign exchange as a net exporter of food; if in this country 1 farmer can feed his own family and 26 others—then surely our work is cut out for us, surely there is still plenty of room for the human race on this compacted globe, and surely the vision of a world free from hunger is a realistic goal and not a pipedream.

After 20 years of working at it, the members and staff of the Food and Agriculture Organization and the U.N. system have only just begun on what Lester Pearson, in his report of the first FAO Conference, called “so bold an aim as that of helping nations to achieve freedom from want.” Watching the World Food Congress over the next 2 weeks some observers may

say, as one historian of the U.N. Charter said of Hot Springs: "Its immediate results consist largely of fairly obvious generalizations and recommendations."

Obvious? Yes, it long has been an obvious generalization that too many people are hungry. But 20 years ago it was not so obvious to many that much could be done about it. Now it is. And I predict that it soon will be just as obvious that we who have inherited the vision and the work begun at Hot Springs are going to do more and more about it—and with such will that another generation will know a world for the first time free from hunger.

President Hails Agreement Between Indonesia and Foreign Oil Companies

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY, JUNE 1

White House press release dated June 1

I have been informed that an agreement has been reached on all outstanding issues between the Government of Indonesia and the oil companies.¹ I am much gratified and congratulate President Sukarno and his associates on this matter. The manner in which this problem has been resolved is in the best tradition of the spirit that has characterized relations between Indonesia and the United States.

LETTER TO WILSON WYATT

White House press release dated June 5

White House Announcement

The President has received from Lt. Gov. [of Kentucky] Wilson W. Wyatt a report on the results of his mission of good offices to Tokyo² in connection with the important negotiations between the Government of Indonesia and the American oil companies. Governor Wyatt delivered a letter from President Sukarno of Indonesia to President Kennedy and reported that

¹ Caltex Pacific Oil Co., Stanvac Indonesia, and Shell Indonesia.

² President Sukarno was in Tokyo on an official visit to Japan.

the negotiations resulted in a mutually satisfactory agreement signed in his presence by representatives of the Government of Indonesia and the oil companies on June 1. The oil company executives described the agreement as "fair and equitable to both parties which should operate over the years to the advantage of both Indonesia and the companies."

Text of Letter

JUNE 5, 1963

DEAR WILSON: Two weeks ago I asked you to undertake a most delicate and urgent mission of good offices to President Sukarno and other officials of the government of Indonesia in connection with critical negotiations between the Indonesian government and American oil companies operating in that country. You accepted promptly and the result has been an outstanding success. An agreement satisfactory to both sides has been achieved after negotiations in which you played an indispensable part.

In taking on this delicate and urgent assignment you have performed a most important service in the national interest. I am grateful to you.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

People of New Orleans Commended on Help to Pakistan

Statement by Secretary Rusk

Press release 304 dated June 6

The spontaneous response of the people of New Orleans in helping our stricken friends in Pakistan is the kind of voluntary, nongovernmental action which binds the people of the free world together.¹ Pakistan has been our steadfast friend and deserves our support in this moment of human distress. This manifestation of friendship and help on the part of the people of New Orleans will benefit our whole country. I congratulate the community leaders who initiated this fine project.

¹ The people of New Orleans organized a voluntary committee to raise funds to send clothing, food, and medical supplies to Pakistan following a cyclone in the Bay of Bengal May 28-29 which struck the south coast of East Pakistan, including the port city of Chittagong, leaving an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 dead and 300,000 to 500,000 homeless. There was extensive property damage, and large areas of the coast were flooded with salt water.

Plan Accepted for Preservation of Temples of Abu Simbel

The Department of State announced on June 12 (press release 316) that the international effort to preserve the Egyptian temples of Abu Simbel from inundation by the rising waters of the Aswan Dam has led to agreement on an engineering plan prepared by a firm of Swedish consulting engineers.

The UNESCO Executive Committee for the Nubian Monuments, meeting in Paris, has accepted the plan developed by Vattenbyggnadsbyran (VBB) of Stockholm, which calls for dismantling the temples and reconstructing them on the hills overlooking the present sites. VBB's proposal had first been approved by the United Arab Republic, which recommended that the UNESCO Committee take favorable action. The UNESCO Committee has now requested the U.A.R. to advertise for bids in accordance with the VBB proposal.

A pledging conference in Paris, to be attended by member states of UNESCO, will be called this fall. In line with prior indications, it is expected that some 40 countries will participate.

The U.S. position, which supports the Swedish plan, is based on the unanimous recommendation of an advisory committee of American experts¹ assembled by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the State Department to assist its review and analysis of engineering and economic factors.

At the pledging conference the United States will pledge, subject to the approval of Congress and other conditions, a contribution of approximately one-third of the estimated cost. This support is to be given provided cost estimates remain in the expected range of \$33-38 million and provided firm arrangements are made with other countries in regard to total financing.

The U.S. contribution would be made in Egyptian pounds owned by the United States from the sale of surplus agricultural commodities. About one-half of the total cost of the

project would be required in currencies other than Egyptian pounds. Exclusive of any U.S. support, approximately \$7.7 million has been pledged to date for the preservation of Abu Simbel by 43 countries, of which about \$6.5 million is in currencies other than Egyptian pounds.

In the judgment of the U.S. advisory committee of experts the two temples of Abu Simbel can be dismantled and reconstructed with only moderate damage to the wall paintings, inscriptions, and statues, and the reconstruction will be satisfactory from an esthetic point of view. Participating in the review of the VBB and other plans by the advisory committee were representatives of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

In September 1961 Congress appropriated the equivalent of \$4 million in Egyptian pounds for the Nubian monuments.² In addition President Kennedy has directed that the Egyptian pound equivalent of \$6 million be set aside to save temples on the island of Philae. This work would be undertaken in 1968 after the dam has been completed, and an appropriation would be sought at that time.

Assistant Secretary Williams Visits West Africa

The Department of State announced on June 10 (press release 311) that Assistant Secretary for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams was scheduled to depart Washington June 21 on a 3-week trip to West Africa. He will discuss aspects of U.S. policy with government and political leaders in Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria. At the invitation of the Spanish Government, Assistant Secretary Williams also plans to visit for the first time Rio Muni and Fernando Póo. He expects to return July 9.

During this trip Mr. Williams also will consult with U.S. ambassadors and other Foreign Service officials as well as with American businessmen and other U.S. citizens living in the countries he will visit.

¹ For a list of the members of the U.S. Advisory Committee on the Preservation of Abu Simbel, see Department of State press release 316 dated June 12.

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 1, 1961, p. 643.

The Foreign Aid Program for 1964

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you again to discuss the foreign assistance program. The main lines of our assistance policy are familiar to the committee, to the Congress, and to the country. But the arguments in support of our program are no less valid because they have been used in earlier years. Conditions abroad have not changed to a sufficient degree to warrant a letdown or revision in our basic goals or methods. The problems, the threats, and the need for continued determination by the United States may not change for many years to come. The members of this committee have been among the leaders in alerting the American people to these sober facts.

The period through which we are passing has been characterized by some as one of "pause," because there has been no great-power confrontation since the Cuban crisis. But surging change continues, and the need as well as the opportunity to support a community of free nations persists.

The times do not call for a massive increase in the foreign assistance program to cover each and every situation and problem. Likewise, the times do not call for us to leave the field—either in discouragement, boredom, or complacency. Rather, we must continue our steady efforts, seek to maximize our influence whenever possible, and seize the initiative wherever we can.

This is as true with reference to the aid legislation as elsewhere in the foreign policy field. I

firmly believe that there is no alternative to continuing reliance on the foreign assistance program as an integral and effective part of American foreign policy. This is not a matter of choice between alternative tools. Foreign aid is the key tool in achieving several major policy objectives.

Our basic objective, in our own national interest, may be simply stated: to help other countries to maintain their independence and achieve self-supporting growth in freedom.

We seek neither domination nor satellites. But at the same time our own interest requires us to assist those who are threatened by the domination of others. In the developing nations of the world a sound, growing economy provides forward momentum and hope—those essential elements which will lessen the temptation to grasp at quick, authoritarian routes to progress and possible external domination. Our foreign aid program plays an integral part in the development process by providing training, advice—and hope—as well as capital.

A detailed discussion of the fiscal year 1964 program is included as an annex to this statement.²

Four Categories of Aid Recipients

Foreign aid has many goals and many methods of reaching these goals in partnership with those countries which we assist. In reviewing our experience with the various aid programs, it may be of interest to note four general categories. First, those countries where our aid programs have been successfully completed.

² Not printed here; for text, see *ibid.*, p. 671.

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 11. For text of a statement by Secretary Rusk on Apr. 5 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, see BULLETIN of Apr. 29, 1963, p. 664.

The countries of Western Europe and Japan—a total of 14—were once major recipients of economic assistance. They now receive no such aid from the United States, have become growing, prosperous nations, and have foreign aid programs of their own.

Second, about 30 countries where the U.S. effort is principally directed to sound and lasting social and economic development. These countries have good prospects for self-sustaining growth, and we are providing substantial assistance with the intention of achieving real progress in the next few years. Over 90 percent of our development lending is planned for these countries.

Some of these countries—Venezuela, Mexico, Jamaica, Israel, Greece, Free China—are approaching self-sustaining growth. Others, such as India, Pakistan, Colombia, and Nigeria, are not so close to self-sustaining growth but are mounting relatively effective development efforts and making real progress. Still others have substantial potential for development, but have not yet demonstrated adequate self-help measures. Our programs are tailored to meet the needs of each of these cases, through careful country-by-country analysis.

In a third group, seven countries, economic development is a long-range goal, but our assistance is primarily focused on the need to maintain external or internal security. Reasonable security and stability must be established before these countries' economies can hope for significant, long-term development. For those on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc, military assistance is often the major component of our aid.

Over the past decade, several countries, such as Greece and Taiwan, have first received assistance primarily oriented toward establishing stability and security. As political and economic institutions were strengthened these economies began to grow and the need for external assistance has declined. Our goal is that these seven countries will follow a similar pattern.

In a fourth group of over 40 countries, U.S. participation is very limited. These countries, which constitute more than half of those in which we have economic assistance programs,

receive about 11 percent of our economic aid. In most of these countries we are a minority contributor to assistance efforts primarily undertaken by our Western European allies or international institutions. In a few, assistance provides an alternative to complete dependence on the Sino-Soviet bloc or secures access to strategic facilities. These limited programs often constitute the best "bargain" in foreign assistance.

Basic Guidelines for Aid Program

From the experience of prior years, we have pinpointed some basic guidelines for our assistance efforts. Application of these guidelines is leading to tighter programing and a more prudent use of our limited resources to achieve maximum results in priority problem areas.

Self-help is the most important single factor in the development process. At best, this country can provide only a small margin of the capital and skills necessary to launch sound development. If countries are to progress—economically, politically, and socially—there must be a real commitment by the people themselves to the development struggle—the difficult struggle against poverty, disease, inertia, illiteracy, and despair. United States assistance can play a crucial role in the development process only when nations take the difficult and sometimes politically risky reforms and fiscal and social measures necessary for development. Self-help by aid recipients is equally important from the standpoint of the United States, because we are well aware that this program is a burden on our taxpayers.

Attached is an annex relating our assistance efforts to the gross national product of the recipient nations.

Selectivity, therefore, must also be a key. We must select those countries willing to make a major self-help effort or of such importance that our aid can significantly encourage such an effort. We must focus upon those countries in which our assistance will provide the necessary margin for growth. We must give sufficient assistance to those selected countries to enable them to make headway toward self-sustaining growth. It is less expensive for us in the long run to provide enough nourishment

to produce growth than only enough to maintain life.

The aid program is becoming increasingly selective. Eighty percent of all economic assistance funds are concentrated in 20 countries; more than 45 percent in 8 countries. And military assistance funds are even more concentrated.

An analysis showing the selectivity of the proposed 1964 program is included as an annex to this statement.

Contributions from others is another important guideline followed by AID [Agency for International Development] in determining allocation of funds to individual countries. The United States is continuing efforts to assure increasing participation by other free nations in providing both bilateral and multilateral assistance. Many of the countries of Western Europe and Japan—originally recipients of foreign aid—are now donors. Other free-world assistance to underdeveloped countries doubled between 1956 and 1961, and the United States is encouraging these nations to bear an increasing burden in the years ahead. It is important also that other free nations liberalize the terms of their assistance.

And we are working constantly bilaterally and through the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], to increase the assistance efforts of other free-world nations.

I have included as an annex an analysis of these efforts.

Technical Assistance

I would like to say a few words about technical assistance. In almost one-half of the countries aided, technical assistance is the most important aspect of our aid program. In many of these countries, particularly in Africa, there is no U.S. aid except for technical assistance. In such cases, our advisers are carefully selected to help the country address one or more critical development problems. Approximately \$55 million, or less than 20 percent of the grant funds proposed for both the development grant and Alliance for Progress sections of the act in fiscal year 1964, are earmarked for 19 countries

where there may be no other U.S. aid activities and 16 where possible development loan activity would not exceed \$4 million each. In many of these countries, U.S. aid missions are not required; our technical assistance programs and personnel are supervised by one or two people assigned to the embassy.

In dollar terms, this is not a major part of our aid program, but it is effective and vitally important.

U.S. Has Special Assets

In the complex business of extending technical and economic assistance to less developed nations, the United States has several special assets.

First, we know from experience in our own country how to achieve rapid economic development. I emphasize the word "rapid." Forty years ago there were many parts of this nation which could be classified as underdeveloped. These areas enjoyed few of the benefits of modern science, technology, medicine, public health, or education. Forty years ago, hookworms and malaria were still among our serious problems in many sections. Forty years ago, only two American farms in a hundred had electricity. Now 98 percent have it—and not just for electric lights but for all sorts of services to the farmer and his family.

Anyone who examines objectively the development of our recently underdeveloped areas, and compares it with what has happened in the Communist nations, must conclude, I believe, that it is we who have demonstrated the capacity for rapid development, we who have found the shortcuts to the future. And we have done it without the brutality, without the degradation of the individual human being, which are characteristic of the Communist and every totalitarian system.

Second, we have the facilities—and considerable experience—for disseminating new knowledge and applying it in practical ways. The high quality of our technology is generally recognized. At one point or another, other nations may equal or surpass it, but across the board our technological eminence is well established. And we are known as a people who like to find new and better methods of doing things.

Third, we have unparalleled education facilities, especially in fields which are essential to economic and social development, such as public health and medicine. I think also of that remarkable instrument, the system of land-grant colleges. Through their farm research and extension education, these institutions have wrought agricultural miracles. The land-grant system provides lessons which are widely applicable in other developing areas of the world.

Fourth, over the last 15 years, we have built a corps of public servants who know at first hand and increasingly understand the problems and requirements of economic development. With the passage of time, with experience, with the weeding out of unsuitable personnel, and with the training of others, we have developed public servants—diplomats, military men, information specialists, educators, agricultural specialists, and others—who represent a vast accumulation of expertness.

Fifth, we have an important asset in the wide American associations with other peoples through voluntary, nongovernmental contacts. These range through scores of organizations to promote better relations with particular countries or areas, to our civic clubs, which have spread to other lands. They include the overseas programs of our private business enterprises, philanthropic foundations, our churches, and the personal friendships with people in other lands formed by so many Americans who have gone abroad as teachers, or students, or just as tourists.

Sixth are the scores of thousands of persons from the less developed countries who have come to the United States for education or special training or perhaps just to learn more about us; and many more thousands who have studied under American teachers in universities, vocational schools, and other training centers in their own countries. Not all of them react favorably to such exposures to us. But experience indicates that an overwhelming majority of the persons from the less developed countries who have studied or visited in the United States or studied extensively under American teachers abroad take away a predominantly favorable impression.

U.S. Aid Programs in Pakistan and India

I should like to turn briefly to a few specific situations which have given rise to public discussion in relation to our mutual assistance programs. Of greatest immediate interest, perhaps, is the great subcontinent of Pakistan and India.

It is of the highest importance to the United States and to the entire free world that these two great nations be secure and that their economic and social development move forward within the framework of free institutions. This requires, in our view, not only that they be free from attacks directed at either one of them from outside the subcontinent but that they themselves find a way to live with each other in peace and harmony. We do not hesitate to assert our own strong national interest in good relations between Pakistan and India. For it is entirely obvious that there is a vast difference for us between a subcontinent in which these two great nations are working together and a subcontinent in which there is deep hostility between them. Working together, they could make the defenses of the subcontinent virtually impregnable; the security of each against an outside attack is gravely weakened if their mutual relations are characterized by fear and distrust. It is for this reason that we have supported a series of United Nations efforts to resolve the overriding issue of Kashmir. Broadly speaking, throughout this period we have supported the Pakistan view that the wishes of the people of Kashmir are highly relevant to a permanent solution. Thus far, all attempts to settle this problem throughout a decade and a half have been unsuccessful, and issues which are deeply rooted in history and in religious and cultural differences show little abatement. It is at least encouraging to note that the leaders of both countries wish to resolve outstanding questions between them by peaceful means. But an actual solution is not yet at hand.

We must not, however, even in the presence of major unresolved issues between Pakistan and India, neglect our own vital interest in the security of both against external attack. In the case of Pakistan, we have recorded this interest in a formal alliance and have worked with our ally to strengthen its capability to defend

itself and its internal institutions by assistance in economic and social development. In the case of India, our assistance until most recently has been economic in character. The Chinese aggression of 1962, however, demonstrated for all to see—and for the Indians to see—the true nature of the conflict between two radically different political and social systems and the difference between the Communist and the free world's concept of peace. It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the issues raised by the movement of Chinese forces against India last fall and the threat that such a movement might be resumed. India itself now recognizes the depth and sweep of the struggle and is straining its own resources to meet this critical challenge.

Before 1962 India had not concentrated on defense, and the Chinese military machine pushed across her border with relative ease. India's record elsewhere, however, has surpassed that of Communist China. India's system is democratic and her economic progress has been steady and real. This is in sharp contrast to the rigid authoritarianism and economic setbacks which have characterized Communist China. It is essential that the system which represents our common way gain the strength to be a bulwark. If this is to be done, India's own very massive efforts must be supplemented by economic and military aid from the West.

There is, in some quarters, a fear that our aid will be too costly; that it will promote ways of life antagonistic to ours; that it will simply strengthen a "neutralist" and cause us to lose a real ally, Pakistan; and that it will be dissipated and ineffective unless the Kashmir issue is settled. These fears arise out of real problems to which we are devoting great time and effort. I can offer no simple solutions, but there are a few valid principles which underlie our efforts.

The security of the subcontinent is indivisible. We respect and honor our ally Pakistan, and so we expect to maintain and improve our relationships. India, in its own words, is still non-aligned, but it is firmly committed against the threat of Communist China.

The stake is so high that we can scarcely escape a substantial investment, but we believe that other nations of the free world will share

the burden of assisting India and Pakistan, and we continue to urge them to do so.

The Alliance for Progress in Brazil

United States aid to Brazil under the Alliance for Progress was extremely limited through much of calendar year 1962. In the latter months of last year, it was made clear that U.S. assistance to Brazil could not be effectively applied so long as there was acute inflation, so long as there were lacking economic and financial policies which provided a basis for sound economic growth. In the latter months of 1962, the Brazilian Government initiated a number of steps to contain inflation, and work was begun on a 3-year development program. Taxes were increased. The budget for 1963 was reduced. Restrictions on credit were imposed. Passenger and freight rates on government-owned transportation were increased. A 3-year development and financial plan was completed in January 1963.

In March of this year, Brazil's Minister of Finance came to the United States. Out of his discussions with U.S. officials came an exchange of letters³ in which Brazil's Minister of Finance outlined a series of financial and economic measures already taken and other measures to be taken by the Brazilian Government. We in turn outlined a program of financial assistance in which the release of U.S. funds would be related to actual performance.

Since March, the Brazilian Government has taken further economic measures. It has also encountered complications. For example: While the Government recommended a pay increase of only 40 percent for Government employees, the Chamber of Deputies apparently felt that a larger raise was more in keeping with the cost of living increases which had occurred since the last pay raise more than a year previous. The Brazilian Government then agreed to this larger increase on the condition that the legislature provide additional offsetting noninflationary revenues. The Chamber of Deputies has met this condition, and the legislation is now pending in the Brazilian

³ For background and texts of letters, see *ibid.*, Apr. 15, 1963, p. 557.

Senate. The Brazilian Government has found it necessary to adjust and reassess its economic and financial policies in other directions. It is my understanding that this adjustment and reassessment are still in process and that no final assessment is yet possible.

While the timetable on the major portion of U.S. assistance specifically related to Brazil's stabilization effort will continue to adjust to Brazil's stabilization performance, certain aspects of U.S. assistance should continue. Our Food-for-Peace program should move forward. Our cooperation in combating misery and privation in Northeast Brazil should likewise continue. Finally, we shall carry forward limited project financing and technical assistance as our contribution to Brazil's self-help efforts under the Alliance for Progress. It is our hope that our readiness to help as Brazil helps herself will give important support to Brazil's effort to move forward and achieve economic growth in a stable economy.

Aid to the United Arab Republic

In the Near East, questions have been raised about aid to the United Arab Republic. The history of the Near East during the past 10 years demonstrates the reasons why aid to the U.A.R., aid consisting of Public Law 480 food and some dollar loans, should be continued.

The failure of the U.S.-U.A.R. arms negotiations in 1955, the withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer in 1956, and the termination of aid to the U.A.R. in 1957-58, all adversely affected the U.S. position, and the instability of the area continued. The U.A.R.-Soviet arms agreement and the reorientation of U.A.R. trade and cultural exchange toward the Soviet bloc ensued. Arab hostility toward Israel was intensified. The Suez Canal was nationalized and subsequently closed during the period of hostilities in the Suez affair.

Our recent experience, since resuming aid to the U.A.R. in 1959, has been a gradual reversal of the adverse situation that developed from 1954 to 1958. The Soviet presence, prestige, and influence in the Arab world diminished to its lowest point in years with resulting shifts westward in U.A.R. trade, training, and cultural contacts. The U.A.R. has adopted a non-

alignment policy increasingly more compatible with free-world interests.

The principal criticism of aid to the U.A.R. is not that it is ineffective in the East-West cold-war context in the Middle East, but rather that it will increase intraregional conflict and the threat against Israel. Our aid to the U.A.R. has been predominantly in the form of surplus foodstuffs with the balance in the form of development projects tied to U.S. procurement.

Our consistent policy in the Near East has been to do all that we can to avoid and contain conflicts within the region.

As has been already demonstrated in this area, the use of an assistance program as a bludgeon to force solutions will not work where deep-seated beliefs and longstanding grievances are held. But what the aid program can do is encourage economic development in such ways as to contribute substantially to the will and the ability of states to remain independent and to exercise a responsible role in a world of free and independent states. Our assistance program is highly relevant, therefore, to our long-run policy in the Near East.

Strategic Position of Indonesia

Indonesia occupies a strategic position of crucial importance, controlling the vital lines of communications between two oceans and two continents. Its population already exceeds that of Japan and is approaching the 100-million mark. Its natural resources, including oil, tin, and rubber, are among the most extensive in the free world.

The Sino-Soviet bloc is making a major effort to draw Indonesia within its orbit. It has been the target of one of the bloc's biggest military and economic aid programs. The Indonesian Communist Party is the largest in the world outside the bloc. It is within this context that U.S. policy toward Indonesia must be considered.

If Indonesia should fall under control of the Sino-Soviet bloc, there would be large and somber consequences for the free world. Conversely, an independent, free Indonesia, living at peace with its neighbors, can exercise a beneficial and stabilizing influence throughout the

region of Southeast Asia. Our basic policy objectives toward Indonesia are to work, within the limits of the situation, to prevent Communist control and to encourage the sound development of an independent Indonesia.

Although rich in some natural resources, Indonesia has experienced severe inflation and industrial dislocation, and its people have realized little if any gain in average income during recent years. Awareness of the need for economic reconstruction and development has grown, and there are encouraging signs of serious determination to face these problems. The first measures of an economic stabilization program have been put into effect. On June 1 a fair and equitable agreement was reached between the Indonesian Government and the foreign oil companies,⁴ which will permit the further development of this valuable asset to the benefit of all concerned. The recent meeting between President Sukarno and Tunku [Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaya] appears to offer a real basis for friendly relations between these neighbors.

To the extent that the Indonesian Government demonstrates a continuing determination to overcome its problems with a sound development effort, we believe that it is in our national interest to be of some help. The alternative, which I am sure none of us could accept, would be to abandon this important country to those who have shown themselves only too eager to subvert its Government and people.

Question of Trade With Yugoslavia and Poland

Finally, I would like to draw the committee's attention to section 402 of the bill which is before you.⁵ This provision would amend section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act, which, in its effect, requires the denial of most-favored-nation treatment to Yugoslavia and Poland.⁶ While this matter in the first instance involves

trade, its ramifications go to the heart of United States policy toward Eastern Europe.

The issue of most-favored-nation treatment of Yugoslavia and Poland, stated in its simplest and most basic terms, is whether the United States is to recognize and take advantage of the trends in the Communist world which are in the interests of the free world. More specifically, is it in the United States' interest to encourage and support independence among the Eastern European countries? And is it in our interest to encourage more liberal policies in Eastern Europe? The answers to these questions, in my judgment, are affirmative, for the alternatives would represent a self-defeating policy of withdrawal by the United States from Eastern Europe.

Section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act, by lumping all Communist countries together, runs counter to United States policy followed with tangible successes by three administrations. The amendment which is being sought would restore to the President flexible authority to extend most-favored-nation treatment when it was important to the national interest and when it would promote the independence of a country from international communism.

This provision, Mr. Chairman, does not involve aid to Poland and Yugoslavia. Normal trade, however, is an essential foreign policy tool in terminating our aid relationships with these countries, while at the same time preserving the benefits from past aid and enabling us to continue to pursue United States interests in the Eastern European area.

We are often criticized at home by those who say our aid program has gained us nothing and lost us friends. I strongly disagree with those who assert that we are widely distrusted or hated. My experience both as a private citizen and as a public official leads me to think otherwise.

Despite the doubling of the membership of the United Nations, the overwhelming majority of that organization continues to support the charter and the building of a world community congenial to our own long-term goals. There are many unaligned states, in the sense that they are not militarily allied with either NATO countries or the Communist bloc. But there are very few neutrals with respect to the

⁴ For background, see p. 17.

⁵ S. 1276.

⁶ For text of a statement made by Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 27, see BULLETIN of June 17, 1963, p. 947.

charter, and, I might add, at moments of crisis we find fewer neutrals than we might have supposed.

There is nothing that the Communists want more than for us to withdraw our support from other independent countries. The number-one objective of Communist policy in regard to Europe, Asia, the Far East, Africa, and Latin America can be summed up in three words: "Yanks, go home." I don't believe that the American people wish to adopt a policy of retreat—for a policy of retreat is a prescription for defeat.

The price of freedom has never been cheap. Building—and defending—freedom has always required courage and tenacity. Often it has cost heavily in treasure—and blood. I would prefer to see freedom defended and built without bloodshed if possible. The dollar cost of defending and strengthening freedom through our foreign assistance program is a small fraction of what we spend on military defense and an infinitesimal fraction of the potential cost of a third world war. I do hope, therefore, that Congress will provide the resources we need for our economic and military assistance program.

ANNEX A

FISCAL YEAR 1964 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
[For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 29, 1963, p. 671]

ANNEX B

RELATION OF U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO GNP OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

One rough indication of self-help is the relation of the magnitude of U.S. assistance to gross national product (GNP) of the recipient country. This is, of course, only a very rough measure of comparison between the recipient country's total effort and the effort of the United States. The meaning of this comparison for each country can only be completely understood if measured within a framework of such factors as the nature of the development problem, the amount of foreign exchange earned, the extent of exploitable natural resources, the skill of the working population, etc.

Although the amount of U.S. assistance is quite small when related to the total country effort as indicated by the GNP, the United States provides in many countries a significant amount of the foreign exchange

going into a country's development program. The U.S. assistance in many cases, e.g. in Pakistan and India, is vital to the development of the country.

It may be useful to examine the relationship of U.S. assistance to GNP in terms of the types of country programs referred to above. The year of comparison is 1961; U.S. economic assistance includes P.L. 480 as well as AID assistance.

I. Countries where U.S. assistance is primarily directed to sound and lasting social and economic development.

A. Some countries are approaching self-sustaining growth. U.S. economic assistance to these countries is in a declining trend. In 1961, U.S. economic assistance was 1.3 percent of GNP of Greece, .3 percent of GNP of Mexico, .2 percent of Jamaica.

B. Other countries are further away from self-sustaining growth, but mounting sound development efforts. The trend of U.S. assistance may be expected to be relatively steady. India, Pakistan, and Colombia are good examples of this situation. In India, U.S. assistance was 1.9 percent of GNP; in Pakistan, U.S. assistance was 2.5 percent of GNP; in Colombia, 2.3 percent.

C. Still other countries have substantial development potential, but have not yet demonstrated adequate self-help. Assistance levels to these countries will vary considerably from country to country in a given year. In one of these countries, U.S. assistance was .7 percent of GNP in 1961. Typically, U.S. assistance ranged from 2 percent to 3 percent of GNP. In a few countries it was higher.

Generally speaking, these countries, which involve the bulk of the AID effort, entail a relatively small contribution by the United States—usually less than 3 percent.

II. Countries where assistance is focused on the need to maintain external or internal security. Assistance levels tend to be high in relation to GNP of these countries because of the immediate nature of the problem, but may vary according to security requirements. U.S. assistance was 16.8 percent of Korea's GNP in 1961, 12.3 percent of Viet-Nam's. In one country, U.S. assistance was only 1 percent of GNP.

III. Countries where U.S. participation is limited.

In general, the aid level will tend to be small in relation to GNP in these countries. It will normally change in amount from year to year because of the varying nature of the projects or programs. Aid provided to assure access to U.S. strategic facilities or to provide an alternative to excessive dependence on the Sino-Soviet bloc may cause an increase in U.S. assistance to some of these countries. U.S. assistance typically ranges from 1 percent of GNP down to .01 percent.

ANNEX C

CONCENTRATION OF AID ASSISTANCE IN FY 64

The following table indicates how much AID assistance is planned for the general categories of assistance:

	No. of countries	% of AID assistance
A. Countries where U.S. assistance is primarily directed to sound and lasting social and economic development.....	30	70.9*
*The focus on development in these countries is further demonstrated by the fact that these countries receive more than 90 percent of development loans.		
B. Countries where U.S. assistance is focused on the speed to maintain external or internal security	7	18.4*
*Although these seven countries receive less than 20 percent of total AID assistance, they receive more than 74 percent of supporting assistance.		
C. Countries where U.S. participation is limited.....	More than 40	10.6

ANNEX D

AID FROM OTHER FREE-WORLD DONORS

Most of the other DAC [Development Assistance Committee] members showed significant improvement in aid performance in 1961 over 1960 in amounts and in terms of aid. The trend of aid levels also seems definitely upward. However, the performance is still quite uneven, with several countries lagging well behind others.

France. Bilateral aid amounted to \$777 million in 1960 and increased to \$858 million in 1961. French aid terms on an overall basis rate as the most liberal in DAC. Over 90 percent of French bilateral aid in 1961 was in grants. Net bilateral loan expenditures in 1961 were thus only \$59 million. This lending was on very liberal terms with 57 percent of gross loan expenditures calling for repayment periods of 20 years or more. New French loan commitments in 1961 were 75 percent (\$143 million) at 20 years or over and of that amount 30 percent (\$57 million) for 30 years or more. Interest rates were below 2 percent on \$62 million or 33 percent of loan commitments. Thus far, however, French lending outside the French franc area has been on relatively hard terms.

Germany. Bilateral expenditures increased from \$219 million in 1960 to \$288 million in 1961.

The terms of German aid lending have shown a

steady liberalization. In 1959 virtually all loans were for periods under 5 years. Loans of 20 years and over totaled \$11 million and comprised 8 percent of total loan expenditures in 1960; they climbed to \$94 million and 43 percent in 1961. Interest rates in 1959 were nearly always at market rates. Now a significant proportion of commitments are made at well below commercial rates, with grace periods of 3 years and more.

German loan commitments were made to 38 countries in 1961, and the list of recipients seems to be broadening.

United Kingdom. Bilateral expenditures increased from \$310 million in 1960 to \$403 million in 1961.

Well over half of British aid is made up of bilateral grants. British bilateral lending provides for rather liberal repayment periods (73 percent of 1960 loan outlays or \$128 million were for 20 years or more, and 87 percent or \$192 million in 1961) and for grace periods running up to 7 years. Britain still provides only a nominal proportion of its loans at subcommercial interest rates.

British aid is concentrated in Commonwealth countries, but Britain is participating in the Turkish consortium and has started technical cooperation programs in Latin America.

Japan. The bilateral component of Japanese aid increased sharply from \$118 million in 1960 to \$203 million in 1961. Japan continues a sizable annual flow of grant reparations payments and has built up a larger and growing flow of aid loans. The terms of loans are also improving. In 1960 only \$18 million or 30 percent of loan expenditures were for periods of over 10 years. In 1961 the figure rose to \$66 million or 44 percent, and new commitments were \$167 million or 64 percent for periods of over 10 years (including \$100 million or 38 percent for periods of over 15 years).

The Japanese provide aid to a number of Latin American countries as well as to most of South Asia and the Far East.

Italy, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, and Portugal. These five DAC countries combined provided a total flow of bilateral assistance approaching the level of Germany in 1961. This amount remained roughly constant at about \$240 million in 1960 and 1961, but is expected to increase significantly by 1963.

New DAC Countries and Non-DAC Countries. Norway and Denmark, which joined DAC subsequent to the first annual aid review, and Sweden, which is not in DAC, have recently passed new foreign aid legislation. The Swedish law accepts 1 percent of gross national product as a target for the eventual size of its program, and the Norwegians have set a similar objective. Switzerland and Austria have made very modest beginnings with an aid program. Australia and New Zealand contribute through the Colombo Plan.

These countries together currently expend about \$75 million in bilateral aid apart from private capital. The flow can be expected to increase.

The principal international financial institutions providing capital assistance to the developing countries are the World Bank, the International Development Association, and the International Finance Corporation, which are affiliated institutions; the Inter-American Development Bank; and the Development Fund and European Investment Bank of the European Economic Community.

These institutions are able to attract and retain competent international public servants, drawing on the experience, knowledge, and resources of many na-

tions, including both the industrially advanced nations and the developing countries themselves. For loans on conventional terms these institutions borrow funds in the capital markets of the free world.

The commitments of these institutions to developing countries were \$667 million in 1960, \$1.3 billion in 1961, and \$1.2 billion in 1962. Their net disbursements (i.e. after deducting repayments) to these countries were \$261 million in 1960, \$230 million in 1961, and \$421 million in 1962. Net disbursements may be close to \$700 million in 1963 and \$1 billion a year by 1965.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Intensification of Demographic Studies, Research, and Training

Following is a statement made before the U.N. Economic and Social Council on April 3 by U.S. Representative Jonathan B. Bingham, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on April 5.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BINGHAM

U.S./U.N. press release 4194 dated May 1

The Population Commission met for the first time in 1947. Thirty percent of the countries and territories listed in United Nations publications for that year had taken no census at any time during the preceding 15 years, and the quality of census data and the completeness of vital statistics were even more deficient. During subsequent years, pursuant to the World Census Program and in large part because of the stimulus provided by the Population Commission and the Statistical Commission, census taking has gradually been extended, so that by now less than 10 percent of the world's distinct geographical entities have still to take a census. Over 97 percent of the world's people, we believe—as opposed to some 66 percent in 1947—live in countries which have taken at

least a rudimentary census at some time during the past two decades. The spread of census taking, particularly among the developing countries, has been a truly dramatic accomplishment and at the least indicates that the importance of such activity is now universally recognized. But much more remains to be done. A simple census is just the beginning of a meaningful program in the demographic field.

Thus the Secretary-General in his report on the Development Decade¹ found it necessary to note that “the lack of basic economic and social statistics and surveys is a well-known obstacle to progress since it deprives the Governments of an adequate quantitative basis for their development plans.” Many of the governments of the world, particularly of the developing countries, look to the United Nations to help and advise them in laying the indispensable statistical foundations for national plans of economic and social development. The next task is to insure that the data obtained from censuses are not only reliable but useful.

Thus there is now an urgent need for manuals on the analysis of census data, on methods of estimating fundamental demographic measures, on methods of projecting the economically active population, school enrollment, rural and

¹ U.N. doc. E/3613.

urban population, and the number of households. It is also important that every possible avenue be explored for the more effective utilization of census data. In some countries census schedules containing data obtained at great expense and of great potential value for national planning purposes have literally moldered away in files without being tabulated or analyzed.

The United States believes that one avenue that needs to be explored is the application of recent advances in technology not only to census operations but to demographic analysis. For example it is considered possible that computers can be programed to scan demographic data for inconsistencies, introducing corrections and supplying estimates for missing segments. After the data are adjusted, the computer can then be used in analysis of the data, pulling together the facts relevant to various governmental or economic requirements.

Computers can also be used to test the feasibility of various development projects in terms of population trends. Since computers are capable of simulating the consequences of various changes in a population, the probable short- or long-range consequences of a project can be determined. For example, planners might wish to determine the prospective success of a proposed educational program designed to reduce illiteracy generally but also to produce adequate numbers of scientific and professional manpower to meet the needs of a developing economy. By simulating the educational process under various investment and allocation policies, they should be able to determine the policy which is most likely to produce the planned results and at the same time to discover potential pitfalls. The relevance of such analysis to the study of population growth in relation to the needs of the developing countries for investment in health and educational facilities is obvious.

In the light of these considerations, my Government is particularly pleased to note that the draft resolution on "Intensification of Demographic Studies, Research and Training" submitted to this Council by the Population Commission assigns high priority to accelerating United Nations work on technical manuals and

to United Nations study of the uses of electronic processing in the analysis of demographic data. We believe that resources devoted to these projects hold the promise of increasing—perhaps manyfold—the return to the developing countries on the efforts they are currently making to obtain essential basic data. These needs, together with the updating of the Population Branch's important and outstanding study, *The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends*,² are rightly assigned a high priority by the draft resolution. The Secretary-General is requested to take immediate steps to make available the necessary resources.

In this connection my Government wishes to express its views with respect to the statement in paragraph 13(a) of the Secretary-General's note on financial implications printed as annex III of the Commission's report.³ We believe that provision should be made for the necessary resources in the Secretary-General's preliminary estimates for 1964 on the basis of the decision of the Economic and Social Council at this session. We would assume, of course, that the Council's decision on this matter will be a consideration in his examination of the overall program of the U.N. in the economic and social area.

Need for Greater Resources

Technical manuals and study of computer applications are, however, only two of the priority needs relating to the demographic program of the United Nations. It is a disturbing fact that at the present time the total professional demographic staff resources of the United Nations are less than they were a decade ago, when the data for analysis were less abundant and the urgency of demographic problems seemed less immediate and was less widely recognized. We seriously doubt whether the activities in this field called for by the General Assembly last fall,⁴ particularly the intensification of studies and research of the interrelationship of population growth and economic and

² U.N. publication, Sales No. 1953. XIII. 3.

³ U.N. doc. E/3723.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 14.

social development, can be implemented within the present resources available in the Population Branch. My Government believes that unless remedial action is taken the high technical standards and outstanding reputation which the Population Branch has attained under the able leadership of the Assistant Director [John D. Durand] in charge may be impaired. We urge that the Secretary-General give the most serious consideration to this matter in his overall review of staff resources and distribution.

It is also important that the work of the headquarters staff continue to be complemented by effective work at the regional level. The United States notes with particular satisfaction that the Population Commission has been able to inform this Council of the success of the demographic advisory service instituted by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in 1962. We wish to endorse the recommendation of the Population Commission that teams of demographic advisers be provided in the ECAFE, ECLA, and ECA regions. The regional economic commissions, with support and coordination at the headquarters level, are in a particularly good position to identify and analyze population problems of their regions and to provide effective advisory services to member governments in the context of the particular economic, social, and cultural characteristics of their regions. The regional economic commissions also need to be in a position to develop coordinated and long-range programs of demographic research on regional problems.

We also wish to endorse the recommendation in paragraph 102 of the Commission's report that the Secretary-General convene in 1963-64 an *ad hoc* committee of experts to advise him in preparing proposals for a long-range program of work to be submitted to the Population Commission at its 13th session.

Principles Underlying Demographic Studies

I have touched upon certain practical measures the need for which can be discerned from a review of the report of the Population Commission and the General Assembly resolution on "Population Growth and Economic Development."⁵ In conclusion I would like to say a few

words about the general objectives which should guide us as the United Nations gives increasing attention to population questions.

The United States welcomed the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1838 (XVII). As Ambassador [Philip M.] Klutznick said at the conclusion of the Assembly debate last December:⁶

The discussions and the final vote, we believe, constitute the clearest kind of mandate for the Secretariat and other organs of the United Nations system to proceed with vigor to further exploration of population growth and its relation to economic and social development. This has been our hope and our aim in the interest of progress in this vital area.

We believe that progress will be represented not by *advocacy* of particular population policies, for such policies must be determined by the countries concerned and by their people in the light of their own economic, social, cultural, and religious circumstances, but by an increase in *knowledge*. The United Nations should have a major role in increasing knowledge both through its own programs of demographic research and analysis and through technical assistance in programs of research and analysis undertaken by developing countries. Although the resources devoted to technical assistance in this area have increased in recent years, they are still extremely modest. The total last year, for example, was less than \$200,000. Increase in knowledge is not, however, exclusively or perhaps even primarily a matter of financial resources. Ways need to be found to underscore the importance to humanity of research on social, cultural, economic, and medical factors affecting population trends and to enlist the interest and enthusiasm of scholars and scientists of talent and imagination in every nation.

The appeal to the developed countries contained in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution on "Intensification of Demographic Studies, Research and Training" is an appeal for the application of talent and imagination.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 19.

⁶ U.S. delegation press release 4132 dated Dec. 19, 1962.

To this I would like to add the belief of my Government that the developing countries themselves, as they grapple with the complex problems of economic and social development, may well make even greater contributions to the sum total of human knowledge. The maximum development of the potentialities of every human being—a world in which each birth will be accompanied by a birthright—is the goal which we seek to achieve.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

INTENSIFICATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC STUDIES, RESEARCH AND TRAINING

The Economic and Social Council,

Taking note of General Assembly resolution 1838 (XVII) of 18 December 1962, which recommends intensified study and research on the interrelationship of population growth and social and economic development, with particular reference to the developing countries, and endorses the view of the Population Commission that the United Nations should encourage and assist developing countries in obtaining basic data and in carrying out studies of the demographic aspects of development,

Bearing in mind the proposals for action of the United Nations Development Decade (E/3613), which acknowledge that the lack of basic economic and social statistics and surveys in many of the developing countries is a well-known obstacle to progress since it deprives the Governments of an adequate quantitative basis for their development plans, and General Assembly resolution 1710 (XVI) of 19 December 1961,

Recognizing the growing contribution and the growing responsibility of the Secretary-General and of the specialized agencies in ensuring that the developing countries obtain and analyse the population data required for the effective implementation of their social and economic development, and in improving the understanding of the interrelationships between population change and social and economic development,

Emphasizing the importance of supplementing the efforts of the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies in these fields by action on the part of Member States co-ordinated with that of the Secretary-General including bilateral arrangements among the Member States,

¹ U.N. doc. E/RES/933-C (XXXV); introduced at the 12th session of the Population Commission by the U.S. in association with Japan and the U.A.R., approved unanimously by the Commission on Feb. 15, 1963, and adopted unanimously by the Economic and Social Council on Apr. 5, 1963.

1. *Invites* the Economic Commission for Africa, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and the Economic Commission for Latin America to examine the possibilities of intensifying their work in the demographic field within the general framework of the programme recommended by the Population Commission in the report of its twelfth session (E/3723) and with special reference to the recommendation of the General Assembly in resolution 1838 (XVII) for intensified studies of the interrelationships of population growth and economic and social growth;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the specialized agencies, where appropriate:

(a) To accelerate work on technical manuals on the analysis of census data, on methods of estimating fundamental demographic measures, on methods of projecting the economically active population, school enrolment, rural and urban population, and the number of households, because of their importance for the Development Decade, and the urgent necessity to make efficient use of the results of the world census programme;

(b) To hasten the completion of the revised edition of *The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends*, so that it may be used in connexion with the 1965 World Population Conference;

(c) To study the uses of electronic computers in the analysis of demographic data;

3. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to give serious consideration to the provision, at both the regional and Headquarters levels, of the necessary financial and staff resources within the limits of the available resources for the economic and social programmes for 1963 to enable the prompt execution of the programmes proposed by the Population Commission in the report of its twelfth session, and to complete the items requested in paragraph 2 above;

4. *Requests* the General Assembly to provide adequate resources to permit the continued effective execution of the programmes recommended by the Population Commission;

5. *Invites* those States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies which are developed countries to consider the value to the developing countries of initiating or expanding the following activities, in co-ordination with the activities of the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies:

(a) Research which would enhance the understanding of the relationship between population trends and social and economic development, and hence would improve economic and social planning—such research to include analysis of the historical records of population trends and social and economic change in the more developed countries—and basic research in the methods of demography, such as the measurement of fertility, mortality and migration;

(b) Research which would increase the effectiveness of social and economic programmes of studies related to population, such as research on health and education;

(c) Training of experts and technicians from the

less developed countries in demography and statistics, expanding the scope of such training in universities and government agencies, and providing support for students from the less developed countries;

(d) Providing technical assistance to the developing countries in preparing, executing, tabulating and analysing population censuses, in establishing the registration of vital events, and in utilizing demographic data and analysis in social and economic planning.

United States Reserves Position on Hungarian Credentials at U.N.

*Statement by Charles W. Yost
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

Mr. Chairman, the United States reserves its position on the credentials of the Hungarian delegation.

Presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower have both made clear on repeated occasions the strong feelings of the United States about the 1956 uprisings in Hungary. The United States has been committed since its birth to the dignity of the individual and his inherent right to freedom and justice. We believe in the right of the people of Hungary and all people to self-determination and independence. Consequently it is only natural that the valiant effort of the Hungarian patriots in 1956 struck a responsive chord in the minds and hearts of the American people and their Government.

The purposes and principles of the United Nations have impelled this organization to join in the continuing endeavor to help the Hungarian people obtain their rights, and it is our intention to persist in efforts to restore the rights of self-determination and independence to the people of Hungary.

The United States delegation takes note of the recent announcement in Hungary of a general amnesty for prisoners arrested in connection with the events of 1956. We have reports of a number of steps taken in that country that appear to have improved the lot of the Hungarian people. We hope that the actions of the

¹ Made before the Credentials Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on June 5 (press release 302; also released as U.S. delegation press release 4214).

United Nations have had a helpful influence in this regard. In this connection, we note with satisfaction that the Secretary-General will be visiting Hungary in July. We hope every effort will be made by all concerned to augment freedom and well-being for the Hungarian people.

Pending further clarification of the precise situation in Hungary, however, the United States will reserve its position on the credentials of the Hungarian delegation.²

Secretary Designates U.S. Members of Permanent Court of Arbitration

The Department of State announced on June 5 (press release 300) that Secretary Rusk has designated Louis Henkin, Professor of Law and of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University, and Myres S. McDougal, Sterling Professor of Law at Yale University, as U.S. members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. They succeed Herman Phleger and David W. Peck, whose terms have expired.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration was created by the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 and 1907. In accordance with the two Hague conventions, each signatory power selects four persons as arbitrators.

The members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration also nominate persons for election by the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly as judges to the International Court of Justice, in accordance with the Statute of that Court.

Members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration are designated for terms of 6 years. They serve in their personal capacities and are not officers of the United States.

The other two members of the U.S. national group on the Permanent Court of Arbitration are Harold Armstrong Smith, of Chicago, and Bethuel Matthew Webster, of New York City. Their terms expire in 1965.

² The Credentials Committee on June 5 unanimously adopted a report to the General Assembly finding the credentials of all representatives to be in order.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Scheduled July Through September 1963

GATT Working Group on Printing Costs and Related Matters	Geneva	July 1-
OECD Fisheries Committee	Paris	July 1-
Victoria International Film Festival	Victoria, B.C	July 1-
IAEA Conference on New Nuclear Materials Technology, Including Nonmetallic Fuel Elements	Prague	July 1-
U.N. ECOSOC Cartographic Conference for Africa	Nairobi	July 1-
International Whaling Commission: 15th Meeting	London	July 1-
IMCO Working Group on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea	London	July 1-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on the International Cooperative Investigations of the Tropical Atlantic	Paris	July 2-
OECD Committee for Manpower and Social Affairs	Paris	July 2-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 36th Session	Geneva	July 2-
OECD Committee for Agriculture	Paris	July 4-
FAO Group on Grains: 8th Session	Rome	July 4-
3d International Film Festival	Moscow	July 7-
IMCO Subcommittee on Code of Signals	London	July 8-
OECD Economic Policy Committee	Paris	July 10-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: Working Party	Paris	July 16-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	July 16-
U.N. ECA Ministers of Finance: Meeting on African Development Bank	Addis Ababa	July 16-
16th International Film Festival	Locarno	July 17-
Intergovernmental Meeting on Yellowfin Tuna Conservation	Costa Rica	July 18-
International Coffee Council	London	July
17th International Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 18-
ICAO International Conference on Air Law	Tokyo	Aug. 20-
International Criminal Police Organization	Helsinki	Aug. 21-
U.N. Conference on Travel and Tourism	Rome	Aug. 21-
ILO Iron and Steel Committee: 7th Session	Cardiff, Wales	Aug. 26-
Centenary Congress of the International Red Cross	Geneva	Aug. 27-
ICAO Legal Committee: 15th Session	Montreal	August
U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade and Development	New York	August
FAO Conference on Wood Technology: 5th Session	Madison, Wis	August or September
U.N. Human Rights Seminar on the Status of Women in Family Law	Bogotá	Sept. 10-
52d Conference of the Interparliamentary Union	Belgrade	Sept. 12-
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 10th Session	Geneva	Sept. 16-
U.N. General Assembly: 18th Session	New York	Sept. 17-
IAEA General Conference: 7th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 24-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: Symposium on the Measurement of Abundance of Fish Stocks	Madrid	Sept. 25-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 51st Statutory Meeting	Madrid	Sept. 30-
ILO Technical Conference on Employment Policy	Geneva	Sept. 30-
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: Meeting of Board of Directors	San José	September
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors	Washington	September
Caribbean Organization Council: 4th Meeting	San Juan	September
PAHO Executive Committee: 49th Meeting	Washington	September
12th Pan American Child Congress	Buenos Aires	September
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 14th Session	Port Moresby, Papua	September
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification	Geneva	September
6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	September
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Extraordinary Session	London	September
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space	New York	September

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, June 13, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.
Accession deposited: Algeria, May 16, 1963.

Aviation

Protocol to amend the convention for unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955.
Signature: Iceland, May 3, 1963.
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, May 3, 1963; Italy, May 4, 1963.
Enters into force: August 1, 1963.¹

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.²
Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, May 24, 1963.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratifications deposited: Colombia, April 18, 1963; Portuguese Overseas Territories, January 14, 1963.
Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.
Notification of approval: Gabon, March 25, 1963.

Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes and schedules, and protocol of provisional application. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700.
Admitted as contracting parties (with rights and obligations dating from independence): Cameroon, March 27, 1963; Central African Republic, April 10, 1963; Congo (Brazzaville), April 16, 1963; Gabon, April 22, 1963; Kuwait, April 3, 1963; Upper Volta, April 9, 1963.

¹ Will not enter into force for the United States.

² Not in force.

BILATERAL

Cyprus

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Nicosia May 29, 1963. Entered into force May 29, 1963.

Netherlands

Operational agreement on arrangements for a visit of the NS *Savannah* to the Netherlands. Signed at The Hague May 20, 1963. Entered into force May 22, 1963.

Pakistan

Agreements amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 14, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4852 and 5228). Effected by exchanges of notes at Karachi May 31, 1963. Entered into force May 31, 1963.

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volume on Near East and Africa for 1942 Published

Press release 290 dated May 31, for release June 8

The Department of State on June 8 released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa*. This volume completes the publication in seven volumes, including one unnumbered volume for China, of the diplomatic papers on the foreign policy of the United States for the year 1942.

In this volume there is documentation on the relations of the United States with 12 countries, arranged alphabetically and preceded by a short section on subjects of multilateral or regional nature. Nearly two-thirds of the volume is concerned with affairs in the Near East, and the rest deals with African matters. Most of the content relates to wartime problems, particularly the strengthening of the area against Axis inroads through the extension of lend-lease aid, food supplies, and technical assistance.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa* (viii, 854 pp.) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$3.25 each.

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Congress. The Foreign Aid Program for 1964 (Rusk) 19
Disarmament
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Releases issued prior to June 10 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 290 of May 31; 296 of June 3; 300 and 302 of June 5; and 304 of June 6.

No.	Date	Subject
*310	6/10	Bowles sworn in as Ambassador to India (biographic details).
311	6/10	Williams departs on trip to Africa (rewrite).
*312	6/10	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*313	6/10	Phillips designated Director, Office of News (biographic details).
†314	6/11	Mrs. Anderson: commencement address at Carleton College.
*315	6/11	Cultural exchange (Fiji).
316	6/12	Plan accepted for preservation of temples of Abu Simbel (rewrite).
†317	6/14	Cleveland: "Peace and Human Rights."
†318	6/14	Hilsman: Conference on Cold War Education (revised).
319	6/14	Korea credentials (rewrite).
†320	6/14	Appointments to Music Panel for Cultural Presentations Program (rewrite).

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Foreign Relations of the United States 1942, Volume IV, the Near East and Africa

The Department of State recently released "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa."

In this volume there is documentation on the relations of the United States with Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Morocco, Muscat and Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon, and Turkey. Nearly two-thirds of the volume is concerned with affairs in the Near East, and the rest deals with African matters. Most of the content relates to wartime problems, particularly the strengthening of the area against Axis inroads through the extension of lend-lease aid, food supplies, and technical assistance.

Copies of "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa" may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$3.25 each.

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THE
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BULLETIN

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Peace and Human Rights

by Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

For the past 2 days you have been discussing that remarkable document—*Pacem in Terris*—which has produced such interest, praise, and even excitement around the world.

The reactions were global and various. But to someone operationally concerned with the problems of peace, the most interesting thing about *Pacem in Terris* was its linkage of a philosophy about the nature of man under God and a philosophy about man's operational efforts to keep peace in the world under the United Nations.

It is not for me, either as a Government official or as a Protestant, to add another interpretation to the growing literature on Pope John's last and most intriguing state paper. But a reading of that paper does stimulate a political scientist to some secular and personal thoughts

¹ Address made on June 15 (press release 317 dated June 14) at a dinner concluding the Midwest Conference on Peace and World Order, sponsored by the Chicago World Peace Center and held at St. Xavier's College, Chicago, Ill.

about the nexus of peace and human rights.

Before we ask what it means to make human rights operational in a world of 100 sovereignties and several hundred thousand political jurisdictions, it is worth just a moment to recall some things which you and I first learned as long ago as we can remember—about events which you know so well they are deep in your bones—words which most Americans can almost recite by heart.

We run the risk of losing our way if we do not keep reminding ourselves of what is permanent. Mr. Justice Holmes once said: "We need education in the obvious more than investigation of the obscure." I doubt if there has ever been a time when that observation was more blazingly relevant than right now. So, in service to the obvious, I recite the hallowed words of the Declaration of Independence of the 13 States:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1254 PUBLICATION 7570 JULY 8, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25, single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

And the immediately following sentence says:

That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Governments, then, in the view of the Founding Fathers, are constituted for the explicit purpose of securing the unalienable rights of men—men who are born equal. That is to say, our political system is built on a truth that has to do with the nature of man. A revolution was promptly fought to make that moral precept operational.

A short while later it became evident to many that the Constitution adopted by the new nation emerging from that revolution was not explicit enough about the rights of membership in the human race.

The framers of the first 10 amendments to the Constitution—the Bill of Rights—were saying that the right of all men to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” had to be protected from explicit forms of infringement by government—and *by* explicit guarantees of freedom of worship, of speech, of press, and of assembly.

Much later, our grandfathers got around to the idea that human slavery is rather inconsistent with human rights, and the practice was abolished. We even got around to the idea that if men had inherent rights, maybe women had them, too.

Still later, the idea gained ground that freedom to starve—or freedom to sleep on a park bench—or freedom to die of a curable disease—were not among the “rights” of man. And so we have seen in recent decades more and more “social legislation,” that is, political action to expand human opportunity.

These were the major breakthroughs as the occupants of our family tree converted into political action the moral precept rendered in the *Pacem in Terris* with these simple but still revolutionary words: “All men are equal by reason of their natural dignity.”

Other nations, of course, have taken comparable steps to make this moral precept operational in their own societies. Indeed, the combined influence of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights is still perhaps

the most revolutionary influence in our own postwar world. The cry for *human* freedom was briefly outshouted by the shriller battle cry for *national* freedom. But around the world—through Asia and Africa and Latin America and back home to Birmingham and Chicago and Washington—mankind is calling for the previous question, the question of individual human rights.

The Four Freedoms

The doctrines of Jefferson—and of the less elegant French revolutionists who were his contemporaries—were proclaimed for “all men.” But they were pursued within national societies. Only in our own time have these universals been pursued universally.

In his message on the state of the Union in 1941—11 months before Pearl Harbor—President Roosevelt looked ahead to a world “founded upon four essential human freedoms.”

As you recall, the first two—“freedom of speech and expression” and “freedom of every person to worship God in his own way”—were restatements of the first amendment.

The third was “freedom from want”—which, said President Roosevelt, “translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.”

And the fourth, of course, was “freedom from fear”—“which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.”

The moral precept of an innate human equality was left implicit in the Four Freedoms. But when it came to drafting the United Nations Charter a few years later, it was made very explicit indeed.

“We the peoples of the United Nations,” says the preamble to the charter, “determined . . . to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women . . . do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.”

Now what of the linkage on the international level between precept and practice—that nexus between the plane of morality and the plane of political action?

Linkage Between Precept and Practice

In 1943 the Hot Springs Conference laid the groundwork for the Food and Agriculture Organization, the first international organization designed to promote freedom from want. Others followed rapidly. Some of them started out mainly to provide for the exchange of information, to conduct studies, and to arrange meetings and conferences. But gradually they all have taken on an executive function as operators of action programs—to survey resources, to help finance and staff training institutions, to wipe out malaria, to fight trachoma, to improve the diets of children, to reduce urban slums, to make pure water run in village wells, to train teachers and to teach literacy, and to do many other practical things in the world of the here and now. Millions of dollars, advanced techniques, tens of thousands of people, and several dozen new international institutions are now at work doing something about freedom from want.

Not many people stood up and took notice back in 1960 when Dag Hammarskjöld, in his typical manner of understatement, observed: “. . . born as an instrument for multilateral diplomacy, the United Nations has grown into an operational agency of significant dimensions . . .” with a “list of responsibilities . . . in the economic and social field.”² But he was pointing to a phenomenon of first-rate importance in world affairs. I prefer to put it this way: The United Nations has acquired a capacity to act in the interest of freedom from want.

A similar development has taken place, of course, in the peacekeeping field. Peacekeeping—by police action—became operational at the time of Korea. It has been intensely operational for the past 7 years in the Middle East, where members of the U.N. Emergency Force patrol the Gaza Strip and the Israeli-Egyptian border 24 hours a day by foot, jeep, and helicopter. It was so operational for 2½ years in

the Congo that 127 officers and men of the U.N. Force died to defend the territorial integrity of the Congo, to prevent civil war, to resist mob violence, and to bring near-order out of near-chaos.

Approximately 48 hours ago a United States Air Force C-130 put down at El Arvish in the Gaza Strip to pick up a contingent of soldiers serving with the Emergency Force in the Middle East and airlift them to tiny Yemen—to see that an agreement reached by mediation would be carried out on the spot.³ Thus in one more case has peacekeeping passed from rhetoric to practice.

The machinery for keeping the peace is still far from extensive—and far from adequate. But it is a start in the direction of making operational the bold words of the charter about freedom from fear of war.

Freedom From Want, a Human Rights Issue

If you stand back and look at the United Nations system, you see that it includes noble words on three subjects. One category is peacekeeping and peaceful change, including the movement of colonies toward self-determination and independence. Another group of words focuses on economic and social development inside each country. And a third theme is the achievement and guarantee of human rights.

On the first of these, United Nations peacekeeping machinery and the decolonization of a third of the world in 17 years bear witness to much effort to match the words with action. In economic and social development, too, an impressive variety of operations marries actions to aspirations: Out of every 20 persons employed by the United Nations system, 17 are engaged trying to raise the standards of life in the world's less developed areas. While the United Nations has since developed a rudimentary capacity to act in support of freedom from fear and freedom from want, it has not so far developed such machinery to match with international action the words about individual rights.

Given the fact that human rights are suppressed *in principle* by the authorities control-

² U.N. doc. E/3394.

³ See p. 71.

ling nearly one-third of humanity and that most others, not the least our own, have preferred to pursue human rights through national action, the absence of international action is not exactly surprising.

But perhaps the reason the development of the charter looks thus unbalanced is that we are used to thinking of human rights as something separable from peace and bread, something that has to do with courts and lawyers and voting rights. Now we know that when we speak of human rights henceforth we should mean not just the right to be free from racial discrimination, not just the right to be independent and choose one's own form of government, not just the rights to register and vote and speak and pray and openly meet; we are speaking also of freedom from want and freedom from fear. We cannot yet know exactly what to do about this insight. But some of the implications are surely clear.

The first implication is this: If we fail to grasp the central position of human rights in human affairs, we risk a dangerous confusion here at home.

This is the year when patience ran out for the Negro American. The barriers against exercise of his constitutional rights are now to be dismantled and carted into oblivion. The remaining "White Only" signs on public accommodations and schools in the South are to be tossed on the rubbish heaps—where they long ago belonged. And out of this ordeal we can emerge a stronger and more united nation than ever before. The fact that the national conscience is being cleansed beneath the glare of klieg lights makes the exercise excruciatingly painful; but it also will help insure that the cleansing is thorough and final.

But is this the last lap, this effort to remove some obvious public forms of discrimination? Is it the final time around for the Bill of Rights? Is access to a good education and to good housing and to good jobs—especially in the great urban centers across the Nation—just a matter of striking out the restrictive covenants and striking down the covert agreements? What happens when they have all been stricken?

What happens will be a new form of tragedy

if there are not enough schools and enough jobs and enough housing to go around. We will have, in short, the old case of the "haves" and the "have nots"—a question of economic elbowroom for a growing population with rising expectations. And what a misadventure it would be if, having struck down the outward signs of racial discrimination, we were to find that the new economic problem looks suspiciously like the old race problem, because so many of the "haves" are white and so many of the "have nots" are not.

The precondition to domestic tranquillity is that we grasp the fact that freedom from want here at home—freedom from want of adequate schools, adequate housing, adequate job opportunities, adequate medical care—is also a human rights issue, one which requires not another round of civil rights cases but an upward spiral of economic growth.

What I have said about our internal affairs applies as well to our international affairs. What carries the label "human rights" is but a small piece of our foreign policy: the drafting of human rights conventions; U.N. seminars on human rights; the granting of fellowships for the study of civil rights law and procedure; conferences on criminal law, women in political life, labor standards, and the like.

In this whole area we are abandoning a 10-year-old tradition of aloofness. Americans are participating actively in the drafting of international recommendations and conventions in the field of human rights.

Beyond these useful, often symbolic, activities, the label "human rights" fades away, but its relevance pervades many other international operations.

We have the technical capacity to cancel out the intolerable indignity that half of mankind is still hungry; "the conviction that all men are equal by reason of their natural dignity" surely requires the elimination of hunger from this planet.

The nation-building work of international agencies—the building of institutions inside the developing countries to heal the sick, grow more food, teach the illiterate, promote free trade unions, and resettle refugees—is a work of enormous import in any but the narrowest conception of human rights.

To reform ancient and burdensome taxes, to change oppressive land-tenure arrangements, are surely exercises in the politics of human rights, not merely in the science of productivity.

And who can miss the relevance to human rights of population pressure which has caused many developing countries to start debating the proper role of public policy in personal decisions about family size?

Klieg-Light Diplomacy

Beyond the work of the specialized agencies, we might well search out and identify the human rights aspects of a number of issues that come before the United Nations in the guise of political problems. Of course they *are* political problems, but only because human rights are the stuff of politics.

This summer the Security Council, which is charged with keeping the peace between nations, will be called to consider as a peace-and-security issue the question of *apartheid* in South Africa and the equally burning question of Portuguese territories in Africa. But in their essence these are problems of human rights—the rights to participate in one's own government and the right to determine with others the destiny of the group—rights which in papal logic flow quite naturally from the “natural dignity” of man.

Equally the repression of captive societies, still so permanent and so repugnant a feature of Soviet policy and practice, is no less an issue of human rights for lack of a court in which the oppressed can complain of their oppression.

The United Nations Charter proclaims “the dignity and worth of the human person” and “the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” Can the United Nations as an organization do something about the validation of these values? Of course it can. It can switch on a floodlight and expose the area in question to the conscience of the world.

Let no one believe that this is a pointless exercise, unrelated to political reality. Under the klieg light of world opinion, a nation's prestige is engaged; and since national power is not unrelated to national prestige, governments are influenced by world opinion—even though it is hard to prove because they seldom admit it.

The blended conscience of men of good will may wink at injustice in the dark; but when the lights are on, a good conscience must speak or desert its possessor. No government anywhere is quite immune to the moral indignation of those—including its own citizens—who watch it at work.

Surely the further development of this still primitive organization, to which we have given the presumptuous name “United Nations,” will feature a wider and more effective use of klieg-light diplomacy.

No nation can wholly escape a roving international eye. But the maturing reaction of world opinion to Little Rock and Oxford and Birmingham and Tuscaloosa demonstrates something very important: that even the most emotional drumbeaters for civil rights, thousands of miles from the scene, are quick to perceive the difference between a country which is having racial trouble because it is unwilling to make progress and a country which is having racial trouble precisely because it is making progress—because its courts and its National Government and most of its people in most of its communities have decided that 100 years of patience is long enough.

Peace the Ultimate Goal of Human Rights

Much of this Pope John XXIII saw clearly and expressed “fervently”—or was it “vehemently”?—in *Pacem in Terris*. When the rest of us, who survive him, perceive that what is going on all over the world is a struggle for peace and human rights—and that these two universal drives are intimately related to each other because they derive directly from the inner nature of man—then the artificial mental barriers which divide domestic affairs from foreign affairs come tumbling down and we see at last, in all its simplicity, the universality of our dilemma.

We see that peace and human rights are not only the related goals of mankind; we see that peace is the ultimate goal of human rights. We see that peace can be the natural condition of the world only when human rights are reasonably secure for all. And we see that progress in human rights, broadly conceived, is the longest yet surest road to peace on earth.

This philosophy is—it must be—the starting point of American foreign policy.

Just last Monday [June 10] at the commencement exercises at American University, President Kennedy put it as succinctly as it can be put: "Is not peace," he asked, "basically a matter of human rights?"⁴

Any nation which struggles and negotiates and relates itself to others under the banner of peace and human rights will prevail, for its goals have gone beyond nations to the nature of man himself. It will, of course, be our steady purpose to escalate the battle for peace and human rights.

I was asked to speak to you this evening about what you in your own communities can, as a practical, day-to-day matter, do about world affairs and the formulation of foreign policy. Without saying so until now, this is exactly what I have been trying to do. For when you move human rights ahead by an inch in your

⁴ BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 3.

State, in your city, in your community, you have helped to formulate our foreign policy and you are up to your ears in world politics.

That was what Eleanor Roosevelt was trying to say when she was asked to help celebrate the 10th anniversary of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. She was no professor of philosophy. But to this woman of the greatest practical wisdom, it was all very clear.

"It is not just a question of getting the [human rights] covenants written and accepted," she said. "It is the question of actually living and working in our countries for freedom and justice for each human being. And I hope that is what we will dedicate ourselves to in the next ten years and that each of us will have the feeling that they must do something as individuals . . . each of us must do something because this is one of the basic foundation stones if we are ever to achieve what the United Nations was established to achieve—an atmosphere in which peace can grow in the world."

The Challenge to Freedom in Asia

by Roger W. Hilsman

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I am very pleased to have a part in the 1963 Conference on Cold War Education, organized in this growing and progressive State of Florida. Governor [Farris] Bryant and all who have worked on this conference deserve our lasting appreciation. The kind of future we shall have in this country, and in the world, depends in large measure on how well we understand our problems and how wisely we deploy our strength and our resources to meet them. But understanding—the goal of this conference—comes first.

¹ Address made at the 1963 Conference on Cold War Education at Tampa, Fla., on June 14 (press release 318, revised).

What is it that we must understand? First, obviously, we must understand the nature of the Communist threat, for it is not a simple threat, but a subtle and complicated one. And, second, we must understand what we Americans can do to meet this threat and the qualities of mind and heart we need to meet it.

What I propose to do today is to talk, first, about the nature of the threat and the way the Communists operate; second, what we can do to cope with it, including the qualities we Americans need to be successful in this; and, finally, to illustrate all of these points by two specific trouble areas on the front lines—Laos and Viet-Nam.

Nature of the Danger

As to the nature of the danger, the ideology of communism is a threat to the United States today mainly because it is joined with the population, resources, and military strength of the countries of the Soviet Union and Communist China, because it is joined with two bases of power.

But the fact that ideology has been joined to these two bases of power should not be misinterpreted: the threat is not just military; it is also political. And of the two, the political threat is probably the more pervasive. This is true because this nation and its allies have made sure that their military defenses are adequate and up to date.

The political threat is also serious because of the Communists' skill in manipulating all the elements of power—political, economic, and psychological as well as military. They use these instruments with considerable sophistication, playing first one then another according to the opportunities open to them in any given situation. Mao Tse-tung has described this alternation of tactics and instruments as "talk/fight; talk/fight," and it describes the technique very well. This sudden alternation between talking and fighting is designed also to induce a maximum amount of confusion, instability, and trouble in the free world. One of the latest examples of their use of this tactic occurred last October in the Chinese Communist attack along the Indian border, followed by their withdrawal beginning a month later.

The immediate goal of the Communists is, of course, to capture the in-between nations, those smaller and weaker nations which today are struggling against odds to remain independent. If the Communists can capture such free nations, turning them against the United States and making them feel that it is the U.S. which poses the danger or forms an obstacle to their goals, then the Communists could win without using military power. Moreover, the Communists have waged an unrelenting attack on the foundations of our way of life, just as they are a threat to freedom elsewhere in the world. Although they argue over differences in emphasis as to how the Communist world should carry out its attacks on free men, their common

goal is plain enough: to further the destruction of the values all free men cherish.

In Asia the greatest danger to independent nations comes from Communist China, with its 700 million people forced into the service of an aggressive Communist Party. We can't ignore that problem, and we don't ignore it. Communist China lies in direct contact with, or very close to, a whole series of free nations ranged in an arc from Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Nepal in South Asia; through Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam in Southeast Asia; and on up through the Republic of China, on its island base of Taiwan, to Japan and Korea. Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand are also alive to the threat posed by the Communist Chinese.

All these free nations must deal with the facts of Communist China and its ambitions. No matter what response each has made, be it nonalignment or alliance with friendly nations, they all are aware that the aim of the Chinese Communists is to gain predominant control in Asia and eventually to secure the establishment of Communist regimes throughout the world. The reaction of each nation is determined by its own material circumstances and, sometimes more importantly, by its own national psychology.

The United States is determined that communism shall not take over Asia.

For this reason we do not recognize Communist China and seek in all possible ways to limit the ability of Communist China to implement its threat to obtain hegemony in the Far East. We recognize the Republic of China as the legal government of China and support its position in the United Nations. We are aware that the economic and social progress on Taiwan, carried out by free Chinese, stands in stark contrast to the failures of the mainland Communist government. Also the existence on Taiwan of a well-trained and -equipped force of 600,000 men, dedicated to the fight against communism, must have a restraining effect on any expansionist ambitions of the Communist Chinese. Furthermore the spirit of the people of the Republic of China, and of their leader, President Chiang Kai-shek, who have conducted

a 40-year struggle against Communist imperialism, is an inspiration to free peoples everywhere.

We stand ready to help peoples who want to help themselves to maintain their independence. Sometimes this involves outright alliance, as with the Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, and, through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, with the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. If any of these nations is attacked the United States is committed to help defend it. Our contribution to security in the Far East also takes other forms, forms designed to meet threats of varying nature.

These threats are never simple ones; some are extremely subtle and sophisticated. If we are to meet these threats successfully, certain qualities of mind must be stressed and certain dangers avoided. Governor Bryant, in a recent address, referred to the danger that the "timid American" poses for our democracy. I think he is quite right. I have often had a similar thought, which I would like to emphasize in what I have to say today.

What has often occurred to me is that, if the United States is not only going to meet the Communist threat but carry off the difficult task of helping to create a new and stable world in the process, then Americans are going to need very steady nerves.

By this phrase "steady nerves," I mean not only not being timid but two additional qualities: first, the capacity for cold, deliberate analysis in order to know when to act and when to bide one's time; second, the unemotional self-discipline and self-control that enables one to act effectively as a result of that analysis. I mean the kind of self-control that enabled President Kennedy to use United States power with such coolness and skill as he did during the Cuban crisis. In negotiations, also, extraordinary qualities of mind and will are demanded, among which the element of cold calm in dealing with complex situations is increasingly important. President Kennedy was speaking of this in his inaugural address² when he said: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

The quality of "steady nerves" is needed in

² BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

both of the fundamental tasks before us. For there are two separate tasks.

One is the meeting of crises; the other is the slower, but more positive, task of nation building, of helping to build a system of stable, strong, and independent states which have solved the problem of both political and economic development.

Viet-Nam and Laos

The cases of Viet-Nam and Laos, both in the area for which I have some responsibility, provide illustrations of problems both of crisis handling and of nation building.

Laos is a small country of perhaps 2 million people. Many of its people live in remote valleys, are loyal primarily to their clans, and know little of the world. They and their country are important because they stand between the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communists on the north and the independent, free countries to the south, which ardently desire to remain free. The Communists would like to gain power in this landlocked country in order to be able to apply increasingly greater pressure on the countries to the south. The tool of the Communists is an organization known as the Pathet Lao, trained, supplied, inspired, and reinforced by the North Vietnamese Communists, the Viet Cong. The problem of contact between the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong is extremely simple; one merely walks or drives a truck across the border. There are roughly 250 miles of border between Communist China and Laos and 600 miles of border between Communist North Viet-Nam and Laos.

Up to 1961 the non-Communist Lao had been reasonably successful in holding off the Communists. But, by 1961, strong military pressure from the Pathet Lao, backed up by the North Vietnamese Communists, threatened to upset the balance and to bring the flames of war to Southeast Asia. The U.S. had three choices: (1) to leave Laos to its fate, (2) to commit American troops to the defense of Laos, or (3) to seek a political settlement that would preserve Laos as an independent nation, one that could not be used by the Communists for further penetration of Southeast Asia.

In June of 1961 President Kennedy met with

Premier Khrushchev in Vienna.³ The only point on which agreement was reached at this meeting was that there should be a neutral and independent Laos. This agreement was tantamount to changing the struggle for Laos from a primarily military matter to a political and psychological struggle. No one believed that the Communists would be satisfied with true neutrality for Laos or that they would stop seeking to establish Communist control. But an attempt was to be made to establish a viable government under a neutral leader, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and gradually to concentrate predominant military and civil power in his government. A conference in Geneva of 14 nations laid down the general outline of how this neutral and independent Laos was to be preserved.⁴ Thus Communist China and Communist North Viet-Nam, as well as the Soviet Union, committed themselves to the concept of a neutral and independent Laos. A sincere effort by all nations concerned to cooperate with the Lao to maintain a truly neutral country would contribute significantly to peace in Asia. However, the Communist side has consistently blocked the implementation of the Geneva Agreements. If the Pathet Lao persist in their attempts to wreck the Geneva Agreements and to destroy the neutral base of the Souvanna government, a new situation of extreme danger will present itself.

The Communists are well organized and they know well the techniques of subversion. But the free world, despite the difficulties of the Lao situation, has considerable experience also in political, economic, and psychological warfare. Moreover, we have the great advantage that it is the overwhelming desire of the Lao people to be neutral and independent. The Pathet Lao can advance only by violence that is clearly in violation of the Geneva Agreements. They have betrayed this fact by their recent open attacks on the neutralist forces of General Kong Le in the Plain of Jars. The outcome of the struggle may well depend upon whether or not

³ For text of a joint communique, see *ibid.*, June 26, 1961, p. 999.

⁴ For texts of a declaration on the neutrality of Laos and an accompanying protocol, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

the International Control Commission, set up by the Geneva Accords⁵ to supervise the implementation of the agreements, will be able to perform its function. Even the limited success of the ICC to date has made it a primary target of Pathet Lao attack.

For those who demand clean, quick victories, Laos will pose a particularly frustrating problem. It is not a neat, tidy situation. If the goal of a neutral, independent Laos is ever to be achieved, it will only be through the unwavering endurance of all parties who genuinely support the Geneva Agreements. In this connection it is a source of satisfaction that Premier Souvanna Phouma in a recent statement denounced the Pathet Lao for the illegal introduction of Viet Cong troops and weapons into Laos. The United States will continue to do its part in respecting the Geneva Agreements, in supporting those forces which seek to promote a genuinely neutral Laos, and in trying to persuade all parties that the success of the Souvanna Phouma government is in the best interests of all the neighbors of Laos.

In South Viet-Nam the origin of the threat to a free nation's integrity is the same as in Laos: Communist North Viet-Nam, or the Viet Cong. As one condition for the Geneva settlement of the Indochina war in 1954, which set up a divided Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong, then known as the Viet Minh, was to withdraw from South Viet-Nam and cease its attempts to take over the south. Thousands of Communist troops were sent back to North Viet-Nam. But others remained in the south to continue organizing secretly for what the Communists, and many others, thought would be the early collapse of the new free Vietnamese Government under President Diem. President Diem showed considerable skill in dealing with an internal situation that was extremely complex and untidy. Various religious sects, with their own private armies, had to be pacified. A gangster-like organization, the Binh Xuyen, which had enjoyed control of the police, had to be subdued by force. President Diem had to develop a unified army, a loyal corps of civil servants, a pro-

⁵ For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 775.

gram of social and economic reform with which to reach the people, and to develop a sense of national cohesion. Working for him, Diem had the renowned intelligence and energy of the Vietnamese people, their pride in their tradition and historic accomplishments. He had also a small though talented corps of officials, many of whom had left North Viet-Nam when the Communists took over. The people of South Viet-Nam wanted only to be allowed to live in peace under a progressive government. Facing the impressive political and military machine which the Viet Cong had developed, the infant Republic of Viet-Nam had need of strong external support, both moral and material. At a time when the odds seemed high against the survival of this new government, the United States stepped in to express with practical aid its confidence in the free Vietnamese.

Those who predicted doom were confounded. A unified army was developed. Steps were taken to develop a civil bureaucracy adequate for the needs of the new Viet-Nam. Social and economic programs began to be implemented. Agriculture revived. The educational system expanded. The concept of a free Republic of Viet-Nam began to be understood.

By 1958 there seemed reason to believe that the Republic of Viet-Nam before long would be able to eradicate what was left of the Communist organization in the countryside. At this juncture, a decision was made in Hanoi, the capital of Communist North Viet-Nam, that such progress of a non-Communist Viet-Nam could not be tolerated. The infiltration of terrorists who had been in training in the north was accelerated. A program of violence was begun which steadily increased in savagery. Keeping in mind Mao Tse-tung's dictum that "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," these Viet Cong began a campaign of extraordinarily inhuman terrorism. The first target was the people themselves. The patient, poor farmers of Viet-Nam were given the choice either of supporting the Viet Cong by providing supplies and recruits or of suffering violence against their person or members of the family. By starting in areas where the government could not yet provide adequate protection,

the Viet Cong met with considerable success in its campaign to control the population. Along with the terrorists came the political organizers to persuade, to indoctrinate, and always to remind the people of the ugly consequences of a failure to cooperate. The inspiration for all of this came from the experiences of the Viet Minh against the French and ultimately, of course, from the example of the Chinese Communist movement of Mao Tse-tung. Another important target of Viet Cong terror was the civil servants of the republic, the teachers, health workers, malaria control teams, the village and district chiefs who were bringing the government's program for the people to the people. Hundreds of these civil servants, often working alone and virtually unprotected in the countryside, have been murdered by this Viet Cong terror. Their sacrifice must not be forgotten for it was made for all free men.

The small detachments of army troops or of self-defense corps, stationed in isolated sections, also were favorite targets of the Viet Cong terrorists. True to Mao's subversive warfare tactics, the Viet Cong invariably attacked these small outposts with superior numbers. Lack of adequate communications often prevented the lonely outpost from calling for help. If a call for help was received, lack of swift transport often precluded rescuing units from arriving before the destruction had been completed.

By 1960 the situation had so deteriorated that it seemed possible the Viet Cong would be able to establish a territorial base in South Viet-Nam, the next step in the Mao formula for a successful "national liberation movement." At this point President Kennedy sent General Maxwell Taylor to South Viet-Nam to confer with the Vietnamese Government and to observe the situation for himself. General Taylor reported that the Vietnamese people retained the will to fight communism and that, given more extensive support, had a chance to defeat the Viet Cong.

While this support has come predominantly from the United States, a number of other countries have provided significant support, moral and material.

The first requirement of the struggle today is to pull the teeth of the Viet Cong terrorist

campaign. This can best be done not so much by killing terrorists but by depriving them of the opportunity to coerce the farmers into providing supplies and recruits. This can only be done by providing practical protection to the farming population. The technique which has been adopted to achieve this protection is the construction of fortified villages, called strategic hamlets. This technique was used successfully in Malaya against the Communist movement there. The same concept had been applied successfully in the late 1790's by the Manchu dynasty of China against the White Lotus sect, a fanatical group whose use of terror resembled closely the methods of the present-day Viet Cong.

The fundamental purpose of a strategic hamlet is to give the farmers the means to defend themselves against terrorist attack. Instead of living in isolated houses, or groups of houses, the farmers gather together in a larger village. Strong defense works are built with the aid of the army. A village self-defense militia is organized, given training, and armed with simple weapons. Basic defense plans are worked out. Where possible, radios are installed so that a village can send out an immediate call for aid in the event of attack. The widespread use of helicopters to send out rescue missions has meant that aid has most often come in time to beleaguered villages.

Once a strategic village has been established, the government can then move in with programs of aid for the villagers, confident that a far higher degree of security can now be given the teachers, nurses, and administrative personnel sent out by the government. The villagers learn that successful resistance to the Viet Cong is possible. They see also the practical efforts of the government to improve their lot, and thus become more enthusiastic in their support of the fight against the Viet Cong.

Simultaneously, the Vietnamese Army is seeking out the terrorists, destroying their jungle training camps and crude munitions factories, going into remote swamp and forest areas where for years the terrorists have been all but immune from attack. The important role of the helicopter in all this has been publicized extensively. But an officer of an allied nation,

knowledgeable in the problems of terrorist warfare, once told me that for all the new developments in weaponry and transport this anti-guerrilla war is still primarily a war of the brains and the feet. By this he meant that as wily as the Communist terrorist is, and as hard and as inured to privation, his opponent must be able to outthink him and outlast him.

While army operations against the terrorist organization are part of the answer, the heart of the struggle is in the strategic village. Thorough and intelligent implementation of this program will leave the terrorist as a fish out of water. Rejected by the people, he will be exposed to relentless pursuit by the armed forces. All but the hard-core Communists among the terrorists will be more and more attracted to the side of the government. An amnesty program has already been instituted by the Vietnamese Government to encourage defection.

These programs are making good progress, and there is every reason to believe that the Viet Cong will be defeated. One barometer of growing GVN strength against the Communists is the increase in voluntary intelligence from the population. In one province, long a Viet Cong stronghold, government forces were actually tipped off in advance to three-quarters of the Viet Cong attacks last month. Last week the number of Viet Cong defectors reached an all-time high of 171. Vietnamese rice exports, halted completely in the fall of 1961, are now normal. We expect a long struggle, but we are confident of the outcome.

The struggle in Viet-Nam gains the headlines in today's newspapers. But throughout Asia, new nations, in varying degrees, are facing the challenge of creating progressive, yet stable, societies in a world of uncertainty. American policy aims to provide our experience, our enthusiasm, and, insofar as our resources permit, our material aid to this great enterprise of nation building.

Given the broader framework of your discussions here on the subject of cold war education, I think it might be useful to draw certain implications from what I have been saying, implications valid over the whole range of our world problems. I have set these down in the

form of five points which I want to leave with you as a conclusion and a summing up.

Education for the Cold War

First, we must remain strong. Strong militarily and economically, and strong morally. Our will to sacrifice when necessary must be steadfast. We know that the Communists are led by their dogma to underestimate the strength and will of democratic peoples. As we remain strong and determined, we shall make clear to the Communists that their challenges to free men can never succeed in the long run. Equally important is the fact that the confidence of all free peoples that communism can be resisted and defeated depends to a large extent on their knowledge that our strength and will and our helping hand are equal to the task. As I stressed at the outset, steady nerves are more than ever before a vital component of this struggle.

Secondly, free-world power and diplomacy must be matched together and used in just the proper proportions and quantities, with careful thought, skill, and precision. In the prenuclear age some errors, some bumbling, could perhaps be tolerated without disastrous consequences. But ever since man has learned the secret of nuclear fire, learned this long before there is any assurance that he can control it, a major error or misstep, a serious accident, could result in the almost instantaneous incineration of the population centers of the world and the mutilation and poisoning of large areas of the earth.

Just as our power must be applied in exceedingly precise amounts, and in full knowledge of the ability and will of the opponent to bring to bear his power, so must our policy objectives be defined with the greatest care and accuracy. If these objectives are defined unwisely, unrealistically, or unclearly, we may expose ourselves to unnecessary setbacks, even to disaster.

Precision, wisdom, realism: these require the utmost in cool and unemotional judgment and what I called earlier cool, deliberate analysis. Tough minds, analytical minds, are required to carry this nation through the dangerous era in which we live. Our minds must be keen enough to recognize that no situation is simple; that untidiness is characteristic of most problems;

that there are no shortcuts to success, no neat, swift solutions anywhere. Today the critical issues we face demand of all of us the capacity to live in a complex world of untidy situations and yet do what is required of us with steady nerves and unflinching will.

Thirdly, while we are combating Communist imperialism in all its forms, we must remember that it is not enough to be against something and that in the last analysis success depends upon our ability to build, to construct, to contribute to man's spiritual and material welfare. We are cooperating with many free peoples in great efforts at nation building, while the Communists try to tear down, in order to impose their hold and their system on the world.

Fourthly, there is a larger need for tolerance in international life. Happily there is a growing understanding among us of the diverse ways by which different peoples seek to obtain happiness and security in a troubled world. In passing I also wish to observe that, remembering our own unfinished business in fulfilling the ideals of the American Constitution, we must be tolerant of the shortcomings we may see in other societies. While we are justifiably proud of our institutions and our freedoms and stand as leaders in the democratic world, our prestige and influence in the world suffer whenever we fall short of our own ideals.

Finally, we must have knowledge, deeper and wider knowledge than we have ever had before, of ourselves and of other peoples, their motives and their hopes. With knowledge we can gain the understanding and the insight on which wise policy must be based. President Kennedy expressed this idea in a speech at San Diego State College in California last week: No country can possibly move ahead, no free society can possibly be sustained, unless it has an educated citizenry whose qualities of mind and heart permit it to take part in the complicated and increasingly sophisticated decisions which are demanded not only of the President and the Congress but of all the citizens, who exercise the ultimate power.

This thought of the President is a fitting close to my observations. If American freedom is to survive and to grow in peace, it is because people like you here at this conference boldly

take the responsibility of knowing and learning and persuading others to pursue this quest. I congratulate you for the important contribution which your activities here are making to the security of our nation and to the peace of mankind.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement for Direct Communications Link

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JUNE 20

White House press release dated June 20

Today (in Geneva) the representatives of the Governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R. at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference signed an agreement which will establish a direct communications link between their respective capitals. This age of fast-moving events requires quick, dependable communications for use in time of emergency. By their signatures today, therefore, both Governments have taken a first step to help reduce the risk of war occurring by accident or miscalculation.

This agreement on a communications link is a limited but practical step forward in arms control and disarmament. We hope agreement on other more encompassing measures will follow. We shall bend every effort to go on from this first step.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

Memorandum of Understanding

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK SIGNED ON JUNE 20, 1963 AT GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

For use in time of emergency, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed to establish as soon as technically feasible a direct communications link between the two governments.

Each government shall be responsible for the arrangements for the link on its own territory. Each government shall take the necessary steps to ensure continuous functioning of the link and prompt delivery

to its head of government of any communications received by means of the link from the head of government of the other party.

Arrangements for establishing and operating the link are set forth in the Annex which is attached hereto and forms an integral part hereof.

Done in duplicate in the English and Russian languages at Geneva, Switzerland, this 20th day of June, 1963.

For the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

For the Government of the
United States of America:

SEMYON K. TSARAPKIN -
*Acting Representative of
the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics to the
Eighteen Nation Commit-
tee on Disarmament*

CHARLES C. STELLE
*Acting Representative of
the United States of
America to the Eighteen
Nation Committee on Dis-
armament*

Annex to Memorandum

ANNEX TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK

The direct communications link between Washington and Moscow established in accordance with the memorandum, and the operation of such link, shall be governed by the following provisions:

1. The direct communications link shall consist of:

A. Two terminal points with telegraph-teleprinter equipment between which communications shall be directly exchanged;

B. One full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit, routed Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow, which shall be used for the transmission of messages;

C. One full-time duplex radio telegraph circuit, routed Washington-Tangier-Moscow, which shall be used for service communications and for coordination of operations between the two terminal points.

If experience in operating the direct communications link should demonstrate that the establishment of an additional wire telegraph circuit is advisable, such circuit may be established by mutual agreement between authorized representatives of both governments.

2. In case of interruption of the wire circuit, transmission of messages shall be effected via the radio circuit, and for this purpose provision shall be made at the terminal points for the capability of prompt switching of all necessary equipment from one circuit to another.

3. The terminal points of the link shall be so equipped as to provide for the transmission and reception of messages from Moscow to Washington in the Russian language and from Washington to Moscow in the English language. In this connection, the USSR shall furnish the United States four sets of telegraph

terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one year's supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the Russian language. The United States shall furnish the Soviet Union four sets of telegraph terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one year's supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the English language. The equipment described in this paragraph shall be exchanged directly between the parties without any payment being required therefor.

4. The terminal points of the direct communications link shall be provided with encoding equipment. For the terminal point in the USSR, four sets of such equipment (each capable of simplex operation), with one year's supply of spare parts, with all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, and with all necessary blank tape, shall be furnished by the United States to the USSR against payment of the cost thereof by the USSR.

The USSR shall provide for preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the United States for reception of messages from the USSR. The United States shall provide for preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the USSR for reception of messages from the United States. Delivery of prepared keying tapes to the terminal points of the link shall be effected through the Embassy of the USSR in Washington (for the terminal of the link in the USSR) and through the Embassy of the United States in Moscow (for the terminal of the link in the United States).

5. The United States and the USSR shall designate the agencies responsible for the arrangements regarding the direct communications link, for its technical maintenance, continuity and reliability, and for the timely transmission of messages.

Such agencies may, by mutual agreement, decide matters and develop instructions relating to the technical maintenance and operation of the direct communications link and effect arrangements to improve the operation of the link.

6. The technical parameters of the telegraph circuits of the link and of the terminal equipment, as well as the maintenance of such circuits and equipment, shall be in accordance with CCITT [Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique] and CCIR [Comité consultatif international des radio communications] recommendations.

Transmission and reception of messages over the direct communications link shall be effected in accordance with applicable recommendations of interna-

tional telegraph and radio communications regulations, as well as with mutually agreed instructions.

7. The costs of the direct communications link shall be borne as follows:

A. The USSR shall pay the full cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Moscow to Helsinki and 50 percent of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Helsinki to London. The United States shall pay the full cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Washington to London and 50 percent of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from London to Helsinki.

B. Payment of the cost of leasing the radio telegraph circuit between Moscow and Washington shall be effected without any transfer of payments between the parties. The USSR shall bear the expenses relating to the transmission of messages from Moscow to Washington. The United States shall bear the expenses relating to the transmission of messages from Washington to Moscow.

Prime Minister of Australia Visits Washington

White House press release dated June 21

The White House announced on June 21 that the Right Honorable Sir Robert Gordon Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, will pay an informal visit to Washington July 8-10.

The Prime Minister will call on President Kennedy and will be guest at a Presidential luncheon in the White House on July 8. The following day he will confer with officials at the State Department, where Secretary Rusk will host a luncheon in honor of Sir Robert and his wife, Dame Pattie Menzies. The Prime Minister last visited Washington and conferred with President Kennedy in June 1962.¹

Sir Robert arrives in the United States on July 2. On July 4 he will inaugurate a new series of Thomas Jefferson Memorial Orations on the grounds of Monticello. This will be the first occasion on which an oration has been given at Monticello on Independence Day. Previous orations have been delivered by former Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.

¹ For text of a joint communique released on June 20, 1962, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1962, p. 116.

On Our Quarrel With Success

by John Kenneth Galbraith
*Ambassador to India*¹

A commencement address such as I am giving today could, at first glance, seem a rather formidable responsibility. It comes at a rather critical moment in the life of the audience. It is delivered and heard under conditions of considerable solemnity. To be at all acceptable the speech must contain advice on some fairly portentous subject—the prospect for mankind, the proper choice of a career, or, at the very minimum, the importance of repaying to a hopefully receptive society some of the investment that, however unwittingly, it has made in the listeners. This could seem a task of some unction. That it is not so regarded is doubtless because no one in the whole of modern history seems ever to have been guided by what he heard in a commencement speech. Indeed it is not on record that anyone ever admitted to having remembered what was said in a commencement speech. Nor is it absolutely certain that anyone has, in fact, ever listened.

So it has come about that, although during this week and next these orations are being ground out on what amounts to an assembly line basis—here and there a stripped model or a compact, many more rich with chrome, quadruple headlights, soft upholstery, ingenious accessories, and double bumpers—it all signifies very little. For this we may be devoutly thankful. Of all the nightmares currently available to Americans, there is none so hideous as the possibility that they might one day begin to heed all the advice that their orators offer them.

Yet I am here as your commencement

speaker. I cannot escape my task even though it is so largely liturgical. So in a great commencement day tradition, I am going to say a word or two about government and the public service. This will lead me on to what I judge to be one of the more important trends in the debate on public policy in our day. My intention is analytical, not hortatory. I do not expect to influence your life or that of anyone else.

Indeed I will omit the usual plea that you consider the public service as a career. That is entirely up to you. If you are primarily interested in making money, you should go into business and make money. No one need beg for talent on behalf of the public service. At least beyond a certain minimum, money is a poor substitute for work that is interesting and engrossing, and in these respects the public service is—or can be—far superior to any private business. As compared with the public service—or, for similar reasons, colleges, universities, and research organizations—private enterprise must have a substantial income differential in its favor.

In this connection, and speaking wholly as an individual, I am dubious of recent proposals to raise salaries of top executive, judicial, and legislative officers of the Federal Government to tycoon levels. People in the lesser ranks of a private corporation think of the top company brass as separated from themselves by unimaginably high incomes. So do people at large. In the past there has been no such sense of alienation in the Federal Government, and it would be unfortunate were it to exist in the future. The upper levels of the permanent civil service and the lesser political posts are presently subject to a considerable financial pinch. This

¹ Address made at commencement exercises at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass., on June 9 (press release 308 dated June 7).

should certainly be relieved and generously. Elsewhere we should be more gradual. Even at present rates there is no visible shortage of candidates for the Supreme Court or Congress or, one suspects, for the Cabinet or our embassies. Nor is there evidence that higher talent would be improved proportionately with pay or at all. In senior government posts we want the kind of man who thinks that public service is worth modest standards of pay.

Some Hazards of Public Service

There are some changes in the public service, or in attitudes toward public policy, which, from the limited perspective of these last 2½ years, do seem to me important. As I have just suggested, the great case for the public service is the interest of the work—the sense of accomplishment that it offers. This sense of accomplishment and the resulting public recognition are in danger. This does merit attention.

One danger comes from the overorganization of government and the excessive subdivision of tasks so that the individual no longer has any real sense of his relation to results. Increasingly, public policy is made, or anyhow considered, in vast oleaginous meetings where each participant speaks for his own bureau, office, or special area of knowledge and many serve only by being present. This is not calculated to enhance interest. Papers, telegrams, press releases are all the product of a highly organized process of group thought. The individual has, as a result, the same relation to results as a tobacco leaf to one of the new homogenized cigars. The speeches of the modern public official are a particular case in point. Their production combines the literary and other talents of a small army and they invariably sound as though they had been written by one. The homogenizing process in the public service tends to exclude the tough, controversial, and uncompromising participant for, naturally enough, he is a great nuisance.

As compared with 25 years ago, the Federal Government now lays a much stronger restraining hand on the individual who has a clear view of what he would like to accomplish and a strong desire to do it. The abrasive controversy which characterized the Roosevelt bu-

reaucracy has all but gone. So has the art of broken field running by the man who knew precisely where he wanted to go and who was skilled at finding the holes in the formidable phalanx composed of those whose mission in life is to resist action and, where possible, also thought. Instead we have much greater emphasis on order, discipline, and conformity. In any great organization these are not wholly to be deplored. They are admirable on questions of nuclear politics. But the Federal Government has urgent need to recognize and foster individual responsibility and achievement on matters of public policy. This is the claim of the public career.

The further hazard which anyone entering the public service must face in our time is the modern compulsion to quarrel with success. This is a serious matter and one that is not well understood. Those who are associated with successful public policy need to be aware of the danger they run. Those who are not so associated will also be rewarded by understanding. They can expect that political and public opinion will now be rallied rather effectively against whatever works, and they can count themselves well out of it. Or they may wish to join the hue and cry.

The Risk of Accomplishment

All students of this modern compulsion to quarrel with success must begin, I believe, with the Tennessee Valley Authority. It was the first major accomplishment of the architects of this curious form of controversy. It remains in many ways the classical example of the phenomenon I am here isolating.

The TVA was launched 30 years ago this spring. From the beginning it seemed clear that this was an innovation of prime importance. And so it turned out. Industry came to the valley. Agriculture improved. Power consumption increased. Commerce flowed on the clear waters of the once muddy and unpredictable stream. Living standards rose. And the word spread. In time a visit to Knoxville or Muscle Shoals went automatically on the agenda of every visitor to the United States. The letters "TVA" were known in Bolivia, Ethiopia, and the Ukraine. Halfway around

the world the Governments of Bihar and Bengal set up the Damodar Valley Corporation in frank imitation. Nothing undertaken by the United States in this century was quite such an unqualified success.

The reaction was highly adverse. The TVA became our most alarming phenomenon. There were formidable efforts to curb the experiment—even to sell it off, as (according to Mr. Emmet Hughes) President Eisenhower yearned to do. Of course the TVA survived these efforts. But it was firmly agreed that nothing of the sort would ever be attempted again. One such experiment, if really successful, is enough.

TVA is no isolated example of a successful quarrel with success. In the years following World War II the GI bill of rights was hailed as an inspired instance of what the Government could do to enlarge educational opportunity. Tens of thousands seized the chance; the Nation is still profiting from the investment. It worked so well and was so much praised that we strongly resolved against any permanent effort of equivalent magnitude in the field of education.

There is also the case of the farmers. In recent decades they have responded to assured prices and income with unparalleled improvements in capital plant, technology, and efficiency and output. This great agrarian success has been celebrated by men of all opinions and all parties, including quite a few who have never seen a farm. The Communists have conceded that this performance improves dramatically on their own agricultural accomplishment. The consequence has been a large-scale demand for the elimination of the price supports and controls which were the fulcrum of this achievement. This attack has been conducted with real vigor. At the moment it seems to be making some headway.

The reaction to the success of the farm economy has had a more general counterpart. Since World War II economic performance in the United States, as also in Western Europe, has been favorable. Employment has been high; the business cycle has shown little of its old violence; there has been no indication that Marx's promise of increasingly adverse per-

formance by maturing capitalism would soon be redeemed. All of this has been in marked contrast with the rather dismal economic showing in much of the period between the two wars.

There can be no serious question as to what made the difference. Capitalism did not reform itself. That reform was needed was never a major contention of the average capitalist. There was a determined public effort to correct the shortcomings of the economic system. If it did not provide needed income and employment, compensatory action was taken by the state. Individuals were assured of substitute employment or income when private opportunities were deficient. The economy was assured *pari passu* of a substitute flow of purchasing power. At the same time taxes were used to arrest previous tendencies to an excessive concentration of income, and larger state expenditures added a further stabilizing influence. Special steps were taken to bolster the position of weaker groups. Private enterprise became the beneficiary of a vast amount of state-sponsored technology.

The results once again have been predictable. The success of the economy has been much applauded. The attack on the measures responsible for the success has been unrelenting. The tax, fiscal, welfare, and other public policies promoting improved performance have been received with profound alarm. There is a widespread feeling that we cannot risk any more such accomplishment. As a result, steps to improve medical care, strengthen and extend unemployment compensation, improve fiscal management by the Government or to enlarge Government responsibility in such fields as, say, urban transport are being stoutly resisted. A friend of mine thinks that, in the great struggle of our time, we are cautious about discouraging the Russians. I doubt if this is the explanation.

The Cases of Cuba and India

However, it is in foreign policy that our modern quarrel with success becomes most intense, and I venture to think that over the next 50 years most of the Ph. D. theses on the phenomenon will deal with external events.

More than momentary attention may well be given to the recent case of Cuba. Here in the

past year the Soviets made a major step across the informal boundary which they and we (although not the Chinese) have respected since World War II. By a firm and considered policy they were persuaded to withdraw. There was no bloodshed—a matter of some significance to those who would have provided the blood. Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Washington, New York, and Chicago were not destroyed in the process. This must have been a source of satisfaction to permanent residents as well as larger taxpayers.

This success provoked an attack of unparalleled proportions. The reaction of some members of the administration of which I am a member has, I confess, struck me as a trifle untutored. They have asked the critics if they really wanted a policy which, by its sanguinary violence, would have alienated all of Latin America and most of the other smaller nations of the world. And they have wondered if nuclear conflict, which in a matter of a few hours might have reduced the United States from a great power to a distraught group of survivors dependent very possibly even for their nutrition on the bounty of other and less damaged countries, was really such a good idea. I fear my colleagues have not fully grasped the compulsion to quarrel with accomplishment. Had they done so, they would not have been so surprised.

In the last few months I have been interested in a lesser quarrel with success concerning India. For many years the policies of India have been the subject of considerable concern. We felt, particularly vis-a-vis China, that India adopted an unnecessarily easygoing attitude. Last autumn the Chinese invaded India. Indian attitudes on China and Chinese communism were dramatically revised. No other country in Asia, perhaps no other country in the world, is so passionately concerned about Chinese ambitions. We went promptly to the support of the Indians in their moment of need and earned their warm gratitude and respect. I think it fair to say that no one a year ago could have forecast such a dramatic improvement in our relations with India. Such has been the success that I am told our problems on economic and military aid to India this year will be particularly difficult. Once again success is causing us serious problems.

The Foreign Aid Program

Our most durable quarrel with success, and one that may merit more minute examination even than the case of Cuba, is foreign aid. This has been the unique American contribution to diplomacy which, it may be added, is a frequently backward craft and one that takes frequent pride in being traditional and unprogressive. It is a contribution vitally related to circumstance. In a world where the few wealthy countries have been getting wealthy and, as a broad generalization, the many poor countries have been remaining very poor, an aid program was an indispensable solvent of tension.

One need reflect for only the briefest moment on the nature of an international society in which the people of Latin America, Asia, and Africa saw their own living standards static or deteriorating while incomes and output in the United States (for which they supplied materials and some markets) went on each year to higher and higher levels. In such a world our influence would be negligible, nonexistent, or replaced by open antagonism, and one is tempted to say deservedly so. Our influence is, in fact, very great. Instead of envy and anger, the image aroused by the word "America" throughout the world is one of generosity and compassion. We are thought to be marked, in contrast with other countries, by our capacity to grasp the problems of less fortunate people.

Our administration of foreign aid has been far from perfect. We have underemphasized education. We have thought it possible to base effective development on reactionary social structures. (Men will not produce very efficiently if they know that the product will go in any case to landlords, tax farmers, and moneylenders.) Money has on occasion been wasted. (Without making a case for waste, we may remind ourselves that it has been a regular companion piece of development. Tens of millions were borrowed by American State governments and put into canals just before the railroads made them obsolete. Hundreds of millions of dollars worth of public subsidy to the railroads found its way into private pockets.)

On occasion we have misjudged the larger purposes of our aid policy and assumed it to

be the servant of narrow ideological preferences. (If we offer a wide range of choice in economic structure as the alternative to communism, we can hardly lose. If we insist on our view of capitalism as the only alternative, our chances are far less favorable.) And, on occasion, we have assumed that questions on foreign aid could best be answered by men of inspired general wisdom who were not excessively hampered by experience in the problems of economic development or of the countries for which they prescribed.

But the test of a policy is not whether all problems are solved but whether it performs its task. The aid program has forestalled what would have been certain calamity in our relations with the poor countries. It is perhaps the principal reason why countries such as India and Pakistan have been spared the painful travail of the Chinese people. It is one of the important reasons why they remain committed to personal liberty and Western institutions. Had there been no aid programs in this last decade, the world would have been very different indeed and from our point of view much less satisfactory.

Once again we have the predictable result. In the case of the aid programs the quarrel with accomplishment is especially severe. The shortcomings are picked out like the trees. The accomplishments have disappeared like the forest. The man of sound and secure reputation, at least of a sort, is the one who tells you where you can cut a half billion, or a billion, or two billion. Even the semantics are revealing. Those who quarrel with success here do not deny the fact. They tell you where the cuts can be made with the least damage.

The notion that we should, as needed, invest more and do better is gradually receding under this onslaught. Once again the quarrel with accomplishment is going very well. However, it is not serving the United States at all well.

Were it the problem of modern government that there are few things to criticize, this tendency to quarrel with accomplishment would be forgivable. It is evident that modern man must quarrel about something. But as government is currently conducted in the United States and despite the enlightened influence of many

people from this State, there is still sufficient that is wrong and even foolish.

I would be sorry today if I seemed to be against criticism. Nothing would be further from my thoughts. I consider it vital for the effective operation of a democracy and a highly congenial personal avocation. But I find it hard to applaud this continuing discontent with accomplishment. Radicals of an earlier generation seemed often to be taking a rather lofty and even critical view of sales, production, profits, and the other symbols of business success. Businessmen fresh from some considerable industrial achievement reacted adversely to this criticism. They thought there might be more attention to results. But government is also a serious affair. The resolution of international disputes without resort to nuclear destruction, the winning of the confidence and esteem of other nations, and improvements in the welfare and well-being of our own people are also worthy of our effort and energy. I doubt that the assault on such public achievement has any more to commend it than the earlier attack on private accomplishment.

U.S. Makes Interim Modification of Tin Disposal Program

Department Statement

Press release 327 dated June 21

The General Services Administration announced today [June 21] an interim modification of its program for the disposal of surplus tin from the national stockpile in the form of a supplementary offering which will be effective during the period June 26–September 30, 1963. The maximum quantity of tin which the General Services Administration may sell in any week has been increased from 200 long tons to 400 long tons, and the limit on these sales for this period has been raised from 2,700 long tons under the current disposal plan to 4,700 long tons. This increase of approximately 200 tons per week in the limit on weekly sales will allow the General Services Administration more flexibility for meeting changing market conditions. No other change in the existing terms of the

current disposal plan, which was made effective April 1, 1963, for 1 year, is contemplated at this time.

In accordance with past practices this move by the United States Government followed consultations between representatives of the U.S. Government and the International Tin Council and the governments of the principal tin-producing countries in advance of the decision to adopt the supplementary program. It is also our intention to consult with the International Tin Council and interested governments before the end of the supplemental disposal period.

It continues to be United States policy to take no action in the disposal of United States stockpiles which would unduly disrupt commodity markets. The General Services Administration will continue to operate its disposal plan in the best interest of the United States Government, taking into account prevailing market prices, and in such a way as to avoid serious disruption of the usual markets of producers, processors, and consumers.

Music Advisers Appointed for Cultural Presentations

The Department of State announced on June 14 (press release 320) that Assistant Secretary Battle has appointed Leopold Damrosch Mannes, president of the Mannes College of Music of New York, as chairman of the music panel which aids the selection of American performing musical artists and groups for overseas tours under the recently reconstituted Cultural Presentations Program of the Department of State, and W. Raymond Kendall, dean of the School of Music of the University of Southern California, as chairman of the academic music panel.

Following recommendations by the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Advisory Committee on the Arts has been reconstituted to give general policy guidance to the program and to the panels of experts which have the responsibility of recommending the musical, dramatic, dance, and other presentations to be sent abroad.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Africa Briefing. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. February 27, 1963. 20 pp.

Developments in Technical Capabilities for Detecting and Identifying Nuclear Weapons Tests. Hearings before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. March 5-12, 1963. 518 pp.

Mexican Farm Labor Program. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of the House Agriculture Committee on H.R. 1836 and H.R. 2009. March 27-29, 1963. 349 pp.

To Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 777, a bill to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees. April 10, 1963. 221 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 5490, to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes. Part I, April 5-10, 1963, 184 pp.; Part II, April 23-29, 1963, 207 pp.; Part III, April 30-May 7, 1963, 241 pp.

Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Part II. April 30-May 8, 1963. 109 pp.

Continuation of Mexican Farm Labor Program. Report, together with minority views, to accompany H.R. 5497. H. Rept. 274. May 6, 1963. 18 pp.

The Foreign Service Buildings Act Amendments of 1963. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 5207, an act to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926, to authorize additional appropriations, and for other purposes. May 7, 1963. 21 pp.

Documents on International Aspects of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954-1962. Staff report prepared for the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee. S. Doc. 18. May 9, 1963. 407 pp.

Eighth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Report of the U.S. House delegation to the eighth conference of members of parliament from the NATO countries, held in Paris, November 12-16, 1962. H. Rept. 300. May 15, 1963. 40 pp.

Amendments to the Foreign Service Building Act of 1926. Report to accompany H.R. 5207. S. Rept. 178. May 15, 1963. 15 pp.

Amendment to the Constitution of the International Labor Organization. Report, together with individual views, to accompany S.J. Res. 60. S. Rept. 179. May 16, 1963. 28 pp.

Amending Legislation Relating to International Organizations. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 6283, a bill to amend the United Nations Participation Act, as amended, and H.J. Res. 405, joint resolution to amend the joint resolution providing for U.S. participation in the International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property. May 17, 1963. 48 pp.

Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior To Market Power Generated at Amistad Dam on the Rio Grande. Report to accompany H.R. 4062. H. Rept. 319. May 23, 1963. 5 pp.

World Food Congress Meets at Washington

The World Food Congress, sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, was held at Washington, D.C., June 4-18.¹ Following are texts of welcoming remarks made on June 4 by President Kennedy and an address made on June 5 by Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman, who was chairman of the Congress.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY, JUNE 4

White House press release dated June 4; as-delivered text

Dr. Sen, President Radhakrishnan,² Secretary Freeman, members of the World Food Congress: I welcome you on behalf of the people of the United States to this country and to its Capital.

Twenty years ago, in May 1943, the first world food congress was held. Today we have gathered to rededicate ourselves to the objectives of that congress, the objective that all nations, all people, all inhabitants of this planet have all the food that they need, all the food that they deserve as human beings. We are here to renew a worldwide commitment to banish hunger and outlaw it.

At the launching of the first world food congress, President Franklin Roosevelt declared that freedom from want and freedom from fear go hand in hand,³ and that is true today.

During the past 20 years there have been revolutionary changes affecting these matters in farm technology, in trade patterns, in economic development, in world trade. Today the average farmer in the United States can produce three times as much as he did in 1945. New trading blocs have been formed, blocs which can be used to strengthen the world or to divide it.

This nation and others have provided economic and technical assistance to less wealthy nations struggling to develop viable economies.

And population increases have become a matter of serious concern, not because world food production will be insufficient to keep pace with the 2-percent rate of increase but because, as you know, the population rate is too often the highest where hunger is the most prevalent.

The same central problem that troubled President Roosevelt when he called together the first world congress in '43 is unfortunately still with us today. Half of humanity is still undernourished or hungry. In 70 developing nations, with over 2 billion people, malnutrition is widespread and persistent.

So long as freedom from hunger is only half achieved, so long as two-thirds of the nations have food deficits, no citizen, no nation, can afford to be satisfied. We have the ability, as members of the human race, we have the means, we have the capacity, to eliminate hunger from the face of the earth in our lifetime. We need only the will.

In the Food and Agriculture Organization, which is sponsoring this meeting, we have the machinery. Under the able leadership of Dr. Sen, the FAO has embarked on a vigorous and

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 752, and Apr. 15, 1963, p. 583.

² B. R. Sen, Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization; President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India.

³ For text of President Roosevelt's letter to the opening session of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, held at Hot Springs, Va., May 18-June 3, 1943, see BULLETIN of May 22, 1943, p. 455; for his address to the delegates to the Conference, see *ibid.*, June 12, 1943, p. 518.

imaginative program which is now at a halfway mark. Through thousands of projects initiated during the 21½ years that we have just passed through, the Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign⁴ has already helped to conquer livestock diseases, increase crop yields, and multiply fishery catches.

U.S. Pledges Full Support

The United States pledges its full support for this campaign through Food for Peace shipments, Alliance for Progress operations, the Peace Corps, and the international efforts directed by the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

Through our food-for-peace program the people of the United States have contributed more than \$12 billion of food and fiber to others during the past 9 years. These donations now bring food to 100 million people in 100 countries, including 40 million schoolchildren. We are grateful for the opportunity that nature has made possible for us to share our agricultural abundance with those who need it, but the distribution of the food to the needy is only part of the job. It can take care of the emergency needs from floods and famines. It can be used to feed refugees and needy children. It is a useful supplement to perennially short diets in many parts of the world, but it is not a permanent solution.

All of our stored abundance, even if distributed evenly throughout the globe to all of the undernourished, would provide a balanced diet for less than a month, and many nations lack the storage and the transportation and the distribution facilities. Many people are inhibited by traditional eating habits from using food that provides rich nourishment. And, perhaps most importantly, modern, efficient agricultural training and education is too often unavailable to the very nations that are most dependent upon it.

The real goal, therefore, must be to produce more food in the nations that need it. Know-how is not the problem. For the first time in the history of the world we do know how to produce enough food now to feed every man,

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 18, 1960, p. 94; July 18, 1960, p. 117; Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1020; Jan. 22, 1962, p. 150; Oct. 8, 1962, p. 534; and Feb. 18, 1963, p. 254.

woman, and child in the world, enough to eliminate all hunger completely. Farm production has undergone a scientific revolution which is dwarfing the industrial revolution of 150 years ago, but this means that agricultural departments and ministries and governments and citizens must make a greater and more systematic effort to share this knowledge. For the first time to know how to conquer the problem and not conquer it would be a disgrace for this generation. We need to help transmit all that we know of farm technology to the ends of the earth, to overcome the barriers of ignorance and suspicion. The key to a permanent solution to world hunger is the transfer of technology which we now have to food-deficit nations, and that task, second to none in importance, is the reason for this Congress.

It would be easy to say that this task is too great for any congress. Most of man has been undernourished since the beginning of man. Even today, as the death rate drops, it merely means that people live longer in hunger and misery; but a balanced, adequate diet is now possible today for the entire human race, and we are gathered to devise the machinery to mobilize the talents, the will, the interest, and the requirements to finish this job.

We realize, of course, that the problem in its great dimensions neither begins nor ends on the farm. It involves the whole economic and social structure of a nation. It involves the building of new institutions, of training young people. Above all, it involves and requires the priority attention of us all in this decade.

Five Basic Guidelines

In the course of your deliberations over the next 2 weeks I would hope that we would agree on at least five basic guidelines to be kept constantly in mind.

First: The persistence of hunger during this decade is unacceptable either morally or socially. The late Pope John in his recent encyclical spoke of the conviction that all men are equal by reason of their natural dignity. That same dignity in the 20th century certainly requires the elimination of large-scale hunger and starvation.

Second: We must recognize the fact that

food-deficit nations, with assistance from other countries, can solve their problem. The Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign is based on this solid premise.

Third: International cooperation, international organization, and international action are indispensable. A contracting world grows more interdependent. This interdependence requires multinational solutions to its problems. This is not a problem for a single nation. It is a problem for the entire human race, because we cannot possibly be satisfied with some nations producing too much, as the President of India said, while others produce little, even though they are both members of the great human race.

Fourth: No single technique of politics, finance, or education can, by itself, eliminate hunger. It will require the coordinated efforts of us all, all of us, to level the wall that separates the hungry from the well-fed.

Fifth, and finally: World opinion must be concentrated upon the international effort to eliminate hunger as a primary task of this generation. Over 1,900 years ago the Roman philosopher Seneca said, "A hungry people listens not to reason, nor cares for justice, nor is bent by any prayers." Human nature has not changed in 1,900 years, and world peace and progress cannot be maintained in a world half fed and half hungry.

There are many struggles, many battles, that the human race now faces. There is no battle on earth or in space which is more important than the battle which you have undertaken, nor is there any struggle, large as this may be, that offers such an immediate promise of success. No congress that Washington has seen in recent years is, I believe, more important than this.

I know that this conference will not consist merely of oration but will represent in 2 weeks a solid determination to develop the means in this decade to make a dent in this problem which will give us promise in our lifetime of making sure that all people in the world have an opportunity to eat.

Another problem will come in the next generation, and that is the problem of how to deal on a worldwide basis, as well as in this, with the problem of surpluses; but the first problem

is to produce enough for all in a way that makes all available to people around the globe. To that task I can assure you the United States of America is committed.

Thank you.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY FREEMAN, JUNE 5

The United States, its people and its Government, extend a most cordial welcome to the World Food Congress and to each participant in these meetings.

We welcome this Congress as a fitting opportunity to pay tribute to those pioneers who launched this effort to combat hunger at the conference in Hot Springs just 20 years ago.

We welcome it as an opportunity to give an additional thrust to the 5-year Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign, the objectives of which the United States supports by a wide variety of economic assistance operations, including Food for Peace shipments, Alliance for Progress operations, Peace Corps activities, and support for the joint efforts of the FAO, the U.N., the OAS, the Colombo Plan, and other international approaches.

We welcome it particularly because of our high hopes that out of these 2 weeks of deliberations may come definite gains, among them a renewed inspiration to mobilize every appropriate available resource and dedicate it to the achievement of our common goals, a greater awareness of the problems involved, and a better understanding of effective means for solving those problems.

As chairman of the World Food Congress, I wish to pay high tribute to the many dedicated people who have done so much to prepare for this Congress and pave the way to its success.

We deeply appreciate the leadership of Dr. B. R. Sen, the Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the effective work of the FAO officials and staff, the support given by the President and the Congress of the United States and the many executive departments involved. We especially want to acknowledge the contributions made by industry and by agricultural organizations, and the work of citizens, through their religious, service, and other voluntary organizations—including

ing the American Food for Peace Council and the American Freedom from Hunger Foundation—that have meant so much in helping to make this a real people-to-people endeavor.

Finally, may I pay tribute to the thousand individuals who are participating in the Congress. Each of you is here because of your deep concern about one of this world's major problems. Each of you is in a position to make a substantial contribution to its solution. The success of this World Food Congress depends on each one of you.

Heterogeneous Nature of the Congress

As we begin our working sessions, I should like to point out the nature of this gathering, to emphasize the urgency of its purpose, and to suggest some approaches to the achievement of its goals.

Throughout my presentation I should like to urge that we commit ourselves to a determined effort to win the campaign for freedom from hunger—to win that campaign so decisively that we can proceed to enlarge and broaden our goal so that it will encompass the positive approach that is the logical corollary to the elimination of any evil or hazard. Freedom *from* the evil of hunger then becomes freedom *for* positive good—freedom to enjoy the better things of life that are possible only when hunger is conquered, freedom to develop all those human qualities that characterize man and distinguish him from the other animals of this earth that can also suffer from hunger, freedom to progress toward higher levels of living, freedom *for* the kind of life that can be within the reach of all the people of the world in an age of abundance.

Throughout this discussion I would ask you to keep in mind the fact that science and technology have now—in this generation—opened the door to a potential for abundance for all. In some nations this abundance has already been achieved, particularly with regard to food, to such an extent that we have not as yet learned how to use effectively all that we produce. Let us accept this challenge of abundance with a determined effort to use all abundance to create abundance for all.

The nature and makeup of this Congress is,

in my judgment, particularly suited to a consideration of this challenge. It is sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization, an international agency through which member nations seek to work together toward common goals. Yet it is truly a people-to-people meeting in the sense that participants have been invited as individuals. Scientists in many fields; representatives of governments, universities, and international organizations; leaders in farmers' organizations, industry, women's groups, and other citizen bodies; men and women from developed and developing countries—all are here encouraged to discuss common problems fully and frankly.

The heterogeneous nature of the participation in this Congress is perhaps matched by the varied nature of the kinds of effort that will be required to achieve the goal of freedom from hunger and to progress toward the use of all abundance to create abundance for all. The achievement of that goal will require more than action by governments, more than action by international organizations. It will require a high degree of public understanding and a mobilization of public opinion. It will require action by agriculture and by industry, by citizens' groups, by individual leaders.

It will require planning and coordination at many levels. It will include action by the governments of developing nations and of developed nations. It will include bilateral action as well as multilateral agreements. It will require experimentation and pilot programs. It will require flexibility. It will require the kind of exchange of information and experience that will enable us to develop, expand, extend, and adapt those methods, techniques, and programs that work the best. It will require a pragmatic and pluralistic approach.

The Measure of Success

There will be no formal, binding document voted upon, signed, and sealed at this Congress. The real success of these meetings will not be measured by any piece of paper, or even by a volume of published proceedings. The measure of the success of this Congress will be determined—in part, but only in part—by the quality of the addresses and papers presented

here and the maturity, vision, and realism that will characterize the discussions that take place. Its success will be measured, most significantly, by the extent to which the individual participants—inspired and informed by their experience here—are encouraged and stimulated to take positive action after the Congress is over, each in his own nation and within his own sphere of influence, toward plans and programs that will advance the goals we seek.

These goals are among the most important and the most urgent of the many goals shared by all men everywhere. Men have sought freedom from hunger since before the dawn of human history. Long before men formulated slogans—indeed, before they had developed much use for words—they struggled in response to the primary human drive for food.

But if the desire and drive to achieve freedom from hunger is as old as life itself, there exist today two new elements of utmost importance.

International Efforts To Combat Hunger

One of these elements is symbolized by the fact that we are meeting here today in a World Food Congress to express our common concern about a universal goal. This represents one of the brightest hopes of this critical age in which we live—the hope that arises because we now seek, in a conscious and articulate manner, freedom from hunger for all men all over the world, and we seek to find ways in which we can work toward these goals in cooperation with each other.

This is something new in history. Primitive man sought food for himself or, at most, for his family. Later a tribe, still later a nation, became the unit within which members acted to achieve freedom from hunger for the group.

During much of recorded history men and nations have been forced by the prevailing fact of scarcity to seek freedom from hunger for themselves at the expense of their neighbors. They have struggled against each other for the fertile valleys and the flood plains. They migrated into new, forbidden, sparsely occupied areas of the world when population pushed too hard against the supply of food. Countless wars have been fought to gain enough territory to secure enough food to survive.

It was left to our period of history for men to develop a concern to combat hunger for all people throughout the world, to recognize that survival depends more on cooperation than on conflict, and thus to launch international efforts to combat hunger. This fact is one new element of utmost importance.

The Potential for Abundance

The second new element is likewise a product of our age. For the first time in history science and technology have progressed so far that we can envision the day when no one on earth need suffer for want of material necessities of life. We can see the possibility of the conquest of hunger and cold and other physical and natural hazards for all men everywhere. The fact of scarcity that has dominated the past can now be replaced by the potential for abundance that is the promise of the future.

This dawn of the age of abundance was recognized by those pioneers who met at Hot Springs 20 years ago. They declared that “the goal of freedom from want of food, suitable and adequate for health and strength of all peoples, can be achieved.”⁵

Two years ago, when the FAO put out its basic study on *Development Through Food*,⁶ this recognition was tinged with even greater optimism. That publication states: “If action which is well within our means is taken, freedom from poverty can be achieved for most of the world in one generation’s time.”

And in FAO’s publication *Third World Food Survey*,⁶ in a discussion as to whether its targets for freedom from hunger can be reached, I find this statement: “There should be little room for doubt on one score: the world could grow enough food to meet all these needs, if we made rational use of nature’s bounty.”

Within those nations that have come to be called the “developed” nations of the world this new potential for abundance has in many respects become a reality—most conspicuously

⁵ For text of the final act of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, see *ibid.*, June 19, 1943, p. 546.

⁶ *Development Through Food* (1962) and *Third World Food Survey* (1963); for sale by the International Documents Section, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. (\$1.50 each).

in the production of food. Here in the United States, for example, agriculture has dramatically demonstrated its productive success. Millions of our farmers, spurred by the incentive and pride of ownership inherent in the American family-farm economy, have applied new discoveries and new methods to their own operations to produce a striking increase in productivity that overshadows increases in other major sectors of our economy. We have produced food to spare and to share. And our economists point out that crop production in the United States could easily be increased by 25 percent by 1967!

Other developed nations in the world are doing likewise. Economists in the United States Department of Agriculture have produced a study entitled *The World Food Budget*,⁷ evaluating world food needs, balancing them with world food supplies, and projecting them into the future under certain possible and probable circumstances. They have come up with the forecast that, assuming a likely rate of growth in population and income and a continued growth of agricultural productivity at the rate that prevailed between 1953 and 1960, the developed countries of the world, by the year 2000, would have a potential for food production at almost double the expected demand! This projection dramatically illustrates the potential for abundance that scientific and technological progress offers to the people of the world.

As we examine the rapidly accelerating rate of progress in these fields we can foresee the end of the physical barriers to an age of plenty. Yet for most of the people that inhabit this earth abundance is only a dream. But it is a dream that becomes more insistent and more compelling every day.

We are meeting here today because we believe that, in a world in which abundance is possible, all people have the right to aspire to make that dream a reality.

We know that in today's world the contrast between those who have enough and those who

have too little is too sharp and too disturbing to be tolerated. A little more than a hundred years ago Abraham Lincoln told the people of the United States that this nation could not long exist half slave and half free. Today, when we can circumnavigate the globe in far less time than it would have taken Lincoln to travel from the east to the west coast of this nation, it is doubtful whether the community of nations inhabiting this earth can long exist half hungry and half well-fed.

The security of the world demands that this unbalance be corrected. The security of the world demands that measurable progress be made without delay. The half of the world that is hungry is increasing in numbers faster than the other half. Unless steps are taken to accelerate the rate at which growing numbers of people in developing nations can reach satisfactory levels of living, the world must face what the Roman philosopher Seneca referred to 1,900 years ago when he said: "A hungry people listens not to reason, nor cares for justice, nor is bent by any prayers."

This is a measure of the urgency of the goals we seek here.

We meet in this World Food Congress because we recognize this urgency. Whether we live in the "developed" nations, in which abundance is sometimes called surplus, or in the "developing" nations, in which food deficits handicap both personal welfare and national economic development, we are meeting here because we believe it is in our own interest, as well as in the common interest of us all, to cooperate in a campaign against hunger throughout the world. We meet in order to learn from each other how the abundance that exists in parts of the world can be used to mutual advantage to create abundance for all.

We meet not only to consider a vision of progress that may be possible but also to study realistically and practically the problems that must be solved if that possibility is to become a reality. Each of the quotations about potential abundance that I presented earlier is a qualified one. One of them says that our goal *can* be achieved, not that it *will* be. One says that poverty can be conquered in this generation *if* we take the necessary action. One says

⁷ *The World Food Budget, 1962 and 1966* (Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 4); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (35 cents).

we can reach our targets *if* we make rational use of nature's bounty.

The goals we seek are not easily reached. There are roadblocks in the way of our progress toward abundance. Many of them are serious. Some seem almost insuperable. Every one of the efforts made—by the FAO, by governments, singly and in cooperation with each other, by citizens' groups and voluntary organizations—every one of these efforts has helped to make us aware of the nature and magnitude of the obstacles that lie in our way. I therefore ask you to consider with me some of the most serious roadblocks, with a view to finding practical means by which they can be overcome.

The Role of Agriculture

One obstacle to progress has been an inadequate recognition of the importance of the role of agriculture in economic growth. A new steel mill seems much more dramatic than an improved rice paddy! Many of the developing nations have allocated their limited resources to industrial growth at the expense of agriculture to a degree that has intensified hunger and hardship and even threatened all economic growth.

An examination of our own economic history here in the United States shows how massive has been the contribution of agriculture to economic growth, particularly when our nation was in the developing state. It released workers to industry as it became more productive. It lowered food costs in relation to income. It provided an expanding market for industrial goods. It produced large earnings from the export of farm products, sustained output during economic depressions, and met wartime needs for food and fiber. It now contributes to world economic growth by assisting in the economic development of other countries.

Agriculture can make comparable contributions to growth in all of the developing nations. In fact, it must make such contributions if development is to succeed.

Experience has shown how serious are the consequences when food and agriculture are neglected by a developing nation that is pushing rapidly for industrialization. As workers are

drawn from the farms without any accompanying increase in efficiency, an already scarce supply of food becomes scarcer. As incomes in industry rise a little, the demand for food increases, and either rationing or inflation are likely to result unless food can be provided from an outside source.

Adequate recognition of this roadblock is the first step toward overcoming it. When it is fully understood that a major factor limiting economic development is a low level of agricultural productivity, programs can be planned to increase that productivity at a proportionate rate.

The program at this Congress offers much opportunity for study and discussion of the essential role of agriculture in economic development. If, out of this Congress, could come an increased awareness of its significance, a greater familiarity with successful agricultural development programs and projects, and a determination to act to make sure that agriculture is accorded its proper place in planning and programming for economic growth, this roadblock could be eliminated.

The Building of Institutions

This leads to a consideration of other roadblocks in the way of progress in agriculture and rural development. Too often, here, the major roadblock is the failure to build the kind of institutions under which agriculture can make its major contribution. It seems much easier to see the need for better seed, fertilizer, machinery, and irrigation systems than it is to develop institutions for education, effective marketing, adequate farm credit, and a sound system of land tenure and ownership.

Permit me to note, very briefly, some of the institutions that have contributed so much to agricultural progress in the United States. I do this not because I mean to insist that institutions that work best in my country are necessarily the best for all, nor because I would ignore the vast differences in conditions that prevail, but rather because I believe that some of these institutions are based on principles that are valid everywhere, that can be adapted to meet many diverse conditions.

I think I would rate, at the very top, general education for all of the people. Unless farmers are literate and informed they face almost insurmountable handicaps in achieving greater efficiency and higher levels of living. The one single "input" that has contributed the most to progress and economic growth in all fields, here in the United States, is popular education.

Higher education and research, so well illustrated by our land-grant colleges, have made contributions of immeasurable value to our agricultural development. Our extension system has brought new knowledge to farmers in their own homes and their own communities. Our land-grant colleges have already made a good start in helping the developing nations, and extension systems are being developed in many parts of the world.

Educational institutions from both developing and developed nations are represented here in this Congress. If our deliberations here can promote greater exchanges of ideas and knowledge, increased cooperation and assistance, great strides forward can result.

Further research and new knowledge about the requirements for adequate nutrition and the efficient production of various foods to meet those requirements will always be needed to meet our constantly expanding needs and goals. But, in the allocation of scarce resources for education, it is important to remember that the foundation must rest on broad, general educational opportunity for all of the people. Early in our history Thomas Jefferson cautioned the people of this nation that if you expect to be both ignorant and free, you expect what never has been and never can be. Popular education is a basic requirement on which all other institutional development depends.

Economic institutions are also essential; and, for agricultural advance is to maximize its contribution to higher levels of living, institutions for the handling, transportation, storage, processing, marketing, and distribution of food must keep so progress as agricultural productivity increases. As the cultivators of the land seek to raise their efficiency and productivity, they need institutions that will assure adequate credit on favorable terms.

Among the institutions that can help to meet

many development needs are cooperatives, one form of private enterprise through which members can pool their resources to help themselves. It is possible that cooperatives can contribute even more in the developing countries than they have in the United States. Laws enacted in this country since the 1920's have encouraged the development of farm cooperatives, and our foreign assistance legislation specifically provides for aid in developing cooperatives abroad.

One institution that has proved its worth by its results is the system of land tenure that is based on ownership and control by those who till the soil and which therefore provides the farmer with a most powerful incentive to improved operations. No other incentive stimulates capital improvements on the land as well as the farmer's assurance that he owns those improvements. No other system has been able to produce the abundance of food that this one has demonstrated so effectively and dramatically. I commend it as emphatically as I know how.

In emphasizing the building of appropriate social and economic institutions as an indispensable part of programs of development, I do not intend to minimize the importance of the physical and material things. These are essential. But they are also easier to come by. Without the right institutional framework, they can be, and have been, used to exploit rather than develop the people themselves. In other words, physical progress and material resources do not necessarily, in and of themselves, bring about abundance for all.

On the other hand, institutional development can bring abundance to areas where material resources are scarce. Some of the best fed people in the world live in Norway, where the proportion of arable farmland is very low. Some of the people with the highest standards of living in the world live in Switzerland, a country rich in resources of beauty and people but lacking in resources such as coal, iron, and petroleum.

If, out of this Congress, there can come a renewed awareness of the importance of institutions, a constructive sharing of experience in institutional development, and a determination

to build the kind of institutions that will most surely and effectively build for abundance for all, then indeed this Congress will have been a success.

Use of Abundance

A third roadblock along the road of progress toward plenty is the failure to make the most effective possible use of existing abundance—abundance available and at hand—to help to achieve greater abundance where scarcity still dominates. I refer to the abundance of technical knowledge as well as to the abundance of food.

We in the World Food Congress are challenged to a major effort to develop methods and consider plans and programs whereby the abundance of food that exists in part of the world can be used most effectively to promote the economic development that will create abundance for those where scarcity still dominates. In issuing this challenge I want to emphasize a clear recognition that the contribution of food as part of an assistance program is never a goal in itself. The goal of every developing nation is to be able to stand on its own feet. But food assistance can be a most powerful tool, a most effective instrument, in progress toward that goal. It is a tool that we have at hand if we will only use it to best advantage.

Many of the developed nations, including the United States, can and do produce more food than can possibly be consumed by their own people. This productivity is increasing. As I stated earlier, projections indicate that, if trends in 30 developed nations continue, by the year 2000 they will be able to produce nearly twice the food that their populations can consume. Let us contrast this with projections for the developing nations.

Such projections cannot, of course, be made very specific, because of the tremendously wide variations in the developing countries and because of the many differing and unpredictable factors that will influence rates of growth. However, it is possible to make certain generalizations on which most will agree.

The most optimistic picture for accelerated economic growth in the developing nations, in the aggregate, indicates that they can and will

increase their own domestic food production. But the most optimistic predictions fail to give any assurance that, in the generation immediately ahead, they will be able to increase it fast enough to meet the increasing demand. This demand will be exceptionally high for several reasons.

First, the rate of population increase in most of these nations is very high and will perhaps go higher before it can be expected to tend to stabilize. Production will have to increase substantially in order to just keep up with population; it will have to increase still faster if it is to meet real nutritional needs.

Second, as economic growth proceeds, real incomes will increase, and with each increase in income comes an increased demand for food. Unless enough food is available to meet the demands created by both increased numbers and higher incomes, the lack of food will become a significant factor limiting economic progress.

It is perhaps one of the most fortunate coincidences of history that at a time when the developing nations of the world are in a takeoff stage in which more food is desperately needed if they are to take off successfully—at that same period the developed nations are producing and can produce an abundance so great that it is sometimes embarrassing. It is up to us, from developed and developing countries alike, to take full advantage of this fortunate coincidence.

It will not be easy. We in the United States are eager to share with others in this conference the experience we have gained in the distribution of more than \$12 billion worth of food in our food-for-peace program during the past 9 years. We have learned that it is not easy to give away food. We have learned that careful planning and close cooperation with receiving nations is essential in order to insure that the food is used to best advantage both to allay hunger and to promote local development. We have learned of the fears of other food-exporting nations and of our own commercial exporters, who are concerned lest food that is donated might diminish commercial demand. We have learned that, however rigorously we avoid any such result, it is still difficult to allay the fear. We have also learned how much depends on the

capacity and ability of the receiving country to transport, store, distribute, and use the food it receives to best advantage.

We are only beginning to learn how effectively food aid can be used to promote economic growth directly. It has long been used, and could continue to be used, to relieve hunger in emergencies and to prevent inflation in countries going through a stage of development I described earlier. Its use in school-lunch and child-feeding programs is an investment in the health and vigor of the rising generation and in a very real sense a capital investment in human resources. But it is only recently that we have begun to develop ways that food can be used as a direct input for economic growth.

Food is being used with dramatic success as part payment for work on labor intensive programs—irrigation, roadbuilding, the building of schools and other public facilities. It is being transformed into an investment that helps build cooperatives and other forms of private enterprise. It is being used to help resettlement of farmers on new lands. It can be used to provide a high proportion of the capital investment required for the development of many programs essential for economic growth. Discussion, consultation, and further experience can result in the improvement and extension of these methods of using available food as capital in improving agriculture and hastening economic development.

Let us, here at this Congress, determine to find new and better ways to use to greatest advantage this instrument of abundance that we have at hand. Let us determine to overcome the difficulties that lie in the way of its maximum use. This is a challenge to both the developing and the developed nations.

The highly productive nations are challenged to find better ways and develop better methods—by national, multinational and international means—by which agricultural abundance can make its most constructive contribution to the goal of abundance for all.

The developing nations are challenged to learn how to handle and use food that they receive, as well as to produce more domestically. They are challenged to study and evaluate the techniques, methods, and institutions that have

proved effective in contributing to abundance, productivity, and economic growth and to adapt all of these to the needs of their own people.

Both are challenged to work together and coordinate their efforts toward that end.

Technical Assistance and Trade

There are other tools available to us which we must perfect and use more effectively. It is hardly necessary to emphasize to this Congress the importance of the sharing of knowledge and experience under technical assistance programs. People ranging from world-renowned scientists to young Peace Corps volunteers have done yeoman service in the campaign for freedom from hunger, through programs carried out by the United States and many other nations and through international activities carried out by the FAO and other international bodies.

And although it is not directly within the province of this World Food Congress, I believe it is in order for us all to bear in mind the importance to the overall achievement of our goal of the expansion of world commercial trade. Many of the food-deficit nations depend on the export of a single exportable food commodity, such as coffee, and to them international arrangements that would regularize and stabilize trade in that commodity are crucially important. To all nations, developed and developing alike, expanding world trade brings abundance closer to reality.

Closing the Gap of Ignorance

I would like to conclude by repeating the challenge faced by this World Food Congress, a challenge to each one of us who participates in these deliberations, a challenge to win so complete a victory in our Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign that we can fix our goal on freedom for the higher levels of living that can characterize an age of abundance—a challenge to use all abundance to create abundance for all.

I have suggested that we consider here several major roadblocks that stand in the way of advance toward our goal. I have urged that we give full recognition to the indispensa-

ble role of food and agriculture in economic development. I have tried to point out the importance of learning how to build social, political, and economic institutions under which greatest progress can be made. And I have urged that we here and now determine to make full use of the abundance we have—abundance of food and abundance of scientific and technical knowledge—as effective instruments to create abundance for all.

The challenges are not easy ones, but they are supremely important. To meet them we face not only scientific and technological problems but also the more formidable barriers that are social, political, and economic in their nature.

There are barriers of nationalism—and other isms—barriers of prejudice, of outworn customs, of misunderstanding and lack of understanding. Most important, and intertwined with all of these, is the barrier of ignorance.

I should like to emphasize that the barrier of ignorance applies not only to the illiterate, not only to those who have not yet learned how to make two blades of grass grow where one grew before, although this is serious enough. But the barrier of ignorance applies as well to the learned and the powerful—to the statesmen of the world who have not yet learned how to put into effect elements of social engineering that will make it easier to extend the potential for plenty to all people.

The gap of ignorance that cries most urgently to be filled today is the gap between man's ability to create power, on the one hand, and, on the other, his lack of knowledge of how to control that power and direct it to the well-being of all men. For the same power that can destroy a city can light a million homes.

It is our challenge and our responsibility to close that gap.

Let us accept that challenge.

Let it never be said of this generation that we were able to orbit the earth with satellites but that we were unable to put bread and rice into the hands of hungry children. Let it never be said that a generation that could literally reach for the stars was unable to reach for—and grasp—the potential for plenty and progress and peace that is at hand.

U.S. Comments on Activities of U.N. Special Fund

Statement by Jonathan B. Bingham¹

We are gratified to note the completion or near completion of a considerable number of Special Fund projects, as well as the fact that financing has actually been forthcoming for part or all of the development activities recommended in several completed projects. We will of course continue to watch very carefully the extent to which the Special Fund's preinvestment activity results in the necessary followup investment, since that will be the measure of ultimate achievement.

The Managing Director [Paul Hoffman] and his staff, as well as the executing agencies, are also to be congratulated on the continued improvement in the rate of implementation of projects after approval by the Governing Council. Of the 209 plans of operation concluded as of March 31, 1963, 72 percent have been signed within 1 year of approval and 29 percent have been signed within 6 months. The average is currently slightly under 9 months, and we are pleased to note² that the Managing Director believes further substantial improvements can be made. In passing, I might note that the World Bank and the United Nations itself have the best records in terms of translating approvals into agreed plans of operations.

We hope that all agencies concerned will make special efforts to improve their effectiveness in this regard, particularly those which have up to now failed to meet the 1-year target in a substantial number of instances.

As we have done previously, we should again like to urge the Managing Director to consider the possibility of retaining outside organizations, not members of the United Nations family, as the executing agents for certain projects, particularly in those fields where there has been

¹ Made before the Governing Council of the U.N. Special Fund on June 3 (U.S./U.N. press release 4210 dated June 5). Mr. Bingham is U.S. Representative on the Governing Council.

² U.N. doc. SF/L. 82, par. 68.

a substantial lag and where the specialized agency concerned may be overburdened.

In connection with the timelag involved in putting projects into operation, it is worth noting that the documentation before us deals only with the lag between Governing Council approval and the signing of a plan of operations. From the point of view of a recipient country which is eager to get on with the job of promoting its own development, the time that passes from the moment a project is submitted for approval until it is actually approved by the Governing Council is just as important.

Three factors are, or may be, involved here: the degree to which modifications in the project proposal may have to be made by the recipient country in order to meet Special Fund criteria, the speed with which the Special Fund staff can process the proposal and prepare it for submission to the Governing Council, and the availability of resources in the Special Fund to finance the project, assuming it meets all the usual criteria. Thus the speed with which projects may be implemented depends on the efforts of the recipient countries themselves, the Special Fund and executing agencies, and the contributing nations. Since available resources restrict the Managing Director in the submission of projects to the Governing Council, both *in toto* and for any given country or group of countries, it is all the more important that the General Assembly's approved target of \$100 million in contributions be met as quickly as possible.

We have already complimented the Special Fund upon the successful completion of a number of projects. We believe that the Managing Director and his staff are also to be complimented for taking the hard decisions necessary in certain cases to discontinue certain projects where it is apparent that they will not lead to successful development endeavors. Such cancellation may be necessary because of unforeseen substantive difficulties, or it may be necessary because the essential commitments for the carrying out of the project on the part of the recipient government have, over a period of time, not been met. We are fully in accord with the last sentence in Document SF/L.82, in which the Special Fund comments that in the

few such cases in which these difficulties cannot be overcome the Managing Director "will have no alternative, in the best interests of the participating governments as a whole, but to recommend to the Governing Council that the projects in question be cancelled."

Finally, in connection with operations, it is also noteworthy, and should be a source of satisfaction to all concerned, that as of March 31, 1963, 848 internationally recruited experts and consultants were serving in 172 Special Fund assisted projects in 81 countries and territories, an increase of over 50 percent in 6 months.

I should like to turn now to the new program submitted for Governing Council consideration. My delegation is highly gratified that the projects show a marked increase in the industrial area. Whereas our analysis of the program submitted to the ninth session indicated a decline in emphasis on industrialization as compared to the previous session (a decline from 30 percent of the total to under 20 percent), our analysis of the current program shows an increase to 31 percent of the total. This is the first time industry has exceeded agriculture in fund earmarkings for the current approvals.

However, the industrial earmarkings are largely for education and training, while the agricultural projects are mainly for surveys and other preinvestment activities. We hope the Fund's work in industry will in due course reach a comparable stage, with more projects leading to the creation of specific opportunities for investment. The proposed project calling for feasibility studies for the establishment of an industrial estate in Iran³ is noteworthy in this connection.

In this connection, I should like to call attention to a suggestion made by the distinguished representative of the Philippines at the recent session of the Committee for Industrial Development. He pointed out that the execution of any program of action for the acceleration of economic development through industrialization requires preliminary surveys analyzing the market potential, plant location, availability of raw materials, and supply of trained labor. He noted that the Managing Director of the Special Fund had earlier as-

³ U.N. doc. SF/R. 7/Add. 19.

sured the Committee for Industrial Development that the Special Fund would encourage industry feasibility studies but had added that sufficient requests of that type from the developing countries have not been forthcoming. The few feasibility surveys requested of the Special Fund have been based entirely on projects whose local cost component or counterpart would be financed by governments, since private entrepreneurs were not eligible for assistance from the Fund. He therefore suggested that it might be useful to adopt a procedure whereby a member government could request a feasibility survey on the understanding that half of the expense incurred would be paid by a private entrepreneur through the government concerned, the other half to be paid by either the Special Fund or the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. Such a procedure would relieve pressure on government resources and would stimulate additional activity in the field of industrial development. He therefore proposed that the Committee should request the Commissioner for Industrial Development to consult both the Managing Director of the Special Fund and the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board to determine the ways and means by which investment feasibility surveys of particular aspects or projects in economic plans and programs could be made and to recommend what steps should be taken to bring the availability of that particular form of assistance to the notice of the developing countries.

This suggestion was warmly received by many members of the Committee for Industrial Development, and we believe there is a great deal of merit in it. We hope that the Managing Director will actively pursue the matter. If it should prove a practical and desirable activity for the Special Fund, but not for the Expanded Program, the minimum figure for Special Fund projects might have to be further reduced.

In addition, and as a possible further stimulus for Special Fund activity in the industrial development field, we should like to suggest that the Managing Director consider more active use of preparatory allocations so as to provide needed assistance to governments in preparing proposals in the industrial field.

A series of financial matters figure very importantly on the agenda of this session, and I should like now to make some preliminary comments on these subjects. During our last session the question of the cash balances of the Special Fund received considerable attention. As a result of the extended discussion, to which many delegations contributed ideas and suggestions, it was generally agreed that a study of this question was desirable. This has now been done, and we have studied with great interest the note of the Managing Director⁴ prepared for this session. We are impressed with the care with which all aspects of the problem were considered. We concur with the conclusions that he has reached and believe that the combination of principles suggested meets the foreseeable needs of the Special Fund while preserving the financial integrity of the Fund, on which such stress was placed by most delegations last January.⁵

We should like especially to underscore the Managing Director's repetition of the importance of paying pledges promptly as an important element in permitting the activities of the Special Fund to proceed vigorously.

As a corollary we once again wish to urge all governments, particularly net donor governments, to make their contributions on a convertible currency basis. Only if they do so can the program be made fully responsive to the needs and desires of recipient governments.

There is one specific aspect of the matter of currency convertibility which has up to now not received sufficient attention. I refer to the administrative costs of the program, necessarily incurred by the Special Fund itself and by the executing agencies. For 1963 the approved administrative budget of the Special Fund is \$2,927,000, and the overhead cost allocation for the projects approved in January was in excess of \$3,200,000. Presumably a comparable amount will have to be set aside for the projects to be approved at this session. These are costs which should be shared by all net donors. Yet the

⁴ U.N. doc. SF/L. 85.

⁵ For a statement made by Mr. Bingham before the Governing Council on Jan. 14, 1963, see BULLETIN Feb. 18, 1963, p. 258.

are not so shared today, because these costs must be met in convertible or readily usable currencies. As a result those governments whose contributions are made in readily usable currencies are carrying an undue share of the burden of administrative and overhead costs.

These considerations would seem to compel the conclusion that all governments, or at least all net donor governments, should as a minimum make a sufficient proportion of their contributions in convertible or readily usable currencies so as to cover their equitable share of administrative and overhead costs.

J.N. Sends Observation Mission to Yemen

Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson in the U.N. Security Council on June 11, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

U.S./U.N. press release 4222

I should like to explain very briefly the understanding of the United States in regard to the resolution we have just adopted, particularly in light of other statements that have been made to the Council.

Frankly, it was our hope that the Secretary-General might have proceeded promptly and without objection on the basis of his reports to the Council to the dispatch of the United Nations Observation Mission in compliance with the request of the parties. Although the resultant delay was unfortunate, it is apparent that the resolution we have just adopted is generally satisfactory.

I feel that I should emphasize, however, that the disengagement agreement between the parties involved in the Yemen situation placed no limitation upon the duration of the United Nations operation to 2 months or any other time. The reference to 2 months arose solely because the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic agreed to finance the

operation for 2 months but without prejudice to the manner of financing thereafter if a longer operation should prove to be necessary.

As to the question of the duration of the operation, we consider that the Secretary-General's report deals with this matter sufficiently and satisfactorily and that the resolution which we have adopted asks him to proceed in accordance with the plan set forth in these reports.

As to the financing of the observer operation, it is proper, in our opinion, that the Security Council resolution makes no provision therefor and merely notes that the parties have agreed between themselves to pay the costs for a limited time. Accordingly the United States delegation voted for the resolution and will welcome the prompt dispatch of observers to the area as proposed by the Secretary-General. We wish to express our thanks to him for his prompt and effective initiative to avoid international conflict in this area.

Finally, we wish to thank you, Mr. President, and the distinguished representative of Morocco for finding a satisfactory solution which permits the Secretary-General to commence immediately the disengagement to which the parties have agreed and which is of such great urgency.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

The Security Council,

Noting with satisfaction the initiative of the Secretary-General as mentioned in his report S/5298 "about certain aspects of the situation in Yemen of external origin", and aimed at achievement of a peaceful settlement and "ensuring against any developments in that situation which might threaten the peace of the area",

Noting further the statement by the Secretary-General before the Security Council on 10 June 1963,

Noting further with satisfaction that the parties directly concerned with the situation affecting Yemen have confirmed their acceptance of identical terms of disengagement in Yemen, and that the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic have agreed to defray the expenses over a period of two months of the United Nations observation function called for in the terms of disengagement,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to establish the observation operation as defined by him;

¹ U.N. doc. S/5331; adopted by the Security Council on June 11 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 1 abstention (U.S.S.R.).

2. *Urges* the parties concerned to observe fully the terms of disengagement reported in document S/5298 and to refrain from any action which would increase tension in the area;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this decision.

Trade Talks Begin in Geneva

The Office of the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations announced on June 18 the names of the U.S. delegates to the following series of negotiations to be held in Geneva in preparation for the sixth round of trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Trade Negotiations Committee

The May 16-21 ministerial conference of the GATT¹ set May 6, 1964, as the opening date of the negotiations, popularly known as the "Kennedy round." The ministers established a Trade Negotiations Committee to conduct the negotiations and to settle outstanding issues. Among these problems is the effect of tariff disparities on the procedures for across-the-board tariff cuts.

The Trade Negotiations Committee will meet on June 27. The members of the U.S. delegation will be:

Chairman

W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

Vice Chairmen

John Evans, Economic Minister, U.S. Mission, Geneva
Robert L. McNeill, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce

Advisers

James H. Lewis, Department of State
Howard Worthington, Department of Commerce
Charles Wootton, U.S. Mission, Geneva

Shortly thereafter, a Tariff Disparities Subcommittee will begin meetings. At these sessions, the U.S. delegation will be joined by Joseph Greenwald and Courtenay P. Worthington, Jr., Department of State.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1963, p. 990.

Committees on Cereals and Meats

The ministers also authorized GATT committees on cereals and meats to begin the negotiating of international commodity arrangements for these products.

The Committee on Cereals will meet on June 24 with the following U.S. delegation:

Chairman

W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

Advisers

John A. Schnittker, Department of Agriculture
Robert Lewis, Department of Agriculture
Anthony R. DeFelice, Department of Agriculture
Fred H. Sanderson, Department of State
Courtenay P. Worthington, Jr., Department of State
Oscar Zaglits, U.S. Mission, Brussels
John Kross, U.S. Mission, Geneva

The Committee on Meats will open discussions on July 1. The United States will be represented by:

Fred H. Sanderson, Department of State
John Kross, U.S. Mission, Geneva

Negotiations on Poultry and Tobacco

Geneva will also be the scene of negotiations between the United States and the European Economic Community on the Community's actions affecting imports of poultry from the United States. Another negotiation will deal with EEC actions affecting imports of tobacco.

The poultry negotiations are scheduled to start on June 25. The U.S. delegates will be:

Chairman

Irwin R. Hedges, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Ioanes, Department of Agriculture

Advisers

John B. Rehm, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
Oscar Zaglits, U.S. Mission, Brussels

The negotiations on tobacco are scheduled to begin on June 24. The U.S. delegates will be:

Chairman

John Evans, Economic Minister, U.S. Mission, Geneva

Advisers

James W. Birkhead, Department of Agriculture
Douglas W. Coster, Department of State
Richard Mattheisen, Department of Commerce
Charles Wootton, U.S. Mission, Brussels

Current U.N. Documents:

Selected Bibliography

Unincorporated or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Reports by the Secretary-General to the Security Council concerning certain developments relating to Yemen. S/5298, April 29, 1963, 3 pp.; S/5321, May 27, 1963, 3 pp.

Letter dated May 1 from the permanent representative of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning charges against the United States. S/5299. May 1, 1963. 2 pp.

Letter dated May 1 from the permanent representatives of Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic, and the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council regarding charges made by Israel (S/5297). S/5300. May 1, 1963. 2 pp.

Letter dated May 3 from the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitting OAS documents on the Haiti-Dominican Republic dispute. S/5307. May 7, 1963. 21 pp.

Interim Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. S/5310. May 9, 1963. 30 pp.

Letter dated May 17 from the permanent representative of the Dominican Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning a telegram from the Haitian Foreign Minister (S/5314). S/5315. May 17, 1963. 2 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of July 14, 1960, and February 21 and November 24, 1961, concerning the Congo. S/5240/Add. 2. May 21, 1963. 19 pp.

Letter dated May 14 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of a resolution on the question of South West Africa adopted by the Special Committee on May 10. S/5322. May 29, 1963. 3 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the financial implications of the United Nations Observation Mission in Yemen. S/5323. June 3, 1963. 4 pp.

General Assembly

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Progress report on UNHCR regular programs for the years 1959 to 1962 and on the former UNREF programs as of December 31, 1962. A/AC.106/193. March 21, 1963. 106 pp.

International Law Commission. Second report on the Law of treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, special rapporteur. A/CN.4/156, March 20, 1963, 74 pp.; Add. 1, April 10, 1963, 73 pp.

Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. A/5403. April 12, 1963. 32 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Manual prepared by the Indian National Committee for Space Research on the Thumba equatorial sounding rocket launching site. A/AC.105/10. April 15, 1963. 50 pp.

Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its

second session (April 16-May 3, 1963). A/AC.105/12. May 6, 1963. 25 pp.

Letter dated May 24 from the permanent representative of the Soviet Union addressed to the Secretary-General transmitting a statement entitled "Dangerous United States activities in outer space." A/AC.105/13. May 28, 1963. 5 pp.

Explanatory paper prepared by the Secretary-General on measures of implementing the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights. A/5411. April 29, 1963. 34 pp.

Letter dated April 30 from the representatives of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico concerning the spread of nuclear weapons. A/5415. May 2, 1963. 2 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on cost estimates for 1963 for the U.N. operations in the Congo. A/5416. May 8, 1963. 27 pp.

U.N. financial position and prospects. A/C.5/974. May 14, 1963. 23 pp.

Letter dated May 13 addressed to the Secretary-General from the permanent representative of Albania concerning the U.N. financial situation. A/C.5/975. May 15, 1963. 3 pp.

Note verbale dated May 24 from the Chargé d'Affaires of Ghana addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the *apartheid* policies of the Government of South Africa. A/5422. May 28, 1963. 2 pp.

Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Improvement of the Methods of Work of the General Assembly. A/5423. May 28, 1963. 48 pp.

U.N. Conference on Consular Relations. Vienna convention on consular relations. A/CONF.25/12. April 23, 1963. 40 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes.

Signed at New York September 28, 1962. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962.¹

Notifications received of undertaking to seek ratification or acceptance: Argentina, May 15, 1963; Denmark, May 21, 1963; Japan, May 10, 1963; Netherlands, May 17, 1963.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened for signature at the United Nations December 10, 1962.¹

Signatures: Ceylon, December 12, 1962; China, April 4, 1963; Greece, January 3, 1963; Philippines, February 5, 1963; Poland, December 12, 1962.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse

¹ Not in force.

of opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague January 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914; for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900. *Acceptance deposited:* Dominican Republic, May 29, 1963.

Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, May 20, 1963.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.¹

Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, May 20, 1963.

Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960; for the United States, April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.

Signature: Portugal, May 15, 1963.

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration on provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, *supra*. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

Signature: Portugal, May 15, 1963.

Procès-verbal extending the period of validity of the declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 18, 1960. Done at Geneva November 7, 1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963. TIAS 5266.

Signatures: Australia, March 13, 1963; Czechoslovakia, April 18, 1963; Turkey, April 24, 1963.

BILATERAL

Ethiopia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Addis Ababa June 11, 1963. Entered into force June 11, 1963.

Nepal

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17, 1960 (TIAS 4477), to provide for additional investment guaranties authorized by new United States legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Katmandu June 4, 1963. Entered into force June 4, 1963.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Memorandum of understanding regarding the establishment of a direct communications link, with annex. Signed at Geneva June 20, 1963. Entered into force June 20, 1963.

¹ Not in force.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Richard I. Phillips as Director of the Office of News. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 313 dated June 10.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Trade—Exports of Cotton Velveteen Fabrics from Italy to the United States. Agreement with Italy. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington July 6, 1962. Entered into force July 6, 1962. TIAS 5186. 2 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Niger. Exchange of notes—Signed at Niamey February 28 and April 26, 1962. Entered into force April 26, 1962. TIAS 5187. 6 pp. 5¢.

Postal Matters—Parcel Post. Agreement and Detailed Regulations with Thailand. Signed at Bangkok May 31, 1962 and at Washington June 7, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962. TIAS 5188. 24 pp. 15¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Gabon. Exchange of notes—Signed at Libreville October 4, 1962. Entered into force October 4, 1962. TIAS 5189. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia. Signed at Tunis September 14, 1962. Entered into force September 14, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5190. 13 pp. 10¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Togo. Exchange of notes—Dated at Lomé August 1 and September 5, 1962. Entered into force September 5, 1962. TIAS 5191. 6 pp. 5¢.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Cash Contribution by Japan. Arrangement with Japan, relating to the agreement of March 8, 1954. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo October 19, 1962. Entered into force October 19, 1962. TIAS 5192. 6 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Turkey. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara August 27, 1962. Entered into force August 27, 1962. TIAS 5193. 3 pp. 5¢.

Trade. Agreement with Paraguay, postponing the termination of the agreement of September 12, 1946, as brought up to date. Exchange of notes—Signed at Asunción September 30 and October 1, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962. TIAS 5194. 3 pp. 5¢.

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Releases issued prior to June 17 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 308 of June 7 and 317, 318, and 320 of June 14.

No.	Date	Subject
*321	6/17	Strong sworn in as Ambassador to Iraq (biographic details).
*322	6/17	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*323	6/19	Noto appointed consultant, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
†324	6/19	Johnson: "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East."
*325	6/20	Cultural exchange (Central America).
*326	6/21	One-millionth passport issued.
327	6/21	Interim modification of tin disposal program.
*328	6/21	Visit of Indian parliamentary delegation.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Foreign Relations of the United States 1942, Volume IV, the Near East and Africa

The Department of State recently released "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa."

In this volume there is documentation on the relations of the United States with Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Morocco, Muscat and Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon, and Turkey. Nearly two-thirds of the volume is concerned with affairs in the Near East, and the rest deals with African matters. Most of the content relates to wartime problems, particularly the strengthening of the area against Axis inroads through the extension of lend-lease aid, food supplies, and technical assistance.

Copies of "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa" may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$3.25 each.

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U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East

by U. Alexis Johnson

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs¹

Much esoteric nonsense is often written and spoken about foreign policy. Perhaps even we in the Department of State are on occasion offenders. It is true that the issues are often complex—it is rare that there are just two sides to a problem or that the issues are black and white in good Western movie fashion—and the business of carrying out foreign policy can be complex indeed in this complex world. However, the fundamentals are really very simple. These fundamentals are not developed in the secret recesses of the Department of State or the National Security Council but rather here in Lincoln, and in Phoenix and Jacksonville, as well as in Washington, New York, and San Francisco. In other words, they are derived from what we are as a people and how we regard the other 94 percent of the people of the world.

¹ Address made at a conference on foreign affairs at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr., on June 20 (press release 324 dated June 19).

Our first goal in foreign affairs and the first responsibility of any administration in Washington is to our own security as a nation and as a people.

However, we as a people recognize that year by year, and almost day by day, we can less and less divorce our security and well-being from that of the rest of the world. Thus it is not only from the humanitarian impulses which lie so deep in our character but also from a hard-headed look at our own direct interests that we derive the fundamentals of our foreign policy. I would list first among these fundamentals a community of free and truly independent nations in which every man can live in equality and dignity, free from hunger, at peace with his neighbor, and having open opportunity to strive to attain his aspirations.

We seek these goals in Asia as elsewhere. This is not just empty rhetoric but the principles which guide our actions and programs.

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Upon superficial analysis these goals would appear to be easily attained because they are the same goals Asians seek. They are the same human goals which have sparked the wave of nationalism and the revolution of rising expectations still sweeping Asia in these postwar decades. There is no denying that Asians want national security, fuller prosperity, equality, dignity, peace, friendly relations based on freedom and justice, and opportunity for themselves and their posterity. In this they are no different from you and me.

Since there is such close identity between our goals and those of Asians, what then obstructs the easy attainment of these aspirations? First, as far as the Communist aspect is concerned, Premier Khrushchev has put one answer as plainly as I could when he said recently, "Marxist-Leninists make no secret of the fact that they want to win all the people on earth for socialism. This we regard as our most important aim on the world arena." Since, as Mao Tse-tung put it, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," the use of force to obtain Communist political control has not been ruled out. In fact, what the Communists call "wars of national liberation" are actively instigated toward this end.

This use of force is not new in Asia. In 1948 the Communist wars of terrorism to seize control were under way in Asia in addition to the civil war in China itself. They were in Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, and what was then called French Indochina. They were defeated in the first four countries, but in Indochina Communists were left in control of North Viet-Nam and two of the northern provinces of Laos. The aggression against the Republic of Korea in 1950 was a more naked use of force, as was the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958. Of present concern are Laos and South Viet-Nam and the Chinese Communist pressure along the Indian frontier.

Although aggressions and "wars of national liberation" can be, and have been, deterred or defeated in Asia, the Communist aim of "winning all the people to socialism," by force if necessary, has not been abandoned. On the contrary the Communists are actively infiltrating

their vanguards and operatives wherever they believe they have opportunity to seize power.

However, we also need to note that even if communism had never existed many of these countries would be wracked by the stresses and strains of building modern states and societies—the problems with which our own experience, past and present, has made us very familiar. Their relations with each other would also be beset by their long history of national rivalries and in some cases deep-seated hostility. In this, of course, the countries of Asia are by no means unique.

Combating "Aggression by Seepage"

I trust that you will not mind my using my last foreign assignment, Thailand, a marvelous land of kindly people, as an example of what has been called "aggression by seepage" by a prominent correspondent. In the northeast provinces of Thailand live about 9 million people, nearly a third of the total population of the country. The majority of these peoples and those of Laos are very similar in culture, customs, and even language. There is also a substantial Vietnamese minority, for the most part loyal to Hanoi, living in this sparsely settled, relatively isolated area of Thailand. For the past several years Communist Pathet Lao agents, supporters of North Viet-Nam's Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, and even a few Communist Chinese "agitprop" men have been working in this area seeking to set up cells and *encadrements*. Clearly this was in preparation for further advance when Laos and the Republic of Viet-Nam were to have fallen.

The Thai Government recognized the incipient danger and attempted to counter it as best it could with the very small and ill-equipped police units it had. We, for our part, cooperated with the Thai Government in its efforts to open up the area so that the people could begin to identify themselves with the nation and could begin to realize the benefits of progress. Through our joint programs roads were built opening up access not only to the hinterlands but to markets. Thousands of wells were dug, not only for potable water but also for irrigation. Training programs were enlarged. To-

day the situation in the northeast looks much more promising. The Thai border police are well officered and trained, and the routes of infiltration are no longer so open. Special mobile teams of Thai technicians and officials are energetically moving into the more remote and troubled areas. Better education is being brought to the area. Information teams are active. Communications are being extended, not just for security but also for the economic well-being of the inhabitants. Security too has been improved both by joint Thai-U.S. effort and through multinational preparedness through SEATO exercises.

The real significance of what is going on in Thailand is, I am convinced, that the free world is moving ahead with foresight, forged from bitter lessons learned elsewhere in Asia. Foresightedly, the Thais, with our cooperation, are moving toward preventing another Viet-Nam or Laos situation. They are doing so on the political, economic, and psychological plane, which calls for much more sophistication, patience, and understanding on the part of all of us than when the struggle reaches the military plane. It is always very late when the military plane is reached.

Our policies are based on the premise that nationalism is healthy and incompatible with the aims of communism. An independent national state is not always going to agree with us, but neither is it consciously going to serve the fundamental purposes of communism. We believe that government rests upon the consent of those governed, not upon the coercion of those ruled. We welcome a world of diversity and abhor enforced conformity. We seek to construct, not destroy. We seek to free men's minds so that open and honest examinations and decisions can be made, not to capture men's minds for exploitation by a single system. In short, we seek international cooperation, not world domination.

These are a few of the principles that are being rediscovered in Asia. They may sound trite to you and to me—and indeed too often we have not paid full heed to them. But as the peoples of the Far East strive to protect the independence they won and as they move ahead in exercising their responsibilities, they are dis-

covering that communism is not the wave of the future. They are recognizing the political, economic, and psychological appeals for what they really are.

All too often slow, steady, undramatic progress is buried in the screaming headlines of battles, scandals, defeats, and threats.

In Korea we see a strong urge to return to civilian government, and the people of Korea want to participate in the business of governing themselves. I am satisfied that they will find a way of doing so.

What of Japan? Not only has it found its rightful place in the community of free nations, but also it is helping others to do so through its development programs in Southeast Asia, through its expansion of trade with the lesser developed nations, through its responsible activities in the United Nations, and through its foreign student exchange programs. Japan is a vital example to Asia of the success of a free-enterprise system in a country with a paucity of natural resources. Japan's industrial capacity, skilled manpower, functioning democracy, and willingness to assume a role in free-world leadership will, I am sure, become even more important in the immense task of nation building all through Asia.

Programs of Cooperation

In these days when we are again having our "great debate" on foreign aid it is perhaps useful to call Japan to mind as just one example of the returns of what I think properly should be called our investment in foreign assistance. It is not possible to measure in monetary terms the political and military value of free Japan as it exists today. However, measured in just pure dollar terms, from 1946 to 1956 we invested around \$2 billion in Japan. Most of this was just plain food to keep people from starving, but a lesser part was for economic rehabilitation. As against this, there has been approximately \$18 billion of trade between Japan and the United States in the last decade, and during the past 5 years the trade balance in our favor has been over \$1 billion. I perhaps need not tell this audience that during the past 10 years we have exported \$4.4 billion of agricultural products to Japan. In addition Japan is di-

rectly repaying \$600 million of that postwar assistance.

As another example of our policy of economic cooperation with those countries of Asia seeking to move ahead, we might cite India. During the past decade approximately \$1.9 billion of United States economic assistance has been invested in India's first and second 5-year plans. During this same period other countries have invested around \$1.5 billion. India provided from its own resources around 90 percent of the financing required for the first 5-year plan and 76 percent of that required for the second 5-year plan, for a total of the equivalent of about \$11,100 million.

In this decade, while the population of India has increased by 21.5 percent, the national income has increased by 43 percent and per capita income by 17 percent. Agricultural production has increased by over 41 percent, and industrial production has nearly doubled. (We might note that during this same period per capita income, and particularly food production, has actually decreased in Communist China.) Our trade with India has increased by over 57 percent, but, above all, we and the rest of the free world are more secure and more prosperous because India has been able to move forward in freedom and prosperity.

Our policy also embraces military cooperation with countries desiring to join with us in such a relationship. We take an active role in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, embracing Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as France and the United Kingdom. We value our ANZUS treaty relationship with Australia and New Zealand as well as bilateral relationships with Japan, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the Philippines. However, this leaves room for us to assist any other free country that wants to defend itself against aggressive Communist power. As you know we have responded to the requests of India and, in cooperation with the U.K. and some other members of the Commonwealth, are assisting that country in better preparing itself to resist Chinese Communist aggression.

At this point a word is perhaps due with respect to Viet-Nam. Our policy there is based

on several premises. First is the premise that the South Vietnamese want to defend themselves. This has been amply demonstrated by the more than 5,000 men killed in action during the past year. Next is the premise that the fight must be one primarily of the Vietnamese themselves. It cannot be a war of Americans against Vietnamese. Thus, important though our role of advice, transport, communications, and supply is, it is primarily the role of an outsider assisting the Vietnamese themselves. Another important premise is that the political, social, and economic aspects of the struggle are of equal if not greater importance than the military struggle, but in any event all aspects of the struggle must be orchestrated in a unified whole. During this process both we and the Vietnamese are learning much. None of us expected or now expect that victory would be easy or quick. However, I am satisfied that solid progress is being made.

The real heart of the program in Viet-Nam in which all these various elements are brought together is in the strategic hamlet program. In these, many Vietnamese not only have the means for the first time of defending themselves but are experiencing their first taste of self-government, of participation in elections and in civic affairs. They are receiving benefits in health and education heretofore not available. They are working together. They are learning that a better life does exist and is attainable. And they are willing to work for it and have shown their willingness to protect it.

Increasing numbers of Vietnamese are now willing to furnish intelligence about Viet Cong operations and individuals; more Vietnamese are abandoning the Viet Cong cause by taking advantage of the Government's "Open Arms" campaign. The Viet Cong weapon losses are increasing, and losses of weapons to the Viet Cong are decreasing. Viet Cong strongholds are being penetrated, and less territory is under exclusive Viet Cong control.

Another aspect of our policy is the encouragement of regional cooperation among the free countries of the area. As I pointed out at the outset, this is beset with many obstacles. In any event, what we can do in this regard is fairly limited as the impulse must come from within

the area itself. However, we stand ready to help whenever we can.

In spite of the difficulties there are encouraging signs of progress. One of the most notable as well as most recent was the replacement of the frictions that have existed between Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia over the formation of Malaysia, with the announcement last week from Manila by the foreign ministers that the three countries are looking toward a confederation. The Indonesian Foreign Minister has coined the name "Maphilindo" for this future grouping, and it may well become a familiar term to us all. In addition there is the older Association of Southeast Asian States (ASA) presently consisting of Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines. This is in addition to the growing cooperation through such U.N. organizations as ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East], which is, among many activities, sponsoring the Mekong River Project among Thailand, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Shadow of Communist China

Back of all of this hovers the shadow of Communist China. None can deny it is a formidable and dark shadow. However, at the risk of oversimplification, let me say that it no longer appears as formidable or even as black as it did a few years ago.

When I first returned to Southeast Asia in 1958, Communist China had just announced its "great leap forward." An almost literal shiver of fear went through the area that Communist China would accomplish the miracles of economic construction that it set as its goals and thus by example and influence alone overwhelm those seeking to pursue the free way. Communist China did not accomplish those miracles. Far from it. Per capita food production has been falling in mainland China as compared generally with its rise in the free countries of Asia. Industrial production lagged rather than "leaping forward," and the rates compare very unfavorably with the larger free countries, such as Japan and India, and even with some of the smaller countries. Students and others who went to Communist China wrote home very unfavorable accounts. The glowing image faded.

In the meanwhile the picture of the two stalwart giants—the Soviet Union and Communist China—marching shoulder to shoulder to conquer all that lay before them also has been fading fast. Not that both of them are not still Communist, but they no longer present that picture of shoulder-to-shoulder unity in carrying out their objectives. Their quarrels have broken into the open and are indeed deep. (However, we should remember that, as a Soviet is reputed to have said, the quarrel is in many ways over how best to bury us.)

All Soviet economic, and apparently most if not all military, assistance to China has been stopped. Soviet technicians were withdrawn, and even Soviet consulates have been closed. Peiping has been using public vituperation toward Moscow and the Kremlin that was formerly reserved for the United States. (I might mention that its vituperation toward India and its leaders is now in much the same vein.) Peiping and Moscow are eagerly cajoling or demanding, depending on the circumstances, the support of other Communist parties and regimes throughout the world. Something new and divisive has undeniably been added to the world Communist movement. This holds dangers as well as opportunities for us. As far as Asia is concerned I would not want to minimize the dangers. While cautious in its action, the public stance of Communist China is more belligerently aggressive than that of the Soviet Union. The Chinese are a people of enormous native capacity in no basic way inferior to any other people, including ourselves. The leaders in Peiping have throughout their rule shown an ability to profit by and correct their mistakes and now in fact seem to be taking some steps toward doing so.

However, I remain optimistic over the future. This is not a careless optimism but one based rather on fundamental human values that transcend geography, race, culture, and religion. I believe that the basic human values embodied in our policies toward Asia are more compatible with the aspirations of the great peoples of the area than are those of our enemies. I also believe that this is increasingly being recognized and understood by those peoples. If we remain true to those values we have a right to be confident of the outcome.

Soviet Proposal of Nuclear-Free Zone in Mediterranean Rejected

Following is an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union.

U.S. NOTE OF JUNE 24¹

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and, with reference to the note of May 20, 1963, of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Washington, has the honor to transmit to the Ministry the views of the Government of the United States of America on the proposal that the area of the Mediterranean Sea be declared a nuclear-free zone.²

The Soviet Government's note appears to be devoted primarily to a propagandistic attack against the presence of United States missile-launching submarines in the Mediterranean and contains a large number of gross misrepresentations of both the position of the Government of the United States and the recent history of the Mediterranean area. In its note of May 18, 1963, the Government of the United States replied to a similar set of groundless charges contained in the Soviet Government's note of April 8, 1963,³ and drew the attention of the Soviet Government to the defensive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to the reasons for its development. The remarks made in the note of May 18 apply to the Mediterranean area, as well as to all other areas covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.

In this connection the Government of the United States wishes to emphasize that it was compelled to strengthen the security of its Allies in the Mediterranean only after their security had been directly threatened by the Soviet Union's deployment of an extensive array of missiles aimed at countries in the area.

¹ Delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on June 24 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow (press release 331 dated June 24).

² For text of a Department statement of May 21, see BULLETIN of June 10, 1963, p. 896.

³ For texts of the U.S. and Soviet notes, see *ibid.*, June 3, 1963, p. 860.

Consequently the United States and the threatened Mediterranean countries were forced in their own defense to counteract the striking power of these Soviet nuclear missiles and Soviet nuclear-equipped aircraft which were poised for attack on the region. If it had done otherwise, the United States would have failed in its duty to help its Allies to defend themselves against a form of nuclear blackmail under which the Soviet Union could have attempted to force the Mediterranean countries to succumb to Soviet dictation or Soviet domination.

This is not an imaginary danger, as may be seen from a number of provocative statements by senior members of the Soviet Government threatening devastating attacks on countries of the Mediterranean region, including threats to attack the Acropolis and the orange groves of Italy. If, as stated in its note, the Government of the Soviet Union is in fact "engaged in peaceful labor and wishes only peace and prosperity to other peoples," it has nothing to fear from the presence of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, which are stationed there solely to defend the integrity of the countries in that region.

With respect to the proposal in the Soviet Government's note to declare the Mediterranean area a nuclear-free zone, the Government of the United States wishes to recall that, being thoroughly aware of the catastrophically destructive nature of thermonuclear weapons, it has continuously sought and advanced proposals designed to eliminate or if this were not possible at least to reduce the danger that such weapons might be used. Despite a discouraging lack of progress it continues to pursue this path unflaggingly and with increased effort. In doing so, it welcomes the proposals of others. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, it must be noted that for a measure in the field of disarmament and arms control to have a beneficial rather than an unsettling and therefore dangerous effect, it must be balanced so that no state or group of states gain military advantage. To disrupt this balance can only create a condition of insecurity that would increase tension and lead to the danger the measure was designed to obviate. This principle of balance was in fact recognized in the Joint Statement of

Agreed Principles of September 20, 1961.⁴

The Note of May 20 of the Soviet Government seems to be designed precisely and solely to change the existing military balance at the expense of the United States and its Allies. The fact that the Government of the United States is constantly seeking ways of decelerating and halting the arms race does not mean that it is prepared to strip itself of its means of defense, or to withhold the protection of those means from its Allies, when the countries from which it and its Allies may be threatened maintain their armaments at full scale.

SOVIET NOTE OF MAY 20⁵

Unofficial translation

No. 22

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to declare to the Government of the United States of America as follows:

Quite recently the Soviet Government was compelled to warn against NATO plans to create nuclear forces which would give the West German Bundeswehr access to atomic weapons and would unleash a nuclear weapons race which would know no state or geographic bounds. Today, the nations of the world are witnesses of the fact that the Government of the U.S.A. and that of some other NATO members are taking new steps in the same direction.

The question concerns the implementation of plans to place in the Mediterranean American atomic submarines equipped with the "Polaris" nuclear missile. Spanish ports and British military strongholds on Cyprus and Malta have been designated as possible bases for these submarines. There have been reports that the "Polaris" submarines will also use Turkish, Greek, and Italian ports. Two such atomic submarines have already entered the Mediterranean and are getting "the feel" of the coastal waters of Greece and Turkey.

The U.S.A. and some of its allies are thus demonstrating once again that the concern to prevent thermonuclear war or even reduce the danger of its occurrence is alien to their policy. Instead of joining in the efforts of states which, anticipating the realization of the program of universal and complete disarmament, are already striving to narrow the sphere of preparations for nuclear war, the predominant powers in NATO are drawing into the orbit of these preparations another vast area with a population of nearly 300 million people.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

⁵ Delivered to the Department of State on May 20 by the Soviet Embassy at Washington.

What does the transformation of the Mediterranean into a gigantic reservoir, filled with dozens of missiles with megatons of nuclear power, involve? What will be the effect of converting the Mediterranean basin into a sort of "missiledrome" where each mile of the sea's mirror-like surface may be used by an aggressor as a launching pad for nuclear missiles?

First of all, this will immeasurably increase the threat that the Mediterranean and the adjoining countries may become the theater of devastating military action. Even the states which have not and do not want to have anything to do with the aggressive preparations of NATO—and this means the overwhelming majority of the states in the Mediterranean area—actually find themselves in a situation where the right to control their future is appropriated by those who command the atomic submarines that ply near their shores. Their security and sovereignty is being undermined by the same dangerous policy in which are caught up the countries that made their territory available for NATO military bases. The uneasiness of the Arabs or Yugoslavs, of the Albanians or Cypriots cannot be allayed by assertions that the sending to the Mediterranean of American missile-bearing submarines is only a "technical" operation to replace the "Jupiter" missiles stationed in Turkey and Italy with other improved ones. No, the present replacement of the stationary American missile bases with floating ones involves far-reaching political and military consequences: the specter of a nuclear war, which appeared at first in those countries which actively participate in the military measures of NATO, is now being registered on the shores of the whole Mediterranean. The submarines equipped with "Polaris" missiles, navigating along the shores of the Mediterranean countries, would broaden the area from which a nuclear attack could be launched and consequently would also extend the geographic sphere of application of thus unavoidable retaliatory measures aimed at rendering harmless the bases of the aggressor.

Of course, the countries in which such submarines would be based, either permanently or from time to time, would expose themselves to the greatest danger. But there is not and cannot be any guarantee against the possibility that the atomic submarine would send its deadly missile from international waters, and then would try to hide near the shores of a state which is not in the NATO bloc, or that it would send its salvo directly from the territorial waters of such a state. It is impossible to exclude the possibility of such a course of events, all the more so since many states of the Mediterranean basin do not possess any real means to prevent atomic submarines from entering their waters, and only a few minutes are needed for something irreparable to take place.

Bringing into the Mediterranean war vessels of NATO with nuclear weapons on board forces the states whose security is threatened by the NATO bloc to implement effective defensive countermeasures in order to be able to avert any attempt on the peaceful life

of their peoples, and not to leave to the NATO powers a free hand to exploit the Mediterranean as a springboard for possible aggression. The peace-loving states will have no choice but to be ready to launch their means of paralyzing the travel routes of atomic submarines and also the shores of NATO members, as well as of countries which permit this bloc to use their territories for permanent or periodic bases for nuclear missiles.

It should be clear to everybody that the NATO staffs are operating in such a manner that the Mediterranean Sea, the shortest commercial sea route connecting the West with the East and a traditional area of recreation and international tourism, has become one more area of dangerous rivalry and conflict, a lair for the bearers of nuclear death.

What will happen to the countries of the Balkan peninsula, of North Africa, the Near and the Middle East—all countries situated along the perimeter of the Mediterranean Sea or even deep in the hinterland, if atomic missile-bearing submarines roam along the shores? Do you think this will increase their security and improve life for them? Is it possible to believe that the Greeks, Turks, Italians, French, Spaniards, as well as other Mediterranean people, will feel more secure if foreign missiles and atomic bombs, over which they have no power or control, are stationed on the very threshold of their homes? Even by an accidental concatenation of events the peoples of this area might become the victims of a deadly catastrophe, against their will and desire.

The Mediterranean peoples have had vast experience during their history. From the countless conflicts which shook ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Carthage down to the two World Wars of the present century, this area has suffered all the vicissitudes of the armed rivalry of states. But even during the Second World War, which quickly shifted to the African Continent and rolled on to the Near and Middle East, there was no weapon which in its destructive power could be even remotely compared with the one which is now hiding in the waves of the Mediterranean, or which would be used in a retaliatory blow against the aggressor if this sea should be used as a center of operations and shelter for an aggressor. If it came to the worst in our time, the Mediterranean Sea would become the Dead Sea in the full sense of the term. Many centers of civilization and culture would be threatened with a fate similar to that of Pompeii. Even people not bound by religious tenets can understand the feelings of millions of Christians and Moslems concerning the fact that, in implementing the designs of the NATO leaders, atomic weapons lie almost under the walls of the Vatican and Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina.

The governments of the Western Powers are trying to justify plans for stationing submarines with Polaris missiles in the Mediterranean Sea, by references to the fact that this is an open sea and that providing or not providing harbors for missile carriers is the domestic concern of individual states. But by what right are

four or five states engaged in NATO's policy, oblivious to the interests of the other Mediterranean countries, prepared to open the Straits of Gibraltar to the passage of atomic weapons? For example, if the governments of Turkey, Greece, Italy, or Spain permit submarines or surface vessels with atomic weapons on board to hide in their waters, then this would be trifling with the fate of not only their own country but would also threaten the security of neighboring countries.

The U.S.A. and other countries of NATO are not stinting in assurances that the American Polaris submarines are being sent to the Mediterranean for "defensive purposes" allegedly, and almost for the "defense" of the countries of this region. However, it will not be an exaggeration to say that out of all the means created for warfare the American weapon now being stationed in the Mediterranean is the least of all suited to serve defensive purposes, but instead is most suitable for any kind of provocation. The distinctive feature of the use of atomic submarines as mobile missile bases consists in the fact that they are counted on to conceal preparations and a surprise nuclear strike.

Moreover, in the Soviet Union, and also in other countries probably, people remember the recent statements of high-ranking persons in the U.S.A. with reference to the fact that under certain circumstances the United States of America may take the initiative in a nuclear conflict with the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government likewise could not fail to give attention to the statements of the leading military figures of the U.S.A. to the effect that the American submarines now being sent to the Mediterranean have been "allocated" to definite targets in the Soviet Union.

It would not be irrelevant to note with regard to the United States Sixth Fleet, sailing from place to place in the Mediterranean year after year, that it has been alleged more than once that its purpose is to help the Mediterranean powers defend their independence and security. In the log of the commander of this fleet, however, there is not a single notation about any operations in defense of the sovereign rights and independence of the countries of North Africa or the Near East. On the contrary, the ships of the Sixth Fleet participated in the preparation for an attack on Syria in 1957, which was blocked by the decisive action taken, particularly by the Soviet Union. With the forces of this fleet the United States occupied the Lebanese coast in the summer of 1958. American naval vessels covered foreign intervention in Jordan. Within sight of the Sixth Fleet the NATO allies of the United States—England and France, together with Israel—committed aggression against Egypt and bombed Cairo and Port Said.

Such are the facts. They throw a sufficiently clear light on the actual situation.

What, actually, are the American naval vessels seeking in the Mediterranean Sea, thousands of kilometers from the borders of the United States? What are the real aims being pursued when, in addition to the sur-

face vessels, atomic submarines are now being sent there armed with nuclear weapons? The NATO measures for spreading nuclear weapons to new areas speak for themselves. The intentions of the United States are made sufficiently clear, however, by the statement of American military leaders, who recently argued that it was essential to station American nuclear weapons in Canada on the grounds that this would permit diversion of part of the nuclear counterblows from the United States to Canada in the event of a war. This, to be sure, was said with reference to Canada, not with reference to the Mediterranean Sea. But just as there, so here too, there is now talk about preparations for an atomic war, carried out under one policy and one strategy.

Perhaps someone thinks it is almost the height of military acumen to conceal one's own nuclear missile bases as far as possible from one's own population centers and as near as possible to the borders of other nations. But can millions of people living along the Mediterranean reconcile themselves to the position of being hostages, into which the leading NATO powers are trying to place them? It is obvious that there enters into the military plans of these powers—now more than ever—the calculation that in the event of a conflict part of the nuclear counterblows that should rightly fall on the aggressor would be diverted to countries innocently involved in the conflict.

It is impossible to pass over yet another circumstance. As is well-known, the General Assembly of the U.N. adopted a resolution⁶ declaring Africa a nuclear-free zone. The purpose of this resolution is to save the African Continent from the dangers inherent in a further spread of nuclear weapons.

Of course, no simple coincidence can explain the fact that the plans of sending American submarines with "Polaris missiles" to the Mediterranean Sea appeared simultaneously with projects of creating the so-called "multinational" and "multilateral" nuclear forces of NATO, in which a considerable role is played by West German revanchists and militarists. These are links of the same policy, of the policy of the absolutely unbridled arms race and of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet people are occupied with peaceful labor and wish only peace and prosperity to other nations. The Soviet Government firmly believes in the principles of the peaceful coexistence of states. It is prepared on the basis of these [principles] to solve all questions of its relations with any nation, regardless of social differences and without any interference in the internal affairs of other states.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/RES/1652 (XVI).

True to the policy of peace and peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union has more than once proposed taking measures for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, supporting plans to create nonatomic zones in various parts of the world, liquidating foreign military bases in the territories of other states, reducing even now the armaments and the armed forces of states in areas where the possibility of a conflict is particularly great. The Soviet Government is in favor of denying the use of foreign territories and ports for stationing any kind of strategic weapons, including submarines with nuclear missiles.

The Soviet Union has presented concrete proposals on all these questions for discussion at the 18-country committee on disarmament at Geneva. Putting these proposals into practice would have strengthened mutual trust among countries and would have made possible the solution of the major problem of our time: universal and complete disarmament.

But the United States and its allies are now doing the following: creating a concentrated nuclear force under NATO and engaging in spreading nuclear missiles over new continents and new oceans; this raises new barriers on the road to disarmament.

For the sake of insuring international security, the Soviet Government proposes that the entire area of the Mediterranean Sea be declared free of nuclear missiles. It is ready to undertake the obligation not to deploy in those waters any nuclear weapons or means for their delivery, bearing in mind the fact that similar obligations will be assumed by other powers. If this area is declared to be a zone free of nuclear missiles, then, acting jointly with the United States and the other countries of the West, the Soviet Union is prepared to give reliable guarantees to the effect that in case of military complications, the area of the Mediterranean Sea will be considered to lie outside the perimeter of utilization of nuclear weapons.

The implementation of these proposals would promote mutual understanding and friendship in the relations between countries of the Mediterranean, it would enable the countries of the Mediterranean basin to devote more strength and resources to the solution of their economic and social problems. At the same time, it would represent a very substantial contribution to the lessening of overall international tension and to guaranteeing peace in Europe, Africa, and throughout the world.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will place the considerations contained in this note under careful study.

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1963.

The United States and Eastern Europe

by Eugenie Anderson
Minister to Bulgaria¹

Let me ask you a question: Have you any idea what privileged men and women you are? I, too, have been unusually fortunate. I have had the honor to serve our country first in Denmark, one of our staunch Scandinavian allies, and now in Bulgaria, a rugged and beautiful Balkan country in a part of Europe known to few Americans. I have also lived and traveled unofficially but widely in India and Asia. Perhaps because I have lived abroad in these three sharply differing areas of our conflicted world, it seems to me that most of us are unaware of our incredibly good fortune.

You are graduating from college, and this itself is a privilege. Today most young people everywhere passionately desire an education. For most Americans this goal is attainable, while in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, higher education is but an insistent dream which comes true for only a tiny minority.

But there are other, even more basic reasons why we, as Americans, are privileged.

First, *we have inherited the treasure of freedom.*

The independence of our country and the rights of the individual were won for us by other Americans nearly 200 years ago. Yet these same liberties are those for which many peoples in the world today still strive desperately and which fewer still have achieved.

We take for granted these infinitely precious American rights: the freedom to think what you will, to say what you think, to believe, or *not* to believe, as you wish; the freedom to wor-

ship as you choose, to pursue the truth—wherever it may lead—in science, history, and all fields of knowledge; the freedom to create new art forms, to seek new kinds of beauty; the freedom to associate with whomever you like, to join together with others for any peaceful purpose, to petition your Government for redress of wrongs; the right to criticize, oppose, and change your Government; the right to choose your own political leaders, to vote them in and to vote them out; the right to equal justice under the rule of law; the right to a fair trial by jury; the right to own property and to pursue whatever occupation you may choose; the right to change your status in life; the right to an education in public or private schools; the right to travel, to move freely about in our own majestic and spacious land, and to see the world beyond if you will.

Less than half the people in the world today possess these rights which we hold basic and should hold sacred. For as Americans the majority of us inherited these freedoms. We live by them almost unconsciously. We accept them casually, often unmindful of their worth.

Secondly, *America has achieved a pinnacle of affluence*, never before known in history.

We are deeply privileged in our unprecedented material wealth. No other nation on earth enjoys such ease, such opulence, such riches. Even more important, our unparalleled standard of living is available to the majority of Americans and not just to those on top. True, Americans have labored with ceaseless energy, ingenuity, skill, and drive. Out of a wilderness we have created this wealth. Our own people have built this awesome power, founded

¹ Address made at commencement exercises at Carleton College, Northfield, Minn., on June 14 (press release 314 dated June 11).

on God-given natural and human resources.

Recently a Bulgarian said admiringly to me, "If there is any paradise on this earth, it is in the United States of America." I fervently agree. Yet today we are embarrassed—and we should be—by our overflowing abundance in a world where most people do not even have enough to eat. I cannot forget the deprived faces of men, women, and children in Asia, where hunger, homelessness, sickness, and hopelessness are the lifelong fate of millions.

We Americans are living in a paradise, yes, but an uneasy one, surrounded as we are by an ocean of human suffering, with rising seas of discontent, rebellion, and revolt.

American affluence is today one of our great good fortunes, but we will surely lose it unless we share it, and quickly. I would add that no other powerful nation in history has given so generously of its wealth to those in need. America has done much, but we must do more.

Third, *the American Revolution remains the hope of mankind.*

The founders of our country came here to create a new kind of society. These men and women dreamed of a system based on equality, reason, freedom, and opportunity. Their dreams are still the driving force of our democracy. The American Revolution still goes on.

We continue to be committed to American ideals. We hold an optimistic belief in our own ability to change our environment. We believe that change can be peaceful and that it must advance the general welfare of all mankind.

Fortunately for us, both as individuals and as a nation, the dynamism of American life is still a reality, not only an article of faith. Where else on this globe than in America can one find such diversity, such a pluralistic culture, and such exuberant growth? Almost as immense as nature itself—yes, and sometimes just as wild. But the point is that there must be continuing evolutionary change, experimentation, discovery, the extension of freedom to all groups, new possibilities for everyone, always new hope.

Despite our own sometimes tarnishing failures, despite years of propaganda and depths of ignorance, the vision of a dynamic, free America still prevails around the world. Rarely have I

traveled in any country and told my nationality that the stranger's face did not light up with an exclamation of wonder, "America!" Or, as a Hungarian refugee once said to me—unforgettably, "Ah, America—the country of infinite possibilities!"

Eastern Europe in Transition

Now I want to talk for a few minutes about that part of Europe where I am serving. It seems fitting to discuss developments in Eastern Europe within the context of our rapidly changing times, because that area today is in transition. Most Americans have tended to think of the Iron Curtain countries in static terms. Such assumptions do not apply today to Eastern Europe. Significant changes have occurred and will continue. United States policy, too, has become more flexible and active vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc.

Until recently the United States avoided a close involvement in European political affairs. We tried to remain only as interested observers in the gradual process by which European states fought for, and gained, their freedom and independence. Yet our heritage inevitably led the United States to give its encouragement to Eastern European peoples striving for freedom from foreign rule. Whether in freedom or in subjugation to a foreign power, they have retained their national memories and pride in their traditions; they have created, defended, and developed a rich cultural background; they have cherished their past successes and suffered from their failures; and they still maintain their faith in individual freedom and national independence.

Contrary to popular belief, Eastern Europe today is characterized not by homogeneity but by disparity, not by identity of policy but by contrasts. In fact, reality today in Eastern Europe underscores Moscow's loss of its former claims to monolithic unity.

Of course, the countries of the Eastern European bloc are still, in the last resort, subject to the ultimate control of Soviet military power. The bloc leaders adhere to Soviet foreign policy and ideology. They are working out with varying degrees of divergence their internal and economic development.

For example, Poland permitted in 1956-57 a reversal of the collectivization process in agriculture. Today only about 10 percent of Polish agricultural land is collectivized, while in Bulgaria the figure is 90 percent. So also in Poland, and to some extent in Hungary, consumers have fared better as a result of the events of 1956 and of conscious government policy. Throughout the bloc, including Bulgaria, some liberalization of internal rule has occurred. Poland, more than other countries in the area, shows the benefits of increased freedom. But there is mounting dissension in Czechoslovakia these days. Rumania seems to be reluctant to subordinate its economy to the planning decisions of the Soviet bloc. By way of contrast, look at Stalinist Albania's anomalous position. It supports Communist China in its conflict with Moscow. It defies the Soviet Union and has no diplomatic relations with it, yet it maintains relations with the Eastern European countries.

Great economic progress has been claimed by all the Eastern European regimes during the past years. The governments proclaim that they have overfulfilled their gross industrial production plans. Clearly the successful fulfillment of economic plans is an attractive subject to Communist propagandists. Yet, at the same time, severe, persistent, and chronic food shortages haunt most of these countries.

United States policy has been and remains consistent in its desire to see governments in Eastern European countries—as elsewhere—which will promote the full independence of their nations. We wish to see governments which will guarantee and promote all the essential internal freedoms and which will work peacefully for normal and constructive relations with all countries.

At the end of the last war, when Stalin brought down the Iron Curtain, he tried to reduce or eliminate all contacts between East and West. He hoped thus to simplify his assimilation of the nations of Eastern Europe into the Communist system. United States policy has always encouraged the drawing aside of this barrier. We want Eastern European countries to associate with us on equal terms.

We should seek new ways to remind the peo-

ples of Eastern Europe, Communists or not, that they are a part of the West and that we look forward to a day of even closer association. We want them to know how well the West has prospered with free systems. We want them to be able to see for themselves that the West is strong, dynamic, and united. We want them to know that we are completely dedicated to world peace but to understand, too, that the West is also capable of defending itself.

We want them to see how our agriculture is flourishing. We want them to compare *our* farm system with that of collectivization.

We want them, Communists and non-Communists, to see for themselves that our people work hard because our incentive under a democratic system is always before us: the opportunity for a higher standard of living, a better education for their children, more leisure, and a richer life.

It is heartening that today increasing numbers of Americans are visiting Eastern European countries. Some go as tourists out of curiosity; others to see their families and friends; still others go to exchange knowledge in professional fields under private or official arrangements. We support these contacts. They help people to understand the problems of bridging our differences. These scientific, cultural, and educational exchanges also help to keep the Eastern European intelligentsia in touch with important developments in the United States. I have found in Bulgaria a profound hunger for communication with Americans.

We, too, welcome the chance to visit with people everywhere in the world. The more Americans the world meets, the greater will be the understanding of American principles. The more we know of others, the richer we will be.

Economic Relations

And what about our economic relations?

The United States permits trade in nonstrategic goods with Eastern European countries. At present it is limited, but we look forward to the day when our relations with these countries will allow such trade to be more significant. We want these people to share the benefits of our industrial and agricultural wealth and

know-how. Cultural influences invariably accompany and follow trade between nations.

Our policy toward Eastern Europe has drawn a distinction between those countries which are independent and are striving for independence and those which subordinate their interests to Moscow. Yugoslavia, while a Communist country, is not aligned with the Soviet bloc despite Khrushchev's wooing, and the policies it follows are those which it believes best meet its national interests. I have already mentioned some ways in which Poland has liberalized its internal rule. As a result of the distinctive developments in these two countries, both have most-favored-nation tariff treatment for the goods they export to the United States—that is to say, the tariff duties levied on their goods are as low as those on goods coming from any other country.

Under a provision of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress required the President to withdraw "as soon as practicable" most-favored-nation treatment from all Communist countries, in effect, from Yugoslavia and Poland since they were the only ones enjoying this status. This requirement goes completely against the policy toward Eastern Europe followed by President Kennedy and his predecessors. It would slam the door in the face of those two countries which have most emphatically rejected Stalinist-type rule and have tried to evolve policies according to their national interests. It would mean lumping them together with all the other Communist countries as if there were no differences among them. It would mean discouraging *all* Eastern European countries from developing meaningful associations with the United States. It would ignore our vital interests in the area, since it would prevent us from pursuing a constructive policy. Instead it would have the effect of reducing our relations to purely formal diplomatic contacts of the least effective kind. Instead of demonstrating our interest in the welfare of the peoples of Eastern Europe, we would appear to be writing them off.

The President has already indicated his wish to see this provision of the Trade Expansion Act amended so that he might have flexible authority to continue most-favored-nation treat-

ment for Yugoslavia and Poland.² Our vital interests in Eastern Europe require this authority for the President.

Few of us at the time of Stalin's death could have predicted that 10 years later the Soviet Union itself would be involved in a raging ideological dispute over freedom for the writer and artist, that Poland would have all but abandoned agricultural collectivization, that a Hungarian Premier could declare that "whoever is not against us is with us," and that Albania would side with Communist China against the Kremlin. Of greatest moment, however, is the impact which the Sino-Soviet conflict will have on the loyalties of Eastern European parties.

The peoples of Eastern Europe are aware of the disarray in the Communist world. And whether they know it or not, they have contributed to their own welfare by the pressure they have brought against their governments. Whether by passive resistance or occasional overt action, the people themselves have forced changes and concessions from their governments.

We believe that Eastern Europe is today in a state of flux. No one can predict what will evolve. Meanwhile we intend to maintain an active policy which will expand our contacts with Eastern Europeans. We persistently wish to demonstrate that we are concerned with the welfare of these peoples. We are interested in their national aspirations for independence. We want to keep them informed about Western thought in all areas of science and culture.

The process of change in Eastern Europe is bound to continue. The ideological rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China must necessarily have a strong impact on the Communist world. The Common Market factor in European and world trade will add some hardship to the Eastern European countries. Already they are trying to avoid the anticipated disequilibrium by integrating their own economies. At the same time they continue to be fascinated by the possibilities of trade contacts with the West. In the light of all these shifting

² For text of a statement by Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 27, see BULLETIN of June 17, 1963, p. 947.

forces, the United States must pursue a complex policy which can take account of the area's new dynamics.

We wish to respond to the aspirations of the Eastern European peoples, which are basically akin to our own revolutionary ideals. They, too, dream of being able to enrich their lives, to enjoy the responsibility of liberty, and to pursue the goal of happiness. They, too, believe in the dignity of man.

Let us maintain our confidence in these peoples, who through the centuries have endured so much. The tides of change which now encompass the globe are at work in Eastern Europe too. Meanwhile the present phase of ferment throughout the Communist world requires imaginative, active United States policies. These can be effective only if understood and supported by the American people.

The Responsibility of the Individual

And what of your own personal role in these years of unrelenting change? For ultimately the carrying forward of American ideals depends on individual Americans: what kind of ideas move us; what values we cherish; whether a humane morality guides us; with what courage we act; what kind of children we raise; what sort of schools and communities we sustain; what quality of arts, literature, theater, and music we create; how we nourish the sciences; what standards of excellence inspire us; whether we relate ourselves as friends and brothers, regardless of color, religion, or nationality; how we resolve our personal and national crises; and finally, whether we as individuals accept America's responsibility to the world.

There are, of course, many ways in which you can work for the triumph of American ideals. But underlying any life course you may choose must be an enduring commitment to the cause of freedom.

I would hope that many of you will discover that politics is the central means we Americans have for preserving freedom, for continuing our unfinished revolution. We *can* surmount our enormous difficulties at home and abroad, but only if enough educated men and women engage themselves in the struggle of

politics. It does not matter which party you choose. It is imperative to infuse a new responsibility in both parties. Recently a national survey showed that only 4 percent of Americans belong to any political organization. How can we hope to improve our democracy if our political parties are run by such a few!

There are many explosive and compelling needs and conflicts in America. Indeed the present confrontation in race relations is of epic proportions—certainly sharper, deeper, and broader than any since the Civil War. *Now* we must achieve full racial equality not only in civil rights but in all areas including education, housing, and employment. Progress must be accelerated in all sections of our country—North and South, East, West, and Middle West, too. Resolving this major crisis without further violence now—not tomorrow, *today*—is an imperative for us all. Our consciences as individual Americans cannot continue to carry the burden of indifference, brutality, and wrong against our fellow man. Our nation, as the leader of the free world, cannot afford more tragedies like Birmingham and Little Rock. I should add that many Americans are now working hard to eliminate segregation in those areas, as elsewhere.

Finally, I submit that American foreign policy also depends on American politics. It is important that some of you will enter the American Foreign Service, the Peace Corps, AID. Indeed I would urge you to consider giving several years of your lives to serving your country abroad. But fully as urgent is the need for inspired, courageous men and women at home to help shape American politics, which in turn molds our foreign policy.

American politics needs more young leaders who know the times into which you have been born. Our country needs more young men and women who understand the infinite worth of the individual and his freedom. We need more young Americans who want to share our liberties, our abundance, our dreams with others. For it is the unfinished American Revolution which is still the hope of mankind.

As Lincoln said so well, when pondering the meaning of our revolution:

"It was not the mere matter of separation of the colonies from the motherland, but that sen-

timent in the Declaration of Independence which gave liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world, for all future time."

Assistant Secretary Cleveland Visits Europe To Discuss U.N. Affairs

The Department of State announced on June 27 (press release 338) that Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, would leave Washington on June 28 for 10 days of meetings and consultations on U.N. affairs at London, Paris, and Geneva.

In Paris, July 1-4, Mr. Cleveland will attend special meetings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and of its Development Assistance Committee. In Geneva, July 5-7, he will chair a conference of U.S. representatives to various U.N. specialized agencies and speak at a dinner meeting of the Society for International Development. While in London, June 29-30 and July 7-8, he will meet with British officials and take part in talks covering a wide range of topics expected to be discussed at the forthcoming meetings of the U.N. General Assembly and other U.N. bodies. Mr. Cleveland will return to Washington on July 9.

King and Queen of Afghanistan To Visit U.S. in September

White House Announcement

White House press release dated June 17

As announced earlier [February 21] Their Majesties the King and Queen of Afghanistan will make a state visit to the United States in September of this year. It is expected that the royal visitors will reach Washington, D.C., on September 5. On arrival, they will be greeted by President Kennedy and high officials of the United States Government. Following several

days of discussion on matters of mutual interest in Washington between King Mohammed Zahir and the President, Their Majesties will proceed on a tour of the United States. Though their program is still under preparation, it is expected Their Majesties will travel widely in the United States and visit a number of different areas.

The people and the Government of the United States are looking forward to extending a warm and cordial welcome to Their Majesties. It is expected that the visit will serve to strengthen existing friendly ties between the two countries.

U.S. Warns Validated Passport Is Required for Travel to Cuba

Press release 334 dated June 26

The Department of State announced on June 26 that it has recently received information that American students have been offered subsidized travel grants from an agency of the Cuban government—the Federation of University Students in Habana—for travel to Cuba during June and July 1963. Since their travel does not meet the established criteria, their passports have not been validated for such travel.

On January 16, 1961, the Department announced that U.S. citizens desiring to go to Cuba must obtain passports specifically endorsed by the Department of State for such travel.¹ This requirement is still in effect.

Passports of U.S. citizens may be validated for travel to Cuba only when their travel may be regarded as being in the best interests of the United States, as in the case of newsmen.

The Department warns all concerned that travel to Cuba by a U.S. citizen without a passport specifically validated by the Department of State for that purpose constitutes a violation of the Travel Control Law and Regulations (title 8, U.S. Code, sec. 1185; title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, sec. 53.3). A willful violation of the law is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.

¹ For text of announcement, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 178.

North America, the Open Continent

by William R. Tyler

*Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*¹

This is one of the happiest events on our calendar. It is not a national holiday, nor a commemoration of a great and victorious exploit, nor is it a memorial to self-sacrifice or valor. We celebrate today a simple act of common sense—a moment of rationality in the history of nations, a moment to remember, for it contains a spark of hope for the future.

We cannot count the gain that our nations have derived from the Rush-Bagot treaty, and it is useless to speculate on the losses which might have occurred if the treaty had not been observed. We know that the gains have been great and that the agreement set the pattern for an open continent, a continent which has grown and prospered, morally and materially, because it has been an open continent.

To us who live in the shadow of modern armaments, this commemoration of common sense teaches an obvious lesson. It urges us to continue our efforts to achieve disarmament on a worldwide scale. It reminds us that a successful treaty can continue to spread its blessings over generations long after the doubts and roadblocks are forgotten.

Just 17 years ago, Mr. Bernard Baruch appeared before the opening session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and made one of the most generous offers ever made by a nation. But, even then, it was apparent that an atomic victory would be a shallow victory. As Mr. Baruch said at that time: "Let us not deceive ourselves: We must elect World Peace or World Destruction."²

The Baruch plan was approved by every

nation in the world except the members of the Communist bloc. But, without them, the plan could never go into effect.

The choice before mankind has grown more stark in the years that have passed. The primitive atomic weapons had a destructive force measured in kilotons—the equivalent of thousands of tons of TNT. The nuclear weapons of 1963 consist of a whole range of sophisticated weapons, the largest of which has a destructive power that is measured in megatons—millions of tons of TNT. The power to destroy has increased a thousandfold.

Even more disturbing is the increased speed of delivery vehicles. The bombers at the end of World War II had a speed of approximately 300 miles per hour. Today's supersonic bombers can travel half way around the world in less than half a day, and today's missiles can do it in about a half hour.

Requirements for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Without adequate verification procedures, any attempt to limit or control modern weapons is useless, for violations would be easy and the party which conforms to the treaty could quickly find itself at the mercy of the violator.

However, we have not abandoned the possibility of finding mutually acceptable grounds for agreement. In this connection, it would seem to be obvious that there is one area in which the United States and the Soviet Union

¹ Address made at Old Fort Niagara, Youngstown, N.Y., on June 16.

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

have something in common. I refer to the desire to avoid a world war. This is not to say that there appears to be any prospect of the Soviet bloc abandoning its objective of bringing the world under Communist domination. Likewise, it is also clear that the Western democracies will never allow the Communists to do this. But the resolution of this problem is not to be found in all-out war, and the Soviet Union appears to understand this critical fact. There would therefore appear to be an interest in both camps in the necessity of preventing mutual annihilation.

We have recently created a special agency of our Government to coordinate work on the disarmament problem. This agency, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was allotted over \$6 million during the fiscal year now ending. In the budget which the President has submitted to Congress for the coming year, \$15 million has been requested by the administration. Disarmament is of interest to many departments of government—the military, the State Department, and the atomic energy establishments, to name just a few. The President has final responsibility for policy in this field, and it is the purpose of the new agency to see that he is supplied with the advice that can enable him to pursue a vigorous and realistic course.

One of the primary challenges which motivates the new agency is the improvement in methods of verification which can assure us of treaty compliance. We have wherever possible formulated the necessary verification so as to minimize Soviet fears that verification will be used for purposes of espionage. For example, the Congress over the last several years appropriated \$90 million to finance improvements in nuclear test detection and identification. This research, conducted by our Department of Defense, has resulted in scientific advances which have enabled us to reduce our inspection requirements for a test ban treaty.

We are now in a position to offer the Soviet Union two alternative treaties: ³ alternative one, a treaty, with no on-site inspection whatsoever, banning nuclear explosions in the atmosphere,

³ For texts of draft treaties, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 411.

under water, and in outer space—this treaty would involve no intrusion in the Soviet Union by outside inspectors (the parties would rely entirely on their own national capabilities to detect explosions); and alternative two, a comprehensive, across-the-board treaty prohibiting tests in all environments, underground tests as well as those in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water. Such a comprehensive treaty would be monitored by our national detection system, plus seven automatic seismic recording stations on Soviet territory. Because of the need for determining the true nature of underground disturbances which cannot be positively identified either as nuclear tests or natural earth shocks, the United States would require that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union accept seven on-site inspections per year on their territory. The Soviet Union insists upon limiting such on-site visits to three a year and refuses even to consider what the inspections should consist of and how they should be conducted. It is obvious that the modalities of inspections are as important as the number of inspections.

In discussions with Soviet representatives we have asked them to address themselves to methods of providing verification and at the same time preventing espionage. We have indicated a willingness to have inspectors blindfolded while in transit to the site of the inspection, to have them transported in planes in which the windows are blacked out and piloted by Soviet pilots. To these suggestions we have received no response.

The object of the forthcoming mission of Under Secretary [W. Averell] Harriman and Lord Hailsham [British Minister for Science] to Moscow is to convince the Kremlin leaders of the need for action now, for the hour is growing late.

I can assure you that the U.S. Government has not for one instant lost sight of the overriding need for the maintenance of security. The revisions we have made in our position are revisions which reflect new scientific knowledge. We do not seek inspection for inspection's sake. But we do demand that verification be such as to give us assurance that all parties to the treaty are observing that treaty. Anything less would

involve a dangerous risk to the security of the free world.

U.S. and Soviet Disarmament Proposals

The test ban treaty is only one of the objectives we pursue in the field of arms control and disarmament. We have also submitted a proposal for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have submitted at Geneva draft outlines of a treaty for general and complete disarmament.⁴ Each proposal calls for disarmament in three stages and for the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization to supervise enforcement. However, this is where the similarity between the two proposals ends.

I shall point out a few of the major differences.

In the first place, the Soviet Union has tended too much, in our view, to stress full agreement on *all* aspects of disarmament before a single stage or measure of disarmament may be implemented. We believe that agreement on a few isolated measures first might allow us reasonably to evaluate how quickly or slowly we can prudently progress along the road to the ultimate goal, while at the same time assuring our security.

The first few steps in a disarmament program, if achieved with no mishap, should lead to confidence in taking the next. Experience remains the best guide; we learn to walk before we learn to run. If we gain assurance from experience that the other side is really fulfilling its obligations in the primary phases, we might tentatively experiment further. If such assurance is not forthcoming, there is no possibility of further progress. Since assurance cannot be based merely on promises, the United States holds that verification through inspection must be guaranteed. The Soviet Union has resolutely refused to accept this kind of verification and has insisted that, in no small part, the United States must accept the Soviet Union's word.

Secondly, the first stage of the Soviet Union's proposal calls for the almost complete elimina-

tion of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, of all foreign bases, and of the deployment of all troops abroad. In addition there would be reductions in conventional armaments, and, what is more important, such reduction would be effected within 15 months. Obviously such a proposal is a very thinly veiled assault on the entire U.S. and NATO defense system. In contrast, the U.S. plan calls for across-the-board 30 percent reduction in all major armaments over a period of 3 years, or 10 percent per year. In other words, reductions should be proportional, thereby leaving the present balance of power undisturbed.

Thirdly, the U.S. proposals call for more effective measures of control than do those of the Soviet Union. The nature of the Soviet society, one of secrecy, makes it imperative that adequate inspection machinery be guaranteed. Secrecy, we believe, breeds suspicion, and to allay it we must have direct access to evidence of what is occurring in the Soviet Union.

In our search for the long-range solution I have been describing we pursue a flexible course of action:

First of all, we desire to negotiate and agree on a total plan going all the way to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

Second, if this is not possible, we are willing to attain the widest area of agreement short of this that is possible at the earliest possible date.

And *third*, we are also willing to seek agreement on any single measure or group of measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and to implement such an agreement at the earliest possible date.

In this third category we include several limited measures looking toward the elimination of the danger of war by accident or miscalculation. Only one of these proposals, a proposal to provide direct and speedy communication between the United States and the Soviet Union, has found a favorable reaction. Negotiations for the so-called "hot line" have been proceeding smoothly, and an agreement may be effected shortly.⁵

The President of the United States, on June

⁴ For text of a U.S. outline of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, see *ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 747.

⁵ For background and text of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement signed at Geneva on June 20, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

10, announced that the United States would refrain from conducting any nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other countries would do likewise.⁶

As the United States has made clear, through its spokesmen at the United Nations and elsewhere, we have no intention of placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit; we will not precipitate a race for such weapons.

Soviet Advantage in "Propaganda Game"

Negotiation for disarmament has been a long and difficult process. During the last 17 years we have tried to find the key or keys that would unlock the door. While we believe that the Soviet Union will eventually come to realize that its long-range interest lies in disarmament, it is not clear that this point is yet fully appreciated in the Kremlin.

They are in an advantageous position to play the propaganda game on this subject. For the governments of the free world are under constant pressure from citizens, press, and organizations. All of these are concerned about peace, and all are alert to spur their governments on to greater efforts. Some of the more extreme groups even advocate unilateral disarmament.

On the Russian side, there is no parallel activity. There is no freedom to demonstrate, to speak, or to publish in the Communist world. The few peace organizations which exist are puppets of the state and are unanimous and vociferous in their approval of every move made by the Kremlin.

The result is that the Kremlin can get a great deal of mileage on vague and superficial proposals. It can avoid candid replies to questions at the negotiating table. Why should it bother, when the reactions of some of the more naive segments of the peace movement show that they are already ahead of the game so far as public opinion is concerned?

This is, of course, quite the opposite of what the peace movement desires to accomplish. The lesson which the peace movement must learn is that it takes two to make a bargain on disarmament and that it is just as important to place pressure on the Kremlin as on Western

governments—more important, in fact, because there are no peace movements to do the job in Russia. And acceptance, at face value, of sweeping generalities merely proves to the Kremlin that they don't have to bother to get serious.

Open Society of the West

Another unbalanced factor arises from the fact that the NATO alliance is composed of governments which are truly independent and sovereign and that, in the open society of the West, they conduct much public business openly. Across the Iron Curtain we have a quite different situation—a situation in which the Russians command, the satellites obey—a situation in which the newspapers print only the final decisions which are handed to them by state officials.

As a result, little or nothing is published about defense and military discussions in the Communist world. Even in the midst of a heavy arms program, all can be silent but the voice of the don. Here in the West, on the other hand, every new idea is reported at length in the press and debated in parliament. As a result, it is quite easy for a casual onlooker to get the impression that the free world is unduly concerned with arms questions.

We will have to live with this unbalanced situation for a long time. I, for one, would not want to see it changed. Freedom to think, to publish, and to criticize the government is a great heritage of the people, both in the United States and in Canada.

But governments must take note of this situation and must not permit the Communists to exploit it to drive a wedge between our people and our governments, or between the nations within our alliance. We must remain united in tactics as well as policy. Only thus will we be able to teach the Soviet Union that cheap propaganda victories are beyond their reach, that they must turn their efforts toward an honest pursuit of disarmament through serious negotiations.

A deeper understanding of the role of modern weapons in international relations and an understanding of initiatives we can take in their management are byproducts of our efforts to

⁶ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

reach an international disarmament agreement. Another byproduct is the fact that we have a forum in which communication lines between East and West are kept open.

We intend to persist in our efforts at negotiation, regardless of frustrations and discouragements. One obstacle to this agreement is the fact that the Soviets insist on maintaining a tightly closed society, distrustful of international organizations and opaque to international inspection. Without moves in the direction of greater openness, it will be difficult to achieve the verification which is essential if all sides are to have confidence in a disarmament treaty.

It is in this direction, the direction of openness, that the world can find great guidance from the history of our Canadian-American experience. The example of an open continent may eventually lead to the creation of an open world.

U.S.-Canadian Interdependence

Let me conclude by saying a few words about our relations with Canada. Few people realize the extent of the involvement of the two countries with each other. The situation results from geography, the magnitude of the trade between us, the size of the investments citizens of each country own in the other, the complexity of our defense arrangements, our joint water resource problems, and many other factors of interdependence. Fortunately, as neighbors, we can speak frankly to each other; and to be able to do so honestly and responsibly is priceless when the variety and complexity of our points of contact are steadily and inevitably increasing.

A proper view of United States-Canadian relations, however, must encompass not just bilateral problems which we consider together but also the problems which we face in other parts of the world. Happily, these problems do not separate us. We can take deep satisfaction that our interests and objectives and our policies are strikingly parallel. Both of our countries want a world in which trade may develop without discrimination and in accordance with sound economics. We are both disturbed over the threat to the economy and peoples of the free world represented by the

Communist system. Finally, we both need each other in terms of mutual security and defense.

We have come a long way since the Rush-Bagot treaty, and in the interim United States-Canadian relations have been, basically, an example to the world. We can be lifted in spirit by earnestly believing that our future is bright with even greater promise.

Technical Cooperation Programs of U.N. System

The Advisory Committee on International Organizations announced on June 28 the release of a report entitled "The Technical Cooperation Programs of the United Nations System."¹

This report is the second in a series to be made by the Advisory Committee on International Organizations, which was appointed in July 1962 to assist the Department of State in a systematic review of U.S. participation in international organizations and in efforts to assure that these organizations carry on their work as effectively as possible. The first report, issued on April 26, 1963, was entitled "Staffing International Organizations."² Sol M. Linowitz, chairman of the board, Xerox Corp., Rochester, N.Y., and partner in the firm of Harris, Beach, Keating, Wilcox, Dale and Linowitz, is chairman of the advisory committee.³

The report on U.N. technical cooperation programs was submitted to Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland by Mr. Linowitz on June 28. It includes seven recommendations to help strengthen U.S. relations with international organizations and to assure more effective use of funds contributed by the United States for technical cooperation purposes.

¹ A limited number of copies of the report are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

² For an announcement, see *BULLETIN* of May 20, 1963, p. 809.

³ For names of the other members of the committee, see Department of State press release 228 dated Apr. 26.

Role of Individual Women in the World Community

by Mrs. Katie Louchheim

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

Tonight I want to say just a few words to you who have heard almost too many words in the past 10 days. I want to speak to you about our role as individuals. But first of all I want to pay tribute to those who, as individuals, especially gifted individuals, have made this 75th conference of the International Council of Women the great success it has been. Mrs. Jacobs, the president of the National Council of Women, is what we call a "doer"; and to the doers, especially those who combine intelligence with charm, go all the plaudits we can tender them. Your outgoing international president, Mme. Lefauchaux, leaves a record of achievements that all can be proud of. We salute her for her wisdom and devotion. And we greet your newly elected international president, Craig McGeachy Schuller, with cheers and all good wishes. Mrs. Schuller and I were co-workers in the first international war relief effort of World War II, UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration]. It was my good fortune to observe at first hand her capabilities in those critical years. Your future as an International Council is in good hands.

We in the State Department are concerned with the progress and problems of women of other countries. We are anxious to see the bonds of friendship strengthened between the women of the United States and the women of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. We all need to know each other better and to draw from each other new strength and fresh ideas as you have been doing at this meeting.

In order to encourage more contacts between American women and the women of your countries, we have enlarged the participation of women in State Department exchange programs. In the past 3 years more women leaders of other countries have visited the United States

¹ Address made at a dinner meeting of the Joint Conference of the National Women of the United States and the International Council of Women at Washington, D.C., on June 29 (press release 345 dated June 28).

as guests of the State Department and other Government agencies than ever before. More American women than ever before have been traveling to your countries, to meet your leaders and to work with them—not only in great international conferences like this one but in small groups or just woman to woman.

President Kennedy, speaking of a better life for ourselves and for our children in Frankfurt, Germany, said: "To realize this vision, we must seek, above all, a world of peace—a world in which peoples dwell together in mutual respect . . . not a mere interlude between wars but an incentive to the creative energies of humanity." Surely women possess the creative human resources of which President Kennedy spoke. We are the teachers, the hearth-tenders, and the heart-healers; we are the guardians of our heritage.

Today, in an interdependent world, all of us recognize that our roles as individuals assume an even greater importance. We have a folk saying in America which goes, "If you want to send a message that will be heard, you can telegraph, telephone, televise, or tell a woman." Folk sayings are based on fact; increasingly women are being recognized as a crucial factor in education, as opinion makers, and indeed as a major political force.

The power of women who cooperate is limitless. The voluntary contributions of women have changed the faces of their communities, urged reforms that could never have waited for the passage of law, and fought long and hard for the laws that made such reforms permanent.

But it is also as individuals that women can create a climate in which progress can take place. It is as neighbors and homemakers, as well as educators and political leaders, that we have become part of the revolution of rising expectations. It is as idealists and standard bearers in the highways and byways, in the marketplace and in the home, that we have our greatest opportunity to become the spokesman for the rights of all mankind.

A contemporary philosopher, Scott Buchanan, has eloquently stated our case: "The human individual is responsible for injustice anywhere in the universe." If we need proof of this thesis we have but to read the headlines. Crisis

is served with the morning coffee; concern is our shadow; change and challenge our birth-right.

Mr. Buchanan's remarks should not be taken to mean that each of us is responsible for injustice anywhere, but that every one of us has the responsibility for dealing with these injustices. To set the universe as the limits of our responsibility may seem to be exaggerating the case. But if we were to ask that each individual assume responsibility for dealing with injustice in his own community, there would undoubtedly be acceptance of our proposition.

We cannot alter, perhaps, what is going on at the other limits of the globe. But the world is now the kind of place where events in our own community affect not only all of us but all of humanity, even those at the other ends of the earth. And so, for the informed, involved, participating citizen, the responsible woman leader, the community expands; it is not only her village or city, it is also her universe.

I know that each one of you, on your return home, will consider your community in its relation to your country and to the free world. On our side we hope that this great meeting here in Washington will be but the beginning of an enduring friendship and that we will be hearing from all of you.

Grant Awarded to American Institute of Indian Studies

Press release 341 dated June 28

The Department of State is awarding a grant totaling \$1,959,000 in U.S.-owned Indian currency (rupees) to the American Institute of Indian Studies at Poona, near Bombay, to provide a 3-year extension of a program of research studies now completing its first year of operation. The institute, which was incorporated in 1961, provides educational facilities and opportunities to qualified U.S. scholars and students for research and training in Indian studies and for the publication of the results of such studies.

Through the grant some 150 U.S. faculty members and graduate students will receive transportation and maintenance expenses to

pursue research interests in India during the next 3 years. The individual grants provide transportation and full maintenance for faculty fellows and junior fellows except in the case of holders of National Defense Education Act fellowships, who receive international transportation only.

The institute is supported both financially and in planning aspects by a consortium of 33 American colleges and universities which have joined forces for the advancement in this country of knowledge and understanding of India. The institutions are: American, Arizona, California, Chicago, Claremont (University College), Colgate, Columbia, Cornell, Duke, Hawaii, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Michigan, Minnesota, State University of New York, Pennsylvania, Rochester, Rutgers, Sweet Briar, Syracuse, Texas, Wisconsin, and members of the Great Lakes Colleges Association (Albion, Antioch, Denison, DePauw, Earlham, Hope, Kalamazoo, Kenyon, Oberlin, Ohio Wesleyan, Wabash, and Wooster).

In 1962 the institute received a grant of \$500,000 from the Ford Foundation which, with the annual dues (\$500 to \$2,500 for member institutions), is expected to cover costs in the United States for the institute's first 5 years of operation. Also in 1962 the Department made a grant of \$500,000, in rupees, for operating expenses in India for the first year. The Department's support, through its Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, is in funds generated through the sale of surplus agricultural commodities and authorized for use by the Department of State under Public Law 480.

W. Norman Brown, chairman of South Asian regional studies at the University of Pennsylvania, is president of the institute. Milton Singer, chairman of the South Asian Language and Area Center of the University of Chicago, is vice president; Henry C. Hart, chairman of the South Asian Language and Area Center of the University of Wisconsin, is secretary; and F. Haydn Morgan, director of project research and grants of the University of Pennsylvania, is treasurer. McCrea Hazlett, formerly provost of the University of Rochester, has recently been appointed director of the institute and will administer the program

in India. D. D. Karve of India is executive officer of the institute. Its Indian headquarters are at Deccan College in Poona.

Fellows of the institute are either at the post-doctoral level or the immediately predoctoral level and are selected under criteria established by the Board of Trustees. Eligibility is not limited to candidates from institutions holding memberships in the institute. Citizens of other countries who are members of teaching staffs or candidates for higher degrees at American institutions are also eligible to apply.

The broad aim of the program is to encourage the growth of foreign language and area competence in the United States as a means of promoting better international understanding. Activities made possible by the institute are intended to contribute to this goal through scholarly research, through the training of American specialists in the field, and by incorporating knowledge of India into the general education of larger numbers of Americans.

Owners of Real Property in Iraq Notified of Legal Requirements

Press release 339 dated June 27

The American Embassy at Baghdad has been informed of an official notification recently issued by the Government of Iraq, addressed to persons not of Iraqi nationality who own or administer real property in Iraq. The notification refers to Iraqi Laws No. 38 of 1961 and No. 46 of 1962, which, in general, restrict ownership of real property by foreigners to a house for residence and an office for the practice of a profession. These laws also require foreigners to transfer to an Iraqi citizen, within a stated period ending August 15, 1963, real property in excess of what they are legally entitled to own. Property not so transferred is to be sold at public sale.

The recent notification requests foreign owners or administrators of real property, regardless of place of residence, in order to "safeguard their rights in the cost of their estates," either to transfer the legal excess of their Iraqi estate or to submit a statement describing their estate to an Iraqi embassy or consulate.

Jointly Financed Exchange Programs Established With Austria and Sweden

AUSTRIA

Press release 333 dated June 25

U.S. Ambassador James W. Riddleberger and Austrian Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky signed at Vienna on June 25 an agreement which will extend the Austro-American Fulbright program at present levels for at least another decade.

Under earlier agreements,¹ which have been in effect since 1950, all costs of the program were paid for by the United States. The new arrangement, authorized by the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, calls for bilateral financing, with the Austrian Government committing 60 million Austrian schillings (approximately \$2.4 million) for the continued exchange of professors, teachers, students, and researchers and also for the establishment of chairs of American studies at the Universities of Vienna, Graz, and Innsbruck. Other cultural activities are provided for.

The new Austro-American agreement is the second to be concluded which provides for bilateral financing and the first actually to become operative. A German-American agreement signed in November 1962² will take effect upon completion of ratification procedures within the Federal Republic. Similar agreements with other countries are expected shortly.

Through the current academic year, a total of 878 Austrian teachers, lecturers, and students have traveled to the United States, and 628 Americans have gone to Austria. Thus, with the inclusion of 58 renewal grants, a total of 1,564 have been made so far.

The new bilateral agreement was foreseen 2 years ago, when United States and Austrian officials signed an agreement transferring to the Austrian Government full responsibility for the future use of European Recovery Program

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2072, 3279, and 4959.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 17, 1962, p. 923.

(Marshall Plan) counterpart funds and, in connection with that agreement, exchanged notes providing that a portion of the counterpart funds would be earmarked for future Austro-American educational and cultural exchange activities.

SWEDEN

Press release 342 dated June 28

Representatives of the Governments of the United States and of Sweden on June 28 signed an agreement extending the Fulbright program of educational exchanges between the two countries. Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson of Sweden and U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Alfred leSesne Jenkins signed for their respective countries at Stockholm.

The revised agreement provides for the first time for joint financing of the program with Sweden. Such joint financing is authorized by the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. Similar agreements for binational financing have been concluded between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria.

The original agreement³ with Sweden was signed in 1952 by the late Dag Hammarskjöld, as Acting Swedish Foreign Minister, and by the then American Ambassador to Sweden, W. Walton Butterworth.

Since the initiation of the program in 1952, the U.S. Educational Commission in Sweden has administered grants to 216 Swedish citizens who have traveled to the United States or to American schools abroad; and to 62 Americans who have gone from the United States to Sweden, as well as 163 Americans who have gone to Sweden from other European countries.

The level of program funds will be increased to at least \$100,000 a year, with Swedish financial participation. In addition to grants for graduate study and research, the program has introduced American lecturers at all four Swedish universities and teacher exchanges between Swedish and American secondary schools.

³ TIAS 2653; for an announcement, see BULLETIN of Dec. 8, 1952, p. 909.

United States Provides Grain to Korea Under P.L. 480

Press release 340 dated June 27

The U.S. Government on June 27 announced that the United States will make available a total of 200,000 metric tons of grain to the Republic of Korea under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480). The commodities to be provided will satisfy the immediate needs of the Korean people arising from extraordinarily inclement weather in the 1962-63 growing period and most recently aggravated by Typhoon Shirley. One hundred and twenty-five thousand metric tons will be provided under title I (sales for local currency) of the act, the remaining 75,000 tons under title II (grant).

The United States will continue to consult with the Korean Government concerning further emergency food requirements.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Study of Population and Immigration Problems by Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Western Hemisphere (I): 1. Trends in Canadian Population, presentation by Dr. Nathan Keyfitz and Mr. Jacques Henripin; 2. Population Trends in Mexico, presentation by Dr. Nathan L. Whetten. Special Series No. 5; March 11, 1963; 79 pp. Western Hemisphere (II): 1. The Demographic Position of the Caribbean, presentation by Dr. George Woodrow Roberts; 2. The Growth of Population in Central and South America, presentation by Dr. T. Lynn Smith. Special Series No. 6; March 27-April 3, 1963; 106 pp.

Study of International Housing. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on a compendium of papers prepared for the study of international housing. April 22-25, 1963. 232 pp.

Staffing Procedures and Problems in Communist China. A study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations to the Senate Committee on Government Operations. May 15, 1963. 50 pp. [Committee print]

Report on Audit of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, Fiscal Year 1962. H. Doc. 113. May 15, 1963. 53 pp.

Amending the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Report to accompany S. 777. S. Rept. 215. June 6, 1963. 13 pp.

Authorizing the President To Proclaim Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Report to accompany H.R. 6012. H. Rept. 365. June 6, 1963. 38 pp.

Exemption From Duty for Returning Residents. Re-

ports to accompany H.R. 6791. H. Rept. 371, June 7, 1963, 7 pp.; S. Rept. 305, June 25, 1963, 5 pp.; H. Rept. 472, June 26, 1963, 3 pp.

Message from the President transmitting the annual report of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, covering its activities for the calendar year ending December 31, 1962. H. Doc. 122. June 13, 1963. 27 pp.

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1964. Report to accompany H.R. 7063. H. Rept. 388. June 14, 1963. 45 pp.

Continued Suspension and Reduction of Duty on Chicory. Reports to accompany H.R. 2827. H. Rept. 389, June 17, 1963, 2 pp.; S. Rept. 308, June 25, 1963, 2 pp.

Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership—II. Staff Study prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. S. Doc. 21. June 17, 1962. 70 pp.

Excluding Cargo Which Is Lumber From Certain Tariff Filing Requirements. Report to accompany S. 1032. S. Rept. 261. June 19, 1963. 6 pp.

Export-Import Bank Act Extension. Report to accompany H.R. 3872. S. Rept. 262. June 19, 1963. 23 pp.

Continued Exemption From Duty for Certain Tanning Extracts. Report to accompany H.R. 2675. H. Rept. 424. June 19, 1963. 3 pp.

Continued Suspension of Duty on Heptanoic Acid. Report to accompany H.R. 5712. H. Rept. 426. June 19, 1963. 1 p.

U.S. Participation in International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 405. H. Rept. 431. June 20, 1963. 3 pp.

Amendment to the Constitution of the International Labor Organization. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 60. H. Rept. 433. June 20, 1963. 4 pp.

Duty on Polished Sheets and Plates of Iron or Steel. Report to accompany H.R. 3674. H. Rept. 440. June 21, 1963. 3 pp.

Duty on Panama Hats. Report to accompany H.R. 3781. H. Rept. 441. June 21, 1963. 4 pp.

Extending an Invitation To Hold the 1968 Winter Olympic Games in the United States. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 324. H. Rept. 444. June 24, 1963. 2 pp.

Continued Suspension of Duties on Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H.R. 4174. S. Rept. 309. June 25, 1963. 3 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During June 1963

ICAO Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services: Meeting of Operations Division.	Montreal	May 14-June 12
U.N. General Assembly: 4th Special Session	New York	May 14-June 27
ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade and Development: 2d Session.	Geneva	May 21-June 28
ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 5th Session	Bangkok	May 27-June 7
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 13th Meeting.	Halifax	May 27-June 8
2d Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference	Mar del Plata, Argentina.	May 29-June 8
U.N. Special Fund: 10th Session of the Governing Council	New York	June 3-10
3d ECAFE Study Week on Traffic Engineering and Highway Safety	Bangkok	June 4-10
World Food Congress	Washington	June 4-18
ANZUS Council: 9th Meeting	Wellington	June 5-6
International Labor Conference: 47th Session	Geneva	June 5-27
U.N. ECE Rapporteurs Group on Housing for the Elderly	Geneva	June 6-7

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, June 25, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; EEC, European Economic Community; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Adjourned During June 1963—Continued

NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport	Paris	June 6-8
Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean	Washington	June 6-27
OECD Preparatory Group for Meeting of Ministers of Science	Paris	June 10-11
UNESCO Executive Committee on the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments: 4th Session	Paris	June 10-12
ECE Housing Committee	Geneva	June 10-13
OECD Industry Committee: Special Committee for Pulp and Paper	Paris	June 11 (1 day)
ECAFE Ad Hoc Committee on the Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning	Bangkok	June 11-12
OECD Trade Committee	Paris	June 11-12
U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Tungsten	New York	June 11-12
OECD Agricultural Policy Working Party	Paris	June 11-14
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	June 11-21
OECD Committee for Scientific Research	Paris	June 12-13
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	June 12-21
UNICEF Committee on Administrative Budget	New York	June 13-14
OECD Development Assistance Committee on Aid to Somalia	Paris	June 14-15
OECD Oil Committee: Ad Hoc Drafting Group	London	June 17-18
ECE Conference of European Statisticians	Geneva	June 17-21
UNICEF Program Committee and Executive Board	New York	June 17-21
FAO Group on Citrus Fruits: 3d Session	Rome	June 17-22
FAO Committee of Government Experts on the Uses of Designations, Definitions, and Standards for Milk and Milk Products: 6th Session	Rome	June 17-22
FAO North American Forestry Commission: 2d Session	Ottawa	June 17-22
ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	Copenhagen	June 17-30
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices: Working Party I	Paris	June 18 (1 day)
International Wheat Council: 37th Session	London	June 18-21
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments)	Paris	June 19-20
UNESCO Preparatory Meeting for an Interdisciplinary Conference on Scientific Land Research	Paris	June 20 (1 day)
NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee	Paris	June 20-21
OECD Turkish Consortium	Paris	June 21-22
2d FAO/WHO Conference on Food Additives	Rome	June 24-25
GATT/EEC Negotiations on Manufactured Tobacco	Geneva	June 24-26
Antarctic Treaty Meeting on Telecommunications	Washington	June 24-28
Caribbean Organization: 3d Meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee of the Caribbean Plan	San Juan	June 24-29
GATT Cereals Group	Geneva	June 24-29
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee	Paris	June 25-27
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee	Paris	June 25-27
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel	Paris	June 26-28
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee	Geneva	June 27-29
NATO Science Committee	Paris	June 28-29

In Session as of June 30, 1963

ECAFE Training Center Seminar on Customs Administration	Bangkok	May 28-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 30th Session	New York	May 29-
13th International Film Festival	Berlin	June 21-
2d ILO Preparatory Meeting for Inter-American Vocational Training Research and Documentation Center	Rio de Janeiro	June 24-
FAO Council: 40th Session	Rome	June 24-
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission	Rome	June 25-
ILO Governing Body: 156th Session	Geneva	June 28-

In Recess as of June 30, 1963

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed June 21, 1963, until July 30)	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962-
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification (recessed Dec. 15, 1962, until September 1963)	Geneva	Sept. 24, 1962-

U.S. Replies to Soviet Charges Against Certain Space Activities

Following is the text of a letter from Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, together with an enclosed statement on Project West Ford.

U.S./U.N. press release 4219

TEXT OF LETTER

JUNE 6, 1963

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: I have the honor to refer to UN Document A/AC.105/13 dated May 28, 1963, a note by which the Permanent Representative to the United Nations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to Your Excellency a statement entitled "Dangerous United States Activities in Outer Space." My Government feels that the attachment to Ambassador [Nikolai] Fedorenko's note contains so many distortions and is so at variance with the facts as to require correction.

The Soviet statement deals in the main with Project West Ford, an experiment in space communications recently carried out by the United States. It implies that this experiment was undertaken without consultation with the world scientific community and over the protests of international scientific bodies. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am enclosing with this note a paper which outlines the history of Project West Ford, the thoroughgoing advance analysis of the experiment which took account of views of scientists both in the United States and abroad, and the wealth of scientific information made available to the international scientific community prior to the conduct of the experiment. My Government believes that Project West Ford clearly demonstrates the open manner in which United States space programs are conducted. As has already been announced, the scientific results of this project will be made public.

The attachment to the Soviet note alludes also to a United States high altitude test conducted in the summer of 1962. The results of

that test have similarly been made public with comprehensive scientific information disseminated to international scientific bodies. In sharp contrast, the Soviet Union has never announced the high altitude tests which it conducted in the fall of 1961¹ following the unilateral rupture by the Soviet Union of the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing which had been in effect since 1958, nor has the Soviet Union announced, or admitted, the three nuclear tests it conducted at high altitude in the fall of 1962.²

Finally the statement transmitted with Ambassador Fedorenko's note attempts to portray the recent meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space³ as one in which Soviet positions were widely supported. In fact, as the records of the Legal Subcommittee show, the Soviet Union found no support for its positions outside the Communist bloc. Twenty of the twenty-eight members of the Legal Subcommittee were anxious to record progress in framing appropriate instruments to reflect the developing law of outer space. This was obstructed only by Soviet intransigence. The Soviet Union went so far as to try to conceal its role of frustrating progress by emasculating the Subcommittee's report. The records of the Subcommittee meeting, however, tell the story of what took place.

On a related subject, I would like to call attention to the failure of the Soviet Union on a number of occasions to comply with existing arrangements to register with the United Nations, under General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI),⁴ the launching of all objects into orbit or beyond. In reviewing registration data submitted by the USSR, the United States has observed that a number of space vehicles launched into earth orbit by the USSR have been omitted.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1961, p. 844.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 26, 1962, p. 806.

³ For text of a statement made in the subcommittee on May 3 by Leonard C. Meeker, see *ibid.*, June 10, 1963, p. 923.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

These omissions occurred in the Soviet submissions of December 21, 1962 and of April 19, 1963. Now, in its latest registration on May 11, 1963, the USSR has failed to correct these earlier omissions. The proper international designations for these six space vehicles in question are as follows:

1962—Alpha Pi, launched on August 25
1962—Alpha Tau, launched on September 1
1962—Alpha Phi, launched on September 12
1962—Beta Iota, launched on October 24
1962—Beta Xi, launched on November 4
1963—1, launched on January 4

All six space vehicles listed above achieved earth orbit and clearly fall within the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 1721(XVI), which calls upon states launching objects into orbit or beyond to file information promptly through the United Nations for the registration of launchings.

In the Soviet Union's first submission of information to the United Nations on March 24, 1962, it was pointed out that "... in the opinion of the Soviet Union, the information furnished to the United Nations for registration will be of real value if the countries concerned will register now and will continue to register all the artificial satellites of the earth placed in orbit and other objects launched into outer space." Moreover, the USSR also stated at that time its understanding that launching data would be registered "... in the chronological order of launchings."

The United States in its submissions for the United Nations registry therefore left gaps in the sequential numbering of international designations on the assumption that the Soviet Union would report the six space vehicles in question. To date the USSR has not done so, although all six were, in fact, launched into earth orbit by the Soviet Union.

There has been speculation in the press and in scientific publications that certain of the above objects were launched by the United States. Such is not the case. As has been stated several times by the United States representatives at the United Nations, the United States submits information to the United Nations registry on *all* objects it launches into earth orbit or beyond.

I should appreciate your having this note,

with the accompanying statement on Project West Ford, circulated as an official document of the United Nations.⁵

Sincerely yours,

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

Enclosure: Statement on Project West Ford.

STATEMENT ON PROJECT WEST FORD

UNITED STATES SPACE COMMUNICATIONS EXPERIMENT (PROJECT WEST FORD)

Project West Ford is a United States space communications experiment involving the placing of hair-like metallic filaments (dipoles) into a relatively short-lived orbital belt around the earth. The purpose of the experiment is to investigate, under very carefully controlled conditions, the technical feasibility of using such dipoles as passive reflectors for relaying communications and to provide an opportunity for objective assessment of possible side effects of further experimentation with this technique on space activities or any other branch of science.

The first launch of a Project West Ford package took place on October 21, 1961 when a United States Air Force Atlas-Agena B carried into orbit a dispenser package containing 75 pounds of dipoles embedded in naphthalene. The package was expected to release the dipoles in such a way that they would gradually disperse to form a thin, narrow, circular orbital ring about 40,000 miles long at an altitude of about 2,000 miles only a few tenths of a degree in width. Investigation has revealed that the dipoles did not form a belt but rather remained in five or six small clumps.

A second launch of a West Ford package took place on May 9, 1963. The long narrow cloud of dipoles was first identified on May 12, 1963. The cloud is in an orbit which is at an altitude of about 2,300 statute miles and is currently increasing in length at the rate of about 1,000 miles per day. It is only a few tenths of a degree wide. Extensive computations based on the exact initial orbital elements indicate that under presently anticipated physical conditions the life of the belt will be less than three years. To date there have been no reports of interference by any scientists, with either optical or radio astronomy, although information on the orbital elements was immediately circulated to scientists around the world, including the Soviet Union. All of the major experimental equipment prepared in advance for Project West Ford has been tested and successful results have been achieved in each case for limited periods of time.

The experiment was carefully planned to avoid interference with other space activities and other scientific pursuits. In 1961 it was reviewed by a special

⁵ U.N. doc. A/AC. 105/15.

panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, headed by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, which concluded that the United States could proceed with the experiment without harm to science. The Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, in an independent analysis, reached a similar conclusion.

On August 8, 1961 President Kennedy issued a policy statement^o that no additional launches of orbiting dipoles would be undertaken until the results of the first successful experiment could be analyzed and that, in this analysis, the findings of foreign, as well as United States scientists, would be taken into consideration.

Facts regarding Project West Ford have been made widely known. In September 1960, a paper on the orbiting dipoles technique was presented to the International Scientific Radio Union. In April 1961 a series of technical articles on Project West Ford were published in the *Astronomical Journal*. Reprints were provided to some 800 foreign astronomers. Additional data on the expected lifetime of the belt were published in the magazine *Science*, October 6, 1961.

A memorandum by the Space Science Board on the results of the first launch and the modifications planned for the second, accompanied by a detailed report by the Lincoln Laboratory, was sent on March 8, 1962, to members of the West Ford Committee of the International Astronomical Union; to officers of COSPAR [Committee on Space Research] and the International Scientific Radio Union; and to individual scientists and scientific institutions in the United States and abroad. A further letter was sent to the same addressees by the Space Science Board on January 18, 1963, outlining plans for a launch in 1963. Still another memorandum stating that a launch was imminent was sent on May 3, 1963. Information about the experiment has also been given to the international scientific community in various scientific meetings and through articles in a number of scientific journals.

For the second launch several additional precautions were taken to assure that the experiment would not interfere with other space activities. The quantity of the dipoles was reduced to about 50 pounds; a mechanism was included to permit the dipoles to be ejected from the dispenser package only if an orbit were attained in which the life of the dipole belt would be of relatively short duration; and telemetry was included in the dispenser package to indicate the temperature, spin, and tumble rate of the package and the rate at which dispensing was taking place, enabling scientists to learn more about the behavior of the belt in its initial development.

In the initial phase of discussions on Project West Ford concern was expressed by some scientists that other scientific activities might be adversely affected by side effects of the project. This concern, which was notably present in 1961, was largely relieved by information exchanges, independent analysis, consul-

^o Not printed here.

tation and the incorporation into the experiment of suggested scientific safeguards. While some scientists have continued to indicate concern about the experiment, there has been no scientifically documented protest against the experiment since the end of 1961.

The first and most widely known statement of a scientific organization about Project West Ford was the resolution of the International Astronomical Union adopted in Berkeley in late August 1961. The resolution expressed appreciation that the plans for Project West Ford had been publicly announced well ahead of launching and that further launchings would be guided by the President's Policy Statement of August 8, 1961. In the resolution, the IAU expressed opposition to the carrying out of the experiment until the question of permanence of the belt could be clearly settled in published scientific papers. Several articles were published on this subject. The general weight of the articles supported the prediction that the belt would be of short duration if a proper orbit was obtained. Among these articles was "Lifetimes of Orbiting Dipoles" by I. I. Schapiro in *Science* October 6, 1961, copies of which were sent to some 800 foreign scientists. The IAU resolution also called for the fullest observation of the belt of dipoles. The United States made every effort to assist and encourage observation by foreign and American scientists.

As a result of information furnished by the United States, D. H. Sadler, General Secretary of the IAU, stated in a letter to all members of the IAU West Ford Committee on May 9, 1962:

"I am writing to you in connection of my letter H4939 of 13 March 1962 (on Project West Ford). In that letter I suggested that the Union could take one of two, rather extreme, courses and I asked for your views as to which course it should take. I have now received 9 opinions in favour of the second course (essentially to take no action) and one strongly expressed opinion in favour of the first course . . . I have had a long discussion with J. A. Ratcliffe, Chairman of the British West Ford Working Party, as a result of which we agreed that there was no substantial case based on the likely actual interference with radio and optical astronomy for protesting against the proposed second attempt to launch the experimental test belt of Project West Ford. In view of these opinions I am proposing to the Executive Committee that the Union should follow the second course and essentially take no immediate action."

COSPAR has established a Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful Space Experiments which held its first meeting in Paris in March 1963. It is understood that the question of Project West Ford was raised at that meeting. The United States will welcome the comments of the Consultative Group on Project West Ford as it has welcomed the views of other scientific groups and individual scientists.

The United States recognizes that concern still exists among some scientists that there may be poten-

tially harmful side effects from possible future United States experiments of this type. The statement of President Kennedy on Project West Ford should make it clear that the United States will not consider the placing of any further belts in orbit until the results of the current experiment have been analyzed. The United States intends to continue to consult on experiments of this type and to avoid any harmful side effects in carrying out all space activities.

In sum, Project West Ford was undertaken only after the most thorough consideration—it has been discussed more thoroughly in advance than any other space experiment—and was undertaken only after the United States was fully confident that it would not have an adverse effect on any other activity. The United States will welcome the study and analysis of the effects of the belt by all interested scientists.

Antarctic Treaty Countries Hold Meeting on Telecommunications

Final Communiqué

The Antarctic Treaty Meeting on Telecommunications which began [at Washington] on June 24, 1963, came to a close on June 28.¹ Representatives of the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as observers from the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) met in accordance with recommendations of the First and Second Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings to discuss radio communication facilities in the Treaty area (area south of 60°S latitude). After five days of discussion the representatives have unanimously agreed to submit eleven recommendations as a part of the final report to be sent to the governments who have participated.

¹ For background and text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 911; for a statement by President Kennedy at the time the treaty entered into force, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 91.

Acting on the basis of resolutions submitted by the Government of Australia, the Meeting has agreed to recommend to the Consultative Meeting a provisional timetable of radio schedules designed to facilitate a more rapid transmission of meteorological data. It has also agreed to recommend that methods for providing reliable communications to transmit data obtained in the Antarctic Peninsula area to the United States Antarctic station at McMurdo be investigated as soon as practicable by Argentina, Chile, the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition, it was agreed that a tentative routing schedule for the transmission of meteorological data from the observing areas to the terminal stations of the Antarctic radio network would be recommended.

At that time the Meeting was notified by the United Kingdom that it is closing its station at Hope Bay this year. Belgium later told the Meeting that it intends to reopen its Antarctic station this year. Japan said it is considering doing so in the near future, while Norway mentioned that it presently has no such plans.

The Meeting has also agreed to recommend that international radio links in Antarctica be limited as far as possible to those presently agreed on. It also agreed to recommend that nations which may accede to the Antarctic Treaty and are entitled to participate in consultative meetings be invited to co-ordinate their communications with those already established in Antarctica. It was further agreed that the Meeting would recommend that two emergency routes should be maintained. These routes would be available for use if the route selected for a main link became inoperative for any reason.

Turning to the question of aeri-als the Meeting agreed to recommend that directive aeri-als should be provided as practicable for each international Antarctic link and that transmitting and receiving aeri-als provided on each such route should be made complementary in polarization and angle of fire by agreement between the parties concerned. The question of the co-ordination of the techniques employed at both ends of each international radio link was discussed and it was agreed to make certain specific recommendations.

The Meeting considered the question of search and rescue procedures and agreed to recommend that distress traffic would have an absolute priority over all other radio offerings at that time. It also specified the recommended radio operating procedures and recommended that stations providing the assistance shall maintain continuous communication during the search and rescue operation with the station requesting assistance until the station requesting assistance is satisfied that the operation is completed. Radio aids to air navigation were discussed and it was agreed to recommend that certain types of navigational aids be provided as soon as practicable at certain stations which provide landing facilities. It was further agreed to recommend that details concerning navigational aids installed be listed each year in the information exchanged between the Governments.

In response to a resolution submitted by the French representative the Meeting agreed that in view of radio interference to some ionospheric observations caused by radio transmissions at some stations the Meeting would recommend that the beginning of some types of radio transmission schedules be delayed five minutes past the hour to permit scientists to complete certain ionospheric observations under comparative noise-free conditions.

In response to a resolution offered by the United Kingdom and to indications given by the SCAR Observer that the Communications Working Group of SCAR may wish to limit its activities in the field of communications co-ordination, the Meeting agreed to recommend that, if it was deemed necessary at the time of the Third Consultative Meeting, the question of continued co-ordination in the field of telecommunications be discussed.

The Meeting, which was conducted under the Chairmanship of Mr. John M. Jones and which had as its Secretary Mr. Henry E. Allen, was conducted in accordance with the spirit of full cooperation and frank discussion which have come to characterize the meetings held under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Economic and Social Council

- Economic Commission for Latin America, 10th session, Mar del Plata, Argentina, May 1963:
- Report of the third special session of the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee, San José, Costa Rica, July 23-31, 1962. E/CN.12/657. August 15, 1962. 83 pp.
 - Report of the fourth special session of the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, November 15-18, 1962. E/CN.12/658. November 21, 1962. 21 pp.
 - Provisional report of the Latin American seminar on housing statistics and programs. E/CN.12/647. February 1963. 233 pp.
 - Report of the eighth session of the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee, San Salvador, El Salvador, January 21-29, 1963. E/CN.12/672. March 1963. 91 pp.
 - Urbanization in Latin America. E/CN.12/662. March 13, 1963. 36 pp.
 - Provisional annotated agenda. E/CN.12/655/Add. 1. March 15, 1963. 13 pp.
 - Some aspects of the Latin American economic situation in 1962. E/CN.12/679. March 29, 1963. 53 pp.
 - The economic development of Latin America in the postwar world, volume I. E/CN.12/659. April 7, 1963. 172 pp.
 - Towards a dynamic development policy for Latin America. E/CN.12/680. April 14, 1963. 155 pp.
 - Note by the Secretariat on the report of the Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning of the Economic and Social Council. E/CN.12/681. May 25, 1963. 5 pp.
 - Social Commission. Report on the world social situation. E/CN.5/375, March 29, 1963, 13 pp.; Add. 1, March 11, 1963, 319 pp.
 - International Co-operation in Cartography. International Co-operation on the Standardization of Geographical Names. Report by the Secretary-General transmitting to the Council extracts from communications received from Hungary and Norway. E/3718/Add.7, March 20, 1963, 13 pp.; E/3718/Add.8, March 26, 1963, 3 pp.
 - Committee for Industrial Development, third session: Financing of industrial development. E/C.5/26. March 28, 1963. 83 pp.
 - Report of the Center for Industrial Development on activities in the field of industrial development. E/C.5/33. April 22, 1963. 66 pp.
 - Report submitted by the International Labor Organization on activities in industrial development. E/C.5/34. April 22, 1963. 34 pp.
 - Report submitted by the Food and Agriculture Organization on activities in the field of industrial development. E/C.5/34/Add. 1. April 22, 1963. 33 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. Indicates Intention To Ratify International Coffee Agreement

Press release 329 dated June 24

The United States on June 24 informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it intends to ratify the International Coffee Agreement.¹ It is expected this notification will lead to the provisional coming into force of the new International Coffee Agreement at an early date.

For the agreement to enter into force, it requires ratification by 20 coffee exporting countries having at least 80 percent of exports and by 10 importing countries having at least 80 percent of imports. However, the agreement may enter into force provisionally when notifications by signatory governments stating their intention to ratify are received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

To date, 24 exporting countries representing 88.7 percent of coffee exports and 10 importing countries representing 26.8 percent of coffee imports have ratified the agreement or formally declared their intention to do so. As the United States imports 51.7 percent of the world's coffee, today's action raises the total of importing countries to 11 representing 78.5 percent of world imports. It is understood that a number of other importing countries are in a position to quickly ratify the agreement. The prospect is, therefore, that the new International Coffee Agreement will come into force provisionally in the next few weeks and that the first meeting of the Coffee Council, administrative body of the agreement, will be held in July. This will permit quota arrangements to be made well in advance of the new coffee year beginning October 1, 1963.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667, and Apr. 1, 1963, p. 493.

The Senate of the United States gave its advice and consent to ratification of the International Coffee Agreement on May 21, 1963. Implementing legislation is now before both Houses of Congress, and consideration is expected shortly.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.

Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

Application to: Cook Islands, including Niue, May 21, 1963.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Application to: Cook Islands, including Niue, May 21, 1963.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes.

Signed at New York September 28, 1962. Opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962.¹

Ratifications deposited: Cameroon, May 24, 1963; Colombia, May 24, 1963; El Salvador, May 17, 1963.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.²

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material.

Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹

Accession deposited: Jamaica, June 5, 1963.

Health

Additional regulations amending the international sanitary regulations (World Health Organization Regulations No. 2) of May 25, 1951, as amended (TIAS 3625, 4420, 4823, 4896, 5156), with respect to notifications. Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1963. Enters into force October 1, 1963.

Publications

Agreement relating to the repression of the circulation of obscene publications, signed at Paris May 4, 1910, as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force September 11, 1911, and May 4, 1949. 37 Stat. 1511; TIAS 2164.

Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, May 23, 1963.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

Notification of approval: Nigeria, May 6, 1963.

BILATERAL

Ceylon

Agreement amending the agreement of November 17, 1952 (TIAS 2652), for financing certain educational exchange programs, as amended (TIAS 4376). Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo June 17, 1963. Entered into force June 17, 1963.

India

Agreement under title III of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 458; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709). Signed at Washington June 27, 1963. Entered into force June 27, 1963.

Israel

Agreement relating to the reciprocal establishment and operation of radio facilities. Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem May 10 and 21, 1963. Entered into force May 21, 1963.

Korea

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Seoul June 18, 1963. Entered into force June 18, 1963.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, as amended. Signed at Seoul April 28, 1950. Entered into force April 28, 1950. TIAS 2059, 4536.

¹ Not in force.

Terminated: June 18, 1963 (superseded by agreement of June 18, 1963, *supra*).

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 7, 1962 (TIAS 5208). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul June 17, 1963. Entered into force June 17, 1963.

Panama

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 24, 1959. Entered into force: June 27, 1963.

Senegal

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed at Dakar June 12, 1963. Entered into force provisionally June 12, 1963. Enters into force definitively on the date of notification from the Government of Senegal that the agreement has been approved in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 24-30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to June 24 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 314 of June 11 and 324 of June 19.

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329	6/24	U.S. indicates intention to ratify International Coffee Agreement.
*330	6/24	U.S. participation in international conferences.
331	6/24	Reply to Soviet proposal of nuclear-free zone in Mediterranean.
*332	6/24	Ferguson appointed Coordinator for International Aviation (biographic details).
333	6/25	Extension of Fulbright agreement with Austria.
334	6/26	Travel to Cuba.
*335	6/26	Harriman: Minnesota State Bar Association (excerpts).
*336	6/26	Washington Action for Youth Program.
*337	6/26	Junior FSO July 4 celebration.
338	6/27	Cleveland visit to London, Paris, Geneva for U.N. talks (rewrite).
339	6/27	Notification to owners of real property in Iraq.
340	6/27	Emergency food aid to Korea.
341	6/28	Grant to American Institute of Indian Studies.
342	6/28	Extension of Fulbright agreement with Sweden.
*343	6/28	Cultural exchange (South America).
†344	6/29	Negotiations with India for cooperation on nuclear power station.
345	6/28	Mrs. Louchheim: International Council of Women.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Department of State 1963

The Department of State recently released a 152-page illustrated report, *Department of State 1963*, which describes its activities at home and abroad during the past year.

The report opens with a brief discussion of the objectives of U.S. foreign policy and then relates in some detail the different means by which the Department of State has been working for the achievement of those objectives.

In a foreword, President Kennedy expresses the view that "the men and women to whom we entrust this critical task" of promoting our foreign relations, "and the work they accomplish are too little known by the American people whose interests they serve." The President adds, "If it [this publication] helps to convey to you something of the same sense of admiration for these dedicated men and women which I share with many of my predecessors, it will truly serve our national purpose."

The book deals with the activities not only of the geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State but also Department offices less well-known to the general public, such as the Executive Secretariat, the Policy Planning Council, the Offices of Security and Protocol, and the Foreign Service Institute. It also includes sections on the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps, and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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Vol. XLIX, No. 1256



July 22, 1963

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President Kennedy Visits Europe

President Kennedy returned to Washington on July 3 following a 10-day trip to Europe during which he visited the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Following, in chronological order, are texts of joint communiques released at Bonn, Birch Grove House (Sussex, England), and Rome, together with major addresses and remarks made by the President on various occasions during the trip and a brief report broadcast to the Nation on July 5.

THE VISIT TO GERMANY

President's Remarks at the Rathaus, Cologne, June 23

White House press release (Bonn) dated June 23

Chancellor Adenauer, Lord Mayor [Theodor Burauen], citizens of Cologne: It is a pleasure and an honor to sign the Golden Book of this ancient city. I bring you greetings from the citizens of America, including the citizens of Cologne, Minnesota, Cologne, New Jersey, and even Cologne, Texas.

It is most appropriate that I come to this city which is so closely identified with the life and the work of your great Chancellor. It was here, for many years, that he first practiced the art of statecraft which has served the West so well. I am told that the Adenauer name continues on

active duty here in this city. In my own country it is sometimes said that there are too many Kennedys in American public life. But I am certain that no one has made that complaint about the Adenauers in the city of Cologne.

It is also appropriate that I come to a city which has long been a window to the outside world. As a citizen of Boston, which takes pride in being one of the oldest cities in the United States, I find it sobering to come to Cologne, where the Romans marched when the Bostonians were in skins. Many of my educational roots were planted in Boston, but 4 years before Harvard University was founded this was the city of Albert Magnus, who taught St. Thomas Aquinas. For Cologne is not only an ancient German city; it is also an ancient European city, a city which, since Roman times, has

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played a special role in preserving Western culture and Western religion and Western civilization.

The problems of the Western World are in many ways different than they were 2,000 years ago, but our obligations as citizens remain the same—to defend our common heritage from those who would divide and destroy it; to develop and enrich that heritage so that it is passed on to those who come after us. Your fellow citizen, Chancellor Adenauer, has fulfilled these obligations as a citizen of the West in full measure, and in keeping with the symbolic mosaic inside this building, he has worked for peace and freedom in this country, in all of Europe, and in all of the world. In this respect he is true to the saying that the young student in Cologne would go to Paris to learn about life, to Holland to learn to count, and to Great Britain to become a tradesman.

It is in this spirit that I come to Cologne to see the best of the past and the most promising of the future. May I greet you with the old Rhenish saying, "*Koelle Alaaf.*"

President's Remarks at Inauguration of German Peace Corps, Bonn, June 24

White House press release (Bonn) dated June 24

Mr. President, Chancellor, Mr. Ministers: I want to express our warm congratulations to the Federal Republic, to the people of the Federal Republic, for the effort that they are now undertaking.

The United States Peace Corps commenced in 1961, and I believe that it has given us an opportunity to harness the idealism which is, I think, in all free people—has given us an opportunity to be of assistance, not merely in the cold field of economic help but in the human relations which must exist for a happy understanding between people.

Western Europe and the United States really are islands of prosperity in a sea of poverty. South of us live hundreds of millions of people on the edge of starvation, and I think it essential that we demonstrate—we in the United States, we in the Atlantic community—that we demonstrate our concern for their welfare. However repugnant the Communist system is to all of us, it nevertheless has been able to

enlist the devotion of a good many people all around the globe. I hope it is possible for us to demonstrate an even greater devotion in the free society.

Nine thousand Americans will be serving overseas by the end of this year. In some countries of Africa, nearly half of the high school students are being taught by Peace Corpsmen. I cannot think of any people that can serve this cause with greater success and more devotion than the German people. Highly skilled and understanding of the great issues which tear the world apart, I believe that you are greatly needed and that you will, as the President said, find your greatest reward in a service in these very difficult times. Dante once said that the hottest places in hell are reserved for those who in a period of moral crisis maintain their neutrality. This is a moral crisis. This is an opportunity, and I am confident that the German youth and, I hope, the older citizens of this country will find their greatest reward not here, pursuing merely their private pursuit, but in some far-off country. In some small village they will lay a seed which will bring a rich harvest for us all in later days.

I hope that these Peace Corpsmen of America and the members of the German Development Service will be joined by representatives of dozens of other free countries in a great international effort in the 1960's for peace. I congratulate the people of Germany on their commitment to this cause.

Exchange of Toasts, American Embassy Club, Bad Godesberg, June 24

White House press release (Bonn) dated June 24

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

I know that all of us who have come from the United States have been very much warmed, heartened, encouraged, strengthened by the generosity of the reception we have received from all of you and from the people of the Federal Republic. I don't think that there is any substitute, however reliable, and however much we admire the press, for an opportunity to visit firsthand and see the American people as the Chancellor has done, and for us to see the German people. Everything else falls away against this opportunity to come face to face,

so that while the Chancellor and many of us will be meeting on Wednesday in Berlin, I do want to take this opportunity to express our warm appreciation to all of you, the strong feeling of confidence it has given us.

I think it renewed the life—although it didn't really need that—of our relationship, and in every way we have been made extremely happy by our visit. We are very much indebted to you all, and we are most indebted to the people whom you serve.

I want to express my special appreciation to the Chancellor. As I said yesterday, he made, as did my predecessors in the United States, the crucial and correct judgment. I think that he has been generous enough to say that perhaps the United States was the only one that made the long, right judgment in the late forties and in the fifties, and he on his part and all of you as colleagues also made the right judgment, and that entitled my predecessors and will entitle the Chancellor and those who have worked with him, it seems to me, to a very important page in the history of our times, which is going to be recorded, I think, as the most significant times of the last years, in fact, the last centuries. These are the critical days because whether the world survives or not is a matter that comes before us for judgment, at least once every year, and I suppose it is going to go on that rather doleful path, but the Chancellor in his time, meeting his responsibility, made the right judgment, and therefore he is an historic figure and one to whom all of us who believe so strongly in the cause of freedom feel privileged to come and pay him our high esteem. I hope that all of you will join in toasting with me to a distinguished leader of your country and also a distinguished leader of the West, the Chancellor.

CHANCELLOR KONRAD ADENAUER

Mr. President, gentlemen: I am deeply touched by what President Kennedy has just said. I am deeply moved because in my opinion it was the United States, at first Mr. Acheson and Mr. Truman, then Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower, who have helped us Germans, a conquered people, who were completely down at the time.

I don't particularly like to make such acknowledgments, but let us face it: Historic

honesty requires that we say that the war which destroyed Germany was provoked by Germany, that the United States has shown the great vision to help the defeated enemy, which was really a deed which is only very rarely found in history.

You, Mr. President, have been here since yesterday. All of us, since your arrival at the airport, have had so many impressions, so many deeply moving experiences—this is certainly true for me—that we can say that a real epoch has been characterized by this visit. You saw yesterday, as we all did, and you have heard the masses in the squares and you have seen in their eyes the real gratitude which they wanted to express. Now gratitude is a very rare virtue, and certainly it is particularly rare in politics, but you have seen it directly with your own eyes, that these masses of people who lined the streets in Cologne, in the cathedral, in Bonn, in the Market Square, were filled with a real desire to demonstrate to you, as the representative of the United States, how grateful they are for everything that the United States has done, particularly to us Germans. I feel that these impressions may, in the difficult moments which you will face in the future, at a time when you will have to make more decisions, help you a little, and if these impressions at the time you have to make such decisions will be revived in front of you, then they may help you make the decisions with that clarity and that forcefulness which statesmen require.

If we can make a little contribution in this sense, I think that would be the best result of your visit here. I want to thank you in the name of all of us Germans for coming here, and I want to emphasize between the United States and us, after all that is behind us, no split or separation or whatever you want to call it will ever happen again. We realize that the leadership is yours, not only because of your great nuclear strength but because of the great political acumen and the moral strength which you and your country have shown. It is, let me say it again, you, as the victors, gave your hand to us as the vanquished, that this is something which I think is the finest that any people can do.

May the memories of these days of your visit

to Germany remain alive, and may the thanks of the thousands contribute a little to help you make decisions in the same spirit which the United States has shown in the past and which forever has insured for the United States a golden page in history. I propose a toast in honor of the President of the United States.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Thank you very much.

Communique Between President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer, Bonn, June 24

White House press release (Bonn) dated June 24

The President of the United States of America, John F. Kennedy, visited Bonn on June 23 and 24 and held talks with leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany. He had a private visit with Federal President [Heinrich] Lübke, and on June 24 met privately with Chancellor Adenauer for detailed discussions on the general international situation. The President and the Chancellor were later joined by Secretary of State Rusk, Vice-Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard and the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, [Gerhard] Schröder, as well as other officials and advisers of the two Governments.

President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer discussed European integration, relations between the European Community and other nations of Europe, progress toward the achievement of the Atlantic partnership, and the problems of Berlin and German reunification. In this connection, they had an exchange of views on Western policy toward the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

The President and the Chancellor were in agreement that the two Governments would continue their close collaboration in the task of developing genuine unity among the nations of Europe and fostering an integrated European Community in close partnership with the United States. On questions of economics and trade, both in their multilateral and bilateral aspects, the President and the Chancellor reaffirmed their agreement on basic aims; among these matters they stressed in particular the need for stronger participation in world trade by the developing countries. They agreed that the strength of the Free World rests in common policies and common aims pursued jointly by

all the nations dedicated to establishing peace in freedom.

The Federal Government shares the view of the United States and other allied powers that controlled disarmament and agreement on the cessation of atomic weapons tests would constitute an important step toward the avoidance of a dangerous armaments race.

The exchange of views confirmed full agreement of the principle that the North Atlantic Alliance continues to be a major instrument for the maintenance of freedom, and the President and the Chancellor agreed that every effort will be made to strengthen common defense planning and joint operation of NATO defense forces.

The President and the Chancellor discussed the proposed multilateral seaborne MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] force. The multilateral organization is considered a good instrument for serving all members of the Alliance in combining their defense efforts. They reaffirmed their agreement to use their best efforts to bring such a force into being. They also agreed that discussions about the principal questions involved in the establishment of such a force should be pursued with other interested Governments.

They reaffirmed the commitment of their two Governments to the right of self-determination, as embodied in the United Nations Charter, and to the achievement of German reunification in peace and freedom. They agreed that the freedom of Berlin will be preserved by every necessary means, and that the two Governments would seek every opportunity to counter the inhuman effects of the Wall. They also agreed that the two Governments would continue to seek to reduce tension through international understanding.

Peace and freedom are prerequisites for overcoming the obstacles that still prevent the greater part of mankind from enjoying full participation in social and economic development. The President and the Chancellor affirmed that the Governments of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are determined to assume their part in these tasks in the context of the free world's strategy of peace.

The discussions took place in a spirit of frankness and cordiality. These meetings have shown full agreement between the two Governments in assessing the international situation, and have once again demonstrated the close and friendly relations which exist between the two countries.

President's Remarks at the Roemerberg Square, Frankfurt, June 25

White House press release (Frankfurt) June 25

Mr. Mayor, Minister-President, Minister Erhard, ladies and gentlemen: Coming as I do from the oldest major city in the United States, I am proud to come to this city. I drove from Hanau to Frankfurt. All along the way the Minister-President pointed out those people along the street who belong to the SPD [German Socialist Party], while Minister Erhard pointed out all those who belonged to the CDU [Christian Democratic Union]. Even though I have been here for almost 3 days, I am yet unable to make the distinction or see the difference. In any case, I see friends.

I was in this city in 1948. I therefore have some idea what the people of this city have done to rebuild Frankfurt so it is now a vital place in a free Germany. There is an old saying that only in winter can you tell which trees are evergreen. I think the people of this city have proved not only their character and their courage but also their commitment to freedom and opportunity to live together with their fellow Germans in a free and peaceful society.

People from Europe came to my country for three reasons: either because of famine and a denial of opportunity, or because of their desire for religious freedom, or because of their desire for political freedom. It was mostly the citizens of Germany and of Frankfurt who came to our country because of their desire in the mid-19th century for political freedom, and therefore they have been among the most independent, the most responsible, and the most progressive of our citizens. Today in our far-off country of the United States, in 20 States of the Union, there are cities with the name of Frankfurt which were founded by citizens of this city who carried with them to the New World the strong commitment to freedom of this city and the Old.

Political leaders come and go. What I hope remains between the United States and Germany is not only a strong feeling of sympathy and friendship but also a recognition in this great struggle in which we now exist, this great struggle to which we have devoted our lives, the struggle to maintain freedom and expand it throughout the world. It is my hope that this country and my own will work in partnership and harmony in the years ahead. That is the best insurance for not only our survival, not only the peace of the world, but also for the maintenance of that commitment to freedom which I think gives hope of having it spread throughout the globe. Abraham Lincoln in the dark days before the Civil War in my own country said, "I know there is a God. I see a storm coming. If He has a part and a place for me, then I am ready." No one can tell in the future whether there is a storm coming for all of us, but what we can be sure of is that no matter what happens, we believe in God and we are ready.

Thank you very much. *Danke schön.*

President's Address at the Paulskirche, Frankfurt, June 25

White House press release (Frankfurt) dated June 25; as-delivered text

Dr. Gerstenmaier, Mr. President Giesinger, Chancellor Erhard, Minister-President Zinn, Mayor Bockelmann, ladies and gentlemen: I am most honored, Mr. President, to be able to speak in this city before this audience, for in this hall I am able to address myself to those who lead and serve all segments of a democratic system, Mayors, Governors, Members of Cabinets, civil servants, and concerned citizens. As one who has known the satisfaction of the legislator's life, I am particularly pleased that so many Members of your Bundestag and Bundesrat are present today, for the vitality of your legislature has been a major factor in your demonstration of a working democracy, a democracy worldwide in its influence. In your company also are several of the authors of the Federal Constitution who have been able through their own political service to give a new and lasting validity to the aims of the Frankfurt Assembly.

One hundred and fifteen years ago a most learned parliament was convened in this his-

toric hall. Its goal was a united German federation. Its members were poets and professors, lawyers and philosophers, doctors and clergymen, freely elected in all parts of the land. No nation applauded its endeavors as warmly as my own. No assembly ever strove more ardently to put perfection into practice. And though in the end it failed, no other building in Germany deserves more the title of "cradle of German democracy."

But can there be such a title? In my own home city of Boston, Faneuil Hall—once the meeting place of the authors of the American Revolution—has long been known as the "cradle of American liberty." But when, in 1852, the Hungarian patriot Kossuth addressed an audience there, he criticized its name. "It is," he said, "a great name—but there is something in it which saddens my heart. You should not say 'American liberty.' You should say 'liberty in America.' Liberty should not be either American or European—it should just be 'liberty.'"

Kossuth was right. For unless liberty flourishes in all lands, it cannot flourish in one. Conceived in one hall, it must be carried out in many. Thus the seeds of the American Revolution had been brought earlier from Europe, and they later took root around the world. And the German Revolution of 1848 transmitted ideas and idealists to America and to other lands. Today, in 1963, democracy and liberty are more international than ever before. And the spirit of the Frankfurt Assembly, like the spirit of Faneuil Hall, must live in many hearts and nations if it is to live at all.

For we live in an age of interdependence as well as independence—an age of internationalism as well as nationalism. In 1848 many countries were indifferent to the goals of the Frankfurt Assembly. It was, they said, a German problem. Today there are no exclusively German problems, or American problems, or even European problems. There are world problems—and our two countries and continents are inextricably bound together in the tasks of peace as well as war.

We are partners for peace—not in a narrow bilateral context but in a framework of Atlantic partnership. The ocean divides us less than the Mediterranean divided the ancient world

of Greece and Rome. Our Constitution is old and yours is young, and our culture is young and yours is old, but in our commitment we can and must speak and act with but one voice. Our roles are distinct but complementary—and our goals are the same: peace and freedom for all men, for all time, in a world of abundance, in a world of justice.

That is why our nations are working together to strengthen NATO, to expand trade, to assist the developing countries, to align our monetary policies, and to build the Atlantic community. I would not diminish the miracle of West Germany's economic achievements. But the true German miracle has been your rejection of the past for the future—your reconciliation with France, your participation in the building of Europe, your leading role in NATO, and your growing support for constructive undertakings throughout the world.

Your economic institutions, your constitutional guarantees, your confidence in civilian authority, are all harmonious to the ideals of older democracies. And they form a firm pillar of the democratic European community.

But Goethe tells us in his greatest poem that Faust lost the liberty of his soul when he said to the passing moment: "Stay, thou art so fair." And our liberty, too, is endangered if we pause for the passing moment, if we rest on our achievements, if we resist the pace of progress. For time and the world do not stand still. Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or the present are certain to miss the future.

The future of the West lies in Atlantic partnership—a system of cooperation, interdependence, and harmony whose peoples can jointly meet their burdens and opportunities throughout the world. Some say this is only a dream, but I do not agree. A generation of achievement—the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Schuman Plan, and the Common Market—urges us up the path to greater unity.

There will be difficulties and delays. There will be doubts and discouragement. There will be differences of approach and opinion. But we have the will and the means to serve three related goals—the heritage of our countries, the unity of our continents, and the interdependence of the Western alliance.

Some say that the United States will neither hold to these purposes nor abide by its pledges—that we will revert to a narrow nationalism. But such doubts fly in the face of history. For 18 years the United States has stood its watch for freedom all around the globe. The firmness of American will and the effectiveness of American strength have been shown, in support of free men and free government, in Asia, in Africa, in the Americas, and, above all, here in Europe. We have undertaken, and sustained in honor, relations of mutual trust and obligation with more than 40 allies. We are proud of this record, which more than answers doubts. But in addition these proven commitments to the common freedom and safety are assured, in the future as in the past, by one great fundamental fact—that they are deeply rooted in America's own self-interest. Our commitment to Europe is indispensable—in our interest as well as yours.

It is not in our interest to try to dominate the European councils of decision. If that were our objective, we would prefer to see Europe divided and weak, enabling the United States to deal with each fragment individually. Instead we have and now look forward to a Europe united and strong—speaking with a common voice, acting with a common will—a world power capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner.

This is in the interest of us all. For war in Europe, as we learned twice in 40 years, destroys peace in America. A threat to the freedom of Europe is a threat to the freedom of America. That is why no administration—no administration—in Washington can fail to respond to such a threat—not merely from good will but from necessity. And that is why we look forward to a united Europe in an Atlantic partnership—an entity of interdependent parts, sharing equally both burdens and decisions and linked together in the tasks of defense as well as the arts of peace.

This is no fantasy. It will be achieved by concrete steps to solve the problems that face us all: military, economic, and political. Partnership is not a posture but a process, a continuous process that grows stronger each year as we devote ourselves to common tasks.

The *first* task of the Atlantic community was to assure its common *defense*. That defense was and still is indivisible. The United States will risk its cities to defend yours because we need your freedom to protect ours. Hundreds of thousands of our soldiers serve with yours on this continent, as tangible evidence of that pledge. Those who would doubt our pledge or deny this indivisibility—those who would separate Europe from America or split one ally from another—would only give aid and comfort to the men who make themselves our adversaries and welcome any Western disarray.

The purpose of our common military effort is not war but peace, not the destruction of nations but the protection of freedom. The forces that West Germany contributes to this effort are second to none among the Western European nations. Your nation is in the frontline of defense, and your divisions, side by side with our own, are a source of strength to us all.

These conventional forces are essential, and they are backed by the sanction of thousands of the most modern weapons here on European soil and thousands more, only minutes away, in posts around the world. Together our nations have developed for the forward defense of free Europe a deterrent far surpassing the present or prospective force of any hostile power.

Nevertheless it is natural that America's nuclear position has raised questions within the alliance. I believe we must confront these questions, not by turning the clock backward to separate nuclear deterrents but by developing a more closely unified Atlantic deterrent, with genuine European participation.

How this can best be done, and it is not easy—in some ways more difficult than to split the atom physically—how this can best be done is now under discussion with those who may wish to join in this effort. The proposal before us is for a new Atlantic force. Such a force would bring strength instead of weakness, cohesion instead of division. It would belong to all members, not one, with all participating on a basis of full equality. And as Europe moves toward unity, its role and responsibility, here as elsewhere, would and must increase accordingly.

Meanwhile there is much to do. We must work more closely together on strategy, train-

ing, and planning. European officers from NATO are being assigned to Strategic Air Command headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. Modern weapons are being deployed here in Western Europe. And America's strategic deterrent, the most powerful in history, will continue to be at the service of the whole alliance.

Second: Our partnership is not military alone. *Economic* unity is also imperative, not only among the nations of Europe but across the wide Atlantic. Indeed, economic cooperation is needed throughout the entire free world. By opening our markets to the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, by contributing our capital and our skills, by stabilizing basic prices, we can help assure them of a favorable climate for freedom and growth. This is an Atlantic responsibility. For the Atlantic nations themselves helped to awaken these peoples. Our merchants and traders ploughed up their soils—and their societies as well—in search of minerals and oil and rubber and coffee. Now we must help them gain full membership in the 20th century, closing the gap between rich and poor.

Another great economic challenge is the coming round of trade negotiations. Those deliberations are much more important than a technical discussion of trade and commerce. They are an opportunity to build common industrial and agricultural policies across the Atlantic. They are an opportunity to open up new sources of demand, to give new impetus to growth, and make more jobs and prosperity, for our expanding populations. They are an opportunity to recognize the trading needs and aspirations of other free-world countries, including Japan.

In short, these negotiations are a test of our unity. While each nation must naturally look out for its own interests, each nation must also look out for the common interest—the need for greater markets on both sides of the Atlantic, the need to reduce the imbalance between developed and underdeveloped nations, and the need to stimulate the Atlantic economy to higher levels of production rather than to stifle it by higher levels of protection.

We must not return to the 1930's, when we exported to each other our own stagnation. We must not return to the discredited view that

trade favors some nations at the expense of others. Let no one think that the United States, with only a fraction of its economy dependent on trade and only a small part of that with Western Europe, is seeking trade expansion in order to dump our goods on this continent. Trade expansion will help us all. The experience of the Common Market, like the experience of the German Zollverein, shows an increased rise in business activity and general prosperity resulting for all participants in such trade agreements, with no member profiting at the expense of another. As they say on my own Cape Cod, a rising tide lifts all the boats. And a partnership, by definition, serves both partners, without domination or unfair advantage. Together we have been partners in adversity; let us also be partners in prosperity.

Beyond development and trade is monetary policy. Here again our interests run together. Indeed there is no field in which the wider interest of all more clearly outweighs the narrow interest of one. We have lived by that principle, as bankers to freedom, for a generation. Now that other nations, including West Germany, have found new economic strength, it is time for common efforts here, too. The great free nations of the world must take control of our monetary problems if those problems are not to take control of us.

Third and finally, our partnership depends on common *political* purpose. Against the hazards of division and lassitude, no lesser force will serve. History tells us that disunity and relaxation are the great internal dangers of an alliance. Thucydides reported that the Peloponnesians and their allies were mighty in battle but handicapped by their policymaking body—in which, he related “each presses its own ends . . . which generally results in no action at all . . . they devote more time to the prosecution of their own purposes than to the consideration of the general welfare—each supposes that no harm will come of his own neglect, that it is the business of another to do this or that—and so, as each separately entertains the same illusion, the common cause imperceptibly decays.”

Is that also to be the story of the Grand Alliance? Welded in a moment of imminent dan-

ger, will it disintegrate in complacency, with each member pressing its own ends to the neglect of the common cause? This must not be the case. Our old dangers are not gone beyond return, and any division among us would bring them back in doubled strength.

Our defenses are now strong, but they must be made stronger. Our economic goals are now clear, but we must get on with their performance. And the greatest of our necessities, the most notable of our omissions, is progress toward unity of political purpose.

For we live in a world in which our own united strength and will must be our first reliance. As I have said before, and will say again, we work toward the day when there may be real peace between us and the Communists. We will not be second in that effort. But that day is not yet here.

We in the United States and Canada are 200 million, and here on the European side of the Atlantic alliance are nearly 300 million more. The strength and unity of this half billion human beings are and will continue to be the anchor of all freedom, for all nations. Let us from time to time pledge ourselves again to the common purposes. But let us go on, from words to actions, to intensify our efforts for still greater unity among us, to build new associations and institutions on those already established. Lofty words cannot construct an alliance or maintain it; only concrete deeds can do that.

The great present task of construction is here on this continent, where the effort for a unified free Europe is under way. It is not for Americans to prescribe to Europeans how this effort should be carried forward. Nor do I believe that there is any one right course or any single final pattern. It is Europeans who are building Europe.

Yet the reunion of Europe, as Europeans shape it—bringing a permanent end to the civil wars that have repeatedly wracked the world—will continue to have the determined support of the United States. For that reunion is a necessary step in strengthening the community of freedom. It would strengthen our alliance for its defense. And it would be in our national interest as well as yours.

It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us all against fragmentation of the alliance. Only such a Europe will permit full reciprocity of treatment across the ocean, in facing the Atlantic agenda. With only such a Europe can we have a full give-and-take between equals, an equal sharing of responsibilities, and an equal level of sacrifice. I repeat again—so that there may be no misunderstanding—the choice of paths to the unity of Europe is a choice which Europe must make. But as you continue this great effort, undeterred by either difficulty or delay, you should know that this new European greatness will be not an object of fear but a source of strength for the United States of America.

There are other political tasks before us. We must all learn to practice more completely the art of consultation on matters stretching well beyond immediate military and economic questions. Together, for example, we must explore the possibilities of leashing the tensions of the cold war and reducing the dangers of the arms race. Together we must work to strengthen the spirit of those Europeans who are now not free, to reestablish their old ties to freedom and the West, so that their desire for liberty, and their sense of nationhood, and their sense of belonging to the Western community will survive for future expression. We ask those who would be our adversaries to understand that in our relations with them we will not bargain one nation's interest against another's and that the commitment to the cause of freedom is common to us all.

All of us in the West must be faithful to our conviction that peace in Europe can never be complete until everywhere in Europe—and that includes Germany—men can choose, in peace and freedom, how their countries shall be governed and choose, without threat to any neighbor, reunification with their countrymen.

I preach no easy liberation and I make no empty promises, but my countrymen, since our country was founded, believe strongly in the proposition that all men shall be free and all free men shall have this right of choice.

As we look steadily eastward in the hope and purpose of new freedom, we must also look—and ever more closely—to our transatlantic ties.

The Atlantic community will not soon become a single overarching superstate. But practical steps toward stronger common purpose are well within our means. As we widen our common effort in defense and our threefold cooperation in economics, we shall inevitably strengthen our political ties as well. Just as your current efforts for unity in Europe will produce a stronger voice in the dialog between us, so in America our current battle for the liberty and prosperity of all citizens can only deepen the meaning of our common historic purposes. In the far future there may be a new great union for us all. But for the present there is plenty for all to do in building new and enduring connections.

In short, the words of Thucydides are a warning, not a prediction. We have it in us, as 18 years have shown, to build our defenses, to strengthen our economies, and to tighten our political bonds, both in good weather and in bad. We can move forward with the confidence that is born of success and the skill that is born of experience. And as we move, let us take heart from the certainty that we are not only united by danger and necessity but by hope and purpose as well.

For we know now that freedom is more than the rejection of tyranny, that prosperity is more than an escape from want, that partnership is more than a sharing of power. These are all, above all, great human adventures. They must have meaning and conviction and purpose—and because they do, in your country now and in mine, in all the nations of the alliance, we are called to a great new mission.

It is not a mission of self-defense alone, for that is a means, not an end. It is not a mission of arbitrary power, for we reject the idea that one nation should dominate another. The mission is to create a new social order, founded on liberty and justice, in which men are the masters of their fate, in which states are the servants of their citizens, and in which all men and women can share a better life for themselves and their children. That is the object of our common policy.

To realize this vision, we must seek, above all, a world of peace—a world in which peoples dwell together in mutual respect and work together in mutual regard, a world where peace

is not a mere interlude between wars but an incentive to the creative energies of humanity. We will not find such a peace today, or even tomorrow. The obstacles to hope are large and menacing. Yet the goal of a peaceful world must—today and tomorrow—shape our decisions and inspire our purposes.

So we are all idealists. We are all visionaries. Let it not be said of this Atlantic generation that we left ideals and visions to the past, nor purpose and determination to our adversaries. We have come too far, we have sacrificed too much, to disdain the future now. And we shall ever remember what Goethe told us, that the “highest wisdom, the best that mankind ever knew” was the realization that “he only earns his freedom and existence who daily conquers them anew.”

Thank you.

President's Remarks Before Industrial Trade Union of Construction Workers, Berlin, June 26

White House press release (Berlin) dated June 26

I am not a stranger to trade union meetings, and therefore I feel most at home here today. I appreciated the invitation which was extended to me through George Meany to join you, Mr. Rosenberg, Mr. Leber, your distinguished Mayor [Willy Brandt], your distinguished Chancellor, and have an opportunity to talk to those of you whose work is essential in these very difficult and dangerous days.

Below is written a quotation in this building from Benjamin Franklin, which says, “. . . God grant that not only the love of liberty, but a thorough knowledge of the rights of men, may pervade all the nations of the earth, so that a philosopher may set his foot anywhere on its surface, and say, ‘This is my country.’” West Berlin is my country.

Benjamin Franklin once said to Thomas Paine, the great American revolutionary, “Where freedom is, there is where I live.” And Paine replied, “Where freedom is not, there is where I live, because no man or country can be really free unless all men and all countries are free.”

It is no accident that during the last 40 years the prime target of the Communist movement has been the destruction of the free trade union

movement. Once the free trade union movement is destroyed, once it is harnessed to the chariot of the state, once trade union leaders are nominated by the head of the state, once meetings such as this become formalities, endorsing the purposes of the state, the trade union movement is destroyed and so is democracy.

Therefore, what you do in this country to maintain freedom, the contributions that you make to improve the welfare of your people, the great sense of responsibility you feel not only toward your members, not only toward your country, not only toward other trade unions, in other countries, but your sense of responsibility for the whole movement of freedom—so long as that exists the world can look to the future with hope.

So I am glad and proud to come here today. In the United States, in the last 30 years, all of the great efforts that were made at home and abroad—Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, President Truman's effort through Marshall Plan, NATO, Point 4, and all the rest, and the effort that President Eisenhower made—all of these great international efforts, as well as great progressive national movements, had the strong endorsement and support of the AFL-CIO, led by Mr. George Meany, who has stood for freedom in the United States and around the globe. Therefore I urge you, gentlemen, in meeting your responsibilities to those who belong to your unions, to also realize that your unions will not survive except in a world of freedom. I urge you to hold out, as we are trying to do in the United States in the AFL-CIO, a helping hand to those who seek to organize trade unions in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This is how a free society remains free, and, in addition, while freedom is an end in itself, it is also a means.

I think that nothing has been more destructive to the myth that once existed that, while communism meant a loss of personal liberty, it was a means of economic advancement. If there is any myth that has been destroyed in the last 10 years, it has been the concept that communism and economic welfare go hand in hand. I believe our times have shown that freedom is the handmaiden of economic advancement, that through a system of freedom,

through a system of progress, through a system of responsibilities within a free society, that is the best way that people can live, not only peacefully at night and in the daytime, but also can enjoy an increasingly high standard of living. That is what we want freedom for, not only so we can exist ourselves and develop our own personalities but so that our people can move ahead: the people in my country who are entitled to an equal opportunity which we are now fighting to give them, the people in this country who desire not only to be free but to make it possible for their children to live better than they lived. And here in Western Europe and in the United States, where the trade union movement has played such an important role, I hope it will be an example to those who live to the south of us, who stand on the razor edge of moving into some kind of totalitarianism or developing a free, progressive society, where, through the trade union movements, the fruits of progress, the fruits of production, can be distributed fairly to the population—not by a leader but by the people themselves.

So I regard this movement as important, this meeting as essential, and I regard it as a privilege to come here. This is a great city. It has meant a lot in the history of the last 18 years. I am proud to be here with General [Lucius D.] Clay. Americans may be far away, but in accordance with what Benjamin Franklin said, this is where we want to be today. When I leave tonight, I leave and the United States stays.

Thank you.

President's Remarks Upon Signing the Golden Book, Berlin, June 26

White House press release (Berlin) dated June 26

I am proud to come to this city as the guest of your distinguished Mayor, who has symbolized throughout the world the fighting spirit of West Berlin, and I am proud to visit the Federal Republic with your distinguished Chancellor who, for so many years, has committed Germany to democracy and freedom and progress, and to come here in the company of my fellow American, General Clay, who has been in this city during its great moments of crisis and will come again if ever needed.

Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was "*Civitas Romanus sum.*" Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is "*Ich bin ein Berliner.*" (I appreciate my interpreter translating my German.)

There are many people in the world who really don't understand, or say they don't, what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin. And there are even a few who say that it is true that communism is an evil system but it permits us to make economic progress. *Lasst sie nach Berlin kommen.*

Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect, but we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us. I want to say, on behalf of my countrymen, who live many miles away on the other side of the Atlantic, who are far distant from you, that they take the greatest pride that they have been able to share with you, even from a distance, the story of the last 18 years. I know of no town, no city, that has been besieged for 18 years that still lives with the vitality and the force and the hope and the determination of the city of West Berlin. While the wall is the most obvious and vivid demonstration of the failures of the Communist system, for all the world to see, we take no satisfaction in it for it is, as your Mayor has said, an offense not only against history but an offense against humanity, separating families, dividing husbands and wives and brothers and sisters, and dividing a people who wish to be joined together.

What is true of this city is true of Germany—real, lasting peace in Europe can never be assured as long as one German out of four is denied the elementary right of free men, and that is to make a free choice. In 18 years of peace and good faith, this generation of Germans has earned the right to be free, including the right to unite their families and their nation in lasting peace, with good will to all people. You live in a defended island of freedom, but your life is part of the main.

So let me ask you, as I close, to lift your eyes beyond the dangers of today to the hopes of tomorrow, beyond the freedom merely of this city of Berlin, or your country of Germany, to the advance of freedom everywhere, beyond the wall to the day of peace with justice, beyond yourselves and ourselves to all mankind. Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved all are not free. When all are free, then we can look forward to that day when this city will be joined as one and this country and this great continent of Europe in a peaceful and hopeful glow. When that day finally comes, as it will, the people of West Berlin can take sober satisfaction in the fact that they were in the frontlines for almost two decades.

All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and, therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words "*Ich bin ein Berliner.*"

President's Address at Free University, Berlin, June 26

White House press release (Berlin) dated June 26; as-delivered text

Sir, Mr. Mayor, Chancellor, distinguished Ministers, members of the faculty, and Fellows of this university, fellow students: I am honored to become an instant graduate of this distinguished university. The fact of the matter is, of course, that any university, if it is a university, is free. So one might think that the words "Free University" are redundant. But not in West Berlin. So I am proud to be here today, and I am proud to have this association, on behalf of my fellow countrymen, with this great center of learning.

Prince Bismarck once said that one-third of the students of German universities broke down from overwork, another third broke down from dissipation, and the other third ruled Germany. I do not know which third of the student body is here today, but I am confident that I am talking to the future rulers of this country, and also of other free countries, stretching around the world, who have sent their sons and daughters to this center of freedom in order to understand what the world struggle is all about. I know that when you leave this school you will not imagine that this institution was founded by citizens of the world, including my own

country, and was developed by citizens of West Berlin—that you will not imagine that these men who teach you have dedicated their life to your knowledge—in order to give this school's graduates an economic advantage in the life struggle. This school is not interested in turning out merely corporation lawyers or skilled accountants. What it is interested in—and this must be true of every university—is it must be interested in turning out citizens of the world, men who comprehend the difficult, sensitive tasks that lie before us as free men and women, and men who are willing to commit their energies to the advancement of a free society. That is why you are here, and that is why this school was founded, and all of us benefit from it.

It is a fact that in my own country in the American Revolution that revolution and the society developed thereafter was built by some of the most distinguished scholars in the history of the United States, who were, at the same time, among our foremost politicians. They did not believe that knowledge was merely for the study, but they thought it was for the marketplace as well, and Madison and Jefferson and Franklin and all the others who built the United States, who built our Constitution, who built it on a sound framework, I believe set an example for us all, and what was true of my country has been true of your country and the countries of Western Europe. As an American said 100 years ago, it was John Milton who conjugated verbs in his library when the freedom of Englishmen was periled. The duty of the scholar, of the educated man, of the man or woman whom society has developed—the duty of that man or woman is to help build the society which has made their own advancement possible. You understand it and I understand it, and I am proud to be with you.

Goethe, whose home city I visited yesterday, believed that education and culture were the answer to international strife. "With sufficient learning," he wrote, "a scholar forgets national hatreds, stands above nations, and feels the well-being or troubles of a neighboring people as if they happened to his own." That is the kind of scholar that this university is training. In the 15 turbulent years since this institution was founded, dedicated to the motto "Truth, Justice,

and Liberty," much has changed. The university enrollment has increased sevenfold, and related colleges have been founded. West Berlin has been blockaded, threatened, harassed, but it continues to grow in industry and culture and size, and in the hearts of free men. Germany has changed. Western Europe and, indeed, the entire world has changed, but this university has maintained its fidelity to these three ideals—truth, justice, and liberty. I choose, therefore, to discuss the future of this city briefly in the context of these three obligations.

Speaking a short time ago in the center of the city, I reaffirmed my country's commitment to West Berlin's freedom and restated our confidence in its people and their courage. The shield of the military commitment with which we, in association with two other great powers, guard the freedom of West Berlin will not be lowered or put aside so long as its presence is needed, but behind that shield it is not enough to mark time, to adhere to a *status quo*, while awaiting a change for the better in a situation fraught with challenge, and the last 4 years in the world have seen the most extraordinary challenges, the significance of which we cannot even grasp today, and only when history and time have passed can we realize the significant events that happened at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties. In a situation fraught with change and challenge, in an era of this kind, every resident of West Berlin has a duty to consider where he is, where his city is going, and how best it can get there. The scholar, the teacher, the intellectual, have a higher duty than any of the others, for society has trained you to think as well as do. This community has committed itself to that objective, and you have a special obligation to think and to help forge the future of this city in terms of truth and justice and liberty.

First, what does truth require? It requires us to face the facts as they are, not to involve ourselves in self-deception—to refuse to think merely in slogans. If we are to work for the future of the city, let us deal with the realities as they actually are, not as they might have been and not as we wish they were. Reunification, I believe, will someday be a reality. The lessons of history support that belief, especially

the history in the world of the last 18 years. The strongest force in the world today has been the strength of the state, of the idea of nationalism of a people; and in Africa and in Latin America and in Asia, all around the globe, new countries have sprung into existence determined to maintain their freedom. This has been one of the strongest forces on the side of freedom. And it is a source of satisfaction to me that so many countries of Western Europe recognized this and chose to move with this great tide, and, therefore, that tide has served us and not our adversaries.

But we all know that a police state regime has been imposed on the Eastern sector of this city and country. The peaceful reunification of Berlin and Germany will, therefore, not be either quick or easy. We must first bring others to see their own true interests better than they do today. What will count in the long run are the realities of Western strength, the realities of Western commitment, the realities of Germany as a nation and a people, without regard to artificial boundaries of barbed wire. Those are the realities upon which we rely and on which history will move, and others too would do well to recognize them.

Secondly, what does justice require? In the end, it requires liberty. And I will come to that. But in the meantime justice requires us to do what we can do in this transition period to improve the lot and maintain the hopes of those on the other side. It is important that the people on the quiet streets in the East be kept in touch with Western society. Through all the contacts and communication that can be established, through all the trade that Western security permits, above all whether they see much or little of the West, what they see must be so bright as to contradict the daily drumbeat of distortion from the East. You have no higher opportunity, therefore, than to stay here in West Berlin, to contribute your talents and skills to its life, to show your neighbors democracy at work, a growing and productive city offering freedom and a better life for all. You are helping now by your studies and by your devotion to freedom, and you, therefore, earn the admiration of your fellow students from wherever they come.

Today I have had a chance to see all of this myself. I have seen housing and factories and office buildings and commerce and a vigorous academic and scientific life here in this community. I have seen the people of this city, and I think that all of us who have come here know that the morale of this city is high, that the standard of living is high, the faith in the future is high, and that this is not merely an isolated outpost cut off from the world, cut off from the West. Students come here from many countries, and I hope more will come, especially from Africa and Asia. Those of you who may return from study here to other parts of Western Europe will still be helping to forge a society which most of those across the wall yearn to join. The Federal Republic of Germany, as all of us know from our visit better than ever, has created a free and dynamic economy from the disasters of defeat and a bulwark of freedom from the ruins of tyranny.

West Berlin and West Germany have dedicated and demonstrated their commitment to the liberty of the human mind, the welfare of the community, and to peace among nations. They offer social and economic security and progress for their citizens, and all this has been accomplished—and this is the important point—not only because of their economic plant and capacity but because of their commitment to democracy, because economic well-being and democracy must go hand in hand.

And finally, what does liberty require? The answer is clear. A united Berlin in a united Germany, united by self-determination and living in peace. This right of free choice is no special privilege claimed by the Germans alone. It is an elemental requirement of human justice. So this is our goal, and it is a goal which may be attainable most readily in the context of the reconstitution of the larger Europe on both sides of the harsh line which now divides it. This idea is not new in the postwar West. Secretary Marshall, soon after he delivered his famous speech at Harvard University urging aid to the reconstruction of Europe, was asked what areas his proposal might cover, and he replied that he was "taking the commonly accepted geography of Europe—west of Asia." His offer of help and friendship was rejected, but it is not too early to think once again in

terms of all of Europe, for the winds of change are blowing across the Curtain as well as the rest of the world.

The cause of human rights and dignity, some two centuries after its birth in Europe and the United States, is still moving men and nations with ever-increasing momentum. The Negro citizens of my own country have strengthened their demand for equality and opportunity. And the American people and the American Government are going to respond. The pace of decolonization has quickened in Africa. The people of the developing nations have intensified their pursuit of economic and social justice. The people of Eastern Europe, even after 18 years of oppression, are not immune to change. The truth doesn't die. The desire for liberty cannot be fully suppressed. The people of the Soviet Union, even after 45 years of party dictatorship, feel the forces of historical evolution. The harsh precepts of Stalinism are officially recognized as bankrupt. Economic and political variation and dissent are appearing, for example, in Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union itself. The growing emphasis on scientific and industrial achievement has been accompanied by increased education and by intellectual ferment. Indeed, the very nature of the modern technological society requires human initiative and the diversity of free minds. So history itself runs against the Marxist dogma, not toward it.

Nor are such systems equipped to deal with the organization of modern agriculture and the diverse energy of the modern consumer in a developed society. In short, these dogmatic police states are an anachronism. Like the division of Germany and of Europe, it is against the tide of history. The new Europe of the West, dynamic, diverse, and democratic, must exert an ever-increasing attraction to the people of the East, and when the possibilities of reconciliation appear we in the West will make it clear that we are not hostile to any people or system providing they choose their own destiny without interfering with the free choice of others.

There will be wounds to heal and suspicions to be eased on both sides. The difference in living standards will have to be reduced by

leveling up, not down. Fair and effective agreements to end the arms race must be reached. These changes will not come today or tomorrow. But our efforts for a real settlement must continue undiminished.

As I said this morning, I am not impressed by the opportunities open to popular fronts throughout the world. I do not believe that any democrat can successfully ride that tiger. But I do believe in the necessity of great powers working together to preserve the human race, or otherwise we can be destroyed. This process can only be helped by the growing unity of the West, and we must all work toward that unity, for in unity there is strength, and that is why I travel to this continent—the unity of this continent—and any division or weakness only makes our task more difficult. Nor can the West ever negotiate a peaceful reunification of Germany from a divided and uncertain and competitive base. In short, only if they see over a period of time that we are strong and united, that we are vigilant and determined, are others likely to abandon their course of armed aggression or subversion. Only then will genuine, mutually acceptable proposals to reduce hostility have a chance to succeed.

This is not an easy course. There is no easy course to the reunification of Germany, the reconstitution of Europe. But life is never easy. There is work to be done, and obligations to be met, obligations to truth, to justice, and to liberty.

Thank you.

THE VISIT TO IRELAND

President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Dail and Seanad, Dublin, June 28

White House press release (Dublin) dated June 28; as-delivered text

Mr. Speaker, Prime Minister, Members of the Parliament: I am grateful for your welcome and for that of your countrymen.

The 13th day of December 1862 will be a day long remembered in American history. At Fredericksburg, Virginia, thousands of men fought and died on one of the bloodiest battlefields of the American Civil War. One of the most brilliant stories of that day was written by

a band of 1,200 men who went into battle wearing a green sprig in their hats. They bore a proud heritage and a special courage, given to those who had long fought for the cause of freedom. I am referring, of course, to the Irish Brigade. As General Robert E. Lee, the great military leader of the Southern Confederate forces, is reported to have said of this group of men after the battle, "The gallant stand which this bold brigade made on the heights of Fredericksburg is well known. Never were men so brave. They ennobled their race by their splendid gallantry on that desperate occasion. Their brilliant though hopeless assaults on our lines excited the hearty applause of our officers and soldiers."

Of the 1,200 men who took part in that assault, 280 survived the battle. The Irish Brigade was led into battle on that occasion by Brigadier General Thomas F. Meagher, who had participated in the unsuccessful Irish uprising of 1848, was captured by the British and sent in a prison ship to Australia, from whence he finally came to America. In the fall of 1862, after serving with distinction and gallantry in some of the toughest fighting of this most bloody struggle, the Irish Brigade was presented with a new set of flags. In the city ceremony, the city chamberlain gave them the motto "The Union, Our Country, and Ireland Forever." Their old ones having been torn to shreds by bullets in previous battles, Captain Richard McGee took possession of these flags on December 2d in New York City and arrived with them at the Battle of Fredericksburg and carried them in the battle. Today, in recognition of what these gallant Irishmen and what millions of other Irish have done for my country, and through the generosity of the Fighting 69th, I would like to present one of these flags to the people of Ireland.

As you can see, gentlemen, the battle honors of the Brigade include Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Yorktown, Fair Oaks, Gaines's Mill, Allen's Farm, Savage's Station, White Oak Bridge, Glendale, Malvern Hill, Antietam, Gettysburg, and Bristoe Station.

I am deeply honored to be your guest in the free Parliament of a free Ireland. If this nation had achieved its present political and

economic stature a century or so ago, my great grandfather might never have left New Ross, and I might, if fortunate, be sitting down there with you. Of course, if your own President had never left Brooklyn, he might be standing up here instead of me.

This elegant building, as you know, was once the property of the Fitzgerald family, but I have not come here to claim it. Of all the new relations I have discovered on this trip, I regret to say that no one has yet found any link between me and a great Irish patriot, Lord Edward Fitzgerald. Lord Edward, however, did not like to stay here in his family home because, as he wrote his mother, "Leinster House does not inspire the brightest ideas." That was a long time ago, however. It has also been said by some that a few of the features of this stately mansion served to inspire similar features in the White House in Washington. Whether this is true or not, I know that the White House was designed by James Hoban, a noted Irish-American architect, and I have no doubt that he believed by incorporating several features of the Dublin style he would make it more home-like for any President of Irish descent. It was a long wait, but I appreciate his efforts.

There is also an unconfirmed rumor that Hoban was never fully paid for his work on the White House. If this proves to be true, I will speak to our Secretary of the Treasury about it, although I hear this body is not particularly interested in the subject of revenues.

I am proud to be the first American President to visit Ireland during his term of office, proud to be addressing this distinguished assembly, and proud of the welcome you have given me. My presence and your welcome, however, only symbolize the many and the enduring links which have bound the Irish and the Americans since the earliest days.

Benjamin Franklin, the envoy of the American Revolution, who was also born in Boston, was received by the Irish Parliament in 1772. It was neither independent nor free from discrimination at the time, but Franklin reported its members "disposed to be friends of America." "By joining our interest with theirs," he said, "a more equitable treatment . . . might be obtained for both nations."

Our interests have been joined ever since. Franklin sent leaflets to Irish Freedom Fighters. O'Connell was influenced by Washington, and Emmet influenced Lincoln. Irish volunteers played so predominant a role in the American Army that Lord Mountjoy lamented in the British Parliament, "We have lost America through the Irish." John Barry, whose statue was honored yesterday, and whose sword is in my office, was only one who fought for liberty in America to set an example for liberty in Ireland. Yesterday was the 117th anniversary of the birth of Charles Stewart Parnell, whose grandfather fought under Barry and whose mother was born in America, and who, at the age of 34, was invited to address the American Congress on the cause of Irish freedom. "I have seen since I have been in this country," he said, "so many tokens of the good wishes of the American people toward Ireland. . . ." And today, 83 years later, I can say to you that I have seen in this country so many tokens of good wishes of the Irish people toward America.

And so it is that our two nations, divided by distance, have been united by history. No people ever believed more deeply in the cause of Irish freedom than the people of the United States. And no country contributed more to building my own than your sons and daughters. They came to our shores in a mixture of hope and agony, and I would not underrate the difficulties of their course once they arrived in the United States. They left behind hearts, fields, and a nation yearning to be free. It is no wonder that James Joyce described the Atlantic as a bowl of bitter tears, and an earlier poet wrote, "They are going, going, going, and we cannot bid them stay."

But today this is no longer the country of hunger and famine that those emigrants left behind. It is not rich and its progress is not yet complete, but it is, according to statistics, one of the best fed countries in the world. Nor is it any longer a country of persecution, political or religious. It is a free country, and that is why any American feels at home.

There are those who regard this history of past strife and exile as better forgotten, but to use the phrase of Yeats, "Let us not casually

reduce that great past to a trouble of fools, for we need not feel the bitterness of the past to discover its meaning for the present and the future."

And it is the present and the future of Ireland that today holds so much promise to my nation as well as to yours, and indeed to all mankind, for the Ireland of 1963, one of the youngest of nations and the oldest of civilizations, has discovered that the achievement of nationhood is not an end but a beginning. In the years since independence, you have undergone a new and peaceful revolution, an economic and industrial revolution, transforming the face of this land while still holding to the old spiritual and cultural values. You have modernized your economy, harnessed your rivers, diversified your industry, liberalized your trade, electrified your farms, accelerated your rate of growth, and improved the living standard of your people.

Other nations of the world in whom Ireland has long invested her people and her children are now investing their capital as well as their vacations here in Ireland. This revolution is not yet over, nor will it be, I am sure, until a fully modern Irish economy fully shares in world prosperity. But prosperity is not enough.

Eighty-three years ago, Henry Grattan, demanding the more independent Irish Parliament that would always bear his name, denounced those who were satisfied merely by new grants of economic opportunity. "A country," he said, "enlightened as Ireland, chartered as Ireland, armed as Ireland, and injured as Ireland, will be satisfied with nothing less than liberty." And today, I am certain, free Ireland, a full-fledged member of the world community, where some are not yet free and where some counsel an acceptance of tyranny—free Ireland will not be satisfied with anything less than liberty.

I am glad, therefore, that Ireland is moving in the mainstream of current world events. For I sincerely believe that your future is as promising as your past is proud and that your destiny lies not as a peaceful island in a sea of troubles but as a maker and shaper of world peace. For self-determination can no longer mean isolation; and the achievement of national independence today means withdrawal from the

old status only to return to the world scene with a new one. New nations can build with their former governing powers the same kind of fruitful relationship that Ireland has established with Great Britain—a relationship founded on equality and mutual interests. And no nation, large or small, can be indifferent to the fate of others, near or far. Modern economics, weaponry, and communications have made us realize more than ever that we are one human family and this one planet is our home.

"The world is large," wrote John Boyle O'Reilly—"The world is large when its weary leagues two loving hearts divide; but the world is small when your enemy is loose on the other side." The world is even smaller today, though the enemy of John Boyle O'Reilly is no longer a hostile power. Indeed, across the gulfs and barriers that now divide us, we must remember that there are no permanent enemies. Hostility today is a fact, but it is not a ruling law. The supreme reality of our time is our indivisibility as children of God and our common vulnerability on this planet.

Some may say that all this means little to Ireland. In an age when "history moves with the tramp of earthquake feet"—in an age when a handful of men and nations have the power to devastate mankind, in an age when the needs of the developing nations are so staggering that even the richest lands often groan with the burden of assistance—in such an age, it may be asked, how can a nation as small as Ireland play much of a role on the world stage?

I would remind those who ask that question, including those in other small countries, of these words of one of the great orators of the English language:

All the world owes much to the little "five feet high" nations. The greatest art of the world was the work of little nations. The most enduring literature of the world came from little nations. The heroic deeds that thrill humanity through generations were the deeds of little nations fighting for their freedom. And, oh, yes, the salvation of mankind came through a little nation.

Ireland has already set an example and a standard for other small nations to follow. This has never been a rich or powerful country, and yet, since earliest times, its influence on the world has been rich and powerful. No large

nation did more to keep Christianity and Western culture alive in their darkest centuries. No larger nation did more to spark the cause of independence in America, indeed, around the world. And no larger nation has ever provided the world with more literary and artistic genius.

This is an extraordinary country. George Bernard Shaw, speaking as an Irishman, summed up an approach to life: "Other peoples," he said, "see things and say: 'Why?' . . . But I dream things that never were—and I say: 'Why not?'"

It is that quality of the Irish, the remarkable combination of hope, confidence, and imagination, that is needed more than ever today. The problems of the world cannot possibly be solved by skeptics or cynics whose horizons are limited by the obvious realities. We need men who can dream of things that never were, and ask why not. It matters not how small a nation is that seeks world peace and freedom, for, to paraphrase a citizen of my country, "The humblest nation of all the world, when clad in the armor of a righteous cause, is stronger than all the hosts of Error."

Ireland is clad in the cause of national and human liberty with peace. To the extent that the peace is disturbed by conflict between the former colonial powers and the new and developing nations, Ireland's role is unique. For every new nation knows that Ireland was the first of the small nations in the 20th century to win its struggle for independence and that the Irish have traditionally sent their doctors and technicians and soldiers and priests to help other lands to keep their liberty alive. At the same time, Ireland is part of Europe, associated with the Council of Europe, progressing in the context of Europe, and a prospective member of an expanded European Common Market. Thus Ireland has excellent relations with both the new and the old, the confidence of both sides, and an opportunity to act where the actions of greater powers might be looked upon with suspicion.

The central issue of freedom, however, is between those who believe in self-determination and those in the East who would impose on others the harsh and oppressive Communist

system; and here your nation wisely rejects the role of a go-between or a mediator. Ireland pursues an independent course in foreign policy, but it is not neutral between liberty and tyranny and never will be.

For knowing the meaning of foreign domination, Ireland is the example and inspiration to those enduring endless years of oppression. It was fitting and appropriate that this nation played a leading role in censuring the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, for how many times was Ireland's quest for freedom suppressed only to have that quest renewed by the succeeding generation? Those who suffer beyond that wall I saw on Wednesday in Berlin must not despair of their future. Let them remember the constancy, the faith, the endurance, and the final success of the Irish. And let them remember, as I heard sung by your sons and daughters yesterday in Wexford, the words, "The boys of Wexford, who fought with heart and hand, to burst in twain the galling chain and free our native land."

The major forum for your nation's greater role in world affairs is that of protector of the weak and voice of the small, the United Nations. From Cork to the Congo, from Galway to the Gaza Strip, from this legislative assembly to the United Nations, Ireland is sending its most talented men to do the world's most important work—the work of peace.

In a sense this export of talent is in keeping with an historic Irish role. But you no longer go as exiles and emigrants but for the service of your country and, indeed, of all men. Like the Irish missionaries of medieval days, like the wild geese after the Battle of the Boyne, you are not content to sit by your fireside while others are in need of your help. Nor are you content with the recollections of the past when you face the responsibilities of the present.

Twenty-six sons of Ireland have died in the Congo; many others have been wounded. I pay tribute to them and to all of you for your commitment and dedication to world order. And their sacrifice reminds us all that we must not falter now.

The United Nations must be fully and fairly financed. Its peacekeeping machinery must be strengthened. Its institutions must be devel-

oped until some day, and perhaps some distant day, a world of law is achieved.

Ireland's influence in the United Nations is far greater than your relative size. You have not hesitated to take the lead on such sensitive issues as the Kashmir dispute, and you sponsored that most vital resolution, adopted by the General Assembly, which opposed the spread of nuclear arms to any nation not now possessing them, urging an international agreement with inspection and control, and I pledge to you that the United States of America will do all in its power to achieve such an agreement and fulfill your resolution.

I speak of these matters today not because Ireland is unaware of its role, but I think it important that you know that we know what you have done, and I speak to remind the other small nations that they, too, can and must help build a world peace. They, too, as we all are, are dependent on the United Nations for security, for an equal chance to be heard, for progress toward a world made safe for diversity. The peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations cannot work without the help of the smaller nations, nations whose forces threaten no one and whose forces can thus help create a world in which no nation is threatened.

Great powers have their responsibilities and their burdens, but the smaller nations of the world must fulfill their obligations as well. A great Irish poet once wrote, "I believe profoundly in the future of Ireland, that this is an isle of destiny, that that destiny will be glorious, and that when our hour has come we will have something to give to the world."

My friends, Ireland's hour has come. You have something to give to the world, and that is a future of peace with freedom. Thank you.

THE VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

Communique Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, Birch Grove House, Sussex, June 30

White House press release (Sussex) dated June 30

During the past two days President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan have held their seventh meeting to discuss current problems. Their talks have taken place at Prime Minister Macmillan's home in Sussex and fol-

lowed on President Kennedy's visit to Germany and Eire.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, Lord Home, British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Hailsham, Lord President of the Council, Mr. Thorneycroft, Minister of Defence, and Mr. Heath, Lord Privy Seal, took part in the talks at various times.

During some twelve hours of discussion the President and the Prime Minister began by hearing reports from Lord Home and Mr. Rusk about conversations which the two Ministers had held in London during the previous two days. The topics covered included Laos and the Far Eastern situation, the position in the Middle East, the problems of NATO and the Western Alliance and the effort for a test ban treaty. President Kennedy and the Prime Minister took note in particular of the situation in Laos and expressed their concern at the frequent breaches of the Geneva Agreement of 1962 and at the failure of certain parties to the Agreement to carry out their obligations under it. They agreed to continue to work closely together for the preservation of peace in Laos and the independence and neutrality of that country. They also agreed to continue close general cooperation in the Far East, particularly in regard to the problems of Viet Nam. As regards the Middle East, the President and the Prime Minister agreed on the importance of the efforts made by the United Nations in working towards conciliation in the Yemen and pledged their support to the Secretary-General.¹

The President and the Prime Minister were agreed on their policy of continuing to help India by providing further military aid to strengthen her defences against the threat of renewed Chinese Communist attack. They were impressed by the importance to the economic progress and defence of both India and Pakistan of whose anxieties they were fully aware, of an honourable and equitable settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries; they stood ready to help in

any way which might be desired by both countries.

President Kennedy and the Prime Minister then reviewed the problems of the Western Alliance, especially in regard to NATO. They noted with satisfaction the decisions reached at the recent NATO meeting in Ottawa² which implemented the concept which they had themselves set out at their meeting at Nassau in December 1962,³ by which a number of powers assigned some or all of their present and future forces to NATO Command.

With regard to the future they took note of the studies now under way in NATO for review of the strategic and tactical concepts which should underlie NATO's military plans.

The President reported on his discussions with Dr. Adenauer in which they reaffirmed their agreement to use their best efforts to bring into being a multilateral sea-borne MRBM force and to pursue with other interested governments the principal questions involved in the establishment of such a force.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that a basic problem facing the NATO Alliance was the closer association of its members with the nuclear deterrent of the Alliance. They also agreed that various possible ways of meeting this problem should be further discussed with their allies. Such discussions would include the proposals for a multilateral sea-borne force, without prejudice to the question of British participation in such a force.

The President and the Prime Minister also reviewed the state of East-West relations and considered in particular the possibility of concluding in the near future a treaty to ban nuclear tests. They agreed that the achievement of such a treaty would be a major advance in East-West relations and might lead on to progress in other directions. They agreed the general line which their representatives, Mr. Averell Harriman and Lord Hailsham, should take during their visit to Moscow in July. The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their belief that the conclusion of a test ban treaty at this time is most urgent and pledged themselves to do all they could to bring this about.

² *Ibid.*, June 10, 1963, p. 895.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1963, p. 71.

THE VISIT TO ITALY

President's Address at NATO Headquarters, Naples, July 2

White House press release (Naples) dated July 2; as-delivered text

Mr. President [Antonio Segni], Prime Minister Leone, Foreign Minister Piccione, Defense Minister Andreotti, members of the NATO Command, ladies and gentlemen: It is fitting that my travels away from home should end in this country and in this city. Italy, wrote Shelley, is the "Paradise of exiles"; and in my exile away from Washington, I have enjoyed this paradise as the last stop in Europe. I shall leave this country with regret.

It is also fitting that the final event of this European tour should take place at this NATO headquarters. NATO is one of the best and the earliest examples of cooperation between Western Europe and North America. The NATO defense treaty pledges us all to the common defense, to regard an attack upon one as an attack upon all, and to respond with all the force at our command. And that pledge is as strong and unshakable today as it was when it was made.

Finally, it is fitting to take this opportunity to review our findings and feelings after 10 days in Western Europe. Specifically, I return to Washington newly confirmed in my convictions regarding eight principal propositions:

First, it is increasingly clear that our Western European allies are committed to the path of progressive democracy, to social justice, and to economic reform, attained through the free processes of debate and consent. I sit here again to stress the fact that this is not a matter of domestic policies or politics but a key to Western freedom and Western solidarity. Nations which agree in applying the principles at home of freedom and justice are better able to work with each other abroad.

Second, it is increasingly clear that our Western European allies are determined to maintain and coordinate their military strength in cooperation with my own nation. In a series of briefings and reviews I have been impressed less by NATO weaknesses, which are so often discussed, and more by the quality of the men, the officers, their steadily more modern weapons, their command structure, and their dedica-

tion to freedom and peace. While we can take heart from these accomplishments, we still have much to do. Important improvements and additions are still needed, and this is not the time to slacken our efforts. But if we continue to build up our strength at all levels, we can be increasingly certain that no attack will take place at any level against the territory of any NATO country.

Third, it is increasingly clear that our Western European allies are committed to peace. The purpose of our military strength is peace. The purpose of our partnership is peace. So our negotiations for an end to nuclear tests and our opposition to nuclear dispersal are fully consistent with our attention to defense. These are all complementary parts of a single strategy for peace. We do not believe that war is unavoidable or that negotiations are inherently undesirable. We do believe that an end to the arms race is in the interest of all and that we can move toward that end with injury to none. In negotiations to achieve peace, as well as preparations to prevent war, the West is united and no ally will abandon the interests of another to achieve a spurious *detente*. But as we arm to parley, we will not reject any path or refuse any proposal without examining its possibilities for peace.

Fourth, it is increasingly clear that our Western European allies are willing to look outward on the world, not merely inward on their own needs and demands. The economic institutions and support of Western European unity are founded on the principles of cooperation, not isolation; on expansion, not restriction. The Common Market was not designed by its founders or supported by the United States to build walls against other European and Western countries, or to build walls against the ferment of the developing nations. These nations need assistance in their struggle for political and economic independence. They need markets for their products and capital for their economies. Our allies in Europe, I am confident, will increase their role in this important effort, not only in lands with which they were previously associated but in Latin America and every area of need.

Fifth, it is increasingly clear that nations

united in freedom are better able to build their economies than those that are repressed by tyranny. In the last 10 years, the gross national product of the NATO countries has risen by some 75 percent. We can do better than we are doing, but we are doing much better than the party dictatorships of the East. There was a time when some would say that this system of admitted dictatorship, for all its political and social faults, nevertheless seemed to offer a successful economic system, a swift and certain path to modernization and prosperity. But it is now apparent that this system is incapable in today's world of achieving the organization of agriculture, of satisfying consumer demands, and the attainment of lasting prosperity. You need only compare West Berlin with East Berlin, West Germany with East Germany, Western Europe with Eastern Europe. Communism has sometimes succeeded as a scavenger, but never as a leader. It has never come to power in any country that was not disrupted by war or internal repression, or both. Rejecting reform and diversity in freedom, the Communists cannot reconcile their ambitions for domination with other men's ambition for freedom. It is clear that this system is outmoded and doomed to failure.

Sixth, it is increasingly clear that the people of Western Europe are moved by a strong and irresistible desire for unity. Whatever path is chosen, whatever delays or obstacles are encountered, that movement will go forward, and the United States welcomes this movement and the greater strength it insures. We did not assist in the revival of Europe to maintain its dependence upon the United States, nor do we seek to bargain selectively with many and separate voices. We welcome a stronger partner, for today no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here. The cause of Western European unity is based on logic and common sense. It is based on moral and political truth. It is based on sound military and economic principles, and it moves with the tide of history.

Seventh, it is increasingly clear that the United States and Western Europe are tightly bound by shared goals and mutual respect. On both sides of the Atlantic, trade barriers are

being reduced, military cooperation is increasing, and the cause of Atlantic unity is being promoted. There will always be differences among friends, and they should be freely and frankly discussed. But these are differences of means, not ends. They are differences of approach, not spirit. Recognizing these and other problems, monetary payments, foreign assistance, agriculture, and the rest, I return to the United States more firmly convinced than ever that common ideals have given us a common destiny and that the Atlantic partnership is a growing reality.

Eighth, and finally, it is increasingly clear and increasingly understood that the central moving force of our great adventure is enduring mutual trust. I came to Europe to reassert as clearly and persuasively as I could that the American commitment to the freedom of Europe is reliable, not merely because of good will, although that is strong, not merely because of a shared heritage, although that is deep and wide, and not at all because we seek to dominate, because we do not. I came to make it clear that this commitment rests upon the inescapable requirements of intelligent self-interest. It is a commitment whose wisdom is confirmed by its absence when two world wars began and by its presence in 18 years of well-defended peace. The response which this message has evoked from European citizens and the press, and leaders of the Continent, make it increasingly clear that our commitment and its durability are understood. And at the same time, all that I have seen and heard in these 10 crowded days confirms me in the conviction which I am proud to proclaim to my own countrymen that the free men and free governments of free Europe are also firm in their commitments to our common cause.

We have been able to trust each other for 20 years, and we are right to go on. One hundred and fifteen years ago this month, Mazzini addressed a mass meeting in Milan with these words: "We are here . . . to build up the unity of the human family so the day may come when it shall represent a single sheepfold with a single shepherd . . . the spirit of God Beyond the Alps, beyond the sea, are other peoples now," Mazzini said, "striving by different routes to reach the same goals . . . improvement, as-

sociation, and the foundations of an authority that shall put an end to world anarchy . . . Unite with them—they will unite with you.”

Today, Italy, the United States, and other free countries are committed to this great end, of the development of the human family. In time, the unity of the West can lead to the unity of East and West, until the human family is truly a single sheepfold under God.

Thank you.

Communique Between President Kennedy and President Segni, Rome, July 2

White House press release (Rome) dated July 2

On July 1st and 2d there took place the scheduled working visit to Italy of President Kennedy during which, in Rome, he was received by the President of the Republic Segni, and, accompanied by Secretary of State Rusk, met with the President of the Council of Ministers Leone and the Vice President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs Piccioni; and in Naples, he visited, together with President Segni, the headquarters of Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

In the Rome talks, which were carried out in that climate of cordial friendship and very close cooperation which characterizes Italo/American relations, there were examined the principal current international problems. In particular, the meetings provided the occasion for a useful and thorough exchange of views on the situation of East-West relations.

In this regard, both sides confirmed their firm intention of persevering in the search for appropriate means to alleviate international tensions. Furthermore, they expressed the conviction that in an atmosphere free from pressure and from threats, existing problems can be directed toward solutions, however partial, without at the same time altering that balance of forces which is guaranteed by the Atlantic Alliance, indispensable instrument for the consolidation of peace in freedom and security.

In this context, President Kennedy explained the position of the United States with respect to the possible development of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. On the Italian side, as a consequence of the agreement in principle

formerly expressed by the Italian Government which was reported to the Chamber of Deputies immediately afterwards, there was expressed a favorable attitude toward participating in studies on this subject to be carried out subsequently among all the governments concerned.

In examining the developments of the Alliance, against the background of the current international situation, both parties again underlined the necessity of persevering in efforts to advance current negotiations for a controlled, gradual and balanced disarmament, of making every effort in order to reach an agreement in the field of nuclear test ban, and of preventing the proliferation of atomic arms.

As for the process of European unification, there was agreement as to its significant value, and on the Italian side, there was reaffirmed the will to encourage its development, increasing the efforts directed toward creation of an integrated Europe. In this connection, there was recalled the known attitude of the Italian Government favorable to European integration not only in the economic field but also in the political. Italian representatives found themselves in agreement with President Kennedy on the necessity that European unity be achieved within the framework of the hoped-for interdependence between the United States and Europe.

Both sides agreed on the desirability of working toward cooperation among the various economic areas in order to promote a greater volume of trade between the areas themselves and to draw them increasingly closer together. In this context, there were examined the results achieved in the ministerial meeting held last May in Geneva⁴ in preparation for the GATT multilateral tariff negotiations which are scheduled to begin next year. Taking into account the complexity of the problems discussed in that meeting, the results achieved so far were considered encouraging. Particular emphasis was laid on the significance of the resolution approved at that time for expanding the commerce of the developing countries, inasmuch as such resolution provides the basis for a better coordination of the efforts of the democratic

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 24, 1963, p. 990.

countries aimed at fostering the economic and social progress of the developing countries. This is in conformity with the policies of both the United States and Italy, designed to promote the strengthening of the free world through a common program in which all nations which are really free can participate.

Both reaffirmed the staunch adherence of both countries to the principles of the United Nations organization; and the firm purpose to continue to carry out within the Organization constructive work particularly with regard to the problems of disarmament, the developing countries, and the maintenance of peace. They placed special stress on the role which, in this connection, the U.N. might play at such time in the hoped-for agreement on disarmament.

In such a spirit, on the American side as on the Italian side, there was underlined the desire to continue the work which the respective governments are carrying on for the strengthening of peace in the world and for the carrying out of their obligations to this end.

REPORT TO THE NATION, JULY 5

White House press release dated July 5

I think every American has reason to be proud of this nation's reputation and standing in Europe. Most of us are descended from that continent. Some of us still have relatives there. Some of us still have sons or brothers buried on that continent. We have close cultural and intellectual ties. We have long been linked by travel and commerce.

Today I can report an even deeper tie between the people of Europe and the people of the United States. Our steadfast role in the defense of freedom for 18 years, for peace and justice, I think has earned us the abiding trust and respect of the people of Europe. Our willingness to undertake the hard tasks of leadership, to station our soldiers and sailors and airmen far away from home—and I saw some of them in Europe—to assume the burdens of preventing another war, all this which we in America sometimes take for granted and which we think other people take for granted has earned

the American people a high reputation and brought us steadfast good will.

This trip was for me a moving experience. I saw the expressions of hope and confidence on the faces of West Berliners 100 miles behind the Iron Curtain. I heard expressions of confidence in the United States from the leaders of Germany and England, Italy and Ireland. And I felt the admiration and affection that their people had for the people of the United States. Above all, I found in every country a deep conviction in our common goals, the unity of the West, the freedom of man, the necessity for peace.

Western Europe is fast becoming a dynamic united power in world affairs. It is not the same Europe that brought our troops twice to war in 40 years. It is not the same Europe that was so dependent on us 18 years ago. There is still much progress to be made. There will still be disappointments. But today we can be more confident than ever that the Old World and the New are partners for progress and partners for peace. And so I am happy to be home.

Soviet Attaché Accused of Improper Activities; U.S. Asks Departure

Press release 350 dated July 1

Following is the text of a note handed on July 1 to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy by Acting Assistant Secretary Richard H. Davis.

JULY 1, 1963

The Department of State wishes to inform the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that Attaché Gennadiy G. Sevastyanov has engaged in highly improper activities incompatible with his diplomatic status. Beginning on April 28 of this year, Sevastyanov attempted to recruit for espionage purposes an alien resident who is an employee of the United States Government. Sevastyanov in this effort tried to coerce the United States Government employee by threatening reprisal to members of his family resident in the Soviet Union if he did not cooperate.

The United States Government cannot permit such unacceptable behavior on the part of an official of the Soviet Embassy and therefore Mr. Sevastyanov's continued presence in the United States is no longer acceptable. The Embassy is requested to arrange for his immediate departure.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C.

U.S. Protests Soviet Restrictions in East Berlin

Following is the text of a U.S. note of protest against "security strips" established by the Soviet Zone regime in East Berlin and East Germany which was delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow on July 5. Identical notes were delivered by France and Great Britain on the same day.

Press release 357 dated July 5

JULY 5, 1963

On June 21, 1963, the East German authorities proclaimed new security measures which imposed draconian restrictions on circulation in that part of the Soviet sector in Berlin situated along the boundaries of the Western sectors.

The East German authorities have no competence for Berlin and these measures are completely illegal. They aggravate the arbitrary actions taken since August 13, 1961, by these authorities in connection with the Soviet Government which have cut the city in two by construction of the "wall". These latest illegal measures constitute a serious infringement of the quadripartite status of Berlin as established in the agreements of 1944 and 1945. They not only purport to limit the right of the Allies to circulate freely in Greater Berlin, but also, together with similar measures taken outside Berlin, constitute in their effects another brutal violation of the most elementary rights of the German population.

I am instructed to inform you that the United States Government protests strongly against

these measures. The United States Government will hold the Soviet Government responsible for the consequences which may result in Berlin or elsewhere.

U.S. and Bulgaria Sign Agreement Relating to Financial Questions

Following is a Department announcement of the signing of a financial agreement between the United States and Bulgaria, together with texts of the agreement and accompanying letters.

Press release 354 dated July 2

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

An agreement relating to outstanding financial questions between the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria was signed at Sofia on July 2. Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, American Minister in Sofia, signed on behalf of the United States, and Ivan Popov, Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed on behalf of Bulgaria. The negotiations which led to the signing of the agreement began on January 12, 1961.

The agreement provides for the settlement on a lump-sum basis of claims of U.S. nationals arising out of war damage, nationalization of property, and financial debts as described in article I.

The lump-sum settlement of \$3,543,398 includes \$3,143,398 in assets of the Bulgarian Government and Bulgarian corporations which were blocked in the United States during the Second World War and \$400,000 which is to be paid by the Bulgarian Government to the U.S. Government in two installments, on July 1, 1964, and on July 1, 1965.

The adjudication of certain American claims against Bulgaria, as provided in Public Law 285, 84th Congress, was completed by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States on August 9, 1955. In accordance with Public Law 285, awards of the Commission have been certified to the United States Treasury for payment and certain payments have already

been made out of the assets referred to above.

The agreement also provides for the unblocking by the U.S. Government of assets of natural persons residing in Bulgaria.

By an exchange of letters between the two Governments it was agreed that the transmission to payees in Bulgaria of United States Treasury checks will be resumed.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA REGARDING CLAIMS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS AND RELATED FINANCIAL MATTERS

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria having reached an understanding on the financial matters specified herein have agreed as follows:

Article I

(1) The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria agree that the lump sum of \$3,543,398, as specified in Article II of this Agreement, will constitute full and final settlement and discharge of the claims of nationals of the United States of America, whether natural or juridical persons, against the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria which are described below:

(a) Claims of nationals of the United States of America for the restoration of, or payment of compensation for, property, rights and interests (direct and indirect), as specified in Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria which entered into force on September 15, 1947;

(b) Claims of nationals of the United States of America for the nationalization, compulsory liquidation or other taking of property and of rights and interests (direct and indirect) in and with respect to property prior to the effective date of this agreement;

(c) Claims of nationals of the United States of America predicated (directly or indirectly) upon obligations expressed in currency of the United States of America arising out of contractual or other rights acquired by nationals of the United States of America prior to April 24, 1941, and which became payable prior to September 15, 1947.

(2) The term "claims of nationals of the United States of America" as used in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) in paragraph (1) of this Article refers to claims which were owned by nationals of the United States of America

(a) for the purpose of subparagraph (a) on October 28, 1944 and continuously thereafter until filed

with the Government of the United States of America;

(b) for the purpose of subparagraph (b) on the effective date of nationalization, compulsory liquidation, or other taking and continuously thereafter until filed with the Government of the United States of America; and

(c) for the purpose of subparagraph (c) on April 24, 1941 and continuously thereafter until filed with the Government of the United States of America.

Article II

The sum of \$3,543,398, referred to in Article I of this Agreement, shall be made up as follows:

(a) The proceeds resulting from the liquidation of assets in the United States of America which were subject to wartime blocking controls and which belonged to the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and its nationals, other than natural persons, amounting in value to \$3,143,398.

(b) The sum of \$400,000 which shall be paid by the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Government of the United States of America in two equal payments of \$200,000 each. The first payment shall be made on July 1, 1964 and the second payment shall be made on July 1, 1965.

Article III

(1) The distribution of the lump sum referred to in Article I of this Agreement falls within the exclusive competence of the Government of the United States of America in accordance with its legislation, without any responsibility arising therefrom for the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

(2) From the date of this Agreement, the Government of the United States of America considers as settled and discharged as between the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria and will not pursue or present to the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria:

(a) Claims falling within Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, without regard to whether all of such claims are included in subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1) of Article I of this Agreement; and

(b) Claims falling within the categories set forth in Article I of this Agreement, without regard to whether the owners of such claims are compensated pursuant to legislation of the United States of America.

Article IV

The Government of the United States of America will release within thirty days of the date of this Agreement its blocking controls over all Bulgarian property in the United States of America.

Article V

The present Agreement shall come into force upon the date of signature.

Done at Sofia on July 2, 1963, in duplicate, in the English and Bulgarian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

EUGENIE ANDERSON

For the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria:

IVAN POPOV

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

Bulgaria

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

Sofia, July 2, 1963

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions between representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of the United States of America regarding the restriction contained in the regulation of the Government of the United States of America known as Treasury Department Circular 655 concerning the transfer of money from United States public funds to payees in Bulgaria.

In this connection I wish to inform you that:

(a) The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria places no obstacles or limitation preventing recipients of allowances, social security payments, military pension or other payments by the United States authorities from holding checks for such payments and from converting them at the most favorable prevailing rate for remittance to private persons, at present 1.17 leva to the dollar.

(b) The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria places no obstacles in the way of beneficiaries in Bulgaria who may have various claims against United States remitting agencies (such as the Social Security Administration, the Veterans Administration and any other agencies concerned) furnishing such agencies such information and documentation as may be required by United States law in connection with these claims and communicating directly or indirectly with respect to these matters with the American agencies and authorities concerned.

In accordance with the understanding we have reached, I will appreciate receiving your confirmation that the Government of the United States of America, taking into account the above assurances, agrees to remove the restrictions contained in Treasury Department Circular 655.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

IVAN POPOV
Deputy Minister

Her Excellency EUGENIE ANDERSON,
American Minister, Sofia.

United States

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Sofia, July 2, 1963

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of this date which reads as follows:

[See *supra*.]

I hereby confirm that, in view of the assurances contained in your letter, the Government of the United States of America will amend Circular No. 655 issued by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States of America, so as to remove the restriction on the transfer of money from United States public funds to payees in Bulgaria.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

EUGENIE ANDERSON
Minister

His Excellency IVAN POPOV,
*Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Sofia.*

United States

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Sofia, July 2, 1963

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the Agreement signed today between the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria relating to financial questions between our countries.

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria put forward the proposal to include within this Agreement the dollar bond obligations issued by the Bulgarian State, owned by American nationals and payable in the United States of America.

The Government of the United States of America has not been in a position to agree to this proposal since it follows the practice of leaving such matters for negotiation between the debtor government and the bondholders or their representatives.

It is the understanding of the Government of the United States of America that the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, by putting forward the proposal mentioned above, has taken note of outstanding Bulgarian dollar bond obligations and expresses its intention to settle these obligations with the bondholders or their representatives.

I shall appreciate receiving Your Excellency's confirmation of the above understanding.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

EUGENIE ANDERSON
Minister

His Excellency IVAN POPOV,
*Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Sofia.*

Bulgaria

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

Sofia, July 2, 1963

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of this date which reads as follows:

[See *supra*.]

I have the honor to confirm that I fully agree with the understanding expressed above.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

IVAN POPOV
Deputy Minister

Her Excellency EUGENIE ANDERSON,
American Minister, Sofia.

Department States Views on Trade Relations Between U.S. and Bulgaria

Department Statement

Press release 355 dated July 2

The conclusion of an agreement on financial claims and related issues between the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria¹ removes a significant obstacle to the establishment of more normal relations between the two countries. Conditions for the expansion of peaceful trade have therefore been improved by the signing of this agreement.

In 1959 after a 9-year hiatus the United States and Bulgaria agreed to resume diplomatic relations.² The resumption of diplomatic relations facilitated the conduct of trade between the two countries. It is the view of both Governments that the expansion of peaceful trade would be mutually beneficial and would serve to develop increasing ties between the people of the United States and the Bulgarian people.

The United States is prepared to authorize the Legation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to establish in New York a commercial office which would have the purpose of promoting trade between our two countries. Both Governments will be prepared to facilitate the travel of commercial representatives and offi-

¹ See p. 138.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1959, p. 866.

cials interested in increasing trade. As conditions permit, both Governments will consider further measures which will contribute to the development of expanded trade relations.

Through such efforts, the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria welcome the possibility of increasing favorable conditions for the expansion of peaceful trade, and the development of more normal trade relations should also serve as a means of increasing fruitful contacts between the peoples of the two countries.

Minister Eugenie Anderson Speaks on Bulgarian Television and Radio

Press release 352 dated July 3, for release July 4

Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, American Minister to the People's Republic of Bulgaria, became the first American diplomatic representative to speak on Bulgarian television and radio in Sofia when she made a brief speech on the occasion of the celebration of July 4, the 187th anniversary of American independence.

Minister Anderson, who was delivering her first speech in the Bulgarian language, appeared in person on Bulgarian television on the evening of July 3. The Bulgarian radio also carried her remarks on July 4.

Following is a translation of Minister Anderson's speech.

Good evening. It is a pleasure to speak to you, the Bulgarian people, on the occasion of American Independence Day. I bring you peaceful and friendly greetings from the American people.

First, I wish to thank you for the kindness and hospitality so many Bulgarians have extended to me during my stay here. I have been living in your beautiful country as the American Minister, and as your guest, for nearly a year. I am learning your language and something about Bulgarian life, culture, and history.

I believe that, because Bulgaria also struggled for its independence—only in the last century—you can understand well why we Americans prize our national independence as well as our individual freedom.

On this day—July 4th—we Americans celebrate freedom, peace, equality, democracy, and justice, and these are the great ideals on which America was founded and by which we still live. These are the blessings which all mankind longs to enjoy.

President Kennedy has asked me to give you his friendly greetings and to assure you that he and the American Government and the American people are dedicated to peace, freedom, and friendship with all nations.

Thank you, and best wishes until we meet again.

Minister to Bulgaria Opens Plastics-USA Exhibit in Sofia

*Remarks by Eugenie Anderson
Minister to Bulgaria¹*

It gives me great pleasure to present to the people of Bulgaria our exhibit "Plastics-USA." With this exhibit the American people send you their friendly greetings.

The people of my country take great interest in the swift development of the plastics industry. Less than 50 years ago almost the only plastic in daily use was celluloid, which was used chiefly for children's toys. Today, as you will see in this exhibit, there is a bewildering variety and range of use of plastics. They are used in such diverse fields as exploration of space, medicine, industry, clothing, household utensils, and, yes, children's toys. The American plastics industry is still growing, with new discoveries all the time.

I hope that this sample of American plastics development will help to promote friendship and communication between the peoples of our two countries. I believe that this exhibit will be like a little window through which the Bulgarian people can glimpse some of the practical aspects of contemporary American life.

I hope you will enjoy this exhibit. Please

¹ Made at Sofia on July 6 (press release 358 dated July 5). The Bulgarian state television covered the ceremony. Radio Sofia carried a report on the ceremony and included excerpts of Minister Anderson's remarks. The American Minister spoke in Bulgarian.

feel free to ask questions about plastics in the United States. The guides will do their best to answer you.

I wish to thank all of those Bulgarians and Americans who have helped to make arrangements for this exhibition.

And now I declare "Plastics-USA" open—and welcome to all.

Netherlands Compensation Program for Nazi Victims

Press release 349 dated July 1

The Department of State has been informed that a financial treaty between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed on April 8, 1960, and providing, *inter alia*, for payment of compensation to Netherlands victims of Nazi persecution, is expected to come into force about August 1, 1963. Approximately \$31 million will be available for this purpose.

Persons who were Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the time the persecution commenced, irrespective of whether the persecution took place in the Netherlands or elsewhere, are entitled to compensation if they were persecuted because of their race, faith, or ideology, including activity in the Resistance Movement. Regardless of the persecutee's nationality at the present time, compensation is to be paid to persecutees who: (1) were imprisoned for 3 months or longer; (2) suffered disability of 70 percent or more for not less than 5 consecutive years as a result of persecutory measures; (3) were under an obligation to wear the Star of David at least 6 months; or (4) were subjected to sterilization.

Heirs of persecutees who died during or as a result of Nazi persecution may also apply for compensation. The right is limited to the non-remarried surviving spouse of a persecutee; or, in the absence of a surviving spouse, jointly to the persecutee's children who had not yet reached 21 years on May 7, 1945; or to parents of a persecutee who was not married and who left no children.

Heirs must meet the same nationality requirements as persecutees. Claims of victims of

heirs who obtained Netherlands nationality after persecution commenced may also be submitted, since additional categories may possibly be established to cover such claimants.

Persons who have reason to believe that they may qualify for compensation under this program are urged to inquire immediately at the nearest Netherlands consulate or at the Embassy of the Netherlands at Washington, D.C. A time limit has been established for applicants filing from outside the Netherlands of 4 months from the date on which the treaty shall go into force. While the Department of State expects to issue an additional press release at that time, interested applicants would be well advised to request without delay, through the Netherlands diplomatic and consular authorities herein mentioned as intermediaries, claim application forms from the Claims Office for German Compensation Payment, P.O. Box D, Amsterdam, as this office is already accepting completed applications for processing.

Consulates of the Netherlands are located at Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Galveston, Grand Rapids, Honolulu, Houston, Jacksonville, Kansas City (Mo.), Los Angeles, St. Louis, Miami, Mobile, New Orleans, New York, Norfolk, Orange City (Iowa), Paterson (N.J.), St. Paul, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Portland (Oreg.), Salt Lake City, San Diego, San Francisco, Savannah, Seattle, Tampa, Charlotte Amalie (St. Thomas, V.I.), and Mayagüez, Ponce, and San Juan (P.R.).

U.S. and India Complete Negotiations on Nuclear Power Station Agreement

Joint Statement

Press release 344 dated June 29

In the last few days representatives of the Government of India and the Government of the United States have substantially completed negotiations on the text of a proposed agreement for cooperation which would provide a legal basis for the installation and operation of a 380-megawatt nuclear power station of United States design at Tarapur, India. The availability of United States financing for the proj-

ect is now being considered by the United States Agency for International Development.¹

The agreement for cooperation which has been negotiated but not signed is specifically tailored for the Tarapur project. Under the terms of the proposed arrangement, which would last for 30 years, the United States would undertake to supply India with its estimated long-term fuel requirements for the plant and information would be exchanged on matters pertaining to the design, construction, and operation of the plant as well as problems of health and safety. Unclassified information in related fields of research and development, including developments in boiling-water technology and the use of plutonium as a fuel, would also be exchanged between the parties during the period of the agreement.

In the course of the negotiations, India and the United States gave serious consideration to the nature of the safeguard arrangements that should pertain to the Tarapur station to assure its peaceful use. The agreement will contain bilateral safeguard provisions designed to assure the peaceful use of the Tarapur station. India and the United States have always agreed in principle that safeguards should be applied to enriched uranium fuel, but there has been a difference of opinion between the Governments with regard to the attachment of safeguards to equipment. In the case of the Tarapur project, it has been possible to achieve a mutually satisfactory arrangement without either Government's giving up its basic position regarding the attachment of safeguards to equipment, since the Tarapur station will be operated only on enriched uranium supplied by the United States or on plutonium produced therefrom; the United States would guarantee the supply of enriched uranium for the period of the agreement.

Another major subject that has been under careful review is the role that the International Atomic Energy Agency should play in the cooperative program. The United States and India have recognized that it would be desirable

¹On July 1 the Agency for International Development announced that AID Administrator David E. Bell had authorized a U.S. loan of up to \$80 million to finance the dollar costs of the nuclear plant construction and fabrication of the initial fuel charge.

for both parties to avail themselves of the services of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The International Atomic Energy Agency is not yet in a position to apply safeguards to large-scale reactors of the size to be installed at Tarapur although the Agency is developing a system to cover such large reactors. Accordingly, the United States-Indian arrangement would include an agreement in principle that, at a suitable time, the Agency will be requested to enter into a trilateral agreement for the implementation of the safeguard provisions in the proposed bilateral agreement, subject to the following conditions:

After the Agency has adopted a system of safeguards for large reactors, and at a reasonable time to be mutually agreed, the United States and India will consult with each other to determine whether the system so adopted is generally consistent with the provisions in the bilateral agreement. If the system is generally consistent, the parties will request the Agency to enter into a trilateral arrangement covering the implementation of safeguard responsibilities. The agreement would permit deferring implementation of the arrangement with the Agency until after the Tarapur nuclear station has achieved reliable full power operation.

It is expected that the proposed Tarapur station will make an important contribution to the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

U.S. Suspends Action on Airport Construction Agreement With Haiti

Press release 353 dated July 3

The United States informed the Government of Haiti on July 3 that the Agency for International Development has suspended all activities to implement the loan agreement for construction of a new jet airport for Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The agreement for a \$2.8 million loan was signed with Haiti last November, but no disbursements had been made.

The United States decision to suspend action on the agreement followed Haiti's default on the last quarterly payments due on loans by the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund (AID) and notification by the

Haitian Government that it was discontinuing payments during the current fiscal year on these loans. The airport loan agreement provides that defaults under any other agreements between the borrower and the United States is a default under the airport loan agreement.

President of Tanganyika Visits Washington

White House press release (Dublin, Ireland) dated June 27, for release June 28

The White House announced on June 28 that Julius K. Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanganyika, will be a guest of the President of the United States July 15-16.

President Nyerere will be the guest of Secretary Rusk at dinner on July 15. He will call at the White House and, together with his party, will be a guest at a White House luncheon on July 16.

President Nyerere last visited President Kennedy on July 17, 1961,¹ about 6 months before Tanganyika gained independence.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

U.S. Communist Party Assistance to Foreign Communist Governments (Testimony of Maud Russell).

Hearing before the House Un-American Activities Committee. March 6, 1963. 51 pp.

Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Part 3. March 28, 1963. 193 pp.

Castro's Network in the United States (Fair Play for Cuba Committee). Hearing before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Part 3, April 10, 1963, 68 pp.; Part 4, April 3, 1963, 40 pp.

Steel Prices, Unit Costs, Profits, and Foreign Competition. Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee. April 23-May 2, 1963. 762 pp.

Restrictions on Locating Chanceries in Residential Areas. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Business and Commerce of the Senate District of Columbia Committee on S. 646, a bill to prohibit the location of chanceries or other business offices of foreign governments in certain residential areas in the District of Columbia. May 3, 1963. 104 pp.

Employing Aliens in a Scientific or Technical Capacity. Report to accompany S. 1291. S. Rept. 335. June 27, 1963. 6 pp.

¹ For text of a joint communique, see BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 297.

A Progress Report on the Status of Women

SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF U.N. COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN NEW YORK, MARCH 11-29, 1963

by Gladys A. Tillett

Two outstanding accomplishments of the 17th session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, which met at New York March 11-29, 1963, were a proposal for a new series of regional U.N. seminars on the advancement of women in the developing countries and the completion of a draft recommendation on marriage incorporating the principles approved by the General Assembly in the marriage convention adopted in November 1962.¹

The new series of seminars on the advancement of women in developing countries will be started 2 years hence on completion of the current series on the status of women in family law. They will promote the objectives of the U.N. Development Decade, in which increased production is a major aim, and give special attention to women's educational needs, vocational and professional training, and employment opportunities. In an informal message to the Commission, the Director General of the International Labor Organization, David A. Morse, said women should be regarded as "the number one potential for the Decade of Development." The Commission's choice of seminar topic reflected the increasing importance of women in the work force of all countries and particularly in nations seeking to lift production levels.

The marriage recommendation is designed to supplement the marriage convention adopted

by the 17th session of the General Assembly. It provides for regular reports on law and practice regarding marriage from all member states, whether or not they become parties to the convention. Adoption of the recommendation by the next session of the General Assembly will encourage recognition of stable family life as the foundation for national progress.

The U.N. Development Decade

Other agenda items, on political rights, access to education, employment opportunities, nationality, and similar matters, were likewise considered in relation to the objectives of the U.N. Development Decade. The Commission could offer practical experience on many aspects because a majority of the members this year came from developing countries—in Africa, from Ghana, Sierra Leone, and the United Arab Republic; in Asia, from China, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines; in Latin America, from Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.

• *Mrs. Tillett is the United States Representative on the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. Her advisers at the 17th session were Alice A. Morrison of the Women's Bureau, Department of Labor, and Rachel C. Nason, Department of State.*

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/1763 (XVII).

Guinea, Senegal, the Dominican Republic, and Iran sent observers. Other members, such as Australia, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, were sensitive to needs because of underdeveloped areas within their own territories.

This interest was reflected also in the choice of officers. The chairman this year was Maria La- valle Urbina of Mexico, a former high court judge, presently in the Ministry of Justice in charge of work for the prevention of juvenile delinquency. Helena Benitez of the Philip- pines was elected first vice chairman and Helvi Sipila of Finland second vice chairman. Aziza Hussein of the United Arab Republic served as *rapporteur*.

Political Rights

The session opened with the announcement of equal suffrage in Iran. In his welcome to the Commission on behalf of the Secretary- General, C. V. Narasimhan, Under Secretary- General of the United Nations for General As- sembly Affairs and *chef de cabinet*, referred to the achievement in Iran as further evidence of the mounting influence and responsibility of women in public life.

Homa Vakil, the wife of the Ambassador of Iran, informed the Commission of the Shah's decree granting women full and equal political rights, thus clarifying the effect of their partici- pation in recent elections. Women in Iran had voted in municipal elections since 1949 but had not previously been allowed to participate in na- tional elections. I intervened immediately to present the congratulations of the United States to Iran, pointing out its good fortune in now having the benefit of the experience and the concern for human welfare which are the par- ticular gifts of women.

My opening statement referred to the work of the President's Commission on the Status of Women in the United States. This aroused great interest; other delegates asked for mate- rial they could use in their home countries, and nongovernmental organization representatives requested copies of flyers and other publications. I pointed out that the United States Commis- sion had brought together leaders from all aspects of national life—men and women—to re-

view the current progress of women, to deter- mine if discriminations still exist, and make constructive recommendations for eliminating them. The fact that some of our States are now appointing similar commissions encouraged fur- ther planning in the Commission.

Education

The discussion of education as well as of em- ployment opportunities centered on the partici- pation of women in the economic life of their countries. The UNESCO report² this year dealt with the educational situation in rural areas, and the ILO supplemented this with an analysis of employment and conditions of work for women in agriculture.³

The documents showed that, except for the United States, Canada, and northern Europe, the country girl is generally at a disadvantage, first because schools are "few and far between" with many providing elementary instruction only, and second because agricultural work tends to be hard and heavy and few other choices of employment are available for women. In many countries there is a preponderance of girls and women in rural areas, and illiteracy is greater among them than among men or among women in other areas. The Commission recom- mended that improvement of both general edu- cation and vocational training for country girls be given due priority and that provision for needed expansion be included in national de- velopment plans. The Commission also drew attention to resources available in the U.N. tech- nical assistance programs and invited nongov- ernmental organizations to cooperate actively in formulating and carrying out programs to strengthen education for rural women and to overcome illiteracy.

In the United States there are rural schools within reach of girls and boys alike. My state- ment called attention to our record and also to our Federal labor laws forbidding the employ- ment of children under 16 in agriculture while school is in session. I also mentioned some of the additional resources available in country areas, such as bookmobiles, radio programs, and

² U.N. doc. E/CN.6/408.

³ U.N. doc. E/CN.6/422.

the leadership of the Federal Extension Service of our Department of Agriculture. The statement continued:

Let us be quite clear on why women need education, and why every country needs women who are educated. Without an education, a mother can offer her family far less than she desires in companionship and care; without training, a girl can expect to earn her way only by the hardest of labor at the poorest pay. Paul Hoffman, Managing Director of the Special Fund here in the United Nations, says this on the importance for education of women and its bearing on the economic development of the country:

"Denial of equal rights to women is also an obstacle to economic development. It is surprising, perhaps, but true that there is a close relationship between the way women are treated in a country and the progress that country has made toward a good life. Where women are virtual slaves, forbidden so much as to go out of the house without their husbands, given no rights whatever in society, the country is invariably primitive. Where women have been largely emancipated, as in Japan, tremendous strides are being made toward modernization.

"The reasons are clear. When a country keeps its women in bondage, half its available brain power is lost."

UNESCO also presented an account of its program activities,⁴ as it does regularly on a biennial basis. Reports on various regional conferences on education showed how special problems of girls had been studied by local leaders in Asia and in Africa, in each case within the full context of educational development as a normal and essential part of the whole. The great difficulty continues to be in finding enough women teachers to staff schools for girls and to share in teaching where schools are coeducational. UNESCO has established some regional centers to help with training and production of materials and also with surveys of accomplishment and analysis of exchange programs and other activities. It is greatly to the advantage of women that UNESCO review all its educational programs regularly to be certain they take full account of the needs of both girls and boys.

Economic Opportunities

In presenting her report, the ILO representative pointed out that women workers are becoming a more permanent and more generally recognized part of the labor force in both in-

dustrially developed and newly developing countries. To focus attention on this development, the major agenda item for the ILO conference in June 1964 will be the question of "Women Workers in a Changing World." The conference will be an opportunity to study women's needs and problems in all their broad aspects, including vocational guidance and preparation of girls and women for work life; measures to meet the needs of working women with family responsibilities; the development of administrative machinery to deal with women's problems; and other important subjects. The Commission asked the ILO for full reports and background materials from this conference.

The ILO representative also reported the decision of the ILO Governing Body to place the question of employment and conditions of work for African women on the agenda of the next African regional labor conference. The Commission welcomed this further evidence of the increasing attention to needs of women in developing countries.

In commenting on the reports, I referred to the increasing importance of education and training for women workers. ILO observations indicated that employment opportunities in the future will depend increasingly on education and training. U.S. experience confirms this trend. Our 1960 census shows that women clerical workers increased 46 percent and professional workers 41 percent in the past decade, while the proportion of women operatives in manufacturing declined. In the United States today the more education a woman has the more likely she is to be working in paid employment. In 1959 more than half of all women with a college degree were working, in contrast to only two-fifths of high school graduates and a still smaller percentage of those who did not go beyond elementary school.

Another trend noted by the ILO and confirmed by U.S. experience is the increasing employment of older women. In our 1960 census almost two out of every five women workers are 45 years or over—double the proportion in 1940. Today more than half the women in our population between 45 and 54 years of age are in the labor force. I described briefly the program of our new manpower training and development act which is designed primarily to

⁴ U.N. doc. E/CN. 6/407.

retrain workers whose skills are outmoded by automation and technological developments. I also discussed the growth of community colleges as a relatively new development through which workers can obtain advance education in their home locality with little or no tuition or cost.

The ILO report on retirement age provided current information on laws in the various countries. In the several years the Commission has considered this subject, the major question has been whether the age should be the same for men and women. Today approximately a third of the countries have established a lower retirement age for women. Soviet delegates have consistently urged that the work done by women entitles them to retirement at an earlier age than men. I pointed out that in the United States the age for voluntary retirement with full benefits had always been 65 for both men and women. At the present time workers of both sexes can elect to retire at 62 with reduced benefits. Noting that the right to claim such benefits at the earlier age had originally been given only to women, I observed that this was a further instance in which U.S. laws which originally provided certain advantages for women only have later been extended to men as well.

Nationality of Married Women

In a brief review of nationality law, the Netherlands and the Philippines described proposals pending in their parliaments which will bring their legislation in line with the convention on the nationality of married women adopted by the United Nations in 1955. Their comments pointed up the value of international conventions in setting simple, definitive standards which can stabilize concepts and provide a universal basis for comparison and evaluation of progress. The convention on the nationality of married women provides that marriage to an alien shall not automatically affect the nationality of the wife, and 27 countries are already parties to it.

Marriage Recommendation

One of the great achievements by the Commission on the Status of Women has been the development of international standards to safe-

guard the entrance of women into marriage. The major part of this work was completed in November 1962 when the General Assembly formally adopted a convention as requested by the Commission, calling on governments to establish guarantees for free consent of both parties, a minimum age of marriage, and compulsory registration of marriages. At this year's meeting the Commission adopted a draft recommendation designed to supplement and give broader effectiveness to the principles established in the convention.

The U.S. statement congratulated members of the Commission on the adoption of the marriage convention. I reported that during my service with the U.S. delegation to the last General Assembly I had the great personal honor of signing the convention on behalf of the United States and that various nongovernmental organizations who had worked hard for the convention had been present at the ceremony. I also expressed my appreciation to the church groups and other organizations in the United States whose support and encouragement had contributed to the strength of U.S. leadership.

With regard to the draft recommendation, I emphasized that marriage and the home are the foundations of our free society and described some of the procedures established in our State laws to safeguard the rights of women on entrance into marriage: for example, minimum age must be proved by a birth certificate or other satisfactory evidence; free consent of both spouses must be expressed in person in the application for a marriage license and during the wedding ceremony; and compulsory registration of marriage requires deposit of a certificate or other document.

Advancement of Women in Developing Countries

As noted above, the Commission recommended that the next series of regional seminars consider the advancement of women in developing countries. The United States initiated this proposal, and it carried unanimously. This decision reflected wide recognition of the value of the women's seminars which to date have dealt with two major aspects of women's status—participation in public life and family law. In line with the objectives of the Development

Decade, this third series will stimulate practical programs to improve the economic status of women as well.

The Commission heard reports on the seminar in Tokyo last May on the status of Asian women in family law, with participation by all countries in the Far East. I attended this seminar as the observer for the United States. The participants in Tokyo included both men and women of high position in their countries. Among them were a senior judge of a supreme court, an attorney general, members of ministries, solicitors, judges, lawyers, educators, social workers, civic leaders, and experts in government service. They were representative also of four of the great religions of the world—Hindu, Buddhist, Moslem, and Christian—and the discussions brought out areas of agreement on social and religious factors affecting women and their position in the family. Many of our conversations centered on the marriage convention, which at that time had not yet been approved by the General Assembly. In the meeting of the Commission I joined with others in discussing the impact of this seminar.

The Commission considered how governments can stimulate the advancement of women in their countries through seminars, fellowships, and other aspects of the advisory services program. Recent sessions of the General Assembly have adopted resolutions, on the initiative of Afghanistan, aimed at speeding up the progress of women in underdeveloped areas. The resolution last fall urged a unified, long-term program with advanced countries and nongovernmental organizations providing new resources for this purpose. The Commission decided that a first step would be a statement listing U.N. and nongovernmental resources now available. As a further step the Commission invited the Secretary-General to explore possibilities for wider use of nongovernmental projects through participation by U.N. fellows or other appropriate cooperation.

In response, 10 of the women's nongovernmental organizations presented a joint statement assuring the Commission they would inform the United Nations at the earliest possible moment of any projects which might be useful for women in developing countries. This statement was a high point in the session, illus-

trating the warm and constructive partnership which exists between the Commission and the some 30 international organizations represented in its meetings.

The U.S. statement emphasized that the advancement of women requires the cooperation and support of men as well as women and that both men and women should join in the planning. In its resolution the Commission recommended appointment of national commissions along the lines of our President's Commission on the Status of Women in the United States, which I had described at the outset of the session.

Work Ahead

The next women's seminar organized by the United Nations will be in Bogotá, Colombia, in September. This will be a regional meeting for the Western Hemisphere on the status of women in family law, and the United States will be among the participants. Since nongovernmental organizations in consultative status can send observers, this seminar will be an opportunity for wide and productive exchange among women of the Americas.

At the next session of the Commission the ILO will present a biennial progress report on equal pay for equal work. The principle of equal pay without distinction as to sex has now been accepted in a great number of countries throughout the world, and I look forward to reporting new legislative action in the United States.

The Commission will also review discriminations against women in certain aspects of family law, particularly with regard to guardianship of children and rights in dissolution of marriage, divorce, or annulment. The Commission's consideration of the latter will take account of information from member countries, including a report on U.S. law and practice prepared by the Women's Bureau in the Department of Labor.

The increasing emphasis in the United Nations on operational programs will be apparent in discussion of technical assistance, seminars, fellowships, and other training and exchange activities. My statements this year drew repeatedly on experience gained by women's and other U.S. organizations in preparation for

citizenship, community service, development of new job opportunities for women, and other fields. Our contribution to the Commission's work will be more valuable as we can provide suggestions for practical implementation. The United Nations already recognizes equality of opportunity and responsibility as the right of every woman the world over. The challenge today is to give effect to these standards in their daily lives.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Warren B. Cheston as deputy scientific attaché at London, Paul A. Siple as scientific attaché at Canberra, and William W. Williams as deputy scientific attaché at Bonn, effective July 3. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 351 dated July 3.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Amendment of annex III of the 1956 agreements on joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands (TIAS 4049) and in Iceland (TIAS 4048) by deletion of part C, paragraph 4 (insurance). Adopted by Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization at Montreal June 4, 1963.

Entered into force: June 4, 1963.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Signed at New York September 28, 1962.¹
Ratifications deposited: Guatemala, June 5, 1963; Panama, June 4, 1963.

¹ Not in force.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.¹

Ratification deposited: Denmark, June 12, 1963.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Accessions deposited: Cameroon, June 18, 1963; Liberia, June 18, 1963.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement relating to the establishment of a United States naval communication station in Australia. Signed at Canberra May 9, 1963.

Entered into force: June 28, 1963.

Austria

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Vienna June 25, 1963. Entered into force June 25, 1963.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, as amended. Signed at Washington June 6, 1950. Entered into force June 6, 1950. TIAS 2072, 3279, 4959.

Terminated: June 25, 1963 (superseded by agreement of June 25, 1963, *supra*).

Bulgaria

Agreement regarding claims of United States nationals and related financial matters. Signed at Sofia July 2, 1963. Entered into force July 2, 1963.

Cyprus

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Nicosia June 18, 1963. Entered into force June 18, 1963.

India

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at New Delhi June 19, 1963. Entered into force June 19, 1963.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, as amended. Signed at New Delhi February 2, 1950. Entered into force February 2, 1950. TIAS 2054, 2881, 4318, 4553.

Terminated: June 19, 1963 (superseded by agreement of June 19, 1963, *supra*).

Indonesia

Agreements amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 19, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4952, 5054, 5118, 5254). Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta June 21, 1963. Entered into force June 21, 1963.

Japan

Agreement providing for utilization of certain Japanese yen accruing to the United States under the agricultural commodities agreements of May 31, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3284, 4495), and February 10, 1956 (TIAS 3580). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo June 14, 1963. Entered into force June 14, 1963.

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No.	Date	Subject
*346	7/1	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*347	7/1	Concert to commemorate anniversary of U.N.
*348	7/1	Statue of George Washington presented to Uruguay.
349	7/1	Netherlands compensation program for Nazi victims.
350	7/1	Note requesting Soviet official to leave U.S.
*351	7/3	Cheston, Siple, Williams appointed scientific attachés (biographic details).
352	7/3	Mrs. Anderson: July 4 remarks on Bulgarian TV and radio.
353	7/3	Airport loan to Haiti suspended.
354	7/2	Agreement with Bulgaria on financial questions.
355	7/2	Trade relations with Bulgaria.
†356	7/2	Chayes: "The Rule of Law—Now."
357	7/5	Protest against "security strips" in East Berlin and East Germany.
358	7/5	Mrs. Anderson: Plastics-USA exhibit.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Department of State 1963

The Department of State recently released a 152-page illustrated report, *Department of State 1963*, which describes its activities at home and abroad during the past year.

The report opens with a brief discussion of the objectives of U.S. foreign policy and then relates in some detail the different means by which the Department of State has been working for the achievement of those objectives.

In a foreword, President Kennedy expresses the view that "the men and women to whom we entrust this critical task" of promoting our foreign relations, "and the work they accomplish are too little known by the American people whose interests they serve." The President adds, "If it [this publication] helps to convey to you something of the same sense of admiration for these dedicated men and women which I share with many of my predecessors, it will truly serve our national purpose."

The book deals with the activities not only of the geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State but also Department offices less well-known to the general public, such as the Executive Secretariat, the Policy Planning Council, the Offices of Security and Protocol, and the Foreign Service Institute. It also includes sections on the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps, and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1257



July 29, 1963

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Fulfilling Our Basic Commitments as a Nation

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before your committee to offer to you my advice about the foreign policy implications of Senate bill 1732. Let me say, at the very beginning, that I consider these foreign policy aspects to be secondary in importance. The primary reason why we must attack the problems of discrimination is rooted in our basic commitments as a nation and a people. We must try to eliminate discrimination due to race, color, religion, not to make others think better of us but because it is incompatible with the great ideals to which our democratic society is dedicated. If the realities at home are all they should be, we shan't have to worry about our image abroad.

As matters stand, however, racial discrimination here at home has important effects on our foreign relations. This is not because such discrimination is unique to the United States.

¹Made before the Senate Committee on Commerce on July 10 (press release 366) during hearings on S. 1732, a bill to eliminate discrimination in public accommodations affecting interstate commerce.

Discrimination on account of race, color, religion, national or tribal origin may be found in many countries. But the United States is widely regarded as the home of democracy and the leader of the struggle for freedom, for human rights, for human dignity. We are expected to be the model—no higher compliment could be paid to us. So our failures to live up to our proclaimed ideals are noted—and magnified and distorted.

One of the epochal developments of our time has been the conversion of the old colonial empires into a host of new independent nations—some 50 since the Second World War. The vast majority of these newly independent peoples are nonwhite, and they are determined to eradicate every vestige of the notion that the white race is superior or entitled to special privileges because of race. Were we as a nation in their shoes, we would do the same.

This tremendous transformation in the world has come about under the impulse of the fundamental beliefs set forth in the second and third

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1257 PUBLICATION 7580 JULY 29, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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sentences of our Declaration of Independence. These universal ideas which we have done so much to nurture have spread over the earth. The spiritual sons of the American Revolution are of every race. For let us remind ourselves that the great Declaration said "all men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights"—not "all men except those who are not white."

Freedom, in the broadest and truest sense, is the central issue in the world struggle in which we are engaged. We stand for government by the consent of the governed, for government by law, for equal opportunity, for the rights and worth of the individual human being. These are aspirations shared, I believe, by the great majority of mankind. They give us allies, declared and undeclared, on all the continents—including many people behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

I believe that the forces of freedom are making progress. I am confident that if we persevere in the efforts we are now making, we shall eventually achieve the sort of world we seek—a world in which all men will be safe in freedom and peace.

But in waging this world struggle we are seriously handicapped by racial or religious discrimination in the United States. Our failure to live up to the pledges of our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution embarrasses our friends and heartens our enemies.

In their efforts to enhance their influence among the nonwhite peoples and to alienate them from us, the Communists clearly regard racial discrimination in the United States as one of their most valuable assets.

Soviet commentary on racial tension in the United States has stressed four themes:

1. Racism is inevitable in the American capitalist system.
2. Inaction by the U.S. Government is tantamount to support of the racists.
3. Recent events have exposed the hypocrisy of U.S. claims to ideological leadership of the "so-called free world."
4. The U.S. policy toward Negroes is clearly indicative of its attitude toward peoples of color throughout the world.

Racial discrimination and its exploitation by

the Communists would have damaged our international position more than they have in fact done but for four circumstances. The first is that nonwhite students have encountered race prejudice in Soviet bloc countries. The second is the loyalty of nonwhite Americans to the United States and its institutions. Despite the disabilities they have suffered they have, with rare exceptions, preserved their faith in our democracy. They have fought to defend it, and they stand guard on the ramparts of freedom today—in Berlin, in West Germany, in Southeast Asia, on all the continents and seas, and in the skies.

The third reason why racial discrimination and its exploitation by our adversaries have not caused us greater damage is that we have made progress in removing discriminatory laws and practices, have advanced toward full equality.

And the fourth reason is that the power of the Federal Government—especially its executive and judicial branches—has been exerted to secure the rights of racial minorities. The recent meeting of African heads of state, at Addis Ababa, condemned racial discrimination "especially in the United States," then approved the role of U.S. Federal authorities in attempting to combat it.

If progress should stop, if Congress should not approve legislation designed to remove remaining discriminatory practices, questions would inevitably arise in many parts of the world as to the real convictions of the American people. In that event hostile propaganda might be expected to hurt us more than it has hurt us until now.

Treatment of Nonwhite Diplomats

I now turn to a special concern of the Department of State: the treatment of nonwhite diplomats and visitors to the United States. We cannot expect the friendship and respect of nonwhite nations if we humiliate their representatives by denying them, say, service in a highway restaurant or city cafe.

Under international law and through the practice of nations, a host country owes certain duties to the diplomatic representatives which are accredited to it, in order to facilitate

the discharge by those representatives of their functions. For example, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which is widely recognized as codifying much of the international law on the subject of diplomatic relations, provides that a diplomat shall be treated by the receiving state with due respect and that state shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity. These obligations are not properly discharged unless diplomatic representatives have access, without discrimination or hindrance, to the public accommodations required by travelers in going about their business.

The United States Government expects that American diplomats abroad will be received in a manner appropriate to their capacity as representatives of the United States. We expect that they will be treated with courtesy and that they will be afforded the facilities necessary for the performance of their functions. Comity among the nations of the world requires that all countries act to receive foreign diplomatic representatives with courtesy and treat them with helpful consideration. We in the United States want to make sure that our conduct as a host country does not merely live up to commonly accepted requirements but indeed sets a standard for all the world.

Putting aside law, custom, and usage regarding the reception of foreign diplomats in this country, the United States has a tradition of warm and friendly reception for those who come to visit these shores from abroad. This tradition is one of the important values in the American heritage. It has been known throughout the world. We want to continue to uphold it and give it living reality in all of our actions and dealings.

One hundred and eleven nations send their diplomatic representatives to Washington and to New York City—in New York to an organization created to represent humanity. And every year thousands of other foreign nationals come to this country on official business or as visitors—professors, mayors, provincial governors, technicians, students, as well as chiefs of state and heads of government and cabinet ministers. They come with avid interest in learning more about us. We value good will.

Indeed, we enjoy much good will. And we would enjoy much more if we did not permit good will to be impaired by such senseless acts as refusing to serve a cup of coffee to a customer because his skin is dark.

Yet, within the last 2 years, scores of incidents of racial discrimination involving foreign diplomats accredited to this country have come to the attention of the Department of State. These incidents have occurred in all sections of the United States. Let me cite a few examples.

Denial of admittance to hotels. In one case the ambassador of one of the larger African countries was taking a trip involving a reservation at a large hotel. When the manager of the hotel realized that the ambassador was not white, he decided to cancel the reservation. It took several top-level officials the better part of a day to persuade the management of that hotel to accept the ambassador in order to avoid an international incident.

Refusal of service in restaurants. There have been many complaints on this score. One of the most publicized involved the representative of a West African country about to obtain its independence. He was refused service while en route from Washington to Pittsburgh. As a result of a casual remark made by him some time later, this incident was reported in our newspapers and throughout Africa. The Department worked hard to make amends for this unfortunate episode. The restaurant opened its doors to all customers regardless of color. Local authorities asked the representative to pay a return visit. But, even in this case, the damage was probably not completely undone. And in many cases there have been no amends.

One African ambassador was en route here from New York. His first experience, even before he had a chance to present his credentials to the President, was that of being ejected from a roadside restaurant.

A Caribbean country which recently became independent assigned consular responsibilities in the immediate area to its first secretary in Washington. In traveling through his area of responsibility he was recently ejected from a

restaurant which he had previously been informed was integrated.

An African ambassador who had experienced several times refusals of service in restaurants finally complained to the Department of State when his wife and 8-year-old child were denied a glass of water. The ambassador wrote to me that he had been an officer in the French Army during World War II and had led his men in battle. He said that even under battle conditions he had treated the children of the enemy with enough kindness and consideration to spare them a drink of water from his canteen.

Denial of admittance to public beaches. An Asian cabinet member and some of his diplomatic colleagues stationed in Washington were refused admittance to a beach nearby. An African ambassador was not only refused admittance to a public beach in this area but threatened and insulted. He now represents his country in a European country. The act of hostility he experienced here remains for him a vivid recollection.

These unpleasant experiences indicate the conditions under which foreign diplomats of color work in the Capital of the United States. I have heard it suggested that some of these representatives may be looking for trouble, that they are trying to test facilities in order to embarrass the United States for political purposes. But it has been our experience in the Department of State that these diplomats are trying to avoid incidents.

The nonwhite diplomat often prefers to keep within the confines of the District of Columbia, knowing that restaurants, swimming pools, beaches, theaters, and other establishments in a large part of the United States are potential places of trouble. If he wants to make a trip, he frequently seeks the assistance of the Department of State in order to avoid embarrassment.

Most governments expect their diplomats to travel in the host country. Most foreign countries, and particularly those in Africa, are well aware of the problems of racial discrimination in the United States. When diplomats from these countries return home they may have learned to understand the difficulties with which our Government has to cope in giving full effect

to the civil rights to which all Americans are entitled.

Incidents Involving Other Visitors

Humiliating incidents are not confined to foreign diplomats stationed in this country. They sometimes involve other visitors from abroad such as recipients of leader grants, AID [Agency for International Development] specialists who may be teachers and graduate students, and even high-level state visitors.

The head of the Civil Aeronautics Board of a West African country, brought here under the sponsorship of the United States Government, was denied service in a restaurant. He terminated his trip right then and there. The mayor of the capital city of a British possession in Africa, which is just about to obtain independence, was humiliated in a restaurant. The assistant secretary of state of another West African country was refused service at a hotel and a restaurant.

We are also aware of incidents involving foreign students who come to the United States, some under government sponsorship and others on their own. These students come here to learn not only skills which will be useful to them when they return home but about our way of life. Some of them return home disappointed and even embittered.

Sometimes these incidents involve not Africans or Asians, but Europeans. Not too long ago a German student was jailed for having eaten a meal in the colored side of a bus terminal lunch counter. The student had chosen to sit there because the white side was completely filled.

I have cited typical incidents. Now I should like to quote just a few of the comments made by nonwhite diplomats in Washington to members of the staff of the Department of State.

An African ambassador: "I am a friend of the United States and I want relations between our two countries to be as good as possible. I am particularly aware of the efforts this administration is making to improve the status of civil rights and, therefore, I shall instruct my staff to be careful not to embarrass our Government by being involved in any unpleasant

situations. Yet I have to find some sort of accommodations for my staff, and I am really at a loss as to how to avoid getting into trouble."

Another African ambassador said: "In spite of the good work this country is doing, personal relations spoil a good deal of the work done in other fields. People feel very hurt when they are treated in this way."

These comments are illustrative. Others are contained in a supplemental paper which I shall be glad to leave with you.

With respect to the presence of diplomats and other foreign visitors in the United States, the provisions barring discrimination in places of public accommodation would go a long way toward removing some of the most acute problems we have experienced in this area. These provisions would end some of the most obvious and embarrassing forms of discrimination. They would enable foreign visitors in our country to travel with much less fear of hindrance and insult. They would create a more normal and friendlier environment for our relations with other countries.

I have dwelt on the experiences and reactions of diplomats and other visitors to this country because they are of special concern to the Department of State. But I would state as emphatically as I can that I do not ask for them rights and decencies which are in practice denied to colored American citizens. One should not need a diplomatic passport in order to enjoy ordinary civil and human rights. Nor would these diplomats and other visitors be favorably impressed by efforts on our part to treat them differently from nonwhite Americans. They realize full well that they are being discriminated against, not as diplomats or as foreigners but on account of their race.

The counselor of an African embassy said: "We do not want any special privileges. We should decline them if they were offered. This is not the answer. We want what American diplomats in our country would get."

The head of government of a large West African country complained when he found that the hotel in which he had been lodged was segregated. He said he would not have stayed there if he had known it was not open to Negro Americans.

So, let me stress again, the interest of the Department of State in this bill reaches far beyond obtaining decent treatment for nonwhite diplomats and visitors. We are directly and comprehensively concerned with obtaining decent treatment of all human beings, including American citizens.

This is a problem which merits the concern and effort of all Americans without regard to any particular region of the country, race, or political party. The present racial crisis divides and weakens, and challenges, the Nation both at home and in the world struggle in which we are engaged. I deeply hope that the issues involved can be approached on the basis of genuine bipartisanship, just as are the broad objectives of this country's foreign policy.

Finally, I note that specific legislative language is being considered by the committee with the Justice Department; the Department of State is not concerned with detailed questions of legislation and enforcement. We in State are concerned with the underlying purpose of the proposed measure and the adverse effects of the present situation. What we would hope is that the Congress would join the executive and the judiciary in declaring it to be our national policy to accord every citizen—and every person—the respect due to him as an individual.

I want to reiterate most emphatically that in the fateful struggle in which we are engaged to make the world safe for freedom, the United States cannot fulfill its historic role unless it fulfills its commitments to its own people.

SUPPLEMENT

Other comments made by nonwhite diplomats to representatives of the Office of Protocol:

A counselor of an African embassy—"The result is that a black diplomat is rather cut off, he withdraws to himself and sees only his own people. This creates constant resentment throughout our staff. Some of us are rather bitter. There is so much about America which is good. What America has done for the underdeveloped countries is wonderful. But here, in this matter, we are dealing on a personal level. When people come to our country, we try to make them feel more at home than they are in their country. Our general feeling here is that 'I am forever a stranger.' There is something about American policy which cannot be explained. It cuts through all your policy—

it is the contradiction between what you say and what you do. You accuse the new countries of a double standard, but there are certain things in this country which seem false. On the one hand, ideals are pitched very high; while on the other, behavior is pitched very low. With never-ending talk of equality there is flagrant racial discrimination—we don't trust this country. If you give me what I know you think is second rate, I resent it, and I do not respect you."

An African ambassador—"I definitely feel that life in Washington is like living on an island, and that if I ever travel, it should be only en route to New York. But even in Washington, things have not been easy."

A staff member of an African embassy—"Even the best friend of this country cannot be happy. One feels bad. One begins to feel all this talk of good relations, the free world . . . is farcical when in daily life this is the situation. It imposes an undue burden which ordinarily one wouldn't have. We feel humiliated."

A staff member of an African embassy—"Ever since I ran into discrimination, I am conscious that we must avert any type of incident. We go about our work with a great load on our minds. We are conscious of it all the time. One is not in the country to provoke incidents. One does not wish to embarrass the host government."

An Asian ambassador—"I realize that discrimination exists and that it cannot be completely abolished overnight. However, I cannot understand or tolerate this discrimination. Although I am not directly affected by it, it hurts me deeply because it affects some of my best friends. When my friends are insulted, I am insulted as well. The people who wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights meant well and I sincerely hope that one day soon the Constitution will be justified. The Government of the United States has shown its willingness to uphold America's boast of equality of all men. But it must act more strongly or this equality will be ridiculed in foreign countries by those who would use it as propaganda. We know that we are limited in our choice of accommodations and this creates in us an inferiority complex. We are here to do a job, but because of this inferiority we cannot do it well. It also leads to dangerous statements made by the diplomats on their return to their countries."

An African ambassador—"I have been told that I ought to wear my robes when I go out, but no, that's ridiculous. At home I dress the way Americans do, and I am not going to dress specially. After all, it's the man who counts, the person inside the suit. I will not wear special clothes in order to be respected as a person. I will be respected regardless of what I wear. When I feel like wearing robes, I will, but if you ask me to do it so everyone will know I am an African, no, I won't."

Another African ambassador—"If I have to announce that I am an Ambassador before I enter any establishment or apartment building in order not to be subjected to insults and humiliation, I will request that my Government recall me."

Under Secretary Harriman Departs for Test Ban Talks in Moscow

The Department of State announced on July 9 (press release 363) that Under Secretary W. Averell Harriman, the President's Special Representative, would depart for London and Moscow on July 11.

Accompanying him to London and Moscow were: Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Carl Kaysen, White House staff; William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; John T. McNaughton, General Counsel, Department of Defense; Frank E. Cash, Department of State; and Alexander Akalovsky, Franklin A. Long, Nedville E. Nordness, and Frank Press, consultant, all of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

President Kennedy and Soviet Leaders Exchange Fourth of July Messages

Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the U.S.S.R.

President Kennedy to Soviet Leaders

JULY 4, 1963

The American people are grateful for your message of good will on the anniversary of our Independence Day. The American Revolution was based on the desire of our people to build a free nation in a world of peace. Today that desire for peace is more urgent than ever. The world has long passed that time when armed conflict can be the solution to international problems. That is why I share your desire expressed in your message of today that we move forward with understanding towards the solution of those key problems which divide us. I am hopeful that world peace, just and lasting, can be achieved.

Soviet Leaders to President Kennedy

JULY 4, 1963

On the occasion of the national day of the United States of America, Independence Day, we convey to you and to the American people warm greetings and wishes for peace and well-being.

In our century, the century of conquering atomic energy and of penetrating in the depths of the universe, the preservation of peace has become a truly vital necessity for all mankind. We are convinced that if the governments of our countries, along with the governments of other countries, having displayed a realistic attitude, firmly set out on the path of removing the hotbeds of international tension and expanding businesslike cooperation, people everywhere will acclaim this as a great contribution toward consolidating universal peace.

United States Blocks Cuban Assets To Counter Communist Subversion

Press release 360 dated July 8

At the request of the Secretary of State, the Treasury Department instituted blocking controls with respect to Cuba effective 12:01 a.m. July 8. This action was taken to restrict the movement of funds from Cuba in accordance with the resolution adopted on July 3, 1963,¹ by the Council of the Organization of American States urging member governments to implement a series of recommendations to counter Castro-Communist subversion in the hemisphere. The measure is also in accord with the resolutions to counter subversive activities adopted on April 4, 1963, at Managua, Nicaragua, by the Governments of the Central American Republics, Panama, and the United States.² This blocking action will also contribute further to the economic isolation of Cuba.

The controls instituted on July 8 are modeled generally on those which are in effect with respect to Communist China and North Korea. They will (1) block all assets in the United States of Cuba or of persons in Cuba, (2) prohibit persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from engaging in unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars to or from Cuba, and

¹ Not printed here.

² For texts, see BULLETIN of May 6, 1963, p. 719.

(3) prohibit all other unlicensed transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals or transactions involving property in which there is a Cuban interest. Thus Cuba will be denied the use of American financial facilities for transfers of funds to Latin America for subversive purposes.

Cuban refugees in the United States or elsewhere in the free world will be regarded as unblocked nationals unless they are acting on behalf of the Cuban regime. Where serious hardship can be proven, remittances by persons residing in the United States to members of their immediate family residing in Cuba will be authorized by special license.

Letters of Credence

Guatemala

The newly appointed Ambassador of Guatemala, Carlos García-Bauer, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 10. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 365 dated July 10.

Secretary Assigned Leadership in International Aviation Policy

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Secretary Rusk.¹

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, June 22, 1963.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The recommendations of the Interagency Steering Committee on International Aviation Policy, which I approved a few weeks ago,² underscored the need for a focus of leadership within the executive branch for (1) identifying emerging problems and advising me on their solution; (2) giving continuing attention to international aviation policies; and (3) assuring necessary follow-up actions. Since international aviation policies necessarily affect our over-all relations with other nations, I shall look to the Secretary of

¹ 28 Fed. Reg. 6489.

² BULLETIN of May 20, 1963, p. 784.

State, as a part of his assigned responsibilities, to provide such a focus of leadership for this vital area of foreign policy.

In making this assignment to you, I am mindful of the statutory responsibilities vested in the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Agency for International Development, which bear importantly on the field of international aviation policy and of the contributions which these agencies are able to make. It is my desire, therefore, that you take such measures as may be necessary to assure that these agencies are appropriately consulted on all matters affecting their interests or falling within their special areas of competence. The effective accomplishment of this undertaking requires the cooperation and full utilization of the resources and skills of each of the agencies which participate in international aviation activities.

In this regard, I endorse the recommendations contained in the May 29, 1963, summary of the Bureau of the Budget study that there be established a high-level interagency Committee on International Aviation Policy, to be chaired by the Secretary of State or his representative. The other members will be the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, or their representatives, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency will serve as vice chairman.

This committee will concern itself with policy matters affecting international aviation, as distinct from the technical matters which will, in the first instance, continue to be handled through the mechanism of the Interagency Group on International Aviation. The Chairman should convene the Committee on International Aviation Policy as soon as possible.

I know that you will take the necessary steps within the Department of State to assure that there are clear assignments of responsibility and adequate allocations of staff resources for meeting the important responsibilities which

leadership in international aviation policy matters entails. Please report to me from time to time upon the significant developments under this program, including such revisions in present policy as may be indicated by changing circumstances.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Captive Nations Week, 1963

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212) the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation, designating the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week", and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

WHEREAS the cause of human rights and dignity remains a universal aspiration and

WHEREAS justice requires the elemental right of free choice and


WHEREAS this nation has an abiding commitment to the principles of national self-determination and human freedom.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 14, 1963, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fifth day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3543; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 7065.

The Rule of Law—Now

by Abram Chayes
*Legal Adviser*¹

Since the beginning of the 16th General Assembly in the fall of 1961 we have heard about the financial crisis at the United Nations. Of course there is a financial crisis in the U.N. The bills that the organization is incurring—largely on account of its operations to keep the peace in the Congo and in the Middle East—have been outrunning by a very large amount the funds it has been able to collect from its members. When Secretary-General U Thant first brought this problem to the attention of the organization he predicted a deficit of \$170 million by June 30, 1962. In fact, despite the bond issue and vigorous efforts to collect arrears, the U.N. deficit, largely attributable to these two peacekeeping enterprises, still amounted to \$72,400,000 at the end of this fiscal year. Although the recent successes of the Congo operations will bring a significant cut-back in current outlays there and permit us to hope that this item may be entirely eliminated in the not too distant future, the problem of financing the rest of the operation and of paying old debts remains.

Thus the financial crisis at the U.N. is a real one. But, as is often the case with controversies over the power of the purse, financial questions cover more deep-seated issues of constitutional dimensions. And in this case I believe the resolution of the financial questions

now being debated in the United Nations² will tell us a great deal about the rule of law in our world and about our ability to make it prevail.

We are met here not as national or governmental representatives but as lawyers, members of a common profession that in many ways transcends national boundaries. Our purpose is to consider how this profession, as a profession, can contribute to the maintenance of world peace. The agenda of the conference covers a familiar range of topics: strengthening the U.N., third-party settlement of international disputes, fuller use of the World Court, respect for agreed procedures in resolving international issues. All of these go to make up the idea of the rule of law in international affairs.

Through its discussions, this conference will seek to develop ways of approaching this idea more nearly in the future. Yet, in the question of U.N. finances, all of the elements I have listed are implicated. And if the nations of the world cannot bring themselves in this matter to act in accordance with the dictates of the rule of law, it is hard to have any very great hope for our capacity to improve and extend it in the future. For this is not a situation where international law, on either its substantive or procedural side, was rudimentary or ill adapted to the situation. The legal issues did not turn on the opinions of publicists or hypothetical reasoning. The question of U.N. finances brought into play a developed corpus of law and legal materials that were dealt with by the most advanced of international legal institutions.

¹ Address made before the World Conference of Lawyers on World Peace Through the Rule of Law at Athens, Greece, on July 3 (press release 356 dated July 2).

² See p. 178.

World Court Opinion on U.N. Assessments

The United Nations undertook the burdens of keeping the peace in the Middle East in 1956 and in the Congo in 1960. In each case the action represented a broad consensus of the states members as to the duties and responsibilities of the organization in the circumstances. The original resolution establishing the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East passed the General Assembly without a dissenting vote.³ The Congo operation, authorized in the first instance by unanimous vote of the Security Council, was later confirmed and expanded by the General Assembly, also without a dissenting vote.⁴

The financing resolutions in each case, too, were the product of extensive consideration of the issues, legal as well as political, and registered broad consensus. Nevertheless, when the Secretary-General first called to the attention of the General Assembly that many members were increasingly in arrears in paying their assessments for these operations, some members questioned the legal liability to pay these assessments. A number of grounds were advanced: that the operations themselves were *ultra vires* or had not been properly authorized by the organization; that the Assembly was without power to compel money contributions in support of such operations or, in any case, had not intended to do so in its assessment resolutions.

International legal institutions provide a formal method for resolving such controversies. The U.N. Charter provides in article 96: "The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question." The Court's competence to render such an opinion is not affected by the adherence or nonadherence of any member of the United Nations to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Article 96 is a part of the charter agreed to by all signatory nations. And, by force of article 93 of the charter, "All Members of the United Nations are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute of

President Sends Greetings to Lawyers' Conference

Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to the World Conference of Lawyers on World Peace Through the Rule of Law held at Athens, Greece, June 30-July 6.

It gives me great pleasure to send greetings to the distinguished group of lawyers participating in the First World Conference on World Peace Through The Rule of Law. This Conference represents five years of effort and brings together lawyers and judges from over a hundred countries in the attempt to develop and strengthen the legal machinery that must form the basis for peaceful relations among all nations. The habits of respect for the law and confidence in its effectiveness are at the root of freedom within nations. And these same habits and confidence must find their place in the relations between nations if we are to build a just and stable peace.

the International Court of Justice." Pursuant to article 96, the General Assembly, by a vote of 52 to 11, with 32 abstentions, after full and careful debate, adopted Resolution 1731 (XVI) requesting the advice of the Court. The question as put in the resolution was whether the expenses authorized in the assessment resolutions covering the U.N. operations in the Congo and Middle East were "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of article 17 of the charter so that, by virtue of article 17, they "shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly."

As is required in such cases, the International Court of Justice gave notice of the proceedings to all states members and gave each the opportunity to submit views on the issues in writing or in oral pleadings. It was not an empty offer. In no other proceeding before the Court have so many states participated. They represented many parts of the globe and all legal systems. The official volume of the Court reporting the case includes written submissions in various forms from 20 different countries: Upper Volta, Italy, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the United States, Canada, Japan, Portugal, Australia, the United King-

³ For text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1956, p. 793.

⁴ For background and texts of resolutions, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159, and Oct. 10, 1960, p. 583.

dom, Spain, Ireland, South Africa, the U.S.S.R., Byelorussia, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, and Rumania.

In the oral arguments which began on the 14th of May 1962 and proceeded through the 21st, 9 of the nations pleaded orally before the Court: Canada, the Netherlands, Italy, the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia, Ireland, the U.S.S.R., and the United States. The United Kingdom and Ireland were represented by their Attorneys General; Australia by its Solicitor General; Canada, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, and the United States sent the Legal Advisers of their respective Foreign Offices.⁵ The U.S.S.R. argued orally before the Court for the first time in history and was represented by the distinguished lawyer, Mr. Grigory Tunkin, former Chairman of the International Law Commission and Director of the Juridical-Treaty Branch of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Two months after the oral arguments, the Court, acting with commendable dispatch in view of the importance of the case and the difficulty of the issues, rendered its opinion. By a vote of 9 to 5 it gave an affirmative answer to the question presented. It held that the expenditures authorized in the financing resolutions were indeed "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of article 17, with the consequence that assessment of those expenses by the General Assembly was binding on the members.⁶

The World Court, as all of you know, is a most distinguished panel of jurists. The Statute of the Court prescribes that it "shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are juris-consults of recognized competence in international law." Members of the United Nations are enjoined, in electing judges to the Court, to "bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should

individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured." It goes without saying that members of the Court sit as independent judges and not as governmental representatives. Indeed, the votes of the judges in the *U.N. Assessments* case itself did not uniformly reflect the national positions their governments had taken on the issues.

I have said that the decision of this Court, so constituted and so composed, was rendered by a vote of 9 to 5. Some have said that this absence of unanimity somehow derogates from the force of the decision. Of course that cannot be so. The very existence of a court with more than one judge implies the possibility of differences of view among the judges. In my own country we are accustomed to seeing questions of grave public and political importance decided by narrow majorities—often a majority of one—in our highest court. The International Court itself, in the recent South-West Africa decision, decided in favor of its own jurisdiction by a single vote. In that case judges of United States and Soviet nationality found themselves together in the majority, while the President of the Court, a Polish national, and the British, French, and Australian judges were in the minority. Although the division was thus as narrow as it could possibly be, we, as lawyers, would expect that South Africa would abide by the decision and appear on the merits of the case. And she has done so.

The opinion of the Court in a case such as the *U.N. Assessments* case is characterized as "advisory." It cannot be "binding" in a juridical sense because there are no parties before the Court upon whom a judgment could operate. But for all other purposes, I would myself suppose that the opinion of the Court, in an advisory case properly before it where the issue is justiciable, is an authoritative statement of the law. In the *U.N. Assessments* case all the conditions were met. The case was before the Court at the request of the General Assembly under article 96 of the charter. The issue was a narrowly defined question of legal liability, fully matured and ripe for adjudication on

⁵ For a statement made before the Court by Mr. Chayes, see *ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 30.

⁶ For a Department statement on the Court's opinion, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

concrete facts comprehensively developed before the tribunal.

But whether or not the opinion by its own force establishes the law we need not debate here. The General Assembly itself has removed any possible question about the status of the Court's advisory opinion. The opinion was transmitted to the Secretary-General and by him to the General Assembly at its 17th session. And after consideration and debate, both in the appropriate committee and on the floor, the Assembly, by a vote of 76 to 17, with 8 abstentions, declared that it "accepts the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the question submitted to it."⁷ Thus this phase of the case came to a close.

General Assembly Action on Court's Decision

The experience in the United Nations since the decision of the Court has not been altogether disheartening. I am informed that approximately \$16 million in arrearages has been paid by 46 countries. Although these countries are, for the most part, small and the amounts owing were correspondingly small, their action to comply with the decision of the Court represents a commendable example of the rule of law in action in international affairs.

Another development is worth noting. As you know, article 19 of the charter provides that:

A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years.

Just prior to the beginning of the 17th session of the General Assembly 6 countries were in such a situation, and again just prior to the special session that began this spring, 10 countries were in arrears more than 2 full years, taking into account the Congo and Middle East assessments. In all of these cases but one, the states concerned, by appropriate payment in advance of the convening of the General Assembly, removed themselves from the scope of article

⁷ For text of a resolution adopted on Dec. 19, 1962, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1963, p. 37.

19. And it should be remarked that these countries were not confined to any single quarter of the globe or any single political system.

The one exception was Haiti, which, as you may know, was in arrears for more than the total of 2 years' contributions when the recent special session opened. Haiti made no payments against its arrears until May 24, 10 days after the special session began. The Secretary-General, in a letter dated May 14, the day the Assembly convened, informed the Assembly President, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan, that Haiti was in arrears in an amount exceeding that specified in article 19. At the opening of the General Assembly, the Haitian delegate absented himself from the hall. Sir Zafrulla, a former judge of the International Court of Justice, replied to the Secretary-General's letter the following day. He said:

I have received your letter of 14 May 1963, informing me that, at the opening of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly, Haiti was in arrears in the payment of its financial contribution to the United Nations within terms of Article 19 of the Charter. I would have made an announcement drawing the attention of the Assembly to the loss of voting rights in the Assembly of the Member State just mentioned, under the first sentence of Article 19, had a formal count of vote taken place in the presence of a representative of that State at the opening plenary meeting. As no such vote took place, and as the representative of Haiti was not present, this announcement became unnecessary.

The Secretary-General's letter and the President's reply were circulated as formal U.N. documents.⁸

Finally, the General Assembly, just a few days ago, in bringing to a close an intensive 7-week special review of the financing of peace-keeping operations, reemphasized the obligation of members to pay their arrearages. A resolution adopted by the overwhelming vote of the Assembly requests the member states in arrears for the Congo and Middle East operations to make arrangements with the Secretary-General "within the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, including the possibility of payment by instalment, for bringing the payments of these accounts up to date as soon as

⁸ For texts, see Note No. 2768 issued to correspondents by the U.N. Office of Public Information on May 21.

possible. . . ."^{*} The deadline for making such arrangements is set at October 31, 1963.

Acceptance of Prescribed Sanctions

I said earlier that the experience in the U.N. since the Court's decision is not wholly disheartening. There is a record of payment of arrearages by certain smaller nations, and in particular the record reflects a healthy respect on the part of the states members for the sanction of article 19. But, if the experience is not wholly disheartening, it cannot be said to be altogether cheering either. For a number of states remain—and, among them, the most substantial delinquents—that have as yet made no payments against their arrearages. Again I should say that this group of states is confined to no single geographical region and no single political or social system.

It must be said then that the implications of the present financial controversy in the United Nations for the rule of law remain in doubt. I hope, and we must all hope—as lawyers interested in the vindication of the processes and procedures of a system of law—that the states remaining in arrears will find some way to meet their obligations and pay the assessments which the Court has found are binding upon them. If so, the rule of law to which we all stand dedicated will have won a notable victory.

But if they persist in their refusal to pay, whatever may be the positions of our governments, I hope we as lawyers will not blink what is at stake. After the course of events that I have outlined here today, there can be no question that the obligations are lawfully owing. That issue was properly presented to a tribunal that all of us, whatever system of law we are familiar with, would recognize as a fully competent court. It was decided by that court after a hearing comporting with the highest standards of justice, a hearing in which there was full opportunity for all interested parties to participate and be heard. The decision of that court was overwhelmingly accepted by the General Assembly, to which it was reported. States may, of course, continue to persist in

their refusal to pay. But they cannot ask us to accept that their refusal is based on legal grounds. When they argue for a result different from that pronounced by the Court, they assert the right to be judges in their own case. And that, as we all know, is fundamentally at odds with the rule of law.

We must all hope that it does not come to this. But if it does, the processes of the law have not yet been exhausted. In this situation, unlike most, the international legal system provides its own sanction for breach of duty. As we have seen, article 19 provides that, when delinquency reaches a certain point, the delinquent "shall have no vote" in the General Assembly. The terms of that article are clear. It represents the considered judgment of the states that framed the charter or have since adhered to it as to the sanction appropriate to continued financial irresponsibility on the part of a member. Each member state has bound itself to the charter containing this sanction—knowingly, solemnly, and with full appreciation of its meaning. The President of the General Assembly by his official act has affirmed the import of article 19: When the arrearages of a member state exceed 2 years' contributions, that state, automatically and by operation of the charter, has no vote in the General Assembly. Specialized agencies of the U.N. have interpreted similar provisions in their own charters in the same way. The 16 member states that have paid amounts sufficient to remove themselves from the ambit of this sanction have shown their understanding of it by their acts.

If some of the states now in arrears persist in their refusal to pay, their arrearages will exceed 2 years' contributions at the beginning of 1964 and we will face the question of the application of the sanction prescribed by the charter. The issue of fidelity of law is, I submit, as much involved in this question as in the question of payment itself.

In one of the early constitutional crises in the history of the United States the Supreme Court handed down a judgment vastly displeasing to President Jackson. We are told that Jackson's response was, "John Marshall has made his decision—now let him enforce it!" The story has many lessons, but one of them

^{*} For text, see p. 185.

is surely that, even in the most developed legal system, the courts cannot enforce the law by their unaided efforts. For this they must depend on the more active arms of government. And if these more active branches fail or refuse in their duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed, this too is an assertion of will in place of law.

Like John Marshall's Supreme Court, the International Court cannot enforce its judgment. Only the Assembly can insure that the sanction for nonpayment of assessments is applied according to its terms. This being the case, to vote against enforcement according to the terms of article 19 is to betray the rule of law as surely as to fail to pay.

Where states have agreed to instruments governing their relations and have established rational and orderly procedures for interpreting those instruments in case of doubt, where those procedures have been duly resorted to and have produced a result, we are entitled to ask that they accept and give effect to that result. And where sanctions are duly prescribed for failure to comply, we are entitled to see that they are applied according to their terms. Unless the nations are prepared to grant this measure of assent to the institutions of law, unless we as lawyers, whatever our nation, are prepared to demand it, the work of this conference will be empty. Far more important, the rule of law, one of the handful of saving ideals that man pursues, will have suffered a grievous blow.

President Amends Order on Trade Agreements Program Administration

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 11075, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (76 Stat. 872), and as President of the United States, it is ordered that Executive Order No. 11075² of January 15, 1963 (28 F.R. 473), as amended by Executive Order No. 11106³ of April 18,


¹No. 11113; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 6183.

²For text, see *BULLETIN* of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 180.

³For text, see *ibid.*, May 27, 1963, p. 839.

1963 (28 F.R. 3911) be, and it is hereby, further amended by substituting for subsection (c) of Section 2 thereof (48 CFR § 1.2(c)) the following:

"(c) There shall be in the said Office two officers, each of whom shall have the title 'Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations', with the rank of Ambassador. The principal functions of each shall be to conduct negotiations under title II of the Act, and each shall perform such additional duties as the Special Representative may direct."



THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 13, 1963.

U.S. Makes Additional Quantities of Uranium 235 Available

Following are two statements released by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission on July 3.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

On September 26, 1961, I announced an increase in the quantities of enriched uranium to be made available for peaceful uses at home and abroad.¹ Since that time, plans for the increased utilization of enriched uranium in nuclear power plants have become more definite and widespread. In order to give assurances that enriched uranium can be supplied to meet these needs, I am announcing today a further increase in the quantities of material to be made available.

I have determined, pursuant to section 41 b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, that the quantities of uranium 235 in enriched uranium to be made available are raised from 100,000 to 200,000 kilograms for domestic distribution under section 53 and from 65,000 to 150,000 kilograms for foreign distribution under section 54. These amounts have been recommended by the Atomic Energy Commission with the concurrence of the Departments of State and Defense. The new total of 350,000

¹*BULLETIN* of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 648.

kilograms is more than double the previous total.

The material will be distributed, by lease or sale, as required over a period of years and will be subject to prudent safeguards against unauthorized use. As nuclear programs develop in the future, it will undoubtedly be necessary to make further determinations increasing the amounts of material to be available. The capacity of the United States for producing enriched uranium is sufficient to meet all foreseeable needs for peaceful uses in addition to our defense needs.

A discussion of the new determination is contained in the attached statement by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

**STATEMENT BY GLENN T. SEABORG
CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION**

The President's announcement today that the quantities of enriched uranium to be made available for peaceful uses at home and abroad have been increased to a total of 350,000 kilograms of contained U-235 is another important step forward in the civilian applications of atomic energy. Of this total, 200,000 kilograms is for distribution to licensed users within the United States and 150,000 kilograms is for distribution to foreign countries under civil agreements for cooperation.

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, enriched uranium within the United States remains the property of the U.S. Government and is leased to licensed users. Legislation to permit private ownership and sale to domestic users is presently under consideration by Congress. Enriched uranium distributed to foreign nations has been leased for use in research reactors and has been sold for use in power reactors. The charges for both lease and sale of enriched uranium at home and abroad are determined by the actual cost, with appropriate allowances for depreciation and other indirect expenses. The current schedule of charges was announced by the AEC on May 29, 1962.

The enriched uranium distributed will be used in research and development and as fuel in nuclear reactors, with the bulk of it being utilized in generating electricity. The new de-

termination by the President is expected to cover allocations of material under present domestic licenses and foreign agreements for co-operation and those anticipated in the near future. Material for use in the AEC's own facilities is not included in this determination. With the growth of nuclear power at home and abroad, further increases in the quantities of material to be made available will need to be considered from time to time. The large capacity of U.S. diffusion plants for the production of enriched uranium permits them to meet both civilian and military requirements.

Allocation of enriched uranium to a reactor project includes material for the fuel loading, for fuel consumption over the period of the domestic license or foreign agreement for co-operation, and for the inventory outside of the reactor associated with the manufacture and storage of fuel elements, cooling and shipment of irradiated fuel, and chemical processing of irradiated fuel to recover the remaining uranium and plutonium. The amount of U-235 contained in enriched uranium returned to the AEC is deducted from the amount supplied by the AEC in computing how much is available for further distribution. The material allocated to a reactor project may not be completely distributed for several decades.

As of April 30, 1963, there were in effect in the United States construction permits or operating licenses for 12 power reactors, 4 test reactors, 79 research reactors, and 16 critical-experiment facilities, and 471 licenses for other uses of special nuclear material, not including the AEC's own reactors, facilities, and uses. Agreements for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy are in effect between the United States and a large part of the free world, including 33 countries and West Berlin; 14 of these agreements provide for cooperation on power reactors. In addition, agreements are in effect with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

Enriched uranium for peaceful uses is distributed abroad only under civil agreements for cooperation. All such agreements contain a guarantee by the cooperating country that the material supplied will be used exclusively for

peaceful purposes. Safeguard provisions allowing inspection of material, facilities, and records by U.S. or international inspectors are also included, as appropriate.

Commission Urges Expansion of American Studies Overseas

The Department of State announced on July 12 (press release 369) that the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs had that day forwarded a report to Congress recommending the expansion of the use of binational commissions in other countries to assist the development of American studies overseas as well as the general academic exchange program of the United States.

The report entitled *American Studies Abroad: Progress and Difficulties in Selected Countries*¹ was prepared by Walter Johnson, professor of American history at the University of Chicago and a member of the Commission. It proposes that binational commissions, now operating in 44 countries, be established in as many as feasible of the some 70 other countries with which the Department of State conducts exchange programs. Dr. Johnson points out that binational commissions enhance acceptance of American studies and other exchange activities by serving a "mutuality of national interests."

Such commissions have been set up in other countries under authority of the Fulbright Act of 1946. The broader provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 authorize establishment of commissions in all of the countries with which the United States has exchange programs. Binational commissions are usually made up equally of Americans living in a foreign country and of nationals of that country.

The report praises the effort by both private

agencies and government to "nourish and stimulate an increased understanding of the United States abroad, not by furnishing information but by imparting knowledge in depth—knowledge of our history, government, culture and aspirations." Private activities cited by the report include the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, the Bologna Center of The Johns Hopkins University, and the programs of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils.

Dr. Johnson urges greater care in the choice of foreign institutions for the placement of American scholars and the establishment of chairs of American studies. He recommends giving preference to universities that would incorporate American studies into their required curriculum, draw visiting scholars into the full professional life of the institution, and provide instruction in American studies by their own faculty members after an initial period.

In the two years since foreign currency funds generated under Public Law 480 (the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954) became available to the Department of State for chairs and workshops in American studies, the program has reached many parts of the world.

Several of Dr. Johnson's recommendations relate to secondary school teachers, including an increase in the number of special seminars on American civilization available to them and the creation of a new category of grantee to enable such teachers of American literature, history, or related subjects to undertake advanced study at appropriate American universities or at selected universities abroad.

Dr. Johnson's is the second report to Congress by the Commission. The first, a study of the effectiveness of exchange programs, was submitted in April² and is now available in booklet form under the title "Beacon of Hope."

¹ A limited number of copies are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

² For a Department announcement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 617.

President Recommends Expansion of Peace Corps

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the Senate. An identical letter was sent on the same day to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

White House press release dated July 4

JULY 4, 1963

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am pleased to transmit legislation which will authorize the appropriation of \$108 million for the Peace Corps in Fiscal Year 1964. It is fitting that this request is made on the 187th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. For the Peace Corps exemplifies the spirit of that revolution whose beginnings we celebrate today.

That revolution was not only a revolution for American independence and freedom. It was, as Jefferson perceived and Lincoln proclaimed, a revolution unbounded by geography, race or culture. It was a movement for the political and spiritual freedom of man.

Today, two centuries later and thousands of miles from its origin, the men and women of the Peace Corps are again affirming the universality of that revolution. Whether expressed by the community development projects of Latin America, or the panchayati raj program of India, the determination of people to be free, to govern themselves, and to share in the fruits of both the industrial and democratic revolutions, is one of the most profound forces at work in the world. To this revolution Peace Corps Volunteers are giving the same qualities of energy and spirit which the 21 year old Lafayette and his equally youthful contemporaries gave as volunteer participants in our own revolution.

In less than two years their accomplishments have already been impressive. They constitute

more than one-third of all the qualified secondary teachers in Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Nyasaland; they have saved a three-quarter million dollar rice crop in Pakistan; they have vaccinated over 25,000 Bolivians; they are teaching in 400 Philippines schools; they have created a thriving poultry industry in the State of Punjab in India; they are teaching in every rural secondary school in Costa Rica and virtually every secondary school in British Honduras; they have contributed to the creation of a system of farm-to-market roads in Tanganyika. But these are only isolated examples; all over the world Volunteers have surveyed roads, taught students and teachers, built schools, planted forests, drilled wells, and started local industries. In their off-hours they have conducted adult education classes, organized athletic teams, and launched programs ranging from music clubs to debating teams.

As important as these achievements are, they are far less important than the contribution Peace Corps Volunteers are making in building those human relations which must exist for a happy and peaceful understanding between people. The United States and a few other fortunate nations are part of an island of prosperity in a world-wide sea of poverty. Our affluence has at times severed us from the great poverty stricken majority of the world's people. It is essential that we demonstrate that we continue to be aware of the responsibility we fortunate few have to assist the efforts of others at development and progress.

With Americans, Lord Tweedsmuir wrote, "the sense of common humanity is a warm and constant instinct and not a doctrine of the schools or a slogan of the hustings." By the careful selection and training of men and women in whom that instinct is a reality, the Peace Corps has already erased some stereotyped images of America and brought hundreds of thousands of people into contact with the

first Americans they have ever known personally. "When the Peace Corps came to my country," wrote the Minister of Development of Jamaica, "they brought a breath of fresh air. They came and mixed with the people. They worked closely with the people. They closed the gap and crashed the barrier. And because they did this, they have paved the way for our own people to understand. . . ."

It is no accident that Peace Corps Volunteers have won this kind of acceptance. Nor is it a coincidence that they have been greeted—as the *Ethiopian Herald* stated—"with open arms." They have been warmly received because they represent the best traditions of a free and democratic society—the kind of society which the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America long for as the ultimate end of their own revolution.

The Communist system can never offer men optimum freedom as human beings. The people of the world's emerging nations know this. Their aspirations for a free society are being stimulated by the presence of Peace Corps Volunteers who have come not to usurp but to encourage the responsibility of local people and not to repress but to respect the individual characteristics and traditions of the local culture. "What is most remarkable about America," wrote German scholar, Philip Schaff, "is that over its confused diversity there broods a higher unity." Because Volunteers of different races and different religions nonetheless come from the same country, they represent the hope of building a community of free nations wherein each one, conscious of its rights and duties, will have regard for the welfare of all.

Already the Peace Corps idea has spread to other nations. Last week I attended the official inauguration of West Germany's own Peace Corps program.¹ The first group of 250 young men and women will be ready for service next year and will eventually include more than a thousand young Germans working around the world. Three other European countries—the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway—have started similar programs. Argentina and New Zealand have already established volunteer or-

ganizations. These efforts have been stimulated and assisted by the International Peace Corps Secretariat, established by the International Conference on Middle Level Manpower last fall in Puerto Rico.² The bill I am transmitting would enable the United States to continue to encourage this movement.

The first American Volunteers are already returning to the United States after two years of Peace Corps service. They are bringing home important skills and experience which will greatly enhance our knowledge of the world and strengthen our role in international affairs. More than one-third of the 700 Volunteers returning this year have indicated a desire to work in international programs. Their ability and usefulness is attested to by the action of thirty-five universities in the United States which have established two hundred scholarships for returning Volunteers. One of these scholarships was created by the donations of the foreign students studying in California. I am also recommending a provision which would authorize the Peace Corps to assist these returning Volunteers to make the most of their opportunities for further usefulness to the Nation.

The funds I am requesting will enable the Peace Corps to place some 13,000 Volunteers in training or abroad by September 1964, a significant increase over the 9,000 who are expected to be enrolled before the end of this year.

Three thousand Volunteers of next year's increase are destined for service in Latin America and one thousand in Africa. In both of these areas an historic opportunity is at hand for the United States. In Latin America, the Peace Corps can, within the span of a relatively few years, write an important chapter in the history of Inter-American partnership and kindle faith in the possibilities of democratic action on the community level. In Africa the Peace Corps will concentrate its efforts on meeting a critical teacher shortage. The opportunity to teach hundreds of thousands of African students is unparalleled in our history.

It is my hope, therefore, that the Congress will enact this legislation making it possible

¹ For text of President Kennedy's remarks, see *BULLETIN* of July 22, 1963, p. 115.

² For a report on the conference, see *ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1962, p. 853.

for the Peace Corps to continue to share with the new nations of the world the experience of a democratic revolution committed to human liberty.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961. Entered into force January 31, 1963. TIAS 5284.

Acceptance deposited: Italy, July 9, 1963.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. *Ratifications deposited:* Nigeria, June 21, 1963; Sweden, July 1, 1963.

Notification given of undertaking to seek ratification: United States (with a declaration), June 24, 1963.

Entered into force provisionally: July 1, 1963.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Application to: Bahamas, Virgin Islands, April 26, 1963.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signatures and acceptances: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, July 10, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signatures and acceptances: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, July 10, 1963.

Fisheries

Declaration of understanding regarding the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington April 24, 1961.

Acceptance deposited: Poland, June 5, 1963.

Entered into force: June 5, 1963.

Proclaimed by the President: June 20, 1963.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany (including Land Berlin), July 12, 1963.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 17, 1962 (TIAS 5259). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz June 24, 1963. Entered into force June 24, 1963.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 4, 1963, as amended (TIAS 5292, 5323). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz June 24, 1963. Entered into force June 24, 1963.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 19, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4952, 5054, 5118, 5254). Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta June 28, 1963. Entered into force June 28, 1963.

Jordan

Agreement supplementing the agreement of July 10 and September 24, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3663, 4012), so as to provide for additional investment guaranties authorized by new U.S. legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Amman June 25, 1963. Entered into force June 25, 1963.

Korea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5208). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul July 5, 1963. Entered into force July 5, 1963.

New Zealand

Agreement extending the supplementary air transport services agreement of December 30, 1960, as extended (TIAS 4645, 4789, 5085). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 28, 1963. Entered into force June 28, 1963.

Paraguay

Agreement amending the reciprocal trade agreement of 1946 as amended (TIAS 1601, 5000) and withdrawing agreement to terminate (TIAS 5322). Effected by exchange of notes at Asunción June 26, 1963. Entered into force June 26, 1963.

Spain

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of March 11 and 18, 1960 (TIAS 4463), for the establishment and operation of a tracking and communications facility on the Island of Gran Canaria. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid, June 27 and 28, 1963. Entered into force July 1, 1963.

United Arab Republic

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 29, 1963. Entered into force June 29, 1963.

International Trade and Economic Development

A United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the first in the history of the U.N., is scheduled to be held in the spring of 1964. Its purpose is to examine ways in which international trade can be made a more effective instrument in promoting the development of the less developed countries. All members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies are expected to attend.

To prepare the groundwork for the Conference, a Preparatory Committee has been established consisting of 32 countries, including most of the major trading nations of the world. At the second of the three scheduled sessions of the Preparatory Committee, which was held at Geneva, Switzerland, May 21-June 29, a preliminary exploration was conducted of the various subjects included on the agenda for the Conference.

Following is the text of a statement made on May 27 by Isaiah Frank, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs and chairman of the U.S. delegation.

We had intended to avoid any general *tour d'horizon*. The United States has not, however, submitted a written statement, and some preliminary expression of our views on this meeting of the Preparatory Committee and on the Conference itself would be in order.

We come here with a closed mind in one important respect; we do not want these meetings to be an empty propaganda show. It is no secret that the United States was reluctant initially to hold the Conference. We consented only after we felt that the propaganda aspects had been downgraded in favor of the practical aspects. I am happy to say that our second session is off to a businesslike start.

In all other respects we come with an open mind. We are ready to examine all proposals that aim to promote the trade and development of the developing countries. We hope to make some suggestions ourselves. We have read with

interest and appreciation the written submissions already made and are prepared to discuss seriously the proposals that are serious. We are willing to reexamine all assumptions on which the present international trade rules and the existing organizations are based. We shall not reject any serious proposal out of hand.

For the first time we are considering in a related whole all aspects of trade as a means to development of developing countries. Our draft agenda for the Conference might be improved stylistically at points, but it has the great virtue of being comprehensive, because it does include all the major trade problems of the developing countries. It is not my intention to reopen the wording of the agenda, nor would I favor rediscussing points resolved at our first session.

I do not mean to imply that all-inclusiveness is necessarily good. It may well be that talk-

ing about everything means dealing seriously with nothing. This is a danger, and I think we all recognize it. We must at some stage be selective if we are to be constructive.

We are delighted to see the focus on trade. There is a financing item on our agenda, and I realize it is an important subject. But external finance is a residual item, the gap filler, as the written presentation of the United Arab Republic put it. The normal, the desirable, way to finance imports is through exports, through trade. We are dealing with interrelated problems, but I think we all agree that trade is the key element.

Internal and External Aspects of Development

Development is not a simple process. Of all human phenomena with which we must deal, the problems of development are perhaps the most complex. They affect every phase of the economic, political, social, and psychological life of countries. The problems are neither entirely external to a developing country's own actions, nor are they entirely internal.

I think this point is important. Most of us find it easier to look outside ourselves for the root of problems. We of the developed countries are inclined at times to argue that *the* reason the developing countries are not progressing more rapidly is that their own domestic houses are not in order. By contrast, developing countries sometimes stress the external barriers which exist in the developed countries.

I think all of us realize that there is truth on both sides. The distinguished representative from Pakistan noted here last week that in the final analysis the growth of the developing countries depends on their own efforts. We all recognize the vital role played in this process by stable governments, honest and efficient administration, enlightened fiscal and monetary policies which among other things discourage capital flight, and the direction of resources to export industries with buoyant rather than sluggish markets. I noted at the first session of the Preparatory Committee that the removal of the church gate will not bring people into church. The removal of trade impediments may or may not bring trade to the developing

countries. Attention must be paid to internal policies, for these policies are fundamental determinants of growth.

But having said this, I also agree that we must give close attention to the impediments to growth which are beyond the control of the developing countries. The falling price of a key commodity, an import restriction against a developing country's product, an internal tax which impedes consumption of a tropical commodity (whether in free-market or centrally planned economies), a lack of foreign exchange to finance necessary imports—all these things can negate the most perfect of internal policies.

The two elements—the internal and the external measures supporting growth—are linked. It would be meaningless to assign priorities as between them. Let's not deal with the internal and external problems as adversaries. Instead, let us examine both together. A change in the structure of international trade, which is what we seek to achieve, requires changes in internal production patterns of developed and developing countries. The external changes are inextricably linked with the internal policies.

I am not stating anything original. The Economic Commission for Latin America, which until recently was headed by our distinguished Secretary General [Raúl Prebisch], has done brilliant work in relating these two aspects of development. In the recent paper of the Economic Commission for Latin America entitled "Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America,"¹ there is a profound discussion of the necessary domestic actions required for development, the internal bottlenecks which must be removed, and the cooperation required internally and externally. It is the necessity for this combination of actions which I also want to stress.

The Practical Approach

Finally, before dealing with the more important agenda items, I would like to endorse a comment made by our distinguished Yugoslavian colleague, namely, that we are here to be pragmatic. Our aim is to make progress.

¹ U.N. doc. E/CN.12/680.

This practical approach is important. Indeed, it is crucial.

I do not see much merit in passing additional resolutions which cannot be followed up by concrete actions. As one of my distinguished Latin American colleagues said to me, we have enough resolution-passing organizations already. We do not need any more. I see little sense in seeking to reach agreement on a set of principles which will be universally acceptable only when so watered down as to be meaningless in terms of operational guidance.

If my purpose were to sabotage this Conference, I would propose the immediate establishment of a body to reach an agreed set of principles as the first order of business before proceeding further with the concrete work of our Conference. This could then consume some 5 to 10 years of meaningless haggling. We already have an illustration of this fact with which all of us are familiar in the prolonged and still-continuing attempt in the United Nations to agree on words with respect to a declaration on international economic cooperation.

However, there may be a time at the end of our deliberations when we shall be able to give expression to action-directed principles that are more than mere words.

In the same way that new resolutions or new sets of universally agreed principles do not of themselves solve real world problems, neither do new organizations. Organizations are not independent, living entities. They are governments acting in concert. When a government says no in one organization, it will not say yes elsewhere only because the label of the organization is changed.

Once again, however, this is not to say that the present organizational structure is perfect and unalterable. The United States is much too young, much too dynamic, a society to place much stock in the *status quo* only because it is what we have. Let us examine our organizational structure pragmatically, and let us then suggest useful changes in a practical and purposeful way.

When I say that purposeful changes should be suggested, I have in mind that much of what we now have is in fact good. Many of the actions in process elsewhere are, indeed, soundly

conceived and need to be supported and strengthened. We are not starting *de novo* to look at all the problems of trade and development. We do not want to preserve the past for its own sake, but we do want to use it as prolog. We see no sense in repeating what we are already doing in other organizations.

I should like now to express some preliminary views on the problems we must deal with.

Commodity Trade

A major aim of the majority of developing countries attending the Conference will be to have something done to assure growing markets and improved and stable prices for their exports of primary products. My Government fully supports this objective.

Commodity problems and the possible ways of dealing with them have been extensively explored in recent years within the U.N. framework and elsewhere. The ground is well prepared for our work. We can start from an advanced position. We know a lot about the problems and a lot about how to deal with them. We have taken a number of valuable initiatives in the recent past.

Up-to-date reviews of trends in commodity trade make it clear that longer term difficulties are superimposed on the problem of short-term instability in commodity markets. The longer term problem is the secular decline in many commodity prices reflecting in many cases a sluggish rate of growth in world demand. We are not as far along in knowing how to deal with the longer term problem as we are with short-term market instability.

It is now generally agreed that there can be no single device for dealing with this range of problems. We must utilize a number of tools in a concerted attack upon them.

First among these tools are various forms of joint action on the problems of particular commodities, ranging from formal commodity agreements to study groups and other consultative arrangements. Commodity agreements may be not only valuable but essential for certain commodities, coffee being the prime example of the current period. They may be impractical or undesirable in other cases. Moreover, the signing of a commodity agreement in

itself does not solve the problem. This fact is well illustrated by some of our current problem situations, with coffee again a case in point. Unless steps are taken to correct the underlying imbalance of supply and demand, through efforts to expand consumption and shift productive resources into other fields, the commodity agreement will break down. It is only a means of buying time while the necessary balance is restored between production and stocks, on the one hand, and effective demand on the other.

Among the problems involved in working out agreements for commodities in longrun oversupply, or in making such agreements work, are:

First, the initiation by exporting countries of the internal measures needed to discourage excess production and to enforce the production controls or export quotas required by the agreement;

Second, the provision of adequate returns to producing countries but not through price policies that cause eventual loss of markets and revenues to substitute products;

Third, the provision of fair opportunities for nations that are low-cost producers to increase their export quotas, or for efficient new producers to enter the field;

Fourth, the segregation by an export tax or by other appropriate means of such revenues as are needed to help shift resources away from production of the surplus commodity into other, more promising lines.

Other basic tools can supplement joint action in individual commodity situations. They include the general drive to expand demand for commodities through research and promotion, efforts to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers to primary commodity exports, diversification in developing countries, and compensatory financing.

We shall be able to consider this last device in the light of the extensive studies of possible new compensatory financing facilities which the CICT [Commission on International Commodity Trade] has just concluded, and taking into account the recent establishment by the IMF [International Monetary Fund] of a new facility to offset short-term fluctuations in export earnings. The United States is one of

those governments which have seen a need for enlarging the existing resources available for this purpose. We welcome the Fund's action and share the view expressed by the CICT report that it represents a substantial step forward. The fact that the new facility could be created without delay and without the need for a new organization or new financial contributions is of particular importance. We will be prepared to reexamine the situation, if it is found that the Fund cannot satisfactorily handle the problem. We, for our part, believe that the IMF facility will in fact prove valuable. And, as a member of the Fund, we shall do our part in insuring that it will be liberally and sympathetically administered.

Manufactures and Semimanufactures

Some ghosts must be laid to rest.

First, there is the ghost that we, the developed countries, want our developing-country colleagues to remain hewers of wood and drawers of water, that we want to prevent them from increasing their production and export of manufactured goods.

What we really want, of course, is the reverse. Our interest is to see more prosperous countries, not only for their sake but because we also want good customers and growing markets. We know that trade grows fastest among countries with diversified and growing economies.

Indeed, the United States recognizes that for most, if not all, developing countries a major expansion of export earnings must take place in the semimanufactures and manufactures sectors if economic development is to take place.

The second ghost is that of reciprocity between less and more developed countries in trade negotiations. This one was laid to rest in practice more than a decade ago. It was explicitly put to its final rest, or so we thought, at the time of the ministerial meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1961, when it was formally agreed in the Declaration on Promotion of the Trade of Less-Developed Countries² that full reciprocity would not be sought from developing countries. For some reason, this ghost keeps coming alive.

The GATT ministers put it to rest again just

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 9.

last week. Their report³ states: "... that in the trade negotiations every effort shall be made to reduce barriers to exports of the less-developed countries, but that the developed countries cannot expect to receive reciprocity from the less-developed countries."

A third ghost is the idea that, whenever developing countries build an export capacity in manufactured goods, the developed countries deny them markets. Cotton textiles are cited as evidence. In fact, this is the only case typically cited. In this unique case, a cooperative effort is being made to bring about an orderly expansion of markets in the developed countries—in some cases to build markets where there were only negligible sales before. It is being done in a pragmatic fashion, taking into account the complex social, economic, and domestic political problems involved. The aim of the cotton textile agreement is not curtailment of markets but their expansion.

The real problem of expanding exports in the general field of manufactures and semimanufactures is not the restriction of markets but the fact that for many countries markets have not as yet even been built. This is where we should put our focus.

Having spoken of ghosts, let's move to the real-life heart of the matter. As I stated, this is the establishment and expansion of markets. It requires such positive steps by developing countries as market research and export promotion. It involves appropriate financial policies in the developing countries such as the avoidance of overvalued exchange rates, and it requires the reduction and removal of barriers in the developed countries.

Activity in this field is intense. Committee III of the GATT has not solved all the problems, but it certainly has made substantial progress. The ministers of GATT countries last week agreed to reexamine the provisions of the General Agreement to see what modifications are desirable in the interest of promoting the export earnings of developing countries. In fact, the decisions taken by the ministers at the GATT meeting last week represent substantial benefits to the developing countries without any suggestion of new obligations on their part.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, June 24, 1963, p. 995.

Regional Groupings

The United States is not a member of any regional economic grouping and can therefore speak objectively. It is well known that we support the European Economic Community. We also favor the gradual elimination of preferences given by the EEC to its associated overseas states. However, we recognize that the preferences cannot be removed suddenly and without some compensatory benefits lest the associated countries suffer severe damage.

We support the formation of regional groupings among less developed countries.

In our view, all regional groupings should be subject to international examination to assess their trade effects on nonmember countries.

The Economic Commission for Latin America, under Dr. Prebisch's guidance, helped to launch the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association. The United States supported the former from its earliest days and is a contributor to its regional development bank. Through the Alliance for Progress we have tried to assist in the development of the Latin American Free Trade Association.

We believe the Preparatory Committee and the Conference should devote study to ways and means of promoting greater regional integration among developing countries in order to foster industries capable of taking advantage of economies of scale and therefore better able to compete effectively in export markets.

Financing of Trade

All foreign currency loans and grants help to finance trade. We agree, therefore, that it is not possible to separate trade and finance. As in other fields, however, we are not starting anew to examine problems.

I shall not at this stage attempt to cite all the relevant aspects of this agenda item. However, I do wish to note very briefly what the United States policy and actions are with respect to this subject.

Many government submissions made to the committee refer to the need for loans on soft terms. The key development lending body of the United States is the Agency for International Development. Its loans are for as much

as 40 years with a 10-year grace period before starting repayment, with only a three-quarters of 1 percent per annum credit charge. From 1946 to the end of 1962, United States economic aid to developing countries has been about \$32 billion, of which some \$20 billion has been in grants. Since 1958 economic aid to the developing countries has been \$16 billion, half of which has been in grants and half in loans.

So far as technical assistance is concerned, all of us remember the famous Point 4 statement of President Truman which launched the modern era of technical assistance. In more recent years our Peace Corps has been the epitome of technical assistance on the part of staunch volunteers dedicated to the cause of the advancement of the developing countries.

There is general recognition today internationally of the need for soft terms for development loans. In addition to bilateral assistance, the United States is the major contributor to the multilateral aid organizations and has played an important role in the progressive softening of aid terms granted by international institutions.

I am citing the record in brief in order simply to indicate our recognition of some of the points about financing made by other delegations.

Trade With Centrally Planned Economies

All of the industrialized countries, whether they have free or centrally controlled economies, have useful roles to play in advancing growth in the developing countries. Because of the far superior strength of the free economies, they will continue to be far more prominent than the centrally controlled economies in trade with the developing countries.

I shall explain in greater detail later in our session what we think are the problems inherent in the bilateral arrangements with the state-trading organizations of the Communist countries. For the present I want only to suggest that we must examine in detail the reasons for the extremely small role which trade with the centrally planned economies plays in the economic development of the developing countries. We must deal with the barriers to expanding the trade of the developing countries with the centrally planned economies with the same de-

gree of realism we propose to employ in discussing other trade problems.

Mr. Chairman, my conclusion is brief. We have come here to work toward the accomplishment of concrete results in fostering the trade and development of the developing countries. We look forward to examining all issues relevant to this problem.

U.N. General Assembly Adopts Seven Resolutions on Financing

The fourth special session of the U.N. General Assembly met at New York May 14-June 27 to consider the financial situation of the organization. Following are statements made in Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary) by U.S. Representatives Francis T. P. Plimpton and Adlai E. Stevenson, together with texts of seven resolutions adopted in plenary session on June 27.

STATEMENT BY MR. PLIMPTON, MAY 22

U.S. delegation press release 4210

Mr. Chairman, in commencing this reply to the statement made by the Soviet representative this morning, I should like, first, to quote what Secretary-General U Thant said to this committee last December 3:

I believe that the financial problem of the organization, which in substance is the question now before this committee, is a vital one. A financially bankrupt United Nations would be an ineffective United Nations if, indeed, it could survive on such a basis. The financial issue is thus one which, if I may say so, transcends political controversy. In their various ways I believe all states represented in the United Nations have found that the organization is useful and, indeed, indispensable in the modern world. It is on this basis that I trust that the committee will deal with this item.

I am sorry to say, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet representative has chosen not to deal with the item on that basis, on the basis hoped for by the Secretary-General, but, instead, has chosen to indulge in the very political controversy, the very cold-war aggression which the Secretary-General hoped could be transcended.

Mr. Chairman, the words "threats" and "blackmail" were mentioned. I leave to this committee the determination as to who has made them.

I regret, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet representative made the choice that he made in dealing with this item. I will not imitate him.

In defense of the Soviet bloc's refusal to pay its just assessments for the United Nations peacekeeping operations, a refusal which is pushing the United Nations toward bankruptcy, the representative of the Soviet Union repeated exactly the same arguments as to the United Nations Charter that the Soviet Union unsuccessfully made before the International Court of Justice last summer,¹ and made again before this committee and the General Assembly last fall,² and made again before the Working Group last winter.³ Mr. Chairman, they are arguments that were completely disposed of by the Court's Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962, completely disposed of by the General Assembly's acceptance of that opinion by the overwhelming vote of 76 to 17, with 8 abstentions.

Mr. Chairman, that opinion and that acceptance by the General Assembly conclusively established that the costs of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza Strip and of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) assessed by the General Assembly against member states are "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of article 17 of the charter and thus are legally binding obligations of the members and are, of course, covered by article 19.

Mr. Chairman, no repetition of thrice-rejected, shopworn arguments can conceal the fact that the Soviet bloc is repudiating its clearly established charter obligations and by so doing is doing its worst to drive the United Nations toward bankruptcy.

Mr. Chairman, although I have no intention of discussing Soviet arguments that have long since been disposed of by the Court opinion and its acceptance by the General Assembly, I can-

not help but point out one thing to the 106 members of the United Nations who are not permanent members of the Security Council. Despite the fact that article 17, paragraph 2, of the charter provides "the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly," in spite of that clear language the Soviet Union would have peacekeeping expenses apportioned, if you please, by the Security Council. What a result, Mr. Chairman! The 11 members of the Security Council determining how the other 100 members of the United Nations shall pay for a peacekeeping operation as to which, according to the Soviet Union, they have no say whatsoever. Fortunately, Mr. Chairman, for those 100 members, such a result is not only on its face contrary to the express wording of the charter; it has been authoritatively and conclusively rejected by the Court and the General Assembly.

Mr. Chairman, I see no need to comment in detail on the stale accusations of the Soviet representative concerning the United Nations operations in the Congo. It was the Security Council itself, with the Soviets voting yes, and the General Assembly itself that authorized and repeatedly reaffirmed the principles and procedures in accordance with which the ONUC operation has been carried out.⁴ The two Secretary-Generals of the United Nations who were charged with the direction of their operation by the Security Council were careful and have been careful to consult the Congo Advisory Committee on the major issues arising in the Congo. The Government of the Congo itself has repeatedly expressed its strong desire to have the U.N. operations continue. And in a recent letter to the Secretary-General it refuted the Soviet contentions about the operation and specifically rejected the Soviet demand that the United Nations forever get out of the Congo.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, while the Soviet representative pretends to be attacking so-called colonialists and so-called foreign monopolies, in actual fact he has been attacking the Security Council and the General Assembly, which authorized the United Nations actions in the

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 30, and Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1963, p. 30.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1963, p. 443; for the report of the Working Group (or Committee of 21), see U.N. doc. A/5407 and Corr. 1.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159; Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221; Sept. 5, 1960, p. 384; Oct. 10, 1960, p. 583.

Congo, and is attacking the Congo Advisory Committee, which steadily has reviewed and guided the United Nations action in the Congo, and is attacking the Congo Government itself, whose urgent and repeated requests have led to the United Nations Operation in the Congo.

Mr. Chairman, it is hardly necessary to remind this committee that the Soviet Union has never made the slightest contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping operation and related economic and technical assistance aid projects for the benefit of the Congolese people. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has limited its efforts to trying to sabotage the United Nations Operation in the Congo simply because it could not control the operation for its own imperialistic purposes.

Mr. Chairman, no Soviet smokescreen of slanted and slanderous misrepresentation as to the effort of the United Nations to achieve peace and stability in the Congo can conceal the fact that that operation is succeeding, or the fact that the Soviet Union has consistently opposed it, or that the United States has wholeheartedly supported that operation from the very beginning.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will let me remind the committee that the United States has contributed by way of assessments and voluntary payments \$114 million to the ONUC operation and that the Soviet Union has not only contributed nothing but that it is \$32 million in arrears in the assessments that have been lawfully imposed on it.

Mr. Chairman, in the Congo, apart from these military operations, the United States has contributed or pledged \$31 million to the Congo Fund. The Soviet Union has contributed not one kopek.

Through the United Nations, Mr. Chairman, the United States has contributed another \$70 million for the Congo import-export program. The Soviet Union has contributed not one kopek.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has contributed in food under the Food-for-Peace Program in arrangement with the United Nations \$40 million for the Congo. The Soviet Union has contributed not one kopek.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union says—as do

all other members and they mean it—that it is a peace-loving country. Does it desire peace in the Middle East? The United Nations Emergency Force established by the members of the General Assembly has helped to keep that peace, but the Soviet Union continues to say that that peacekeeping operation is illegal and should be withdrawn. And they have said that they will not pay for any part of it. This makes one ask this question, Mr. Chairman: What does the Soviet Union really want in the Middle East? And why does it oppose a United Nations operation which has succeeded in keeping the peace in the Middle East?

Mr. Chairman, the United States is proud of the fact that its policies and the policies of the United Nations coincide. The United States wants a world of independent, sovereign states free to work out their destinies in their own ways, free from domination by outside powers or outside totalitarian parties. The United States wants developing states to be given all possible assistance in their task of developing their own resources, their own skills, and their own talents. So does the United Nations. I heard with astonishment our Soviet colleague say that the Soviet Union was going to refuse to share in the technical assistance projects of the United Nations which aim for exactly those aims and which the United States fully supports.

Mr. Chairman, I repeat our pride that the aims of the United States and the aims of the United Nations are the same, and our determination that despite obstructionisms our joint aims shall be realized, and despite Soviet attempts to bankrupt this organization. Mr. Chairman, the United States delegation is confident that all members of this organization who share those aims will stand fast in their determination that this organization shall not be bankrupt and shall survive.

[In a further intervention, Ambassador Plimpton said:]

Mr. Chairman, I simply want to say that my Soviet colleague is unduly complimentary as to the difficulty of preparing in advance, at least, some replies to Soviet contentions. When one has heard the somewhat cracked phonograph record played so many times, despite the fact

that the International Court of Justice and the General Assembly have rejected the tune, one has no difficulty in remembering the same old words.

I might just add, Mr. Chairman, that I certainly hope that the remainder of our discussions in this room and the remainder of the informal conferences, which, I hope, will lead to some solution of the financial difficulties of this organization, will be held on the basis suggested by the Secretary-General. Surely all of us are interested in this organization, in its survival. And the United States delegation earnestly hopes that from now on we shall conduct ourselves in a way that will lead to solutions and not against solutions.

STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, JUNE 21

U.S. delegation press release 4224

What I shall have to say this morning will not take very long.

The time for contention and debate—for negotiation and maneuver—on the subject at hand is now behind us. Heaven knows that time was long enough!

But we meet today in an atmosphere of general relief, in a mood of sober confidence. We meet in an environment of renewed faith in the capacity of men of good will to resolve their common problems—faith in the responsibility of the vast majority of the membership of this body and thus in the future of this organization. More specifically, we can see ahead of us a way back toward financial health for the United Nations—a trip that may not be entirely smooth but one for which we at least now have a road map.

Let me contrast this atmosphere briefly with the almost desperate outlook of 1 year ago, when financial disorder threatened to give way to financial chaos.

Let me contrast this with the general feeling of pessimism which prevailed—without warrant, I always believed—when the Committee of 21 concluded its work a few months ago.

And let me contrast the mood of today with that of the early meetings of this committee, when bitter and unfounded charges were made

against my country, charges which I will ignore.

For more than a month now you have been going through the most exacting and most rewarding task of civilized man—the task of reconciling different points of view, of accommodating national positions, of producing a consensus. In the process we have all endured disappointment and frustration. There were times when the last drop of patience seemed to have drained away and the last drop of energy seemed to be expended.

But the members have been aware that much more was at stake than a fundraising formula. They have been conscious that political and constitutional issues underlay and outweighed the financial issue. They have been mindful of the integrity of the organization itself, and of the responsibility of the members for defending and preserving that integrity.

The result is that we have before us a group of resolutions which are not in the exact form in which they would have been written by any delegation here today. But the impressive list of sponsors is evidence enough of the broad consensus that has emerged from this long process. And it also is evidence of the large number of delegations which have worked so hard to find the key to a statesmanlike solution. For this they deserve the gratitude of us all.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation does not look upon the package of resolutions before us as ideal in all respects. For one thing, the reference to “special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security,” which appears as the fourth principle in the draft resolution on general principles, strikes us as a misreading of the charter. The special responsibility for decisions about peace and security on behalf of the whole organization was allocated, under the charter, not to the 5 permanent members but to all 11 members of the Security Council. Moreover, the charter does not assign responsibility for financing peace and security decisions, or for financing any other kind of decision, to the members of the Security Council but to the General Assembly as a whole.

Also, while any of the permanent members can block Security Council action, they do not

themselves, without the votes of nonpermanent members, have the power to initiate action. Furthermore, any such principle would hardly be applicable to a peacekeeping operation such as UNEF, initiated by a recommendation of the General Assembly.

It is the General Assembly—and not the Security Council—to which the charter gives the responsibility for financing the U.N.'s activities. I cannot believe that any delegation, with a few obvious exceptions, believes that the trend toward the assumption of useful responsibilities by the Assembly should now be terminated and the right to finance peacekeeping operations reserved for settlement in some small room by a few great powers.

We also feel that the next principle, in paragraph (e), which refers to the possibility of special consideration for the victims of or those otherwise involved in events or actions leading to a peacekeeping operation, may raise serious practical problems when we come to deal with the unpredictable events of the future. Nevertheless, the collective responsibility of all members is reaffirmed with pristine clarity as the first principle; and the possibility of special consideration for members covered by (e) is appropriately related to the special circumstances of each case, so that we will be free to deal realistically with each issue, as it arises, in the larger interest of peace itself.

At the same time we are well aware that the resolutions before us are not just the way any of the delegations would have preferred to see them; that accommodations to other views have been made by many of the members; that some have agreed to bear a greater share of the financial cost than they intended to a few weeks ago; and that the net result is a true consensus of the overwhelming majority reached by the democratic process of give and take.

The facts are that these draft resolutions among them establish a useful set of agreed general principles to guide us in the future; they provide an equitable basis for financing the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo for the rest of this year; they establish a deadline for working out schedules for the payment of arrearages; and they extend to the end of the year the authority

of the Secretary-General to sell the remaining part of the authorized bond issue.

In brief, they accomplish somewhat more than the minimum task we set ourselves: to resolve the immediate problem of financial support for keeping the peace in the Middle East and the Congo.

As evidence of our support, Mr. Chairman, the United States is prepared, subject to its governmental processes, to join other developed countries in making a voluntary contribution, in addition to its assessment, to help provide the funds required under the financing resolutions. It is gratifying to us that this year a number of other developed countries have also indicated their willingness to make such voluntary contributions. This is additional evidence of the general will to restore this organization to financial health.

Mr. Chairman, these resolutions testify to the underlying agreement of the great majority of the membership that the major and smaller powers share a common interest in the peace and security of the world—and share a common interest in strengthening the United Nations for collective pursuit of that interest.

It may well be, Mr. Chairman, that greater tests still lie ahead. But we can all take legitimate satisfaction from the fact that the world has once again met a severe test of its confidence in this great experiment in collective security—and the United Nations has emerged stronger than before.

With that sense of satisfaction, with renewed faith and pride in the organization, the delegation of the United States will vote in favor of the five resolutions before us.⁵

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Resolution I⁶

GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO SERVE AS GUIDELINES FOR THE SHARING OF THE COSTS OF FUTURE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS INVOLVING HEAVY EXPENDITURES

The General Assembly,

Noting with appreciation the report of the Working

⁵ U.N. docs. A/C. 5/L. 782-786; A/C. 5/L. 787 and L. 788 were introduced on June 24.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/RES/1874(S-IV) (A/C.5/L. 782); adopted by a vote of 92-11, with 3 abstentions.

Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII) of 19 December 1962,

Recognizing the necessity of sharing equitably the financial burden of peace-keeping operations to the extent not otherwise covered by agreed arrangements,

1. *Affirms* that the following principles, *inter alia*, shall serve as guidelines for the equitable sharing, by assessed or voluntary contributions or a combination thereof, of the costs of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures that may be initiated in the future:

(a) That the financing of such operations is the collective responsibility of all Member States of the United Nations;

(b) That, whereas the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions, the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute toward peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures;

(c) That, without prejudice to the principle of collective responsibility, every effort should be made to encourage voluntary contributions from Member States;

(d) That the special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security should be borne in mind in connexion with their contributions to the financing of peace and security operations;

(e) That, where circumstances warrant, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation of any Member States which are victims of, and those which are otherwise involved in, the events or actions leading to a peace-keeping operation;

2. *Considers* that suitable administrative procedures should be established to ensure that provision for the financing of a peace-keeping operation is made by the General Assembly at the time the operation is authorized;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to review in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, as appropriate, suitable administrative procedures designed to improve the financial procedures to be followed by the General Assembly at the time peace-keeping operations are authorized, and to report to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session on the results of this review and any recommendations he may wish to make regarding procedures to be followed in the future.

Resolution II⁷

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE: COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1963

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1089 (XI) of 21 December

1956, 1090 (XI) of 27 February 1957, 1151 (XII) of 22 November 1957, 1337 (XIII) of 13 December 1958, 1441 (XIV) of 5 December 1959, 1575 (XV) of 20 December 1960 and 1733 (XVI) of 20 December 1961,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the cost estimates of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)⁸ for the period 1 January 1963 to 31 December 1963, and the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions⁹ thereon,

1. *Decides* to continue the Special Account for the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force;

2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to expend up to 31 December 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$1,580,000 for the continuing cost of the United Nations Emergency Force;

3. *Decides* to appropriate an amount of \$9,500,000 for the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force for the period 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963;

4. *Decides* to apportion:

(a) the amount of \$2,500,000 among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963;

(b) the \$7,000,000 balance of the amount appropriated in paragraph 3 of this resolution, among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963, except that each "economically less developed country" shall be assessed an amount calculated at 45 per cent of its rate under the regular scale of assessments for 1963;

provided that this apportionment shall constitute an *ad hoc* arrangement for the present phase of this peace-keeping operation, and shall not constitute a precedent for the future;

5. *Decides* that, for the purpose of this resolution, "economically less developed countries" shall mean all Member States except Australia, Austria, Belgium, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom and the United States of America;

6. *Recommends* that the Member States named in paragraph 5 of this resolution make voluntary contributions in addition to their assessments under this resolution in order to finance authorized expenditures in excess of the total amount assessed under this resolution, such voluntary contributions to be credited to a special account by the Secretary-General and transferred to the United Nations Emergency Force Special Account as and when an "economically less developed country" has once paid to the credit of that account its assessment under paragraph 4(b) of this resolution or an equal amount, the transfer to be of an amount which bears the same proportion to the total

⁷ U.N. doc. A/RES/1875 (S-IV) (A/C.5/L.783); adopted by a vote of 80 to 11, with 16 abstentions.

⁸ U.N. doc. A/5187.

⁹ U.N. doc. A/5274.

of such voluntary contributions as the amount of such payment bears to the total of the assessments on "economically less developed countries" under paragraph 4(b); any amount left in such special account on 31 December 1965 shall revert to the Member States that made such voluntary contributions in proportion to their respective voluntary contributions;

7. *Appeals* to all other Member States who are in a position to assist to make similar voluntary contributions or alternatively to forgo having their assessment calculated at the rate mentioned in the exception contained in paragraph 4(b) of this resolution;

8. *Decides* that voluntary contributions referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this resolution may be made by a Member State, at its option, in the form of services and supplies, acceptable to the Secretary-General, furnished for use in connexion with the United Nations Emergency Force during the period 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963 for which the Member State does not require reimbursement, the Member State to be credited with the fair value thereof as agreed upon by the Member State and the Secretary-General.

Resolution III¹⁰

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO: COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1963

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Security Council resolutions of 14 July 1960, 22 July 1960, 9 August 1960, 21 February 1961 and 24 November 1961, and General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960, 1583 (XV) of 20 December 1960, 1595 (XV) of 3 April 1961, 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV) of 15 April 1961, 1619 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1633 (XVI) of 30 October 1961 and 1732 (XVI) of 20 December 1961,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the cost estimates of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)¹¹ for the period 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963, and the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions¹² thereon,

1. *Decides* to continue the Congo *ad hoc* Account for the expenses of the United Nations Operation in the Congo;

2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to expend up to 31 December 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$5,500,000 for the continuing cost of the United Nations Operation in the Congo;

3. *Decides* to appropriate an amount of \$33,000,000 for the United Nations Operation in the Congo for the period 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963;

4. *Decides* to apportion:

¹⁰ U.N. doc. A/RES/1876 (S-IV) (A/C.5/L.784); adopted by a vote of 80 to 12, with 15 abstentions.

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/5416.

¹² U.N. doc. A/5421.

(a) the amount of \$3,000,000 among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963;

(b) the \$30,000,000 balance of the amount appropriated in paragraph 3 of this resolution, among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963, except that each "economically less developed country" shall be assessed an amount calculated at 45 per cent of its rate under the regular scale of assessments for 1963;

provided that this apportionment shall constitute an *ad hoc* arrangement for the present phase of this peace-keeping operation, and shall not constitute a precedent for the future;

5. *Decides* that, for the purpose of this resolution, "economically less developed countries" shall mean all Member States except Australia, Austria, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and the United States of America;

6. *Recommends* that the Member States named in paragraph 5 of this resolution make voluntary contributions in addition to their assessments under this resolution in order to finance authorized expenditures in excess of the total amount assessed under this resolution, such voluntary contributions to be credited to a special account by the Secretary-General and transferred to the Congo *ad hoc* Account as and when an "economically less developed country" has once paid to the credit of that account its assessment under paragraph 4(b) of this resolution or an equal amount, the transfer to be of an amount which bears the same proportion to the total of such voluntary contributions as the amount of such payment bears to the total of the assessments on "economically less developed countries" under paragraph 4(b); any amount left in such special account on 31 December 1965 shall revert to the Member States that made such voluntary contributions in proportion to their respective voluntary contributions;

7. *Appeals* to all other Member States which are in a position to assist to make similar voluntary contributions or alternatively to forego having their assessments calculated at the rate mentioned in the exception contained in paragraph 4(b) of this resolution;

8. *Decides* that voluntary contributions referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this resolution may be made by a Member State, at its option, in the form of services and supplies, acceptable to the Secretary-General, furnished for use in connexion with the United Nations Operation in the Congo during the period 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963 for which the Member State does not require reimbursement, the Member State to be credited with the fair value thereof as agreed upon by the Member State and the Secretary-General.

Resolution IV¹³

PAYMENT OF ARREARS IN RESPECT OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE AND THE AD HOC ACCOUNT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations,

Noting with concern the present financial situation of the Organization resulting from the non-payment of a substantial portion of past assessments for the UNEF Special Account and the Congo *ad hoc* Account,

Believing that it is essential that all assessments for these Accounts be paid as soon as possible,

1. *Appals* to Member States which continue to be in arrears in respect of their assessed contributions for payment to the UNEF Special Account and the Congo *ad hoc* Account to pay their arrears, disregarding other factors, as soon as their respective constitutional and financial arrangements can be processed, and, pending these arrangements, to make an announcement of their intention to do so;

2. *Expresses its conviction* that Member States who are in arrears and object on political or juridical grounds to paying their assessments on these accounts nevertheless will, without prejudice to their respective positions, make a special effort towards solving the financial difficulties of the United Nations by making these payments;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult with those Member States which are in arrears on the UNEF Special Account and on the Congo *ad hoc* Account and to work out with them arrangements as to the most appropriate modalities within the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, including the possibility of payment by instalment, for bringing the payments of these accounts up to date as soon as possible;

4. *Requests* Member States who are in arrears on these accounts to make the arrangements with the Secretary-General set out in paragraph 3 of this resolution before 31 October 1963;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly on the consultations and arrangements mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this resolution.

Resolution V¹⁴

TERMS AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE ISSUE OF UNITED NATIONS BONDS

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision in operative paragraph 1 of

¹³ U.N. doc. A/RES/1877(S-IV) (A/C.5/L.785); adopted by a vote of 79 to 12, with 17 abstentions.

¹⁴ U.N. doc. A/RES/1878(S-IV) (A/C.5/L.786); adopted by a vote of 93 to 12, with 4 abstentions.

General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 to authorize the Secretary-General to issue United Nations bonds in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the annex to that resolution,

Decides to amend paragraph 8 of the annex to General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) to read as follows:

"The bonds may be sold in whole or in part from time to time until 31 December 1963."

Resolution VI¹⁵

ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE FUND

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the purposes of the United Nations as set out in Article 1 of the Charter,

Realizing the need for prompt and effective action to prevent any threats to or breaches of international peace and security,

Believing that inadequate financial resources can seriously delay or jeopardize the success of such action,

Desiring to make sufficient funds readily available to the Secretary-General, thus enabling him to discharge his responsibilities under the Charter in cases of breaches of the peace without undue delay,

Convinced that the establishment of a Peace Fund through voluntary contributions from Member States as well as organizations and individuals is worthy of study as a means of furthering this objective,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult all Member States and other interested organizations on the desirability and feasibility of establishing such a Peace Fund;

2. *Requests further* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session.

Resolution VII¹⁶

CONTINUATION OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE EXAMINATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED NATIONS ESTABLISHED UNDER GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1854/B (XVII)

The General Assembly,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII),¹⁷

Bearing in mind the principles enunciated in resolution 1874(S-IV) of 27 June 1963, that shall serve as guidelines for the equitable sharing of the costs of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures that may be initiated in the future, to the extent that these expenditures will not be otherwise covered by agreed arrangements,

Bearing in mind further that the maintenance of

¹⁵ U.N. doc. A/RES/1879(S-IV) (A/C.5/L.787); adopted by a vote of 91 to 12, with 2 abstentions.

¹⁶ U.N. doc. A/RES/1880(S-IV) (A/C.5/L.788); adopted by a vote of 95 to 12, with 2 abstentions.

¹⁷ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 37.

peace and security is a primary purpose of the United Nations,

Desirous that ways and means should be found to arrive at working arrangements so that all Member States may feel able to share in such costs,

Noting that the tasks with which the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations was charged have not been completed,

1. *Decides* to continue in being the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations;

2. *Requests* the Working Group to:

(a) Recommend a special method for the equitable sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures to the extent not otherwise covered by agreed arrangements;

(b) Consider suggestions regarding other sources of financing future peace-keeping operations;

(c) Explore ways and means for bringing about the widest possible measure of agreement among all Member States on the question of the financing of future peace-keeping operations;

3. *Invites* the Working Group to consult as appropriate with the Committee on Contributions;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make available to the Working Group the necessary facilities and assistance for the accomplishment of its tasks;

5. *Asks* the Working Group to report on these matters to the General Assembly as soon as possible, but not later than at its nineteenth regular session.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Foreign Service Examination To Be Held September 7

Press release 368 dated July 12

Applications for the Foreign Service officer examination, to be given September 7 in major cities throughout the country, must be filed no later than July 22. Applications may be obtained by writing to the Director, Board of Examiners, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Eligible candidates are those who were at least 21 years of age or under 31 years of age as of July 1 and who have been citizens of the United States for at least 9 years as of that date. Those who have bachelors' degrees or who have successfully completed their junior year of college may take the examination at age 20.

Candidates taking the examination will be tested in English expression, general ability, and general background. In addition three options will be offered to test specific knowledge in (1) history, government, and social sciences, (2) management and business administration, and (3) economics.

The work of the Foreign Service requires a diversity of skills. Applicants with training in budget and fiscal work, management, personnel, law, labor relations, banking and finance, foreign trade, and all other aspects of economics and administration are sought, as well as those with training in political science, history, government, and the liberal arts.

The following are the 72 cities where the examination will be held:

Agana, Guam; Albuquerque, N. Mex.; Anchorage, Alaska; Atlanta, Ga.; Augusta, Maine; Austin, Tex.; Balboa Heights, C.Z.; Baltimore, Md.; Bismarck, N. Dak.; Boise, Idaho; Boston, Mass.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Charleston, W. Va.; Charlotte Amalie, V.I.; Cheyenne, Wyo.; Chicago, Ill.; Cincinnati, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; Columbia, S.C.; Columbus, Ohio; Dallas, Tex.; Denver, Colo.; Des Moines, Iowa; Detroit, Mich.; El Paso, Tex.; Fairbanks, Alaska; Grand Forks, N. Dak.; Hartford, Conn.; Helena, Mont.; Honolulu, Hawaii; Indianapolis, Ind.; Jackson, Miss.; Jacksonville, Fla.; Juneau, Alaska; Kansas City, Kans.; Little Rock, Ark.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Louisville, Ky.; Madison, Wis.; Manchester, N.H.; Miami, Fla.; Montgomery, Ala.; Montpelier, Vt.; Nashville, Tenn.; New Orleans, La.; New York, N.Y.; Oklahoma City, Okla.; Omaha, Nebr.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Phoenix, Ariz.; Pierre, S. Dak.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Portland, Oreg.; Providence, R.I.; Raleigh, N.C.; Reno, Nev.; Richmond, Va.; Sacramento, Calif.; St. Louis, Mo.; St. Paul, Minn.; Salt Lake City, Utah; San Francisco, Calif.; San Juan, P.R.; Seattle, Wash.; Spokane, Wash.; Springfield, Ill.; Syracuse, N.Y.; Tampa, Fla.; Trenton, N.J.; Washington, D.C.; Wilmington, Del.; and Worcester, Mass.

The examination will also be held at any American diplomatic or consular post abroad at which a candidate may ask to take it.

Appointments

Chester C. Carter as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, effective July 7. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 361 dated July 9.)

Allen R. Ferguson as Coordinator for International Aviation, Bureau of Economic Affairs, effective June 25. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 332 dated June 24.)

Carl Tolman as scientific attaché at Tokyo, Japan, effective July 7. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 364 dated July 10.)

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360	7/8	Blocking controls against Cuba.
*361	7/9	Carter appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations (biographic details).
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363	7/9	Harriman departs for Moscow test ban talks.
*364	7/10	Tolman appointed scientific attaché at Tokyo (biographic details).
365	7/10	Guatemala credentials (rewrite).
366	7/10	Rusk: Senate Committee on Commerce.
†367	7/12	Rusk: "State of the North Atlantic Alliance" (as-delivered text).
368	7/12	Foreign Service officer examination.
369	7/12	Commission reports on U.S. academic exchange program (rewrite).
*370	7/12	Itinerary for visit of President Nyerere of Tanganyika.
371	7/12	Amendments to Nyerere itinerary.

*Not printed here.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Digest of International Law Volume I

The Department of State has released the first volume of a new *Digest of International Law*, by Dr. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser. The *Digest* is a successor to the Hackworth *Digest*, published in 1940.

The new *Digest* is in the nature of a reference book, containing materials, official and unofficial, intended to inform the user as to the status of developments regarding particular aspects of international law.

Chapter I of volume I treats of theories of international law, its subjects and sources, its relationship to local law, and efforts toward its codification.

Chapter II deals with the legal status of present-day states, territories, and governments and their classification. Included are listings and groupings of states and governments, with information as to origin, changes, official names, etc. Recent evolutions in the structure of the British Commonwealth and of the French Community are among the topics discussed.

Volume I of the *Digest of International Law* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for \$4.25.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1258



August 5, 1963

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The State of the North Atlantic Alliance

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

I notice some young people in the audience; let me just say three sentences to you. You may want to ask me: What is foreign policy all about? It's about you—your ability to walk the world in decency and confidence and peace, you and your children. Foreign policy is about building that decent world order that gives you a chance. That's what the thousand cables a day coming into the Department of State mean; that's what the 15 international meetings going on somewhere in the world every working day throughout the year mean to you young people.

We are under no illusion in the Department of State that, when we talk about international law or states or the United Nations, we are talking about abstractions. We are talking about people and what they mean to people, because we understand that foreign policy reaches into every home in the country. We have a million men in uniform outside the United States today,

and that means that we reach into every home. We understand this very deeply, and I want you young people to know that I think we know what your relation to foreign policy is.

We are in a period of great change; we are in a period where it is not easy for a Secretary of State to declare great simple policies on particular points because there is so much flux. It is a period when we must go back to the very simple ideas on which our nation was founded—the things to which we are deeply committed.

I suggest to you that in President Eisenhower's second term and in President Kennedy's present term the responsibilities of the President of the United States have changed in kind, and not just in mass, and that these two men have faced questions of a new order of magnitude—a new order of faithfulness—never before faced by any President.

This is due to several things. One has been the explosion of states—the multiplication of states. Before World War II, 8 governments disposed of the continent of Africa. Now it's

¹ Made before the Virginia State Bar Association at White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., on July 12 (press release 367; as-delivered text).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1258 PUBLICATION 7581 AUGUST 5, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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about 35, and the number is growing. We do business with 112 states. Did you happen to know that in this calendar year 33 of those states have scheduled elections and changes in government in 1963 and that we have already had 6 unscheduled changes of government in this calendar year? For as far as we can see into the future, there will be 25 changes of government a year somewhere in the world and half of those will be crises because so many of these states do not have built-in constitutional means for passing power from one hand to the other.

And as these countries have become independent, they have been seized with an insistent demand for economic and social development, partly because their nationalist leaders have promised them that if you got rid of colonial rule, your daily life would be better—a connection which was not necessarily so. But there they are, with the hounds of development snapping at their heels, needing to move forward. And so this revolution of rising expectations about which you have heard is something very pressing and very urgent in our business.

And then, since about 1955-56, something else has come into the world: The Soviet Union has acquired a massive nuclear delivery capability against Western Europe and the United States—something new. The decision which President Truman made in 1950 to go into Korea and the decision which President Kennedy made last October to challenge the full power of the Soviet Union with regard to those missiles in Cuba were two utterly different decisions—decisions in kind—because $E=MC^2$ has posed for men genuinely a new question, and that is the survival of the human race. And President Eisenhower and President Kennedy have had to think about and live with that problem as other human beings have not in our experience.

Now these are great elements which put this world in motion. There are other factors, such as the talks now going on between Moscow and Beijing, with the greatest consequences for all the rest of us, and yet talks which we have only a limited capability of influencing one way or the other; changes going on within the bloc in Eastern Europe; changes between East and West—in relationships between the Soviet bloc,

say, and Western Europe. This is a pregnant moment, a moment where many things could happen, where there could be important changes for good or for bad. That is why it is necessary for us to keep our compass bearings clear and, to use the expression of General Omar Bradley, to take our course from the distant stars and not from the light of each passing ship.

European Growth and Unity

In a period of this sort it is very important for us to know where our allies are, who our friends are, and what those commitments mean. And therefore I should like to talk to you a few minutes tonight about the state of the NATO alliance, which joins the great continents of Europe and North America in a common effort to preserve the peace and security of the Atlantic area. I am moved to do this in part by the impressions which I formed in accompanying the President on his recent trip to Europe.²

We found Europe—and those of you who have visited Europe have found Europe—prosperous, vital, and resurgent. Its economic growth is going forward at a rapid rate; living standards are rising; the contrast with lagging Communist progress in Eastern Europe is becoming more and more marked. And this growing wealth is being more equitably distributed as a result of widespread economic and social reforms.

Side by side with this material progress we found widespread confidence that Europe's movement toward greater unity would continue. European unity has its roots too deep among the peoples of this great continent—too deep especially among the young people—not to resume its growth. There are too many Europeans who fully understand the historic importance of the Franco-German reconciliation that after several centuries a war is not going to arise in Western Europe—too many people understand that to let some of our temporary differences stand in the way of that great movement toward European unity.

² For background, see BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 114.

Much has already been done. Progress has been made toward developing a community based on genuine equality, on common rules and institutions, and on subordination of parochial interests in the wider common needs of Europe as a whole. But much remains to be done. And one of the reasons for the President's trip was to make clear our own view about these great unfinished tasks of European unity and Atlantic solidarity. There will be delays and obstacles. We must judge the pace toward unity not by what happens in any single week, or month, or even year, but in terms of the timespan that is fitting to the historic importance of the development itself.

Certainly the United States welcomes this progress toward European unity. We recognize that only a united Europe is likely to be a strong Europe. And only a strong Europe can be an effective and fully equal partner of the United States in carrying forward the constructive and defensive tasks on which the growth and survival of the free world depend.

In this age no nation by itself can assure the defense and the welfare and the freedom of its people. But the United States and a strong united Europe, working together as equal partners, can achieve these great aims.

But these goals involve great adjustments on both sides, and difficulties are inevitable with any of these great creative enterprises. But if we have a clear view of where we are going, and if we can devote to this enterprise the dedicated effort it deserves, we can be optimistic about the outcome.

Unity for Defense

For the first purpose of this partnership is to strengthen the common defense.

Both in the May meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at Ottawa³ and during the President's recent trip, I found the members of NATO fully united in support of this purpose.

There are, of course, occasional interallied differences on means and approach. But such differences are bound to arise when an alliance

³ For text of a communique adopted on May 24, 1963, see *ibid.*, June 10, 1963, p. 895.

of free nations confronts such complex and difficult issues as evolving conditions now pose for the NATO alliance.

But the Soviet Union would make no greater mistake than to interpret interallied differences as major cracks within the alliance—cracks to be exploited by aggressive action. For the alliance is agreed on essentials. This has been proved by the successful deterrence of aggression against the NATO area for 14 years. The Cuban crisis of October 1962 proved this again, when it produced a show of unquestioned solidarity among all of the NATO partners.

Now this unity in times of crisis is not enough, for unity is also needed to avert crisis. And what Moscow thinks about these matters is of very great importance to the rest of us. This precrisis unity is sought through arrangements which provide in advance that forces shall come instantly under NATO command in the event of war. And it is important to maintain this integrated military structure of NATO, for looser forms of cooperation without solid commitment would not meet the need.

U.S. Commitment

Our success in maintaining NATO unity since 1949 is an achievement without precedent among peacetime multilateral alliances.

This unity reflects the full commitment of the United States, no less than that of its partners, to the defense of the entire NATO area. From our point of view—and it is important that not only the Europeans but the Americans understand this—from our point of view, this commitment does not rest in sentiment, although sentiment exists; it does not rest in amiability or in philanthropy. It is based upon the most fundamental realities of our own national interests and our own international policy. For the defense of Europe is vital to the defense of the United States.

That is why we have 400,000 military personnel in Europe: to defend the United States. With the exception of one country, this comprises the largest single national military commitment to NATO in Europe. It is thus a simple fact—and this is something which Europeans must understand better—it is thus a sim-

the fact that the United States is a principal European military power.

This American presence in Europe gives flesh and bone to the language of the NATO treaty: that an armed attack against any one country in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against us all. In 1949 that was a political commitment, but in 1963 it is a statement of plain, simple fact.

Conventional Forces

Now NATO will not remain strong and united in deterring attacks, however, merely by reaffirming faith in its purposes. We need continually to reexamine NATO's situation and to review its problems.

The military situation today differs markedly from that that was confronted by NATO in 1949. In the face of these changing conditions, the alliance needs to maintain a force which will give its members confidence in their military security to stand firm in the face of hostile threats and pressures.

In our view such a posture should include powerful conventional forces as part of a balanced conventional-nuclear force structure. Such forces are needed both to enhance the deterrent and to enable NATO to confront dangers with confidence.

Such a balanced force structure is also likely to hold the alliance together in periods of prolonged tension and crisis. For it will assure members of the alliance that they need not confront, in the event of enemy aggression, an instant choice between simple surrender or not so simple thermonuclear devastation. It will provide a range of alternative responses from which they can choose the one best suited to their military and political purposes at the time.

The NATO military authorities have proposed, and the alliance has approved, certain force goals whose attainment would represent the first step toward such a balanced military posture. As an American, I am proud that the United States is leading the way to meeting these approved force goals. The American soldiers whom the President inspected on his recent trip to Europe are among the best armed and trained in the world.

But as a citizen of the Atlantic world, I am

anxious that the alliance as a whole also meet its combined commitments. For in a genuine partnership burdens must be equitably borne; all countries must contribute their fair share to the total strength of the alliance. And I am confident that this in fact is what is going to be done.

Nuclear Forces

A truly balanced force cannot be attained without effective nuclear power and the will to use it if required. The nuclear power of the alliance must be organized so as to meet this military need. The nuclear power of the alliance is massive indeed and has risen rapidly in these more recent years. The organization of this power involves, however, vital political considerations. It goes to the heart of relations among the nations of Europe and between Europe and the United States. For this is a power of the life and death of nations and decisions to be made on a moment's notice.

But because the political framework of Europe is still evolving and because we here are grappling with highly complex military problems, we cannot pretend to offer neat and final answers simply from the United States to this nuclear question. Both this and the previous United States administration have believed that the general direction should eventually offer Europe an opportunity to make a genuine contribution to a unified Atlantic nuclear deterrent. This is the direction most consistent with the concepts of Atlantic partnership and European unity.

We have, in the last 2 years, taken some important interim steps to this end.

We have agreed with our partners on guidelines for the employment of nuclear weapons in specific military circumstances.

We are making available to our allies much more information regarding the capabilities and characteristics of nuclear weapons than ever before.

We also agreed with our allies, at the last NATO ministerial meeting in Ottawa, that a new Deputy for Nuclear Affairs should be established at Supreme Allied Headquarters in Europe; that he should have a staff consisting of officers drawn from a number of NATO

countries; and that an international liaison group representing the NATO Command in Europe should be attached to our Strategic Air Command headquarters at Omaha. These Ottawa decisions, taken in conjunction with the assignment of British V-Bombers and American Polaris submarines to NATO, will increase not only the strength and reach of NATO forces but also the knowledge and professional competence of NATO staffs in the nuclear area.

We are quite aware, however, that these are only initial steps and that they alone are not enough. They do not fully meet the desire of a revived Europe—living under the gun of Soviet nuclear power—to carry a greater share of the responsibility for its own nuclear defense.

This desire has come to focus, in large part, on medium-range ballistic missiles, since these are the only effective weapons of strategic range which can usefully be deployed in the European area against similar weapons aimed at Europe.

European desires for MRBM's first made themselves manifest in 1960. There were then, and there are now, broadly three alternative ways of responding.

One, we could refuse to provide MRBM's to allied forces. This could well signal to our allies, facing the threat of hundreds of Soviet MRBM's, American indifference to their nuclear concerns and thus to the concept of genuine partnership in the nuclear field.

Two, we could deploy such missiles to nationally manned and owned forces. Whatever technical safeguards might be built in against premature use, the political effect of thus establishing new nationally owned and manned strategic missile forces would be divisive within the alliance and deeply unsettling in terms of East-West relations.

The *third* alternative would be to provide MRBM's to forces jointly organized by us and our allies but not to nationally manned and owned forces. And if such forces must come into being, it can only be under multilateral manning and ownership.

After considering these three alternatives, General Eisenhower directed my predecessor, Secretary of State [Christian A.] Herter, to present the concept of a multilateral sea-based force to the NATO meeting in December 1960.⁴

After thorough review of the matter, the present administration also concluded that the multilateral force would be more consistent with our long-term goals of European unity and Atlantic partnership than either of the alternative responses to the missile problem that we have described.

Such a multilateral force would be open to all NATO countries on a basis of equality. It would be based on both United States and European productive resources. It could not break down into national components over time or under the pressure of sudden crises. And as Europe moved toward unity we could, as the President indicated at Frankfurt,⁵ contemplate an increase in the collective European role and responsibility in such a force. Most important, it would be under the control of multilateral authorities, including the Supreme Command, to prevent any contribution to national nuclear proliferation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that, from a military standpoint, a mixed manned force in surface warships would be an effective part of the nuclear deterrent. The same conclusion has been reached by allied military authorities, including the Supreme Commander, General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer.

Discussions with our allies about this concept have been proceeding since the summer of 1962. We were able to get considerable "feel" of allied reactions during our recent trip.

In Germany President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer agreed that they would use their best efforts to bring this force into being and that the matter should be further pursued with other interested countries.

In the United Kingdom we found agreement that the force was technically feasible, but no decision had been made as to British participation pending their further study of the overall problem of nuclear deterrents which they wish to make.

In Italy we found a favorable response to the concept, which had been given its support by the previous Italian government, and a desire to proceed with discussion among the countries concerned.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1961, p. 39.

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 22, 1963, p. 118.

The current level of strength and confidence in the nuclear power of the alliance will allow some time for this discussion in order to address the questions involved with the care that they deserve. If our allies then wish to proceed, the United States will be prepared to join them in creating this multilateral force. For we believe that such a force would notably enhance the strength and the cohesion of the alliance.

Political Consultation

The object of such a force—as of all NATO forces—would be to preserve peace. But more than military strength is needed to preserve peace. We also need a concerted Atlantic political and economic strategy.

All of us realize that our security is affected not only by what happens in the NATO treaty area but also by what may happen elsewhere in the world.

How should NATO cope with this inescapable interdependence between events inside and outside the NATO treaty area? By making NATO worldwide? I think not; that would certainly be impracticable. By consultation? To the maximum extent feasible and, may I add, to the extent that each of the members is willing to accept the responsibilities involved in genuine consultation.

We are continually seeking ways to perfect these processes of alliance consultation. Few people realize how much progress has been made since about 1957. It was decided then that NATO machinery should be adapted to the new post-Stalin Soviet emphasis on political, psychological, and economic initiatives and that new procedures were to be put into effect to this end.

When the 15 NATO ambassadors now sit around the NATO Council table in Paris each Wednesday, they cover a wide range of political and economic subjects. The primary instrument for Atlantic *economic* cooperation is the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]; but NATO also provides a forum in which these issues can be weighed against *political* background which lends them the necessary urgency. I believe that the processes of consultation will continue

to gather strength as Europe itself moves toward unity and a more dynamic role on the world scene.

But consultation is not a substitute for action. Those members who have responsibilities elsewhere may at times be forced to act without the prior approval of all NATO allies and indeed, at times, without as extensive consultation as would be desirable. We had a special and difficult case in the immediate crisis over Cuba last October, although Cuba itself had been fully discussed in NATO throughout the preceding year. But the understanding and support of our allies for what had to be done in that crisis was not only gratifying but made a major contribution to a peaceful solution of that missile crisis.

Negotiation

This process of consultation is as important in concerting actions toward the Communist nations as in the free world. For peace can only be made more secure if the West is as united in its efforts to reduce sources of international tension as in enhancing its defenses.

To reject negotiation with the Communists could be to forgo a chance of strengthening peace. But to undertake negotiation without full and intimate transatlantic consultation, on the other hand, could endanger the unity on which peace depends.

So we recognize both these needs: the need for negotiation, the need for consultation.

To meet the need for negotiation, we have been discussing the possibility of arms control with the Soviet Union for some 16 months at Geneva, where three other NATO allies participate with us. To meet the need for full consultation, we have kept the North Atlantic Council fully and currently informed about the state of these negotiations.

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to set up a direct communication link, which they could use in time of crisis to reduce the risk of war by miscalculation.⁶ We hope that agreement on other safeguards against miscalculation can follow, enhancing the effective-

⁶ For text of agreement, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

tiveness of this initial step, because last October, something new happened in history: Nuclear powers seriously and specifically had to consider nuclear war as an active element in policy and not simply as a theoretical exercise. And it became quite clear during that period that those who are responsible for this weapon must indeed keep in touch with each other—not just despite differences but because of differences—if these weapons would be kept within human control.

Some progress has been made also toward narrowing differences on a test ban, which could help to inhibit the development of new national nuclear capabilities. Agreement has, however, eluded us thus far. Under Secretary [W. Averell] Harriman and Lord Hailsham will discuss the matter further in Moscow with the Soviet leaders beginning early next week.⁷

We should like to achieve a test ban if we can, to begin to turn down an arms race which, if not turned down, will become increasingly burdensome in terms of billions upon billions of additional resources, increasingly unpredictable and chancy in terms of results, increasingly dangerous in the process. We are keeping in the most intimate touch with our allies during these discussions. We have reaffirmed to them the commitment which the President made in his American University speech,⁸ that "The United States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, not merely because they are our partners but also because their interests and ours converge."

The OECD and Aid Coordination

Two years ago a second great Atlantic institution was created to increase the effectiveness of the partnership on the economic side. That is the OECD, which evolved from the highly successful Organization for European Economic Cooperation of the Marshall Plan. It now has in it 20 nations of the Atlantic area.

The OECD has the power to make binding decisions by unanimous actions and to make recommendations to governments. Its greatest effectiveness, however, is as an active agency

for consultation—a place where policies still in the making in many countries can be developed in mutually reinforcing concert. The range of affairs already examined there, with fair to excellent success, includes economic policy, monetary and balance-of-payments policies, agriculture, trade, science, manpower, social affairs, and development assistance for underdeveloped countries.

This last matter—development assistance—is the special responsibility of the Development Assistance Committee. And it is here that we and the industrially developed nations of the Atlantic area, plus Japan, coordinate our efforts to assist in the development of these newly independent nations of the rest of the world.

The foreign aid provided by the European members of this Committee is really very substantial—about \$2.5 billions in 1961, of which approximately two-thirds was in grants. We expect this participation to increase. But this would not in the immediate future lessen the need for development assistance from the United States. For the total requirements are very large, if these less developed countries are to maintain their independence and move toward the goal of self-support at tolerable levels of living.

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of our foreign aid programs to our own national security. Despite difficulties and disappointments here and there, they have indeed produced formidable results.

Popular Support for International Cooperation

The American people have made, in the last two decades, a far-reaching choice between international cooperation and isolation—and this in the military, the political, and the economic fields. During this period a whole series of important international commitments have had the support of national leaders of both our major political parties and of large bipartisan majorities in Congress.

The U.S. Senate, for example, approved our membership in the United Nations by a vote of 89 to 2. The legislation carrying out that membership passed the Senate 67 to 7, and the House 344 to 15.

Aid to Greece and Turkey, under the Truman

⁷ See p. 198.

⁸ BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

Doctrine, 1947: approved 67 to 23 in the Senate, 287 to 108 in the House. The Marshall Plan: 69 to 17; 329 to 75. The ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty: 82 to 13. Six years later the ratification of SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], the Manila Treaty: 82 to 1. And last year the Trade Expansion Act was approved by votes of 78 to 8 in the Senate and 292 to 125 in the House.

In a recent Gallup poll, 82 percent of those questioned answered that they would rather the United States worked closely with other nations than pursue an independent course in world affairs. That emphatic result indicates how truly the American people have taken to heart the experiences of two world wars in this century and of a third and still greater threat to our freedom for the future.

For in this world struggle in which we are engaged, the forces of freedom have indeed been gaining in strength. The Communist system is torn by internal schisms and plagued by low food production, economic shortcomings, ideological disputes. But this world remains a very dangerous place. And the forces of coercion are still powerful and determined. If we should curtail our efforts, the present generally favorable trend could quickly be reversed.

As Secretary of State I am therefore concerned by the voices here and there who would have us give up our efforts—that is, who would quit this struggle and abandon the field to those who would destroy freedom. And, oddly, some of the most strident of these voices profess to be strongly anti-Communist, although what they would seem to want us to do is exactly what the Communists hoped that we would do. And that is to go home. Because if we come home, the Communists begin to take over.

There are many ways of withdrawing and of quitting in this great struggle for freedom. One way is to cut back our military establishment in the absence of sound and adequately inspected international agreements to reduce armaments. Another way of quitting is to cut back our foreign aid programs. Another way is to quit our alliances. Still another is to pull out of the United Nations.

We can't win this world struggle by retreating. Indeed, retreat is the sure road to defeat.

I don't believe the American people intend to take that road.

The Ideas That Unite Us

I would urge you, when you go home, if you have not done so recently, to read the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. You will find some familiar language there. And you should, because that language had a very substantial American influence in its drafting at the end of World War II at a time when we were thinking long and deeply about our relations with the rest of the world, at a time when we had been chastened in the fires of a great war. We shall not have another chance to draw lessons from a world war to build a decent world order. For this time we must build that decent world order before that world war is upon us. But you will find in those simple words not only a succinct summary of the long-term foreign policy of the American people; you will also find there a reflection of the words and the ideas which are our greatest strength in this present struggle.

The simple notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed is the most explosive political idea in the world today. You feel its force in every continent, and you feel its force as a cohesive relationship between us and other nations wherever we turn. You find in that simple notion a scarlet thread of American policy throughout the decades.

This helps to explain why we find it more easy to get along with democracies than with dictatorships, why we react instinctively as we do when great colonial issues arise, why we are so deeply disturbed about what is going on in Eastern Europe, and why we are concerned when we here at home fail to live up to the greatest aspirations and commitments of our own political system.

These simple notions unite us with other peoples because they are deeply rooted in human nature, a human nature that has expressed itself in almost every major tradition of which we know, and certainly in every continent. And these are the notions which give us allies, committed or not, at times of crisis and help to ex-

plain why it is that, when we find ourselves in crisis, there are far fewer neutrals than you might suppose. So there is great reason to move forward here in confidence, calmness, care, sobriety, but with the determination to do those things that are necessary to get on with the great unfinished business both here and abroad which will surely strengthen and stabilize the great story of freedom, which is the course of history in the story of man.

President Reports on Progress of Test Ban Talks at Moscow

*Statement by President Kennedy*¹

I have a brief statement to make on the progress of the negotiations in Moscow.² After 3 days of talks we are still hopeful that the participating countries may reach an agreement to end nuclear testing, at least in the environments in which it is agreed that on-the-ground inspection is not required for reasonable security. Negotiations so far are going forward in a businesslike way. It is understood, of course, that under our constitutional procedures any agreement will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. It is also understood by our allies that the British and American representatives are not negotiating on other matters affecting their rights and interests. Any matter of this sort which may come under discussion will be kept open for full allied consultation.

Finally, it is clear that these negotiations, if successful, should lead on to wider discussions among other nations. The three negotiating powers constitute the nuclear test ban committee of the Geneva conference, and if the present negotiations should be successful, it will be important to reach the widest possible agreement on nuclear testing throughout the world. But all of these questions are still ahead of us, and

¹ Read by the President at the opening of his news conference on July 17.

² For the names of members of the U.S. delegation to the talks, see BULLETIN of July 29, 1963, p. 159.

today, while the negotiators are at work, I think we should not complicate their task by further speculation, and for that reason I do not expect to respond to further questions on this subject.

President Nyerere of Tanganyika Visits Washington

Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanganyika, visited the United States from July 14 to 20. He was in Washington July 15-17. Following is the text of a communique released jointly on July 16 by the Office of the White House Press Secretary and the Office of the Press Secretary of the President of Tanganyika, together with a White House announcement of a new Peace Corps agreement between the two countries.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanganyika, met yesterday and today with the President. They discussed political developments in Africa as related to world developments and those developments affecting the relations of the United States and Tanganyika.

President Nyerere reviewed for the President the decisions taken by the recent African heads of state meeting in Addis Ababa and stressed the importance of the establishment at that meeting of an Organization of African Unity. President Nyerere also outlined the steps being taken to form an East African federation at an early date.

The President reviewed the United States position on world issues of interest to Tanganyika, stressing particularly the importance of promoting peace and economic progress within a framework of freedom. The President confirmed the continuing support of the United States for the principle of self-determination and expressed confidence in even greater cooperation and understanding between the United States and Tanganyika.

President Nyerere thanked the President for

the warm welcome which he and his party had received on his first visit to the United States since Tanganyika's independence.

PEACE CORPS AGREEMENT

The White House announced on July 16 that there would be a short ceremony at the White House that afternoon during which President Nyerere of Tanganyika and Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver would make a joint announcement of an agreement under which 80 new volunteer teachers will be sent to Tanganyika in November. The third group of volunteers requested by the East African republic, they will teach English and other subjects in upper primary grades.

In 1961, when the Peace Corps began, Tanganyika was the first country to make a formal request for volunteers. That first group consisted of 29 surveyor-engineers and 5 geologists. They have just completed their 2-year tour of duty in Tanganyika and are returning to the United States this summer. During their stay, they mapped 7,500 square miles of Tanganyika hinterlands, worked on 525 miles of road construction, surveyed approximately 4,000 miles of road, and taught courses in forestry, road-building, and engineering.

The new contingent of teachers will join a group of 20 nurses and 2 laboratory technicians who are just starting their second year of work in the hospitals of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanga, and Moshi.

United States and Mexico Agree To Conclude Convention for Settlement of Chamizal Boundary Dispute

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY, JULY 18

White House press release dated July 18

I have approved the recommendations for a complete solution to the Chamizal border problem contained in a Memorandum of the Department of State and of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Mexico dated July 17, 1963. I am pleased to note that President López Mateos has also approved the Memorandum. The Memorandum proposes the resolution of this long-standing dispute by giving effect in today's circumstances to the 1911 international arbitration award.

It is gratifying to be able to approve a proposed settlement of the Chamizal dispute and thus bring closer to a successful conclusion the constructive efforts of President Taft and all the other American Presidents since him who have sought to resolve this complex problem on a mutually satisfactory basis. I believe the solution which has been recommended to me will make a significant contribution to relations

between the United States and Mexico and will contribute to the welfare and orderly development of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua.

The Department of State will now undertake negotiations with the Government of Mexico looking to the early conclusion of a convention to carry out the recommendations in the Memorandum.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT AND MEMORANDUM

Press release 375 dated July 18

Department Statement, July 18

The Presidents of the United States and Mexico announced today their agreement to conclude a convention for the settlement of the Chamizal boundary dispute. The recommended terms of settlement which the Presidents have approved were submitted to them in identical memoranda by the Department of State and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign

Relations. According to the terms of the recommended settlement, the United States would transfer to Mexico 437 acres in the vicinity of El Paso, Texas. Conclusion of the convention will be a final step in the resolution of this controversy, which has been earnestly sought by every United States administration since 1910.

An international arbitral commission awarded to Mexico in 1911 an undeterminable part of the Chamizal zone in El Paso, Texas. The area of the zone then totaled approximately 598 acres. The Mexican claim was based on a shift in the channel of the Rio Grande. The United States Government, which had disputed the claim, rejected the award on several grounds, but in the understanding that the Governments of the two countries could proceed at once to settle their differences through diplomatic channels. Since 1911 the controversy has been a major problem in relations between the two countries. Every United States administration beginning with that of President Taft has attempted to resolve it in a mutually satisfactory manner. Proposals for a settlement have varied, and every practical means of settling the matter is believed to have been explored by the Governments at one time or another. In June 1962 President López Mateos urged that a further attempt be made, and President Kennedy agreed.¹ The two Presidents instructed their respective executive agencies to recommend a complete solution which, without prejudice to the juridical positions of the two Governments, would take into account the entire history of the tract. They recognized that any mutually acceptable settlement would affect many people in the city of El Paso and agreed that respect for the rights and interests of the people affected on both sides of the border should be a principal consideration in reaching a solution. The recommended settlement follows generally the solution set forth in the international arbitral award of 1911.

An important consideration in a settlement is the firm intention of the two Governments, in accordance with the treaties of 1848² and 1853,³

¹ For text of a joint communique of June 30, 1962, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 135.

² 9 Stat. 922.

³ 10 Stat. 1031.

to maintain the Rio Grande as the boundary between the two countries. Maintenance of the Rio Grande as the boundary was an objective of the so-called Banco Treaty of 1905,⁴ under which thousands of acres, formerly on the United States side of the river, have been transferred to Mexican sovereignty as shifts in the channel placed them on the Mexican side of the river, and other thousands of acres, formerly on the Mexican side, have been transferred to United States sovereignty as they were shifted by river movements to the United States side. Under a 1933 treaty⁵ the river just below El Paso was straightened and stabilized. In that process the two countries exchanged over 10,000 acres in order that the river might remain the boundary.

In the recommended Chamizal settlement, similar transfers of territory are involved and the same problem of maintaining the river as the boundary arises. Since 1899 an enclave of 386 acres, known as Cordova Island and under the jurisdiction of Mexico, has jutted north of the river into El Paso. The transfer to Mexico of additional acres in a Chamizal settlement would have augmented the amount of territory under Mexican jurisdiction north of the river. The two Governments agreed therefore that in any settlement the Rio Grande should be relocated, completing the 1933 stabilization and restoring the river as the international boundary for its entire reach in the vicinity of El Paso.

The recommended terms of settlement to be incorporated in a convention would accordingly provide: There would be a net transfer to Mexico of 437 acres of territory now under the jurisdiction of the United States. Of this area, 366 acres would be from the disputed Chamizal zone and 71 acres would be from United States territory to the east adjacent to Cordova Island. Cordova Island itself, lying between these two areas, would be divided equally between the United States and Mexico in the process of the relocation of the river. The United States would transfer to Mexico for the 193 acres it would receive out of Cordova Island an equal acreage from the United States

⁴ 35 Stat. 1863.

⁵ 48 Stat. 1621.

territory just east of Cordova Island. The Rio Grande would be relocated by channelization and reconstituted as the boundary between the United States and Mexico, thus eliminating the Cordova Island enclave.

Both Governments would acquire title to all the land and improvements in the areas which could be transferred, and each Government would receive the areas transferred without encumbrances of any kind, including any private titles. No payments would be made between the two Governments for the lands passing from one country to the other. The United States would, however, be paid by a private Mexican bank for the value to Mexico of the structures that would pass intact to Mexico. The two Governments would share equally the costs of actual construction of the relocated river channel, each Government bearing the costs of compensation for the value of the improvements destroyed in the construction process in the territory under its jurisdiction prior to the relocation of the boundary. The costs of constructing the bridges which would replace the existing bridges would be borne in equal parts by the two Governments. The citizenship status of persons who are or were residents of the areas being transferred would not be affected, nor would jurisdiction over or the applicability of laws to acts in or with respect to the area, including criminal or civil proceedings decided or pending at the time of transfer, be affected. Once the convention has been approved and comes into force and the necessary enabling legislation enacted, the International Boundary and Water Commission would agree upon a period in which to effect the acquisition of the properties. The relocation of the boundary line and the transfer of sovereignty would take place when the United States Commissioner on the Commission has certified that the acquisition of the properties and evacuation of the occupants have been completed and payment for the structures passing intact to Mexico has been received, and when the Commission has certified with the approval of the two Governments that the new boundary line has been demarcated.

The Department believes that settlement of this longstanding controversy would be a nota-

ble achievement in inter-American relations and in the history of peaceful settlement of international disputes. The Department is convinced, despite the serious temporary inconveniences that it would cause for many people in El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, that the settlement would greatly benefit both communities in the solution of current municipal problems and in the planning and realization of their future development.

Text of Memorandum

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF MEXICO BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR A COMPLETE SOLUTION OF THE CHAMIZAL PROBLEM

A. The Chamizal tract is an area on the north bank of the Rio Grande, within the city limits of El Paso, Texas. When, at the end of the past century, the controversy between the Governments of the United States and of Mexico over the Chamizal began, the total area of this tract was approximately 598 acres.

B. The principal factors relating to the controversy under reference are summarized as follows:

1) Each one of the two Governments claimed international title over the entire area of the Chamizal.

2) On June 15, 1911, the International Boundary Commission, United States-Mexico, increased by the appointment of a third member, the presiding Commissioner Eugene Lafleur of Canada, ruled, by a majority vote, that the United States had international title to that part of the Chamizal which, in 1864 before the floods of that year, was to the north of the center of the channel of the Rio Grande; and that Mexico had international title to that part of the Chamizal which was to the south of said center of the channel in 1864.

3) The United States Commissioner on the International Boundary Commission challenged the validity of the majority ruling, on the ground, among others, that in the opinion of the United States, in 1911 it was impossible to determine the channel of the river in 1864.

4) In the award under reference, the Presiding Commissioner and the Commissioner of Mexico included the following statement: "They also conceive that it is not within their province to relocate that line, inasmuch as the parties have offered no evidence to enable the Commissioners to do so."

5) From the date of the award to the present the two Governments on various occasions attempted without success to settle the Chamizal controversy. On June 30, 1962, President Kennedy and President Lopez Mateos announced their agreement to instruct their executive agencies to recommend a complete solution to the Chamizal problem which, without prejudice to their juridical positions, took into account the entire history of this tract.

C. A portion of land under Mexican jurisdiction,

known as Cordova Island, with an area of 386 acres, is also to the north of the present channel of the Rio Grande. The location of this land north of the river resulted from an artificial cut made in the year 1899 by common agreement between the two Governments so as to reduce the dangers of floods. Cordova Island is contiguous to the Chamizal tract. Its precise location and peculiar formation are shown on the attached map.⁶

D. For either country, it is undesirable to have a portion of its territory on the opposite bank of the Rio Grande. In fact, these instances of physical isolation hinder border-control measures and the best utilization of the detached areas. These problems are particularly serious in the case of Cordova Island, because it is an area the urbanization of which under present conditions would be unsatisfactory and of doubtful benefit since it is practically isolated from Mexican territory and as an enclave in El Paso constitutes an obstacle to the logical development of that city.

E. According to the calculations made by both Governments, the part of the Chamizal claimed by Mexico has an area of approximately 437 acres. The transfer to Mexico of the portion of the Chamizal which it claims, without relocation of the channel of the Rio Grande, could not by itself be considered as the complete solution called for by the Joint Communique of June 30, 1962, because a portion of territory under Mexican jurisdiction would yet remain to the north of the present channel of the Rio Grande. This area of 823 acres is composed of 437 acres in the Chamizal and 386 acres in Cordova Island.

F. Both Governments have always demonstrated their firm intention to restore the Rio Grande as the boundary between them as provided in the Treaties of 1848 and 1853, through efforts to find adequate solutions to all instances where portions of their respective territories are situated on the opposite bank of the river.

G. From the foregoing, it is clear that the complete solution of the Chamizal problem calls for incorporating into Mexico 823 acres presently north of the Rio Grande, by means of the excavation of a new channel which would restore the river as the boundary between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez.

H. The excavation of the new river channel would complete the project executed by both Governments in the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Valley. Under the terms of the Convention of February 1, 1933, the channel of the Rio Grande has been rectified in the sector of the river from Cordova Island to Cajoncitos Canyon, a distance of 88 miles. That rectification, which has afforded an extensive border region with adequate protection against floods and, additionally, with the many benefits derived from the existence of a precise and stable natural border, could not have been carried out

⁶Not printed here; for a copy of the map, see Department of State press release 375.

had there not existed then, as now, mutual understanding and good will between the United States and Mexico, as its completion required the cutting of 86 tracts, under the jurisdiction of Mexico, with a total area of 5,120 acres in exchange for 89 tracts, cut from the United States, with the same total acreage. The ease and rapidity which characterized the exchanges of territory under reference—this task was begun in the year 1934 and terminated in 1938—indicate the advisability of following the same procedure by concluding a convention applicable to the sector of the river separating El Paso from Ciudad Juarez.

Recommendation

In view of the foregoing, the Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Relations make the following joint recommendation for the complete solution of the Chamizal problem:

In the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez sector, the Rio Grande should be relocated into a new channel in order that south of the center of the new channel an area of 823 acres, in a single tract, be incorporated into Mexico. The center of the new channel would be the international boundary.

1. The new channel would have the following characteristics:

(a) It would commence at the point where the divergence between the present day and the 1864 channel begins (marked "A" on the attached map).

(b) The course of the new channel would be such that the areas transferred and the compensations therefor would be reduced to a minimum, with no further limitations than those imposed by the objective of contributing, in a positive manner, to the future development of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez and by technical requirements.

(c) The new channel would be concrete lined, in order that its width be as narrow as may be compatible with the technical requirements for protection against floods; that the number of persons and properties affected be minimized; that health conditions along the river be improved; that border control be facilitated; and that the project contribute to the beautification of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez.

2. The recommended new channel for the river, which would comply with the criteria set forth in the Recommendation and numbered paragraph 1 above, has been delineated on the attached map of the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez region by the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico. The results of this relocation of the channel of the river follow:

(a) Of the 437 acres in the Chamizal tract to which Mexico claims international title, approximately 366 acres would be incorporated into Mexico in that same tract. The 71 acres in the Chamizal tract which would not be incorporated into Mexico in the Chamizal tract would be compensated for by cutting to Mexico an equal acreage from the territory under the jurisdiction

of the United States immediately to the east of Cordova Island.

(b) Also, 193 acres of territory under the jurisdiction of the United States in the area immediately to the east of Cordova Island would be cut to Mexico and would be compensated for by an equal acreage which would be cut to the United States from territory under the jurisdiction of Mexico in the northern portion of Cordova Island.

3. Finally, the Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Relations have reached the following supplementary agreements:

(a) The lands in the Chamizal tract and in the zone immediately to the east of Cordova Island which would pass to Mexico would be free of any limitation on ownership or encumbrance of any kind including any private titles. The land in Cordova Island which would remain north of the new river channel and would pass to the United States would also be free of any limitation on ownership or encumbrance of any kind including any private titles. No payments would be made, as between the two Governments, for the value of the lands which would pass from one country to the other as a result of the incorporation into Mexico of Chamizal territory and of the relocation of the river channel.

(b) The transfer of lands in Cordova Island referred to in the penultimate sentence of the preceding paragraph would not require the adoption of any special measures by the Government of Mexico as these lands are not privately owned and are uninhabited.

(c) In the lands which would pass from the United States to Mexico in the Chamizal zone as well as in the area immediately to the east of Cordova Island there are some 382 structures which would pass intact to Mexico. All these structures are owned by private individuals with the exception of the Navarro School and the offices of the United States Border Patrol which are in the zone to the east of Cordova Island. Approximately 3,750 persons reside on the lands which would be directly affected by the relocation of the river.

(d) Once the required Convention is approved in accordance with the respective constitutional processes of the two countries, and the necessary legislation is enacted for carrying out the provisions of the Convention, the Government of the United States in conformity with its laws would acquire the properties which would be transferred to Mexico and effect the orderly evacuation of the occupants of the areas involved within a period of time which would be agreed upon by the two Commissioners on the International Boundary and Water Commission.

(e) The Government of Mexico would communicate to the Government of the United States the names of the private individuals or corporations, of Mexican nationality, to whom the Government of Mexico may decide to convey the titles to the properties comprised of those structures which would pass intact to Mexico and the lands on which they stand. These

persons or corporations would pay the Government of Mexico for the value of said lands and they would pay the Government of the United States for the estimated value to Mexico of these structures.

(f) The Commissioner of the United States on the International Boundary and Water Commission would certify as to the completion of the acquisitions and arrangements cited in 3(d) as well as of the action provided for in the last part of 3(e) and would so inform the Commissioner of Mexico. Both Commissioners would then proceed to demarcate the new boundary line, recording this in a Minute. The relocation of the boundary line and the transfer of lands provided for in the Convention would take place upon approval of this Minute by both Governments in accordance with established procedure.

(g) The costs of constructing the new river channel would be borne, in equal parts, by the two Governments. However, each Government would bear the costs of compensation for the value of the improvements or structures destroyed in the process of constructing the new channel of the Rio Grande in the territory under its jurisdiction at the time the Convention enters into force.

(h) The costs of constructing the bridges which would replace the six that are presently in use would be borne in equal parts by the two Governments. The legal status of the four bridges that presently are international bridges would not be altered by the provisions of the convention and, therefore, the agreements now in force which relate to them would apply without change to the new bridges which replace them. The bridges which would replace the international bridges on Stanton-Lerdo and Santa Fe-Juarez Streets would be located on the same streets. The international bridge or bridges which would replace the two to Cordova Island would be toll free unless the two Governments should agree to the contrary. The location of the free bridge or bridges would be subject to agreement between the Commissioners of the United States and Mexico on the International Boundary and Water Commission to be reached and recorded in accord with established procedure.

(i) The International Boundary and Water Commission would be charged with the relocation, improvement, and maintenance of the river channel, as well as the construction of the new bridges.

(j) The relocation of the boundary and the transfer of lands resulting therefrom would not affect in any way: the legal status, with respect to citizenship laws, of those persons who are present or former residents of the lands transferred; the jurisdiction over legal proceedings of either a civil or criminal character which are pending at the time of, or which were decided prior to, such relocation; or the jurisdiction over the law or laws applicable to acts or conduct performed within or with respect to the lands transferred prior to their transfer. The Convention would contain provisions to give effect to these principles.

The Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Relations are certain that the final solution of the Chamizal problem will be of great value to the future harmonious development of the cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez. But even more, the solution of this controversy will serve as a notable example to the world at large and will contribute to world peace by again demonstrating that all differences among nations, regardless of how complicated they may be, can be resolved through friendly negotiations.

July 17, 1963

WASHINGTON, D.C. and MEXICO, D.F.

President Moves To Facilitate Use of Foreign Currencies

White House press release dated July 8

The President transmitted to Congress on July 8 an amendment to the general provisions of the 1964 budget which would ease the United States balance-of-payments situation by permitting foreign currencies to be used more flexibly.

The amendment will facilitate the use of foreign currencies through a change in Treasury banking and accounting arrangements. It will help to improve the United States balance-of-payments position without making any change in the system of congressional control of foreign currencies or in the availability of foreign currencies for programs for which they are reserved under existing law. The proposed language would accomplish these purposes by enabling currencies on hand to be used for current needs and to be replaced as required later.

The new provision would free for immediate U.S. Government use foreign currencies restricted under three programs—the market development and research programs of the Department of Agriculture and the educational exchange program of the Department of State. When currencies are reserved under these programs, they are set aside, even though they may not be used for several years. Therefore, when the United States requires currencies for other programs in a given country, as it does in many countries, the currencies must be purchased commercially with dollars, even though at the same time identical currencies may be idle in Treasury accounts. By using these idle cur-

rencies to meet current needs, U.S. dollar payments abroad would be reduced by an equivalent amount and the U.S. balance of payments would be benefited accordingly. Approximately \$75 million of administratively reserved currencies could be made available, with \$35–40 million to be used in the first year following enactment of the amendment. As currencies are needed for the three programs later, the Treasury would supply them from subsequent receipts or buy them if necessary.

Department Releases First Volume of Digest of International Law

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on July 15 (press release 373) that a new *Digest of International Law*, the first since the beginning of World War II, is now being published by the Department. On that day the first volume was formally presented to Secretary Rusk by Assistant Legal Adviser Marjorie Whiteman. The *Digest* is being prepared by and under the direction of Miss Whiteman.

A successor to Hackworth's *Digest of International Law*, published in 1940, the new *Digest* will contain the first official and comprehensive treatments of the new areas of international law that have developed in the past two decades, such as the law of outer space, disarmament, Antarctica, and the continental shelf. Other areas of international law, such as aviation and international organizations, which were in their infancy when Hackworth's *Digest* was published, will be dealt with at length in the new *Digest*. An entire volume will be devoted to the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the international banking ventures, and other international organizations which have grown up since the war.

Eventually the *Digest* is expected to run to 15 or 16 volumes, roughly twice the size of its predecessor. Present printing schedules call for at least three more volumes during the com-

ing winter, with the rest following as quickly as possible.

Volume I, which runs to practically 1,000 pages, contains two chapters—"International Law" and "States, Territories, and Governments." Hackworth's *Digest* covered the same material in 160 pages. The birth of more than 50 states, the postwar evolution of the British Commonwealth and the postwar history of the French Community, the development of the United Nations trust territories, and the recent history of the League of Nations mandates are all recorded in this volume.

The *Digest* is the fifth digest of international law to be published by the Department. The first was published in 1877. Prepared by John L. Cadwalader, Assistant Secretary of State, it was titled *Digest of the Published Opinions of the Attorneys-General and of the Leading Decisions of the Federal Courts, with Reference to International Law, Treaties, and Kindred Subjects*. This *Digest* was a single volume of less than 300 pages, with the subjects arranged in alphabetical order rather than under chapter headings.

The second *Digest of International Law* was prepared by Dr. Francis Wharton, Chief Examiner of Claims for the Department of State, and published in 1886. Wharton's *Digest* was a three-volume work, which set the pattern for succeeding digests insofar as the general format and table of contents were concerned. John Bassett Moore prepared the third *Digest*, which ran to eight volumes. It was published in 1906 and incorporated much of Wharton's *Digest*. The *Digest* by Green Haywood Hackworth, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, published in 1940, was the fourth.

Work on the present *Digest* began formally in 1957, when Legal Adviser Herman Phleger asked Miss Whiteman to undertake the task. Material for the *Digest*, however, has been collected by Miss Whiteman during the preceding two decades.

Copies of volume I are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, at \$4.25 each.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK

I am delighted to receive the first volume of the new *Digest of International Law*. This is our first comprehensive treatment of public international law by the Department since Hackworth's *Digest*, which was published at the beginning of World War II.

The 23 years which have passed since the publication of Hackworth's *Digest* have been years of unprecedented growth and development for international law, both in its procedural and substantive aspects. This growth and development are no more than a reflection, and a consequence, of the increased collaboration and cooperation among nations on a rapidly shrinking planet. In this sense these volumes will be a documentary record of the complexity and compactness of our world and of the interrelationship of its nations and people.

This volume, and the ones to come, will fill an important gap in the legal materials available to the United States Government, to the bar and to the public in this country, and to governments and scholars throughout the world. We are grateful to you, Miss Whiteman, for undertaking the preparation of the *Digest of International Law* and for the intensive work you have done and have directed over several years, to see the task through to completion. We look forward to the other volumes in this important project.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Antitrust Developments in the European Common Market. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Part I. March 8-14, 1963. 262 pp.

Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Part 5. March 29, 1963. 67 pp.

Training of Foreign Affairs Personnel. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 15 and S. 865, bills to establish a National Academy of Foreign Affairs, S. 32 and S. 99, bills to establish a U.S. Foreign Service Academy, and S. 414, a bill to establish a Freedom Commission and a Freedom Academy. April 4-May 1, 1963. 492 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Scheduled August Through October 1963

Inter-American Ministers of Education: 3d Meeting	Bogotá	Aug. 4-
UNESCO/BIRPI African Study Meeting on Copyright	Brazzaville	Aug. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Geochemical Prospecting Methods and Equipment.	Bangkok	Aug. 5-
U.N. Seminar on the Rights of the Child	Warsaw	Aug. 6-
BIRPI African Seminar on Industrial Property	Brazzaville	Aug. 12-
17th International Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 18-
ICAO International Conference on Air Law	Tokyo	Aug. 20-
International Criminal Police Organization	Helsinki	Aug. 21-
U.N. International Conference on Travel and Tourism	Rome	Aug. 21-
ILO Iron and Steel Committee: 7th Session	Cardiff, Wales	Aug. 26-
Centenary Congress of the International Red Cross	Geneva	Aug. 27-
U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade and Development.	New York	August
ECE Steel Committee	Geneva	Sept. 9-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Extraordinary Session	London	Sept. 10-
U.N. Human Rights Seminar on the Status of Women in Family Law	Bogotá	Sept. 10-
52d Conference of the Interparliamentary Union.	Belgrade	Sept. 12-
GATT Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration	Geneva	Sept. 16-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 8th Session.	Bangkok	Sept. 16-
5th FAO Conference on Wood Technology	Madison, Wis	Sept. 16-
U.N. General Assembly: 18th Session	New York	Sept. 17-
ICAO Limited Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Bangkok	Sept. 17-
12th Pan American Child Congress	Buenos Aires	Sept. 22-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee	Geneva	Sept. 23-
IAEA General Conference: 7th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 24-
ITU CCITT Working Parties of Study Group IV	Geneva	Sept. 24-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: Symposium on the Measurement of Abundance of Fish Stocks.	Madrid	Sept. 25-
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 10th Session.	Geneva	Sept. 30-
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 9th Session	Bangkok	Sept. 30-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 51st Statutory Meeting.	Madrid	Sept. 30-
ILO Technical Conference on Employment Policy	Geneva	Sept. 30-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.	Washington	September
Caribbean Organization Council: 4th Meeting	San Juan	September
PAHO Executive Committee: 49th Meeting	Washington	September
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 14th Session	Port Moresby, Papua	September
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification	Geneva	September
6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	September
U.N. Conference on Cocoa	Geneva	September
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space	New York	September
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 3d Session	Paris	September

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 18, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Communications Panel	Paris	September
OECD Ministers of Science	Paris	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 21st Session	Geneva	Oct. 7-
ICEM Executive Committee: 22d Session	Geneva	Oct. 7-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Oct. 7-
ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference	Geneva	Oct. 7-
ICEM Council: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 14-
IMCO Assembly: 3d Session	London	Oct. 16-
11th Pan American Railway Congress	México, D.F.	Oct. 18-
U.N. ECE Committee on Trade	Geneva	Oct. 21-
BIRPI: Committee of Experts on Problems of Less Developed Countries in Field of Industrial Property	Geneva	Oct. 21-
U.N. ECA Conference on African Electric Power Problems	Addis Ababa	Oct. 21-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 21-
UPU Consultative Committee on Postal Studies: Management Council	Washington	Oct. 28-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 3d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 28-
ICAO Visual Aids Panel: 3d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 28-
IMCO Council: 9th Session	London	Oct. 29-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 7th Session	Geneva	October
South Pacific Commission: 25th Session	Nouméa	October
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 4th Session	Vienna	October
IA-ECOSOC: 2d Annual Meeting at Ministerial Level	São Paulo	October
IA-ECOSOC: 2d Annual Meeting at Expert Level	São Paulo	October

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Following are statements made in the United Nations Trusteeship Council by M. Wilfred Goding, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and U.S. Special Representative in the Trusteeship Council, and Vincente N. Santos, President, Marianas District Legislature, Saipan, and adviser to the U.S. Special Representative.

OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. GODING, JUNE 5

U.S./U.N. press release 4212

It is a privilege to be here again this year as Special Representative for the Administering Authority of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.¹ I am especially grateful for the opportunity to report to members of the Council at this particular time. The past year has been a very eventful year—the most eventful year, I am convinced, since the territory became a

trusteeship area. It has been a year of unusual progress as well as one of major trial.

A full record of our activities of fiscal year 1962 is given in the written report² which already has been placed in your hands. In this oral report, therefore, I shall summarize only briefly the major advances and setbacks that have occurred within the past year, especially as they relate to the programs and plans that have been discussed at these sessions during the past 2 years. I shall then be glad to attempt to answer any questions you may wish to ask. As always, the Administering Authority looks forward to receiving comments and suggestions of the members of the Council.

Before I begin a résumé of the past year's activities, I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the Micronesian people. I am constantly and increasingly reminded of their innate abilities, of their kindness and generosity, of their loyalty and devotion to demo-

¹ For a statement made by Mr. Goding in the Trusteeship Council on May 31, 1962, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 264.

² *Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1962* (Department of State publication 7521) ; for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (75 cents).

cratic principles, of the rising generation's capacity to accept the responsibilities of their chosen professions and to provide the leadership that should enable them to decide their own destiny in the world of nations in the reasonably near future, and perhaps sooner—more rapidly than would have been thought possible a few decades ago.

It is these qualities of the Micronesian people which are mainly responsible for the splendid human relations existing in the Trust Territory, which was so well expressed by a recent visitor from Fiji who, after traveling through the islands, remarked that although good race relations prevailed elsewhere in the Pacific, they could not be compared with the easy relations and complete acceptance of all races by each other which is so apparent in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

At this point I would also like to say that one of the most gratifying experiences of the past year has been the vastly increased and growing interest and effort in Micronesia that has taken place among all segments of the U.S. Government, as well as among many private agencies and individuals, not only in the United States but, indeed, in many areas of the world.

Not only the interest but the active support and direct aid of those agencies in a position to help was forthcoming when needed. This willingness, or indeed this eagerness, to help was demonstrated time and again during the past year. It was demonstrated when the Administering Authority sought, and was successful in acquiring, new legislation and greatly increased funds with which to intensify its efforts in all fields of endeavor. It was demonstrated when an outbreak of poliomyelitis occurred in the Marshall Islands, with the result that the disease was checked before it could spread to other areas of the territory. Again, it was demonstrated recently when Typhoon Olive swept over the Marianas District, leaving in its wake a great deal of damage and destruction.

The interest of the U.S. Government in the islands of the Trust Territory has made itself apparent in many other ways. An Interdepartmental Task Force comprised of members of various Federal agencies, which had been set up the year before, was active during this period

in working for needed legislation and providing other assistance. The 87th U.S. Congress passed a bill which included the Trust Territory in those areas which could receive Federal assistance in case of disaster, and this became law last June when President Kennedy approved it.

Had it not been for this last-named action, the Trust Territory administration would have been sorely pressed to provide emergency needs and permanent repairs resulting from the recent typhoon. My colleagues and I have just come from the island of Saipan, to which we moved our headquarters a year ago and over which the eye of the typhoon passed. This was the first major storm to strike Saipan in 49 years and one of the most severe in the island's recorded history. Miraculously, no lives were lost. But the storm damaged or destroyed homes, farms, schools, hospitals, churches, commercial garden crops, and Government installations of all types in Rota and Tinian as well as in Saipan.

Because of the Congress' and the President's action last June, assistance was available immediately. The President declared the stricken Marianas a major disaster area, and within 24 hours needs had been surveyed and plans made for assistance. The American Red Cross, together with the Department of Agriculture, will dispense food as long as the need exists. With the aid of nurses from the U.S. Navy hospital in Guam, typhoid inoculations were given to all residents in the stricken areas. A representative from the President's Office of Emergency Planning surveyed damage to public facilities such as schools, power plants, water plants, dock facilities, and other Government buildings and estimated the damage at over \$2 million. Rehabilitation work already has begun. Assistance also has been given to help replace houses and local businesses.

Administration

When I appeared before this body a year ago, I presented a reassessment of our needs in the fields of education, economic development, public health, and major construction. This analysis highlighted the fact that we need to set a much more rapid pace in the development of

the Trust Territory. To do so meant vastly increased appropriations.

Accordingly, a budget of \$15 million was requested for the current fiscal year. It is with a great deal of gratification that I am able to report that the full amount of the request was approved by the Congress. This is an increase of over 100 percent over the prior year's appropriation and compares with annual appropriations which had approximated \$7 million for all functions of government for the previous several years.

Active support for the increased appropriation came from all levels of government—from the Office of the President, the Department of the Interior, the Department of State, the Bureau of the Budget, the congressional committees concerned, and the U.S. Congress itself. All agreed wholeheartedly that the Administering Authority could meet the challenge it faced only by launching a vastly accelerated program.

Enactment of a new law was necessary before the increased appropriation could be approved, since a statutory limitation of \$7.5 million for Trust Territory administration had earlier been set by Congress. Our first step thus was to have the appropriation ceiling lifted. This was accomplished with the passage by Congress of a new authorization law in July 1962,³ which enabled us to request \$15 million for our 1963 operations.

Because the new law did not become effective in time for the increased appropriation to be included in the general appropriations bills for fiscal year 1963, it was necessary to submit a supplemental request for consideration of the newly authorized appropriation. Accordingly we submitted a supplemental budget to bring our 1963 appropriation up to the total of \$15 million authorized. Enactment was carried over to the 88th session of the U.S. Congress, and on May 17 of this year we received the second half of our increased appropriation.

Although this delay temporarily held up some aspects of our accelerated construction program, the intervening period was used to good advantage in the perfecting of our plan-

ning. When the money became available we were able to move more expeditiously into our construction program.

Other administrative events of major and far-reaching import took place during the year under review. The first was the unification of all the territory under civilian administration. By Executive order of the President,⁴ the former Saipan District was placed under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior on July 1, 1962.

The turnover of the former Saipan District to us by the Department of the Navy was accomplished in a smooth and exemplary manner and the naval administration is to be commended for the cooperation we received during this complex operation. The integration of Saipan District also enabled us to bring about another long-sought amalgamation—that of unifying all the Mariana Islands into one district. On July 1, 1962, the Marianas District was created from the former Rota and Saipan Districts. Two events, long sought by the people of the Mariana Islands as well as by recent visiting missions and the Trusteeship Council, thus were brought to successful culmination at the beginning of the year under review.

Along with the unification of Saipan Island and the Northern Mariana Islands with the rest of the territory went another historic event, that of the transfer of the headquarters of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to Saipan Island, thus establishing a provisional capital of the territory for the first time within its own boundaries. These two historic events have brought about increased cooperation amongst the people of the territory and have stimulated greater political cohesion. The establishment of headquarters on Saipan has also enabled us to utilize to the maximum the services of qualified Micronesians on the headquarters staff as well as to make easier our program of inservice training. In every headquarters department there are now Micronesian staff members, with all districts being represented.

Last year I set forth in detail the range of headquarters staff positions occupied by Micronesians, and I will not repeat here except to say

³ For a statement by President Kennedy, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 272.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, May 28, 1962, p. 887.

that in most areas the number has appreciably increased. Additionally, more than 50 clerical and other positions formerly held by U.S. citizens when we were located on Guam now are filled exclusively by local citizens.

The replacement program continued also at the district level. In Palau, Mr. Takeo Yano became the first Micronesian to be appointed assistant district administrator in administration affairs on a permanent basis. Altogether, during the past year, some 65 Micronesians were placed in professional and senior executive positions in the Trust Territory, an increase of 150 percent over the previous year. There are 100 Micronesians holding senior positions, making up approximately half of all the professional and top-level positions in the administration.

We are also continuing the analysis of wage scales in the territory. Because of budgetary limitations we have been unable to make a complete wage-scale readjustment, although a start was made last October, when a substantial salary adjustment was made covering most of the lower and middle pay rates. An additional salary adjustment is scheduled for July, soon after the beginning of the new fiscal year. This wage increase will be instituted at all levels, with special attention being given to the elimination of any inequities that still exist.

A wage adjustment was also put into effect during the year for the Kwajalein area, and in January 1963 the differential paid to Micronesians when they are employed in districts other than their own was raised from 15 percent to 25 percent.

Political Advancement

Under the guidance of the new headquarters Political Affairs Office, the political development program was speeded up considerably. This section is composed of a political affairs officer, who is both a political scientist and lawyer, and two Micronesian assistant political affairs officers, both holding degrees in political science. As each district congress met, it received technical advice from the Political Affairs Office, thus aiding immeasurably in legislative drafting and in the improvement of legislative procedures.

The political highlight of the year was the

Council of Micronesia session held in late September and early October in Koror, Palau. This was the first time that the Council of Micronesia had met within the territory's boundaries, and its deliberations resulted in recommendations and resolutions which will profoundly affect the future political development of the territory. The Council resolved that a true legislative body be created as soon as possible and, to achieve this end, established a Legislative Drafting Committee to begin preliminary work on the drafting of a constitution.

At a meeting last fall the Council adopted an official Trust Territory flag in order that the territory might have a symbol of unity and identity. This flag, a miniature set of which I am pleased to present to members of this body with the compliments of the Council of Micronesia, consists of a circle of six white stars on a field of blue. Representing the six districts of the territory, the white stars also stand for peace, with the blue background symbolizing freedom and loyalty.

The Council also voted to hold a special session in March 1963 at the provisional capital in Saipan to consider the preliminary report of the Legislative Drafting Committee. This special session resulted in preliminary recommendations on the part of the Council as to the makeup of a legislative body. These recommendations are currently under study. While there are many steps still to be taken before a true territorial legislative organ can come into existence, I am more than ever confident that well before 1965 we shall have an effective territorial legislative organization operating in the territory.

Political progress continued also on the municipal and district level. The most important political event of the year on the district level was the formation and chartering of the Marianas District Legislature. Chartered on January 7, 1963, the new body convened its first session on March 4, 1963. With the creation and chartering of the Marianas District Legislature, the people of the district for the first time through their chosen representatives have a forum for the solution of problems facing the entire district, since only municipal legislative bodies existed previously in Saipan, Rota, and Tinian.

Two significant events of general social and political import occurred this past year. On August 2, 1962, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service announced that visas for entry to the United States on the part of Trust Territory citizens no longer would be required when a citizen was proceeding in direct and continuous transit from the Trust Territory to the United States. All that a Trust Territory citizen now needs to enter the United States as a nonimmigrant is sufficient official identification. Certain minor regulations, such as security of official acceptance by a school, however, still are in effect for Trust Territory residents who are applying for entrance as students.

A very significant event was the Executive order signed by President Kennedy on August 21, 1962, which, among other things, directed that regulations relating to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands be revised to facilitate free entry of United States citizens, United States investment, and United States-flag vessels into the area with the exception of Eniwetok, Bikini, and Kwajalein, which will continue to be under the control of the Department of Defense. In ending his message, the President stated: "I intend that these actions I have taken will foster responsible political development, stimulate new economic activity, and enable the people of the islands to participate fully in the world of today."⁵ This step, I believe, will do much to aid us in accomplishing the President's stated objectives.

Economic Development

Without question the economic highlight of the year was the signing of a basic agreement with a major United States seafood company under which the company will establish a commercial fishery industry in the Palau District. Several other commercial fishery concerns also conducted surveys in the territory during the year, exploring possibilities for similar or related commercial fishery projects. The opening of the territory to outside private investment has drawn much attention from industrial

concerns. Surveys have been conducted by representatives of the pineapple and sugar industries, as well as by other industries.

An Economic Development Loan Fund established by the Administering Authority, in which was placed an initial increment of \$100,000 this past year, has stimulated the development of small business and small-scale business enterprises. This loan fund is an addition to the present chartered trading company loan fund, out of which loans were also made during the year. The rules governing this latter fund, however, restrict loans to chartered trading companies. We are now seeking the removal of the present restrictions and plan to merge this fund with the general Economic Development Loan Fund.

Additional funds for the Economic Development Loan Fund have been requested for this forthcoming year. To date, the fund has granted outright loans as well as served as guarantor for commercial bank loans. By this latter method, the use of the loan fund has been expanded considerably. Loans made or achieved during the year ranged through a variety of small-scale business enterprises. It is hoped that the fund can be rapidly expanded to make or underwrite large-scale development loans.

The year witnessed continued rapid expansion in credit unions and cooperatives, the number more than doubling that of the previous year. Others have submitted charters and by-laws for consideration or are in the preliminary stages of organization. Training in cooperative principles and procedures also was carried out through district conferences, and a major training session was held last fall in Saipan for delegates from all districts.

Five districts now have branch banks, the latest branch having just this month been opened in the Ponape District Center. Only Yap District now lacks a branch bank. The growth of the local banks, as well as the flourishing of credit unions, is eloquent witness to increased economic development. A few of the Council members present today may recall that the Special Representative 6 years ago reported on the results of a territory banking survey conducted for us by a banking concern. That survey was very pessimistic and reported that there appeared to be little opportunity for establish-

⁵ For texts of a White House announcement and a statement by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, Sept. 10, 1962, p. 384.

ment of branch banks in the foreseeable future. We now have five branches and indications of more to come.

Although our outlook for commercial fishery development at long last appears promising, we are not neglecting our own fishery development projects. A small school of fisheries completed the first year of operation in Palau, and some 25 young men are undergoing training in tuna fishing methods at the present time on tuna boats in Hawaii. Our pilot fishery project at Palau moves forward steadily. A boatbuilding expert was hired this past year to serve as a consultant to the Palau Boatbuilders Association, and a loan was made to this group as well as technical assistance and aid given to enable the group to erect a boatyard.

Our production of copra now is reaching the level found before the disastrous typhoons of 1957-58 which so drastically cut production in the Marshalls, Ponape, Truk, and Yap. Well over 13,000 tons of copra were produced during the last fiscal year, even though only some 11,700 short tons had been sold at the close of last year. There was a sizable overall increase in copra revenue to producers, compared with the preceding year, as a result of increased production. The Copra Stabilization Fund shrank considerably, since the fund maintained a constant price throughout the year in spite of falling market prices. The copra picture has brightened somewhat recently. Prices are slightly higher, and decreased shipping costs enabled the fund a few months ago to realize the first profit on sales in over 2 years. If this trend continues, we hope to be able to bring the fund balance up to a more normal level and to raise prices paid to the copra producer.

Revenue from fish exports and vegetable produce again showed appreciable increase. Fish export revenue for the year was \$85,000, a small figure but one that is annually increasing as seen by comparison with last year's figure of \$65,000. When local and interdistrict sales are added, revenue from this source is close to \$200,000. Vegetable produce revenue, almost exclusively going to the islands of Rota, Tinian, and Saipan, increased to \$95,000 in fiscal 1962 as compared to \$68,000 for the previous year. Local farmers markets have expanded. Events

such as the opening of the Majuro road in the Marshalls have made possible the local sale of large quantities of fresh produce to the District Center in Majuro. In other districts, also, as road improvement has occurred, farmers have been able to get their produce to the central markets, where there is a constant demand.

Increasing reliance on local fresh produce, local meat, fish, and other local supplies is seen by comparing the volume of commodities imported in the territory. In 1961, with a population of some 77,913 people, total food imports came to \$2,329,181. In fiscal year 1962, although the population had increased to 80,980 people, food imports were reduced to \$1,883,190. Food imports still are high, but it is encouraging to note a downward trend. Canned fish is still imported in quantity, and it is our hope that this import can be cut considerably when the commercial fishing operation gets under way in Palau, since indirectly that operation will spur local production and consumption.

Coconut rehabilitation and replanting continues as do other developmental programs in subsistence and cash crops. Details of the agriculture program are given in full in our annual report. The cacao program is proceeding beyond expectations. Trees are beginning to bear, and barring any unforeseen calamity, commercial production of cacao as a major crop will become a reality within the next few years. The cacao subsidy program described in our report has been an unusual success. Through this program, as well as private plantings, there are now estimated to be close to 2 million cacao seedlings and trees growing in the territory, most in the Districts of Ponape, Truk, Palau, and Yap.

Ramie production also is showing unusual promise, and it is anticipated that the pilot project in Palau need be continued only for another year before local commercial development can take over. To enable the copra producer to make use of coconut-husk byproducts, coir fiber processing is being developed through a pilot project in Truk. The Farm Institute in Ponape concluded its first year of operation, and plans for expansion of this agricultural extension training are under way.

Continued emphasis is being placed on pro-

essional agricultural training at the university level abroad. This past year, 2 young graduates returned to the territory with degrees in tropical agriculture. Additionally, some 8 students have returned with advanced training ranging from 2 to 5 years in the field of agriculture. Six additional scholarship students are leaving this month for university training to join a group of some 12 other agricultural students already in school. Of this group, 4 are working toward advanced degrees while the rest are still on the lower level of undergraduate work. Special training in forestry methods and rice growing techniques also were offered Micronesian agricultural extension agents during the year.

The operation of the Micronesian Products Center resulted in an approximate doubling of handicraft income during the past year, mainly for the woodcarvers of Palau. The Center also indirectly sparked the formation of the Woodworkers Guild in that district. In the other districts the promise of an immediate and steady market stimulated women's organizations as well as individuals to develop better handicraft. Handicraft selection boards have been established in all districts; all handicrafts screened and evaluated prior to being sold to the Center. The result has been a marked increase in quality of product. An interesting side development has been the remaking of traditional artifacts and ancient objects by older craftsmen. Many of these traditional objects have never been seen before by the younger Micronesians. These copies have sold exceedingly well, and some are of a quality that exceeds even the original counterparts now to be found only in the museums of Europe.

The past year saw the beginning of tourism for the territory. While only a handful of true tourists managed to get to the Eastern Carolines or to Palau due to limited passenger capacity on our amphibious airplanes, which still must be used on these flights, a few nonetheless did manage. The Marianas, however, has a small but flourishing tourist business. Our DC-4 plane, which is depicted on page 82 of the annual report, has a seating capacity of 57 and makes three flights a week from Guam to Saipan and, I might say, in the past few months

almost always has been filled to capacity or near capacity. Additionally, two small private charter airlines located in Guam also fly between Guam and Rota-Tinian-Saipan carrying tourists as well as businessmen. A number of subsidiary business establishments already have resulted, and plans are under way for greatly increasing hotel accommodations.

Conditions have changed from those which prompted the distinguished former delegate from Bolivia in 1961 at the 27th session to express rather serious doubts about the future of tourism, when he rather ruefully complained that it seemed to him the only people who had access to the territory were members of the U.S. Navy, the administration, Spanish nuns, anthropologists, and United Nations representatives! The reverse is now true. His list, I assure him, is now a small minority. Tourists of various nationalities are now a frequent sight on Saipan. With the completion of land airfields in all districts and the use of larger land-based planes, we expect tourism to become an important aspect of the local economy.

Transportation

Several major advances can be recorded in the transportation area. The year saw the completion of the Truk dock and final dredging of the Truk harbor. A 3,500-ton motor vessel, the *North Star*, was acquired from the Department of the Interior and is now in service, renamed the *MV Pacific Islander*, thus providing a second major logistic vessel. We will be able to provide 35-day service between the district centers, Guam-Saipan, and Japan. This will more than double the frequency of passenger and logistic services to all districts. We plan also to retire the remaining uneconomical AKL-class vessels now operated in our field-trip service from service as soon as feasible and replace them with smaller, more economical, and practical-type vessels. Two such new vessels already have been built to our specifications, the *MV Militobi* and the *MV Kaselehlia*, and are in service. Funding for an additional smaller field-trip vessel has been requested in our budget for the coming year.

As I previously indicated, on July 1, 1962, a DC-4 aircraft was placed in regular service be-

tween Guam and Saipan. Carrying 57 passengers and appreciable cargo, this plane also is used to fly to Angaur in Palau and to Truk on a monthly basis or as need demands. Flights can now be made to Yap, with the opening of the new airfield there. When necessary, the DC-4 can also fly from Truk to Kwajalein-Majuro and back to Guam-Saipan by overflying Ponape.

Airfield construction is being accelerated, since movement of additional staff and essential supplies is going to be essential in support of our accelerated programs. Full utilization of DC-4 airplanes cannot be made until there are adequate land airfields at Koror and Ponape. A major accomplishment of the year was the completion of a 4,800-foot airstrip at Yap. Hazardous water landings now can be dispensed with there, and, equally important, more essential air cargo and greatly increased numbers of passengers can be carried. Work also has been started on the Palau airfield. We hope to put this field in operation before the end of the next fiscal year, which will permit conversion of service to the Western Carolines by DC-4 and other land-based planes. Improvements were made to the Truk and Majuro airfields as well as to airfields in Saipan. Ponape District, thus, is the last missing link in the needed chain of land airfields in the territory. The unusual ruggedness of Ponape Island poses special difficulties for airfield construction, but engineering surveys made last year have indicated that an airfield project is feasible. Additional engineering studies now are being conducted for the purpose of making a final site selection.

Considerable road improvement occurred during the year, some brought about completely through community-directed efforts while others were started as offshoots of major construction programs. The Marshall Islands District again demonstrated that roadbuilding on a coral atoll could be accomplished by determination, willingness to work on the part of the people, and minimum assistance from the administration. With the example of a 35-mile road built the previous year by the people of Majuro before them, the people of Arno Atoll

requested similar assistance from the administration in the form of a loan of a bulldozer and other equipment and constructed an 18½-mile road. Dedication took place a week ago, and Arno Atoll now, like its sister atoll of Majuro, has all the tiny islands of its atoll linked by a road. The Marshalls District now has some 44 miles of road that did not exist a little over a year ago.

On Yap Island, the Yapese people, through community effort, have achieved magnificent results in rehabilitating roads and bridges. This came about through assistance from the Yap airfield project. Using equipment on a loan basis whenever this could be made available, the people of Yap have rebuilt many miles of roads on their own initiative during the year. This is in addition to the road to the new airfield constructed by the administration. Bridges have been repaired, and within a very short time it will be possible to traverse the entire length of Yap Island by road.

Living as we do in a tropical climate, our physical facilities are subject to more rapid deterioration than is elsewhere normal. Our area also suffered greatly from the ravages of war. A limited budget in the past also kept our rate of new construction at a slow pace. The result was that, although a few new facilities were always being constructed, the majority of the territory's physical facilities such as roads, utilities, schools, hospitals, and public buildings were aged and often worn beyond the point of repair. To support our accelerated education effort and to provide the needed assistance to raise the territory's economic level, it is necessary that we accelerate almost every phase of our operating and maintenance activities.

For the year that is just drawing to a close, we requested and were granted \$7½ million for construction purposes. Four million dollars of this will be used in the accelerated elementary school construction program and \$3,300,000 in other construction activities. We have had well over a fivefold increase in our construction funds for this type of support activities.

For this coming fiscal year, due to start July 1, we have requested another \$6 million for accelerated construction; \$4 million to carry on

aspects of the accelerated school construction program; and an additional \$2 million to continue our construction program in such vital areas as public health, economic development, and the construction or improvement of airfields, roads, utilities, and transportation facilities. With this increase in our overall construction programs, we feel we shall be able to make a very great advance in all aspects of our work.

Education

Elementary Education

As I have already indicated, we are placing major emphasis on greatly expanded support of public elementary education in the territory. Of the present year's budget of \$15 million, over \$4 million is being used to construct some 240 classrooms and some 100 housing units for an approximate 140 American elementary school teachers. The bulk of the elementary school classroom construction and teacher housing must of necessity in most districts for the first year be in or near the district center, but our plans call for extension of the program until all public elementary schools are included. For the coming fiscal year, starting July 1, we have requested an additional \$4 million to continue the elementary school construction program. Thus, this coming year we hope to construct 248 additional new classrooms, making a grand total of 488 new elementary school classrooms. Some 128 additional teacher housing units will be erected to make a total of 228 teacher houses.

For education program operations for the coming year we have requested \$2,280,000, which is an increase of \$1,200,000 over the present level of education funding. Most of this program increase will be utilized in employment of approximately 140 elementary school teachers to staff the elementary schools which we are building in our accelerated education development program. The following year funds will be requested for an additional 100 American teachers to reach a total of 240. Within the next 2 years there will be at least one American teacher teaching in English in every public elementary school in the territory. Concurrently, a program of upgrading present Micronesian elementary teachers will be carried

out. This program will include inservice training on the job, special summer training sessions in the districts, attendance at our teacher institute in Ponape, and a vastly increased program of college training for present and prospective teachers in Guam, Hawaii, and mainland United States.

The scope and magnitude of the accelerated elementary education program is such that it is not possible in this brief exposition to convey details. For those members of the Council who may be interested in specific details as to implementation, as to degree and rate of speed of penetration into the outlying areas, I shall be pleased to furnish such details during the question period.

This tremendous increase of support of elementary school education will, of course, have great impact on all our other educational programs.

Many recommendations made by this Council over the past several years are incorporated in our accelerated education program and are either in the process of implementation or soon will be. One of these to which a great deal of attention has been given is that of the teaching of English and of using English as the medium of instruction in the elementary schools. This program already is being implemented at selected elementary schools in the various districts, and it will become a reality for all of our public elementary schools as American teachers arrive and start teaching. We intend to have as many as we can of the 140 American schoolteachers slated for the first year of operation on the job in the elementary schools with the opening of the school year this September. A crash program of classroom construction, teacher housing, and teacher recruitment currently is in full swing.

The vastness of our area, the differences inherent between the tiny low coral atolls and the sizable, mountainous, high islands, the difficulties of transportation, will mean a faster pace of development in some areas than in others. I assure the members of the Council, though, that no area will be overlooked and that the children in the remote coral atolls far from the district centers will as promptly as

possible have the same elementary school opportunities as will their cousins in the more urban district centers.

Concern was expressed at last year's meeting by some members that the entrance age of elementary school children, which we had lowered to 7 years, still was high and that the entrance age should be set at 6 years. It is intended to lower the compulsory age of entrance to 6 years as our facilities permit. To set the compulsory school age at 6 years before we have sufficient teachers or classrooms would gain little. I am confident, however, that we will be able to place the entrance age at 6 years during this coming year. Currently there are hundreds of children of 6 years of age in our public schools. I might further add that our thinking on the elementary school level is going beyond this. Under study is the feasibility of eventually establishing a preprimary year of school which would concentrate on teaching children oral English before they enter first grade.

Junior and Senior High Schools

Implementation moved steadily forward on the establishment of consolidated junior-senior high schools. In all districts, other than Yap, the 10th grade was started in September 1962 and the 11th grade will be opened this coming September. Yap will start the 10th grade this fall. This past year some of the 10th-grade Yap students enrolled in the Pacific Islands Central School in Ponape, while a number went to Palau to take the special vocational arts course in the Palau high school. By the fall of 1964 all districts should have full 4-year high schools in operation.

Replanning of junior-senior high school building needs indicated the need for additional classroom buildings and dormitories for all districts. Some of these additional high school buildings had been completed or were nearing completion at the close of the fiscal year. A new classroom building was completed at Truk, and a vocational shop building was under construction; in the Marshalls two new classroom buildings and a school administration building were added to the high school unit; a new classroom building and a vocational arts building were completed at the Palau District high school.

The Pacific Islands Central School continued in Ponape but with a somewhat changed makeup, since most of the entering freshmen, other than Yapese students, were 10th-grade students from Ponape. Within another 2 years, the main student body at PICS will be predominantly Ponapean, and the original Pacific Islands School will have become the Ponape District high school. A new post-high-school unit, however, was added during the year. This was the interdistrict teacher training institute, which combines high school and postgraduate high school work with specialized training in teacher education. The teacher training institute was established at PICS due to this high school's somewhat central location and the established facilities already there. Additionally, a boys' dormitory and classroom building were constructed on the PICS campus for the institute. The aim of the institute is to upgrade schoolteachers. Teachers who do not have a full high school degree can work toward high school accreditation as well as earn credits in the teacher training institute.

Increased emphasis was given during the year to students in the field of higher education who were studying outside the territory. Some 239 students were in high school outside the territory, with all but 13 of these being in Guam schools. Most were on sponsorship arrangements whereby a student lived with a private family. The Trust Territory administration provided a full-time student counselor to look after their welfare, set up a system of reduced fares on the territory's planes and ships, and, additionally, in January 1963 the administration agreed to provide free transportation to Guam for all bona fide sponsored students.

Some 126 students also were studying in institutions of college level on Guam or abroad during the year. Of these, 65 were on full scholarship from the administration. During the year work began on a college dormitory at the College of Guam. Although primarily for scholarship students, the dormitory will be open to other Trust Territory students as well. A major increase in scholarships for the forthcoming school year 1963-64 will come about, since the number of district scholars has been increased from three per district to five per dis-

trict starting with the college term which opens this month. Thus there will be a 60-percent increase in the number of government scholarships this coming school year.

Public Health

Two new, modern hospitals were put into operation in the Trust Territory during the past year, one in Majuro in the Marshall Islands and the other in Saipan in the Mariana Islands. These, together with the new hospital that was opened in Palau 18 months ago, provide modern hospital facilities in three of our six districts.

New hospitals in the other three districts will be constructed within the next 2 or 3 years. Planning for hospital units in Truk and Ponape is now under way, and construction of the new Truk District hospital should be initiated during the next few months. Also, site studies for a new hospital in Yap have started, although actual construction will not be undertaken for another 2 years.

Some additional facilities are required on the three new hospitals already in use. The \$900,000 hospital complex that was opened in Saipan last September received considerable damage during the recent typhoon. Repair of the buildings was started immediately after the storm under the rehabilitation program of the Office of Emergency Planning and is expected to be completed within the next month. The hospital in the Marshalls is completed except for the construction of a few minor subsidiary buildings; and a new kitchen and dining hall wing is nearing completion in the hospital in Palau.

In addition to district hospitals our public-health expansion program calls for field hospitals to be located in key spots of population concentration away from the district centers. Three such subhospitals are now in operation at Rota, Kusaie, and Ebeye in the Kwajalein Atoll. The latter facility was completely renovated and modernized during the past year. These, together with nearly 100 outlying island dispensaries and the increased personnel needs of the new district hospitals, require the training of additional medical personnel—doctors, technicians, and nurses. In fact the shortage of trained personnel, especially nurses, is af-

fecting not only our hospital needs but our plans for improved outisland health services.

Various steps are being taken to meet those growing demands. Our medical scholarship program is being increased. Presently 10 medical scholars are attending schools in the Philippines, Hawaii, and the United States working toward medical degrees. Also in process are programs for inservice and outside postgraduate training for our present medical officers. The recruiting of six doctors from the States is now under way, each to be a specialist in a different field of medicine. These will provide further and continuing inservice training in their special fields to our Micronesian doctors, one to be stationed in each of the six districts and to be rotated at intervals.

The Trust Territory continues to be faced with an acute shortage of graduate nurses. Not only do we not have enough graduate nurses, but there is a constant attrition in the ranks, for evidently the young men of the territory have found that nurses make excellent wives and mothers. We need at least 20 new graduate nurses a year for the next 5 years merely to meet the minimum expansion needs in all districts.

To meet this demand, the Trust Territory School of Nursing, presently located in Palau, will be moved next month to the island of Saipan, where temporary buildings will be occupied until permanent buildings can be constructed. Work already has started on the first of the new permanent School of Nursing buildings, which are to be an adjunct to the new Saipan hospital. The immediate move to temporary buildings will make it possible to double the present enrollment from 15 to 30, and further expansion to 50 or 60 students will be possible as soon as new buildings are finished.

In the field of dental services one of the most important events of the year was the graduation of 10 students from the School of Dental Nursing in December 1962. This was the school's first graduation. A new class of 10 students enrolled for the 2-year course in January of 1963. Preventive dental treatment was expanded not only at district centers but in all outlying areas during the year.

During March and April 1963 a public-health task force team under interdepartmental spon-

sorship visited the territory to study and observe our public-health program. This visit was the result of one of the recommendations of the President's Task Force on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The team, consisting of a U.S. public-health expert, a sanitary engineer, and a nurse consultant, was accompanied by the program officer of the Office of Territories and is now engaged in preparing a report on their findings. We are looking forward with much interest to the team's report and recommendations, since we are seeking at all times to improve the health service in the territory.

It is with regret that I must report on two events in public health that were severe blows to the Trust Territory. The first of these tragic events was an outbreak, in early January 1963, of type I virus polio at Ebeye, Kwajalein Atoll, in the Marshall Islands District. More than 200 cases of poliomyelitis, with 11 deaths, resulted in the district; 88 percent of the cases were children under the age of 7 years. Some 50 patients, nearly all below the age of 7, were left with significant residual paralysis.

An immediate mass vaccination program using Sabin oral vaccine and application of strict quarantine regulations confined the epidemic to the Marshall Islands. A mass oral vaccination program also was at once launched throughout the rest of the territory for type I polio, and in all districts the final stage of the mass inoculation program for type II and III polio currently is under way. When this is finished sometime next month, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands will be one of the very few areas in the world where a hundred percent polio vaccination coverage has been accomplished.

Again, when our need was urgent, we received prompt and generous support and assistance from the Department of the Interior, the U.S. Navy, the Transport Company of Texas in Kwajalein, the Communicable Disease Center of the U.S. Public Health Service, from other agencies, and from many generous individuals.

Equally important is the aid that has been pledged for the long-range rehabilitation program that will be needed for the afflicted chil-

dren. Special polio clinic facilities will be constructed at the new Majuro hospital, special equipment is being procured, and staff are receiving specialized training.

To help us meet the costs of long-range rehabilitation, we are receiving the unstinting support of the American Red Cross, which is providing a physical therapist, and the National Foundation, which is providing services of specialized polio treatment teams, as well as transportation funds and funds to provide braces for children who will need special care and treatment in Honolulu. The Shriners Crippled Childrens Hospital in Honolulu, for its part, has offered to provide hospitalization for those children who must be sent to Honolulu for specialized treatment. The bulk of the affected children, however, will be cared for and treated at the polio clinic we are adding to the new hospital in Majuro.

The other tragic event was the loss a month ago of our Director of Public Health, the late Dr. Harrie E. Macdonald. More than any other person, he was responsible for the solid foundation of our present public-health system. He had confidence and pride in the competence of our Micronesian doctors and in their ability to conduct public-health programs in the districts. Having brought the territory's Public Health Service to this point, he was working at the time of his death on the first phase of an expanded program of training for our Micronesian doctors.

Land and Claims Settlement

With the appointment of a Land and Claims Administrator on the headquarters staff, land matters of all types have been expedited during the past year.

The land dispute involving the entire island of Angaur in the Palau District and dating from 1908 through the administrations of the Germans and Japanese as well as ours was brought on June 8, 1962, to a successful conclusion. Some 1,980 acres of land formerly held in public domain were deeded to private owners. A similar dispute of 20 years' duration involving all of Arakabesan Island in Palau was settled in August 1962. Over 90

percent of Arakabesan Island was returned to private ownership, and private claims to the remainder of the island were released. Homesteading in Palau also was expedited, with over 1,700 acres being homesteaded, and an additional 4,000 acres were opened for homesteading on Babelthup and Koror Islands.

In the Marshalls, eminent domain cases were heard by the High Court concerning government use of land on three small islets in the Kwajalein Atoll. Judgment was entered in two cases and compensation allowed in the amount of \$40,359.46 for use rights to 71.1 acres.

As the U.S. representative has already informed you,⁶ legislation which would provide a means for judicial settlement of the land claims on Kwajalein Island and Dalap Island of Majuro Atoll presently is under consideration by the U.S. Congress. The bill, in brief, would permit the claimants to file a petition with the United States Court of Claims for just compensation. It provides also for administrative settlement by the High Commissioner if the claimants desire to seek this procedure within limits of payment which are set by funds already appropriated. The bill was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives and is scheduled for hearing by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs next week.

In Ponape District the active land release and homestead program continued at a rapid pace during the past year. Of special interest is the program whereby former holders of Japanese leases, who still occupy the land they leased under the Japanese administration, are eligible to receive quitclaim deeds for their land. Over 200 such quitclaim deeds have been issued, and many hundreds more are being processed. Hundreds of Ponapeans who have held land of this nature on tenuous leases for several decades at long last are receiving title to this land.

In the new Marianas District vast areas of land formerly held as in use by the Administering Authority are being released. Since July 1962, over 7,600 acres have been released from this category and placed in the public domain

⁶ For a statement by Sydney R. Yates, U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council, on June 5, see U.S./U.N. press release 4217.

and are available for homesteading purposes. Additional releases currently are being sought.

Status of Displaced Rongelapese

The annual Rongelap survey was conducted in March 1963 by a joint AEC[Atomic Energy Commission]-Trust Territory medical team and reported the general health of the Rongelapese to be satisfactory, with no further discernible aftermaths of the fallout found. A bill to compensate the people of Rongelap was passed by the United States House of Representatives on April 1 and is now under consideration in the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Conclusion

Acceleration of education and construction activities is under way, and we intend to press forward with programs of acceleration in public health and in political, social, and economic development fields. We have the wholehearted support of the people of the territory. With this, and the continued aid of the Administering Authority, I have confidence that our programs will move forward with ever-increasing speed on all fronts.

I am grateful to have the opportunity to present this brief report, and I will endeavor to provide, as far as I am able, any additional information members of this Council may desire.

STATEMENT BY MR. SANTOS, JUNE 5

U.S./U.N. press release 4218 dated June 6

It is an honor for me to attend this meeting of the Trusteeship Council. I consider this an unusual honor due to the fact that this is the first time I have traveled outside of the Pacific Trust Territory area. I would like to extend to the Council warm greetings from the people of the Trust Territory. At the same time I feel certain that I will gain a very profitable experience during my stay and participation at this meeting.

I am very grateful to the Government of the Trust Territory and the United States for this

opportunity to serve as an adviser to the United States delegation. For the past 10 years I have been engaged closely in teaching on the purpose and functions of the United Nations and its various organs. My students have spent many hours studying the activities of this body, and they recognize that the United Nations and this particular Council is an important instrument for helping the progress of humanity everywhere on the face of the world.

I am pleased to inform the Council that the people of the Trust Territory are very conscious of the functions of the Trusteeship Council and the activities which this Council has undertaken in the past to assist the territories to meet their needs. Our people look toward the United Nations as a great organization to bring about good relations among nations, to help bring freedom to all peoples, and to keep the peace and security for the enjoyment of all mankind. Perhaps we are more conscious of the need for peace, since our island was one of the major battlefield areas of World War II. We have seen what war does; we have had our homes destroyed and lost our loved ones. We do not want this to happen again in any place in the world.

I am from Saipan, having been born in Garapan, Saipan, in 1933. I started my schooling during Japanese administration but had only 1 year of schooling before the end of the war. After the war I entered an American school and in 1951 graduated from the Pacific Islands Teacher Training School, which was then at Truk.

I started teaching immediately after graduation, first in one of our elementary schools. In 1952 I became a teacher in the district junior high school and have been teaching in the junior high school since that time. By profession I am a social science and history teacher and have been concerned mainly with civics, a field which is very important in our new and developing political life. Currently, in addition to handling social science classes, I serve as assistant principal for the new public high school of the Marianas District.

I am a Member of the Council of Micronesia and also a Congressman in the new Marianas District Legislature. Prior to this, I had the

privilege of serving as a Congressman in the Saipan Municipal Congress, as Legislative Secretary from 1960 to 1961 and as Vice Speaker in 1962.

I am fortunate to have traveled and visited all of the district centers except that of Yap. These trips have given me firsthand information on the political movements and aspirations of each district. The trips were made under the auspices of the Council of Micronesia, which formed three subcommittees—political, economic, and social—to study conditions in the territory. I was elected to serve as a member of the political subcommittee for 1961–62. Our committee visited each district, meeting with the district congresses' officials and other important leaders.

I had the privilege to sit with the Ponape, Palau, and Marshall Congresses while they were in session. I was astonished at the performance and the ability of the men who were striving to better the living conditions of their people. It was through education that these men acquired the necessary knowledge to help them proceed and move forward toward a certain goal in which they believe men ought to live. These men, of course, are the leaders in their own communities. Many have left their homes in order to obtain the required knowledge to assist their people. We believe that education makes the dream of these men come true. It is education that makes everything possible in our modern civilization.

People in the Trust Territory feel that education is a vital necessity to procure better living. More and more young men and women all over the Trust Territory are interested in getting higher education; they are forever in search of ways to acquire higher levels of education. The Government of the Trust Territory is aware of this particular matter and has increased scholarships this year to meet the need. District congresses also are appropriating funds for additional scholarships and special training.

Parents in the Trust Territory today understand the importance of education. They have come to a point where they have to modify the old traditional beliefs that sons and daughters should always stay at home with the family.

Today many of our children are away from their parents—either attending school on Guam, PICS on Ponape, in the United States, and elsewhere. Because of this change on the part of the parents also, many Micronesians are now holding many important positions both in the district centers and at headquarters in Saipan. These positions fall in all categories—political, economic, social, education, judiciary, et cetera. This is quite evident, especially in the Public Health Department, where all the hospitals in the districts are headed by Micronesians.

It is perhaps worth mentioning the person responsible for the progressive movement which has been achieved in the field of health, for he is a man who will always be remembered in the hearts of the Micronesians. He is the late Dr. Macdonald. We owe him our respect and honor for his untiring efforts and devotion toward the improvement of health in the Trust Territory.

In the Department of Education two districts are headed by Micronesians. There are two young men working now in the Political Affairs Office at headquarters, and each district has political affairs officers. I believe the Council is aware of the gradual improvement of Micronesian employment conditions in the Trust Territory. Many important jobs are held by Micronesians today. This is possible because of advanced training and schooling offered by our Government.

One of the most significant events which took place on July 1, 1962, was the unification of the administration of the Trust Territory under civil government. I know that the Council is pleased with this result. With the new change in administration, Rota District was incorporated with Saipan District and a new district formed: the Marianas District. Immediately, the leaders in the Marianas, with the assistance of the political affairs personnel from headquarters, initiated the creation of a District Legislature. After several weeks of preparation and planning, the members of the Charter Convention adopted the District Legislature Charter for the Mariana Islands.

In March of this year the Marianas District Legislature convened its first session in the his-

tory of the Marianas. This is a manifestation of the political progress which is taking place in the Trust Territory. I was honored to be elected its first President.

An important event was the transfer of Trust Territory headquarters onto the soil of the territory. This transfer will bring the people of the territory closer together. It will bring more understanding and cooperation among the people of the Trust Territory and at the same time strengthen the feeling of political unity. This unity was manifested during the special session of the Council of Micronesia, which was held at headquarters, Saipan, this past March, when the major issue of formation of a Territorial Congress was discussed. The primary objective of the session was to decide whether the body should be a bicameral one or unicameral. After a lengthy discussion on this matter the Council finally decided, by a majority vote, to recommend for consideration the bicameral system. Personally, I favor the unicameral system. At this stage of our development, such a body would, I feel, be less complicated.

Another item worthy of mention is the interest of people in their government. This is manifested through the many elections held in the past. More and more people are participating during the elections. It used to be that a candidate needed only a handful of voters to be elected; very few people were interested in the affairs of their government. But today, at least in my district, a candidate must work day and night for his election. People are aware of the importance of good government, and they judge a candidate's ability and performance accordingly.

In the Marianas, where we have political parties, especially on the island of Saipan, people are very conscious of their government. The political leaders who hold seats in the Municipal Congress and the District Legislature must accomplish results or else they will not be re-elected at the next election. Personally, I would like to see other districts adopt political parties. I know that political parties are new in our territory, but they are not new in the world. Political parties, I feel, help insure that qualified candidates run for office and provide better public officials.

Social conditions in the Trust Territory are progressing rapidly. People are gaining better understanding and appreciation of the 20th-century civilization, and health conditions are improving under the supervision of public-health personnel. Trust Territory students are studying for medical degrees. Nurses are also playing a very important part in the improvement of health. Without their assistance, the doctors would find it difficult to accomplish their tasks. A few months ago a polio protection program for the whole Trust Territory was initiated.

Perhaps this is an appropriate time to mention the typhoon which hit the Marianas. Typhoon Olive, with winds of 115 miles and gusts up to 123 knots, smashed into Saipan on April 30 of this year. Saipan was severely damaged. Among the major damages was the destruction of part of the new district hospital. The supply warehouses and public works buildings suffered great damages. Power lines were down. About 95 percent of all houses on Saipan had suffered some damage, with about 30 percent total destruction of local buildings. Three villages suffered damages, the worst being Tanapag, then Chalan Kanoa and San Roque. No lives were lost, however, and only one minor injury resulted during the typhoon.

The people are very grateful for the generous assistance from different groups and organizations. The U.S. Navy in Guam provided transportation for inspection teams, shipment of medical supplies, and naval hospital personnel to help in administering typhoid inoculations. The American Red Cross and other agencies gave immediate assistance. As a resident of Saipan, and on behalf of my people, I wish to extend to all the people, groups, agencies, and organizations who have extended their assistance to us in one way or another our appreciation, which also goes to the Government of the Trust Territory for its quick and generous assistance during the time of disaster.

In the field of economic development, the territory is progressing also. Many business enterprises, both large and small, are helping to boost the economy of the territory. At the same time, the Government is providing experts in the field of economics, both in the districts and at headquarters level.

We are trying our best to share in the development of these problems of our islands. We look toward the Council for advice and guidance.

Before I withdraw, I wish to extend my appreciation for this opportunity to appear in the presence of this Council. And, lastly, for this great organization, the United Nations, I pray that the many hours of meetings and debates will bring success in the maintenance of happiness, peace, and security for all mankind.

CLOSING STATEMENT BY MR. GODING, JUNE 17

U.S./U.N. press release 4223

May I first express my appreciation and that of my colleague, Mr. Santos, for the many courtesies shown to us by members of the Council during this meeting. Mr. Santos, who cannot be with us today, will take back to Micronesia a deeper understanding of the role of this body and a new appreciation of the interest and concern of the Council in the affairs of our islands.

For my part, this year's review has been a most stimulating one. As High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, I am deluged, if I may use this term, during the year with the minutia of our many-sided activities. I find it refreshing and rewarding to have the opportunity to receive the analytic comments and views of the members of the Council, many of whom have devoted years to working on problems of administration not dissimilar in broad outline to those we face in the Pacific Trust Territory. Seen through your eyes, certain of our problems take on new aspects, new dimensions, and different meaning. I can assure you that my staff and I give careful and serious consideration to the recommendations that emanate from this body.

I am particularly appreciative of the many encouraging comments made during the closing statements on the progress achieved during the past year and on our new accelerated program of development. I say "appreciative," not in a personal sense, but in terms of my staff, Micronesian and American, who have worked together as a team under trying conditions to

out this accelerated program into action. The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom commented on how the "bounding energy of the New Frontier" had been applied to the Pacific area. I might add that we have met an equal response on the part of our Micronesian people. If our programs succeed, it is in large measure due to the cooperation, the patience, the willingness, and the energy of the Micronesians themselves.

The distinguished representative of Australia has noted that in our political development program we have been guided by the concept that political advancement should be an evolutionary process which evolves through the will, the needs, and desires of the people of the territory. That this is the pattern desired by our people is shown over and over in the debates of the district legislatures, in the deliberations of the Council of Micronesia, and in the discussions of local municipal councils. One of our younger and highly respected political leaders expressed this concept with the words: "We must learn to walk before we can run."

I have participated for the past 2 years in the Council of Micronesia deliberations and have had the privilege of sitting as an observer at several of our district congress sessions. I have been deeply impressed by the political growth that has taken place, at the maturity of judgment that is being demonstrated by elected officials, and by the willingness of our Micronesian leaders not only to accept the privileges but also to assume the responsibilities of democratic self-government. I cannot at this point predict exactly when in the near future the present Council of Micronesia will become a functioning territorial legislative organ. I can assure the Council though that a sound and representative legislative body is in the making and that I regard it as a great honor and privilege to participate in its formation.

At a previous session the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom commented that in any area the touchstone of political advance must be the will of the people. Here in the Pacific Trust Territory I feel that there is a legislative body which is evolving through the will of the people and at the pace desired by them. There is no question that political ad-

vancement on a territorial level is entering the final stage; we have learned to walk, and soon we will be running. Thus, at the risk of repetition, I repeat again that I have every confidence that well before 1965 a truly representative territorial legislative body will be operating in our territory.

It was pointed out by the distinguished representative of New Zealand that the shape of the new legislature has been discussed and defined at some length by the Council of Micronesia. The Council's recommendations are now under study. We have been able to obtain the complete text of the Council of Micronesia recommendation on the framework of a proposed territorial legislature, and this has been distributed to all members of the [Trusteeship] Council. The other resolutions and recommendations of the October 1962 and of the March 1963 sessions of the Council of Micronesia will be made available to the 1964 visiting mission. These recommendations also will be treated in detail in our next annual report, which will be examined at next spring's session of the Trusteeship Council. The distinguished representative of New Zealand is correct when he noted that the steps that remain are largely technical ones.

Local Participation in Government

The past year witnessed major strides of the Council of Micronesia toward its eventual destiny and has also seen other major political advances. The adoption of a Trust Territory flag as a political symbol has done much to strengthen the unity of the people of our several districts. For the first time in the long history of the islands, the people have a flag which is theirs—a flag designed by one of them and chosen by their elected representatives. This may seem a relatively small thing, but it is nonetheless of tremendous significance in welding a widely separated group of island people together and creating a sense of "national unity."

The deliberations of the Council of Micronesia during its two sessions this past year reveal a significant trend from political parochialism of a district level to a broader "national" feeling. Whereas in earlier meetings

specific district problems tended to dominate the sessions, the sessions of the past year stressed common problems and joint ways of solving them. One district congress president in writing to his counterpart in another district stated this feeling of "oneness" in these words: "Divided we cannot proceed, united we cannot fail." There is no question that a "Micronesian self," in the terms described by the distinguished representative of New Zealand, is emerging in the territory.

Through charter change and technical assistance we have strengthened district legislatures to enable them to function more efficiently in a more representative and democratic fashion and to take over larger lawmaking responsibilities at the district level. Technical assistance also has been given to local governments and local officials. At all levels election supervision has been provided, and our political affairs section has given advice and aid in the formation of political parties.

I would like to assure the distinguished representative of China that we are giving careful attention to political development on the municipal level. Our program of chartering is progressing satisfactorily, and, through our expanded political affairs staff at both the district and headquarters level, we are now able to provide training sessions for local officials. The formal chartering of a local municipality is important, but equally important is the need for trained local officials who understand how to conduct the functions of municipal government within the framework of its charter. The people themselves must not only be willing to accept the privileges of self-government, but they must be prepared to shoulder the responsibilities that go along with these privileges.

I am most appreciative of the penetrating comments made by the distinguished representative of New Zealand in his closing remarks. He rightly pointed out that though a territorial legislature must be the focus of political consciousness, the "Micronization" of the executive side is no less important. He noted that preparation of schedules for replacement of expatriates is one way of achieving the goals of a replacement program. This in essence is what we are doing. A manpower review committee was established this past year to screen all new

hires as well as renewal of contracts of all present non-Micronesian employees to insure that Micronesians are being placed in posts for which they qualify.

I can assure the distinguished representative of Liberia that with the unification of all the territory under civilian control on July 1, 1962, most of the disparities noted by the 1961 visiting mission as between the former District of Saipan and the rest of the territory have been removed. With the second increment of our wage-scale adjustment scheduled for next month, wages for administration employees will be uniform throughout the territory. Our accelerated elementary education program will provide equal elementary schools and equally qualified teachers in all districts. The former Saipan Copra Stabilization Fund has been merged with the larger Trust Territory Copra Stabilization Fund.

Economic Potential of the Territory

A very important as well as provocative question was posed by the distinguished representative of Australia when he asked what is the proper point of balance between social development, economic development, and political development in an area such as ours. That political advancement is not necessarily dependent upon economic self-sufficiency has been dramatically illustrated over and over by the birth of new nations during the past 10 years. Nonetheless, neither political advancement nor social development will mean much if the economic growth lags too far behind. The distinguished representative of Australia has also noted that our territory, in common with other island areas of the Pacific, possesses certain unique characteristics—the small land area, the tremendous ocean distances that must be traversed, and the relatively small populations which provide only limited sources of manpower. Often it is hard to see, given these limiting factors, how economic self-sufficiency can ever be attained in an island area such as ours. Perhaps the islands of the Pacific Trust Territory may never reach self-sufficiency, but as the distinguished representative of New Zealand commented, who can say what possibilities exist until all have been explored?

That our great economic potential lies in the sea is unquestionable. Here lies the hidden wealth of Micronesia; here lies the great hope of its future. Farming the sea must be achieved if the islands of the Pacific are to achieve a sound economic base. The opening of the area to commercial fishing concerns is only the beginning step in the development of an intensive local fishing industry which in time should provide livelihood for thousands of our people. I assure the distinguished representative of Liberia and the distinguished delegate from China that we fully share the feeling that this major resource must be protected for the Micronesians. This is a paramount feature in all our considerations, and, I might add, this aspect is fully accepted by every American industry which has demonstrated interest in our area. Provisions for training of Micronesians, for them to hold stock, and provisions for eventual purchase of equipment and plants by local investors are an essential feature of any negotiations we undertake.

The taming of the sea in other respects will be equally important to our islands. Paramount here are the worldwide experiments of desalination of sea water. Many areas of the world will have vast new horizons open to them once this barrier has been breached and low-cost and simple methods of desalination have been achieved. To us it will mean that hundreds of tiny islands now not habitable can be put to use. It will mean vastly increased production of all types of crops in our world of island tolls.

Another area in which we have keen interest is that of the use of solar energy. We are investigating all possibilities of how solar energy experiments can be put to use in our region. Pilot projects using simple solar devices for cooking purposes, for small-scale refrigeration units, and for solar batteries for power uses are under consideration for certain of our islands.

Agricultural Diversification

Hope has been expressed here that more effort will be made to diversify our present agricultural export crops, i.e. copra and cacao, in order that the local agricultural

economy will not be completely dependent upon the fluctuating world market of these two products. Through experimental pilot projects and through subsidy programs we are encouraging the development of other crops which have commercial value. The production of ramie fiber, coir fiber and its byproducts, limited lumber production, papain, tapioca starch export, export of bananas, and many other items, all have real economic potential. While I do not envisage any of these becoming a major source of income, combined with a major cash crop such as copra or cacao they can provide an important secondary source of income. Thus I hasten to assure the distinguished representative of France that we are in agreement with his viewpoint that we must strive for economic diversification.

Many other aspects in the economic field are receiving careful attention. Serious attention, for example, is being given to the possibility of ricegrowing in our area. Three of our districts, Ponape, Palau, and the Marianas, have good potential for ricegrowing, and next month we are starting a pilot project to demonstrate that ricegrowing, both by the wet as well as dry method, is economically feasible for these three districts. While we cannot look forward to completely supplying all of our local rice demands, I feel confident that in time we can greatly cut down rice imports, which now average close to a half million dollars a year.

The potential of meat producing is great. Our high islands should be able to supply almost all of our fresh meat requirements. Saipan, Rota, and Tinian Islands of the Marianas District, Ponape Island, and Kusaie Island have the most potential for development of a livestock industry, and already many thousand head of cattle are found in these islands. With faster and better means of transportation, adequate freezing and storage facilities, a local meat industry meeting our own consumption, as well as exporting considerable quantities of beef to Guam, should become an important segment of the economic life of the above three districts.

Potentials exist for many small-scale industries which could provide products and commodities now imported from outside. Much of

our clothing could be manufactured locally ; our soap production could be vastly increased.

I am indebted to the distinguished representative of Liberia for her very helpful comments on economic development and am particularly grateful that she pointed out that we had made no mention of Micronesian participation in economic planning. This was an omission on my part, since we do have considerable Micronesian participation in present economic planning. It is my strong conviction that the territory's economic development will not be meaningful unless Micronesians participate to the fullest extent on all levels of economic activity and planning. Each district now has active economic development boards. The Subcommittee on Economic Development of the Council of Micronesia plays an important role in assessing economic needs, and its recommendations have been carefully considered by us.

The assistant economic development officer in the headquarters economic section is a Micronesian. Two Micronesians serve on the Copra Stabilization Board, and this coming year several Micronesian members will be appointed to the board of directors which will be formed to control the economic development fund. Thus I can assure the Council that Micronesians are closely associated with economic planning in the territory. We look forward to the recommendations which will be forthcoming after the new economic, social, and political survey is completed. From the recommendations of this group, plus our present economic plans, I feel we will be able to draw up, as suggested by the distinguished representative of New Zealand, a long-range, comprehensive economic development guide for the territory.

Programs in Educational and Social Fields

The representative of UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] drew attention to one of the major problems in the field of elementary education—that of the inability of many of the municipalities to bear the local costs of education. We are devoting major attention to this aspect in our accelerated education program, and I have already described our proposals in

detail in my opening statement as well as during the questioning period. However, I would like to add that in addition to building new schools, the recruitment of American teachers, the training of Micronesian teachers, there are several other equally important aspects to which we are devoting attention. The first of these is a program of equipping elementary schools with suitable school furniture and teaching aids and the furnishing of free books and supplies for all public school students. Formerly only minimum aid was extended in this field, and here a major change is being made. This coming year, for example, the expenditure for elementary school equipment and supplies will run into several hundred thousand dollars.

In cooperation with the district legislatures we have instituted a system of subsidizing elementary school teachers salaries. While the basic salary is still being paid out of district revenues, the central government now provides a considerable subsidy which is added to the salary of all elementary school teachers who meet minimum certification standards. Further, during this coming year it is our intention to review present elementary school teacher salary levels and to bring them in line with salaries which are paid in our Micronesian Title and Pay Plan. Since the district legislatures desire to continue their support of elementary schools, the raising of teachers salaries at all levels will mean an increased subsidy on the part of the central government.

I am also pleased to assure the distinguished representative of Liberia that we are providing additional opportunities for study in the metropolitan country. This year, for example, some 10 to 12 additional students will be going to the University of Hawaii; others will be going to universities in the mainland United States, while others will be attending the College of Guam.

The College of Guam, a month or so ago, received accreditation as a 4-year college, and greatly expanded programs in all academic fields are now under way. The College of Guam has many potentials for our use. It is strategically located with respect to the Western Carolines, the Marianas, and the Eastern Carolines region. It has an imposing campus and a physi-

cal plant whose eventual cost will run into several million dollars. Its staff is well qualified, and many are specialists on the Pacific area. The College of Guam can well become a center for Pacific studies. It has the added attraction of being close enough to all our districts to enable our students to return home at regular intervals to visit their families. This is an aspect which means a great deal to our students, particularly those who are married. Thus, although in general I would agree with the distinguished delegate from Liberia on the value of an institution of higher education within the territory, it is my feeling that it would be somewhat premature and uneconomical for us to attempt to build a college when we have such ready access to the College of Guam.

This does not mean, however, that we will not continue to expand higher education facilities in certain selected fields of study within the territory. I have already indicated our expansion plans for our nursing school, as well as our teacher training institute. These will be further expanded. Similarly, our School of Dental Nursing will be strengthened, as will our farm institute, which provides extension training on a post-high-school level for local agricultural agents.

There appears to be some misunderstanding with respect to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands' not using the United Nations scholarship programs. Over the past 10 years there has been an average of two United Nations fellowships received annually by Trust Territory citizens. These have covered a variety of fields ranging from study of radio broadcasting in New Zealand and Western Samoa to public-health activities in Japan and the Philippines, to community development study in the Philippines, Burma, and Jamaica, and social development grants in Hawaii and elsewhere.

Most of the Council members have remarked favorably on our greatly increased appropriations, particularly in the field of elementary education. I am indebted though to the distinguished representative of New Zealand for pointing out that provision of additional money does not remove all the stumbling blocks. He has rightly noted that all educational progress

in a sense consists in the replacement of one set of problems for another. This, indeed, Mr. President, can be said to be an aspect of all progress and growth—problems are never completely solved, for new and different ones constantly arise.

What we are attempting in all our education programs is to equip our Micronesian young people to better solve the problems which inevitably will face them in their changing world. It is our contention that the most immediate problem lies in expanding and improving education at the elementary school level. This belief has brought about the launching of a vast, accelerated program in this field.

Our next stage will be acceleration in secondary school education and in the vital field of adult education. Here also is a great challenge to be met, for, unless we can bring the older generation within the orbit of the changing world, our accelerated education program on the elementary and secondary level could serve to create a gulf between the young and old. There is great eagerness among our adult population for education—education for their children and education for themselves. For our part we intend to provide facilities to meet the educational needs and desires of this vital portion of our population.

We share the concern expressed by the distinguished representative of Liberia on the needs of the tuberculosis control program. We are endeavoring to strengthen the program of tuberculosis control in all districts. BCG vaccination continues, new and more potent drugs are constantly being introduced, and we are stressing preventive aspects as well as treatment of this disease. TB control teams have been established in each district and will be greatly strengthened under our accelerated public-health program. The special assistant to the Director of Public Health devoted full time this past year to organizing tuberculosis control work in the Marshalls District. Our expanded medical program calls for a tuberculosis specialist to be added to our staff. We are determined that this dreaded scourge will be brought under control in the Pacific Islands. Funds for public-health activities for the year we are about to enter on July 1, that is fiscal

year 1964, have been appreciably increased over funds of the past year. For the next fiscal year, an even greater acceleration is planned and expansion of all aspects of our public-health program will be carried out.

Problems Connected With the Outer Islands

We still have unique problems connected with the provision of education, health services, social services for the inhabitants of those small islands we have come to term the "outer islands." I would be among the first to admit that these problems have not been adequately met in the past, mainly because of insufficient transportation services. These outlying islands with their small populations, however, represent only a small fraction of our total land area and only a small minority of our population. We must, of course, meet the demands of the outislanders and fully intend to do so, but there is a point at which economic practicability must enter into the picture. The distinguished representative of China touched on this point when he suggested that it might be worth while for the administration to consider ways and means of encouraging small isolated groups to move to more populated areas and join larger communities. In certain of our small islands, the total population consists of only 10 to 30 individuals, and the islands on which they live often are a hundred miles or more from the district center or other populated areas. In the main, these islands have little to offer economically, and the young adults increasingly move to the district center or other populated regions. Thus we are left with small, isolated groups made up of elderly people and young children. There is no question but that eventual amalgamation of tiny groups of this nature will come about.

The question as to how to achieve a proper balance between the programs at headquarters, the district centers, and the outlying areas is one to which we have given a great deal of thought. I agree with the distinguished representative of China that more attention needs to be given to decentralization, not only to insure that our programs reach into the isolated out-island areas but also into the hinterland region surrounding the district center area in which the great bulk of our population reside. Much

of the problem of attracting and keeping our educated young people in the village level will disappear as we open these hinterlands to the conveniences of modern life possible under local resources. It is not enough simply to station a well-trained teacher, a doctor, a nurse, or an agriculturist in an outlying area. They must be able to put into practice what they have learned, and they, as well as the people of the outlying region, should be able to participate in improved standards of living.

It is this goal that we are striving for in our accelerated education program by providing the means whereby an elementary school far from the district center will have equal facilities and as well trained teachers as do the schools in the urban centers. Our public-health program calls for expansion of hospital service to the population centers outside the district centers through the building of field hospitals. The building of roads, the extension of public utilities insofar as this is feasible, into the hinterland area must be an important phase of any program of development. These items have high priority in our present program, and even greater emphasis will be placed on them in our expanding program, which calls for acceleration in all fields of endeavor.

I am pleased to be able to report at this time that the typhoon rehabilitation program for the Mariana Islands is progressing most satisfactorily. On June 11 President Kennedy allocated \$1,300,000 for the special rehabilitation program I described in detail in my opening statement, and this will enable us to move forward rapidly in the reconstruction of damaged facilities in Saipan, Rota, and Tinian. The Administering Authority shares the hope expressed by members of the Council that a speedy solution to the longstanding problem of the Kwajalein land claims, as well as compensation for the people of Rongelap, will soon come about. My administration earnestly hopes that these two areas of doubt and uncertainty can be cleared up well before this Council convenes next spring.

It has been our practice, Mr. President, each year to circulate immediately upon the return of the Special Representative to the territory the summary records of the Trusteeship Coun-

cil, in order that the people of the territory may read for themselves the complete transcripts of the meetings here. Not only are these summary records distributed in considerable quantity, but our local radio stations use them in special broadcast programs. I can assure the Council that the deliberations of this body are followed with keen interest by the people of the Trust Territory. Before the 1st of July records of this meeting will be distributed throughout our territory.

In closing, Mr. President, may I express again my appreciation for the many helpful comments brought forth at this meeting and thank you and the members of the Council for the interest expressed in the affairs of the Trust Territory.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Economic and Social Council

Fifteenth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Note by the Secretary-General transmitting to the Council an extract from the report of the 19th session of the Commission on Human Rights. E/3737. April 1, 1963. 19 pp.
Report of the *ad hoc* committee established under Council resolution 851 (XXXII) on coordination of technical assistance activities. E/3750. April 18, 1963. 24 pp.
Economic and social consequences of disarmament. E/3736, May 13, 1963, 12 pp.; Add. 1, May 10, 1963, 21 pp.; Add. 2, May 13, 1963, 12 pp.; Add. 3, May 13, 1963, 14 pp.
Technical assistance activities of the United Nations. E/3757. May 13, 1963. 77 pp.
Provisional agenda for the 36th session of ECOSOC. E/3755. May 14, 1963. 17 pp.
World campaign for universal literacy. E/3771. May 15, 1963. 84 pp.
U.N. conference on the application of science and technology for the benefit of the less developed areas. E/3772, May 21, 1963, 91 pp.; Corr. 1, June 10, 1963, 1 p.; and Add. 1, June 3, 1963, 173 pp.
General review of the development, coordination, and concentration of the economic, social, and human rights programs and activities of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency as a whole: report of the Special Committee on Coordination. E/3778. May 27, 1963. 13 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Signed at New York September 28, 1962. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1963.
Notification received of undertaking to seek ratification: Nicaragua, June 26, 1963.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.
Signature: Upper Volta, May 2, 1963.
Acceptance deposited: Upper Volta, May 13, 1963.

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Dated at Montreal October 9, 1946; entered into force April 20, 1948. TIAS 1868.
Admission to membership: Algeria, October 19, 1962; Burundi, March 12, 1963; Jamaica, December 28, 1962; Rwanda, September 18, 1962; Trinidad and Tobago, May 27, 1963; Uganda, March 28, 1963.

Law of the Sea

Convention on fishing and conservation of living resources of the high seas;¹
Convention on the continental shelf;¹
Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.
Ratification deposited: Australia, May 14, 1963.
Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.¹
Ratification deposited: Australia (with reservations), May 14, 1963.
Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 5200.
Ratification deposited: Australia (with reservations), May 14, 1963.
Optional protocol of signature concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962.²
Signature: Australia, May 14, 1963.

Maritime Matters

Inter-American convention on facilitation of international waterborne transportation (Convention of Mar del Plata). Signed at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963. Enters into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the 11th ratification or adherence.
Signatures: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile (with reservation), Colombia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Peru, United States, and Uruguay, June 7, 1963.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Application to: Guam, Puerto Rico, Samoa, and Virgin Islands, July 7, 1963.

Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes and schedules, and protocol of provisional application. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700.

Admitted as contracting party (with rights and obligations dating from independence): Chad, July 4, 1963.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

Acceptances deposited: Argentina, July 16, 1963; Dominican Republic, July 12, 1963.

Accession deposited: El Salvador, July 17, 1963.

BILATERAL

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of June 30, 1958 (TIAS 4067), relating to the use of the Veterans Memorial Hospital and granting aid for medical care and treatment of veterans. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila June 28, 1963. Entered into force June 28, 1963.

Portugal

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 28, 1961 (TIAS 4904). Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon June 5 and 26, 1963. Entered into force June 26, 1963.

Sweden

Agreement amending the agreement of November 20, 1952, as amended (TIAS 2653, 4359), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Stockholm June 28, 1963. Entered into force June 28, 1963.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Howard H. Haugerud as Deputy Inspector General for Foreign Assistance, effective July 14. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 381 dated July 22.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Chile. Signed at Santiago August 7, 1962. Entered into force August 7, 1962. With exchanges of notes—Dated at Santiago August 7 and October 3 and 4, 1962. And amending agreement effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago August 29 and September 10, 1962. Entered into force September 10, 1962. TIAS 5195. 18 pp. 10¢.

Economic, Technical and Related Assistance. Agreement with Paraguay. Signed at Asunción September 26, 1961. Entered into force September 26, 1961. TIAS 5196. 7 pp. 10¢.

Defense—Furnishing of Articles and Services. Agreement with Bolivia. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz April 26, 1962. Entered into force April 26, 1962. TIAS 5197. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Burma. Signed at Rangoon November 9, 1962. Entered into force November 9, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5198. 8 pp. 10¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Chile. Exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago October 3 and 4, 1962. Entered into force October 4, 1962. TIAS 5199. 5 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps Program in North Borneo. Agreement with United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at London October 25, 1962. Entered into force October 25, 1962. TIAS 5201. 5 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps Program in Sarawak. Agreement with United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at London October 25, 1962. Entered into force October 25, 1962. TIAS 5202. 5 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Military Assistance to India. Agreement with India, supplementing the agreement of March 7 and 16, 1951, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington November 14, 1962. Entered into force November 14, 1962. TIAS 5206. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Korea. Signed at Seoul November 7, 1962. Entered into force November 7, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5208. 8 pp. 10¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Colombia. Exchange of letters—Signed at Bogotá October 5, 1962. Entered into force October 5, 1962. TIAS 5210. 3 pp. 5¢.

Experimental Communications Satellites—Intercontinental Testing. Agreement with Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo November 6, 1962. Entered into force November 6, 1962. TIAS 5212. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India. Signed at New Delhi November 26, 1962. Entered into force November 26, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5225. 9 pp. 10¢.

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No.	Date	Subject
*372	7/15	U.S. participation in international conferences.
373	7/15	Publication of <i>Digest of International Law</i> (rewrite).
*374	7/15	Guest list for dinner for President Nyerere of Tanganyika.
375	7/18	Agreement with Mexico on the Chamizal.
†376	7/16	Rusk: Department's appropriation for 1964.
*377	7/17	Visit of Dominican Republic parliamentary delegation.
*378	7/18	Visit of Afghanistan parliamentary delegation.
†390	7/18	Fredericks: "Our Policy Toward Africa."

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Digest of International Law Volume I

The Department of State has released the first volume of a new *Digest of International Law*, by Dr. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser. The *Digest* is a successor to the Hackworth *Digest*, published in 1940.

The new *Digest* is in the nature of a reference book, containing materials, official and unofficial, intended to inform the user as to the status of developments regarding particular aspects of international law.

Chapter I of volume I treats of theories of international law, its subjects and sources, its relationship to local law, and efforts toward its codification.

Chapter II deals with the legal status of present-day states, territories, and governments and their classification. Included are listings and groupings of states and governments, with information as to origin, changes, official names, etc. Recent evolutions in the structure of the British Commonwealth and of the French Community are among the topics discussed.

Volume I of the *Digest of International Law* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for \$4.25.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1259



August 12, 1963

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The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Step Toward Peace

Following is an address to the Nation by President Kennedy on July 26 concerning the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water which was initialed by representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at Moscow on July 25, together with texts of an agreed communique and the treaty, which were released simultaneously at Washington (White House press release), London, and Moscow on July 25.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY ¹

Good evening, my fellow citizens: I speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope. Eighteen years ago the advent of nuclear weapons changed the course of the world as well as the war. Since that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth. In an age when both sides have come to possess enough nuclear power to destroy the human race several times over, the world of communism and the world of free choice have been caught up in a vicious circle

¹ Delivered from the White House by television and radio on July 26 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

of conflicting ideology and interest. Each increase of tension has produced an increase of arms; each increase of arms has produced an increase of tension.

In these years the United States and the Soviet Union have frequently communicated suspicion and warnings to each other, but very rarely hope. Our representatives have met at the summit and at the brink; they have met in Washington and in Moscow, in Geneva and at the United Nations. But too often these meetings have produced only darkness, discord, or disillusion.

Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the at-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1259 PUBLICATION 7584 AUGUST 12, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

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osphere, in outer space, and under water. For the first time, an agreement has been reached bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control—a goal first sought in 1946, when Bernard Baruch presented a comprehensive control plan to the United Nations. That plan and many subsequent disarmament plans, large and small, have all been blocked by those opposed to international inspection. A ban on nuclear tests, however, requires on-the-spot inspection only for underground tests. This nation now possesses a variety of techniques to detect the nuclear tests of other nations which are conducted in the air or under water. Such tests produce unmistakable signs which our modern instruments can pick up.

Limitations of Treaty

The treaty initialed yesterday, therefore, is a limited treaty which permits continued underground testing and prohibits only those tests that we ourselves can police. It requires no control posts, no on-site inspection, no international aid.

We should also understand that it has other limits as well. Any nation which signs the treaty will have an opportunity to withdraw if it finds that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests; and no nation's right of self-defense will in any way be impaired. Nor does this treaty mean an end to the threat of nuclear war. It will not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it will not halt the production of nuclear weapons; it will not restrict their use in time of war.

Nevertheless, this limited treaty will radically reduce the nuclear testing which would otherwise be conducted on both sides; it will prohibit the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and all others who sign it from engaging in the atmospheric tests which have so alarmed mankind; and it offers to all the world a welcome sign of hope.

For this is not a unilateral moratorium, but a specific and solemn legal obligation. While it will not prevent this nation from testing underground, or from being ready to conduct atmospheric tests if the acts of others so require,

it gives us a concrete opportunity to extend its coverage to other nations and later to other forms of nuclear tests.

This treaty is in part the product of Western patience and vigilance. We have made clear—most recently in Berlin and Cuba—our deep resolve to protect our security and our freedom against any form of aggression. We have also made clear our steadfast determination to limit the arms race. In three administrations our soldiers and diplomats have worked together to this end, always supported by Great Britain. Prime Minister Macmillan joined with President Eisenhower in proposing a limited test ban in 1959, and again with me in 1961 and 1962.

But the achievement of this goal is not a victory for one side—it is a victory for mankind. It reflects no concessions either to or by the Soviet Union. It reflects simply our common recognition of the dangers in further testing.

This treaty is not the millennium. It will not resolve all conflicts, or cause the Communists to forgo their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance to others. But it is an important first step—a step toward peace—a step toward reason—a step away from war.

Here is what this step can mean to you and to your children and your neighbors.

An Opportunity To Reduce World Tension

First, this treaty can be a step toward reduced world tension and broader areas of agreement. The Moscow talks have reached no agreement on any other subject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter. Under Secretary Harri-man made it clear that any nonaggression arrangements across the division in Europe would require full consultation with our allies and full attention to their interests. He also made clear our strong preference for a more comprehensive treaty banning all tests everywhere and our ultimate hope for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government, however, is still unwilling to accept the inspection such goals require.

No one can predict with certainty, therefore, what further agreements, if any, can be built

on the foundations of this one. They could include controls on preparations for surprise attack, or on numbers and type of armaments. There could be further limitations on the spread of nuclear weapons. The important point is that efforts to seek new agreements will go forward.

But the difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason to be reluctant about this step. Nuclear test ban negotiations have long been a symbol of East-West disagreement. If this treaty can also be a symbol—if it can symbolize the end of one era and the beginning of another—if both sides can by this treaty gain confidence and experience in peaceful collaboration—then this short and simple treaty may well become an historic mark in man's age-old pursuit of peace.

Western policies have long been designed to persuade the Soviet Union to renounce aggression, direct or indirect, so that their people and all people may live and let live in peace. The unlimited testing of new weapons of war cannot lead toward that end, but this treaty, if it can be followed by further progress, can clearly move in that direction.

I do not say that a world without aggression or threats of war would be an easy world. It will bring new problems, new challenges from the Communists, new dangers of relaxing our vigilance or of mistaking their intent.

But those dangers pale in comparison to those of the spiraling arms race and a collision course toward war. Since the beginning of history, war has been mankind's constant companion. It has been the rule, not the exception. Even a nation as young and as peace-loving as our own has fought through eight wars. And three times in the last two years and a half I have been required to report to you as President that this nation and the Soviet Union stood on the verge of direct military confrontation—in Laos, in Berlin, and in Cuba.

A war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be like any war in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, as well as untold

numbers elsewhere. And the survivors—a Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communists Chinese, "The survivors would envy the dead. For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors. So let us try to turn the world from war. Let us make the most of this opportunity, and every opportunity, to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous nuclear arms race, and to check the world's slide toward final annihilation.

Freeing World From Fear of Radioactive Fallout

Second, this treaty can be a step toward freeing the world from the fears and dangers of radioactive fallout. Our own atmospheric tests last year were conducted under conditions which restricted such fallout to an absolute minimum. But over the years the number and the yield of weapons tested have rapidly increased and so have the radioactive hazards from such testing. Continued unrestricted testing by the nuclear powers, joined in time by other nations which may be less adept in limiting pollution, will increasingly contaminate the air that all of us must breathe.

Even then, the number of children and grandchildren with cancer in their bones, with leukemia in their blood, or with poison in their lungs might seem statistically small to some, in comparison with natural health hazards. But this is not a natural health hazard, and it is not a statistical issue. The loss of even one human life or the malformation of even one baby—who may be born long after we are gone—should be of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren are not merely statistics toward which we can be indifferent.

Nor does this affect the nuclear powers alone. These tests befoul the air of all men and all nations, the committed and the uncommitted alike, without their knowledge and without their consent. That is why the continuation of atmospheric testing causes so many countries to regard all nuclear powers as equally evil; and we can hope that its prevention will enable those countries to see the world more clearly, while enabling all the world to breathe more easily.

Preventing Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Third, this treaty can be a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them. During the next several years, in addition to the four current nuclear powers, a small but significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical, and financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. In time, it is estimated, many other nations will have either this capacity or other ways of obtaining nuclear warheads, even as missiles can be commercially purchased today.

I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries, large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.

If only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped on any American, Russian, or any other city, whether it was launched by accident or design, by a madman or by an enemy, by a large nation or by a small, from any corner of the world, that one bomb could release more destructive power on the inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the bombs dropped in the Second World War.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union nor the United Kingdom nor France can look forward to that day with equanimity. We have a great obligation—all four nuclear powers have a great obligation—to use whatever time remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to persuade other countries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess, or produce such weapons.

This treaty can be the opening wedge in that campaign. It provides that none of the parties will assist other nations to test in the forbidden environments. It opens the door for further agreements on the control of nuclear weapons, and it is open for all nations to sign; for it is in the interest of all nations, and already we

have heard from a number of countries who wish to join with us promptly.

Strengthening Our Nation's Security

Fourth and finally, this treaty can limit the nuclear arms race in ways which, on balance, will strengthen our nation's security far more than the continuation of unrestricted testing. For, in today's world, a nation's security does not always increase as its arms increase when its adversary is doing the same, and unlimited competition in the testing and development of new types of destructive nuclear weapons will not make the world safer for either side. Under this limited treaty, on the other hand, the testing of other nations could never be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's homeland.

We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, the nuclear strength that we need. It is true that the Soviets have tested nuclear weapons of a yield higher than that which we thought to be necessary, but the hundred-megaton bomb of which they spoke 2 years ago does not and will not change the balance of strategic power. The United States has chosen, deliberately, to concentrate on more mobile and more efficient weapons, with lower but entirely sufficient yield, and our security is, therefore, not impaired by the treaty I am discussing.

Risk of Secret Violations Not Overlooked

It is also true, as Mr. Khrushchev would agree, that nations cannot afford in these matters to rely simply on the good faith of their adversaries. We have not, therefore, overlooked the risk of secret violations. There is at present a possibility that deep in outer space, hundreds and thousands and millions of miles away from the earth, illegal tests might go undetected. But we already have the capability to construct a system of observation that would make such tests almost impossible to conceal, and we can decide at any time whether such a system is needed in the light of the limited risk to us and the limited reward to others of violations attempted at that range. For any tests which might be conducted so far

out in space, which cannot be conducted more easily and efficiently and legally underground, would necessarily be of such a magnitude that they would be extremely difficult to conceal. We can also employ new devices to check on the testing of smaller weapons in the lower atmosphere. Any violation, moreover, involves, along with the risk of detection, the end of the treaty and the worldwide consequences for the violator.

Secret violations are possible and secret preparations for a sudden withdrawal are possible, and thus our own vigilance and strength must be maintained, as we remain ready to withdraw and to resume all forms of testing if we must. But it would be a mistake to assume that this treaty will be quickly broken. The gains of illegal testing are obviously slight compared to their cost and the hazard of discovery, and the nations which have initialed and will sign this treaty prefer it, in my judgment, to unrestricted testing as a matter of their own self-interest, for these nations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting the arms race, in holding the spread of nuclear weapons, and in breathing air that is not radioactive. While it may be theoretically possible to demonstrate the risks inherent in any treaty—and such risks in this treaty are small—the far greater risks to our security are the risks of unrestricted testing, the risk of a nuclear arms race, the risk of new nuclear powers, nuclear pollution, and nuclear war.

A Responsibility of All Americans

This limited test ban, in our most careful judgment, is safer by far for the United States than an unlimited nuclear arms race. For all these reasons, I am hopeful that this nation will promptly approve the limited test ban treaty. There will, of course, be debate in the country and in the Senate. The Constitution wisely requires the advice and consent of the Senate to all treaties, and that consultation has already begun. All this is as it should be. A document which may mark an historic and constructive opportunity for the world deserves an historic and constructive debate.

It is my hope that all of you will take part in that debate, for this treaty is for all of us. It is

particularly for our children and our grandchildren, and they have no lobby here in Washington. This debate will involve military, scientific, and political experts, but it must be left to them alone. The right and the responsibility are yours.

If we are to open new doorways to peace, we are to seize this rare opportunity for progress, if we are to be as bold and farsighted in our control of weapons as we have been in the invention, then let us now show all the world this side of the wall and the other that a strong America also stands for peace.

There is no cause for complacency. We have learned in times past that the spirit of one moment or place can be gone in the next. We have been disappointed more than once, and we have no illusions now that there are shortcuts on the road to peace. At many points around the globe the Communists are continuing their efforts to exploit weakness and poverty. Their concentration of nuclear and conventional arms must still be deterred.

The familiar contest between choice and coercion, the familiar places of danger and conflict, are still there, in Cuba, in Southeast Asia, in Berlin, and all around the globe, still requiring all the strength and the vigilance that we can muster. Nothing could more greatly damage our cause than if we and our allies were to believe that peace has already been achieved and that our strength and unity were no longer required.

But now, for the first time in many years, the path of peace may be open. No one can be certain what the future will bring. No one can say whether the time has come for an easing of the struggle. But history and our own conscience will judge us harsher if we do not now make every effort to test our hopes by action, and this is the place to begin. According to an ancient Chinese proverb, "A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step."

My fellow Americans, let us take that first step. Let us, if we can, get back from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace. And if that journey is one thousand miles, or even more, let history record that we, in this last hour at this time, took the first step.

Thank you and good night.

COMMUNIQUE

The special representatives of the President of the U.S.A. and of the Prime Minister of the U.K., W. A. Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs of the United States, and Lord Hailsham, Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science for the United Kingdom, visited Moscow together with their advisers on July 14. Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham were received by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N. S. Khrushchev, who presided on July 15 at the first of a series of meetings to discuss questions relating to the discontinuance of nuclear tests, and other questions of mutual interest. The discussions were continued from July 16 to July 25 with A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. During these discussions each principal was assisted by his advisers.

The discussions took place in a businesslike, cordial atmosphere. Agreement was reached on the text of a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This text is being published separately and simultaneously with this communique. It was initialed on July 25 by A. A. Gromyko, Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham. Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham together with their advisers will leave Moscow shortly to report and bring back the initialed texts to their respective Governments. Signature of the Treaty is expected to take place in the near future in Moscow.

The heads of the three delegations agreed that the test ban treaty constituted an important first step toward the reduction of international tension and the strengthening of peace, and they look forward to further progress in this direction.

The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non-aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three Governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organisations concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing discussion on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement sat-

isfactory to all participants. A brief exchange of views also took place with regard to other measures, directed at a relaxation of tension.

TEXT OF TREATY

TREATY

banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article II

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall

be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

Article III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties—the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

Article V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary

Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the _____ day of _____, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

For the Government of the United States of America

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Rusk and Mr. Harriman Discuss Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Following is the transcript of an interview of Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Harriman by Martin Agronsky on a National Broadcasting Company television program on July 28.

Press release 394 dated July 28

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, this week in Moscow we came to the turning point in a long hard road. You began traveling it long before you assumed your present duties. I wonder if you could put it in historical perspective for us and look back to the beginning.

Secretary Rusk: Well, Martin, I hope that what the President has called an important first step will in fact prove to be a turning point. But that, of course, is for the future.

When I heard from Averell Harriman that it seemed possible that we could initial an agreed test ban treaty for the three environments, my mind went back to the summer of 1945, when I was a colonel on the War Plan Section of the General Staff, when the news of the first bomb first came in. One of my colleagues, a Regular officer, instantaneously commented that "War has devoured itself. We cannot settle disputes by this means any longer."

I also think of the Acheson-Lilienthal report,¹ which pointed out that nature does not yield up its secrets on the basis of political favoritism, that the basic scientific knowledge involved in these weapons would become generally known to mankind, and that it was im-

¹ For background and excerpts from the report, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1946, p. 553.

portant for us to try to commit this great power to peaceful purposes rather than to war.

I think of the Baruch proposals,² in which we tried to put the lid back onto Pandora's Box and to find a way to bring this great power under control.

I think of the prolonged negotiations in which I took part to try to organize United Nations forces under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in the hope that the United Nations forces could somehow be a substitute for national competitive armaments.

And then, during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations, one can recall how we in the West have been gnawing at this problem, in trying to find some answer to the unrestricted, unlimited arms race in the nuclear field.

You will recall that in the midfifties the United States and United Kingdom monopoly in nuclear weapons was broken effectively when the Soviet Union achieved delivery systems that could deliver devastation against Western Europe and the United States. Therefore these weapons came to be competitive, and one can recall last October that perhaps for the first time in history great powers had to think operationally about the prospect of a nuclear exchange.

Now, these are sobering events. It is important for us to try to make some small movement to bring them under control. I do believe that this limited agreement is very useful and constructive from that point of view.

It does not do a great deal. All that it does is to eliminate testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under the water. It does not reduce nuclear stockpiles. It does not eliminate nuclear war or the threat of nuclear war. It does not prevent an arms race.

But, nevertheless, it does help to impose some limitations and some ceiling upon the arms race. And it saves, I think, mankind from the kinds of testing about which they are in deep disaccord, to which they have very deep objections.

And it may be the turning point that you mentioned—opening the door. Because here is something which both sides have apparently

found in their self-interest. It may be a turning point at which other questions could be taken up for further explorations.

Mr. Agronsky: Governor Harriman, perhaps you could discuss the turning point aspect of it.

You went to Moscow with a double mission, in effect. First, to bring back the nuclear test ban treaty—which you did. Secondly, Governor Harriman, you were empowered to discuss with Premier Khrushchev a number of other issues beyond the test ban, going to unresolved problems between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Can you tell us what issues you raised with Mr. Khrushchev? What issues he raised with you? What progress was made in that area?

Possibility of Breakthrough

Under Secretary Harriman: There was one thing that Mr. Khrushchev said to the press on Saturday morning [July 27] when I left Moscow. He said this might be a breakthrough, which confirms what Dean Rusk has just said. If it is a breakthrough, it will mean the heralding of other steps. I wouldn't want to venture a guess as to whether there would be other steps. But he seems to feel that there will be; otherwise he would not have said so.

Certainly within the Soviet Union this agreement has been hailed as a great event, and of course the Russian people long for a relief from the tensions and fear of war. They have had a great deal of it, as you well know—a great deal of war and have suffered a great deal.

What he has in mind for the future is very hard to tell. The only subject which he put forward as a major subject to discuss and come to an agreement on at once was a nonaggression pact between the NATO countries and those that belong to the Warsaw treaty. This of course would be a limited step in itself because from the outline of what he suggested it is really a reaffirmation of the obligations that we have all taken to the United Nations to settle disputes by peaceful means.

But he seems to want to have—he seems to be pressing for some sort of agreement. It was not clear to me just what he had in mind, because I was not authorized to negotiate. We made it very clear to our allies that we were

² *Ibid.*, June 23, 1946, p. 1057, and Dec. 15, 1946, p. 1088.

going there to negotiate a test ban treaty, which was proposed by the President and Prime Minister Macmillan, and Mr. Khrushchev accepted it. He later on proposed that we sign two agreements at the same time, a test ban and also a nonaggression pact.

Mr. Agronsky: He did propose that?

Under Secretary Harriman: Yes, he did propose that in the July 2 speech. That, of course, was utterly impossible for us to do. We were only two countries of NATO, and we would never think of discussing a problem that would affect all of our partners and our allies without coming to an understanding with them beforehand.

So therefore this was just explored, and, as the communique said,³ we agreed to take this matter up with our allies, consult with them, and see what the next move should be.

So I cannot tell you what is going to be in the future.

The other matters which he mentioned to us—he also said to the press or said publicly in his speech—he suggested that we get on with some of the things which have been suggested to make surprise attack more difficult: the establishment of control posts at the ports and the railroad centers and the airfields and the road junctures, and that sort of thing, and also a limitation on budgets, and also limitations on the level of forces. But those, I think, he spoke of in connection with a nonaggression pact.

Now, I don't know where that will carry us, but I am quite sure that he wants us to discuss that with our allies, and that is the only subject which he put forward as of importance for the immediate future. If we get through that step, and if there is some value in it for us, which is not clear yet because we don't know what the provisions will be, then possibly something else may happen.

But he seems to have in mind that this is only one step forward. I think that there are certain aspects of this, Dean, which you can mention. I think that the world as a whole, the people of the world, look upon this as ending a great threat—that the Soviet Union and the United States, which have been the ones that have done most of the testing, will no longer

³ See p. 239.

test under this treaty. We have agreed to stop testing, and that will end radioactive fallout which had in the minds of many people threatened the health and welfare of the human race.

Now, we cannot tell whether other countries will test or what the eventual future will be. But I have found in both the Soviet Union and in Europe it was welcomed as a very important step in many ways and started hope. As to whether that will eventuate, I would not want to predict.

Secretary Rusk: Averell, I am sure you would want our listeners to know that, when you talk about ending testing, this ends tests in the atmosphere, and under the water, and in outer space. Underground tests would still be permitted, so long as fallout does not extend beyond the country in which these underground tests are to take place.

But we do have at times, it seems to me, a sort of vicious circle between arms and political problems. On the one side, arms themselves—particularly modern and sophisticated arms—that can be launched with devastating destruction at a few moments' notice—arms themselves create tension. It is very hard to disarm until some of the great political issues separating the East and the West are themselves resolved. So we feel it is important not to think just in terms of disarmament, although we think it is important to do what we can in this field, but to try to resolve such issues as Laos and Viet Nam and Berlin and the German questions—these are the real divisions.

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, since you raised these points, and you, Governor Harriman, since you have dealt with Mr. Khrushchev in Moscow on this matter, can you be more specific about what was done in terms of dealing with these problems? Can you tell us anything about the future in the sense, or about the past, Governor Harriman, in your conversation?

Under Secretary Harriman: No. The matter which Mr. Khrushchev wanted to talk about most was this question of the nonaggression pact. He was thinking of Europe and Germany, and he was not too much interested in discussing other matters. Of course, I did raise Laos, as I said I would.

Mr. Agronsky: What did he say?

Under Secretary Harriman: We had a useful exchange, but we didn't get very far because this information is somewhat different. The British have talked in much detail with the Soviets, because the British and the Soviets are cochairmen of the agreement that was made in Geneva and they are responsible for the carrying out of the agreement and responsible for the activities of the International Control Commission. There is a difference of information, and it was agreed we would try to get closer together. In any event, it started some discussions which we will certainly carry on, and the discussion was useful.

But what was mostly on Mr. Khrushchev's mind was the situation in Europe, and he seemed to want to move ahead with some sort of further understandings, and we cannot tell what they will be until we begin to negotiate, and we can only do that with our allies, with their approval.

Secretary Rusk: I want to point out that Mr. Harriman's recent mission in Moscow was aimed at the test ban in the three environments. He was not there for the purpose of discussing all of the problems between ourselves and our allies on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other. By concentrating on the test ban I think he was able to reach an agreement without injecting a great many other questions that would have complicated the problem.

Mr. Agronsky: And, Mr. Secretary, a week from now you yourself are going to Moscow with a congressional delegation to sign the treaty. Will you at that point, with the test ban behind you, carry on these conversations with Mr. Khrushchev that Mr. Harriman has started?

Secretary Rusk: I think you can assume that when foreign ministers get together, they always talk. And that has been the case on every occasion when I have met Mr. Gromyko thus far, and I have no doubt that we will explore rather broadly the question as to where it might be possible to find other points at which agreement is possible.

This will not be easy or simple. It may take some time because many of these points do involve the interests of other nations. The President has made it quite clear that we are not

going to negotiate the interests of other nations without the participation of those other nations.

Question of Nonaggression Treaty

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, is it too soon to ask you what the thinking of our Government is on a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty?

Secretary Rusk: I think that this is something that has to be talked out thoroughly in NATO. From one point of view, NATO itself has made clear from its beginning that it considers itself organized within the framework of the U.N. Charter, that it is organized for defensive purposes, that it is not planning to conduct armed attack against anyone, that it is prepared to settle disputes by peaceful means.

Now, these are the basic elements of the treaty structure of NATO itself. So from that point of view, as a matter of principle, there is no great problem. But, given the absence of understanding on some of the great issues that are involved in the relations between East and West, what would such a nonaggression pact mean? What would it mean to all the parties? How would it be used? These are things that need exploration.

If we could move toward an agreed resolution of some of these larger questions, this would fall into place very easily.

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, one question that is automatically raised in connection with the Warsaw Pact-NATO treaty is this one: Our allies have already indicated that they have some doubts about the credibility—about our commitment to defend with nuclear weapons Western Europe against a massive attack by the Warsaw Pact nations, a massive conventional attack. Might not our allies feel that this would lessen still further the credibility of an American nuclear response to such a Soviet attack?

Secretary Rusk: Martin, that doubt that you express comes largely through the gossip channels and not through the solid opinions of governments in direct discussions of these great issues of war and peace within the alliance. I do not believe that there is any doubt whatever in the alliance that the defense of the alliance is indivisible and that the United

States will do whatever is necessary to do its part in making the defense of NATO impregnable.

Mr. Agronsky: Well, such a pact would not undermine, then, the NATO alliance?

Secretary Rusk: Not at all. This pact in no way affects the commitments of all of the allies within NATO for its mutual defense. And, indeed, the nuclear strength of NATO has been enormously increased in recent years, and our allies know about that and fully understand its implications. And I think perhaps the other side does too.

What Was Soviet Objective?

Mr. Agronsky: Governor Harriman, you indicated at Hyannis Port, after you had spoken to the President, that one of the questions, one of the reasons that led Khrushchev to sign this nuclear test ban treaty was his concern at Russian relations with Communist China. Can you elaborate on that in any way?

Under Secretary Harriman: Well, the question was, what was Russia's objective in signing this treaty? I said I didn't know. But certainly one of the preoccupations, if you have been reading the Soviet press lately, is their relations with Peiping. And they have been writing each other letters. You know, each one wrote the other about a 50,000-word letter, which is perhaps a world record for exchange of information. So we know pretty much what their differences are. But it does seem as if the Soviet Union wanted to make this agreement for some reason because of the conflict which quite obviously exists.

But I do think that there are other reasons.

I said also that the Russian people are longing for some break in tensions. They have had a tough, hard war; 20 million people were killed in the war, as you know. I was there during most of the war. And they feel very deeply the desire for peace. And since the war there have been the tensions that have existed, which have been discussed this evening. So I do not know of any people in the world that have any greater desire for peace than the Soviet Union.

Mr. Khrushchev is becoming more and more a political leader than the dictator that Stalin

was. Even though there is only one party, it is necessary for him to keep a certain popularity with the Russian people in order to maintain his leadership within the party. And he certainly has a desire in his relations with them—I saw him talking to the Russian people on several occasions. Right after the American Soviet track meet, he went out and talked with the people. I was with him. He shook hands with them, and he patted the children on the head. He might have been an American politician. There is such a tremendous difference. You know, Stalin would never—never—go out in public. He rushed through the streets at 6 miles an hour, the windows of his car were closed, the curtains drawn. So that it is quite a change between the two.

So that you have got to think in terms of what is useful for the Kremlin leaders in connection with controlling their own people.

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, do you think that the Sino-Soviet split has the effect of bringing the United States and Russia closer together and improving the prospects of resolving outstanding U.S.-Russian differences?

Secretary Rusk: I think we have to take account of the fact that the Soviet Union has said in the field of ideologies there is no coexistence and we have to bear in mind that their aim is still to establish a Communist world. But, on the other hand, I think that in this nuclear field we and the Soviet Union do have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war.

Those who have developed nuclear weapons understand that a one-megaton weapon—and we are now talking about weapons of tens of megatons—that a one-megaton weapon is 5 times the size of the weapon that fell on Hiroshima. And those who have these weapons in their possession have a much more direct an operational sense of what a nuclear war means than those who have not really felt deeply about these great issues of war and peace.

So I think that there may be here some element of common interest based upon the nature of these weapons and the nature of the nuclear exchange on which we might find certain points of agreement that might open the way for the future.

Mr. Agronsky: And I am sure you will at

empt to explore them when you go to Moscow. Well, gentlemen, thank you very much for a very interesting insight into the meaning of the nuclear test ban.

U.S. Protests Ceylon's Decision on Oil Legislation

Department Statement

Press release 383 dated July 23, for release July 24

Early in June the Government of Ceylon announced its decision to give the state-owned Ceylon Petroleum Corporation a monopoly of the internal distribution of petroleum products as of January 1, 1964. On July 5, 1963, the American Ambassador to Ceylon [Frances E. Willis] acting under instructions presented a note¹ to the Prime Minister of Ceylon. The attention of the Government of Ceylon was invited to the fact that the proposed action would be contrary to assurances given in 1962 that the private oil companies would be permitted to operate in Ceylon on the basis of fair competition. To date no reply to this note has been received.

On July 3 the Government of Ceylon issued a communique announcing its intention to introduce in Parliament legislation to enact into law its decision to have the internal distribution of petroleum products assigned solely to the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. The communique also stated that "the amending act would have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the principal act or any undertaking given by the government in regard to the import, sale and distribution of petroleum." On July 17 the government in fact introduced such a bill.

The Government of the United States does not question the right of a sovereign nation to nationalize property belonging to American citizens or companies, provided adequate and effective compensation is promptly paid in accordance with international law. The United States Government, however, regrets this most recent decision of the Government of Ceylon on

two principal grounds. First, as indicated above, this action is at variance with assurances given earlier by the Government of Ceylon. Second, compensation has not yet been paid to the American companies for their properties which were taken over in 1962. The proposed action of the Government of Ceylon will deprive the companies of the use of the remainder of their properties throughout the island and therefore will give rise to further and more complicated questions of compensation.

The United States Government is continuing its endeavors to obtain compensation for the fair value of the properties of the American oil companies taken over in 1962. It will also continue to seek in Ceylon and elsewhere to make it possible for American citizens and companies to conduct their business on the basis of fair competition.

U.S. and India Sign Agreement To Strengthen India's Air Defense

Press release 379 dated July 22

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and India have reached agreement [July 22] on certain measures to strengthen India's defenses against possible future air attacks from Communist China. These measures include the following:

1. The Government of the United States will provide the Government of India with radar and related communications equipment, initially in the form of mobile units, subsequently in the form of fixed radar installations. The United States will retain title to the mobile units, which will be withdrawn when the fixed radar installations are provided. Equipment for the fixed radar installations will be furnished to the Government of India under the terms of the agreement of November 14, 1962,¹ between India and the United States regarding assistance to the Government of India for the purpose of defense against Chinese Communist aggression.

2. The United States will provide training for Indian technicians in the operation and

¹ For text of a Department statement and an exchange of notes, see BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1962, p. 837.

¹ Not printed.

maintenance of mobile and fixed radar installations and related communications equipment.

3. Elements of the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force will join with the Indian Air Force in periodic, joint training exercises in India.

The above measures follow the findings of the Commonwealth/U.S. Air Defense Mission which visited India earlier this year in response to the request of the Government of India.

In the event of renewed Chinese Communist aggression against India the United States has agreed, pursuant to the present agreement, to consult with the Government of India regarding possible measures to strengthen India's air defenses in the light of the situation existing at the time. The agreement does not, however, involve any commitment on the part of the United States Government to come to India's assistance in the event of a renewed Chinese Communist attack.

Department Notes Anniversary of Korean Armistice

*Department Statement*¹

Tomorrow [July 27] marks the 10th anniversary of the Military Armistice Agreement² which brought a conclusion to the tragic struggle in Korea. Although the people of Korea have since been spared the horrors of war, they have been denied the full fruits of the peace by the continued necessity of maintaining burdensome defenses against the threatening Communist forces in the north that were augmented almost from the moment the armistice was signed. The intransigence of the northern regime, with its Communist allies, has further frustrated the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Korean people for the reunification of their country under a free act of self-determination.

The United States Armed Forces, as part of the United Nations Command, stand today, and

will continue to stand, with their Korea friends and allies in protecting the lives of the Korean people until lasting peace with justice can be attained. Two of their members, Captains Ben W. Stutts of Florence, Alabama and Carleton Voltz of Frankfort, Michigan, have been under unwarranted detention by Communist forces since May 17. This anniversary would be an especially fitting time for their release in reflection of the concern for human welfare which brought about the armistice of 1953.

U.S. and Panama Announce Results of Canal Zone Talks

Press release 384 dated July 23

President Kennedy and President Roberto Chiari of the Republic of Panama agreed, during President Chiari's visit to Washington on June 12-13, 1962,¹ to appoint high-level representatives to discuss points of dissatisfaction concerning certain aspects of the treaties between the United States and Panama governing the Panama Canal. The results of these discussions, held in Panama, have been summarized in a joint communique and aide memoire issued as State Department press release 17 on January 10, 1963,² and in the following final joint communique issued by the two Governments on July 23.

The representatives designated by the Presidents of the Republic of Panama and of the United States of America to discuss points of dissatisfaction between the two countries with regard to the Canal Zone, in terminating the sessions, wish to make public that, since the issuance of the last communique on January 10, 1963, the following results have been obtained with the authorization of their respective Governments:

1. Agreement has been reached on the creation of a Bi-national Labor Advisory Committee composed of representatives of Panama and the United States, which will consider labor di

¹ Read to news correspondents on July 26 by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 3, 1953, p. 131.

¹ For text of joint communique, see BULLETIN of July 9, 1962, p. 81.

² *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1963, p. 171.

putes which may arise between Panamanian employees and the authorities of the Canal Zone and will advise the Government of Panama and the Governor of the Canal Zone thereon.

2. The United States Government has prepared a draft bill for presentation to the Congress of the United States which would make available to Panamanian employees of the United States Government in the Canal Zone the same governmental health and life insurance benefits as are available to the United States citizen employees.

3. There has been full discussion of the steps taken by the Canal Zone authorities to implement treaty obligations with regard to equal employment opportunities. Various aspects of the wage scale have been discussed. The minimum wage in the Canal Zone, which was increased to 60 cents per hour on April 1, 1962, was increased again to 70 cents per hour on July 1, 1963, and will be increased to 80 cents per hour on July 1, 1964, together with proportionate increases in the entire wage structure for all employees. The Panamanian representatives have requested greater increases.

4. The United States has agreed to deduct, withhold and remit to the Government of Panama the sums owed for income tax by employees who are required to pay income tax to the Republic of Panama and who work for the Panama Canal Company or any other agency of the United States Government in the Canal Zone.

5. The Panamanian representatives, with the object that there may be continuous jurisdiction from the capital city to the rest of the territory of the Republic, have requested that the jurisdiction over a corridor comprising Fourth of July Avenue, the bridge over the Canal and the road to Arraijan, be transferred to Panama. The United States representatives indicated that the United States is preparing proposals to submit to Panama for consideration for an agreement covering this matter.

6. The Panamanian representatives have requested that piers 6 and 7 in Cristobal be licensed to the Colon Free Zone. The United States representatives have indicated that the United States Government is preparing the terms of an agreement for consideration by Panama.

U.S. Views on International Air Rate Policy

Press release 392 dated July 25

Major features of the views of the U.S. Government concerning international air rate levels were reiterated through the release on July 25 by the Department of State of a statement made by the U.S. delegation at a conference in Ottawa on governmental relations with the International Air Transport Association. The statement, as presented at the conference on July 18 by Alan S. Boyd, chairman of the delegation, follows.

The United States Government bases its views on international air rates on statutory considerations of public interest. Of first importance is facilitating the freedom of international movement for the people and for their commerce to the fullest extent possible consistent with the requirement of operational safety and the dictates of sound economic conditions and rate-making principles. The fulfillment of this objective requires safe, convenient, rapid air transportation, taking efficient advantage of modern technology and performed at a price which is reasonable to the passengers and shippers and which meets the economic needs of the carriers for the continuation and expansion of air services.

In spite of its disadvantages the most practicable method of setting international rates still appears to be the IATA mechanism. So long as IATA moves in a direction consistent with the public interest, the United States Government will continue to support the operation of IATA as the machinery for determining rates, subject to Government approval.

An integral part of reasonably satisfactory functioning of IATA, in the United States' view, is the setting of rates which are consistent with the public interest. The United States Government criteria for such rates have evolved over a quarter century of domestic air carrier regulation and are now well documented in the history of the Civil Aeronautics Board's decisions. It is not the intention of the United States Government to attempt to impose its views of public interest on the international

community. However, to be satisfactory to the Government of the United States, rates set by private agreement among the carriers must not be substantially inconsistent with the standards of justness and reasonableness to both the public and the carriers.

When, from time to time, the United States determines the broad characteristics of a rate level or structure that should in its view be in effect, it will advise American carriers of its views and will engage in discussion with other nations with the hope of securing their agreement to, or at least understanding of, its rate policies. Finally, recognizing that interairline ratemaking is a bargaining process which does not always result in furthering the public interest, the United States Government will, whenever the issue demands it, have no alternative but to use its power to disapprove rate resolutions.

It is the view of the United States that rates on the North Atlantic and on the Pacific are, by its standards, too high under the Chandler agreement¹ and that they were too high prior to the Chandler agreement.

It is considered useful to indicate some general types of rate changes which the United States would favor:

1. A substantial general reduction in tariffs, with or without altering the structure of tariffs.
2. A supereconomy service, such as, for example, the "thrift" service recently proposed by Pan American; such a service might or might not have "no reservation" characteristics.
3. Sharp reductions in off-season rates.
4. Directional rates, introducing, for example, a substantial reduction in fares for westbound transatlantic travel during May, June, and July and for eastbound travel during August and September. This would serve partially to counteract the great imbalance in traffic during the summer months, most of which originates in and returns to the United States.
5. Further extension of group fares on scheduled flights.

The views herein expressed are based on pub-

¹ A rate agreement reached by the International Air Transport Association at Chandler, Ariz., in 1962.

licly reported cost and revenue figures. Our policies and our philosophical approach to civil aviation dictate that, given economic and efficient operation and management, air carrier operations should be profitable at sharply reduced fare levels.

Passamaquoddy-Saint John Report Received by President Kennedy

The White House on July 16 released the following text of remarks made by President Kennedy on that day upon presentation to him by Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall of a report on the International Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project and the Upper Saint John River Hydroelectric Power Development Project for Canada and the United States.¹

I am pleased to meet today with Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives from New England to discuss the report on the International Passamaquoddy Tidal Project submitted by Secretary Udall. Two years ago I asked Secretary Udall, in cooperation with the Corps of Engineers, to restudy the proposed project and the hydroelectric potential of the St. John River in Maine to determine whether recent developments in electric power technology had enhanced the economic feasibility of these projects.²

This report has been presented to me this morning, and its major conclusions are most encouraging. The report reveals that this unique international power complex can provide American and Canadian markets with over a million kilowatts for the daily peak period in addition to 250,000 kilowatts of firm power. Electric power rates in the New England region are among the highest in the United States, and the survey indicates that a massive block of power can be produced and delivered at a cost of about four mills per kilowatt hour, approxi-

¹ Copies of the report are available upon request from the Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C. 20240.

² For texts of letters dated May 20, 1961, from President Kennedy to Secretary Rusk and Secretary Udall, see BULLETIN of June 19, 1961, p. 969.

mately 25 percent below the current wholesale cost of power in the region.

I am pleased to note also that the development plan proposed would preserve the superb recreational areas of the Allagash River from flooding and that an area suitable for a new national park would be preserved in this scenic part of Maine.

Any proposed resource development project must, of course, meet the national interest test. It must strengthen the economy of the whole Nation and enable America to better compete in the market places of the world. I understand that, measured by the customary feasibility standards, the Passamaquoddy-St. John project now meets the national interest test.

During the last three decades American taxpayers, through their Federal Government, have invested vast sums of money in developing the water resources of the great rivers of this country—the Columbia, the Missouri, the Colorado, the Tennessee, and others. These investments are producing daily dividends for our country, and it is reasonable to assume that a similar investment in conserving the resources of New England will also benefit the Nation. It is also reasonable to assume that a New England development will stimulate more diversified industry, increase commerce, and provide more jobs.

Our experience in other regions and river valleys shows that private utility customers as well as public agency power users benefit from lowering the basic cost of electric energy.

Harnessing the energy of the tides is an exciting technological undertaking. France and the Soviet Union are already doing pioneering work in this field. Each day over a million kilowatts of power surge in and out of the Passamaquoddy Bay. Man needs only to exercise his engineering ingenuity to convert the ocean's surge into a national asset. It is clear, however, that any development of this magnitude and new approach must also be considered in the context of the national energy study currently being undertaken by an interdepartmental committee under the chairmanship of the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Dr. [Jerome B.] Wiesner.

These projects involve international waters,

and equitable agreements must therefore be reached with the Canadian Government. Therefore I am requesting the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations immediately with the Government of Canada looking toward a satisfactory arrangement for the sharing of the benefits of these two projects. Also, to insure full consideration of these proposals, I am directing that the Interior Department and the Corps of Engineers accelerate their work on the remaining studies of details.

The power-producing utilities of the United States are second to none in the world. The combined effort of science, private industry, and government will surely keep this nation in the forefront of technological progress in energy and electric power.

I think that this can be one of the most astonishing and beneficial joint enterprises that the people of the United States have ever undertaken, and therefore I want to commend the Department of the Interior for its initiative in working on this matter the past 2 years, the congressional delegation from Maine which has been interested in this for many years, and the Members of Congress from New England who have supported this great effort. I think it will mean a good deal to New England and a good deal to the country.

Letters of Credence

Colombia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Colombia, Eduardo Uribe Botero, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 387 dated July 24.

Yemen Arab Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Yemen Arab Republic, Mohsin A. Alaini, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 385 dated July 24.

The Balance of Payments

SPECIAL MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO THE CONGRESS¹

To the Congress of the United States:

Soon after my inauguration, I reported to the Congress on the problems presented to this Nation by 3 successive years, beginning in the late 1950's, of mounting balance of payments deficits accompanied by large gold outflows; and I announced a program designed to restore both confidence in the dollar and eventual equilibrium in our international accounts.² The challenge posed by those pressures was heightened at that time by the need to halt and reverse the spread of unemployment and revive our faltering economy. Rejecting a choice between two equally unpalatable alternatives—improved employment at home at the cost of a weaker dollar abroad or a stronger dollar at the cost of a weaker economy and Nation—we sought a new course that would simultaneously increase our growth at home, reduce unemployment, and strengthen the dollar by eliminating the deficit in our international payments. It is appropriate now—nearly 2½ years later—to look back on the problems faced, to review the progress made and to chart the course ahead.

There is much from which to take heart. Our economy has resumed its growth and unemployment has been reduced. The dollar remains strong, bulwarked by nearly 40 percent of the free world's monetary gold stock as well as by a newly constructed network of bilateral and

multilateral financial arrangements. Our gold outflow has been halved. There are signs of longer run improvement in our world competitive position, as our prices and costs hold steady while others are rising. The deficit in our balance of payments has been reduced—from \$3.9 billion in 1960 to \$2.4 billion in 1961 and \$2.2 billion in 1962.

Our basic strength, moreover, is vast, real, and enduring. Our payments deficits, measured in terms of our loss of gold and the increase in our short-term liquid liabilities to foreigners, have consistently been equaled or exceeded by the growth of our long-term, high-yielding foreign assets—assets which have been and will continue to be an increasing source of strength to our balance of payments. Today, Americans hold more than \$60 billion of private investments abroad, and dollar loans repayable to the U.S. Government total over \$11 billion. At the end of 1962, all of these assets exceeded our liabilities to foreigners by an estimated \$27 billion. And they have shown an increasing strength over the years: our total income from these sources in 1959 was \$3 billion; in 1962 it had risen to \$4.3 billion; and we expect further substantial increases in the coming years.

These are all signs of progress. But unemployment is still too high; our growth rate is still too low; and it is now clear that, despite the favorable forces at work over the long run, more remains to be done today to eliminate the continuing payments deficit.

A significant portion of our progress so far

¹ H. Doc. 141, 88th Cong., 1st sess.; transmitted on July 18.

² For text of the President's message of Feb. 6, 1961, see BULLETIN of Feb. 27, 1961, p. 287.

has been due to special agreements with friendly foreign countries—for debt prepayments, advance payments for military equipment, and U.S. borrowings abroad. While similar arrangements may once again prove capable of covering a substantial amount of the gross deficit in 1963, such special transactions cannot be relied upon for the indefinite future. Moreover, while our commercial trade balance and Government expenditures overseas have shown modest improvement, capital outflows, both short term and long term, have increased.

Although there is urgent need for further effort I want to make it clear that, in solving its international payments problem, this Nation will continue to adhere to its historic advocacy of freer trade and capital movements, and that it will continue to honor its obligation to carry a fair share of the defense and development of the free world. At the same time, we shall continue policies designed to reduce unemployment and stimulate growth here at home—for the well-being of all free peoples is inextricably entwined with the progress achieved by our own people. I want to make it equally clear that this Nation will maintain the dollar as good as gold, freely interchangeable with gold at \$35 an ounce, the foundation stone of the free world's trade and payments system.

But continued confidence at home and cooperation abroad require further administrative and legislative inroads into the hard core of our continuing payments deficit, augmenting our long-range efforts to improve our economic performance over a period of years in order to achieve both external balance and internal expansion, stepping up our shorter run efforts to reduce our balance of payments deficits while the long-range forces are at work and adding to our stockpile of arrangements designed to finance our deficits during our return to equilibrium in a way that assures the continued smooth functioning of the world's monetary and trade systems.

Before turning to the specific measures required in the latter two categories, I must emphasize once again the necessity of improving this Nation's overall long-range economic performance—including increased investment and modernization for greater productivity and profits, continued cost and price stability, and

full employment and faster growth. This is the key to improving our international competitiveness, increasing our trade surpluses, and reducing our capital outflows.

That is why early enactment of the comprehensive *tax reduction and revision* program previously submitted is the single most important step that can be taken to achieve balance abroad as well as growth here at home. The increased investment incentives and purchasing power these personal and corporate tax reductions would create, combined with last year's actions giving special credits for new investment and more favorable depreciation treatment, will promote more employment, production, sales, and investment, particularly when accompanied by the continued ample availability of credit and reasonable long-term rates of interest. A prosperous, high-investment economy brings with it the rapid gains in productivity and efficiency which are so essential to the improvement of our competitive position abroad.

To gain new markets abroad and retain the gains of new growth and efficiency here at home, we must continue the *price-cost stability* of recent years, limiting wage and profit increases to their fair share of our improving productivity. That is why we have, for 2 years, been urging business and labor to recognize and use reasonable wage-price guideposts for resolving the issues of collective bargaining. Our success in holding down our price level relative to that of our major competitors is a powerful force working to restore our payments balance over the longer run. This fact should not be obscured by current short-run developments.

While these long-range forces are taking effect, a series of more immediate and specialized efforts are needed to reduce the deficit in our international transactions and defend our gold reserves:

1. Export Expansion

Our commercial sales of goods and services to foreign countries in 1962 exceeded our purchases by \$4.3 billion, and they are continuing at about the same rate this year. This is our greatest strength, but it is not enough. Our exports of goods have risen only moderately over the past 3 years, and have not kept pace

with the rapid rise of imports which has accompanied our domestic expansion. As a result, rather than furnishing increased support for our other transactions, 1962 saw a decline in our commercial trade surplus.

The primary long-term means for correcting this situation is implementation of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations is preparing to use to the fullest extent the authority given to me by the act, in an across-the-board drive for lower tariffs and against other barriers to trade. This should open new markets and widen existing markets for American exports.

As mentioned above, our whole long-range domestic program—including increased investment, improved productivity, and wage-price stability—is designed to better the competitive position of our products both at home and abroad. Continued price stability at home, contrasted with the upward trend in prices abroad, will create an increasingly favorable climate for American exports; and this administration is concentrating on six immediate measures to help American businessmen take advantage of our export potential.

First, the Export-Import Bank has created a wholly new program of export financing which now provides U.S. business with credit facilities equal to any in the world. The major element in this new program is the guarantee of short- and medium-term export credits by the Foreign Credit Insurance Association, composed of more than 70 private insurance companies in conjunction with the Export-Import Bank. I urge the Congress to act promptly to restore the Bank to full operating efficiency by renewing its charter and authorizing adequate financing.

Second, the Departments of State and Commerce have strengthened and expanded efforts overseas to probe for new markets and promote the sale and distribution of American products.

Third, the Department of Commerce has developed a broad program of education and assistance to present and potential American exporters. I have requested a relatively small amount of additional funds to strengthen the Department's efforts to stimulate our exports. These funds, amounting to \$6 million, were not approved by the House of Representatives. It

is essential, if we are to increase our trade surplus, that they be included in the final appropriation bill. This modest sum would pay for itself many times over in increased exports, lower payments deficits, and protection for our gold reserves.

Fourth, the Department of Agriculture announced last March a new auction program for direct sales of cotton abroad. It is expected that this new technique will insure competitive pricing for our cotton in export markets and will increase exports by as much as \$100 million over last year's levels.

Fifth, present ocean freight rates discourage our exports as compared to imports. The freight charges on Atlantic crossings are far higher for eastbound freight than for comparable items bound for our shores. A similar situation prevails on other trade routes. While these substantial differentials may have been acceptable in the immediate postwar period of the dollar shortage when Europe was struggling to get on its feet, their magnitude is clearly unjustified today. Accordingly, I have directed the Secretary of Commerce to take corrective action through the Maritime Administration; and I am urging the Federal Maritime Commission in its role as an independent regulatory agency to question those specific export rates which appear unduly high. Should legislation prove necessary, it will be sought.

Sixth, in order to give further momentum to the expansion of our export performance, I will convene a White House Conference on Export Expansion on September 17 and 18, to alert American firms, whether or not they are now exporting, to the opportunities and rewards of initiating or expanding export efforts. We shall use this opportunity to emphasize to American businessmen that vigorous action to increase their exports would serve their own private interests as well as the national interest.

2. Tourism

Another element that requires attention in our commercial transactions is the increase in our unfavorable net tourist balance. With increasing prosperity encouraging American travel abroad, total tourist spending in foreign countries rose another 10 percent last year, to

nearly \$2½ billion. This was partially offset by increased foreign tourist expenditures in the United States, but the net result was an outflow of \$1.4 billion, or two-thirds of last year's overall balance of payments deficit. This year the cost is estimated to be still greater. That is why we have had to limit the duty-free exemption for returning tourists to \$100 per person. Last year this measure achieved a saving of more than \$100 million, and I am gratified that Congress has extended the limitation for another 2 years. We have also sought, through establishment of the U.S. Travel Service, to increase our income from visitors coming to our country. To further that effort, I strongly recommend that Congress approve the full amount of the appropriation requested for the U.S. Travel Service.

In addition, in cooperation with the appropriate Government agencies, I am asking the domestic travel and tourism industry to launch a more unified drive to encourage Americans to learn more about their own country and the glory of their heritage. A "See America Now" program, to be in full operation by the spring of 1964, will make the most of our magnificent resources and make travel at home a more appealing alternative to travel abroad.

3. Federal Expenditures Abroad

Federal expenditures abroad go largely for defense and aid. These represent the obligations which flow from our position of world leadership and unrivaled economic strength. With the recovery of other economically advanced nations, particularly our allies in Western Europe, we have made vigorous and increasingly successful efforts to work out with them a better sharing of our common responsibilities. These efforts—combined with rigorous scrutiny of offshore expenditures—have enabled us, in spite of mounting worldwide requirements and costs, to reduce the overall total of our own overseas expenditures while we increase the security of the free world and maintain a high level of assistance to developing countries.

A continual process of modernizing our Armed Forces and increasing efficiency, resulting in heightened defense effectiveness, is reducing the requirements for overseas dollar

expenditures. At the same time, by tying our aid more effectively to domestic procurement and cutting civilian expenditures sharply, we should be able to achieve further savings. In fact, by January 1965, these processes should result in a reduction of the rate of our Federal overseas dollar expenditures by approximately \$1 billion from that of 1962.

(A) Military expenditures

The Defense Department has, since the beginning of this administration, been making vigorous efforts to restrain overseas expenditures, without reducing military effectiveness.

Thus, despite the Berlin buildup of 1961 and rising costs overseas, gross expenditures abroad by the Defense Department have been held below 1960 levels. As a result of the desire of our allies to acquire from us modern military equipment, which they need to strengthen free world defenses, at lower cost than they could produce the equipment themselves, substantial offsets to these expenditures have also been achieved, so that our net outlays abroad for defense have declined from \$2.7 billion in 1960 to \$1.9 billion in 1962.

In line with these continuing efforts, the Secretary of Defense has informed me that the annual rate of expenditures abroad by the Department of Defense will be reduced—by measures to be put into effect before the end of calendar year 1964—by more than \$300 million from the 1962 level. At the same time the Department of Defense will continue to seek arrangements with major allied countries to increase their military procurement from the United States so as to reduce the net outflow still further. The Secretary has further assured me that this reduction will be accomplished without any reduction in the effectiveness of our military posture and with no impairment in our ability to meet our commitments to our allies in all parts of the world.

In addition to direct expenditures by the Defense Department, our defense expenditures abroad have for many years been increased by the cost of programs for the acquisition of strategic materials from foreign sources. The cost of these programs is now steadily declining since they have largely fulfilled their purpose and are no longer needed. Within 2 years they

will be reduced by over \$200 million as compared to 1962, insuring a total reduction in defense dollar expenditures well in excess of \$500 million.

(B) Agency for International Development

During 1960 only about one-third of AID program expenditures were in the form of U.S. goods and services. Last year that proportion had risen to about 50 percent. But during the fiscal year which ended last month, fully 80 percent of AID's commitments were "tied" to the export of U.S. goods and services. The balance was virtually all committed for purchases in the less-developed countries rather than in the developed nations where the payments surpluses exist which give rise to our deficit. During fiscal year 1964, for which funds are now being considered by the Congress, AID commitments tied to U.S. exports will rise beyond 80 percent of the total. I have directed the Administrator of AID to continue and intensify this policy so that AID expenditures entering our balance of payments in fiscal year 1965 may be further reduced by about \$500 million as compared to fiscal year 1961, from about \$1 billion to not over \$500 million, the lowest practicable minimum.

(C) Other departments and agencies

The oversea disbursements of all other departments of government have also been brought under special review and control by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Total Federal expenditures abroad (excluding Defense, AID, Treasury payments on foreign-held debt, and Federal pension payments) coming within the scope of this review now amount to approximately \$600 million per year. The Director of the Budget has assured me that vigorous screening of expenditures abroad by these other Federal departments and agencies will achieve further substantial balance of payments savings. These savings, together with those which may be expected from revisions of programs under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, should amount to some \$100 million a year. This includes my request to the Congress to enact legislation per-

mitting freer use of our present holdings of the currencies of a number of other countries.

4. Short-Term Capital Flows

By skillful use of the tools of debt management and monetary policy, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve System have substantially reduced the outflow of short-term capital through a series of carefully managed increases in short-term money rates, while maintaining ample credit availability and keeping both long-term rates and bank loan rates low and, in many cases, declining. Experience in the recovery underway over the past 2½ years provides a solid basis for expecting that a determined effort can succeed in keeping long-term investment and mortgage money plentiful and cheap while boosting short-term interest rates. From February 1961 through July 12, 1963, the rate on newly issued 3-month Treasury bills rose 76 basis points, while the rise in long-term Treasury bond yields was held to only 22 basis points and the yields on high-grade corporate bonds and mortgages actually declined.

However, the recorded outflows of short-term funds, together with unrecorded net outflows, a large portion of which undoubtedly represent short-term capital movements, still amounted to approximately \$1.6 billion in 1962 and have continued on a substantial scale so far this year. A sizable reduction in this drain would do much to strengthen our overall balance of payments. It is for this reason that the Federal Reserve has decided to increase the rediscount rate from 3 to 3½ percent. At the same time, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have raised the interest-rate ceilings on time deposits payable in 90 days to 1 year, in order to enable our banks to compete more effectively with those abroad and thus attract funds that might otherwise leave the country.

While none of us welcomes higher interest rates at a time when our economy is operating below capacity, an increase in short-term rates—at a time when liquid savings are growing rapidly, and when there are no accompanying restrictions on credit availability nor paral-

lel increases in the interest rates on bank loans, home mortgages or other long-term obligations—should have little, if any, adverse effect on our economy. The unprecedented flow of liquid savings should largely insulate the longer term markets from the effect of higher short-term rates. I have been assured by both Treasury and Federal Reserve officials that they intend to do everything possible through debt management policy and open-market operations to avoid any reduction in domestic credit availability and any upward pressure on long-term interest rates while the economy operates below capacity without inflation. Other agencies of the Federal Government will work to maintain continued ready availability of private mortgage loans at stable interest rates. Nevertheless, the situation lends increased urgency to the fiscal stimulus that would be provided by the prompt enactment of the substantial tax reductions I have recommended.

5. Long-Term Capital Outflows

Long-term capital outflows consisting of direct investment in productive plants abroad appear to have leveled off in recent years, whereas portfolio investments in the form of long-term loans or securities purchases have been rising rapidly. While our long-range program should increase the attractiveness of domestic investment and further reduce the outflow of direct investment, the rising outflow of long-term capital for portfolio investment abroad shows no sign of abating. It is up from \$850 million in 1960 to \$1.2 billion in 1962, and so far this year is running at an annual rate of well over \$1.5 billion.

In view of the continued existence of direct controls and inadequate capital market mechanisms in many foreign countries, and the wide differential between the long-term rates of interest in the larger industrial countries and the United States, there appear to be only three possible solutions to this problem, two of which are unacceptable under present circumstances:

A substantial increase in our whole long-term interest rate structure would throw our economy into reverse, increase unemployment, and substantially reduce our import require-

ments, thereby damaging the economy of every free nation.

The initiation of direct capital controls, which are in use in most countries, is inappropriate to our circumstances. It is contrary to our basic precept of free markets. We cannot take this route.

A third alternative—the one which I recommend—would stem the flood of foreign security sales in our markets and still be fully consistent with both economic growth and free capital movements. I urge the enactment by the Congress of an interest equalization tax, which would, in effect, increase by approximately 1 percent the interest cost to foreigners of obtaining capital in this country, and thus help equalize interest rate patterns for longer term financing in the United States and abroad. The rate of tax should be graduated from 2.75 percent to 15 percent of the value of debt obligations, according to the remaining maturity of the obligation, and should be 15 percent in the case of equity securities. This tax should remain in effect through 1965 when improvements in both our balance of payments and in the operation of foreign capital markets are expected to permit its abandonment.

Under this alternative, the allocation of savings for investment in securities will continue to be the result of decisions based on market prices. There will be no limitations on the marketing of foreign issues and no governmental screening of borrowers. Reliance will be placed on price alone to effect an overall reduction in the outflow of American funds for stocks, bonds, and long-term loans—both new or outstanding, whether publicly marketed or privately placed.

The tax would not apply to direct investment. It would not apply to securities or loans that mature in less than 3 years. Nor would it apply to the loans of commercial banks. These exemptions will assure that export credit will remain fully available. Furthermore, purchases of the securities of less developed countries or of companies operating primarily in such countries will not be taxed.

Nor will the tax apply to transactions in for-

Joint Canadian-United States Statement on Proposed Interest Equalization Tax ¹

Representatives of Canada and the United States met in Washington during the weekend to appraise the impact on the Canadian financial markets of the proposed United States "interest equalization tax."

The two Governments recognize the need for effective action to improve the balance-of-payments positions of both countries and both are equally determined that such action shall not impair the intimate economic relationships between the two countries, nor impede the growth essential for both economies.

For many years the capital markets of the two countries have been closely interconnected, and U.S. exports of capital to Canada have financed a substantial portion of the Canadian current account deficit with the U.S. This need continues. A portion of these flows must be supplied through the sale of new issues of Canadian securities in American markets. U.S. officials had considered that ample flows for these needs would continue under the proposed "interest equalization tax." However, Canadian representatives stated that this would require a very substantial rise in the entire Canadian interest rate structure. It was recognized by both Governments that such a development would be undesirable in the present economic circumstances.

¹ Released simultaneously at Ottawa and Washington on July 21 (Treasury Department press release).

foreign securities already owned by Americans, or to the purchase of securities by foreigners. Underwriters and dealers would be exempted from the tax on stock or securities resold to foreigners as part of the distribution of a new issue. But all Americans who purchase new or outstanding foreign securities from foreign issuers or owners would be subject to this tax. In order to avoid unfair burdens on transactions which are nearly complete, the tax should not apply to offerings of securities for which active registration statements are now on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Purchase commitments which have already been made should also not be affected.

The Secretary of the Treasury is submitting the details of this proposal to the Congress; and I have been assured that the House Ways and Means Committee will be prepared to give high

In the light of this situation U.S. officials agreed that the draft legislation to be submitted to the Congress would include a provision authorizing a procedure under which the President could modify the application of the tax by the establishment from time to time of exemptions, which he could make either unlimited or limited in amount. The President would thus have the flexibility to permit tax-free purchases of new issues needed to maintain the unimpeded flow of trade and payments between the two countries, and to take care of exceptional situations that might arise in the case of other countries. U.S. officials made clear that this did not modify their proposals regarding the taxation of transactions in outstanding securities; over the past year such transactions between Canada and the U.S. have not been a major factor.

The Canadian authorities stated that it would not be the desire or intention of Canada to increase her foreign exchange reserves through the proceeds of borrowings in the U.S., and it is the hope and expectation of both Governments that by maintaining close consultation it will prove possible in practice to have an unlimited exemption for Canada without adverse effects on the United States.

It was agreed that active consultations would continue to strengthen the close economic relations between the two countries and at the same time facilitate measures for making the maximum practicable contribution to economic expansion and the strength and stability of both currencies.

priority to this proposal after action has been taken with respect to the overall program of tax reduction and reform now before it. Since the effectiveness of this tax requires its immediate application, I am asking Congress to make the legislation effective from the date of this message.³ The Internal Revenue Service will promptly make available all instructions necessary for interim fulfillment of the provisions of this recommendation, pending the enactment of legislation by the Congress.

³ The Treasury Department announced at 6:15 p.m. on July 18 that "purchasers of foreign securities traded on a national securities exchange registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission would not be subject to the Interest Equalization Tax proposed by the President in his Message to the Congress today on purchases made on such exchanges prior to and including August 16, 1963."

6. Investment by Foreign Savers in the Securities of U.S. Private Companies

Investment by foreign savers in the securities of U.S. private companies has fallen rapidly to less than \$150 million in 1962. The better climate for investment that will flow from enactment of the program for tax reduction and reform now before the Congress will do much to improve this situation but a direct action program is also needed to promote oversea sales of securities of U.S. companies. Such a program should also be designed to increase foreign participation in the financing of new or expanded operations on the part of U.S. companies operating abroad.

To meet these two facets of a single problem, a new and positive program should be directed to the following areas of effort:

(a) The identification and critical appraisal of the legal, administrative and institutional restrictions remaining in the capital markets of other industrial nations of the free world which prevent the purchase of American securities and hamper U.S. companies in financing their operations abroad from non-U.S. sources;

(b) A review of U.S. Government and private activities which adversely affect foreign purchase of the securities of U.S. private companies; and

(c) A broad and intensive effort by the U.S. financial community to market securities of U.S. private companies to foreign investors, and to increase the availability of foreign financing for U.S. business operating abroad.

Such a program will necessarily involve a pooling of the know-how and efforts of the Government and the financial community. I have asked the Treasury Department, in consultation with the State Department, to develop an organization plan and program.

The increased freedom of capital movement and increased participation by foreign citizens and financial institutions in the ownership and financing of American business, toward which these efforts are directed, will serve to strengthen the economic and political ties of the free world as well as its monetary system. Securities of U.S. private firms could be and should be one of our best selling exports. An

increasing foreign investment in these securities will encourage a more balanced two-way capital traffic between the United States and other capital markets and minimize the impact of net long-term capital outflows from the United States on our balance of payments.

7. Special Government Transactions

Special Government transactions covered \$1.4 billion of our deficit in 1962. These included prepayment of debt by foreign countries, advance payments on military purchases here, and the issuance by the Treasury of medium-term securities to foreign official holders of dollars. Further debt prepayment is expected in 1963—France has just announced a prepayment of \$160 million—but it is clear that these are temporary gains which cannot be repeated for very long. Nor is it likely that advance payments on military purchases will again be large, as the pace of deliveries against purchases is now rising.

Therefore, as our continuing balance of payments deficit leads to accruals of dollars by foreign central banks, exceeding the size of the dollar balances which they normally carry, it has been particularly helpful that a number of foreign governments and central banks have begun purchasing a new type of nonmarketable, medium-term Treasury security, denominated either in dollars or in their own currencies, as a convenient alternative to the purchase of gold. Some \$610 million of such securities have been newly issued thus far in 1963.

Further debt prepayments and further sales of these securities during the remainder of this year will reflect the unprecedented degree of cooperation now prevailing in international finance and the growing recognition that correction of payments imbalances is a responsibility of the surplus as well as the deficit countries. In this spirit we shall also continue to press for a fuller and fairer sharing of the burdens of defense and aid and for the reduction or elimination of the trade barriers which impede our exports.

8. Gold Sales and Increased Dollar Holdings

Gold sales and increased dollar holdings serve to finance what remains of our deficit after spe-

United States Authorized To Make Drawing From IMF

The International Monetary Fund announced on July 18 that it had entered into a standby arrangement that authorizes the United States to draw the currencies of other members of the Fund up to an amount equal to \$500 million during the next 12 months. The quota of the United States in the Fund is \$4,125 million, of which \$1,031 million has been paid in gold. The amount of the standby arrangement represents a little less than half the amount the United States could draw on a virtually automatic basis under Fund practice.

The United States has not previously made use of the Fund's resources. Drawings of U.S. dollars from the Fund by other members have amounted to approximately \$4.2 billion since the Fund's operations began in 1947. In recent years Fund policy has encouraged drawings in non-dollar currencies and repayments to the Fund in U.S. dollars. This policy has provided assistance in financing the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit. As a result of repayments, the Fund's dollar holdings are now almost at the subscription level, which is 75 percent of quota or about \$3 billion, and the Articles of Agreement prevent repayment to the Fund with U.S. dollars beyond that level. In these circumstances the standby arrangement, which is available for general balance-of-payments needs, is intended to facilitate repayments by other members. This would be accomplished through United States drawings of other convertible currencies, which would be sold to Fund members for dollars and used by them to make repayments to the Fund.

cial governmental transactions. In 1962, this deficit amounted to approximately \$2.2 billion. It was financed by the sale of \$890 million in gold and \$17 million of our holdings of foreign exchange as well as by an increase in foreign holdings of dollars and U.S. Government securities amounting to \$653 million, and an increase of \$626 million in the holdings of dollars by the International Monetary Fund.

The total outflow of gold for the 2 years 1961 and 1962 combined only slightly exceeded the outflow in the single year 1960; and the outflow in 1963 is running at a rate well below last year. Since the rise in short-term interest resulting from the recent action of the Federal Reserve will make it considerably more attractive for foreigners to hold their assets in dollars, in-

cluding short-term U.S. Government securities, prospects are improved that increased foreign holdings of these assets instead of gold will finance a still larger share of our deficit.

9. The International Monetary Fund

The International Monetary Fund, however, presents a different situation. Last year the Fund's dollar holdings increased as other countries paid off their debts in dollars and concentrated new borrowings in other convertible currencies to the extent practicable. But the Fund's rules provide that, except in the case of a drawing—that is, a borrowing—it cannot hold more of any currency than was paid in at the time of original subscription (in effect, 75 percent); and the Fund's holdings of dollars have now nearly reached that level.

To meet this situation, the United States has requested, and the Executive Board of the IMF has approved, a \$500 million standby arrangement which authorizes us to draw on the Fund from time to time during the coming year. It is our intention to utilize this authority for the purpose of facilitating repayments which are expected to total about \$500 million during the course of the next 12 months. When a country desires to repay the Fund, we will draw convertible foreign currencies from the Fund, paying for them with dollars. The country making the repayment will use its own dollars to buy these foreign currencies from us in order to repay the Fund. All transfers will take place at par. Thus the Fund will continue to finance a portion of our deficit by increasing its holdings of dollars and its various debtors will continue to have a simple and costless method by which they can redeem their obligations to the Fund. The alternative, under present circumstances, now that they cannot pay off directly in dollars, would have been either to buy gold from the United States with which to repay the Fund, or to purchase other convertible currencies in the market with their dollars at extra cost and inconvenience.

Drawings by the United States under this new arrangement will be repayable in 3 years with a 2-year extension available if needed. No interest will be payable, but the drawing will be subject to a one-time service charge of one-half of 1 percent.

10. Evolution of International Monetary System

During the past 2 years great progress has been made in strengthening the basic fabric of the international monetary system upon which the whole free world depends. Far closer cooperation among the central banks of the leading industrial countries has been achieved. Reciprocal credit arrangements have been established to meet instantly any disruptive disturbance to international payments—arrangements which successfully contained the monetary repercussions of the Berlin crisis in 1961, the heavy pressure on the Canadian dollar in the spring of 1962, the Cuban crisis last autumn, the reaction that followed the exclusion of the United Kingdom from the Common Market, and a number of less striking events that might, in other years, have set off dangerous rounds of currency speculation. An informal but highly effective operating relationship has grown up among a number of the same countries with respect to the London gold market, ruling out for the future any repetition of the alarming rise in the price of gold which created such uncertainty in October 1960. Finally, 10 of the leading industrial countries have established a \$6 billion facility for providing supplemental resources to the International Monetary Fund, which will be available in the event of any threat to the stability of the international monetary system.⁴

The net result has been to provide strong defenses against successful raids on a major currency. Our efforts to strengthen these defenses will continue. While this process is taking place, the United States will continue to study and discuss with other countries measures which might be taken for a further strengthening of the international monetary system over the longer run. The U.S. interest in the continuing evolution of the system inaugurated at the time of Bretton Woods is not a result of our current payments deficit—rather it reflects our concern that adequate provision be made for the growth of international liquid-

ity to finance expanding world trade over the years ahead. Indeed, one of the reasons that new sources of liquidity may well be needed is that, as we close our payments gap, we will cut down our provision of dollars to the rest of the world.

As yet, this Government is not prepared to recommend any specific prescription for long-term improvement of the international monetary system. But we are studying the matter closely; we shall be discussing possible improvements with our friends abroad; and our minds will be open to their initiatives. We share their view that the problem of improving the payments mechanism is one that demands careful joint deliberation. At the same time, we do not pretend that talk of long-range reform of the system is any substitute for the actions that we ourselves must take now.

The Promise of the Future

Full implementation of the program of action I have outlined today should lead to substantial improvement in our international payments. The rate of Government expenditures abroad will drop by \$900 million over the next 18 months, and the combined effect of the increase in short-term interest rates and the interest equalization tax should equal, and more probably exceed, this figure. Gains of this magnitude—approximately \$2 billion—will give us the time our basic long-term program needs to improve our international competitive position, and increase the attraction for investment in the United States.

These two objectives must be the basis of any permanent closing of the payments gap, and this program will achieve them without threatening our growth at home. It will also do so without compromising our adherence to the principles of freer trade and free movements of capital. It will, in fact, help prevent pressures for more restrictive measures. In short, while we must intensify our efforts, we can do so with full confidence in the future.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 18, 1963.*

⁴ BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187, and Nov. 19, 1962, p. 795.

Secretary Rusk Discusses Appropriation Request Before Senate Committee

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

I welcome this opportunity to appear before you in support of the appropriation request of the Department of State for fiscal year 1964. The Assistant Secretaries and other principal officers of the Department will appear before you later to discuss the details of the budget estimates for their respective areas of responsibility.

Mr. Chairman, first I would like to present a brief statement concerning our 1964 budget estimates and then, if the committee is agreeable, to discuss in executive session some of the more important aspects of the international situation.

Unsettled world conditions continue to add to the work of the Department and therefore to its costs of operation. In the past year the placement of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, the India-China border dispute, forceful as well as peaceful changes in foreign governments, continued problems in the Congo, as well as a number of major problems in the NATO alliance and other areas of our international relations, have strained the Department's resources of people and money. Our budget for 1964 was drawn up after careful analysis of our needs and after we had taken a number of steps to improve the organization and management of the Department to promote greater efficiency and economy of operations.

Together with Under Secretary Ball and other senior colleagues, I held hearings in my office extending over a number of weeks this past year on the budget estimates submitted by

the Assistant Secretaries. We did not look solely at costs in their areas but reviewed critically their management practices and the manner in which their work was being carried out. The result of this review, I believe, has been an across-the-board improvement in the efficiency of the Department's operations. We gave special attention, of course, to those items for which added funds were requested, trimming them down to the lowest levels consistent with program needs.

The budget² presented to the Congress last January reflected these efforts to tighten our administrative processes, at home and abroad, to adjust our organization to the highest priority needs, and to use our resources prudently.

In our continuing search for economy we have been able to take a number of actions to reduce the cost of operations. For example, we expect to announce shortly the closing of a number of consular posts in several countries abroad. We have established a new tour-of-duty policy to lengthen the duration of assignments to both hardship and nonhardship posts. We are using economy air accommodations for travel within the United States, and between the United States and Western Europe and the Caribbean area. State, AID [Agency for International Development], and USIA [U.S. Information Agency] are jointly engaged in establishing consolidated administrative organizations to provide common services to all

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Appropriations on July 16 (press release 376).

² For excerpts from the budget dealing with international affairs, see BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 224.

agencies at a number of posts abroad. We have a regional finance center in Paris which performs payrolling and other fiscal services for posts in 41 countries of Europe and Africa.

As this committee knows, the House did not approve a substantial portion of the increase requested in our appropriations for 1964. Realizing that the House action indicates a desire to restrict expansion to a minimum, we have reviewed our original estimates and have further trimmed them to eliminate those items of increase which we believe can be deferred. However, we find it necessary to urge the Senate to amend the appropriations as passed by the House. The presentation now before you requests increases in several appropriations which I consider necessary in the national interest.

The Department requested appropriations for 1964 totaling \$359,721,000. The House in H.R. 1063 approved appropriations totaling \$305,551,000.

Their action reflected a failure to appropriate \$27,000,000 for the foreign buildings program because new authorizing legislation had not been enacted. The request submitted to this committee in the amount of \$26,040,000 is based on authorizing legislation approved by both the House and the Senate, but on which final action is still pending.

The House action also involved a reduction of \$13,725,000 in our request for educational and cultural exchange. We ask that the amount approved by the House be increased by \$11,130,000, primarily to permit expansion of the exchange-of-persons program.

Finally, the House action involved reductions of a total of \$13,945,000 for all other appropriations, including the ordinary operations of the Department. In this category we request restoration of \$9,680,000 for the following items:

Salaries and expenses	\$6,818,000
Acquisition, operation, and maintenance of buildings abroad (special foreign currency program)	1,150,000
Missions to international organizations	225,000
International conferences and contingencies	197,000
International fisheries commissions	143,000
Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West	1,147,000

Salaries and Expenses

The House bill provides \$153,000,000, an increase of \$5,451,500 above amounts appropriated for 1963, but a reduction of \$9,800,000 below our estimates.

The House allowance, as indicated in the committee report,³ will cover mandatory increases in the costs of doing business—such items as pay-increase costs, within-grade promotions, overseas wage and price increases, and pay in excess of 52-week base. It will also provide operating funds—but no new positions—for eight new posts and most of the funds requested for home leave and transfer travel.

The amount in the House bill does not, however, provide funds for any of the new positions requested or for any of the nonmandatory but highly desirable increases requested for operating expenses.

We are requesting your consideration of increases above the House bill totaling 435 positions and \$6,818,000. The material which has been furnished to the committee shows the distribution of this request by major organization unit, and each Assistant Secretary concerned will present his own case during the course of these hearings. But I would like to highlight briefly the main elements of our request.

Last year the Department held the line on positions; we did not ask for a single additional position. Our concentration was on the urgent need to obtain a better balance in resources—to obtain adequate support for our personnel to enable them to get the best job done in the Department and in the field. This is still our goal.

The decision to absorb our increased workload without increasing our staff was taken with the knowledge that we would have to shift personnel to meet the new requirements. We have done this. However, current developments are such that I believe we have reached, for the present, the limit in this direction. This does not imply a change in policy. It simply means that increased workloads and new requirements which have been assigned to us and which we have had to assume require additional people.

³ H. Rept. 388, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

We are requesting, therefore, funds for 435 additional positions—132 in Washington and 303 overseas.

Many factors contribute to make up the increased staff requirements. We have scaled down our original request for 570, but we believe that additional manpower is required to meet important and high-priority needs.

Commercial staff (129 positions). The Departments of State and Commerce are engaged in an intensive effort to develop export markets and expand our trade to reduce the gold outflow. Secretary [Luther H.] Hodges and I join in endorsing this request to increase the capability of our posts abroad to assist American businessmen in finding new markets. A representative of the Department of Commerce will discuss this matter further during the course of these hearings. The request includes 48 officers, 5 American clerks, and 76 local nationals.

Specialized attachés (11 positions). The Departments of Labor, Interior, and Commerce have submitted urgent requests for assignment of additional officers at a few key posts abroad to enable us more adequately to represent United States interests in science, minerals, labor, fisheries, and civil aviation matters. The request includes 6 officers and 5 American clerks.

New posts (58 positions). Funds are requested to put us in position to open and staff five new posts in Africa and three in the Far East. The proposed locations of these posts, and the need for them, will be discussed with the committee in executive session. The request includes 15 officers, 10 American clerks, and 33 local nationals.

Consular workload (80 positions). The passport and visa workload continues to rise at home and abroad. Requests for passports have increased by more than one-third since 1958. In fiscal year 1963 more than 1 million passports were issued, exceeding our estimates. A further increase is expected in 1964, and additional personnel is necessary so that we may continue to satisfy the public demand for prompt service. Increases in visa workloads at posts for which additional personnel are requested ranged from 15 to 40 percent in fiscal year 1962. The request includes 20 officers and

30 clerks for work in the United States and 9 officers and 21 local nationals overseas.

Intelligence and research (35 positions). These positions are requested to help the Bureau of Intelligence and Research meet the demands made upon it, especially in view of the heavily increased work entailed by our relations with 111 countries and the increased pace of events related to critical areas and problems. The request includes 22 officers and 13 clerks.

Public information (15 positions). Additional staff is required for the Bureau of Public Affairs to improve our public information operations and meet rapidly increasing public demand for information about United States foreign policy problems. The request includes 8 officers and 7 clerks.

Special Latin American program (30 positions). Additional personnel are needed to strengthen our ability to deal with critical problems in Latin America, in such areas as tax reform, political organizations, and rural affairs. These positions will give us a pool of manpower to deal with critical areas for relatively short periods of time without the necessity of permanently increasing the staff at a particular post. Despite shifts of positions among posts, our resources have not been adequate to meet the recurring and difficult crises that face us in many areas of Latin America. The request includes 4 officers and 2 clerks in Washington and 20 officers and 4 clerks overseas.

Training (31 positions). This increased staff will improve our training program, particularly in African and South Asian languages. The request provides for linguists to develop instructional material in several languages for which we do not now have an adequate program of instruction, and the assignment of additional officers for full-time training in hard languages as a further step toward overcoming our present shortage. The total request includes 6 officers and 6 clerks for the staff of the Foreign Service Institute and 19 training positions.

Security (17 positions). Our security staffs in Washington and abroad should be strengthened. The request includes 7 officers to meet increased investigative workload in the United States and 8 officers and 2 clerks overseas, pri-

marily for regional offices and posts in Africa where security staff has not kept pace with expanded operations in the new African countries.

International organization affairs (7 positions). Our participation in the United Nations and other international organizations continues to grow. The U.N. is deeply involved in the problems of disarmament, peacekeeping machinery, outer space, and economic and social developments; the specialized agencies of the U.N. and other international organizations are continually expanding their diversified programs; international conferences continue at an ever increasing pace. The request includes 4 officers and 3 clerks to strengthen the staff of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs dealing with these subjects.

Overseas staff (22 positions). This request includes 5 officers, 7 clerks, and 10 local nationals for slight strengthening of the staffs at 16 posts in Africa, the Near East, and the Far East.

Of the total increase of \$6,818,000 requested above the House bill, \$3,453,646 is required for salaries and expenses for the 435 positions. The remaining \$3,364,354 is to provide increases in travel, equipment replacement, and other support funds to give our people at home and abroad better facilities to work with.

Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Activities

Our request for mutual educational and cultural exchange was \$55,975,000. The House approved \$42,250,000, a reduction of \$13,725,000. However, since we anticipate the availability of \$1,100,000 in reserve funds already on hand in binational commissions and foundations, the House action represents an effective cut of \$12,625,000. I strongly urge restoration of \$11,130,000.

This amount would provide our full budget request for an expansion of our exchange-of-persons programs for Africa, the American Republics, Eastern Europe, the Far East, and the Near East and South Asia.

These programs should go forward to meet the expanding needs and opportunities in countries all around the world. Exchange-of-persons programs have unique utility in our relations with the rest of the world. They play an

essential role by forming the kind of positive, constructive relationships on which peace and security depend.

That these programs are effective was documented by the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs in a report⁴ to the Congress earlier this year. This distinguished group of citizens was appointed by President Kennedy a year and a half ago, under authorization of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. In that act the Congress asked the Commission to make a special study of the effectiveness of past programs. On the basis of extensive interviews with former exchangees and others with special knowledge, in the United States and in other countries, the Commission said the exchange-of-persons program over the last 15 years has demonstrated clearly and beyond question its rewarding effectiveness.

I believe we have in the exchange programs that the Fulbright-Hays Act makes possible one of the most powerful, although quiet, elements in our foreign policy. We are asking the Congress to strengthen exchange-of-persons programs as a proven and powerful force for mutual understanding and for peace.

Foreign Buildings

The House did not approve any funds for the foreign buildings program because new authorizing legislation had not been enacted. Our request was for \$27,000,000.

We now request an amendment to the House version of the bill to provide \$26,040,000 for this program, the amount recommended in the conference report⁵ on the authorizing bill (H.R. 5207), which the Senate has approved. We shall be happy to discuss this request, Mr. Chairman, if the committee desires. However, since final action has not been taken by the Congress on H.R. 5207, perhaps this should be deferred for the time being.

We are requesting restoration of \$1,150,000 in the foreign buildings special foreign-currency

⁴ H. Doc. 93, 88th Cong., 1st sess.; for a Department announcement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 617.

⁵ H. Rept. 497, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

program for the proposed U.S. Information Service building in New Delhi, a project deleted by the House but which we believe is of high priority.

Missions to International Organizations

The Department requested \$2,745,000 for the expenses of the missions which represent us in the international organizations in which the United States participates. The House approved \$2,500,000, a reduction of \$245,000.

We are requesting restoration of \$225,000, primarily for the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York and the U.S. Mission to International Organizations at Geneva. The increase in recent years of United Nations membership and the complexity and number of General Assembly agenda items require strengthening of our mission in New York.

Of particular urgency is the need to strengthen the staff of our mission at Geneva during the period of preparation for negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act and to improve its administrative facilities to better support our delegations to the numerous international conferences which meet there.

International Conferences and Contingencies

The budget request for expenses of participation in international conferences was \$2,170,000. The House approved \$1,943,000, a reduction of \$227,000. We are requesting restoration of \$197,000 primarily for four areas of conference activity: the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development scheduled for the spring of 1964; telecommunications conferences, particularly the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference for Space Allocation; inter-American conferences; and conferences of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

International Fisheries Commissions

We requested \$2,053,000 for the United States share of eight international fisheries commissions. The House approved \$1,910,000, a reduction of \$143,000. We request restoration of the full amount, which will provide the United States share of the planned programs for next

year which have been approved by the commissions.

East-West Cultural Center

The 1964 request for the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West in Hawaii was \$5,690,000. The House approved \$4,460,000, a reduction of \$1,230,000.

Our present request is for an increase of \$1,147,000 above the amount in the House bill, distributed by major projects as follows:

\$534,000 in additional operating expenses for staff salary increments, increased costs, and support to the programs of the Institute of Advanced Projects;

\$313,000 to permit continuation at the 1963 level of the senior scholar program; and

\$300,000 for preparation of construction plans for a building for the Institute of Advanced Projects and for a residence apartment for married students.

That concludes my statement concerning our 1964 budget needs, Mr. Chairman, and now, if it would be of interest to the committee, I should like to discuss some aspects of the international situation in executive session. This may assist you in understanding the role of the Department and in evaluating our budgetary requests during the hearings which will follow.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Part 4, March 13 and June 20, 1963, 177 pp.; Part 6, June 14, 1963, 67 pp.; Part 7, March 25, 1963, 149 pp.

Government Information Plans and Policies (Part 1). Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. News Media Panel Discussion, March 19, 1963; Department of State-Department of Defense, March 25, 1963. 174 pp.

Make Counterpart Funds Available for Agricultural Conferences. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Operations of the House Committee on Agriculture on H.R. 4914 and H.R. 5380. Serial M. May 7 and 8, 1963. 32 pp.

Problems of the Domestic Textile Industry. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee. May 22-23, 1963. 250 pp.

An Emerging Consensus on Economic and Social Development

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

I welcome this opportunity to join again for a few days in the work of the Economic and Social Council. I wish that no other need existed for the United Nations but the work of this Council for the betterment of man's life.

To me, therefore, it is regrettable that the economic and social work of the United Nations, like an iceberg, all too often is submerged in the political seas that rage around us. And even in those relative moments of calm when the world sees the submerged iceberg, I don't think it realizes its depth or magnitude and that, out of every 20 persons employed by the United Nations system, 17 are involved in raising the standards of life on our planet.

The fact, however, that our sights are focused in this Decade of Development on attaining today the expectations of tomorrow is apparent from the rich variety of the agenda. It runs the full gamut of the world's economic and social problems.

But what we—any of us—say here will be as nothing unless what we do here enhances the dignity of man and offers real opportunities to him and to his children to share the abundant blessings of our earth.

The range and variety of our agenda is, of course, a reflection of the world around us. It may belabor the obvious to say that ours is a world of multiple revolutions, of vast ferment,

of pervasive change, of political turmoil. A great American jurist—Oliver Wendell Holmes—who was quoted here only yesterday once said: "We need education in the obvious more than investigation of the obscure." And I suspect that this observation has never been more apt than it is today. So let me begin, if I may, by taking a few moments to embroider the obvious.

Within the very recent past, discovery of some of the secrets of the atom has put such destructive force into the hands of great powers that the whole purpose of armed struggle is becoming meaningless and the conventional wisdom about national security which has instructed the leaders of all states in all times past has suddenly become obsolete.

Within the very recent past, scientific discoveries have so extended the average span of life that the population expansion threatens to cancel out our best efforts to improve living standards.

Within the very recent past, nearly half a hundred new nations have gained independence—and with it the risks and perils of self-government.

Within the very recent past, we have become grimly aware of the intolerable contradiction of want in the midst of plenty, of surplus food in the midst of hunger, of burgeoning knowledge in the midst of ignorance. And we have become aware too, only very recently, of the complex ways in which our nations are inter-

¹ Made before the 36th session of the Economic and Social Council at Geneva, Switzerland, on July 10 (U.S./U.N. press release 4227 dated July 12).

dependent. Science, transport, communications, economics, and politics have all become international concerns.

For these and other reasons, our age is one of contradiction, paradox, and crisis, and there are good and sufficient reasons for all the ferment and turbulence of our times, for all the complexity and danger of our affairs, and, therefore, for all the variety of the agenda before us.

I believe we should try to identify what is common within the diversity, what is simple beneath the complexities, what is lasting within the tides of change. It would be well to take our bearings and let such clarity as there is shine through the confusion. And I like to believe, Mr. President, that clarity is, in fact, beginning to shine through confusion in at least five important areas.

Complexity of Development Process

To begin with, in the area of economic and social development, we are beginning to see the job as a whole. As nation after nation struggles to come to grips with the hard realities of national development, as we together seek to transform the United Nations Decade of Development from slogan to reality, we sense an emerging consensus along these lines:

First, there is no one formula for the organization of developing societies to speed them from traditional to modern economies. Each society must be organized in the light of its own history, culture, resources, and stage of development.

Second, there is no one sector of the economy which, by forced-draft growth, will carry automatically the rest of the economy along with it. The interrelationships between agriculture and industry and transport, between these and education or health or housing, between all these and political action plus institution building—all these relations are direct enough and complex enough for us to see now that development depends on more or less simultaneous growth in all major sectors of economic and social activity. There are relative priorities, but there are no absolute priorities.

Third, science and technology have no inherently magical qualities; nor can they be dug up from one cultural setting and transplanted

intact to another. What works in one place may need adaptation before it will work in another, and the process of adaptation requires scientific and technological institutions in the developing countries, which in turn require specialists, and specialists in turn require training. And every community also requires social conditions which will make people receptive to scientific thought and technical progress.

Fourth, external assistance is vital; but it is also useless except as a critical supplement of a national effort that engages the material and human resources of the whole developing nation.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that we are approaching a consensus of these basic points about the development problem. If their net meaning is that the development process is a very complex affair, it is nonetheless clarifying to dispel false dogma and be done with illusion. These basic points raise practical questions for us about the adequacy and relevance of the plans and the programs of the United Nations system of agencies, about organization and coordination, about staffing and training, to make good the promise of the Development Decade to which we are all pledged.

We cannot work effectively on these gigantic tasks in isolation from one another, nor can we make progress with blind optimism, fatuous oversimplification of our difficulties, or with cynical resignation. We are dealing with people. And man is not just an economic factor, nor are all his motives material. He is complex, capricious, selfish, yet at times incredibly noble. Our approach to making the most out of what we have must therefore be a comprehensive approach to profound international problems. And we dare not give up in impatience as the struggle becomes dreary or protracted.

Peaceful Change in Human Affairs

The second area in which I believe that clarity is emerging through confusion is in our thinking about peace—and not only peace in the negative sense of the absence of war but peace in the positive sense of peaceful change in human affairs, which is our concern here in the Economic and Social Council.

Last month President Kennedy said:²

Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. . . . World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor; it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement.

Thus does clarity begin to emerge on the subject of peace itself—a method of peace, a way to make peace operational in an imperfect and changing world, as we make peace operational within imperfect and changing national societies.

This is why the United Nations can succeed where the League of Nations failed: because it has some capacity for securing peaceful change—by peaceful settlement of disputes, by helping to guide nations peacefully from dependence to independence, by helping to promote economic and social change, and by helping to lift peacefully the stifling weight of custom, law, tradition, and prejudice which allocates the rights of the individual in so many parts of the world.

Yet even today there are those who seem to favor peace but object to peaceful change—and those who favor change even at the risk of making the peace. So the test of the United Nations is whether it can acquire a sufficient authority to bring about peaceful change—in political affairs, in economic and social affairs, and in human rights. This realization, this understanding, which is spreading gradually, also helps to let clarity through the apparent confusion of our affairs.

And this is why, Mr. President, my Government supports, and will continue to support, every sound move not only to extend and improve the machinery of the United Nations for preventing war but for insuring peaceful change in human affairs.

Central Role of Human Rights

The next and third area in which I feel a new clarity emerging is in human rights—in the rather sudden discovery, that is, of the central role of human rights in all our affairs. Perhaps it is not even enough to speak of a central

role for human rights; for the real point is that human rights are the heart and the core of nearly everything we do and try to do.

To be more explicit, I feel we have put much too narrow a construction on the term “human rights.” The subjects we have dealt with under that rubric include what we refer to in my country as the “civil rights” guaranteed by our Constitution: the right to vote, the right to free speech and free press and free assembly and freedom of religious practice. These rights, of course, are at the heart of the democratic system—the first freedoms of a society built upon respect for the inherent dignity and equality of all men.

Parenthetically I want to say that in my country too many of our Negro citizens still do not enjoy their full civil rights—because ancient attitudes stubbornly resist change in spite of the vigorous official policy of the Government. But such indignities are an anachronism that no progressive society can tolerate, and the last vestiges must be abolished with all possible speed. Actually in the past few years we have made more progress in achieving full equality of rights and opportunities for all of our citizens than during any comparable period since Abraham Lincoln’s Proclamation of Emancipation freed our Republic and our national conscience from a heavy burden 100 years ago.

The very struggles which now call worldwide attention to our shame are themselves signs of a progress that will be increasingly visible in the months ahead. The sound and fury about racial equality that fill our press and airwaves are the sounds of the great thaw; the logjam of the past is breaking up.

And the attainment of equality for all in America should give the cause of human rights a great impetus throughout the globe. I would hope that it would also set an example of how democracy seeks a solution of its most stubborn ills—not secretly or furtively but openly for all to hear and see.

Turning from civil rights in the United States, it is important to bear in mind that the concept of human rights—with its symbols of courts and laws, speeches and meetings, churches and periodicals—has been broadened in both theory and practice in recent times.

²BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

This expansion of the human rights idea grew out of the rising conviction that freedom to starve, or to sleep without shelter, or to die for lack of medical care, are not among the inalienable rights of men.

When in 1941 President Roosevelt looked forward to a world "founded upon four essential human freedoms," the first two—"freedom of speech and expression" and "freedom of every person to worship God in his own way"—were restatements of freedoms already guaranteed by many constitutions. But the third was a more recent idea. It was "freedom from want," which, said President Roosevelt, "translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world."

And the fourth, of course, was "freedom from fear," which means a worldwide reduction of armaments so that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.

I need not dwell on the point that nearly everything we deal with in the Economic and Social Council has to do with freedom from want and that we are, then, dealing basically with human rights. Nor need I stress that wherever disarmament is under discussion, wherever the subject is machinery for keeping the peace and managing peaceful change, there too the underlying issue is freedom from fear—and thus human rights.

What I want to emphasize is this: As we come to see that, beneath the various functional labels like agriculture and health and education and labor, lurks the human rights issue of freedom from want, as we begin to realize that, behind the technical language about disarmament and truce supervision and mediation and such, lies the human rights issue of freedom from fear, we are seeing through the complexity of our affairs, we are glimpsing what is simple and raw and permanent in the swirling events of our times, and we are revealing the link that binds together nearly everything we are discussing—the human being and his rights as an individual. President Kennedy made the ultimate point last month when he said: "... is not peace ... basically a matter of human rights?"

The Directions in Which We Want To Move

Mr. President, I believe that clarity is emerging on another point. In the midst of all the turmoil of our multiple revolutions, our high tides of change, we are beginning to see what counts is the direction in which we are moving. The directions in which we want to move, of course, are:

- toward self-determination for all peoples
- toward freedom from want,
- toward freedom from fear,
- toward acceptance and guarantees of full human rights for the individual human being

It is important to note here that the goals are distant, that they are relative and not absolute that they keep changing and will change again and that, as a practical matter, some have to be reached before others.

I need only mention that political independence for a nation as a whole does not by itself bring political rights to the individual citizen of the country, and that even if the political rights of the last citizen have been secured, this does not by itself bring him freedom from want or freedom from fear.

To dream of securing human rights at once is a fell swoop is as great a fantasy as to dream of securing peace by the single act. For the securing of human rights, like the inseparable task of securing the peace, is not a single step but a long process—and like peace it is the "product of many nations, the sum of many acts."

The key question, I repeat, is whether we are moving in the right direction—toward self-determination, toward freedom from want, toward freedom from fear, toward guaranteeing the rights of the individual person. Once we are moving in the right general direction, once change is impelling us toward those distant, relative, and shifting goals, then reasonable men can dispute the question of whether the movement is too slow or too fast, too erratic or too steady.

There is no slogan or banner or name or ideological formulation that will tell us just what kind or what degree or what rate of change is most desirable in all situations. What we do know is that movement must be fast enough to

prevent a buildup of pressure to an explosion point and not so fast that all order is swept away in the process. To find that balance, and to keep the rate of change within these limits, is the most challenging task of the United Nations and of leaders of good will everywhere; indeed, this is exactly the purpose and the meaning of the whole system of world order we have been trying to construct for the past 16 years: to promote changes for the better in the condition of mankind and to do so peacefully.

Surely this is within our reach. But surely the whole system is threatened when change is promoted at such breakneck speed that order breaks down and the peace is endangered. And even more surely is the whole system threatened when there is adamant opposition to any change at all.

Historically, we have seen both extremes. We have seen a world—not so very long ago—of which it could be said that every regime in power was devoted basically to the perpetuation of the *status quo*, to the prevention of change. We have seen a period—and we are not yet out of it—in which loud voices were raised on behalf of massive change by massive violence. There is no peace—and no human rights—in either extreme.

Peace and human rights—peace with freedom from want and freedom from fear and freedom for the individual—can come only through steady, persistent, manageable, peaceful change in the direction of these goals.

Responsibilities of U.N. Membership

Finally, Mr. President, I like to believe that there is a fifth area of clarity emerging; at least I hope this is the case. And this is awareness of the responsibility that goes with membership in international organizations, a sense of loyalty to the agency itself, a recognition that the lasting integrity of the institution is more important than temporary political advantage, a feeling that we all have to play by the rules of the game.

No organization can long endure without the loyalty of its membership; the institution itself is something more than a collection of its members, as the whole is more than a sum of its

parts; and the game has no form or shape or purpose without established rules and no order unless the rules are followed until changed.

Of course, we pay a price for membership in international organizations. In exchange for access to any orderly system for conducting our affairs, we agree to be bound by the rules and procedures of that system; in exchange for the rights of membership, we acknowledge the same rights for all other members; in exchange for privileges, we assume duties.

All this is difficult, often exasperating, and sometimes frustrating to all of us. Everyone prefers his own way to the way of accommodation with others; no one enjoys sitting still to hear another give voice to views which he abhors; we all find it difficult from time to time to respect procedures which seem to be getting in the way of our purposes.

But this, after all, is the democratic system at work, and the United Nations was founded as a forum in which opinions could be expressed and argued fully and freely, in which all decisions could be democratically arrived at. If that tradition should be altered now, we threaten not only the political future of the U.N. but its economic and social aims.

That would be a tragedy from which the developing countries would be the first to suffer. It is no accident that among the first acts of all the new states that have emerged in recent years is the application for membership in the United Nations. While we are all partners in this great enterprise, the first and foremost objective of the entire system of U.N. organizations in the economic and social field is to help the developing countries in their struggle for modernization. The U.N. is their instrument to accelerate their growth and to achieve a better life for their people. Nothing, therefore, should be done to blunt that instrument. Its effectiveness must not be impaired by attempts to enforce change by acts of impatience in violation of democratic principles and orderly procedures.

There are those who stubbornly resist change and uphold doctrines that are not in keeping with some of the basic principles of the charter. We deplore and reject such attitudes. We are also confident that they will not be able to

impede the growth of the U.N. and the achievement of its objectives. Moreover, one ignores the winds of change at his peril.

We believe, Mr. President, that we all have a responsibility for preserving and strengthening the great tradition of the charter and the system of international organization. And therefore we fervently hope that its constitutional integrity and the principle of full and free debate on which its survival depends will not be undermined, however great the provocation.

Specifics of Development Programs

Turning for a moment to the specifics of our development programs, let me say, Mr. President, that, in the opinion of my Government, attaining the objectives of the Development Decade will not only be the greatest possible achievement in this decade but it will also strengthen the United Nations in the other vital areas of peace and human rights. Habits of international cooperation developed in one area will spread to the others.

To achieve this great objective our organizations have taken many encouraging steps. Major emphasis has been put on the development of human resources, and the United Nations system expects to concentrate a great part of its activities during the decade on education and training of all types and all levels and on the more effective transfer of scientific and technical knowledge to the less developed countries.

WHO [World Health Organization] is becoming more and more effective in extending the foundations of public health.

ILO [International Labor Organization] plans to increase its activities in the fields of vocational training and management.

UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] has given new impetus to education and science.

The World Bank has expanded its economic development activities and enhanced its ability to provide advice.

The Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning, started a year ago, is already making notable contributions to development planning and the training of new leaders to translate plans into action. We look forward

to the establishment of similar institutions in Africa and Asia.

At United Nations headquarters the Economic Projections and Programming Centre will offer help with a great awareness of the relation of international developments to national economic policies.

The impressive speeches we have heard here confirm that the followup on the Conference on Science and Technology³ will be a critical factor in the future of the Development Decade.

The course of hunger and malnutrition still afflicts more than half of mankind, and the great World Food Congress in Washington last month⁴ expressed alarm at the extent to which the growth of population intensified human needs. Hence, my Government supports wholeheartedly and with high hopes the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign.

Our task in the Decade of Development involves social as well as technical change. For as we know, sustained economic development cannot occur unless rural populations are brought forward along with the rest of the country. In developing countries four-fifths of the people live in the rural area. They must develop the purchasing power to buy factory produced goods if industrial development is to go forward. The United Nations-FAO World Food Program, which is exploring new ways of using surplus food for purposes of development, has made a most encouraging start, and we look forward with hopeful interest to the further development of this experimental program.

But perhaps the most significant development during the past year has been in the field of international trade. I shall not dwell on preparations for the Conference on Trade and Development,⁵ but I do want to mention two significant actions by my Government. Last year I expressed the hope that the Congress of the United States would approve the Trade Expansion Act. It did, and with good luck and co-

³ For a statement by Secretary Rusk regarding the Conference, see *ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1963, p. 188.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 58.

⁵ For a statement by Isaiah Frank, see *ibid.*, July 21, 1963, p. 173.

operation on all sides, the effects might be more far-reaching than the Marshall Plan.

The United States will make full use of the new authority to widen markets for the raw materials and manufactures of the developing nations and to strengthen our efforts to end discriminatory and preferential trade agreements, which, in the long run, can only make everyone poorer and the free world less united.

Of particular significance to some of the developing countries is the authority to reduce or eliminate duties or import restrictions on tropical commodities. The Trade Expansion Act is also designed to afford greater access to our markets for the manufactured and semimanufactured products of these countries.

The United States has taken an increasingly active role in measures designed to stabilize and improve markets for primary commodities. An historical milestone was the negotiation last September of the International Coffee Agreement,⁶ since coffee is the most important agricultural commodity in international trade. The coffee agreement recognizes a mutuality of obligations of producers and consumers, and some developed countries could help by removing obstacles to consumption. But it is clear that in the long run good prices for coffee can be assured only if some producing countries take more promising steps to break the bonds of one-crop economies and develop all sectors of their economies.

Although we believe that exports must provide the major part of the foreign exchange required by developing countries, the United States remains committed to a program of assistance through both private enterprise and government aid. We have reexamined our assistance programs, and searching questions are now being asked of recipients with regard to per capita income and its distribution; the competence of the government, its sensitivity to the needs of the population; well-conceived, long-range economic development plans; the distribution and collection of taxes; the priority given to citizens who live in rural areas; land distribution and community development; the

⁶ For a statement by Ambassador Stevenson at the U.N. Coffee Conference on Sept. 28, 1962, see *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667.

climate and incentives for private investment, both foreign and domestic; and the effectiveness of controls over the expenditure of foreign exchange for luxury imports.

In the United States we are now placing increasing emphasis on the international institutions. The success of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the United Nations Special Fund, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association has encouraged us to urge their further development. And we are prepared to join with other countries in subscribing additional resources to IDA.

It is gratifying to note that the flow of financial assistance to the developing countries has increased substantially. The net flow of long-term capital to the developing countries rose from \$5.3 billion in 1959 to \$7.2 billion in 1961, a figure about twice as high as the annual average in 1951-1955. More than nine-tenths came from the members of OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], which is actively concerned with increasing the volume and effectiveness of such aid and capital.

We believe that one of the major contributions the United Nations itself can make to the success of the Development Decade is through the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund. My Government hopes that at the next pledging conference in October the goal of \$150 million set for these two programs will be reached—at long last. We expect to continue our pledge of \$60 million, subject to the condition that it shall not exceed 40 percent of the total pledge. Moreover, we welcome the suggestion of the Secretary-General to rationalize the top management of these two programs which are so closely related and complementary. While we should like to know more about this proposal, it strikes us as a first step in the right direction. We trust that thereafter we shall be able to move toward their closer integration.

I have talked of trade, industrial and food production, and aid. But economic advancement cannot long continue unless its fruits are shared widely and masses of people are motivated to participate in its success. I have heard

it argued that the secret of all development is steel and kilowatts. That might do for a mechanical world of robots but not for a flesh and blood world of men, a world—as the Secretary-General tells us in his shocking report on the world social situation⁷—in which the homeless, the unemployed, the halt and blind, the orphans, the delinquents, the aged derelicts, the unfortunate of every land, are larger in number than 13 years ago. And though educational opportunities are greater by far than ever before, in many areas the quality of teaching has declined and there are more illiterates today than 10 years ago.

I think, too, of the miraculous scientific advances that the world has seen in this generation—advances that have bypassed nearly a billion people who are suffering from a variety of diseases. While we in the United States, for example, look forward to refinements in cancer research, millions of people in Asia and Africa still die each year from dysentery.

Finding a solution to all these problems is a staggering task for the Decade of Development. And it poses a crisis—a social and economic crisis—more menacing, I would say, than even the spread of nuclear weapons.

But people are bound together not alone by mutual fears but by mutual hopes for the common good. And I think we have made some other promising beginnings. For example, much of value will be learned through the Research Institute for the Study of the Interaction of Economic and Social Factors in Development, made possible through the generosity of the Netherlands Government. We also note with great interest the proposal to establish a United Nations training and research institute. The Secretary-General has expressed his support for the proposal, and we emphatically agree with his appraisal. Such an institute could supply not only trained personnel but a better understanding of the operational potentials and limitations of the United Nations family of organizations.

To conclude these comments in the area of economic and social work, I repeat what I said at the outset: We are beginning to see the problem of development as a whole. We see that

⁷ U.N. doc. E/CN. 5/375 and Adds. 1 and 2.

many of the items on our agenda are not isolated projects but part and parcel of our efforts to deal with economic and social development as a whole. We see that our specialized agencies are not working in wholly separate fields of endeavor—not dealing with compartmentalized techniques and disciplines—but are coping with one or another part of a problem which is of a piece.

After 15 years of economic and social work we begin to see more clearly:

—that the development process involves all major sectors of economic and social life, all relevant technologies, and a combination of internal effort and external aid;

—that peace is a process, a system of resolving disputes and managing change through international institutions;

—that human rights are the ultimate business of nearly all that we do;

—that since our goals are never final, what counts is that change is taking place and that the trend is in the right direction; and finally

—that once we adopt the goals of peace and human rights, we are committed to peaceful change and to the responsibilities that go with it for orderly democratic procedures.

Mr. President, if the present meeting of the Economic and Social Council is guided by an emerging consensus on those points, it not only will deal with the items of our agenda but will help to illuminate and clarify the present state of human affairs. One could ask no more than that of this meeting.

International Coffee Council Meets

The Department of State announced on July 26 (press release 393) that Jerome Jacobson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, would head the U.S. delegation to the first meeting of the International Coffee Council, which will be held at London beginning July 29 for a period of 4 weeks.

The Council is the highest authority of the International Coffee Agreement, which came provisionally into force on July 1, 1963. It is expected that representatives from at least 27 exporting countries accounting for 90 percent

f world coffee exports and some 14 importing countries accounting for more than 80 percent of all imports will attend the meeting.

The chief purpose of the meeting will be to select key officers of the new coffee organization, establish export quotas for the coffee year beginning October 1, 1963, and make the necessary administrative arrangements for the operation of the agreement.

The U.S. delegation is listed below:

Delegate

Rome Jacobson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State

Alternate Delegates

Henry Brodie, Director, Office of International Resources, Department of State

Paul E. Callanan, Assistant Chief, Foodstuffs Division, Department of State

Government Advisers

Henry Bashkin, Department of Commerce

David Stoner, Department of State

Industry Advisers

John F. McKiernan, President, National Coffee Association, New York, N.Y.

George V. Robbins, Director of Green Coffee Operations, Maxwell House Division, General Foods Corporation, New York, N.Y.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol (relating to harp and hood seals) to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089). Open for signature at Washington July 15-29, 1963. Enters into force on date all parties to the Convention have deposited instruments of ratification or have given written notification of adherence.

Signatures: Canada, July 15, 1963; Denmark, July 26, 1963; Iceland, July 22, 1963; Italy, July 26, 1963; Norway, July 19, 1963; Poland, July 16, 1963; Spain, July 25, 1963; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, July 18, 1963; United Kingdom, July 20, 1963; United States, July 26, 1963.

Protocol (relating to the place for holding Commission meetings) to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089). Done at

Washington June 25, 1956; entered into force January 10, 1959. TIAS 4170.

Adherence deposited: Poland, July 25, 1963.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.

Adherence deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, June 15, 1963.

Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926, as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Accession deposited: Kuwait, May 28, 1963.

Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes and schedules and protocol of provisional application. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700.

Admitted as contracting party (with rights and obligations dating from independence): Cyprus, July 8, 1963.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, 3365, respectively.

Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, May 18, 1963.

Notifications given that they consider themselves bound: Senegal, April 23, 1963; Tanganyika, December 12, 1962.

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Cyprus, June 12, 1963.

BILATERAL

Pakistan

Agreement relating to the loan of a submarine to Pakistan. Effected by exchanges of notes at Karachi April 22, June 9, 14, and 29, 1963. Entered into force June 29, 1963.

Saudi Arabia

Agreement relating to the loan of 11 F-86 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of notes at Jidda November 10 and 13, 1962. Entered into force November 13, 1962.

Agreement relating to the loan of one additional F-86 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of notes at Jidda May 1 and 22, 1963. Entered into force May 22, 1963.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Benjamin H. Read as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department, effective July 22. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 380 dated July 22.)

Appointments

Jerome Jacobson as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective July 25. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 391 dated July 25.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.

Fact Sheets. These pamphlets contain information on the land, people, government, politics, economy, and foreign policy of the following:

Indonesia. Pub. 7267. Far Eastern Series 121. 12 pp. 10¢.

Viet-Nam. Pub. 7469. Far Eastern Series 116. 17 pp. 10¢.

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The Newly Independent Nations. A brief description of the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of the following states which have become independent since 1943:

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Republic of Chad. Pub. 7494. African Series 29. 4 pp. 5¢.

Gabon Republic. Pub. 7495. African Series 30. 4 pp. 5¢.

Cyprus. Pub. 7503. Near and Middle Eastern Series 70. 4 pp. 5¢.

Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Pub. 7504. African Series 31. 5 pp. 5¢.

Jamaica. Pub. 7506. Inter-American Series 84. 4 pp. 5¢.

Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). Pub. 7514. African Series 32. 6 pp. 10¢.

Tanganyika. Pub. 7515. African Series 33. 6 pp. 5¢.

Profiles of Newly Independent States. A concise reference guide on the status of 49 sovereign states which have become independent since 1943. Pub. 7488. *Geographic Bulletin No. 1.* 26 pp. map. 25¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 22-28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to July 22 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 376 of July 16.

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379	7/22	Air-defense agreement with India.
*380	7/22	Read designated Special Assistant to Secretary and Executive Secretary (biographic details).
*381	7/22	Haugerud sworn in as Deputy Inspector General for Foreign Assistance (biographic details).
*382	7/22	U.S. participation in international conferences.
383	7/23	Nationalization of private oil companies in Ceylon.
384	7/23	U.S.-Panama communique on Canal Zone talks.
385	7/24	Yemen credentials (rewrite).
*386	7/24	25th anniversary of cultural exchange program.
387	7/24	Colombia credentials (rewrite).
†388	7/24	Algeria credentials (rewrite).
*389	7/24	Ethiopian parliamentarians visit U.S.
*391	7/25	Jacobson appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
392	7/25	U.S. statement on international air rate policy.
393	7/26	Delegation to International Coffee Council meeting (rewrite).
394	7/28	Rusk-Harriman NBC interview on test ban treaty.

*Not printed.

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Vol. XLIX, No. 1260



August 19, 1963

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Negotiating a Limited Treaty for Banning Nuclear Tests

by Under Secretary Harriman¹

Thank you, Mr. President.² This is very nice to have a kind introduction. I have had some pretty rough ones from former presidents, and I never know when I come here what kind of reception I will have. I hope that this is a sign that the rest of you will give me as polite a treatment.

But in any event, one of the remarks that the president made about my having gone to the Soviet Union at the age of 8 and landing on the Siberian Coast—I happened to tell that to Stalin one evening when we were discussing other matters. I said, “Mr. Marshal, the first time I ever came to Russia I came without

a passport.” He looked at me very sternly and said, “When was that?” I said, “Well that was a long time ago. That was 1899.” “Oh,” he said, “that was under the Czar. You couldn’t do it now.”

But it is true that I did go to Russia again in 1926, and that was when I first learned to have a great respect for foreign correspondents. I don’t know how many of you foreign correspondents know what I am talking about, but I tried to find out from the embassies, our embassies in Europe, and from the foreign offices of a number of governments—I was then pursuing the nefarious business of being an international banker—and I got the same answer from everybody, more or less: The Soviet regime will last for 5 years. Well, that 5 years was movable. The answer was always the same, but it was 1 year later the same answer as you got the year before—5 years.

But when I got to Moscow I found some men that are now giants of Soviet reporting—I can’t remember all of them, but I remember Duranty

¹ Remarks made before the National Press Club at Washington, D.C., on July 31. Mr. Harriman led the U.S. delegation to the test ban talks at Moscow July 15–25. On July 25, with representatives of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, he initialed a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water (for text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239).

² Bryson Rash, president of the National Press Club.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1260 PUBLICATION 7586 AUGUST 19, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

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and Knickerbocker and others—and they gave me the best inside understanding of what was going on in the Soviet Union. And ever since that time, whenever I go to a capital, as soon as I can get away from the diplomats I go and find out what our press has got to tell, and I have learned a lot.

I am not suggesting that all of your foreign correspondents are—I am not commending them all, but I am certainly commending the overwhelming majority of American reporters who go abroad and stay long enough and go with an open mind. So that I come to you with appreciation of what your responsibilities are and what you are doing.

No Illusions About Relations With U.S.S.R.

This business of dealing with the Soviet Union as such goes back quite a while.

In 1941 I went there first with Lord Beaverbrook, and it is interesting to note the changes that have taken place since that time. That was when the Nazi armies were at the gates of Moscow.

I remember in 1945 in San Francisco a meeting with some of the members of the press. I think I had three groups, one reporters and then two groups were among those that are in the rarefied atmosphere known as columnists. And I made the unfortunate statement from the standpoint of reaction that—it seems very trite today—that we had to recognize that our objectives and the Kremlin's objectives were irreconcilable but we would have to find some way to live on this small planet and try to avoid war.

Now that word "irreconcilable" offended a certain number of people. They got up and left the room and said I was unfit to be Ambassador to the Soviet Union, should be recalled, and it was one of the few times that a background off-the-record talk was abused; they were so offended by it. Some of them apologized afterward, because it seems now such a normal thing to say. And I still say that.

I find no difference between Khrushchev and Stalin in terms of determination to communize the world. There is a material difference in the methods by which they go about it, and that is important in itself. But Mr. Khrushchev be-

lieves that communism is destined to rule the world, just as Stalin did.

I think I can sum it up quite quickly by a few sentences perhaps. Stalin used to talk about the advances of communism through the failures of capitalism, and those of you who know the Marxian dialectics know just exactly what he meant by that. Once he said very colorfully that communism breeds in the cesspools of capitalism.

Khrushchev, 15 years later, sitting in the same office—this was in 1959 when I was there—the same pictures on the wall, presumably the same chair, said: "We are making such an enormous success of communism in the Soviet Union that other countries are going to have to follow our example."

Now I say that our objectives are still irreconcilable. As the President so wittingly said in his speech before The American University on June 10,³ if other countries would leave their neighbors alone and permit the people of those countries to develop a government of their own choosing in their own way we would be closer to peace. We haven't arrived at that point at the present time.

Some day I hope that a leader of the Soviet Union will say, "We have Russia for the Russians." But the leadership of the Kremlin still believes that it is part of their responsibility to push and force and compel the advance of communism through every means they can, short of nuclear war. They believe still in wars of liberation, as you well know. So don't let's have any illusions about our relations with the Soviet Union.

Areas of Common Interest

On the other hand, despite this irreconcilability of our objectives, there are some areas in which we have common interest, and when I was sent by the President to Moscow we were dealing in one of those areas.

It has become increasingly clear, perhaps underlined by the manner in which Mr. Khrushchev withdrew his offensive weapons from Cuba, that he does not want to face nuclear war, and it is very easy to understand why.

³ BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

They have had really a fantastic success in the development of their industry, the development of their education and their science. They still are way behind in agriculture, as all Communist countries are. And, of course, the life of the people is not as free as we would believe it should be, but at the same time, the life of the people is better than it was before; and Khrushchev wants to catch America in that respect, as you well know, and he wants to avoid nuclear war. He doesn't want to see this destroyed, and the people of Russia don't want it.

Of all the people in the world, there are no peoples that are more conscious of war than the Soviet Union, the people of Russia, because they have suffered so much and because the problems are always held before them by what they get from the press. Therefore I think we can say with assurance that when we talk about a test ban treaty as a first step toward the control of nuclear weapons and when Khrushchev speaks of it, as he did in his *Pravda* interview on the Saturday morning I left, he is sincere in that.

It is interesting that he selected July 15th. The President and Prime Minister Macmillan, as you know, wrote to Mr. Khrushchev on June 8 and suggested a meeting to consider a test ban, and Mr. Khrushchev said, "All right, come on July 15th," which was just a short time after the meeting was arranged between the Chinese Communists in Moscow with a delegation representing the Soviet Communists, and that had been going on for a week or so before we arrived.

Major Issue Between Moscow and Peiping

I think we have to understand in the motivations of Mr. Khrushchev's colleagues that their great preoccupation is this challenge of Peiping for leadership in the Communist international movement.

Now even in Stalin's time I talked to him many times about China. He had never thought a great deal of Mao Tse-tung, and we haven't got time to go into that this morning, but this difference between them is of long duration. It came out rather more rigorously from 1960 on, when the Soviets withdrew their tech-

nical assistance and withdrew their credits and trade. As Mr. Khrushchev himself said, "We cut 60 percent—only 40 percent of what it used to be a few years ago."

Their relations have been strained. But now they have come to a great bitterness because since Cuba the Chinese Communists are making greater efforts, greater inroads in the Communist parties around the world, first in the Far East, and you notice in minority groups in some of the Communist parties in a number of countries. And that is an unheard-of thing to do. It was written in the book and was accepted that Moscow was the center of all wisdom as far as communism is concerned. The world was going to be dominated by communism with a center and seat in Moscow.

Although there has been a challenge before, it has been unimportant. But now it has made some progress, and Mr. Khrushchev said, "I am a man of peace, and this removal of the offensive weapons from Cuba indicates that I want to preserve the peace and preserve mankind." Peiping said, "No, you aren't fit to lead the Communist movement. You haven't got the vigor and the determination and courage."

Now that was pretty shocking. And since that time there has been an increasing feeling between the two countries, and those of you who follow the Communist press know that both Peiping and Moscow have said some pretty rough things about each other—and some more this morning about this test ban treaty. The Chinese called it a fraud and speak of it as being Khrushchev's selling out to the imperialists.

In any event, if any of you want to take the trouble to do it, I suggest you read the exchange of letters that they have had recently. They are only 50,000 words each; so it won't take you very long to read them—probably the longest single letters of correspondence in history.

But there is no mystery about it. Those of you who want to understand it can see it before you. The issue now has been made. Khrushchev and the Communist Party of Russia are maintaining that they are the ones that are going to preserve the peace of the world; they are going to lead the world to communism, but avoiding nuclear war, and they are just as vig-

orous, just as determined, but they are going to do it without endangering the peoples of the world, whereas China is the one that is dangerous—the Chinese Communists are the ones that are going to lead the world to nuclear holocaust, and that is what is the major issue between them. There are many others.

But don't make any mistake about a division between them in terms of repudiating each other or breaking—if there is major trouble—breaking the front between them. They have not done so, and there is no indication that they will.

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Now this treaty is a good treaty. It is clear. Every paragraph was discussed. We understand each other. Some of the wartime agreements were written so hurriedly that the words concealed the meaning of the principals, and that was some of the trouble that came from them. Naturally it would be so. We spent 10 days at this. The treaty we tabled was the one that Mr. Foster [William C. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] and his group had tabled in 1962 in August in Geneva⁴ and was thoroughly considered by all of the people, the advisers of the administration, and they tabled that treaty. We went through it with great care.

One of the difficulties was that Mr. Khrushchev, as you remember, in his July 2d speech said that two treaties should be signed simultaneously, a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw treaty countries as well as a nuclear test ban.

Now this, of course, is a test ban limited to three environments: outer space, in the atmosphere, and under the water, and it excludes underground. And because underground is excluded, we were able to come to an agreement, because in these three environments it is the consensus of knowledgeable opinion that it can be policed; the identification—the detection and identification—is reasonably assured.

When Mr. Khrushchev made his July 2d speech in East Germany he brought that out,

and then it became more clear that there could be an agreement.

In our 10 days' discussion the United States and the United Kingdom were very firm on removing a treaty for nonaggression away from the test ban treaty, and that they acceded to. You notice in the communique⁵ there was reference to it in a paragraph in which we have agreed to consult with our allies and to see how and whether and on what conditions and what objectives we would carry on further—well, the objective is clear—but the conditions in which we would carry forward discussions about a nonaggression pact.

We could not discuss that in Moscow. The United Kingdom and the United States could not discuss that question without our NATO allies, and we had not consulted them in advance.

Khrushchev wants for some reason or other to continue discussions and is very anxious to make some progress in that field. I was not able to explore very thoroughly what his reasons were. But I am quite ready to say that he made it plain he was not going to demand a recognition of East Germany as one of the conditions of the test ban. He recognizes that the countries of Western Europe don't intend to recognize what we call the East German "regime," but still known as the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany. We are for the reunification of Germany and support the Germans in that context.

Now, the provisions of the agreement are clear. They are limited, of course. There is a withdrawal clause, which is also clear, and the other provisions, if you have taken the trouble to read it. We were able to go through paragraph by paragraph and exchange views as to the interpretation of the meaning of the words, and we agreed that we understood each other. There is no secret agreement; there is no gimmick in this agreement and no secret understandings.

Now, it has a limited objective, of course. But it is the first step to reduce the risk of war, as the President said the other night,⁶

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 415.

and I won't run through what it does not do. But it is the first step in bringing under control nuclear power in connection with weapons, and if it is followed by further steps it may be a signal event.

Mr. Khrushchev called it a breakthrough in his press conference published in *Pravda* the morning I left, but of course he pointed to the fact that there had to be further steps.

The other importance of it, of course, is that the people of the world do not want to see further testing in the atmosphere. They are gravely concerned over the contamination of the atmosphere. And if any of you have traveled, you know that particularly the underdeveloped countries—I wouldn't say particularly, but since they have nothing to do with nuclear weapons—they are enormously concerned. This isn't in connection with their weapons, but they are concerned over the health of their children, and I think that is true of this country, and the reports we get from abroad show that it is overwhelmingly true around the world.

Now I am very much interested—I have in my hand—I was just given this as I came in—the Federation of American Scientists, which I understand is a distinguished group of 2,500 members, has come out in support—or the board of directors have come out for very important reasons with the statement "The Federation of American Scientists believes that it would be a national catastrophe if the pending test ban agreement was not ratified," and so forth.

Now I think you will find more and more people speaking in this vein. There are those who legitimately want to know the effect on our security, and I can say this unequivocally as far as my judgment is concerned—I am not asking you to say that everybody agrees with it—but it is my judgment that if we continue to spend the money that is necessary on scientific development, the development of our missiles, the capability of delivery, and keep up with our underground testing, spend the money on energy, and if we maintain our Military Establishment, there is no reason to doubt that we can maintain the kind of predominance in the nuclear field which is necessary as a great deter-

rent; and so to turn away from this, I think, would be a very great tragedy. It couldn't be better expressed than by this statement of the directors of the Federation of American Scientists.

U.S. Recognizes Military Junta as Government of Ecuador

Department Statement

Press release 399 dated July 31

The Department of State has cabled our Ambassador in Quito, Maurice M. Bernbaum, directing him to acknowledge the note of July 12¹ from the military junta of Ecuador. By means of this acknowledgment we are resuming relations with Ecuador and are recognizing the military junta as the provisional government of Ecuador. This action was taken after consultation with other hemisphere governments in the light of the following factors:

The United States Government has ascertained that the authority of the military junta has been accepted and recognized throughout the national territory and has noted the junta's stated intention to respect Ecuador's international obligations.

The note of July 12 declared that a military junta constituted by the combined command of the Armed Forces of Ecuador has assumed the responsibility of governing the nation until such time as it would be possible to organize elections in which the people of Ecuador would be able to exercise their will freely within the provisions of a new constitution.

The United States Government has noted with special satisfaction the solemn assurances offered by the military junta of its determination to restore Ecuador to constitutional government at the earliest possible moment. In public statements the junta has indicated its belief that this goal can be achieved in substantially less than 2 years. The junta also has declared its intention to provide a new constitution and lay the basis for the return to civilian government via constitutional procedures.

¹ Not printed.

While these assurances offered by the junta have lessened the concern which naturally arose in the United States following the events of July 11, the United States Government reiterates its firm belief, shared elsewhere in the hemisphere, that military seizures of political power should not become an acceptable substitute for constitutional procedures.

U.S. Comments on Communist Inspired Incidents in Korea

Two U.S. soldiers were killed and a third wounded on July 29 in an ambush by North Korean infiltrators on the southern edge of the Korean demilitarized zone about 20 miles north of Seoul. On the following day some of the same group of infiltrators were pursued by U.S. soldiers and Korean police and one American serviceman, one Korean police officer, and two North Koreans were killed. Following are Department statements regarding the two incidents which were read to news correspondents by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 29

We are outraged by this latest incident, which is reminiscent of the Communist grenade attack on a guard post on our side last December, in which one U.S. soldier was killed and another wounded. There have been similar attacks on ROK [Republic of Korea] Army personnel as well. We are calling an early meeting of the Military Armistice Commission to confront the Communist side with these latest murders.

In the latest case, the ambush took place close to the southern edge of the demilitarized zone against a jeep carrying Ninth Regiment, First Cavalry, personnel to a guard post in the demilitarized zone. Automatic weapons, which are banned in the demilitarized zone, were used in the attack.

In addition to calling an early meeting of the MAC, we will have to consider what other actions we will take. It is this kind of deliberately planned and executed violation, as well as the unjust detention of persons like Captain [Ben W.] Stutts and Captain [Carleton] Voltz,¹ which reminds us that the Korean and Chinese Communists keep the peace in Korea only insofar as deterred by the continued presence of U.N. strength.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 30

The facts of today's encounter, so far as we know them, are as follows:

At 9:00 a.m. this morning, Korean time, an estimated group of five North Korean infiltrators were seen by South Korean police near Munsan-ni, about 7 miles south of the point of yesterday's attack.

Fifteen U.S. soldiers were dispatched from a nearby First Cavalry Division unit to assist in running them down. In the ensuing fire fight, one American serviceman, one Korean police officer, and two of the North Korean agents were killed. At this point, the investigation of the facts is still going on.

As far as countermeasures are concerned, these are under discussion here and with our people in Korea.

Today's incident is one result of the intensive alert and search operations now under way.

I would like to repeat what I said yesterday: that these incidents remind us that the peace in Korea is kept only by U.N. strength and determination to resist Communist aggression.

At this point, these attacks appear to be a reflection of the North Korean Communist activities in connection with the 10th anniversary of the armistice. However, I would not want to exclude the possibility of their being linked to wider developments in Asia.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 246.

Our Policy Toward Africa

by J. Wayne Fredericks

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

It is a pleasure to appear again on the Africa studies program sponsored by the Social Studies Institute of St. Paul. I want to pay special tribute to the St. Paul public schools for having had the vision to initiate this type of program, which has already led communities in other parts of the country to start similar African summer courses for adults and students interested in African affairs. It is gratifying to know of the increasing public interest in this area in African developments.

The United States has an interest in the newly independent countries of Africa. It has an interest in the still nonindependent areas of Africa. And it has an interest in South Africa, too. It is not only political, economic, and social interests that bind us to the African Continent but the self-interest of maintaining peace and stability there as well as throughout the world.

A year ago when I appeared on this platform, I asserted that America's vital interest was peace for ourselves and our children and that this depended on stability and satisfaction around the world. The sudden emergence of African nations and the startling upsurge of African influence in the U.N. and its specialized agencies have placed the concerns of Africans before the American people in a dramatic way and demand an understanding of them as they relate to our national security.

Let's review briefly the basic African concerns. All over the continent Africans con-

tinue to give the highest importance to five requirements: (1) freedom, (2) dignity, (3) a more abundant life, (4) African unity, and (5) freedom from cold-war involvement.

The United States respects the desire of the Africans to remain free of cold-war entanglements, and we support these other goals which the Africans have set for themselves.

We are interested in African development and our program is making a substantial contribution. Our policy is to help Africans because we believe that their independence will be strengthened by undertakings contributing to a more rational use of scarce human and material resources.

Our desire is to maintain and strengthen the mutually beneficial relationships which exist between European and African nations in many parts of the African Continent. Europe's assistance to Africa is greater than our own, and we look to European countries to continue to play a principal role in financing African assistance.

There can be no doubt about the necessity for the United States to prevent Communist penetration for subversion through providing new nations an alternative source of aid to the often still-suspect former colonial metropolises. At the same time, the recent Clay Committee report asserted, "... the need for development assistance and U.S. interest in providing it would continue even if the cold war and all our outstanding political differences with the Communists were to be resolved tomorrow."

In the interval since I last appeared on this

¹ Address made at the St. Paul Social Studies Institute, Como Park Junior High School, St. Paul, Minn., on July 18 (press release 390).

platform, the people of Algeria in cooperation with France have achieved their freedom, and France continues to provide vital assistance to this area despite the violence which occurred at the end of French rule. In the Congo the United Nations aided in the reintegration of Katanga, permitting the Congolese the first real opportunity since independence to concentrate on their complex nation-building problem. The resumption of relations between Belgium and the Congo now permits Belgium to assist the Congo in many fields.

But the most urgent problem moving African nationalists today remains the application of self-determination in the Portuguese territories in Africa and for the nonwhite populace of South Africa.

The Cause of African Unity

African influence in the United Nations and its specialized agencies in the past year has grown startlingly. We have the best examples of this influence today in their actions in the International Labor Organization, in the United Nations Economic and Social Council, and in the UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] education meeting in Geneva in the past month as the African nations have sought to expel Portugal and South Africa from these organizations because of their inflexible positions.

A new degree of effectiveness of African organization is traceable to the meeting of African chiefs of state in Addis Ababa in May, where they, among other things, established an African Liberation Committee. The committee is already functioning in Dar-es-Salaam in support of African nationalist movements in the still dependent areas of the continent.

At Addis Ababa also the cause of African unity was advanced with the signing by 30 heads of state of a charter establishing an Organization of African Unity. The charter has already been ratified by more than two-thirds of the signatory states and will, therefore, formally enter into force in the near future.

In my opinion the establishment of the OAU is indeed a significant and historic event. It indicates that Africa is on the threshold of an exciting new chapter in the advance toward

unity, a unity which was denied to them because of long years of colonial domination.

The United States, as in Europe and Latin America, heartily supports the establishment of institutions which will promote political, economic, and cultural cooperation in Africa. Among the institutions called for in the OAU is the establishment of a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means. Other important commissions to be established by the OAU are for economic and social affairs, education and culture, defense, and health, sanitation, and nutrition.

The establishment of a workable OAU could give further impetus to the activities of important regional organizations already functioning, such as the African and Malagasy Union, comprising 13 French-speaking states, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the East African Common Services Organization, which provides a considerable degree of economic integration in that area of Africa.

Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda are reported to be negotiating for the establishment soon of an East African federation with strong central powers to more effectively pool their national resources for the common good. Zanzibar, a self-governing British territory, is also considering joining this East African federation. Tanganyika and Uganda are independent, while Kenya, which only recently elected an African government, is expected to obtain her independence soon. Such a federation, if successful, could also have a powerful influence upon neighboring African areas where the African people have not yet obtained self-determination and self-government.

Nothing in the past year has altered my conviction that one-party government in Africa does not exclude the practice of democratic principles like free discussion and universal adult suffrage, although in some places freedoms we cherish are restricted. Independence-minded Africa remains determined to be free of both Soviet bloc controls and undue Western influence. In the past year the Communists have initiated a review of their African policies because of the clear rebuffs administered by the Republic of Guinea and newly independent Al-

geria. Communism, which demands uniformity, has made no enduring friends in Africa; the Western World of free choice tolerates, indeed welcomes and thrives on, African national individuality.

The United States must remain a progressive, dynamic, democratic nation, and it must avoid identification with reaction if it is to maintain its leadership and win the cooperation of Africa. In recent weeks the United States has faced a special test, not in the foreign field but in its domestic racial crisis. President Kennedy's honest recognition of our racial injustice and his expression of determination to see this wrong righted have, initially at least, maintained Africa's respect.

The past year, therefore, in summary has witnessed important advances in the area of African political freedom, individual dignity, and African unity. African nations have maintained, indeed strengthened, their freedom from cold-war involvement while progress toward a more abundant life has proceeded less spectacularly in the day-to-day expansion of economic development activities.

At the same time the higher degree of African organization reflected in the Addis Ababa conference and its aftermath have brought to crisis stage the problems of Portuguese and South African inflexibility where self-determination and the political franchise are concerned.

U.S. Policy and Southern Africa

Before turning to consider this crisis in southern Africa and to its special relation to our own Afro-American problem, let me review what U.S. policy has been toward this area of Africa. Our policy, simply stated, is to support the aspirations for freedom of parts of Africa still not independent. The United States supports the continuing tide of self-determination and the expeditious preparation for self-government in the dependent areas.

On Portuguese Angola the United States voted for a U.N. resolution² reaffirming the "inalienable right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence" and urging

² U.N. doc. A/RES/1742 (XVI); for background and text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1962, p. 385.

Portugal "in particular to set up freely elected and representative political institutions with a view to transfer of power to the people of Angola." But the United States opposed a resolution recommending "immediate" independence for Angola, in the belief this would be counterproductive in Angola rather than promote social and economic progress for the Angolan people in view of the desperate shortage of educated and trained people.

On another dependent area, South-West Africa, the United States voted for a U.N. resolution³ to have Secretary-General U Thant establish an "effective U.N. presence" in that territory, which the Republic of South Africa administers. The United States maintained that South Africa still had international obligations in South-West Africa and should abandon *apartheid* in that territory, recognize its people's right to self-determination, and "proceed to move in that direction."

With respect to *apartheid* in South Africa, our view is clear. We are unalterably opposed to *apartheid*. Our traditions and our values permit us no other position. We believe that the continuation of *apartheid* can lead only to profound human tragedy for *all* races in Africa. We are firmly committed to use our best efforts to encourage South Africa to abandon these policies and to live up to its obligations under the U.N. Charter.

You should understand that the African leaders are fiercely determined to win freedom for all the peoples of Africa. Prime Minister Milton Obote of Uganda during a commencement address at Long Island University on June 14 expressed this thought in these trenchant words:

The African leaders expect the West to practice those ideals of Christianity and democracy that they preach. We are disappointed to find the West compromising on the very principles they value so much in their countries whenever they are faced with African problems. In the case of South Africa and even Angola and Mozambique, the West preaches one thing and prac-

³ U.N. doc. A/RES/1805 (XVII); for statements made by U.S. Representative Jonathan B. Bingham in Committee IV (Trusteeship), see U.S. delegation press releases 4094 dated Nov. 13 and 4098 dated Nov. 19, 1962.

tices another. The Western knowledge, thought and ideals which the West advances with one hand are at the same time being withdrawn by the other.

Civil Rights and Foreign Relations

As the African people are busily engaged in building up their new states and properly utilizing their hard-won independence, they at the same time are not unmindful that American Negroes are seeking to gain equality of citizenship in our own country. Examples of racial discrimination and acts of violence in the United States have been widely reported abroad. Soviet propaganda organs have been inundating the world with pictures and lurid stories about hostile acts committed against Negro demonstrators in Birmingham and elsewhere.

Secretary Rusk, commenting upon this situation,⁴ said that we ought all to recognize that "this nation is now confronted with one of the gravest issues that we have had since 1865 and that this issue deeply affects the conduct of our foreign relations." In our effort to support the great causes of freedom in the world, Mr. Rusk noted, we in this country "are running this race with one of our legs in a cast."

Until the present, the internal question of civil rights—with all it involves for the American Negro—and the international question of United States and Africa have only occasionally been directly related. For example, the 1954 Supreme Court decision with respect to segregation helped improve our image in Africa, just as Little Rock made our position more difficult. At the same time, American Negro interest in Africa has been sporadically increasing, with ensuing implications for American policy. But because avowed Federal Government policy has been on the side of integration and equality of treatment the pressures on governmental leaders were neither intense nor prolonged as far as African policy was concerned, and the foreign reaction to events in this country was blunted.

In my opinion the situation is rapidly changing. The consequences of this change for United States policy toward Africa need searching examination. The principal reason for this change lies in the fact that our racial crisis

coincides with the new confrontation of forces in Africa over colonialism and *apartheid*.

At home Negroes are clearly not going to put up with further delay on the civil rights issue. This means there may be more incidents, with pictures such as that of the Birmingham policeman with a dog leaping at a Negro. Our strife will remind people of strife in South Africa.

As tension mounts the Negro elements of the population become a more articulate force in the public life of this country. As a matter of practical politics, they may be expected to exercise this force in other fields than domestic civil rights. This trend is both an opportunity and a problem in the conduct of policy toward Africa, for if Negro opinion is well informed it will be helpful but if it is merely a reflection of its frustration at home it could easily be harmful to our long-term interests in Africa.

Drive for Self-Determination

The significant developments in Africa which may bring about a dangerous situation are these:

We have increasingly endorsed self-determination in Africa and have welcomed the emergence of the independent African nations. With one exception this transformation has been amazingly peaceful. However, we are down to the hard core of dependent Africa. We have been hopeful that Portugal and South Africa will find it in their interest to cooperate in peaceful political change. There has been little evidence that this is their intention, and African nations demand that the world choose now to support more positive actions.

In our relations with the rest of Africa we may find ourselves having to acquiesce in more extreme action or face sharply reduced influence, to the detriment of other important objectives. At the U.N. we shall more and more be branded as hypocrites by the Afro-Asians and branded as traitors to the West by their opponents.

As I indicated earlier, at Addis Ababa African leaders organized themselves for a concerted assault on these pockets of resistance. Conference resolutions condemned racial discrimination everywhere and set up a special fund to assist in the liberation of southern

⁴ BULLETIN of June 17, 1963, p. 935.

Africa. The conference also adopted resolutions on decolonization, urging the great powers to cease aid to colonial governments which use that aid to suppress nationalist liberation movements.

In the weeks since Addis Ababa the Africans, in an impressive demonstration of their newfound unity, attempted at the annual Geneva meeting of the International Labor Organization to obtain the expulsion of South Africa and, failing that, withdrew from further conference participation. In a subsequent meeting the governing body of ILO recommended to the United Nations that it take up the question of the expulsion of South Africa from the world organization.

At the UNESCO education meeting a resolution expelling Portugal was adopted, and Portugal withdrew protesting the resolution's illegality.

This week in Geneva also, where the United Nations Economic and Social Council is meeting, South Africa voluntarily withdrew from participation in the work of the ECOSOC regional Economic Commission for Africa. South Africa had been prevented from participating effectively in that organization's work and withdrew in the face of the certainty of a vote formally to expel her.

President Nyerere⁵ made clear African feeling on Monday [July 15] in his speech at the National Press Club when he said:

Although we have as much to gain as anyone [from participation in international bodies], we break up useful technical meetings because we will not cooperate with South Africa and Portugal.

Many people do not understand these things. They ask us why we do not get on with the job of dealing with the social and economic problems facing our own countries, and why we do not leave the other matters alone until we have done so. . . . Our nationalist motivation . . . means that continuing colonialism anywhere—but particularly in Africa—is an affront to those of us who have won independence. . . . Tanganyika cannot rest content while alien rule continues in the south of our continent.

⁵ Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanganyika, made an official visit to the United States July 14–20; for text of a joint communique by President Kennedy and President Nyerere, see *ibid.*, Aug. 5, 1963, p. 198.

Problem of Political Stability

The problem of maintaining political stability in a newly independent nation is an extremely complicated and delicate task. The people demand much, and often there is relatively little to give. And the task of providing what little there is satisfactorily calls for a high degree of statesmanship.

In most African colonies only a limited number of indigenous civil servants were trained. Therefore the new governments have had to choose between continuing all or part of a trained European civil service or employing untrained or partially trained indigenous people. This choice has been and remains a hard one between governmental efficiency and the political pressure of rapid Africanization. There is no question but that Africans can be trained to do the job, but this cannot be done overnight. Schools of public administration, therefore, become a tremendously important part of any African program.

In the larger countries with well-developed tribal loyalties there is the added problem of making the power of the central government effective in the remoter regions.

It is challenges such as these that tend to encourage the development of vigorous, often one-party systems to provide order and direction during the transition from strong centralized colonial rule to the yet-to-be-developed African national norms. According to a recent analysis of political systems in 32 African nations, the one-party system prevails in 15 countries and the multiparty system flourishes in another 15 states, while in 2 African countries (Libya and Sudan) no elections have been held in some time.

Much as we would prefer systems more in keeping with the particular kind of democratic tradition we are accustomed to, it is important to understand Africa's one-party systems. First of all, they normally bear little resemblance to the monolithic Nazi and Communist models that the term "one-party system" immediately evokes in this country. There is a varying amount of internal discussion and plurality in decision-making inside the one-party framework. Furthermore, it can be hoped that the

present phase is transitional. We must remember there was no two-party system in this country immediately after our Revolution. Most of today's African political leaders are the revolutionary fathers of their countries, and widespread formal opposition to them is probably not to be expected in the early days of independence.

An explanation of the party system and democracy in Africa was recently given by Tom Mboya, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs in Kenya and Secretary-General of the recently victorious Kenya African National Union. He said:

Democracy is government of the people, by the people, for the people. The supporters of the party system argue as though the word "people" in this definition read "party." A government which gives all citizens the right to vote, the right to contest elections, and the right to express themselves freely inside and outside parliament is not undemocratic.

Concern With Living Standards

While Africa is making progress toward improving its political societies, its leaders are increasingly concerned with the urgent necessity of improving the standards of living of their people, which are abnormally low when compared with Europe or the United States. The average annual per capita income is only \$90 for sub-Saharan Africa, and for Africa as a whole, \$132. Compare that with the \$2,500 per capita income in the United States. The average African farmer—and most Africans are farmers—can produce only about 4 percent of the output of his North American counterpart. Such statistics as these give some indication of Africa's imperative needs.

Foreign capital investments have played an important role in the development of African enterprises and should continue to do so in the future. The Africans have said that they welcome private capital investment with the caveat that it should contribute to the economic well-being of the country as a whole and not be merely for the benefit of "outsiders." The days of colonial exploitation in Africa have virtually come to an end.

If the African people over the long term are to obtain a higher standard of living, they must

look primarily to their own resources to develop their economic and social potentialities. African leaders, faced with a paucity of university-educated people and a literacy rate averaging only about 10 percent, therefore are deeply concerned with developing educational and technical training facilities that will provide the professional and skilled personnel so urgently needed in all sectors of their society.

American programs of assistance, encompassing all levels of formal education as well as technical and professional courses and internships in Africa and overseas, are helping to fulfill this need. Our assistance also includes health programs designed to improve the productivity and general well-being of individuals.

Private American philanthropic organizations such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Phelps-Stokes Fund are engaged in vitally needed educational and health projects in various African areas. Through the activities of Operations Crossroads about 300 students from American colleges paid their own passage to Africa to work on worthwhile projects alongside young Africans. Their goal was to improve relations between Africa and the United States and to help Africans help themselves.

One of the most heartening developments in the African training program has been the outstanding success scored by the Peace Corps. These trained and dedicated volunteers are excellent "ambassadors of good will" for the United States. The volunteers, besides helping to build better societies in Africa, are giving the Africans a glimpse of American idealism in action. Nearly 1,500 American men and women are serving as Peace Corps volunteers in 16 African countries.

The United Nations programs in Africa, which the United States is supporting, are providing substantial assistance to the well-being of Africa. The U.N. through its specialized agencies has been especially active in the fields of education and health. The U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization has given high priority to projects for improving agriculture to bolster the economic development of the African nations.

American leadership in world affairs re-

quires us to take a positive role in Africa. We must keep our eyes on the long-term future of Africa, which I regard as bright with promise.

Therefore let us not be dismayed by temporary disappointments, misunderstandings, and perhaps setbacks. In the formulation of United States foreign policies toward Africa, we see these nations as important members of the world community, having their own dignity and sharing with us in the great aspirations of human rights, freedom, and independence.

Ambassadors Asked To Report on Activities in Promoting Exports

Press release 401 dated August 2

The Secretary of State on August 2 signed a letter to American ambassadors abroad concerning the strong emphasis which the export drive continues to require for balance-of-payments reasons. The text of Secretary Rusk's letter follows.

AUGUST 2, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: You will recall that in my letter of October 19, 1962,¹ I emphasized the role which our Chiefs of Mission and their senior staff members would need to play in order for us to succeed in our joint efforts to expand adequately the volume of American exports.

I am sure you are aware that our balance-of-payments situation remains a very real and stubborn problem, even though our current export volume constitutes some improvement over the recent past. The facts are that imports in 1962 increased by \$1.7 billion while exports increased by \$800 million (from \$20.1 to \$20.9 billion). Hence our net surplus on merchandise trade declined. International payments of all types, which include military expenditures and foreign aid, of course, continued to exceed receipts and our balance of payments remained in the red by some \$2.2 billion.

As a companion piece to the export drive, the Administration is taking all actions which it believes are currently possible—consistent with our foreign policy objectives and position of

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1962, p. 682.

leadership in the free world—to moderate the balance-of-payments impact of our governmental activities and programs abroad.² Clearly these actions need to be kept within those bounds which will neither impair our national security and other foreign policy objectives nor circumscribe the latitude which our citizens enjoy in their trade and financial relationships abroad. If the United States can push its exports to a substantially higher plateau, many elements of our balance-of-payments problem will disappear without resort to actions which would be unpalatable both domestically and internationally. The rough road of restrictive retrogression is the last thing that we would wish to contemplate.

Since I wrote to Chiefs of Mission last fall on the importance of their personal participation in the support of export promotion, I have had many gratifying reports as to what they and their senior staff members have been doing to further this vital activity.

Because of the special emphasis which we in Washington attach to the Export Expansion Program for balance-of-payments reasons, I should appreciate it if your Embassy would prepare for my guidance and that of the Secretary of Commerce a summary of your Mission's recent activities in line with the concepts expressed in my earlier letter. I should like such a report to cover the specific ways in which the Embassy has found it possible to give support to this program. I would also like to know of the particular difficulties encountered in promoting United States exports, what the Embassy thinks needs to be done to solve these problems, as well as any suggestions for improving our export expansion work as a whole. Material already submitted need not be repeated but only brought up to date.

I look forward to receiving such a report and I am confident that it will reflect that degree of participation and support necessary to ensure the success of our export drive.

Sincerely,

DEAN RUSK

² For text of a special message of President Kennedy to the Congress dated July 18, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 250.

The Kennedy Round—Progress and Promise

by William T. Gossett

Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations¹

A little over 9 months ago the Trade Expansion Act was launched, upon a tranquil sea and with a favoring wind. Since then, it has been buffeted by high winds of protectionism and of nationalism, sometimes mounting to gale force. Despite all that has happened, we have kept afloat—and we have even made some headway.

Certainly—and this has been a source of great strength to us—the dedication of President Kennedy to the principles and goals of the act has not weakened or even wavered. The negotiations authorized by the act, already known as “the Kennedy Round,” are, he said in Frankfurt last month,² “a test of our unity.” And he added, very pertinently: “While each nation must naturally look out for its own interests, each nation must also look out for the common interest. . . .”

I shall give you this evening a short account of our voyages and adventures so far. I shall also take a look at what lies ahead of us before we can hope to make harbor. I do so with the warning, inspired by experience, that we must expect the unexpected and be prepared to adjust to it.

Indeed, it was while Governor Herter [Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations] and I were on our initial exploratory mission to Europe that we had our first painful surprise—the collapse of the negotiations for British entry

into the Common Market.³ Apart from its many other unfortunate consequences—with which we shall have to live until Britain takes her rightful place in Europe, as I am confident she will—this made the “dominant supplier” provision of the Trade Expansion Act virtually ineffective. Under this provision, as you know, the President has authority to bargain for the complete elimination of tariffs on items for which the United States and the EEC [European Economic Community] account for 80 percent of the free world's exports. With Britain in the EEC, this would have embraced a very wide range of trade; without her, it applied only to aircraft and possibly one or two other items.

Even so, the President has unprecedented bargaining authority. He has the basic authority to reduce tariffs by 50 percent over a 5-year period. He also can cut tariffs by any amount on any item the current duty on which is 5 percent or less, and on agricultural commodities and tropical agricultural and forestry products under certain circumstances. I stress these points because it is often forgotten that, despite the Brussels breakdown, the Trade Expansion Act still has these liberal provisions for slashing tariffs down to zero.

“It Takes Two To Tango” was the theme of a popular dance tune. And it takes two to make a success of the coming trade negotiations. The United States, as I have indicated, is willing and able to negotiate on a wide front. Much depends upon whether our principal trading

¹ Address made before the Koppers Company Business International Roundtable at Pittsburgh, Pa., on July 17.

² BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 118.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1963, p. 237.

partner, the European Common Market, is equally able and willing. This is what we explored during the spring months of this year, culminating in the GATT ministerial meeting in May.⁴

The Concept of "Écrêtement"

Those of you who have taken an interest in trade union negotiations in the United States over the years will recall that able and resourceful union spokesmen sometimes raise an issue—like the demand to "open the books" in the automobile industry—as a talking point preliminary to actual bargaining. By its novelty, such a talking point can attract favorable publicity and keep management on the defensive. Sometimes, when such an issue has been squeezed dry of all the tactical advantages it offers, it is dropped; sometimes it is pressed at the bargaining table in a watered-down and more readily negotiable form.

Whether it was so planned or not, a suggestion made by the EEC, called *écrêtement*, turned out to be just such a gambit to the GATT meeting in May. Like "open the books," it had an attractive sound and a plausible content.

The U.S. tariff schedule, while it averages about the same as the Common Market's, has more high rates and more low rates; EEC tariffs, in the process of being averaged among the six member nations, are bunched in the middle. It was suggested—first through friendly journalists and then formally at a preliminary working party—that *écrêtement*—roughly translatable as "de-peaking"—was the magic answer. Instead of the across-the-board, linear tariff cuts for which we had been preparing for many months—and which the Six have been practicing among themselves—an entirely new and complex negotiating formula was put forward. It was proposed that the industrialized countries should move toward uniform tariffs—one level for raw materials, another for semimanufactures, still another for manufactured products. During the forthcoming round of tariff negotiations, according to the plan, each country would lower its tariffs by half of the dif-

ference between its present tariff rates and the target figures for the various categories. The effect, of course, would be to require deeper cuts in high tariffs than in medium or low tariffs.

The concept of *écrêtement* was, one must admit, a fine flower of the subtle Gallic mind. The main drawback to it is that it does not take us very far along the way to the reduction of tariffs and the promotion of international trade. Indeed, when we put our slide rules to work and brought *écrêtement* down out of the clouds into mundane figures, we found that—as originally proposed—it would have resulted, on the average, in 10-percent cuts in the Common Market tariffs and 12-percent in ours. In view of our long-proclaimed goal of a 50-percent tariff cut, Shakespeare's "Much Ado About Nothing" would have been a more entertaining fantasy to play at Geneva.

Achievements at GATT Ministerial Meeting

The EEC spokesmen did not actually press for *écrêtement* at the GATT ministerial meeting, May 16 to 21. They chose rather to stress the "disparities" presented by high U.S. tariffs and to seek some formula by which to bring them under attack. This was the issue that was debated long and vigorously, and finally resolved. It emerged as the fourth of the "Principles" listed in the ministerial resolution⁵ and reads in part as follows:

... the tariff negotiations ... shall be based upon a plan of substantial linear [across-the-board] tariff reductions with a bare minimum of exceptions which shall be subject to confrontation and justification. The linear reductions shall be equal. In those cases where there are significant disparities in tariff levels the tariff reductions will be based upon special rules of general and automatic application.

In presenting this language, the conference chairman added for the record that "significant disparities are construed to be 'meaningful' in trade terms." This is, in our view, an essential part of the compromise that was hammered out at Geneva.

There have been a variety of verdicts on the Geneva meeting. I note for example that *Trade Talk*, published by the Committee for a National Trade Policy, declared editorially:

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 24, 1963, p. 990.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 995.

Many were disappointed that there seemed to be so little substantive progress at the recent negotiations. It seemed that, after monumental preparations by the EEC and the USA, the mountain had given birth to a mouse.

I understand the reasons for such a feeling, and I suspect that some of you may share it. I think, however, that we have some solid reasons for satisfaction at the outcome.

At the very least, we avoided a crackup of the Kennedy Round. When Ulysses sailed his boat between Scylla and Charybdis, he may have negotiated only a few hundred yards—but without surviving that passage he never would have reached Ithaca.

Moreover, the Ministers showed a willingness to make firm decisions, rather than to put them off—notably in tackling the thorny problem of rules for the negotiations, and in setting a definite date, May 4, 1964, for the actual beginning of the talks.

Also, the Ministers made remarkable progress in other matters. They did much to recognize the needs of the less developed nations in the field of trade. They made important decisions about the inclusion of agriculture in a general lowering of trade barriers. And they determined that *all* barriers to trade—not merely tariffs—must be attacked.

We consider these to be very substantial achievements, although they left formidable problems to be resolved—the precise way in which the tariff disparities question is to be dealt with and the manner in which agriculture can be involved in the negotiations.

Speaking of the disparities question, the German Vice Chancellor, Dr. Ludwig Erhard, aptly commented: “We are agreed on the shell of an egg. What will be in the egg, we do not know.”

While agreeing with Dr. Erhard that only the shell was settled—that is, very general rules of procedure with vitally important details still to be spelled out—we take considerable satisfaction in the shape of the shell. It provides for a full measure of reciprocity between the U.S. and the EEC. It places no arbitrary limits on reductions in tariffs and upholds the important principle of equal reductions. It provides the means for dealing with disparities whenever they make a real dollar difference to any nation.

And it endorses linear tariff reductions and provides safeguards against unjustified exceptions.

Question of Agricultural Trade

In the longer run the question of agriculture is likely to be crucial. From the beginning we have made it clear that the negotiations we seek cannot be confined to industrial goods. The level of U.S. exports depends heavily upon markets for agricultural commodities, especially in the EEC.

We have already had a sharp warning, in the form of the prohibitive tariffs imposed upon our poultry exports,⁹ of protectionist tendencies in the common agricultural policy of the EEC. Let me dwell a bit on this poultry question, because we consider it an excellent illustration of the case for freer trade among nations.

Modern American methods of producing broilers are so efficient as to amount to a genuine technological breakthrough. Between 1948 and 1962, while virtually all other prices of consumers' goods were rising, the prices received by our producers of broilers actually dropped from 32.3 cents per pound to 15.2 cents.

Through international trade, the benefit of this breakthrough was widely shared by consumers in many countries—and particularly in Germany, where cheap broilers created what was virtually a new market. Between 1956 and 1962 the per capita consumption of poultry meat in West Germany almost tripled—from 4.6 pounds to 12.3 pounds. Thus the average German family could look forward to chicken every Sunday—instead of every 3 weeks, as in the past.

They are not getting such a bargain at present. Between mid-1962 and the present, the total duty on U.S. broilers imported into West Germany has been stepped up from less than 5 cents per pound to about 13½ cents.

Poultry—although an important test case—is only a small portion of our total agricultural exports to the Common Market. They amounted to \$1.2 billion in 1962, as compared with only \$200 million in U.S. imports of EEC agricultural products. They account for almost all our trade surplus with the Common Market,

⁹ For background, see *ibid.*, p. 996.

out of which our vital military commitments there are financed.

These exports are in grave danger of being drastically slashed if the EEC common agricultural policy takes the protectionist path that it did in poultry. Crucial to this question is the level at which the Common Market target price for grain is set. If it is set at or near the highest price levels prevailing in the Common Market—those in Germany—French agriculture will become immensely profitable. Output will be expanded greatly.

This decision is imminent—among other things, because the French have made it clear that the EEC's common agricultural policy must be implemented before they will engage in serious tariff negotiations. And, once the decision is made, it will, because of the slowness with which agricultural systems change and the special political compulsions to which they give rise, affect the world's economy for many years to come.

It is not only our interests that are involved. The Common Market's agricultural policy, even at its present early stage of implementation, has already brought on an economic crisis in neighboring Denmark so grave that drastic austerity measures have been taken by its Government to cope with it. If a high target price for grain stimulates French production, exporting nations like Australia and Canada will be increasingly plagued by the problems of unmanageable world surpluses.

It is for this reason that we are seeking, in the coming round of GATT talks, what we call "arrangements" for cereals, meats, and dairy products.

We recognize the political problems in each of the participating countries. We have our own political problems as well. But, as a manifestation of the seriousness of our intentions to tackle these problems on a worldwide scale, we are willing to discuss our own agricultural system at the bargaining table.

Technical Problems

Apart from the serious and difficult issues at stake, negotiations with the EEC present challenging technical problems. At this stage in their coalescence, the six member nations find

achieving a common outlook—and hence endowing the EEC Commission with negotiating authority—a long and difficult process. Decisions are hammered out only after prolonged discussion and tend to come very late in the day.

For example, as I speak now, the EEC Commission has yet to be granted authority to negotiate on commodity arrangements for meats and cereals, on nontariff barriers to trade, and even on poultry.

Even when the Six *do* endow their Commission spokesman with negotiating authority, the representatives of the member nations ride very close herd on him and are quick to jog his elbow when questions of national interest are at stake.

It is precisely for this reason that the responsibility for setting a sensible pace, for moving "with all deliberate speed" toward the target date of May 4, 1964, rests squarely upon us. We have important homework to do. By getting ahead with it, we can help and inspire—and perhaps even prod—the Common Market to get ahead with theirs.

By early September we hope that the President will be able to submit to the Tariff Commission a list of the articles on which we contemplate negotiating. The length and depth of this list will, we believe, be more than adequate to demonstrate to the rest of the world that the United States is fully dedicated to the policy of freeing trade. Our list, I believe, will challenge the EEC to enter this phase of the negotiations in the same spirit.

The Trade Expansion Act requires the Tariff Commission to advise the President as to the probable economic effect of any proposed trade agreement concession on any article. The Commission is required to hold hearings in the course of its investigations and to give all interested persons an opportunity to present their views. It must render its advice to the President within 6 months of the time he submits the list to it.

In addition, the Trade Information Committee—an interagency committee—will hold hearings roughly during the same period. At these hearings any interested person may present his views on any matter relevant to the proposed trade agreement. These hearings will focus largely upon determining which foreign tariffs and trade restrictions are most burdensome to

U.S. exporters, and I hope that the exporters among you will be forthcoming with this vital information, which only you, really, are in a position to give.

In any program of linear tariff cuts, there must be exceptions. Indeed, the EEC nations have made exceptions to the tariff cuts among themselves. The Trade Expansion Act itself specifically reserves certain items from the negotiations. In addition, the President has complete discretion to reserve additional items, taking into account the advice of the Tariff Commission. We expect this discretion to be used sparingly and that other nations will show equal self-restraint.

Prospects for Kennedy Round

The question recurs, however—will this mountain of effort produce only a mouse of tangible achievement?

I begin by sounding a cautionary note. Some commentators have accused us of taking what they call the "hard line" with the EEC. I prefer to call our line flexible but firm.

We are flexible in our recognition of the legitimate needs of other nations and in our willingness to seek means, within the framework of an agreement which is generally equitable, to accommodate them. We do not consider this the kind of negotiation in which one side must lose if the other wins.

As we see it, both sides stand to gain—and can gain.

But we are firm in our determination not to make an imprudent agreement for the sake of appearances, or for public relations purposes, or merely to paper over the cracks without really closing them. We are prepared to sit at the bargaining table so long as an agreement fair to both sides seems even remotely possible of achievement. But we are also prepared to walk away from the bargaining table if no such agreement is feasible.

So much for the cautionary note. Now I shall give reasons for optimism—a prudent optimism—about the outcome of all our efforts.

In the aeronautical industry they used to describe the airplane as "a machine so complicated that it almost doesn't work." Sometimes these trade negotiations likewise seem so complex and

so beset with difficulties of all kinds that it seems just barely possible that they will work out.

What makes the airplane fly is the power of its engine. What can make these trade negotiations succeed is the motive power provided by the needs—and the hopes—of many nations and of most of mankind.

First, a few facts about the urgent need for success in lowering tariffs and other barriers to trade.

There is need for it within the EEC itself. Since the door was closed—temporarily, we hope—on Britain, the gulf between Europe's two great trading blocs, the EEC and the European Free Trade Association, has widened and deepened. Each expects to eliminate all internal tariffs by 1967. The EEC has already gone 60 percent of the way, and EFTA will reach this point by the end of the year.

The tariff discriminations thus created will cut squarely across traditional channels of trade. To take one example: West Germany's world trade surplus is estimated at \$500 million for last year, but with EFTA alone it was \$1.4 billion. Without its markets in EFTA—which will be increasingly threatened by tariff discrimination—Germany would have suffered a trade deficit of \$900 million in 1962.

The EFTA nations likewise will suffer from this widening trade gap. Sweden's trade with Belgium, for example, was considerably reduced last year, and Swedish authorities have described the prospects after the latest EEC internal tariff cut as "even more unpromising." They have warned that the tariff gap between the EEC and EFTA has reached the point where it menaces intra-European trade.

The ultimate solution, and one to which the United States looks forward with long-term confidence, is the economic integration of Europe. Since the breakdown at Brussels, such integration is not imminent, but success at GATT in lowering tariffs can keep the split from deepening and may even help to heal it.

The impact of the EEC is not confined to Europe but is worldwide in character. I have already referred to the grave concern of nations, like ourselves, which export Temperate Zone agricultural products, a concern which the

developing pattern of the EEC's common agricultural policy fully justifies.

The less developed nations are also deeply worried over the possible disruption of traditional patterns of trade. This is one of the chief forces behind the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, scheduled for next year. It is a warning too that GATT must work effectively, in the general interest of *all* its members, or the pressure to establish alternative trade machinery will be irresistible.

All these pressures already converge upon the EEC, and they will increase in the coming months. As we are, the EEC is a world force, and it is in the process of facing up to world responsibilities. Its officials have publicly recognized this fact. President Walter Hallstein of the EEC Commission said last month:

The two aspects of our nature—that we cohere internally and are open to the world and turned toward the world—are inseparable from each other.

It is not only the needs of much of the world but the hopes as well that focus upon Geneva. There are the hopes of the great majority of Europeans for the “fully cohesive Europe” of which the President spoke at Frankfurt. There are the hopes of men of good will on both sides of the Atlantic for a fruitful partnership. There are the hopes of the less developed nations, mostly in the southern half of the world, for the opportunities in trade that will enable them to earn a better living for their peoples.

The “Grand Design”

These are the same hopes which make up what has been called the “Grand Design.”

A regiment of self-appointed Cassandra has been in full cry in recent months. We have been told that Europe is in outright rebellion against the United States—against “Governess America,” as one columnist put it. We have been told that neutralism is sweeping Europe—or, alternatively, that Europe is seeking to become a “third force,” playing the United States off against the Soviet Union and vice versa. These “waves of the future,” it is predicted, will sweep the Grand Design away like a castle in the sand.

There even seems to be a tendency to belittle the phrase itself—a tendency which I am unable to understand. Ours is a great nation and grand objectives become it better than petty ones.

There is one feature which is common to all this babble of voices. They purport to tell us what Europeans are thinking, but they seldom quote what influential Europeans have been saying.

To mention a few, Lord Home, Britain's Foreign Secretary, has called the idea of a European unity excluding America “profoundly mistaken.” And, just to make it unanimous for Britain, Harold Wilson, leader of the British Labor Party, said during his visit to Washington this spring that his party has as its goal “an Atlantic—and wider than Atlantic—Community.”

The self-same sentiments are widely and deeply held within the Common Market, as evinced, for example, by the insistence of the German Parliament that its approval of the Franco-German treaty should in no way diminish its dedication to a wider European unity and to an Atlantic partnership with America.

Different sentiments may occasionally be expressed in some German *schloss* or some French salon. But they are minority voices, voices of the past. The debates of recent months have only underlined the fact that those who look to the future look to the Atlantic. They prefer the Grand Design of the future to the grandeurs of the past. Indeed, the words of Governor Herter 2 days after the collapse of the British talks⁷ today are as true as when they were spoken:

Regardless of the setbacks that it may meet now and then, I am confident that the development of this [Atlantic] partnership represents the true course of the history of our countries.

Necessity compels, hope inspires. Both necessity and hope, deeply and widely felt, will be sitting at the table in Geneva next year, and they will be mighty forces working on and through the delegations of many nations toward the success of the Kennedy Round.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1963, p. 298.

U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee To Meet at Washington

Press release 397 dated July 30

The eighth annual meeting of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs will be held in Washington September 20-21.

Representing the Government of Canada will be the Honorable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; the Honorable Walter Gordon, Minister of Finance; the Honorable Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and Commerce; and the Honorable Harry Hays, Minister of Agriculture.

The United States will be represented by the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; the Honorable Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce; the Honorable George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; the Honorable Charles S. Murphy, Under Secretary of Agriculture; and the Honorable John A. Carver, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Interior.

The annual meeting of the Joint Committee which was inaugurated in 1953 provides an opportunity for Cabinet officers of both governments to consider economic and trade matters of common concern to the two countries. Previous meetings have been beneficial in furthering understanding between the two governments on economic and trade matters. The last meeting was held in Ottawa January 12-13, 1962.¹

AID Closes Mission in Haiti

The Agency for International Development on August 1 announced the closing of its mission in the Republic of Haiti. The action culminates the phasing out of AID programs and services over the past year. The three remaining employees in the Port-au-Prince office will be assigned to other duties.

With two exceptions AID has now suspended all its projects in Haiti. Reflecting the abiding interest of the United States in the welfare of

the island's people, AID will continue its support of a malaria-eradication project and a Food-for-Peace program serving 160,000 Haitians, including many children.

The malaria project, financed with the help of a U.S. grant, employs Haitian nationals supervised by four U.S. and seven Pan American Health Organization technicians. In the future the malaria project will be administered by that agency.

The United States will continue to donate food commodities to CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and Church World Service, which distribute the food under contract agreements with Haiti.

W. M. Blumenthal Confirmed Deputy for Trade Negotiations

The Senate on July 31 confirmed W. Michael Blumenthal to be a Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador.

Members of Advisory Commission on Cultural Affairs Confirmed

The Senate on July 31 confirmed Walter Adams and Mabel M. Smythe to be members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, each for a term of 3 years expiring May 11, 1966, and until a successor is appointed and has qualified.

Letters of Credence

Algeria

The newly appointed Ambassador of Algeria, Cherif Guellal, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 388 dated July 24.

¹ For text of a communique issued at the close of the meeting, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 168.

President Recommends Revision of Immigration Laws

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the Senate. An identical letter was sent on the same day to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

White House press release dated July 23

JULY 23, 1963

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am transmitting herewith, for the consideration of the Congress, legislation revising and modernizing our immigration laws. More than a decade has elapsed since the last substantial amendment to these laws. I believe there exists a compelling need for the Congress to re-examine and make certain changes in these laws.

The most urgent and fundamental reform I am recommending relates to the national origins system of selecting immigrants. Since 1924 it has been used to determine the number of quota immigrants permitted to enter the United States each year. Accordingly, although the legislation I am transmitting deals with many problems which require remedial action, it concentrates attention primarily upon revision of our quota immigration system. The enactment of this legislation will not resolve all of our important problems in the field of immigration law. It will, however, provide a sound basis upon which we can build in developing an immigration law that serves the national interest and reflects in every detail the principles of equality and human dignity to which our nation subscribes.

Elimination of Discrimination Based on National Origins

Present legislation establishes a system of annual quotas to govern immigration from each country. Under this system, 156,700 quota im-

migrants are permitted to enter the United States each year. The system is based upon the national origins of the population of the United States in 1920. The use of the year 1920 is arbitrary. It rests upon the fact that this system was introduced in 1924 and the last prior census was in 1920. The use of a national origins system is without basis in either logic or reason. It neither satisfies a national need nor accomplishes an international purpose. In an age of interdependence among nations, such a system is an anachronism, for it discriminates among applicants for admission into the United States on the basis of accident of birth.

Because of the composition of our population in 1920, the system is heavily weighted in favor of immigration from northern Europe and severely limits immigration from southern and eastern Europe and from other parts of the world. An American citizen with a Greek father or mother must wait at least 18 months to bring his parents here to join him. A citizen whose married son or daughter, or brother or sister, is Italian cannot obtain a quota number for them for an even longer time. Meanwhile, many thousands of quota numbers are wasted because they are not wanted or needed by nationals of the countries to which they are assigned.

I recommend that there be substituted for the national origins system a formula governing immigration to the United States which takes into account (1) the skills of the immigrant and their relationship to our needs, (2) the family relationship between immigrants and persons already here, so that the reuniting of families is encouraged, and (3) the priority of registration. Present law grants a preference to immigrants with special skills, education or training. It also grants a preference to various relatives of United States citizens and lawfully resident aliens. But it does so only within a national origins quota. It should be modified so that

those with the greatest ability to add to the national welfare, no matter where they were born, are granted the highest priority. The next priority should go to those who seek to be reunited with their relatives. As between applicants with equal claims the earliest registrant should be the first admitted.

Many problems of fairness and foreign policy are involved in replacing a system so long entrenched. The national origins system has produced large backlogs of applications in some countries, and too rapid a change might, in a system of limited immigration, so drastically curtail immigration in some countries the only effect might be to shift the unfairness from one group of nations to another. A reasonable time to adjust to any new system must be provided if individual hardships upon persons who were relying on the present system are to be avoided. In addition, any new system must have sufficient flexibility to allow adjustments to be made when it appears that immigrants from nations closely allied to the United States will be unduly restricted in their freedom to furnish the new seed population that has so long been a source of strength to our nation.

Accordingly, I recommend:

First, that existing quotas be reduced gradually, at the rate of 20 percent a year. The quota numbers released each year would be placed in the quota reserve pool, to be distributed on the new basis.

Second, that natives of no one country receive over 10 percent of the total quota numbers authorized in any one year. This will insure that the pattern of immigration is not distorted by excessive demand from any one country.

Third, that the President be authorized, after receiving recommendations from a 7-man Immigration Board, to reserve up to 50 percent of the unallocated quota numbers, for issuance to persons disadvantaged by the change in the quota system, and up to 20 percent to refugees whose sudden dislocation requires special treatment. The Immigration Board will be composed of 2 members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 2 members appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and 3 members appointed by the President. In addition to its responsibility for

formulating recommendations regarding the use of the quota reserve pool, the Board will make a continuous study of our immigration policy.

All Quota Numbers Used

But it is not alone the initial assignment of quota numbers which is arbitrary and unjust; additional inequity results from the failure of the law to permit full utilization of the authorized quota numbers. While American citizens wait for years for their relatives to receive a quota, approximately 60,000 quota numbers are wasted each year because the countries to which they are assigned have far more numbers allocated to them than they have emigrants seeking to move to the United States. There is no way at present in which these numbers can be reassigned to nations where immense backlogs of applicants for admission to the United States have accumulated. I recommend that this deficiency in the law be corrected.

Asia-Pacific Triangle

A special discriminatory formula is now used to regulate the immigration of persons who are attributable by their ancestry to an area called the Asia-Pacific triangle. This area embraces all countries from Pakistan to Japan and the Pacific islands north of Australia and New Zealand. Usually, the quota under which a prospective immigrant must enter is determined by his place of birth. However, if as much as one-half of an immigrant's ancestors came from nations in the Asia-Pacific triangle, he must rely upon the small quota assigned to the country of his ancestry, regardless of where he was born. This provision of our law should be repealed.

Other Provisions

In order to remove other existing barriers to the reuniting of families, I recommend two additional improvements in the law.

First, parents of American citizens, who now have a preferred quota status, should be accorded nonquota status.

Second, parents of aliens resident in the United States, who now have no preference,

should be accorded a preference, after skilled specialists and other relatives of citizens and alien residents.

These changes will have little effect on the number of immigrants admitted. They will have a major effect upon the individual hardships many of our citizens and residents now face in being separated from their parents.

In addition, I recommend the following changes in the law in order to correct certain deficiencies and improve its general application.

1. *Changes in the Preference Structure.* At present, the procedure under which specially skilled or trained workers are permitted to enter this country too often prevents talented people from applying for visas to enter the United States. It often deprives us of immigrants who would be helpful to our economy and our culture. This procedure should be liberalized so that highly trained or skilled persons may obtain a preference without requiring that they secure employment here before emigrating. In addition, I recommend that a special preference be accorded workers with lesser skills who can fill specific needs in short supply in this country.

2. *Non-quota status for natives of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago should be granted.* Under existing law, no numerical limitation is imposed upon the number of immigrants coming from Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or any independent country in Central or South America. But the language of the statute restricts this privilege to persons born in countries in the Caribbean area which gained their independence prior to the date of the last major amendment to the immigration and nationality statutes, in 1952. This accidental discrimination against the newly independent nations of the Western Hemisphere should be corrected.

3. *Persons afflicted with mental health problems should be admitted provided certain standards are met.* Today, any person afflicted with a mental disease or mental defect, psychotic personality, or epilepsy, and any person who has suffered an attack of mental illness, can enter this country only if a private bill is enacted for his benefit. Families which are able and will-

ing to care for a mentally ill child or parent often forced to choose between living in United States and leaving their loved ones behind and not living in the United States being able to see and care for their loved ones. Mental illness is not incurable. It should be treated like other illnesses. I recommend the Attorney General, at his discretion and under proper safeguards, be authorized to waive those provisions of the law which prohibit admission to the United States of persons with mental problems when they are close relatives of United States citizens and lawfully resident aliens.

4. *The Secretary of State should be authorized, in his discretion, to require re-registration of certain quota immigrant visa applicants to regulate the time of payment of visa fees.* This authority brings registration lists up to date, terminates the priority of applicants who have refused to accept a visa, and ends the problem of "insurance" registrations by persons who have no present intention to emigrate. Registration figures for oversubscribed quota areas are now inaccurate because there exists no means of determining whether registrants have died, have emigrated to other countries, or for some other reason no longer want to emigrate to the United States. These problems are particularly acute in heavily oversubscribed areas.

Conclusion

As I have already indicated the measures I have outlined will not solve all the problems of immigration. Many of them will require additional legislation; some cannot be solved by one country. But the legislation I am submitting will insure that progress will continue to be made toward our ideals and toward the realization of humanitarian objectives. The measures I have recommended will help eliminate discrimination between peoples and nations on a basis that is unrelated to any contribution immigrants can make and is inconsistent with our traditions of welcome. Our investment in new citizens has always been a valuable source of our strength.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Department Welcomes Amendment Philippine War Damage Act

release 400 dated July 31

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

The Department of State on July 31 welcomed the passage by the House of Representatives of the Fulbright-Hays amendment to the Philippine War Damage Act of 1962. The amendment provided equitable settlement of all outstanding claims based on a \$25,000 limitation on any individual claim. This ceiling would permit 99.6 percent of the 86,000 claimants to be paid in full. Balances of claims over \$25,000, which previously would have gone to large claimants, would be paid into a special account to be used for educational programs in the Philippines and educational exchange programs agreed upon between the President of the Philippines and the President of the United States.

It is estimated that this special educational fund would amount to approximately \$20 million to \$30 million. Senator Fulbright made this point in his comments to the Senate describing the amendment that the educational programs available could be broadly conceived. As examples, Senator Fulbright noted the fund could be used in the Philippines for school construction; assistance to teachers salaries; providing training, salaries, and equipment of community development specialists, to provide support for the educational aspects of the youth movement; vocational training and agricultural extension work.

REMARKS BY MR. HILSMAN¹

The amendment to the Philippine War Damage Bill which has just passed the American Congress seems to me to be a symbol of the new relationship between the United States and the Philippines. It is also, I might say, a

tangible vote of confidence in President Macapagal's administration and in the ability of his administration to get things done.

You will note that the amendment provides for a full settlement of the mass of the claims. Ninety-nine point six percent of the 86,000 claimants will be compensated to the maximum permitted under the original 1946 legislation. But, in addition, this compromise legislation provides a special educational fund which will amount to some \$20 million or \$30 million, which will be available to the Philippine Government for educational programs and exchange. It is not just for educational exchange.

Senator Fulbright stressed that it was the intent of the American Congress that these programs could be most broadly conceived. Sympathetic consideration is given in Senator Fulbright's statement to training and educational assistance, to teachers salaries, to whatever serves to promote education in the Philippines.

It is up to the Government of the Philippines to determine which programs it wishes to use this money for. The fund can be geared to and be an integral part of President Macapagal's 5-year social economic program and Land Reform Act. We in the United States will cooperate to the fullest extent permitted under the legislation to make this money have a broad impact on the whole of the Philippines. The Government of the Philippines can then redirect its own appropriations from the educational field into other areas of economic and social development.

Thus the amendment insures that the smaller claimants will be paid in full. At the same time, the Filipino people as a whole, who suffered as a nation through the war, will receive the benefits of rehabilitation payments. Not just a narrow segment of society but the whole of the Philippines will benefit by this special fund set up under the compromise legislation.

¹ Roger Hillsman, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Adjourned During July 1963

U.N. ECAFE Training Center Seminar on Customs Administration.	Bangkok	May 28-July
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 30th Session	New York	May 29-July
ILO Inter-American Vocational Training Research and Documentation Center: 2d Preparatory Meeting.	Rio de Janeiro	June 24-July
FAO Council: 40th Session	Rome	June 24-July
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission	Rome	June 25-July
GATT Working Group on Printing Costs	Geneva	July 1-2
OECD Industry Committee	Paris	July 1-2
OECD Fisheries Committee	Paris	July 1-3
IMCO Working Group on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea.	London	July 1-5
International Whaling Commission: 15th Meeting	London	July 1-5
GATT Meats Group	Geneva	July 1-6
GATT Tariff Reduction Subcommittee	Geneva	July 1-6
26th International Conference on Public Education	Geneva	July 1-12
IBE Executive Committee	Geneva	July 1-12
U.N. ECOSOC Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa	Nairobi	July 1-15
OECD Committee for Manpower and Social Affairs	Paris	July 2-3
OECD Energy Committee Working Party	Paris	July 2 (1 da
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on the International Cooperative Investigations of the Tropical Atlantic.	Paris	July 2-5
U.N. ECAFE Regional Symposium on Flood Control, Reclamation, Utilization, and Development of Deltic Areas.	Bangkok	July 2-9
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Meeting on the Congo.	Paris	July 3 (1 da
U.N. Sugar Conference	London	July 3-4
OECD Committee for Agriculture	Paris	July 4-6
FAO Group on Grains: 8th Session	Rome	July 4-12
3d International Film Festival	Moscow	July 7-21
OECD Joint Working Party on Apples and Pears	Paris	July 8 (1 da
IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals	London	July 8-12
South Pacific Commission: Exploratory Talks	London	July 8-12
GATT Working Party on Relations With Poland	Geneva	July 9-11
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	July 9-10
OECD Economic Policy Committee	Paris	July 10-11
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments).	Paris	July 12-13
Conference of Aeronautical Authorities	Ottawa	July 15-20
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Growth).	Paris	July 16-17
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Planning and Project Formulation: 2d Session.	San José	July 16-24
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Fiscal and Financial Policies and Administration: 2d Session.	San José	July 16-24
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform: 2d Session.	San José	July 16-24
U.N. ECA Meeting of Experts on Establishment of an African Development Bank.	Khartoum, Sudan	July 16-26
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Meeting on East Africa.	Paris	July 18-19

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 2, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECO, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Trade and Trade; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; O, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

Inter-American Conference on Biology Education	San José	July 21-28
OECD Tourism Committee	Paris	July 22 (1 day)
Working Party on Costs of Production and Prices of the OECD	Paris	July 23 (1 day)
Economic Policy Committee: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party of Experts		
on the Relation of Wage Differentials to Labor Mobility.		
OECD Oil Committee	Paris	July 23-25
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting .	Paris	July 24-25

Session as of August 1, 1963

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament .	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962-
Economic and Social Council: 36th Session	Geneva	July 2, 1963-
ECOSOC Special Committee on Industrial Development and	San José	July 26-
Financing of the Private Sector: 2d Session.		
ECOSOC Special Committee on Health, Housing, and Commu-	San José	July 26-
nity Development: 2d Session.		
ECA Conference of African Finance Ministers for the Estab-	Khartoum, Sudan . . .	July 27-
lishment of a Development Bank.		
International Coffee Council	London	July 29-
IT Trade Negotiations Committee	Geneva	July 31-

United States Explains Position on Portuguese Territories

Following are statements made by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the Security Council, on July 26 and 31, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on July 31.

STATEMENT OF JULY 26

U.N. press release 4230

The question which the Security Council has been discussing for the past week has, as we all know, troubled and concerned the United Nations for several years. This concern has been deeply felt by my Government, I believe, as well as by other.

The question of Portuguese territories has been considered in the United Nations during a long period of time from three separate but very closely related aspects. The General Assembly has examined the question in its relationship to Chapter XI of the charter and has unequivocally affirmed itself.¹ The General Assembly has examined the question in relationship to Resolution 1514, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and again has unequivocally declared its position.² Finally, the Security Council has examined at least part of the question—the situation in Angola—in its relationship to inter-

national friction and the maintenance of international peace and security.³

And now once again the Security Council at the request of 32 African nations has taken up consideration of this question, and this time in the broader framework of all of the Portuguese territories in Africa.

The position of the United States and our convictions on each of these aspects of the question of Portuguese territories have been set forth both in the Assembly and in the Security Council. However, in order to make entirely clear the starting point or, better perhaps, the broad basis from which the United States approaches our current deliberations, I would, with the indulgence of the Council, like to review very briefly our position with regard to each of these aspects.

First of all, the General Assembly has found that the territories under Portuguese administration are non-self-governing territories within the meaning of chapter XI of the charter and, therefore, are subject to the provisions of that chapter. We supported that view in the General Assembly, and we have urged Portugal to cooperate with the United Nations and to fulfill the obligations under chapter XI both as regards the administration of the territories

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/1542 (XV).

² BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 21.

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 497, and July 10, 1961, p. 88.

themselves and also the submission of information to the Secretary-General.

Second, we have steadfastly supported the principle of self-determination. I might add what you already know that this position long antedates the declaration contained in Resolution 1514, that it was first expounded as a universal doctrine by Woodrow Wilson at the end of the First World War. At that time it was still a new idea—though persuasive enough to contribute to the creation of many independent nation-states both in Europe and in the Middle East as successors to the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires. The right of peoples to choose the terms of their political, economic, and social destiny is written into our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution, as it is written into the Charter of the United Nations.

Hence the United States delegation has continuously supported in the United Nations, since the initial consideration of Angola in the Security Council, measures calling for Portuguese recognition of this principle and for an acceleration of political, economic, and social advancement for all inhabitants of Portuguese territories toward the full exercise of this self-determination. Consistent with this belief we have publicly and privately and continuously urged Portugal to accept this principle and give it practical effect for the peoples of Portuguese territories.

We believe the United Nations as an organ devoted to the reduction of international friction, the maintenance of peace and security, and dedicated therefore to peaceful change, must relentlessly strive for a solution to this problem through the creative paths of peace, difficult though these paths may often seem. This principle is fundamental not only to the charter but to the very concept of the United Nations and is one which we shall not abandon. To this end we have supported measures in the Council and in the Assembly. We have also undertaken bilateral efforts, some of which are not unknown to the members of the Council, and we shall continue to do so as long as the source of friction presented by the situation in Portuguese territories continues to exist.

Peaceful Self-Determination

Mr. President, up until now I have delayed in participating in this discussion. I have done so because I wished to define the situation within the terms of the charter and the functions of the Security Council. To this end I have studied carefully the letter and accompanying memorandum⁴ submitted to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of 32 African nations. I have carefully and attentively considered the presentations of the four African foreign ministers representing the African chiefs of state and heads of government who met so recently at Addis Ababa. I have listened with equal attention and studied just as carefully the Foreign Minister of Portugal's statement to the Council. And after hearing the subsequent statements of the members of the Council, I believe we have a clearer idea of the problem facing the Council and how the Council might act to resolve what is both a stalemate and a dispute. It is a stalemate because we have perceived no progress. It is a dispute because there is a fundamental difference of opinion.

Stalemates are of course a dangerous condition in human affairs. They are the powder kegs of history, and unless they are resolved they may explode at any time into violence with unpredictable consequences for the peace of the world. Change will come in the Portuguese colonies; the present temporary stalemate of forces will be broken one way or another in the not too distant future.

The pace of decolonization in the last 18 years has been phenomenal. When World War I ended there were just over 50 independent nations in the world. Today—less than a generation later—hardly 2 percent of the world population still live in dependent territories. More independent nations have been created in that period than existed in all the world at the close of World War II. Here is a record to satisfy the most impatient of us. No one can complain that there has not been action and progress—indeed action and progress far beyond what the most optimistic could have expected in 1945.

⁴ U.N. doc. S/5347.

Most of this great achievement was accomplished with very little or no bloodshed. This I think is also something of which all of us, liberators and liberators alike, particularly we members of this great peacekeeping organization, can be proud. We have achieved freedom and we have kept the peace, and we have many members of this organization, both liberators and liberators, to thank.

Now that should also be our goal in the case of the Portuguese territories. Change will come, self-determination will come. There can be no question about that. The only question is whether it will come peacefully or with a violence and bloodshed which will reflect on the prestige of the United Nations and on the loyalty of its members to the charter and which will cause suffering and hardship to the peoples whose interests we profess to act, the peoples of the Portuguese territories.

There is no conflict of principle before this issue. The only issue before us—complex as it may be—is to discover and to agree upon the best practical way open to this organization to help bring about peaceful change, in the interests of the people of the Portuguese territories, in the interests of the Republic of Portugal, and of the independent states of Africa and the peace of the world.

The core of the problem is the acceptance of the application of the right of self-determination, as the preceding speakers have said.

[Alberto Franco] Nogueira, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Portugal, has conceded that the criteria and procedure defined by the United Nations for the exercise of this concept cannot justifiably or realistically be considered the only criteria for valid self-determination.

I hope he does not fear that any of us are going to deprive Portugal of its proper place in Africa. Many African leaders around this table and elsewhere have emphasized that, once Portugal has granted self-determination, it will, in the interest of the inhabitants of its present territories as well as in its own interest, have a great role to play in the field of economic and cultural development and progress. The United States has in the past offered to give sympathetic consideration to any request by

Portugal for material assistance in fulfilling certain aspects of that responsibility. No doubt others would likewise be prepared to assist. But in any case, with or without help, Portugal's role in Africa will be ended only if it refuses to collaborate in the great and the inevitable changes which are taking place. If it does collaborate, its continuing role is assured, and I for one, sitting here in my own behalf, should like to express with pride the gratitude of my Government for the progress that Portugal is attempting to make to improve the conditions of life among the inhabitants of its territories.

However, the overwhelming majority of the United Nations, which have been most effectively represented by the African ministers present at the Council table, do not agree that the self-determination of which the Foreign Minister of Portugal speaks is sufficient. And this disagreement has been the subject not only of this discussion here during the past week but of many decisions in the United Nations. We must persevere, I suggest, as the charter requires in peaceful efforts to establish this principle and to get it carried out. We believe the African states have shown a sense of responsibility in coming to the Council with such a clear and such a reasonable objective.

For our part, the United States cannot accept and must emphatically reject the concept suggested to the Council that an acceptable means of solving such a problem is to aggravate the situation until it does indeed become a threat to international peace and security, as my distinguished British colleague has said here a moment ago. This concept is a contradiction of the provisions and the spirit of the charter itself to which we and our governments are pledged to conform. We are not here to create threats to peace and security but to prevent them; we are not here to endanger the peace but to guard it. We are here to strengthen and not to burn the moral and the legal foundations of a peaceful world order.

Unfortunately the problem is that there is no dialog going on and thus little chance for the voice of reason to prevail. There is a kind of vacuum in which emotions can only continue to become embittered. But we believe—based

on the statements of the four foreign ministers, who in the first instance seek a peaceful solution and have appealed for Portuguese cooperation, and on the statement of the Foreign Minister of Portugal, who suggested conversations with African leaders without reservations or restrictions—that the grounds exist for these channels to be reopened in the interests of the people of the Portuguese territories.

Getting Parties Together

This then, it seems to us, is the place to start. The second essential is to make sure that they are talking about the right things, including the means of exercising self-determination. Now, Mr. President, third parties cannot speak for Portugal, nor can they speak for the people of the Portuguese colonies, nor for the African leaders. Yet it is plain that the principals in this dispute need help in getting together, in breaking down the barriers which prevent any discussion at all from even beginning. And this is one place where I suggest that the Security Council can play an effective role.

The United States is convinced that it would be useful to designate a special representative of the Security Council whose task it would be to facilitate a meaningful dialog between the Government of Portugal and appropriate African leaders. Such a representative would visit the territories, would consult with all concerned, would take appropriate steps to open consultations to bring about a real exercise of self-determination and the reduction of international friction. If that can be done, the right people will be talking about the right subject.

It is our belief that this Council must make every possible effort to get significant consultations started. And in this connection we note with gratification that the Foreign Minister of Portugal has invited the African foreign ministers or their representatives to visit Portuguese territories. He has placed no conditions or limitations on these visits. And this seems, too, a most valuable offer made in a spirit of cooperation. Though this invitation is obviously only a partial step, we hope that it will be accepted and that it will contribute to the achievement of the objectives we all approve.

We have seen the end of apparent stalemate

many times in the course of history—frequently, I remind you, when the outlook seemed darker than ever and, on occasion, just in the nick of time. I need only refer by way of example to the news that came to us only yesterday that the long, dreary, frustrating stalemate in the nuclear testing issue appears to be broken.⁵ It was broken because men declined to surrender to despair, because men worked patiently and imaginatively to break that deadlock.

Obligations of U.N. Members

Finally, Mr. President, there is even more, I would like to suggest, at stake here than the course of events in the Portuguese colonies in the next few years.

There is, I believe, an obligation on the part of the United Nations to do its utmost to see that the great story of national liberation—to which the United Nations has already contributed so much—ends on a note of peaceful change and not in a bloodbath.

There is, I believe, an obligation to prove that this democratic institution, the Security Council of the United Nations, possesses the central virtue of a democratic institution and that is the capacity to support and to stimulate peaceful change, which is the only alternative to violence and war in a world of rapid change.

And there is, I believe, a heavy obligation on each of us to strengthen the United Nations by a realistic appraisal of its limitations as well as its capacities—and working day in and day out to expand these capacities until the day comes when the United Nations is fully equipped to keep the peace of the world and to manage and enforce peaceful change.

In these respects our actions here will echo in the history of the years to come.

Three-Power Resolution

Now in the draft resolution⁶ before us submitted by Ghana, Morocco, and the Philippines, there is little of substance with which my delegation disagrees. Our aims are very close to its aims, and we shall be happy to support them if

⁵ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

⁶ U.N. doc. S/5372.

ey are couched in a form and language which we can accept and which are consistent with the Charter, which is the sovereign law of all of us. But the present language of the resolution we cannot accept, and we could not vote for the resolution in its present form. Though we agree that the situation in the Portuguese territories in Africa gives rise to very serious international friction and might, if continued, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, we do not agree that a threat to the peace already exists. We do not agree, therefore, that the situation falls within the scope of chapter VII of the Charter or that the language of any resolution we adopt should so suggest.

Moreover, some of the language of the resolution before us is almost certain not to promote but to inhibit the consultations to which we have agreed and which we consider the most hopeful approach toward a peaceful, prompt settlement of this problem on the basis of the principles every member of the Security Council has endorsed.

Let us not surrender to the emotion and frustration that this issue has generated, no matter what the provocation, but rather carefully select our tone and the words most likely to further the ends we so earnestly seek.

The restriction on the sale and the supply of arms and military equipment to Portugal for use in its African territories, which appears in paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, is a policy which the United States has in fact, as we have frequently stated in the United Nations, been pursuing for some years. We would, therefore, have no reason for objecting to such a recommendation based on the fact that such sales might contribute to increasing international tension in the area in a resolution otherwise satisfactory.

Finally, we must not impose an impossible burden on the Secretary-General or on any representative he may name to deal with this problem. It cannot under the best of circumstances be solved overnight. Let us assign him reasonable goals to be achieved without undue delay and also without unrealistic time limits which could only arouse false hopes. I have already suggested that an alternative to imposing this

burden directly upon the Secretary-General might be to ask him to appoint someone to serve as a special representative of the Security Council who would be able to devote himself exclusively to this case and whose mandate in the implementation of self-determination might be spelled out more extensively in a resolution.

We believe that, through further consultations among members of this Council and the four African ministers who are visiting us, a draft can be produced which could command general acceptance and could enable the Council to adopt a resolution by a large majority. It is far better, it seems to us, to take joint action by an impressive degree of unanimity, even though it does not go as far as many would like, than to fail to reach agreement and find ourselves unable to take any effective action at all on this great issue.

STATEMENT OF JULY 31

U.S./U.N. press release 4232

It is the very sincere hope of the United States delegation that the resolution⁷ which has just been adopted by the Council will not hinder but will contribute to the peaceful solution of the situation in the Portuguese territories.

The United States abstained on the resolution primarily because we do not believe that it is drafted in either language or form best calculated to achieve the results which we all seek as quickly and as harmoniously as possible.

In my earlier statement before the Council, I remarked that the aims of the resolution originally proposed by Ghana, Morocco, and the Philippines were very close to our aims and that I thought that, through further consultations among the members of this Council and with the African foreign ministers, a resolution could be produced which would command more general acceptance. Consultations did take place, and I should like to express appreciation for the spirit of reasonableness, of cooperation and accommodation of the sponsors of the resolution, of the African foreign ministers and the other members of the Security Council.

⁷ U.N. doc. S/5380.

As a result of these consultations, some welcome modifications which in our judgment improved the resolution were suggested and accepted by the sponsors. They have been proposed as amendments^{*} by the distinguished representative of Venezuela and have now been adopted by the Council. These changes have helped to relieve the apprehensions of the United States about the use of language which, in our opinion, clearly fell within the terms of chapter VII of the charter. We welcome the statement of the distinguished delegate of Ghana that even the wording in the resolution draft was not intended to invoke chapter VII. And we are glad to see that the language has now been further changed to leave no doubt on that score.

We regret that other objections which we had to the original text, however, still remain and that, accordingly, it was not possible to produce a full agreement among us.

I repeat in this explanation of our abstention what I have already said. While the United States cannot agree with some of the provisions of the resolution just adopted, we do agree with much of the substance of the resolution and have from the very infancy of our Republic believed in the principle of self-determination of peoples. The heart of this resolution and the settlement of the danger posed by the situation in the overseas territories of Portugal in Africa is the recognition and the application of that right of self-determination for the peoples of these territories. The Council has called on Portugal to recognize this right and to undertake negotiations on this basis. We firmly believe that the developments we all want can be achieved and can only be achieved in an orderly, peaceful manner and without further violence and suffering on both sides as a consequence of such negotiations conducted in good faith.

By its action the Council has also requested the Secretary-General to furnish such assistance as he may deem necessary to this end. This we believe is a significant provision, and the assistance of a third party may be helpful, if not indispensable, to a peaceful solution. The task

could be time consuming and heavily tax the patience, the resourcefulness, and the skill of such a third party. We hope he will draw on the many resources and methods available to him in a persistent and continuing effort to insure progress. We are confident that the Secretary-General and his representatives in pursuing this formidable mission will also in accordance with his charter authority and responsibility take every possible step to reduce friction and to bring about the change in a peaceful setting. But ultimately he must count on the spirit of cooperation and accommodation of the parties. Without it there can be no satisfactory sequel to the Council's action here today.

The resolution also asks that member states refrain from the sale or the supply of arms and military equipment to Portugal for use in the Portuguese overseas territories in Africa. The United States has felt that arms supplied to Portugal for other purposes and used in its overseas territories might well contribute to an increase in friction and danger. With these considerations in mind, the United States has for a number of years followed a policy of providing no arms or military equipment to Portugal for use in these territories. And with these same objectives in mind, we have also prohibited direct export of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese territories. The United States will continue to adhere to this policy. We trust, Mr. President, that other states will exercise a similar restraint, avoiding actions of any kind which could further increase the tensions in the area and that they will cooperate fully to assure that the solution will be achieved through peaceful means.

To resolve the longstanding controversy about the future of these territories in a manner consistent with the course of history, with the wishes of all of the inhabitants, and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations would be a great boon to this troubled world. And my Government earnestly hopes that the interested parties, with the help and the encouragement of the United Nations and all of the friends of peace, will arrive at their destination. They can count on the help, wanted, of the Government of the United States.

^{*} U.N. doc. S/5379.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION^a

The Security Council,

Having examined the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration as submitted by the forty-two African Member States,

Recalling Security Council resolution S/4835 of 9 June 1961¹⁰ and General Assembly resolutions 1807 (VII) of 14 December 1962 and 1819 (XVII) of December 1962,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960 which declares the Territories under Portuguese administration to be Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter IV of the Charter, as well as General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, by which the General Assembly declared *inter alia* that immediate steps be taken to transfer all powers to the people of these Territories without any conditions or reservations in accordance with their freely expressed wishes, without distinction as to race, creed or colour in order to enable them to enjoy complete freedom and independence,

Confirms resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly of 14 December 1960;

Affirms that the policies of Portugal in claiming the Territories under its administration as "overseas" territories and as integral parts of metropolitan Portugal are contrary to the principles of the Charter and relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council;

Deprecates the attitude of the Portuguese Government, its repeated violations of the principles of the United Nations Charter and its continued refusal to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly of the Security Council;

Determines that the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration is seriously disturbing peace and security in Africa;

Urgently calls upon Portugal to implement the following:

(a) The immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence;

(b) The immediate cessation of all acts of repression and the withdrawal of all military and other forces at present employed for that purpose;

(c) The promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and the establishment of conditions that will allow the free functioning of political parties;

(d) Negotiations, on the basis of the recognition of the right to self-determination, with the authorized representatives of the political parties within and outside the Territories with a view to the transfer of

^a U.N. doc. S/5380 and Corr. 1; adopted by the Council on July 31 by a vote of 8 to 0, with 3 abstentions (U.S., U.K., France).

BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 89.

power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV);

(e) The granting of independence immediately thereafter to all the Territories under its administration in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples;"

6. Requests that all States should refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories under its administration, and take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment for this purpose to the Portuguese Government;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the implementation of the provisions of this resolution, to furnish such assistance as he may deem necessary and to report to the Security Council by 31 October 1963.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on latest developments concerning the proposed Yemen observation mission. S/5325. June 7, 1963. 1 p.

Note verbale dated June 7, 1963, from the U.S. representative addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the appointment of Gen. Hamilton H. Howze as commanding general of the military forces made available to the unified command. S/5327. June 19, 1963. 1 p.

Letter dated June 10, 1963, from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the Secretary-General regarding alleged violation of the armistice agreement by Israel, S/5329, June 10, 1963, 1 p.; note verbale dated June 11, 1963, from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General in reply, S/5332, June 11, 1963, 2 pp.

Letter dated June 14, 1963, from the representative of Saudi Arabia addressed to the Secretary-General enclosing a summary of alleged Egyptian air raids on Saudi Arabian territory, S/5333, June 17, 1963, 3 pp.; letter dated June 20, 1963, from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General in reply, S/5336, June 21, 1963, 2 pp.

Letter dated June 22, 1963, from the representative of the Yemen Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General regarding alleged armed aggression by British forces, S/5338, June 24, 1963, 2 pp.; letter dated July 1, 1963, from the deputy permanent representative of the United Kingdom to the President of the Security Council in reply, S/5343, July 2, 1963, 4 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Narcotics

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5273.

Ratification deposited: Turkey, July 15, 1963.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol (relating to harp and hood seals) to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington July 15, 1963.¹

Signatures: France and Portugal, July 29, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Signed at Moscow August 5, 1963. Enters into force after deposit of ratifications by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Signatures: United States, United Kingdom, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Trade

Protocol for the accession of Spain to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 30, 1963.¹

Signature: United States, July 26, 1963.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement amending the agreement of November 5, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3949, 4636), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro May 20 and June 6, 1963. Entered into force June 6, 1963.

Japan

Arrangement providing for Japan's financial contributions for United States administrative and related

¹ Not in force.

expenses during the Japanese fiscal year 1963 under the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 1954. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo July 19, 1963. Entered into force July 19, 1963.

Malagasy Republic

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Tananarive July 26, 1963. Entered into force July 26, 1963.

United Kingdom

Amendment to the agreement of June 15, 1955, amended (TIAS 3321, 3359, 3608, 4078), for cooperation on the civil uses of atomic energy. Signed Washington June 5, 1963.

Entered into force: July 31, 1963.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on July 31 confirmed the following nominations:

George W. Anderson, Jr., to be Ambassador to Portugal. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 21.)

Howard Rex Cottam to be Ambassador to the State of Kuwait. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 405 dated August 6.)

Donald A. Dumont to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Burundi. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated July 26.)

Henry Cabot Lodge to be Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

James I. Loeb to be Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated June 21.)

Claude G. Ross to be Ambassador to the Central African Republic. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated July 13.)

Appointments

Samuel Z. Westerfield, Jr., as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective July 28. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 398 dated July 30.)

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 29–August 4

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to July 29 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 388 of July 24 and 390 of July 18.

No.	Date	Subject
*395	7/29	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†396	7/29	Modernization of consular operations (rewrite).
397	7/30	U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.
*398	7/30	Westerfield appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
399	7/31	Relations with Ecuador resumed.
400	7/31	Department statement on Philippine war damage legislation.
401	8/2	Rusk: letter to ambassadors on export drive.
†403	8/3	Gardner: "Human Rights—Some Next Steps" (as-delivered text).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1959

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents is an annual, one-volume collection of the principal messages, addresses, statements, and reports and certain of the diplomatic notes exchanged and treaties made in a given calendar year which indicate the scope, goals, and implementation of the foreign policy of the United States.

As was true with respect to the earlier volumes in the series, the 1959 compilation includes some documents issued by other governments and by regional international organizations of which the United States is not a member where the pronouncements or settlements revealed in them were of major consequence to the United States in the formulation of its own policies.

In most instances the documents are arranged under topical headings within each of the 14 parts. The mechanical devices used to facilitate quick reference include a table of contents and list of documents, source, cross-reference, and (wherever possible) informational footnotes; and an index.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN



Vol. XLIX, No. 1261

August 26, 1963

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Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Signed at Moscow, Transmitted to Senate for Advice and Consent to Ratification

A treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water was signed by representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at Moscow on August 5.¹ Following are texts of remarks made by Secretary Rusk at the signing ceremony and a joint communique released simultaneously by the three Governments, together with a message from President Kennedy transmitting the treaty to the Senate on August 8 and a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State which accompanied the President's message.

THE SIGNING AT MOSCOW

Remarks by Secretary Rusk

Our three Governments have today taken what all mankind must hope will be a first step on the road to a secure and peaceful world. The treaty we have signed today is a good first

¹ For text of the treaty, initialed at Moscow on July 25, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

step—a step for which the United States has long and devoutly hoped. But it is only a first step. It does not end the threat of nuclear war. It does not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it does not halt the production of nuclear weapons; it does not restrict their use in time of war.

It is therefore not possible for us to guarantee now what the significance of this act will be. History will eventually record how we deal with the unfinished business of peace. But each of our Governments can and will play an important role in determining what future historians will report.

For it will be our individual policies, attitudes, and actions by which this step in the arms control field can be made the first and only one, or the first of many. If collectively we and other nations pursue a course to insure that the forward momentum of this agreement is maintained by further steps, man's long, hopeful quest for peace will cease to be only a dream and will begin to acquire solid reality.

So today the President of the United States directed me to sign this treaty, which I have done with great satisfaction, preparatory to its

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as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Submission to our Senate for its consideration under our constitutional system. In a broader sense, the signature of this treaty represents the readiness of the United States to join with the two other original signatories, and with other nations, in a determined and sustained effort to find practical means by which tensions can be reduced and the burdens of the arms race lifted from the shoulders of our peoples. For this reason, we are particularly pleased that Secretary-General U Thant has accepted our invitation to be here for this occasion.

Text of Communiqué

Press release 404 dated August 5

On August 5 in Moscow in the Grand Kremlin Palace A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and Lord Home, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, signed a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, who had been invited by the three signatory Governments, was present at the signing of the Treaty.

The signing ceremony was attended on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., A. P. Kirilenko, L. N. Brezhnev, Yu. V. Andropov, L. F. Il'ichev, N. Ponomarev, V. N. Titov, A. N. Shelepin, A. F. Ustinov, V. Ye. Dymshits, M. A. Lesechin, P. F. Lomako, I. T. Novikov, K. N. Rudnev, V. Smirnov, R. Ya. Malinowski, E. P. Slavov, A. M. Petrosyants, V. V. Kuznetsov, V. A. Korin, A. A. Sobolev, A. A. Grochko, S. K. Sarapkin, A. F. Dobrynin, A. A. Soldatov, and the following Chiefs of Sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.: M. N. Gerasimov, G. I. Tunkin, L. M. Zamyatin, F. Molochkov, Z. V. Mironova; on behalf of the United States of America by Honorable William C. Pastore, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Senator Aiken, Senator Fulbright, Senator Saltonstall, Senator Humphrey,

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Open for Signing

Statement by Acting Secretary Ball¹

The treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water is open for signing today in three capitals of the world. Nations representing every continent and every political system will sign the treaty in this room today. Many more have made clear that they intend to accede, and we look forward to the time when almost every nation in the world will subscribe to the treaty's obligations.

This agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union was the solemn act of the three major nuclear powers, resolved to begin the business of trying to arrest and control the nuclear arms race—a race that is devouring our resources at an increasing rate, a race that prepares us for a war no sane man can want, and in which there can be no “victory.”

Yet, in today's world, none of the nuclear powers can stop or even slow that race alone. Only by the joint action of nations willing to move forward together can we make progress.

No one can predict what this treaty will bring. We may hope, however, that it will lead to the further and broader measures that the world so sorely needs to secure a just and lasting peace.

¹ Made at the signing ceremony at Washington on Aug. 8 (press release 408). The treaty was also open for signature at London and Moscow on the same date.

Senator Pastore, Honorable William C. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Honorable Glenn Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Honorable Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador at Large, Honorable Arthur Dean, Consultant to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Honorable Foy D. Kohler, U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.; on behalf of the United Kingdom by The Right Honorable Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Peter Thomas, Minister of State, Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow.

The Treaty, in three original and identical texts in the Russian and English languages, was signed simultaneously by A. A. Gromyko, Mr.

Rusk and Lord Home. The signers and the Secretary General of the U.N. made brief speeches which are published separately.

The three Governments which signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water have agreed that this Treaty is an important initial step towards the lessening of international tension and the strengthening of peace, and have expressed their hope that further progress will be achieved towards that end.

The three Governments have expressed the hope that other States will accede to the Treaty. They will themselves take the necessary measures for the prompt ratification of the Treaty in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

It was agreed that the Treaty would be open for signature in all three capitals beginning on August 8.

The signing of the Treaty was attended by numerous representatives of the Soviet and foreign press, radio and television.

TRANSMITTAL TO THE SENATE²

The President's Message

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 8, 1963

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This treaty is the first concrete result of 18 years of effort by the United States to impose limits on the nuclear arms race. There is hope that it may lead to further measures to arrest and control the dangerous competition for increasingly destructive weapons.

The provisions of the treaty are explained in the report of the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted herewith. Essentially it prohibits

only those nuclear tests that we ourselves can police. It permits nuclear tests and explosions underground so long as all fallout is contained within the country where the test or explosion is conducted.

In the weeks before and after the test ban negotiations, the hopes of the world have been focused on this treaty. Especially in America, where nuclear energy was first unlocked, where the danger of nuclear war and the meaning of radioactive fallout are so clearly recognized, there has been understanding and support for this effort. Now the treaty comes before the Senate, for that careful study which is the constitutional obligation of the members of that body. As that study begins I wish to urge that the following considerations be kept clearly in mind:

First: This treaty is the whole agreement. U.S. negotiators in Moscow were instructed not to make this agreement conditioned upon any other understanding; and they made none. The treaty speaks for itself.

Second: This treaty advances, though it does not assure, world peace; and it will inhibit, though it does not prohibit, the nuclear arms race.

While it does not prohibit the United States and the Soviet Union from engaging in all nuclear tests, it will radically limit the testing in which both nations would otherwise engage.

While it will not halt the production or reduce the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, it is a first step toward limiting the nuclear arms race.

While it will not end the threat of nuclear war or outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, it can reduce world tensions, open a way to further agreements, and thereby help to ease the threat of war.

While it cannot wholly prevent the spread of nuclear arms to nations not now possessing them, it prohibits assistance to testing in these environments by others; it will be signed by many other potential testers; and it is thus an important opening wedge in our effort to "get the genie back in the bottle."

Third: The treaty will curb the pollution of our atmosphere. While it does not assure th

² S. Ex. M, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

world that it will be forever free from the fears and dangers of radioactive fallout from atmospheric tests, it will greatly reduce the numbers and dangers of such tests.

Fourth: This treaty protects our rights in the future. It cannot be amended without the consent of the United States, including the consent of the Senate; and any party to the treaty has the right to withdraw, upon 3 months' notice, if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

Fifth: This treaty does not alter the status of unrecognized regimes. The provisions relating to ratification by others, and the precedents of international law, make it clear that our adherence to this treaty, and the adherence of any other party, can in no way accord or even imply recognition by the United States or any other nation of any regime which is not now accorded such recognition.

Sixth: This treaty does not halt American nuclear progress. The United States has more experience in underground testing than any other nation; and we intend to use this capacity to maintain the adequacy of our arsenal. Our atomic laboratories will maintain an active development program, including underground testing, and we will be ready to resume testing in the atmosphere if necessary. Continued research on developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy will be possible through underground testing.

Seventh: This treaty is not a substitute for, and does not diminish the need for, continued Western and American military strength to meet all contingencies. It will not prevent us from building all the strength that we need; and it is not a justification for unilaterally cutting our defensive strength at this time. Our choice is not between a limited treaty and effective strategic strength—we need and can have both. The continuous buildup in the power and invulnerability of our nuclear arsenal in recent years has been an important factor in persuading others that the time for a limitation has arrived.

Eighth: This treaty will assure the security of the United States better than continued unlimited testing on both sides. According to a

comprehensive report prepared by the responsible agencies of Government for the National Security Council, the tests conducted by both the Soviet Union and the United States since President Eisenhower first proposed this kind of treaty in 1959 have not resulted in any substantial alteration in the strategic balance. In 1959 our relative nuclear position was strong enough to make a limited test ban desirable, and it remains so today. Under this treaty any gains in nuclear strength and knowledge which could be made by the tests of any other power—including not only underground tests but even any illegal tests which might escape detection—could not be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's homeland. We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, the nuclear strength that we need. On the other hand, unrestricted testing—by which other powers could develop all kinds of weapons through atmospheric tests more cheaply and quickly than they could underground—might well lead to a weakening of our security. It is true that the United States would be able to make further progress if atmospheric tests were continued—but so would the Soviet Union and, indeed, so could other nations. It should be remembered that only one atomic test was required to complete the development of the Hiroshima bomb. Clearly the security of the United States—the security of all mankind—is increased if such tests are prohibited.

Ninth: The risks in clandestine violations under this treaty are far smaller than the risks in unlimited testing. Underground tests will still be available for weapons development; and other tests, to be significant, must run substantial risks of detection. No nation tempted to violate the treaty can be certain that an attempted violation will go undetected, given the many means of detecting nuclear explosions. The risks of detection outweigh the potential gains from violation, and the risk to the United States from such violation is outweighed by the risk of a continued unlimited nuclear arms race. There is further assurance against clandestine testing in our ability to develop and deploy additional means of detection, in our determina-

tion to maintain our own arsenal through underground tests, and in our readiness to resume atmospheric testing if the actions of others so require.

Tenth: This treaty is the product of the steady effort of the U.S. Government in two administrations, and its principles have had the explicit support of both great political parties. It grows out of the proposal made by President Eisenhower in 1959 and the resolution passed by the Senate in that same year; and it carries out the explicit pledges contained in the platforms of both parties in 1960. Nothing has happened since then to alter its importance to our security. It is also consistent with the proposals this administration put forward in 1961 and 1962—and with the resolution introduced in the Senate, with wide bipartisan support, in May of 1963.

This treaty is in our national interest. While experience teaches us to be cautious in our expectations and ever vigilant in our preparations, there is no reason to oppose this hopeful step. It is rarely possible to recapture missed opportunities to achieve a more secure and peaceful world. To govern is to choose; and it is my judgment that the United States should move swiftly to make the most of the present opportunity and approve the pending treaty. I strongly recommend that the Senate of the United States advise and consent to its ratification.

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State ³

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 8, 1963.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House:

I have the honor to submit to you, with the recommendation that it be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, a certified copy of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

On October 31, 1958, the United States and the United Kingdom began negotiations with the Soviet Union at Geneva for an effectively controlled nuclear test cessation agreement. As you are aware, continued studies and assessments of the technical, political, mili-

³ Also released as Department of State press release 409 dated Aug. 8.

tary, and other aspects of this subject have been conducted since that time in connection with the negotiations.⁴

The Senate has followed the test ban negotiations with close attention, holding many hearings and acting a resolution in support of the efforts of the executive branch (S. Res. 96, 86th Cong., 1st sess.). Congressional advisers have attended the negotiations at Geneva at various times since 1958.

The first proposal for a limited test ban treaty was advanced by the United States and the United Kingdom on April 13, 1959. On that date, supported by Prime Minister Macmillan, President Eisenhower proposed in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev⁵ a ban on tests above ground and up to 50 kilometers. On September 3, 1961, you and Prime Minister Macmillan proposed to Chairman Khrushchev that the two Governments agree immediately not to conduct "clear tests which take place in the atmosphere and produce radioactive fallout".⁶

On August 27, 1962, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted to the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.⁷ Both proposals have been renewed by the United States and the United Kingdom at various times since then.

On May 27, 1963, Senators Dodd and Humphrey introduced in the Senate a resolution (S. Res. 148, 86th Cong., 1st sess.). This resolution, cosponsored by other Senators, urged negotiation of a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere and the oceans.

On June 10, 1963, in a speech at American University,⁸ you announced further negotiations with the Soviet Union for a nuclear test ban and a suspension of United States tests in the atmosphere so long as other nations did not conduct them.

On July 2, 1963, Chairman Khrushchev expressed willingness of the Soviet Government "to conclude an agreement banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water."

Commencing July 15, 1963, negotiations were held in Moscow between W. Averell Harriman, representing the United States, Lord Hailsham, representing the United Kingdom, and A. A. Gromyko, representing the Soviet Union, looking toward the possibility of concluding a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in all environments, but not underground. On July 25, 1963, these negotiations resulted in an agreed draft initiated by the representatives of each of the parties.⁹

⁴ For an article by William J. Gehron on the history of political and technical developments of the negotiations from Oct. 31, 1958, to Aug. 22, 1960, see BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1960, p. 482.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1959, p. 704.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 476.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 415.

⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

⁹ For an address to the Nation on July 26 by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

August 5, 1963, the treaty was signed in Moscow by Secretary Rusk on behalf of the United States, by A. A. Gromyko on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and by Lord Home on behalf of the United Kingdom.

The treaty consists of a preamble and five articles. The preamble indicates the relationship of this treaty to the much broader aim of achieving an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, as well as to the more specific aims of eventually preventing nuclear weapons tests in all environments, meanwhile stopping the contamination of the atmosphere by radioactive fallout.

Article I contains the principal substantive obligations of the parties. Under its first paragraph the parties undertake to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out, at any place under their jurisdiction or control, nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water. In the context of provisions devoted to obtaining a complete, verifiable ban on tests in these three environments, the treaty language relates "any nuclear weapon test explosion" to "any other nuclear explosion," thus preventing evasion based on the contention that a particular detonation was not a weapon test but the explosion of an already tested device. The phrase "any other nuclear explosion" includes explosions for peaceful purposes. Such explosions are prohibited by the treaty because of the difficulty of differentiating between weapon test explosions and peaceful explosions without additional controls. The article does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in the event of war nor restrict the exercise of the right of self-defense recognized in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Underground nuclear explosions are not prohibited so long as they do not cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosions are conducted. Thus, so long as adequate precautions are taken to prevent such spread of radioactive debris, the treaty will not prohibit the United States from conducting underground nuclear weapons tests or underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The second paragraph of article I contains an undertaking by the parties to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of the prohibited tests and explosions anywhere by anyone. This provision prevents a party from doing indirectly what it has agreed to refrain from doing directly.

Article II contains a procedure for amending the treaty. Any party may propose an amendment, and a conference to consider such an amendment must be called if requested by one-third or more of the parties

although a conference would not be necessary for the adoption of an amendment. To be effective, an amendment must be approved and ratified by a majority of all the parties which must include the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Thus, no amendment can become effective without the advice and consent of the Senate.

Article III provides that the treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all three original parties and specifies how other states may become parties. It designates the three original parties as Depositary Governments and contains other provisions of a formal nature relating to ratification, accession, and registration with the United Nations.

An increasing number of countries have indicated their intention of becoming parties to the treaty and of thus broadening its effectiveness. The provisions for signature and accession have been designed to permit the widest possible application of the treaty. At the same time adherence to the treaty will in no way imply recognition or change in status of regimes the United States does not now recognize. Nor will it in any way result in according recognition or change in status to any regime not now recognized by any other party.

Article IV provides that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It also creates a special right of withdrawal, upon 3 months' notice, if a party finds that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article V provides that the English and Russian texts of the treaty are equally authoritative and makes provision for the deposit of the original treaty instruments and the transmittal of certified copies to signatory and acceding states.

There is transmitted for your information, and for that of the Senate, the agreed communique issued by the representatives of the original parties on July 25, 1963, at the conclusion of the Conference in Moscow at which the treaty was formulated.

I believe that the signing of this treaty is a significant achievement. Its ratification by the three original parties and by such other states as may sign or accede to it will be an important and hopeful step toward the reduction of international tensions, alleviation of the fears and dangers caused by radioactive fallout, and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons capability. I believe it will promote the security of the United States and the entire free world.

In view of these advantages, and of the hopes and expectations of virtually every nation in the world, it is my sincere hope that the United States will promptly ratify this treaty.

Respectfully submitted.

GEORGE W. BALL

Human Rights—Some Next Steps

CONVENTIONS ON SLAVERY, FORCED LABOR, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN

More than 150 years ago, Thomas Jefferson predicted that from this country the "fire of freedom and human rights" would "be lighted up in other regions of the earth." Today this fire glows brightly: Men of many races, nations, and creeds—some only lately awakened to their birthright of equality—are now demanding their full measure of freedom.

In the struggle against repression the front is everywhere. No nation is so remote or so familiar, so tiny or so large, so poor or so wealthy, so backward or so advanced, as to stand apart. In less than two decades the number of independent nations has doubled. Today barely 2 percent of the world's peoples live in non-self-governing territories. With national independence so nearly secure, the arena of action has broadened from the nation to the individual. The contest will not be won until men, like nations, determine their own destinies.

With the Declaration of Independence, the United States dedicated itself to preserving and enlarging individual human rights. In the intervening years it built upon this foundation a series of specific guarantees, among which the Bill of Rights, the Emancipation Proclamation, the 13th and 19th amendments, the Child Labor Act, the minimum wage laws, and the 1954 Supreme Court decision are only the more familiar.

Small wonder, then, that many of the emerg-

¹ Made before the Rotary Club of Ypsilanti, Ypsilanti, Mich., on Aug. 5 (press release 403 dated Aug. 3; as-delivered text). Mr. Gardner is Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.

ADDRESS BY RICHARD N. GARDNER¹

ing nations shaped their constitutional doctrines after the same concepts which molded our own. Nor is it surprising that these same nations look to the United States for support in world affairs when fundamental human rights are at stake.

I submit that the real significance of Little Rock and Birmingham and Cambridge is not that the United States is making *no* progress in civil rights but precisely that we *are* making progress. Certainly we are far from perfect. But it is gratifying that so many other countries have observed recent events in our country with sympathy and understanding because they are aware that we are sincerely trying to do something about our shortcomings.

The United Nations, like the United States, was built on a foundation of respect for individual freedom. In article 56 of the charter the members of the U.N. "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55"—which include "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, religion."

In accordance with these provisions, the General Assembly and other U.N. organs have considered questions of racial discrimination and other violations of human rights where they are members' official policy and are inconsistent with the obligations in articles 55 and 56, as in the case with the *apartheid* policy of the Union of South Africa.²

² See p. 333.

Beyond these charter provisions, the General Assembly in 1948 adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without a single negative vote and with the abstention only of the Soviet bloc, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. While this document does not have the binding force of an international agreement, it does represent an historic effort to define "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations" in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Following its adoption, the members of the U.N. turned to the drafting of binding legal instruments on specific human rights on which widespread consensus existed and which appeared appropriate for embodiment in conventional form.

Just over 2 weeks ago, President Kennedy met at three of these conventions—those on forced labor, slavery, and the political rights of women—to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.³ Although the legal standards established by these conventions are already reflected in our Constitution and statutes, and have long been deeply rooted in our legal and moral heritage, the United States has so far not ratified them, or any other human rights convention drafted under U.N. auspices—a fact which many of our friends find hard to understand.

Just what do these conventions provide?

The supplementary convention on slavery, already ratified by 49 countries, supplements the 1926 slavery convention, to which the United States is a party, by dealing with conditions leading to slavery. It requires states parties to take all practicable and necessary measures to bring about as soon as possible the complete abolition of such practices as debt bondage, slavery, involuntary marriage or transfer of women for payment, transfer of widows as inherited property, and exploitation of children. It provides that states parties shall make participation in the slave trade a criminal offense and that any slave who takes refuge on board a vessel of a party shall *ipso facto* be free. It provides that the states parties shall make mutilation, branding, or marking of a slave

or person of servile status and the act of enslaving or inducing another person into slavery criminal offenses.

The convention concerning the abolition of forced labor, already ratified by 60 countries, provides that each ratifying member undertakes to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or compulsory labor

—as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social, or economic system;

—as a method of mobilizing and using labor for purposes of economic development;

—as a means of labor discipline;

—as a punishment for having participated in strikes; or

—as a means of racial, social, national, or religious discrimination.

The convention on the political rights of women, ratified by 40 countries, provides that, on equal terms with men and without discrimination, women shall: *first*, be entitled to vote in all elections; *second*, be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies established by national law; and *third*, be entitled to hold public office and exercise all public functions established by national law.

It is worth repeating that each of these conventions deals with an important human right already guaranteed by our Federal Constitution and by existing Federal law. Consequently, no change in our domestic legislation would be required.

But what, exactly, is the practical benefit of ratifying these conventions?

Their ratification can play a modest but still significant part in building an international environment congenial to American interests. We have learned from hard experience of the intimate interdependence between human rights and our national security. Nazi Germany should have taught everyone the lesson that internal suppression is often the handmaiden of external aggression—that the destruction of freedom at home can quickly lead to the destruction of freedom abroad.

President Kennedy summed up this relation-

³See p. 322.

ship eloquently in his speech at American University in June⁴ when he asked, "And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights . . .?" Worldwide progress in the vindication of human rights and fundamental freedoms will also be progress toward creating a peaceful and stable world order.

Obviously, words on paper are not enough. Nobody believes that the signing of a human rights convention in and of itself brings automatic improvement in the condition of people around the world. But U.S. participation in the great effort under U.N. auspices to define and clarify basic human rights of the kind embodied in these three conventions can make a practical contribution to our national interest in promoting human rights in at least three ways:

First, these conventions have an influence on the constitutions and laws of the countries which are parties to the conventions and thus may be implemented in practice within their societies. This is particularly true of many of the newly independent countries which consciously take the U.N. conventions as a model. United States ratification will attract wide attention and encourage similar commitments by others.

Second, the adherence of the United States to these conventions will put us in a position, as a contracting party, to blow the whistle on countries that have ratified the conventions but have failed to implement them in practice. Our failure to accept these conventions ourselves makes it more difficult for us to work for the improvement of human rights within other countries.

Third, U.S. ratification of these conventions is our entrance fee to influence in the future drafting of legal norms in the human rights field. If we continue to fail to ratify any human rights conventions, other countries may come to discount our views when such basic issues are discussed.

It is essential that the United States demonstrate its continuing adherence to fundamental concepts which have motivated our country since its birth. Our power in the world derives not just from our position as an arsenal of

weapons or as a storehouse of commodities but as a society which seeks the universal realization of the dignity of man.

With a growing number of human rights issues competing for world attention, the United States is under challenge by friend and foe alike to maintain its leadership in this field. Other nations may measure our sincerity in terms of the commitments we share with them, and we should not hesitate to make those commitments which accord with our own constitutional guarantees.

Our adherence to these conventions will affirm anew our faith in basic freedoms throughout the world. It is this belief in the importance and worth of every individual, a belief which motivates our efforts for social and economic progress, that distinguishes us from the totalitarians of the left and of the right.

As the President said in his letter to the President of the Senate at the time he transmitted the conventions to the Senate:

The United States cannot afford to renounce responsibility for support of the very fundamentals which distinguish our concept of government from all form of tyranny.

Let us assure that no nation can accuse us of extinguishing Jefferson's "fire of human rights" or of obscuring its light from the earth.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SENATE

Following is a letter from President Kennedy to Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the Senate transmitting the conventions on slavery, forced labor, and the political rights of women.

White House press release dated July 22

JULY 22, 1963

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have today transmitted to the Senate three conventions with view to receiving advice and consent to ratification. These are:

1. The Supplementary Convention to the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery

⁴ BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

⁵ S. Ex. L, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

prepared under the direction of the United Nations in 1956, to which 49 nations are now parties.

2. The Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labor,⁶ adopted by the International Labor Organization in 1957, to which 60 nations are now parties.

3. The Convention on the Political Rights of Women,⁷ opened for signature by the United Nations in 1953, to which 39 [40] nations are now parties.

United States law is, of course, already in conformity with these conventions, and ratification would not require any change in our domestic legislation. However, the fact that our Constitution already assures us of these rights does not entitle us to stand aloof from documents which project our own heritage on an international scale. The day-to-day unfolding of events makes it ever clearer that our own welfare is interrelated with the rights and freedoms assured the peoples of other nations.

These conventions deal with human rights which may not yet be secure in other countries; they have provided models for the drafters of constitutions and laws in newly independent nations; and they have influenced the policies of governments preparing to accede to them. Thus, they involve current problems in many countries.

They will stand as a sharp reminder of world opinion to all who may seek to violate the human rights they define. They also serve as a continuous commitment to respect these rights. There is no society so advanced that it no longer needs periodic recommitment to human rights.

The United States cannot afford to renounce responsibility for support of the very fundamentals which distinguish our concept of government from all forms of tyranny. Accordingly, I desire, with the constitutional consent of the Senate, to ratify these Conventions for the United States of America.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

⁶S. Ex. K.

⁷S. Ex. J.

TEXTS OF CONVENTIONS

Convention on Abolition of Slavery

SUPPLEMENTARY CONVENTION ON THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, THE SLAVE TRADE, AND INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY⁸

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to the present Convention
Considering that freedom is the birthright of every human being;

Mindful that the peoples of the United Nations reaffirmed in the Charter their faith in the dignity and worth of the human person;

Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, states that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude and that slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms;

Recognizing that, since the conclusion of the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926,⁹ which was designed to secure the abolition of slavery and of the slave trade, further progress has been made towards this end;

Having regard to the Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and to subsequent action by the International Labour Organisation in regard to forced or compulsory labour;

Being aware, however, that slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery have not yet been eliminated in all parts of the world;

Having decided, therefore, that the Convention of 1926, which remains operative, should now be augmented by the conclusion of a supplementary convention designed to intensify national as well as international efforts towards the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery;

Have agreed as follows:

⁸Opened for signature at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956; entered into force Apr. 30, 1957. As of July 1, 1963, the following countries had become parties to the supplementary convention through ratification or accession: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, China, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Malaya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanganyika, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

⁹46 Stat. 2183 and Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3532.

SECTION I
INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY

ARTICLE 1

Each of the States Parties to this Convention shall take all practicable and necessary legislative and other measures to bring about progressively and as soon as possible the complete abolition or abandonment of the following institutions and practices, where they still exist and whether or not they are covered by the definition of slavery contained in article 1 of the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926:

(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined;

(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a tenant who is by law, custom or agreement bound to live and labour on land belonging to another person and to render some determinate service to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to change his status;

(c) Any institution or practice whereby:

(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or

(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise; or

(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person;

(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.

ARTICLE 2

With a view to bringing to an end the institutions and practices mentioned in article 1 (c) of this Convention, the States Parties undertake to prescribe, where appropriate, suitable minimum ages of marriage, to encourage the use of facilities whereby the consent of both parties to a marriage may be freely expressed in the presence of a competent civil or religious authority, and to encourage the registration of marriages.

SECTION II

THE SLAVE TRADE

ARTICLE 3

1. The act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country to another by whatever means of transport, or of being accessory thereto, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties

to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to very severe penalties.

2. (a) The States Parties shall take all effective measures to prevent ships and aircraft authorized to fly their flags from conveying slaves and to punish persons guilty of such acts or of using national flags for that purpose.

(b) The States Parties shall take all effective measures to ensure that their ports, airfields and coasts are not used for the conveyance of slaves.

3. The States Parties to this Convention shall exchange information in order to ensure the practical co-ordination of the measures taken by them in combating the slave trade and shall inform each other of every case of the slave trade, and of every attempt to commit this criminal offence, which comes to their notice.

ARTICLE 4

Any slave who takes refuge on board any vessel of a State Party to this Convention shall *ipso facto* be free.

SECTION III

SLAVERY AND INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES
SIMILAR TO SLAVERY

ARTICLE 5

In a country where the abolition or abandonment of slavery, or of the institutions or practices mentioned in article 1 of this Convention, is not yet complete, the act of mutilating, branding or otherwise marking a slave or a person of servile status in order to indicate his status, or as a punishment, or for any other reason, or of being accessory thereto, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to punishment.

ARTICLE 6

1. The act of enslaving another person or of inducing another person to give himself or a person dependent upon him into slavery, or of attempting these acts, or being accessory thereto, or being a party to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to punishment.

2. Subject to the provisions of the introductory paragraph of article 1 of this Convention, the provision of paragraph 1 of the present article shall also apply to the act of inducing another person to place himself or a person dependent upon him into the servile status resulting from any of the institutions or practices mentioned in article 1, to any attempt to perform such acts, to bring [being] accessory thereto, and to being a party to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts.

SECTION IV

DEFINITIONS

ARTICLE 7

For the purposes of the present Convention:

(a) "Slavery" means, as defined in the Slavery Con-

vention of 1926, the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, and "slave" means a person in such condition or status;

(b) "A person of servile status" means a person in the condition or status resulting from any of the institutions or practices mentioned in article 1 of this Convention;

(c) "Slave trade" means and includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a person acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged; and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves by whatever means of conveyance.

SECTION V

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN STATES PARTIES AND COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION

ARTICLE 8

1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to co-operate with each other and with the United Nations to give effect to the foregoing provisions.

2. The Parties undertake to communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations copies of any laws, regulations and administrative measures enacted or put into effect to implement the provisions of this Convention.

3. The Secretary-General shall communicate the information received under paragraph 2 of this article to the other Parties and to the Economic and Social Council as part of the documentation for any discussion which the Council might undertake with a view to making further recommendations for the abolition of slavery, the slave trade or the institutions and practices which are the subject of this Convention.

SECTION VI

FINAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 9

No reservations may be made to this Convention.

ARTICLE 10

Any dispute between States Parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or application, which is not settled by negotiation, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute, unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement.

ARTICLE 11

1. This Convention shall be open until 1 July 1957 for signature by any State Member of the United Nations or of a specialized agency. It shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall inform each signatory and acceding State.

2. After 1 July 1957 this Convention shall be open for accession by any State Member of the United

Nations or of a specialized agency, or by any other State to which an invitation to accede has been addressed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of a formal instrument with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall inform each signatory and acceding State.

ARTICLE 12

1. This Convention shall apply to all non-self-governing, trust, colonial and other non-metropolitan territories for the international relations of which any State Party is responsible; the Party concerned shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, at the time of signature, ratification or accession declare the non-metropolitan territory or territories to which the Convention shall apply *ipso facto* as a result of such signature, ratification or accession.

2. In any case in which the previous consent of a non-metropolitan territory is required by the constitutional laws or practices of the Party or of the non-metropolitan territory, the Party concerned shall endeavor to secure the needed consent of the non-metropolitan territory within the period of twelve months from the date of signature of the Convention by the metropolitan State, and when such consent has been obtained the Party shall notify the Secretary-General. This Convention shall apply to the territory or territories named in such notification from the date of its receipt by the Secretary-General.

3. After the expiry of the twelve month period mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the States Parties concerned shall inform the Secretary-General of the results of the consultations with those non-metropolitan territories for whose international relations they are responsible and whose consent to the application of this Convention may have been withheld.

ARTICLE 13

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the date on which two States have become Parties thereto.

2. It shall thereafter enter into force with respect to each State and territory on the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession of that State or notification of application to that territory.

ARTICLE 14

1. The application of this Convention shall be divided into successive periods of three years, of which the first shall begin on the date of entry into force of the Convention in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 13.

2. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by a notice addressed by that State to the Secretary-General not less than six months before the expiration of the current three-year period. The Secretary-General shall notify all other Parties of each such notice and the date of the receipt thereof.

3. Denunciations shall take effect at the expiration of the current three-year period.

4. In cases where, in accordance with the provisions of article 12, this Convention has become applicable to a non-metropolitan territory of a Party, that Party may

at any time thereafter, with the consent of the territory concerned, give notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations denouncing this Convention separately in respect of that territory. The denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of the receipt of such notice by the Secretary-General, who shall notify all other Parties of such notice and the date of the receipt thereof.

ARTICLE 15

This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations Secretariat. The Secretary-General shall prepare a certified copy thereof for communication to States Parties to this Convention, as well as to all other States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention on the date appearing opposite their respective signatures.

DONE at the European Office of the United Nations at Geneva, this seventh day of September one thousand nine hundred and fifty six.

Convention on Abolition of Forced Labor

CONVENTION 105

CONVENTION CONCERNING THE ABOLITION OF FORCED LABOUR¹⁰

The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation,

Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, and having met in its Fortieth Session on 5 June 1957, and

Having considered the question of forced labour, which is the fourth item on the agenda of the session, and

Having noted the provisions of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, and

Having noted that the Slavery Convention, 1926,

¹⁰ Adopted at the 40th session of the General Conference of the International Labor Organization at Geneva June 25, 1957. As of July 1, 1963, the following countries had become parties to the convention through ratification or accession: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Malaya, Mali, Mexico, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somali Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, and United Kingdom.

provides that all necessary measures shall be taken to prevent compulsory or forced labour from developing into conditions analogous to slavery and that the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956, provides for the complete abolition of debt bondage and serfdom, and

Having noted that the Protection of Wages Convention, 1949, provides that wages shall be paid regularly and prohibits methods of payment which deprive the worker of a genuine possibility of terminating his employment, and

Having decided upon the adoption of further proposals with regard to the abolition of certain forms of forced or compulsory labour constituting a violation of the rights of man referred to in the Charter of the United Nations and enunciated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and

Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of an international Convention, adopts this twenty-fifth day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and fifty-seven the following Convention, which may be cited as the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957:

ARTICLE 1

Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention undertakes to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or compulsory labour—

(a) as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system;

(b) as a method of mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic development;

(c) as a means of labour discipline;

(d) as a punishment for having participated in strikes;

(e) as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.

ARTICLE 2

Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention undertakes to take effective measures to secure the immediate and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labour as specified in Article 1 of this Convention.

ARTICLE 3

The formal ratifications of this Convention shall be communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour Office for registration.

ARTICLE 4

1. This Convention shall be binding only upon those Members of the International Labour Organisation whose ratifications have been registered with the Director-General.

2. It shall come into force twelve months after the date on which the ratifications of two Members have

been registered with the Director-General.

3. Thereafter, this Convention shall come into force for any Member twelve months after the date on which its ratification has been registered.

ARTICLE 5

1. A Member which has ratified this Convention may denounce it after the expiration of ten years from the date on which the Convention first comes into force, by a notice communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour Office for registration. Such denunciation shall not take effect until one year after the date on which it is registered.

2. Each Member which has ratified this Convention and which does not, within the year following the expiration of the period of ten years mentioned in the preceding paragraph, exercise the right of denunciation provided for in this Article, will be bound for another period of ten years and, thereafter, may denounce this Convention at the expiration of each period of ten years under the terms provided for in this Article.

ARTICLE 6

1. The Director-General of the International Labour Office shall notify all Members of the International Labour Organisation of the registration of all ratifications and denunciations communicated to him by the Members of the Organisation.

2. When notifying the Members of the Organisation of the registration of the second ratification communicated to him, the Director-General shall draw the attention of the Members of the Organisation to the date upon which the Convention will come into force.

ARTICLE 7

The Director-General of the International Labour Office shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations full particulars of all ratifications and acts of denunciation registered by him in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Articles.

ARTICLE 8

At such times as it may consider necessary the Governing Body of the International Labour Office shall present to the General Conference a report on the working of this Convention and shall examine the desirability of placing on the agenda of the Conference the question of its revision in whole or in part.

ARTICLE 9

1. Should the Conference adopt a new Convention revising this Convention in whole or in part, then, unless the new Convention otherwise provides—

(a) the ratification by a Member of the new revising Convention shall *ipso jure* involve the immediate denunciation of this Convention, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 5 above, if and when the new revising Convention shall have come into force;

(b) as from the date when the new revising Convention comes into force this Convention shall

cease to be open to ratification by the Members.

2. This Convention shall in any case remain in force in its actual form and content for those Members which have ratified it but have not ratified the revising Convention.

ARTICLE 10

The English and French versions of the text of this Convention are equally authoritative.

The foregoing is the authentic text of the Convention duly adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation during its Fortieth Session which was held at Geneva and declared closed the twenty-seventh day of June 1957.

IN FAITH WHEREOF we have appended our signatures this fourth day of July 1957.

The President of the Conference,

HAROLD HOLT.

The Director-General of the International Labour Office,

DAVID A. MORSE.

The text of the Convention as here presented is a true copy of the text authenticated by the signatures of the President of the International Labour Conference and of the Director-General of the International Labour Office.

Certified true and complete copy.

For the Director-General of the International Labour Office:

FRANCIS WOLF,

Legal Adviser of the International Labour Office.

Convention on Political Rights of Women

CONVENTION ON THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN¹¹

The Contracting Parties,

Desiring to implement the principle of equality of rights for men and women contained in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognizing that everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or indirectly through freely chosen representatives, and has the right to equal access to public service in his country, and desiring to equalize the status of men and women in the

¹¹ Opened for signature at New York March 31, 1953; entered into force July 7, 1954. As of July 1, 1963, the following countries had become parties to the convention through ratification or accession (asterisk indicates ratification or accession with reservation): Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Canada*, Central African Republic, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark*, Dominican Republic, Ecuador*, Finland*, France, Greece, Guatemala*, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India*, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan*, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Senegal*, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia.

enjoyment and exercise of political rights, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Having resolved to conclude a Convention for this purpose,

Hereby agree as hereinafter provided :

ARTICLE I

Women shall be entitled to vote in all elections on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.

ARTICLE II

Women shall be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies, established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.

ARTICLE III

Women shall be entitled to hold public office and to exercise all public functions, established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.

ARTICLE IV

1. This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and also on behalf of any other State to which an invitation has been addressed by the General Assembly.

2. This Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ARTICLE V

1. This Convention shall be open for accession to all States referred to in paragraph 1 of article IV.

2. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession.

2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession the Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.

ARTICLE VII

In the event that any State submits a reservation to any of the articles of this Convention at the time of signature, ratification or accession, the Secretary-General shall communicate the text of the reservation to all States which are or may become parties to this Convention. Any State which objects to the reservation may, within a period of ninety days from the date of the said communication (or upon the date of its becoming a party to the Convention), notify the Secretary-General that it does not accept it. In such case, the Convention shall not enter into force as between such State and the State making the reservation.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any State may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General.

2. This Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date when the denunciation which reduces the number of parties to less than six becomes effective.

ARTICLE IX

Any dispute which may arise between any two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation, shall at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless they agree to another mode of settlement.

ARTICLE X

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in paragraph 1 of article IV of this Convention of the following :

(a) Signatures and instruments of ratification received in accordance with article IV ;

(b) Instruments of accession received in accordance with article V ;

(c) The date upon which this Convention enters into force in accordance with article VI ;

(d) Communications and notifications received in accordance with article VII ;

(e) Notifications of denunciation received in accordance with paragraph 1 of article VIII ;

(f) Abrogation in accordance with paragraph 2 of article VIII.

ARTICLE XI

1. This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts shall be equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit a certified copy to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States contemplated in paragraph 1 of article IV.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Convention, opened for signature at New York, on the thirty-first day of March, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-three.

Department Closes Thirteen Posts

The Department of State announced on July 29 (press release 396) that, in a long-planned move to modernize its consular operations abroad, it is in the process of closing 13 con-

ular posts between now and September 1.

The decision to close the 13 consulates results from a series of management surveys conducted over the past 30 months. William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, said:

By direction of Secretary Rusk, the reviews will continue. They may lead to additional consular post closings.

More effective administration of overseas operations is the primary reason for the action announced today. It does not reflect any change whatsoever in United States relationships with the countries or areas in which the posts are to be closed.

The closing of these posts will result in an estimated saving in excess of \$300,000 in the current fiscal year and more than \$500,000 annually thereafter. A reduction of overseas expenditures will also contribute to balance-of-payments savings.

The management surveys are designed to lead to the most effective use of trained personnel and to provide the most efficient Foreign Service possible within available resources. Modernization and improvements in communications, travel, and methods of handling consular work are some of the factors that make it feasible to close some consular posts.

The consular posts to be closed are those at Salzburg, Austria; Santos, Brazil; Edmonton, Canada; Manchester, England; Le Havre, France; Cork, Ireland; Haifa, Israel; Venice, Italy; Penang, Malaya; Piedras Negras, Mexico; Basel, Switzerland; Cardiff, Wales; and Sarajevo, Yugoslavia.

In addition, consular work of the consulate general at Geneva will be transferred to the Embassy at Bern, but officers of the U.S. Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations at Geneva will be available to provide certain services. Most of the activities of the consulate general at Yokohama will be transferred to the Embassy at Tokyo, but a small staff will be retained in Yokohama.

Consular agents will be appointed at Cork, Ireland, and Haifa, Israel, to provide essential consular services at these locations, and consideration will be given to the appointment of consular agents at other locations where warranted.

As of July 1 there were 166 U.S. consulates throughout the world. In their local fields they deal with visa services; citizenship and passport services; protection and welfare services

for American citizens, property, and interests; notariats; services for ships, seamen, and airmen; and special services for other Federal and State agencies.

Revised Tariff Schedules To Be Effective August 31

Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, announced on July 25 that the revised tariff schedules of the United States are slated to become effective on August 31. The tariff schedules will take effect 10 days after a Presidential proclamation of the new nomenclature and rates contained in them. This proclamation will be issued in accordance with the authority of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962.

The Tariff Classification Act of 1962 authorizes the President, upon the completion of certain procedures, to proclaim new U.S. tariff schedules based upon studies and recommendations of the Tariff Commission. The Commission's work was initiated under the authority of the Customs Simplification Act of 1954.

The new tariff schedules will simplify the determination and application of U.S. import duties. They will thus benefit domestic producers, who will have more dependable knowledge of the rates of duty applying to the types of products they sell and the materials they buy. They will also benefit importers and consumers.

Entry into force of the new schedules has been approved by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and by the countries with which the U.S. still maintains bilateral trade agreements.

The schedules, annotated for statistical purposes, will be on sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. The annotated schedules became available on August 1 at a subscription price of \$5.00 (\$1.25 additional for foreign mailing). The subscription price includes supplementary material for an indefinite period.

Public Hearings Pertaining to Trade Agreements

REGULATIONS OF TRADE INFORMATION COMMITTEE¹

Following is the text of regulations of the Trade Information Committee, Part 211 of Chapter II (Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations) of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

In Chapter II of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations a new Part 211 is added to read as follows:

- Sec.
211.1 Office, mailing address, and hours.
211.2 Notices of public hearings.
211.3 Requests for public hearings under section 252(d).
211.4 Submission of written briefs.
211.5 Presentation of oral testimony at public hearings.
211.6 Presentation of oral testimony at informal conferences.
211.7 Information open to public inspection.
211.8 Information exempt from public inspection.
211.9 Information available to United States Government agencies.

AUTHORITY: §§ 211.1 to 211.9 issued under sec. 202.3(b) of this chapter. Secs. 211.2 to 211.6 also issued under secs. 223, 252(d), 76 Stat. 875, 880; 19 U.S.C. 1843, 1882(d).

§ 211.1 Office, mailing address, and hours.

(a) The office of the Trade Information Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) is in the Executive Office Building, 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C., 20506.

(b) All communications to the Committee should be addressed to the "Executive Secretary, Trade Information Committee, Executive Office Building, 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C., 20506".

(c) The regular hours of the office of the Committee are from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on each business day, Monday through Friday.

§ 211.2 Notices of public hearings.

The Committee shall publish in the FEDERAL REGISTER a notice of a proposed public hearing, the subject matter of the proposed public hearing, the period during which written briefs may be submitted, the period during which requests may be submitted to present oral testimony, and the time and place of the proposed public hearing, in the following instances—

(a) Upon publication of a list of articles by the President under section 221(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), as a result of which public hearings are required to be held by section 223 of the Act with respect to any matter relevant to a proposed trade agreement,

(b) Upon the granting by the Committee of a request, made by an interested party in accordance with § 211.3, for a public hearing under section 252(d) of the Act with respect to a foreign import restriction,

(c) Upon request by the Trade Executive Committee, or

(d) Upon the Committee's own motion.

§ 211.3 Requests for public hearings under section 252(d).

(a) A request by an interested party for a public hearing under section 252(d) of the Act may be submitted in writing at any time. Such request will be granted only if it identifies with particularity the foreign import restriction complained of, states the reasons why the restriction is believed to be of the kind covered by section 252 of the Act, and describes concisely the effect of the restriction upon United States exports.

(b) A request for a public hearing under section 252(d) of the Act shall be submitted in not less than fifteen (15) copies, which shall be legibly typed, printed, or duplicated, and of which at least one copy shall be made under oath or affirmation.

(c) After receipt and consideration of a request for a public hearing under section 252(d) of the Act, the Committee will notify the applicant whether the request is granted, and if so, will take action under § 211.2, and if not, will give the reasons for the denial.

§ 211.4 Submission of written briefs.

(a) Participation by an interested party in a public hearing announced under § 211.2 shall require the submission of a written brief before the close of the period announced in the public notice for its submission. Such brief may be, but need not be, supplemented by the presentation of oral testimony in accordance with § 211.5.

(b) A written brief by an interested party concerning any aspect of the trade agreements program or any related matter not subject to paragraph (a) of this section and submitted pursuant to a public notice shall be submitted before the close of the period announced in the public notice for its submission.

(c) A written brief by an interested party concerning any aspect of the trade agreements program or any related matter not subject to paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of this section may be submitted at any time.

(d) A written brief shall state clearly the position taken and shall describe with particularity the evidence supporting such position. It shall be submitted in not less than fifteen (15) copies which shall be legibly typed, printed, or duplicated, and of which at least one copy shall be made under oath or affirmation.

§ 211.5 Presentation of oral testimony at public hearings.

(a) A request by an interested party to present oral testimony at a public hearing shall be submitted in writing before the close of the period announced in the

¹ 28 Fed. Reg. 7947.

public notice for its submission, and shall state briefly the interest of the applicant and the position to be taken by the applicant. Such request will be granted only if a written brief has been prepared and submitted in accordance with § 211.4.

(b) After receipt and consideration of a request to present oral testimony at a public hearing, the Committee will notify the applicant whether the request is granted, and if so, the time and place for his appearance and the amount of time allotted for his oral testimony, and if not, the reasons for the denial.

(c) Oral testimony presented at a public hearing shall be made under oath or affirmation. The interested party may briefly summarize and should supplement the information contained in the written brief, and should be prepared to answer questions relating to such information.

(d) A stenographic record shall be made of every public hearing.

§ 211.6 Presentation of oral testimony at informal conferences.

(a) A request by an interested party to present oral testimony to the Committee concerning any aspect of the trade agreements program or any related matter at an informal conference may be submitted in writing at any time. Such request will be granted only if it is accompanied by a written brief prepared in accordance with § 211.4(d).

(b) After receipt and consideration of a request to present oral testimony to the Committee at an informal conference, the Committee will notify the applicant whether the request is granted, and if so, the time and place for his appearance and the amount of time allotted for his oral testimony, and if not, the reasons for the denial.

(c) At an informal conference the interested party may briefly summarize and should supplement the information contained in the written brief, and should be prepared to answer questions relating to such information.

(d) A stenographic record shall be made of every informal conference.

(e) A request to present oral testimony to the Committee at an informal conference will not be granted if the Committee determines that the subject matter of the proposed oral testimony comes within the subject matter of a contemporaneous public hearing as announced by a public notice.

§ 211.7 Information open to public inspection.

With the exception of information covered by § 211.9, an interested party may, upon request to the Executive Secretary, inspect at the office of the Committee—

(a) Any written request, brief, or similar submission of information,

(b) Any stenographic record of a public hearing or an informal conference, and

(c) Other public written information concerning the trade agreements program and related matters.

§ 211.8 Information exempt from public inspection.

(a) The Committee shall exempt from public inspection business information submitted by an interested party if the Committee determines that such information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association, the disclosure of which is not authorized by law or by the interested party furnishing such information.

(b) A party requesting that the Committee exempt from public inspection business information submitted in writing shall clearly mark each page "For Official Use Only" at the top. A party requesting that the Committee exempt from public inspection business information submitted orally at an informal conference shall ask that such information be marked "For Official Use Only" on the stenographic record.

(c) The Committee may deny a request that it exempt from public inspection any particular business information if it determines that such information is not entitled to exemption. In the event of such denial, the party submitting the particular business information will be notified of the reasons for the denial and will be permitted to withdraw his submission.

§ 211.9 Information available to United States Government agencies.

All information received by the Committee shall be available to the agencies of the United States Government represented on the Committee, and to such other agencies of the United States Government as the Committee may designate.

Effective date. This part shall become effective on the date of its publication in the Federal Register.

By the Committee.

BERNARD NORWOOD,
Chairman.

AUGUST 2, 1963.

NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING²

PUBLIC HEARING CONCERNING PROPOSED INCREASES IN RATES OF DUTY ON CERTAIN ARTICLES

1. *Notice of public hearing.* Pursuant to its regulations, and in particular § 211.2(d) of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (28 F.R. 7947) the Trade Information Committee in the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations has ordered a public hearing with respect to proposed increases in rates of duty on articles to be selected from those listed in Annex A below.

2. *Subject matter of public hearing.* The purpose of the public hearing will be to receive information and views concerning the economic effects of an increase in

² 28 Fed. Reg. 8066.

the rate of duty on any article identified in Annex A below.

The purpose of such increases in rates of duty would be to redress the imbalance of tariff concessions between the United States and the European Economic Community arising out of the withdrawal of a German tariff concession on poultry which has been followed by the imposition by the European Economic Community of unreasonable import restrictions upon United States exports of frozen poultry. Such increases in rates of duty as are finally decided upon would be proclaimed by the President pursuant to section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

3. *Time and place of public hearing.* The public hearing will be held beginning at 10:00 a.m., e.d.s.t. on Wednesday, September 4, 1963, in the Hearing Room of the Tariff Commission, 8th and E Streets NW., Washington, D.C. (3d Floor, F Street side).

4. *Presentation of oral testimony.* A request to present oral testimony shall be submitted in writing to the Executive Secretary of the Committee on or before Wednesday, August 21, 1963, and in accordance with the applicable provisions of this notice and the Committee's regulations (Part 211 of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (28 F.R. 7947)).

Any such request shall include the name, address, telephone number, and organization of the party submitting the request, a brief statement of the party's interest in the subject matter of the public hearing, a brief statement of the position to be taken, and the name of the person who will present oral testimony.

Each party submitting a request will be notified whether the request is granted, and if so, the date on which he is scheduled to appear and the amount of time allotted for his testimony, and, if not, the reasons for the denial.

5. *Submission of written briefs.* In order to ensure due consideration, written briefs shall be submitted as early as possible, and in no case later than Tuesday, September 3, 1963. Written briefs shall be prepared and submitted in accordance with the applicable provisions of this notice and the Committee's regulations (Part 211 of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (28 F.R. 7947)).

6. *Limitation on presentation of views.* Oral testimony and written briefs shall be limited to a consideration of the probable economic effects of an increase in a rate of duty on any article identified in Annex A of this notice. Consideration will not be given to oral testimony or written briefs dealing with any article not identified in Annex A.

All communications regarding this notice should be addressed to the Executive Secretary, Trade Information Committee, Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C., 20506.

BERNARD NORWOOD,
Chairman.

AUGUST 6, 1963.

ANNEX A

Tariff Schedule of the United States (new) Item No.	Articles	United States Tariff Schedules (existing) Par. No.
117. 45- 50	Roquefort cheese-----	710
125. 30	Bulbs, roots, rootstocks, clumps, corms, tubers, and herbaceous perennials: Other, imported for horticultural purposes.	753
132. 50	Potato starch-----	83
167. 30	Still wines produced from grapes, containing not over 14 percent of alcohol by volume, in containers each holding not over 1 gallon.	804
168. 20- 22	Brandy-----	802
252. 35	Cigarette paper, whether or not cut to size or shape, cigarette books, and cigarette bookcovers.	1552
254. 25		
256. 10		
310. 01- 02	Singles yarns, wholly of continuous man-made fibers (multifilament yarns), with twist but not over 20 turns per inch.	1301
437. 02	Caffeine-----	15
437. 18	Theobromine-----	15
455. 16- 20	Edible gelatin-----	41
455. 22- 24	Photographic gelatin-----	41
455. 40	Inedible gelatin and animal glue, valued under 40 cents per pound.	41
493. 30	Dextrine and soluble or chemically treated starches.	84
609. 22	Flat wire, of iron or steel other than alloy iron or steel, not coated or plated with metal, over 0.05 inch in thickness.	316(a)
642. 74	Cloth, gauze, fabric, screen, netting, and fencing, all the foregoing, of stainless steel, whether in rolls, in endless bands, or in lengths, but not cut to shape, if woven (of simple warp and weft construction), with meshes finer than 90 wires to the lineal inch in warp or filling.	318
650. 91	Scissors and shears, and blades therefor, all the foregoing valued over \$1.75 per dozen.	357
683. 50	Shavers and scissors, with self-contained electric motors, and parts thereof.	357
692. 05	Automobile trucks valued at \$1,000 or more, and motor buses.	369
723. 10	Motion-picture film, 1 inch or more in width, sensitized but not exposed.	155
723. 15	Photographic film other than motion-picture film, sensitized but not exposed.	155
723. 30	Silver halide photographic papers, sensitized but not exposed.	140

Security Council Calls for Ban on Sale of Arms to South Africa

Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representatives Adlai Stevenson and Charles W. Yost, during debate on the racial policies of the Republic of South Africa, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on August 7.

STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, AUGUST 2

S./U.N. press release 4233

All of us sitting here today know the melancholy truth about the racial policies of the Government of South Africa. Our task now is to consider what further steps we can take to induce that Government to remove the evil business of *apartheid*, not only from our agenda but from the continent of Africa.

The policy of *apartheid* denies the worth and the dignity of the human person. And for this very reason we must try to express our feelings, we believe, with as much restraint as we can muster. Self-righteousness is no substitute for practical results.

It is all too true that there is scarcely a society of the world that is not touched by some form of discrimination. Who among us can cast the first stone or boast that we are free of any semblance of discrimination, by color or religion or in some other form?

I take the liberty of quoting to you a few lines from a speech I made in Geneva a couple of weeks ago.¹ I said that:

... in my country too many of our Negro citizens still do not enjoy their full civil rights—because ancient attitudes stubbornly resist change in spite of the rigorous official policy of the Government. But such dignities are an anachronism that no progressive society can tolerate, and the last vestiges must be

abolished with all possible speed. Actually in the past few years we have made more progress in achieving full equality of rights and opportunities for all of our citizens than during any comparable period since Abraham Lincoln's Proclamation of Emancipation freed our Republic and our national conscience from a heavy burden 100 years ago.

The very struggles which now call worldwide attention to our shame are themselves signs of a progress that will be increasingly visible in the months ahead. The sound and fury about racial equality that fill our press and airwaves are the sounds of the great thaw; the logjam of the past is breaking up.

I wanted to repeat what I said in Geneva to leave no doubt that the United States position is not one of self-righteousness, self-satisfaction.

The question before us, however, is how and when the logjam of racial discrimination will be loosened and brought into the mainstream of the United Nations Charter. If we all suffer from the disease of discrimination in various forms, at least most of us recognize the disease for what it is—a disfiguring blight.

The whole point is that in many countries governmental policies are dedicated to rooting out this dread syndrome of prejudice and discrimination, while in South Africa we see the anachronistic spectacle of the Government of a great people which persists in seeing the disease as the remedy, prescribing for the malady of racism the bitter toxic of *apartheid*.

Mr. President, just as my country is determined to wipe out discrimination in our society, it will support efforts to bring about a change in South Africa. It is in the United States' interest to do this; it is in the interest of South Africa; it is in the interest of a world which has suffered enough from bigotry and prejudice and hatred.

Present Situation Offers Little Hope

The past two decades have seen an explosion of nationhood unequalled in history. Certainly the pace of decolonization in Africa has been

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 265.

nothing less than phenomenal, and it offers a record of progress far beyond what the most optimistic among us could have expected in 1945. The new states of Africa are gaining strength, resolutely fighting to build prosperous, dynamic societies and to do this in cooperation with other African states.

But as this meeting of the Security Council so graphically emphasizes, the full potential of this new era cannot be realized because of South Africa's self-chosen isolation. Worse yet, progress in Africa is overshadowed by the racial bitterness and resentment caused by the policies of the South African Government. And it is the duty of this Council to do what it can to insure that this situation does not deteriorate further and that the injustice of *apartheid* comes to an end—not in bloodshed and bondage but in peace and freedom.

What we see and hear, however, offers us at present little hope. Indeed, the situation is worse than it was 3 years ago when this Council first met on the question of *apartheid*.² Speakers before me have reviewed the record of previous discussions of *apartheid* by this Council and of the General Assembly. As they have pointed out, we have called repeatedly upon the Government of South Africa to consider world opinion, to cooperate with the United Nations, and to set in motion some meaningful steps toward ending discrimination and policies and practices that would offend the whole world wherever they were pursued.

Outside of this organization, many members—not the least of which is my own Government—have attempted repeatedly to persuade the South African Government to begin moving along the lines of these resolutions. I myself, Mr. President, have had something emphatic to say on this score on two occasions in the Republic of South Africa—things that had grieved me to have to say after enjoying so much courtesy and hospitality from the friendly and the gracious people of that lovely land.

But it is only stating a fact of life to say that the visible result of all of these discussions and resolutions here in the United Nations and all diplomatic activity so far is zero.

It is only stating the obvious to say that up

until this time our efforts have yielded no tangible results.

It is only calling things by their right name to say that we are confronted for the moment with a deadlock between the overwhelming majority of mankind and the Republic of South Africa.

There has been no forward motion; indeed, there has been retrogression—calculated retrogression.

Need I read the bill of particulars?

For the past 15 years the Government of South Africa has built a barrier between the races—piling new restrictions upon old restrictions.

All South Africans must carry identification cards indicating racial ancestry.

Segregation in religion, education, and public accommodation is total.

Freedom of employment is limited; wage rates for the same work and the same responsibility are different according to the color of your skin.

Freedom of movement is inhibited.

Strikes by Africans in South Africa are illegal.

Africans in South Africa are prohibited from residing, from doing business or acquiring real property in most cities, and in large areas of the countryside.

Voters are registered on separate rolls according to race, and since 1958 non-European voters have had no representation whatever—even by Europeans—in the legislature.

This is not the whole story. But the point is that these and other measures of discrimination—aimed at the total separation of races into privileged and unprivileged segments of society—do not represent inherited social defects for which remedies are being sought but injustices deliberately and systematically imposed in the recent past.

Summary of Basic Principles

Mr. President, we are all agreed and we have proclaimed again and again in this body and in the General Assembly, and in many other forums of the United Nations, certain basic views about the issue before us. However, we must restate them again and again so that we can

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1960, p. 667.

am up where we stand and deliberate with clarity and candor on how to move forward.

First, we have affirmed and reaffirmed that *apartheid* is abhorrent. Our belief in the self-evident truths about human equality is enshrined in the charter. *Apartheid* and racism—despite all of the tortured rationalizations we have heard from the apologists—are incompatible with the moral, the social, and the constitutional foundations of our societies.

A second basic principle on which we are agreed is that all members of the organization have pledged themselves to take action, in cooperation with the organization, to promote observance of human rights without distinction as to race.

Thirdly, we continue to believe that this matter is of proper and legitimate concern to the United Nations. We have often stated in the General Assembly our belief that the Assembly can properly consider questions of racial discrimination and other violations of human rights where they are a member's official policy and are inconsistent with the obligations of that member under articles 55 and 56 of the charter to promote observance of human rights without distinction as to race. Moreover, the *apartheid* policy of South Africa has clearly led to a situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security.

Measures U.S. Has Taken

We also believe that all members, in the words of the resolution³ passed almost unanimously by the 16th General Assembly should take such separate and collective action to bring about an abandonment of *apartheid* as is open to them in conformity with the charter. The United States supported that resolution and has complied with it.

I should like to take this occasion to bring up to date the record of the measures the United States has taken to carry out this purpose.

First, we have continued and, indeed, have accelerated our official representations to the Government of South Africa on all aspects of *apartheid* in that country. We have done this through public words and private diplomacy, expressing our earnest hope that the South

African Government would take steps to reconsider and to revise its racial policies and to extend the full range of civic rights and opportunities to nonwhites in the life of their country. And we have observed to the South African Government that, in the absence of an indication of change, the United States would not cooperate in matters which would lend support to South Africa's present racial policies.

We have utilized our diplomatic and consular establishments in South Africa to demonstrate by words and by deeds our official disapproval of *apartheid*.

And as the United States representative informed the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly on October 19, 1962,⁴ the United States has adopted and is enforcing the policy of forbidding the sale to the South African Government of arms and military equipment, whether from Government or commercial sources, which could be used by that Government to enforce *apartheid* either in South Africa or in the administration of South-West Africa. We have carefully screened both Government and commercial shipments of military equipment to make sure that this policy is rigorously enforced.

But I am now authorized to inform the Security Council of still another important step which my Government is prepared to take.

We expect to bring to an end the sale of all military equipment to the Government of South Africa by the end of this calendar year in order further to contribute to a peaceful solution and to avoid any steps which might at this point directly contribute to international friction in the area. There are existing contracts which provide for limited quantities of strategic equipment for defense against external threats, such as air-to-air missiles and torpedoes for submarines. We must honor these contracts.

The Council should be aware that, in announcing this policy, the United States as a nation with many responsibilities in many parts of the world naturally reserves the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security. If the interests of the world community require the pro-

³ U.N. doc. A/RES/1663(XVI).

⁴ BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1962, p. 791.

vision of equipment for use in the common defense effort, we would naturally feel able to do so without violating the spirit and the intent of this resolve.

Now, Mr. President, we are taking this further step to indicate the deep concern which the Government of the United States feels at the failure of the Republic of South Africa to abandon its policy of *apartheid*.

In pursuing this policy, the Republic of South Africa, as we have so often said, is failing to discharge its obligations under articles 55 and 56 of the charter, whereby members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of, among other things, universal respect for the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Stopping the sale of arms to South Africa emphasizes our hope that the Republic of South Africa will now reassess its attitude toward *apartheid* in the light of the constantly growing international concern at its failure to heed the numerous appeals made to it by various organs of the United Nations, as well as appeals of member states, such as my Government.

Question of Sanctions

As to the action of this Council in this proceeding, we are prepared to consult with other members and with the African foreign ministers present at the table, and we will have some suggestions to make. It is clear to my delegation that the application of sanctions under chapter VII in the situation now before us would be both bad law and bad policy.

It would be bad law because the extreme measures provided in chapter VII were never intended and cannot reasonably be interpreted to apply to situations of this kind. The founders of the United Nations were very careful to reserve the right of the organization to employ mandatory coercive measures to situations where there was an actuality of international violence—or such a clear and present threat to the peace as to leave no reasonable alternative but resort to coercion. We do not have that kind of a situation here. Fortunately for all of us, there is still time to work out a solution through

measures of pacific settlement, and any solution adopted by this Council must be reasonably calculated to promote such settlement.

It is bad policy because the application of sanctions in this situation is not likely to bring about the practical result that we seek, that is, the abandonment of *apartheid*. Far from encouraging the beginning of a dialog between the Government of South Africa and its African population, punitive measures would only provoke intransigence and harden the existing situation.

Furthermore, the result of the adoption of such measures, particularly if compliance is not widespread and sincere, would create doubts about the validity of and diminish respect for the authority of the United Nations and the efficacy of the sanction process envisioned in the charter. Also on this matter, views differ so widely that we cannot hope to agree on the necessary consensus to make such action effective even if it were legitimate and appropriate.

And as for suggestions of diplomatic isolation, persuasion cannot be exercised in a vacuum; conflicting views cannot be reconciled *in absentia*.

Instead, we believe still further attempts should be made to build a bridge of communication, discussion, and persuasion. If the human race is going to survive on this earth, wisdom, reason, and right must prevail. And let us not forget that there are many wise and influential people in that great country who share our views.

It is regrettable accomplishments in so many fields of human endeavor in South Africa are being obscured by a racial policy repugnant to Africa and to the world. Certainly one ultimate goal for all of us is to assist South Africa to rejoin the African Continent and to assist in the development of all the peoples of Africa.

And this, Mr. President, is why my Government has looked with such favor on the idea of appointing special representatives of the Security Council who can work energetically and persistently and be free to exercise their own ingenuity and to pursue every prospect and every hint of a useful opening.

We cannot accept the proposition that the only alternative to *apartheid* is bloodshed.

We cannot accept the conclusion that there is no way out—no direction to go except the present collision course toward ultimate disaster in South Africa.

Certainly there are alternatives, and they must be identified and they must be explored before it is too late.

It is a matter of considerable regret to my delegation that the Government of South Africa has chosen to absent itself from these proceedings. But regrets to the side, Mr. President, it is exceedingly difficult in this shrunken and interdependent world to live in self-ostracism from international society; in this world of instant communication, it is progressively more hazardous to fly in the face of world opinion. And certainly the obligation to talk about dangerous disputes is too solemn to be ignored by even the most stubborn of leaders today.

Mr. President, there is nothing inherently immutable in any impasse in human affairs. Many a seemingly hopeless cause has prevailed in the course of history. I had occasion just last week to recall here that negotiations over the testing of nuclear weapons looked hopeless for five long, dreary, and frustrating years—until the impasse was broken suddenly, to the vast relief of an anxious world. And as I said, the stalemate was broken because men refused to give up hope, because men declined to give in to despair, because men worked consistently and doggedly to break the deadlock. Manifestly this treaty does not solve all of the problems in connection with nuclear armaments; but every long journey begins with a single step and this is a beginning.

So I should like to suggest very emphatically that we approach the problem of *apartheid* in South Africa as a similar challenge to ingenuity, to the instinct for survival of humankind. As President Kennedy said with reference to the atomic treaty, we must not be afraid to test our hopes.⁵

It is in the spirit of testing our hopes that this sad episode will end in reason and not in flame that I on behalf of my Government solemnly, earnestly, appeal to the Government of South Africa to change course and embark on

a policy of national reconciliation and emancipation.

STATEMENT BY MR. YOST, AUGUST 7, IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE

U.S./U.N. press release 4235

My Government is able to support this resolution because it reflects the attitude of the United States toward the racial policies of the Republic of South Africa. We particularly appreciate the cooperation of the sponsors of the resolution which has facilitated our desire to vote in favor of it.

We have over a period of years expressed our strong disapproval of the policy of racial discrimination being pursued in South Africa contrary to the obligations of the Republic Government under articles 55 and 56 of the charter. Thus we wholeheartedly endorse the appeal to South Africa to abandon these policies and to liberate those persons who have been imprisoned, interned, or subjected to other restrictions merely because they are opposed to the policy of *apartheid*.

My delegation also supports the request that all member states cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms and military vehicles. As you will recall, Ambassador Stevenson announced in this chamber on August 2 that the United States Government had taken another important step demonstrating its concern at the continued lack of progress in ending racial discrimination in South Africa by voluntarily deciding to end the sale of all military equipment to the Government of South Africa by the end of this year.

Mr. President, the Council will also recall that at the time the United States representative announced this new policy he explained that our decision not to sell armaments after the end of this year to South Africa was without prejudice to the completion of delivery of certain strategic equipment, such as air-to-air missiles and torpedoes on which contracts had already been signed. In addition, it will be recalled that we naturally reserved the right to interpret this policy in light of any future requirements for the common defense effort in assuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

Mr. President, having commented on the principal operative portions of the resolution, may I also mention two preambular paragraphs and related aspects of the text.

With respect to the seventh preambular paragraph of the resolution, I wish to emphasize that the United States is most gratified that the sponsors have seen fit to change their original formulation from "is seriously endangering international peace and security" to "is seriously disturbing international peace and security." In making this change they clearly recognize that a number of Council members are not prepared to agree that the situation in South Africa is one which now calls for the kind of action appropriate in cases of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. As members of the Council are aware, chapter VII does not speak in terms of disturbances to the peace, even serious ones, but only of actual threats to the peace, or breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression.

The resolution's preambular reference to disturbing the peace thus refers to those underlying elements of this certainly serious situation which, if continued, are likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. This is quite different from finding a fully matured threat to or breach of the peace in the present situation. There are in this troubled world many disturbances to international peace and security. But even in those parts of the world where there is now sporadic fighting on international frontiers, this organization has wisely been cautious about invoking the powers of the Security Council under chapter VII.

The change in wording to which I have referred has been of the greatest importance in determining the decision of the United States to vote for this resolution; in fact, it was a decisive factor.

I might add that the fact that operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution as adopted "call upon" member states to take certain action does not, of course, give these paragraphs a mandatory character. The words "call upon" are found in chapter VI as well as chapter VII of the charter; they have been repeatedly employed

by the General Assembly as well as the Security Council; and in the customary practice of the United Nations they do not carry mandatory force.

May I make one further point, Mr. President, about preambular paragraph 6, which reads: "Regretting that some States are indirectly providing encouragement in various ways to the Government of South Africa to perpetuate, by force, its policy of *apartheid*." In our view the allegation that some member states are indirectly providing support of this kind is of questionable accuracy and propriety. In fact, we have seen no evidence that any state is encouraging the Government of South Africa to perpetuate, whether by force or otherwise, its policy of *apartheid*, which we all condemn. For this reason, we would have preferred to have this paragraph omitted.

With these explanations of our attitude toward certain paragraphs of the resolution, we were most happy to join with other members of the Council in voting for it. We profoundly hope that the Government of South Africa will take to heart this solemn warning from the highest body of the United Nations and will promptly take steps to abandon the indefensible and dangerous racial policy which it is now pursuing.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ⁶

The Security Council,

*Having considered the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, submitted by the thirty-two African Member States*

Recalling Security Council resolution S/4300 of 1 April 1960,

Taking into account that world public opinion has

⁶ U.N. doc. S/5386; adopted by the Council on August 13, 1960, by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (France, U.K.). In an earlier vote, operative paragraph 3 of the original draft resolution failed of adoption by a vote of 8 to 0, with 6 absences (Ghana, Morocco, Philippines, U.S.S.R., Venezuela). In a subsequent vote, the draft was adopted by a vote of 9 to 0, with 6 absences (Brazil, China, France, Norway, U.K., U.S.). It read as follows: "Calls upon all States to boycott all South African goods and to refrain from exporting to South Africa strategic materials of direct military value."

⁷ U.N. doc. S/5348.

been reflected in General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) and particularly in its paragraphs 4 and 8,

Noting with appreciation the two interim reports of the Special Committee on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa contained in documents S/5310 of 9 May 1963 and S/5353 of 17 July 1963,

Noting with concern the recent arms build-up by the Government of South Africa, some of which arms are being used in furtherance of that Government's racial policies,

Regretting that some States are indirectly providing encouragement in various ways to the Government of South Africa to perpetuate, by force, its policy of *apartheid*,

Regretting the failure of the Government of South Africa to accept the invitation of the Security Council to delegate a representative to appear before it,

Being convinced that the situation in South Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security,

1. *Strongly deprecates* the policies of South Africa in its perpetuation of racial discrimination as being inconsistent with the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and contrary to its obligations as a Member State of the United Nations;

2. *Calls upon* the Government of South Africa to abandon the policies of *apartheid* and discrimination as called for in the previous Security Council resolution of 1 April 1960, and to liberate all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of *apartheid*;

3. *Solemnly calls upon* all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the situation in South Africa under observation and to report to the Security Council by 30 October 1963.

World Bank Issues Financial Statement for Fiscal Year 1963

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development reported on August 6 additions of \$114 million to its reserves during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1963, raising its total reserves to \$813 million.

Additions during the year were made up of net earnings of \$82.7 million and loan commissions of \$31.3 million. The earnings were placed in the supplemental reserve against losses on loans and guarantees, and the loan commissions were credited to the special reserve. These figures compare to net earnings of \$70.3 million and loan commissions of \$30 million in the fiscal year 1962. On June 30, 1963, the supplemental

reserve totaled \$558.1 million and the special reserve was \$254.9 million.

Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was \$203.9 million, compared with \$188.3 million in the preceding year. Expenses, which included \$103.7 million for interest on Bank borrowing and other financial expenses, totaled \$121.2 million, compared with \$118 million last year.

During the year the Bank made 28 loans totaling the equivalent of \$448.7 million, compared with a total of \$882.3 million last year. The loans were made in Colombia (3 loans), Cyprus, El Salvador, Finland, India, Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan (3 loans), Panama, Peru, Philippines (2 loans), Singapore, Swaziland, Thailand (4 loans), Uruguay, and Yugoslavia (2 loans). This brought the gross total of loan commitments at June 30 to \$7,121.5 million. By June 30, as a result of cancellations, repayments, sales of loans, and exchange adjustments, the portions of loans signed still retained by the Bank had been reduced to \$4,712.3 million.

Disbursements were \$620.4 million, compared with \$485.4 million in the preceding year. Cumulative disbursements amounted to \$5,425.5 million on June 30, 1963.

During the year the Bank sold or agreed to sell \$273.3 million principal amount of loans. On June 30 the total sales of loans amounted to \$1,605.3 million, of which all except \$69 million was without the Bank's guarantee.

Repayments of principal received by the Bank during the year amounted to \$112.9 million, and repayments to purchasers of parts of loans amounted to \$130.6 million. This brought total principal repayments to \$1,318.9 million on June 30, consisting of \$655.4 million repaid to the Bank and \$663.5 million repaid to the purchasers of borrowers' obligations sold by the Bank.

The outstanding funded debt of the Bank amounted to \$2,519.2 million on June 30, 1963, reflecting a net decrease of \$1.6 million in the past year. During the year there was a gross increase in borrowings of \$124 million. This consisted of a Netherlands guilder public bond issue in the amount of f.40 million (US\$11 million equivalent); a public offering of \$5 million

of U.S. dollar bonds in Austria, and a placement of \$5 million of U.S. dollar notes with the central bank of Austria; the private placement of an issue of \$100 million of U.S. dollar bonds; and the delivery of \$3 million of bonds which had been subject to delayed delivery arrangements. The funded debt was decreased by \$125.6 million as a result of the maturing of the equivalent of \$107.8 million of bonds and of sinking fund and purchase fund transactions amounting to \$17.8 million.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and India Sign Atomic Energy Agreement

Press release 411 dated August 9

An agreement for cooperation which provides the legal basis for installing and operating a 380-megawatt nuclear power station of United States design at Tarapur, India,¹ was signed on August 8, 1963, at the Department of State by Indian Ambassador Braj Kumar Nehru, Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot, and Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. In compliance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the agreement has been placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for a period of 30 days. Following is the text of the agreement.

AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA CONCERNING THE CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Whereas the peaceful uses of atomic energy hold great promise for all mankind;

Whereas the Government of India has decided to construct and operate a civil atomic

power station near Tarapur in Maharashtra State as hereinafter specified;

Whereas the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India desire to cooperate with respect to the construction and operation of the aforesaid civil atomic power station;

Now therefore the Parties hereto agree as follows:

Article I

Unclassified information shall be exchanged between the Parties hereto with respect to the development, design, construction, operation, and use of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, including research and development related thereto and problems of health and safety connected therewith.

Article II

A. During the period of this Agreement the United States Commission will sell to the Government of India and the Government of India will purchase from the United States Commission, as needed, all requirements of the Government of India for enriched uranium for use as fuel at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, it being understood that the Tarapur Atomic Power Station shall be operated on no other special nuclear material than that made available by the United States Commission and special nuclear material produced therefrom. The enriched uranium, which shall contain no more than twenty per cent (20%) U-235, will be made available in accordance with the terms, conditions and delivery schedules set forth in a contract to be made between the Parties; provided, however, that the net amount of U-235 contained in the enriched uranium sold hereunder shall not exceed 14,500 kilograms. The net amount of U-235 shall be the gross quantity of U-235 contained in the enriched uranium sold to the Government of India hereunder less the quantity of U-235 contained in recoverable uranium resold or otherwise returned to the Government of the United States of America or transferred to any other nation or group of nations or international organization with the approval of the Government of the United States of America.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 143.

B. The net amount of U-235 contained in the enriched uranium to be sold pursuant to Paragraph A of this Article has been agreed upon by the Parties on the basis of estimated requirements for fueling the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. If the construction of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station is not begun by June 30, 1965, the United States shall not be required, unless it is otherwise agreed, to sell enriched uranium for fueling the Tarapur Station under this Agreement.

C. Within the limitations contained in Paragraph A of this Article the quantity of enriched uranium sold by the United States Commission under this Article and held by the Government of India pursuant to this Agreement shall not at any time be in excess of the quantity necessary for the full loading of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, plus such additional quantity as, in the opinion of the Parties, is necessary to permit the efficient and continuous operation of the Station.

D. The Government of India will retain title to any enriched uranium purchased from the United States Commission.

E. It is agreed that when any special nuclear material utilized in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station requires reprocessing, and recourse is not taken by the Government of India to the provisions of Article VI C of this Agreement, such reprocessing may be performed in Indian facilities upon a joint determination of the Parties that the provisions of Article VI of this Agreement may be effectively applied, or in such other facilities as may be mutually agreed. It is understood, except as may be otherwise agreed, that the form and content of any irradiated fuel elements removed from the reactors shall not be altered before delivery to any such reprocessing facility.

F. With respect to any special nuclear material produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station which is in excess of the need of the Government of India for such material in its program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Government of the United States of America shall have the first option to purchase such special nuclear material at the fuel value price of the United States Commission which may be in effect domestically at such time as it may exercise its option. If such option is not exer-

cised, the Government of India may with the approval of the Government of the United States of America transfer such excess special nuclear material to any other nation or group of nations or international organization.

G. Some atomic energy materials which the Government of India may request the United States Commission to provide in accordance with this Agreement are harmful to persons and property unless handled and used carefully. After delivery of such materials to the Government of India, the Government of India shall bear all responsibility, insofar as the Government of the United States of America is concerned, for the safe handling and use of such materials.

Article III

Materials needed for use at or in connection with the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, other than source materials or the special nuclear materials required for fueling the reactors, will, when such materials are not available commercially, be transferred by the Government of the United States of America to the Government of India on such terms and conditions and in such amounts as may be mutually agreed; provided, however, that special nuclear material transfers will be confined to limited quantities.

Article IV

The application or use of any information (including design drawings and specifications) and any material, equipment and devices, exchanged or transferred under this Agreement, shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it, and the other Party does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of such information and does not warrant the suitability of such information, materials, equipment and devices for any particular use or application.

Article V

It is agreed that the Government of the United States of America will permit persons under its jurisdiction to transfer and export materials, equipment and devices, other than source or special nuclear materials, to, and perform services for, the Government of India and such persons under its jurisdiction as are au-

thorized by the Government of India to receive and possess such materials, equipment and devices, and utilize such services for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, subject to applicable laws, regulations and license requirements of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India.

Article VI

A. The Parties to this Agreement emphasize their common interest in assuring that any material, equipment or device made available to the Government of India for use in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, or in connection therewith, pursuant to this Agreement shall be used solely for peaceful purposes. The Government of India emphasizes, in contrast to the position of the United States, that its agreement to the provisions of this Article in relation to equipment or devices transferred pursuant to this Agreement has been accorded in consideration of the fact that, as provided in this Agreement, the Tarapur Atomic Power Station will be operated on no other special nuclear material than that furnished by the Government of the United States of America and special nuclear material produced therefrom, in consequence of which the provisions of this Article in relation to equipment or devices in any case ensue from the safeguards on fuel.

B. The following arrangements shall be applicable between the Parties:

1. The Parties have reviewed the design of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and may review any significant modification in this design for the sole purpose of determining that the arrangements provided in this Article can be effectively applied. For the same purpose, the Parties may review the design of other facilities which will use, fabricate or process any special nuclear material made available pursuant to this Agreement or produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. Such a review of the design of these other facilities will not be required if the Government of India, pursuant to mutually acceptable measurement arrangements, has placed an agreed equivalent amount of the same type of special nuclear material under the scope of this Agreement.

2. The Parties have agreed that a system of

records and reports shall be established to assure the complete accountability of any special nuclear material which is made available to the Government of India pursuant to this Agreement or which is produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. This system of records and reports shall be as described in the schedule annexed hereto and marked Annexure "A".

3. Any special nuclear material made available pursuant to this Agreement or produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, which is in surplus to the current needs of the fuel cycle for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and which is not transferred by the Government of India pursuant to this Agreement, shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, be stored at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station.

4. There will be consultations and periodic exchanges of visits between the Parties to give assurance that the objectives set forth in paragraph A of this Article and the provisions of this Agreement concerning transfers are being observed. To the extent relevant to the accomplishment thereof, personnel designated by the Government of the United States of America, following consultation with the Government of India, upon request of the Government of the United States of America, and personnel designated by the Government of India shall have full access to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and to conversion, fabrication and chemical processing facilities in India at such time as special nuclear material transferred to the Government of India for, or received from, the Tarapur Atomic Power Station is located at such facilities, and at such other times as may be relevant to the accomplishment of the above-noted objectives. Personnel so designated shall also be afforded access to other places and data, and to persons, to the extent relevant to the accomplishment of those objectives. The personnel designated by either Party, accompanied by personnel of the other Party if the latter so request, may make such independent measurements as either Party considers necessary; and nothing in this Agreement is intended to impede the ability of either Party to have prompt access to data, places and persons to the extent relevant to accomplish the above-noted objectives. The Government of the United States of America

will keep such access to a minimum consistent with the need for effective verification that those objectives are being observed.

C. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement the Government of India shall have the right, upon prior notice to the Government of the United States, to remove from the scope of this Agreement quantities of special nuclear material provided it has, pursuant to mutually acceptable measurement arrangements, placed agreed equivalent quantities of the same type of special nuclear material under the scope of this Agreement.

D. In the event of noncompliance with the guarantees or with the provisions of this Article, and the subsequent failure of the Government of India to fulfill such guarantees and provisions within a reasonable time, the Government of the United States of America shall have the right to suspend or terminate this Agreement and require the return of any equipment and devices transferred under this Agreement and any special nuclear material safeguarded pursuant to this Article.

Article VII

A. The Government of India guarantees that the safeguards in Article VI shall be maintained and that:

1. No material, equipment or device transferred to the Government of India or authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement, by sale, lease or otherwise, will be used for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose, and

2. That no such material, equipment or device will be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of India except as may be agreed to by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India, and then only if in the opinion of the United States Commission such transfer falls within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the other nation or group of nations or international organization.

B. The Government of the United States of

America guarantees that no special nuclear material produced at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and acquired by it, or an equivalent amount of the same type substituted therefor, shall be used for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose.

Article VIII

A. Recognizing the desirability of making use of the facilities and services of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Parties agree in principle that, at a suitable time, the Agency will be requested to enter into a trilateral agreement for the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Article VI, in accordance with the following paragraphs. In addition, in accordance with the objectives set forth in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Government of the United States of America is prepared, in principle, to include appropriate provisions in the aforementioned trilateral agreement, for the application of Agency safeguards to such special nuclear material produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station as may be received in the United States, or to equivalent material substituted therefor.

B. After the Agency has adopted a system of safeguards for the reactors of the size of those of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and at a reasonable time to be mutually agreed upon, the Parties will consult with each other to determine whether the system so adopted is generally consistent with the safeguards provisions contained in Article VI. If the system is generally consistent with these provisions, the Parties will request the Agency to enter into a trilateral agreement as referred to in the preceding paragraph. While the Parties recognize that the trilateral agreement should be implemented as soon as practicable, it is agreed, in order to avoid any dislocation or uncertainty during the period of early operation of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, that the Government of India may specify that the agreement shall not be implemented until the Station has reached reliable full-power operation.

C. In the event the Parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on the terms of the trilateral arrangement envisaged in this Ar-

ticle, paragraph A, either Party may, by notification, terminate this bilateral agreement. Before either Party takes steps to terminate, the Parties will carefully consider the economic effect of any such termination. Neither Party will invoke its termination rights until the other Party has been given sufficient advance notice to permit arrangements by the Government of India, if it is the other Party, for an alternative source of power and to permit adjustment by the Government of the United States of America, if it is the other Party, of production schedules. The Government of the United States of America will not invoke its termination rights unless there has been widespread acceptance, by those nations with whom it has bilateral agreements, of the implementation of safeguards by the Agency or of provisions similar to those contained in this Agreement. In the event of termination by either Party, the Government of India shall, at the request of the Government of the United States of America, return to the Government of the United States of America all special nuclear materials received pursuant to this Agreement and in its possession or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The Government of the United States of America will compensate the Government of India for such returned material at the current schedule of prices then in effect domestically.

Article IX

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(a) "United States Commission" means the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

(b) "Tarapur Atomic Power Station" means an electrical generating power plant consisting of two boiling water reactors and associated equipment with a combined net output of approximately 380 MWe, to be located near Tarapur, Maharashtra State, India.

(c) "Equipment and devices" and "equipment or device" means any instrument, apparatus, or facility and includes any facility, except an atomic weapon, capable of making use of or producing special nuclear material, and component parts thereof.

(d) "Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government

agency, or government corporation, but does not include the Parties to this Agreement.

(e) "Reactor" means an apparatus, other than an atomic weapon, in which a self-supporting fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium.

(f) "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon or a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(g) "Special nuclear material" means (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235 and any other material which the United States Commission pursuant to the United States Atomic Energy Act determines to be special nuclear material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing.

(h) "Source material" means (1) uranium, thorium or any other material which is determined by either Party to be source material or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials in such concentration as either Party may determine from time to time.

(i) "Parties" means the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India, including the United States Commission on behalf of the Government of the United States of America. "Party" means one of the above-mentioned "Parties".

(j) "Reliable full power operation" shall be deemed to have been reached one year after the Tarapur Atomic Power Station has first operated continuously for one hundred hours at full power. In computing this one-year period, periods during which either reactor is not in operation for more than four consecutive weeks will be excluded.

Article X

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which both Governments have notified each other of compliance with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force of such Agreement and shall remain in force for a period of thirty (30) years.

ANNEXURE "A"

The Parties have agreed that the system of records and reports for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station will consist of the following elements:

A. With respect to records, information covering the following will be included:

1. receipts of all nuclear materials²,
2. internal movements of all nuclear materials,
3. any removal of nuclear materials, including shipments, known losses, and unaccounted for quantities,
4. inventories of all nuclear materials on hand at the end of each accounting period, showing form, quantity, and location, and
5. reactor-operating data necessary for determining and reporting on the production and consumption of any nuclear materials and the use of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station.

B. With respect to reports, information covering the following will be included:

1. all receipts and removals of nuclear materials,
2. any production and consumption of nuclear materials,
3. any known losses and unaccounted-for nuclear materials,
4. all inventories of nuclear materials, and
5. the operation of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, including unusual incidents; and significant modifications made or to be made in the plant or in the fueling program.

Routine reports covering the foregoing elements shall be submitted to the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India on a monthly basis. Any losses of nuclear materials, however, or any unusual incidents or major changes in the fueling program will be reported as soon as the loss has been discovered or the change has been scheduled.

The Parties further agree that if any special nuclear material which is made available to India pursuant to this Agreement or produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station is placed, in accordance with this Agreement, in any facilities in India other than the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, then the principles of the agreed-upon system referred to in Paragraph B.2 of Article VI of this Agreement and set forth in this Annexure will be applied to such a situation.

The records and reports will include such details as may be relevant to the achievement of the objectives of Article VI and may be modified by mutual agreement.

In the event of unusual incidents, special reports may be requested, including such amplifications and elucidations as each party considers relevant to the achievement of the objectives of Article VI.

²The term "nuclear material" as used in this Annexure means both source materials and special nuclear materials as they are defined in Article IX of this Agreement. [Footnote in original.]

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.¹

Signatures affixed at Washington: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Liberia, Malaya, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, August 8, 1963; Congo (Léopoldville), Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Netherlands, Norway, Sudan, Turkey, August 9, 1963.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202. *Ratification deposited:* Colombia April 5, 1963.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Amendment to agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3301, 3738, 4317), concerning the civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. Enters into force on the day on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

India

Agreement for cooperation concerning the civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 8, 1963. Enters into force on the date on which both Governments have notified each other of compliance with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Ireland

Amendment to the agreement of March 16, 1956, as amended (TIAS 4059, 4690), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. Enters into force on the day on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Japan

Protocol amending the agreement of June 16, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4133, 4172), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. Enters into force on the day on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Philippines

Amendment to agreement of July 27, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3316, 4515), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. Enters into force on the day on which each Government

¹ Not in force.

receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 21, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5256). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon July 24, 1963. Entered into force July 24, 1963.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.

Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1963. Compiled by the Treaty Affairs Staff, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State. Pub. 7481. 336 pp. \$1.75.

Foreign Affairs—Excerpt From the State of the Union Message, January 14, 1963. Address of the President delivered before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Pub. 7487. General Foreign Policy Series 185. 19 pp. Limited distribution.

Red China and the U.S.S.R. A transcript of the television program "State Department Briefing: Red China and the U.S.S.R." in which four top Department officers participated. Pub. 7497. General Foreign Policy Series 186. 35 pp. 25¢.

Sample Questions From the Junior Foreign Service Officer Examination (Revised). Pamphlet of interest to candidates seeking a career in the Foreign Service of the United States. Pub. 7500. Department and Foreign Service Series 111. 39 pp. Limited distribution.

Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere. Foreign Affairs Outlines—No. 2. Address by Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs before the Latin American Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Pub. 7509. Inter-American Series 85. 19 pp. 15¢.

The United States and Europe: Policy in Evolution. Foreign Affairs Outlines—No. 3. Leaflet based on a letter of February 15, 1963, from Under Secretary of State George W. Ball to Senator Paul Douglas, Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives, concerning the breakdown in negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community. Pub. 7518. European and British Commonwealth Series 65. 4 pp. 5¢.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1962. 15th annual report to the United Nations on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1961—June 30, 1962. Pub. 7521. International Organization and Conference Series 39. 281 pp. 75¢.

Department of State 1963—A Report to the Citizen. An illustrated report describing the functions and policies of the Department and some examples of the problems and hazards routinely encountered in the day-to-day administration of foreign affairs at home and abroad. Pub. 7530. General Foreign Policy Series 187. 150 pp. \$1.50.

Telecommunication—Coordination and Use of Radio Frequencies Above 30 Megacycles per Second. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa October 24, 1962. Entered into force October 24, 1962. TIAS 5205. 31 pp. 15¢.

Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council. Agreement with Other Governments, as amended at the Ninth Session of the Council, Karachi, January 6–23, 1961. Entered into force November 23, 1961. An amendment adopted December 17, 1958, by the Council at the Eighth Session, Colombo. Entered into force December 17, 1958. TIAS 5218. 17 pp. 10¢.

Army Mission to Panama. Agreement with Panama extending the agreement of July 7, 1942, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Panama March 26 and July 6, 1962. Entered into force July 6, 1962. And amending agreement. Exchange of notes—Signed at Panama September 20 and October 8, 1962. Entered into force October 8, 1962. TIAS 5226. 7 pp. 10¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI:4 of the Agreement of October 30, 1947. Agreement with Other Governments. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960. Entered into force with respect to the United States November 14, 1962. TIAS 5227. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan amending the agreement of October 14, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi December 3, 1962. Entered into force December 3, 1962. TIAS 5228. 3 pp. 5¢.

Amendments to the Constitution of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, as Amended. Adopted at the Eleventh Session of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, October 30–November 24, 1961. TIAS 5229. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Argentina amending the agreements of April 25, 1955, as amended and December 21, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Buenos Aires September 19 and November 26, 1962. TIAS 5230. 4 pp. 5¢.

Sampling of Radioactivity of Upper Atmosphere by Means of Balloons. Agreement with Australia, extending the agreement of May 9, 1961. Exchange of notes—Dated at Canberra September 11 and October 30, 1962. TIAS 5231. 3 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Disposition of Equipment and Materials. Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of May 26, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara August 10, 1962. Entered into force August 10, 1962. TIAS 5232. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia amending the agreement of February 12, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz December 6, 1962. TIAS 5233. 4 pp. 5¢.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Administrative Expenditures. Agreement with Belgium, amending Annex I to the agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels October 29 and November 20, 1962. Entered into force November 20, 1962. TIAS 5234. 3 pp. 5¢.

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†410	8/8	Foreign policy briefing at Boston.
411	8/9	Atomic energy agreement with India.
*412	8/9	Diplomatic passports for retired FSO's.
†413	8/9	Gardner: "Outer Space: Problems of Law and Power" (revised).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Treaties in Force . . . January 1, 1963

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force between United States and other countries at the beginning of the current year.

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of states which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1262



September 2, 1963

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The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Symbol of a New Course

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

I appear here this morning to support the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.² Last week in Moscow the treaty was signed on behalf of the United States and the other original parties—the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. The Senate of the United States now has the constitutional responsibility to examine this treaty with care so that it may give the President its advice and, I earnestly hope, its consent to a prompt ratification.

The President has given the treaty before you this morning an apt characterization. It is, he has said,³ “not the millennium. . . . But it is an important first step—a step toward peace—a step toward reason—a step away from

war.” Since 1789 the Senate has given its consent without reservation to the ratification of 943 treaties. I believe this may well prove one of the most significant occasions for the exercise of that constitutional prerogative.

U.S. Efforts for International Controls

The United States, as the first nation to unleash the power of the atom, recognized from the beginning its awesome potentialities for good and evil. In the less than two decades since the first use of a nuclear weapon, the United States has worked continuously to achieve effective international controls so that the power of the atom might be committed to the improvement, rather than the destruction of mankind. Disarmament and the control of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, have been concerns of the highest priority for the three administrations that have borne responsibility for the great issues of peace and war during the atomic era.

Less than a year after the explosions at Hiro-

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Aug. 12 (press release 418). Representatives of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Joint Atomic Energy Committee also attended the hearing.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1262 PUBLICATION 7592 SEPTEMBER 2, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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shima and Nagasaki the United States presented its first comprehensive proposal for international control of the atom. As offered by Bernard Baruch at the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946,⁴ the plan called for the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority with responsibility for control of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to our security, with the power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities, and with the duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.

During the remainder of the Truman administration the United States continued to press these proposals in the United Nations and elsewhere. Though the great majority of the countries accepted the basic principles of the plan, the Soviet Union, unfortunately, did not.

President Eisenhower was in office less than 3 months when he renewed the United States offer for "international control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons."⁵ Two years later at the summit meeting in Geneva he personally launched the "open skies" proposal.⁶ Throughout the ensuing years, no matter what the temperature of the cold war, the United States has pursued in every available forum its search for peace through effective and verified disarmament.

These efforts disclosed a wide gap between the approach of this country and that of the Soviet Union to disarmament problems, mainly on the question of inspection and control. In the middle 1950's, therefore, the United States undertook to explore more limited measures. The most promising of these was control of nuclear weapons testing. There were good reasons for this. All mankind had what might even be described as an instinctive impulse to end the pollution of the air and earth that was a consequence of unrestricted testing. And, while arrangements banning bomb tests could not be wholly self-enforcing, the problem of detection and control seemed manageable. An

agreement to stop testing—or not to begin—would not strip a nation of its defenses or carry it too far into the unknown. Here, many felt, was a good point from which to start.

The first Western proposal for control of nuclear tests was submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee of the United Nations General Assembly on August 21, 1957.⁷ Sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France, it called for a comprehensive 12-month ban on testing. This proposal, however, again encountered the reluctance of Communist states, with closed societies, to accept the international inspection and control required for effective enforcement of a comprehensive ban. On April 13, 1959, after months of inconclusive debate on this issue of inspection and control, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan advanced a proposal for a ban on tests in the atmosphere up to an altitude of 50 kilometers.⁸ This proposal did not require on-site inspection since significant tests of this kind could be detected and identified by national systems. Even this, however, was not accepted by the Soviet Union.

When the present administration assumed office, President Kennedy immediately undertook further explorations of the possibility of banning nuclear weapons tests. In 1961 President Kennedy, again with Prime Minister Macmillan, proposed a ban on tests in the atmosphere that would produce radioactive fallout.⁹ It was rejected by the U.S.S.R. The full text of a treaty embodying a ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water was tabled by the United States and United Kingdom delegations at Geneva on August 27, 1962.¹⁰ At the same time they tabled the text of a comprehensive treaty which provided for on-site inspections for detecting and identifying underground tests.¹¹

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

⁸ For text of a letter from President Eisenhower to Premier Khrushchev on Apr. 13 and the latter's reply, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1959, p. 704.

⁹ For text of a joint statement, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 476.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 415.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 411.

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

Before these texts were tabled there were consultations both with appropriate committees of Congress and with our allies and associates. For the past year the text of a three-environment test ban has been before the world for comment and discussion. The treaty we have just signed in Moscow and which is now before you is based in its essential elements on the draft tabled in Geneva a year ago. Throughout this period, the concept has remained the same—to take a first step toward the control of nuclear weapons by prohibiting testing in those environments where our national systems are capable of detecting significant violations, leaving for subsequent steps the elimination of those tests that can be detected and identified only with an adequate system of inspection.

Limiting the Risk of Nuclear War

Some may ask why three administrations representing both of our great political parties have devoted so much effort in attempting to make progress toward disarmament and, in particular, toward a ban on nuclear tests when those same administrations were also building a nuclear arsenal of increasing and massive destructive power. The answer lies at the heart of the dilemma which troubles our world.

The values that are the heritage of a free society have been menaced by a Communist bloc armed with the most modern weapons and intent on world domination.

For our nation this poses a special problem. We must, for our own security and as the leader of the free world, maintain a mastery of the most advanced weapons while technology moves forward at a breathtaking pace. At the same time we must use all our resources of will and intellect in an effort to halt the burdensome and dangerous competition in weapons that is the somber characteristic of the present world situation.

I recall the comment of a fellow officer in 1945, when we heard about the explosion of the first atom bomb. "War," he said, "has devoured itself." Today the United States has operational weapons in its arsenal hundreds of times as destructive as that first atom bomb. The Polaris and Minuteman missiles are armed with warheads tens of times as powerful. The

Soviets also have weapons of great destructive power.

The hard fact is that a full-scale nuclear exchange could erase all that man has built over the centuries. War has devoured itself because it can devour the world.

If our nation is to survive today, we must be able at all times in the absence of the far-reaching disarmament which still eludes us to endure a nuclear attack and deliver counterblows of vast devastation. As Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara will make clear tomorrow, we have the ability to do so. We intend to keep it that way, lest others be tempted by ambition to abandon reason.

Yet the facts must be faced. No one can realistically think of "victory" in a full-scale nuclear exchange. Last October during the Cuban crisis, men confronted decisions that might have moved to a nuclear war. That experience has been sobering for all.

No responsible man will deny that we live in a world of vast and incalculable risks. Where decisions may be required in minutes, we must be constantly on guard against the accident or miscalculation that can lead where no one wants to go. A local conflict anywhere around the globe in which the interests of the great powers are engaged might suddenly pose the prospect of nuclear war.

Nor can any responsible person say that we can improve our security by an unlimited arms race extending without relief into the future. On the contrary, great as the risks now are, they would rapidly increase. Arsenals will grow larger, weapons more destructive, the frustrations of stalemate and fear more intense. The risks will increase unpredictably as nuclear weapons become available to more and more countries.

It is against this prospect, which the world must frankly face, that the Senate is asked to consider the present treaty. If there may be marginal risks in it, they are far less in my opinion than the risks that will result if we accept the thought that rational man must pursue an unlimited competition in nuclear weapons.

All three of our Presidents who have borne supreme responsibility for our national security during the nuclear age have found the risks of

an unlimited nuclear race far greater than those inherent in safeguarded progress toward arms control.

Provisions of the Treaty

Let me review with you the provisions of this treaty.

The treaty before you is a self-contained document, and it embodies the whole of the agreement. As the President said in his message of transmittal,¹² there are no side arrangements, understandings, or conditions of any kind.

The fundamental obligation is set forth in *article I*. That article prohibits nuclear weapon tests as well as all other nuclear explosions in peacetime in three environments: the atmosphere, under water, and outer space. Underground explosions are permitted so long as the radioactive debris remains within the country where the explosion takes place. Each party also undertakes not to assist any other country, whether or not a party, in conducting nuclear explosions of a kind prohibited under the treaty.

This treaty does not affect the use of nuclear weapons in war. It has to do with nuclear weapon testing in time of peace. Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are, however, subject to the same limitations as nuclear weapons tests. This restriction is necessary because it is difficult to distinguish between the two without on-site inspection. It will not mean the end of our Plowshare program. Many of the peaceful experiments and uses in which we are interested can be conducted underground within the limits of the treaty. Dr. Seaborg [Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission] will discuss this with you in detail.

Article II provides a procedure for amending the treaty. Amendments may be proposed by any party and are approved by a majority vote. The majority must include the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. Amendments do not enter into force until instruments of ratification have been deposited by a majority of the parties, "including the instruments of ratification of all the Original

Parties." Thus no amendment to the treaty can enter into force until it has been considered and approved by the Senate.

It has been said that this amendment process involves a veto. It does. I regard such a veto as essential to the security interests of the United States. Without it, the ban could be extended on terms and conditions that would be unacceptable—as, for example, to underground testing without on-site inspection.

Article II also provides that, if one-third of the parties so desires, a conference may be called to consider amendments, but a conference is not a necessary part of the amending process.

Article III prescribes the procedures for ratification and accession. We hope the treaty will have the widest possible application.

It has been suggested that, by the act of subscribing to the treaty, a regime might gain recognition by parties to the treaty that do not now recognize it. No such effect can occur. In international law the governing criterion of recognition is intent. We do not recognize, and we do not intend to recognize, the Soviet occupation zone of East Germany as a state or as an entity possessing national sovereignty, or to recognize the local authorities as a government. Those authorities cannot alter these facts by the act of subscribing to the test ban treaty. The President made this clear in his press conference of August 1. On August 2 the Department of State issued a formal statement to the same effect. Copies of both should be a part of the record of this hearing.

All this would necessarily follow from the general rule of international law that participation in a multilateral treaty does not affect the recognition status of any authority or regime. But this treaty contains additional safeguards. Treaties typically provide for a single depositary. *Article III*, however, provides that each of the three original parties will be a depositary of the treaty. No depositary need accept a signature or an instrument of accession from authorities in a territory it does not recognize as a state.

The East German authorities will subscribe to the treaty in Moscow. The Soviet Union may notify us of that act. We are under no obligation to accept that notification, and we

¹² For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 316.

U.S. Policy on East Germany Not Affected by Test Ban Treaty

At his August 1st news conference President Kennedy was asked whether the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty by the East German regime would amount to tacit recognition of East Germany. Following is the President's reply.

That is not correct. This matter was discussed and the position of the United States and Britain was made very clear to the Soviet Union, and as a matter of fact the Soviet Union mentioned a regime which it did not recognize and did not wish to recognize. So that a procedure was developed whereby a regime which is not recognized by one of the other parties to the treaty can file its assent with one of the three parties.

This act would not constitute recognition by the remaining signatories. The fact of the matter is that we signed a part of a multilateral treaty on Laos which the Red Chinese also signed, but we do not recognize the Red Chinese regime. This is a matter of intent. Diplomatic procedure, custom, and law provide that recognition is a matter of intent. We do not intend to recognize the East German regime, and therefore the language which is in the treaty was part of the treaty when it was tabled more than a year ago, and it has been before us for a year and it does not provide for recognition of East Germany and we will not recognize it, and we believe strongly in the reunification of Germany as a free, democratic country. That is our policy in the past and our present policy and our future policy and would not be affected by this test ban agreement.

I do think that it is important that we have as great a participation in this nuclear test ban agreement as possible. We have received no encouragement, but we would like the Red Chinese to come into the agreement. It looks like they will not, but it would obviously be in the interest of world peace. But that does not constitute recognition.

have no intention of doing so, but the East German regime would have committed itself to abide by the provisions of the treaty.

By this arrangement we not only assure that no implication of recognition may arise, but we reserve our right to object if later the East German regime should seek to assert privileges under the treaty such as voting or participating in a conference called under article II.

Article IV gives any party the right to withdraw from the treaty "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." A party must give months' notice of its decision to withdraw. This provision is in our interest. If and when events occur that make testing in any of the three environments necessary for the security of the United States, we will be able to resume. Under the treaty we alone will decide whether extraordinary events have occurred and whether they jeopardize our supreme national interests. We need answer to no tribunal and to no authority other than our own conscience and requirements. We hope that the treaty will last and will grow in strength, but certainly no President of the United States would hesitate to exercise the right of withdrawal if the national security interest requires it.

If the Soviet Union itself were to test in violation of the treaty, the fundamental obligation that is the consideration for our adherence would disappear. In that case the United States could, if it chose, consider itself released from its reciprocal obligation and could resume testing without delay.

U.S. Security Maintained

Under this treaty the national security of the United States can and will be fully maintained.

This country has learned much from the experience of the last 18 years. We do not propose to forget those lessons. We have no basis yet for assuming a fundamental change in Soviet objectives. We are still engaged in a contest between free choice and coercion. The President made this clear, and I want to reiterate it here today.

But there is nothing inconsistent between this treaty, or other effectively enforceable arms control agreements, and a policy of vigilance. The same three administrations that have sought disarmament over the past 18 years have effectively met Communist threats of aggression—in Iran, in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Western Europe, in Korea, in Southeast Asia and in Cuba. But whatever may be the funda

mental antagonisms between us and the Soviet Union, we have a mutual interest in avoiding mutual destruction.

We shall remain ready to meet further challenges. The treaty permits underground testing. The policy of the United States is to continue to test underground as necessary to our security. Moreover, although we hope for compliance, we cannot discount the possibility that the Soviet Union may violate the treaty. We shall be on the alert for any violations, and we have a high degree of confidence in our ability to detect them. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency will discuss this capability in detail. But I am confident that, if significant testing in violation of the treaty takes place, we will know about it. And we will be ready at all times to resume testing in all environments, and promptly, if that should become necessary. Dr. Seaborg will be prepared to deal with these matters in detail.

Concrete Gains of the Treaty

This is a limited treaty. The President listed the things it does not do, and we must keep them in mind in judging its significance. At the same time, if—as seems likely—most of the nations of the world adhere to the treaty, and if they observe its obligations, this will in itself bring concrete gains.

First, the United States and the Soviet Union already have enough nuclear power to inflict enormous destruction on each other. Still, the search for bigger, more destructive weapons goes on. Each generation of major weapons has been more expensive than the last. Each has involved an increasing burden, an increasing diversion of resources from the great unfinished business of mankind. Yet greater armament has not demonstrably brought greater security. The treaty, if observed, should slow this spiral, without damage to our relative strength.

Second, the treaty will help contain the spread of nuclear weapons. Most of the countries with the capacity and the incentive to develop nuclear weapons over the next decade

Department States Views on Status of East German Regime

*Department Statement*¹

We understand the Federal Republic's concern that this treaty should work no recognition or change in status for East Germany. This question is one of great importance for the Federal Republic, and it is entirely right and proper that they should study the matter carefully and satisfy themselves fully on it.

Under Secretary [W. Averell] Harriman and his advisers had this problem very much in mind during the negotiation of the treaty.

Now, it is a well-established proposition of international law that recognition is not accorded to an unrecognized regime when that regime acts to become a party to a multilateral treaty along with states that do not recognize it. Similarly, such action by an unrecognized regime does not result in any recognition or acknowledgment of the existence of the state which the regime purports to govern.

Diplomatic recognition of a government and also recognition or acknowledgment of the existence of a state is a matter of intention. No government is held to recognize unless it intends to do so.

The United States does not recognize that East Germany constitutes a state.

Now, you will recall that the United States signed the Lao agreements together with Communist China and North Viet-Nam. We have always maintained that this does not affect recognition status of the other signatories.

We are fully satisfied that the recognition problems have been effectively handled and the East German regime cannot change its status or achieve recognition from us or any other state which does not now recognize it merely by adhering to the treaty.

We are confident that, when the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany completes its study of the international law and practice on this question, it will reach the same conclusion.

¹ Read to news correspondents by a Department spokesman on Aug. 2.

or so have already announced that they will accept the self-denying ordinance of the treaty. While this does not guarantee that they will never become nuclear powers, their renunciation of atmospheric testing will act as a deterrent by making it much more difficult and ex-

pensive for them to develop nuclear weapons.

Third, the treaty will reduce the radioactive pollution of the planet. The increased radioactivity from nuclear testing has thus far stayed within tolerable limits, in a statistical sense. But as the President said, "this is not a natural health hazard, and it is not a statistical issue." Moreover, if testing were not restricted, more and more countries would conduct tests. Many of them would lack either the incentive or the means to minimize the fallout. We have a high obligation to safeguard life and health and the genetic integrity of the human race. Today no one can say for certain how much fallout is too much. But if this treaty is observed it will go a long way to assure that we do not transgress the limits.

"A Choice Between the Quick and the Dead"

For 18 years we have held the Communist drive in check largely by the deterrent force of our massive military strength. We shall maintain that overwhelming strength until we are certain that freedom can be assured by other means.

But throughout we have known that a lasting peace could not be founded upon armed might alone. It can be secured only by durable international institutions and by a respect for law and its procedures. The problem has been to convince the Communist world that its interest also lay in that direction.

The most important thing about the treaty is, therefore, what it may symbolize and what new paths it may open. That, no one can now foretell.

But as the Senate undertakes its appraisal of this treaty it is well to recall the vivid statement that Bernard Baruch made to the United Nations when the nuclear age was first upon us:¹³

We are here [he said] to make a choice between the quick and the dead. . . .

Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear.

For 17 years all men have lived in that

¹³ *Ibid.*, June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

shadow of that fear. But if the promise of this treaty can be realized, if we can now take even this one step along a new course, then frail and fearful mankind may find another step and another until confidence replaces terror and hope takes over from despair.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 16

Press release 425 dated August 16

Secretary Rusk: I understand that the leadership of the House of Representatives is planning to bring the Foreign Assistance Act to the floor next Tuesday [August 20]. This legislation authorizes our programs of military and economic aid.¹ The appropriation stage will of course come later.

Foreign aid is today, and has been since World War II, a key tool of American foreign policy. The basic objective of our foreign aid programs has not changed since the beginning of the Marshall Plan. The programs are designed to assist other countries to maintain their independence and to develop into self-supporting nations.

The record of accomplishment over these years has been very good indeed. We have already been able to terminate economic aid programs in 17 countries, and another 6 countries should be able to join this list in the near future. Of the 49 nations to gain independence since 1943, not one has chosen a Communist form of government.

The foreign aid program makes a positive contribution and a vital contribution to the decent world order which is a central aim of our foreign policy. I hope very much that the House will pass the legislation, and without crippling amendments, and that the requested funds will then be provided in full measure. This is not the time for us to relax our effort in the present world situation.

¹ For statements made by Secretary Rusk before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Apr. 5 and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 11, see BULLETIN of Apr. 29, 1963, p. 664, and July 1, 1963, p. 19.

Now I am ready for your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you assess the Chinese Communist charge that the Soviets agreed and then decided not to provide them with atomic weapons?

A. It has been our impression that there was a period during which the Soviet Union extended very considerable technical assistance to the Chinese, and that some of this was in the nuclear field, but that in 1959 or early 1960 much of this technical assistance was withdrawn. I would think that what Peiping said on this subject in general conforms to our own information. But I think I would not want to speculate too broadly upon what this might have meant.

I do think that nuclear powers, particularly the two largest nuclear powers, are both concerned about the problem of proliferation. I suppose that, as difficulties developed and tensions developed between Moscow and Peiping, this question of cooperation in the nuclear field was one of the victims of that tension.

Proposal on Static Control Posts

Q. Mr. Secretary.

A. Yes.

Q. On another topic, is there any substance to the reports that the United States is ready to accept the Soviet offer to station ground inspectors in East and West?

A. Well, I think that if you will look at the full statement—actually I have not myself seen the actual full statement made in Geneva in the last day or so—but this is simply an indication that we are prepared to look further into this point of static control posts as a measure against surprise attack—control posts at key ports and railway stations, highway centers, and airfields. You will recall that Mr. Khrushchev referred to that earlier in the summer as one of the steps.

Now, one of the problems of course will be whether this is something that can be taken up specifically as a precise move with respect to surprise attack or whether it is going to be related to other and more difficult questions, such as levels of forces or nuclear-free zones or questions of that sort.

Back in 1958 this was a proposal which was part of a complex—a complex which I think would not be a basis for agreement at this point. But I would think that, both from what Mr. Stelle said and what Mr. Tsarapkin said,² this is a subject which can be discussed further, but at the moment I don't see clearly that there will be a rapid agreement on this point.

Q. In that connection—

A. Yes.

Q. There is a report out of Bonn that the U.S. is considering reducing its forces in West Germany by 10 percent. Would this have anything to do with our negotiations in Geneva?

A. No. I don't understand this particular report. As you know, there has been a report of very broad reorganizations in the structure of our Armed Forces, particularly in the Army, but I have no basis for that particular report.

Q. So you reject that?

A. I say I don't have any information that would lead me to think that that report is accurate. We are not planning those reductions.

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the nuclear test ban hearings, Senator [Wayne] Morse has called for a statement from you on whether we intend to give—to share—American nuclear secrets with France in view of the fact that the administration now considers it a nuclear power. He says any such move would be a hypocritical act and would cause him to vote against the treaty. Could you clarify this for us?

A. Well, I expect to return to the Senate before these hearings are over for discussion of particular points that might be left dangling during the discussions thus far.³ I would call your attention to the treaty itself,⁴ article I,

² Charles C. Stelle, U.S. representative to the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which reconvened at Geneva on July 30, and Semyon Tsarapkin, Soviet representative.

³ For a statement made by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug. 12, see p. 350.

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

paragraph 2, which provides that each of the parties undertakes to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the prohibited environments.

We would consider ourselves of course bound by that paragraph, and this would be a ruling consideration in any assistance that we might give or will be asked to give to any country that is involved in this nuclear field.

I also call your attention to the fact that recently in his press conference President de Gaulle referred to this question as a hypothetical question. I think I might just leave it with those two comments.

Q. Mr. Secretary.

A. Yes.

Q. Senator Morse of course referred to elements other than the three prohibited environments. He referred of course to nuclear assistance in any respect which would involve the spread of nuclear weaponry.

A. Well, I would have to study what he has said, and I will have a chance to go into that fully when I go back down to the Senate.

Possibility of Additional Steps

Q. Mr. Secretary.

A. Yes.

Q. Before you went to Moscow there was some question expressed here as to just what were Soviet intentions in reaching a test ban agreement, whether Khrushchev was interested in a very broad solution on East-West problems, or simply limited solutions, a kind of breathing spell. After your trip there, have you any clearer views as to just what are Soviet intentions?

A. Well, it is always a little dangerous to try to enter fully into the mind of someone else on a matter of this sort. I got the impression—or had the impression during these past few weeks—that we are not involved in a comprehensive discussion of the full range of East-West relations looking toward some negotiated *détente* across the board. I do have the im-

pression that it is worth exploring particular points—for example, some of these measures in the surprise-attack field would be a good example—to see whether there might not be other points of agreement.

You will have observed, both from what was said by Lord Home [British Foreign Secretary] and me and by Chairman Khrushchev and Mr. Gromyko, that references were made to the test ban treaty as a possible first step, and expressions of the hope that other steps might be found. Well, we have not yet found those other steps, but I think there will be further contact and discussion in the weeks and months ahead to see whether some additional steps could not be taken. I think that this surprise-attack field is one that we might be able to build further on.

I do believe that the Soviet Union has some real interests in this test ban treaty and in exploring these matters further. I think the argument between Moscow and Peiping about the role of thermonuclear war in the modern world is a serious argument.

I believe that the Soviet Union does have, as all of us have, some great unfinished tasks for its own people in which it would like to make substantially large investments. There are considerations which, looked at objectively and without regard to ideological differences—there are considerations which would indicate that the Soviet Union may be ready to take up some of these particular points and see what might be done with them. But this is speculative. One can be wrong by tomorrow morning. We just have to keep working at it and see what can happen.

But we do not have—I want to emphasize—we do not have undisclosed agreements on points that surrounded or had anything to do with this test ban discussion. The agreement is fully known, fully public; there are no strings or reservations, anything of that sort, connected with it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at his last press conference, General de Gaulle made a proposal for a four-power disarmament conference. Have you been able to obtain any details of the proposal? And is it now under active consideration at all?

A. No. We have had nothing further on that.

Q. There was a similar proposal, Mr. Secretary—well, not in numbers—from Chinese Communist leadership calling for some sort of worldwide disarmament conference. I believe that was delivered officially to the U.S. Government. Have you studied it? Do you expect to reply to it?

A. Well, I wouldn't quite call that a similar proposal. President de Gaulle was talking about a four-power consultation; and the Chinese have talked about a large worldwide chief-of-government party to look at nuclear disarmament.

We have had what the Chinese have made public on those proposals, and they were repeated when our Ambassador saw the Chinese representative in Warsaw the other day, but I don't see in those proposals any opportunity to move forward on what is a very far-reaching, complex matter. I think the manner of the proposal and the character of the proposal from Peiping has not added very much to the situation.

Situation in South Viet-Nam

Q. Sir, the religious situation in South Viet-Nam appears to be worsening. Would this be likely to have any effect on our attitude toward the Diem government?

A. Well, I think it is obvious that we are deeply distressed by the dissensions that have occurred in South Viet-Nam, arising out of religious differences, and these internal matters with which you are familiar. We are especially distressed because we regret anything which seems to create disunity at a time when things were moving in a favorable direction, in the security field, and moving toward a position where the South Vietnamese could be finally safe and independent in their own activities.

The numbers of incidents have been dropping rapidly from last year. Such elements as sabotage, propaganda incidents, the larger sized attacks, those were dropping. Additional areas of the country were coming under Government control. The strategic-hamlet program had been moving forward. I think it is still moving forward.

So that we would hope very much that the

Government, President Diem, and the Buddhist leaders—based upon what has been said by both sides in recent days—would find a way to resolve these differences among themselves so that everyone could return to the central task of the country, which is to insure its safety and its freedom. We will do what we can in this regard. These are complex and difficult issues. We hope very much that the Government out there will take a strong lead now to bring about a greater degree of peace and serenity within the country itself.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since the President on August 1⁵ indicated an interest in giving France some nuclear help, has there been any movement on this proposal, or is it still as it was on August 1?

A. I think there has been no change. My comments made today would cover that point, I think.

Trade With Yugoslavia and Poland

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Coming back to the Foreign Assistance Act, what is the present position of the Department of State on the most-favored-nation clause in regard to Yugoslavia and Poland? And what do you think the chances are for the Congress to reverse its original position on that point?

A. Well, I think the attitude of the Department of State is, and has been, that we believe that the President, the Executive, ought to have flexibility in dealing with this question of trade with Yugoslavia and Poland. We regret very much the amendment to the bill last year, which barred the most-favored-nation treatment, which would cause us to interrupt our trade relationships. We would hope very much that the Congress this year would give us the amendment that we have sought.

I think that it is perhaps not for me to try to predict what the result will be. I would hope, however, that we could get the flexibility that we need in a matter of that sort.

⁵ At a news conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is delaying the Chiang Kai-shek government's signature to the partial test ban treaty?

A. I, frankly, don't know just what the status of their consideration of that matter is.

As you may know, 63 have signed the treaty thus far. There will be 3 more today, bringing the total to 66. There will be a considerable number of others who will sign. I don't have precise information about what might be the situation with regard to Nationalist China.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the subject of the surprise attack, do you have any indications that we may have French cooperation in that?

A. Of course, anything that involves our NATO allies would have to be discussed fully with our NATO allies. We could not, for example, make arrangements ourselves, nor even could the four NATO members now sitting at Geneva be able to make arrangements, on control posts throughout the NATO alliance without fullest consideration in NATO. So I am sure that, if this appears to be moving toward serious discussions, France would, necessarily, have to be consulted and have to consider what its own attitude would be.

Q. But you haven't had any indication from them?

A. Well, these matters have been before NATO, and they have been informed of the discussions thus far. But they haven't reached a point of—what shall we say—maturity, where the precise attitudes of the NATO countries have been worked out, because we don't really know what propositions are possible, and what linkages the other side might attempt to inject into these conversations, and what the framework is. So that there is still a good deal of work to be done on that.

Yes.

Q. The White House has said you have been directed to consider the possible negotiation of an international agreement on wool textiles. Do you feel there is any possibility of obtaining such an agreement?

A. Well, quite frankly, I am not really well briefed on that this morning. I would like to pass that one, because that is very complicated and, shall I say, a delicate matter. And I think that anything I might say could well be wrong at the moment. So I will pass that one, if you don't mind.

Q. Mr. Secretary, during your talks with Mr. Gromyko, it was understood that the issue of Cuba was raised. And, if so, could you tell us what his response was to the status of Soviet troops on the island?

A. Well, I did, while I was in Moscow, express our continuing concern about the presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. And also our well-known concern about the attempts of Castro to interfere in other countries in this hemisphere. But I don't think that I should today go into that in any detail, nor to say what Mr. Gromyko's reply was.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Reports from Geneva this morning say that one of the linkages which Russia appears to be injecting into these surprise-attack talks is a reduction of forces in the two Germanies and the placing of inspectors in the two Germanies. Is this the kind of linkage that would be acceptable?

A. Yes. I would think that what we ought to try to do is to find out whether there are other precise steps, as precise as the "hot line," as precise as the test ban in three environments, as precise as, say, static control posts, on which we can move. The more things are linked into other matters, the more difficult they become. And I don't see myself that linking static control posts into mutual reduction of forces is likely to lead to an early agreement. I think that makes it a very, very unpromising prospect.

Portuguese Territories in Africa

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes, sir, back here.

Q. What is your view, sir, on Spain's decision in the past few days to grant some degree of self-rule to its African territories, and also

on the Portuguese Premier's speech in the past few days regarding Portuguese African territories, particularly his criticism of American policy toward those territories?

A. Well, we can't be expected to like some of the things that Dr. [António de Oliveira] Salazar said about U.S. policies in his statement—what seems to us to be a distortion of our aims in a situation of this sort, or that we are somehow trying to exercise, extend some sort of sphere of influence, as far as the United States is concerned.

It's well known that the people of this country really do attach importance to the simple notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed and that what the people of a particular territory think about their circumstance or situation is an important question.

Now, this is not just a question of, shall we say, high principle. It's a very practical notion in the modern world that political arrangements are stable and promising when they clearly rest upon the consent of those directly involved. And so we would hope that this factor could be taken fully into account and that the European relationship to Africa or the Portuguese presence in Africa could be sustained by the demonstrated consent of the people. But it's for the people themselves to clarify that point.

And so we will continue to work at this and counsel on it, as far as our responsibilities to the United Nations are concerned.

I think that perhaps that is about all that I would say at this point on that issue.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a little while ago you were talking of the questions you might explore with Soviet Russia in the wake of the test ban. And among them you mentioned Peiping-Moscow relations. Have you or your diplomats had frank exchange of views on this point with Soviet Russia?

A. No. I might have misled someone if I indicated that Moscow-Peiping relations was a subject for exploration with Moscow. That has not been a subject of conversation between us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are some people who

say that in a nuclear age any agreement between East and West to station inspectors on each other's soil to watch military movements on the ground and potentially in the water—that this wouldn't really be much of a step to ease tensions. What is your view on this, and how do you regard it as potentially significant?

A. Well, I wouldn't think that conventional forces are unimportant simply because there are nuclear weapons in the background. I think there could be some advantages. Obviously, such a step would not solve all the problems. But I should think there could be some advantages in people knowing whether or not there are significant changes in the deployment or concentration of conventional forces.

After all, it is entirely possible that if there is a crisis, or if there is a prospect of war, it might well start or be precipitated in the conventional side first. But it would be a limited step. But the fact that it is limited doesn't necessarily mean that it would not be worth while.

Question of Soviet Troops in Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary.

A. Yes.

Q. Without going into what Mr. Gromyko told you on the question of Soviet troops in Cuba, do you have the feeling or impression—or, what impression do you have about the possibilities of an early Soviet troop withdrawal from Cuba?

A. I just wouldn't be able to speculate on that, and I certainly don't want to get into that famous numbers game here today. I don't have any information that would lead me to be able to make a responsible comment on that point.

Q. Do you feel that the troop withdrawal might greatly help in facilitating the settlement of some of these other points that you mentioned?

A. Oh, I think there would be no question about the complete withdrawal of Soviet military personnel in Cuba making a very helpful contribution to the general state of relations. I think that would be very apparent. Any—

Safeguards in Relation to Test Ban

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The question has been raised in the test ban hearings on Capitol Hill as to whether a delay in providing specifics about the safeguards which would accompany a treaty would delay ratification. Do you anticipate any delay in providing details to the Congress about the required safeguards, sir?

A. No, I would think not. I mean, the safeguards of the sort we are talking about have been matters of policy in the executive branch straight through. And I think each of the witnesses has emphasized the importance of these safeguards, such things as the continuation of underground testing, such things as the maintenance of our laboratories in full operational capability, such things as the preparation for prompt resumption of testing in these three prohibited environments, if violation should occur, and we ourselves had to resume testing.

Questions of that sort have been up, of course, and it is our strong view in the executive branch that these safeguards must be in hand.

That will require support from the Congress—appropriations. It will require a good deal of advanced planning on the part of our own nuclear establishment. But I think they are of great importance.

I don't believe that this is an issue on which there is any real difference of view between the executive and legislative branches. Therefore I don't see why it should delay the hearings.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when Governor Harriman got back from Moscow, some of us got the impression that the Soviets would not agree to any further accord on any subject unless they first got something along nonaggression declaration lines. Is that still your impression here, or does the discussion about the static posts indicate that they will yield on that point?

A. Well, I don't believe there was any categorical position on that particular point. As you know, during the Hailsham-Harriman discussions in Moscow,^a the Soviets did press rather hard on this nonaggression idea. We

^a BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

agreed that it would be discussed with the NATO alliance. Those discussions have not been completed, although NATO has taken note of the nonaggression proposal which the Soviets introduced at Geneva quite some months ago.

No, those discussions will go forward in NATO at the appropriate time. But it is not my impression that resolution of this question is a prerequisite to discussing any other question. In other words, it's not a condition. It's not a *sine qua non* of taking up other points. As you have observed, Mr. Tsarapkin today did enter into a discussion of the control posts problem at Geneva.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the case in Cuba again where American planes watched while a kidnaping was conducted by Castro's troops in British waters, do you think there is room for an agreement where instantaneous action could be taken by either the British or the United States in defense of that area?

A. Well, I think there were several problems there. I personally believe that our own military people conducted themselves correctly in that situation. It is not, I think, for us to go into British territory in a situation of that sort. The British were promptly informed. But also remember, it is not a very suitable mission for an aircraft to take on the job of trying to rescue refugees who are in the hands of somebody else and where firing from the air will endanger the refugees as much as those who are doing something with the refugees. In other words, the means available were limited basically to observation. And this is something, of course, we are discussing with the British. But I think that our men there acted correctly in that situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in what sense do you mean it is being talked about with the British?

A. Well, we are discussing with them that particular problem, and this, of course, raises the question of what the situation could be if this sort of thing were repeated and how one can give protection to refugees who might come out under these circumstances.

Q. On the question of control posts, do you think that stationary control posts are sufficient?

enough to watch and prevent surprise attacks, or does the United States think in the shape of mobile control posts in the respective area?

A. Well, how mobile, I think, would be a question to be taken up in discussions. But the idea of this particular static control post proposal would be that at a given airfield, at a given port or railway center, these observers would be able to determine whether there were substantial troop movements through those centers.

Now, obviously, it would have to be mobile enough at the port to be able to know what was happening at the port. But I doubt that would mean they would be rambling around the countryside. My guess is that there will be no problem about the degree of mobility required in the immediate location to carry out the mission that they have in that immediate location.

But my further guess is that the Soviet Union is not prepared at this point to accept roving observers with any degree of radius from their assigned position.

Position on Comprehensive Test Ban

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes, sir?

Q. It has been disclosed now on the Hill that sometime back, before the partial test ban came into negotiation, final negotiation, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff took a negative position on the comprehensive treaty proposal of the United States. Could you tell us whether that position, taken at that time, led the State Department to alter its position? Or were you prepared to go ahead regardless of the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposition?

A. Well, that poses what has turned out to be a hypothetical question. I don't know that there is much profit in going back on an "as if" basis.

Q. I asked the question—

A. We have had, as General Taylor [Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] pointed out, regular consultations, frequent consultations with the Joint Chiefs on these disarmament questions. They have been sitting regularly with the so-called Committee

of Principles at Cabinet level, and they have sat in on discussions at the White House with the President about these disarmament questions. I think the principal obstacle to a comprehensive treaty has been the attitude of the Soviet Union toward inspections.

Q. I asked the question because I believe the testimony has been that, despite the fact we have only a limited test ban treaty, this Government wants a total test ban treaty. And, in fact, Mr. Harriman raised that point at Moscow. Is that not correct?

A. The policy of the United States is, as expressed among other places in the preamble of this limited treaty itself, to seek a comprehensive test ban. But that will require a fully adequate assurance, inspection arrangements, so that we would know that there would not be any significant cheating that could affect our security.

Q. But it is a fact—

A. It remains our policy. The present prospect is that that question is not likely to move very fast in the near future.

Q. But it is a fact that there is now an unresolved difference in this Government on that comprehensive treaty, is it not?

A. Well, I don't—I'm not sure that I would call such a difference unresolved. After all, the executive branch is headed by the President of the United States. (Laughter.)

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes?

Q. Is this country free under the test ban treaty to offer nuclear assistance to France if that assistance is intended to avoid future French testing?

A. Well, I think the treaty itself makes clear that assistance in carrying out prohibited explosions is prohibited by the treaty. Now, I don't want to get into what might be permitted under the treaty itself. I think that if all countries sign the treaty and there were clearly to be no prohibited explosions, then these issues would move over into another field in terms of nuclear policy, alliance policy, and the rest of it. But I can't get into that today.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes?

Q. Do you foresee any important changes in our relationship with Eastern Europe following the situation that exists around Berlin?

A. I think one has had the impression that the countries of Eastern Europe have been interested in increasing their trade relations and exchange relations with Western Europe, and there have been some signs they would like to do that also with the United States.

I don't think it is possible to generalize completely on that, or to draw too many conclusions from it, but we have sensed that they have been interested in finding ways to increase their trade. I think that, for example, a country like Czechoslovakia lives as much on trade as any other country in Europe. And it has expanded its trade with Western Europe.

As you know, there is a very large trade going on between Western Europe and the Socialist bloc to the East, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, now more than \$51½ billion in both directions each year. I think that the Eastern European countries have been looking for ways to improve their relations with the West. But it's a little early yet, I think, to categorize that in great detail or to draw long-range conclusions from it.

Q. Thank you, sir.

A. All right.

U.S. Agrees to Extradition of Ex-President of Venezuela

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

Press release 417 dated August 12

The Secretary of State on August 12 informed the Ambassador of Venezuela that the United States has agreed to the request of the Government of Venezuela for the extradition of Marcos Pérez Jiménez.

The request was made in August 1959 under the extradition treaty of 1922 between the United States and Venezuela¹ in which the two

countries bind themselves, on a reciprocal basis, to extradite persons charged with committing any of the crimes enumerated in the treaty. At the conclusion of the extradition hearing on the Venezuelan request, United States District Judge George W. Whitehurst, sitting as extradition magistrate, found that the evidence presented by Venezuela showed probable cause to believe Marcos Pérez Jiménez guilty of the crimes of embezzlement or criminal malversation, breach of trust, and receiving money unlawfully obtained; that there was no legal impediment to his extradition; and that, therefore, the requirements of the treaty had been met. Thus, under United States law, the Secretary of State was authorized to extradite Marcos Pérez Jiménez for trial on only the crimes of embezzlement or criminal malversation, breach of trust, and receiving money unlawfully obtained, and, under the treaty, Venezuela could try him only for those offenses were he to be extradited.

In habeas corpus proceedings, brought by Marcos Pérez Jiménez to challenge the decision of the extradition magistrate, the decision of the magistrate was upheld by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The habeas corpus proceedings were finally terminated when, on June 17, 1963, the Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing of a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In addition to the record of the extradition hearing and the habeas corpus proceedings, the Secretary has had before him written submissions from the attorneys for Marcos Pérez Jiménez and from the Government of Venezuela. The Secretary also met with attorneys for Marcos Pérez Jiménez at their request, at which time they presented arguments in opposition to extradition. Finally, the Government of Venezuela presented a note giving assurances that should Pérez Jiménez be returned to Venezuela careful security measures would be taken to insure his physical safety, that he would be given a fair trial and given all the rights

¹ 43 Stat. 1698.

accorded an accused under the laws of Venezuela, including the right to full and effective defense and including the right to be defended by counsel of his own choosing, and that, in accordance with article XIV of the treaty, he would be tried only for those offenses for which extradition was granted.

TEXTS OF NOTES

Secretary Rusk to Ambassador Tejera-Paris

AUGUST 12, 1963

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to note No. 320, dated August 5, 1961,² in which the Government of Venezuela formally requested the extradition of Marcos Perez Jimenez for the crimes of embezzlement or criminal malversation, receiving money or valuable securities knowing the same to have been unlawfully obtained, and fraud or breach of trust, as specified in paragraphs 14, 18 and 20 of Article II of the Extradition Treaty of 1922, between our two countries.

As you are aware, an extradition hearing was held pursuant to the provisions of Section 3184, Title 18, United States Code, at the conclusion of which the Honorable George W. Whitehurst, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting as extradition magistrate, found that the evidence presented by your Government showed probable cause to believe Marcos Perez Jimenez guilty of the above-mentioned crimes, but that insufficient evidence had been presented to warrant his extradition on the charges of complicity in murder with which he was also charged in Venezuela. Habeas corpus proceedings brought to challenge the decision of the extradition magistrate resulted in his decision being upheld by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On June 17, 1963, the United States Supreme Court denied the petition of Marcos Perez Jimenez for a rehearing on that Court's denial of his petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I have taken note of your Government's assurances, contained in your note No. 1396, dated July 22, 1963, that careful security arrangements have been made by your Government to eliminate any risk of physical harm to Marcos Perez Jimenez should he be extradited, that he would be tried only for those offenses for which his extradition is granted, that he would be given all the rights accorded an accused under the laws of your country, including the right to full and effective defense, and that he would have the right to adequate legal counsel of his own choice.

Accordingly, there is enclosed my warrant² directing the United States Marshal for the Southern District of Florida or any other public officer or person having charge or custody of Marcos Perez Jimenez to

surrender and deliver him up to such person or persons as may be duly authorized by your Government to receive him in order that he may be returned to Venezuela for trial for the crimes of embezzlement or criminal malversation, receiving money or valuable securities knowing the same to have been unlawfully obtained, and fraud or breach of trust. The specific offenses which are considered, in this case, to be encompassed by the crimes and those for which extradition is granted are those charges set forth in paragraphs 15. B, 15. C and 15. D(3) of the Second Amended Complaint for Extradition filed March 8, 1960, in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, by Manuel Aristeguieta in case No. 9425-M-Civil entitled *Manuel Aristeguieta, Consul General of the Republic of Venezuela, Plaintiff, v. Marcos Perez Jimenez, Defendant*.

Inasmuch as the extradition magistrate found sufficient evidence of criminality of Marcos Perez Jimenez only with respect to these crimes, his extradition is granted on the condition, specified in Article XIV of the Extradition Treaty of 1922, that he shall be tried only for those crimes.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

DEAN RUSK

His Excellency Dr. ENRIQUE TEJERA-PARIS,
Ambassador of Venezuela.

Ambassador Tejera-Paris to Secretary Rusk

EMBAJADA DE VENEZUELA
Washington, D.C., July 22, 1963

1396

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Your Excellency's note of July 19, 1963,² in which Your Excellency invites my comments on certain contentions made to Your Excellency by attorneys for Marcos Perez Jimenez in connection with his extradition.

The contentions are groundless.

The attorney's suggestion that the accused would be subject to the danger of physical harm is quite unwarranted. As has already been indicated to the Department of State, the careful security arrangements that have been made by my Government for the custody of the accused eliminate any risk of such harm. I am quite prepared to submit the details of such arrangements to Your Excellency. Your Excellency will understand that my Government has a far greater interest even than Your Excellency in assuring against any such danger. I am sure also that Your Excellency is fully aware that my Government inflicts no harm on prisoners such as had been resorted to in my country prior to January 1958.

The attorney's suggestion that the accused would

² Not printed here.

likely be tried for offenses other than those for which Your Excellency will grant extradition is irresponsible. I invite Your Excellency's attention to the clear guarantee contained in the treaty of extradition itself that an extradited accused can be tried only on the charges for which extradition is granted. I need hardly remind Your Excellency of my Government's meticulous adherence to its international obligations, repeatedly demonstrated. Moreover, Your Excellency will find, upon examination of the requisition for surrender and its attachments presented to Your Excellency on behalf of my Government, that the charges for which surrender is requisitioned—to which the trial will be confined—are stated with unusual particularity by the Supreme Court of Justice of my country and coincide precisely with those which have been sustained by the courts of Your Excellency's country in the extradition proceedings against the accused. Hence neither Your Excellency's Government nor the accused will have the slightest difficulty in confirming that there is strict compliance at the trial with the limitations of the requisition for surrender and with the treaty guarantee. Moreover, the very exhaustive opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sustaining the determination of the lower court in the extradition proceedings, reviews in detail the evidence found by that Court to sustain the charges in extradition; the very detail of that Court's review of the facts provides most effective assurance that the trial of the accused will be kept within the bounds prescribed by the treaty. I believe there is no other case in any country where such assurance has been so complete.

The attorney's suggestion that the accused would not receive a fair trial betrays unfamiliarity with the legal process provided by the Constitution and procedural code of my country, which includes the right to habeas corpus that had been taken away by the government in office prior to January 1958. The Supreme Court of Justice of my country has plainly decreed that, upon the accused's return, it will determine the court of proper jurisdiction for the trial and this will be done in accordance with established procedure applicable to the specific charges for which extradition is granted. Trial will occur in the regular civil courts in all respects in the regular manner. I am sure that Your Excellency is familiar with the criminal procedure in my country which protects the rights of an accused to a degree that, in important respects, is greater than is true in many other great democracies. Nor is there the least reason to believe that the legal process in my country will take any such extraordinary length of time as has been consumed by the extradition process thus far in this case unless the accused himself prolongs the process by persistent interlocutory appeals and other dilatory measures as defendants in all countries sometimes succeed in doing.

The attorneys' suggestion that the accused would not be able to retain adequate legal assistance in his defense is false. The law of my country assures an

accused the right to counsel of his own choice. It is well known that eminent members of the bar of Venezuela have indicated their willingness to act in the defense of the accused; certain steps to that end, indeed, seem already to have been taken. This is in entire accord with the high tradition of the Venezuelan bar as stated by the former Minister of Justice in an address to the Bar Association in Caracas on January 11, 1963, when he emphasized that it was inconceivable that lawyers should be dissuaded "from lending their professional services in the defense of an accused, whatever may be the nature of the crime or the personality of the accused."

The determination of my Government to protect the right of an accused to full and effective defense is illustrated by an incident involving one of the United States attorneys for the accused in this case. That attorney was permitted to go to my country to investigate the case and was given the privilege of interviewing persons in prison. Unfortunately he exceeded permissible bounds by taking depositions otherwise than in the lawful manner which, in my country as in many others, is a serious offense. It seems that he also made certain provocative statements to the press. As a result an individual member of my country's Congress made a very critical and highly emotional speech in that Congress. But a committee of that Congress, upon investigation of the incident, not only refused to join in the sentiments expressed in the individual's speech but file a report which said:

"The freedom of expression of thought and the right of defense of every accused that the Venezuelan laws guarantee to foreigners and citizens permits statements to be made without any other limit than those established by law.

"The aforesaid statements in the press, attributed to the United States citizen Mr. Moore in his capacity as defense attorney of the extradition defendant, Marcos Perez Jimenez, do not exceed the right of a foreigner to freedom of expression and exercise of the rights of an accused insofar as they express an opinion respecting a judicial proceeding against his client."

I may also point out that Your Excellency is aware of the very effective means at Your Excellency's disposal after the surrender of the accused to assure yourself that he is treated with entire propriety and in strict accordance with the requirements of the treaty and the pertinent inter-governmental obligations.

May I express the hope that Your Excellency will now determine to carry out your Government's treaty obligation in response to my Government's requisition for surrender duly presented two years ago. The courts of Your Excellency's country have pronounced the evidence presented by my Government against the accused to be overwhelming. Nor has the accused attempted even the slightest exculpatory explanation of this evidence at any time, despite the fact that important items of such evidence consisted of his own handwritten memoranda. I feel sure that Your Excellency will find no cause for any further delay in

acting favorably on my Government's requisition as required by the treaty.

It has been a source of great satisfaction to my Government to observe that the courts of Your Excellency's country have firmly rejected the effort made on behalf of the accused to introduce into extradition doctrine some novel and special immunity for one who has held high governmental office. Those courts properly have insisted that no man is above the law. It is solely in vindication of that great principle that my Government has pursued this case in the face of such discouraging procedural obstacles as thus far have been thrown in its way. I am confident that Your Excellency, no less

than the courts of Your Excellency's country, appreciates the vital importance of vindicating that principle and will not permit the foregoing baseless contentions of the accused's attorneys to obscure a principle that must be maintained faithfully if the governments of this hemisphere are to enjoy mutual confidence and their peoples mutual respect.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and distinguished consideration.

E. TEJERA P.

Ambassador of Venezuela

Outer Space: Problems of Law and Power

by Richard N. Gardner

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

At 12 noon on April 22, 1889, President Harrison threw open several million square miles of Government land for settlement in the Oklahoma Territory. Some eager "sooners" sneaked into the territory too soon, but the vast majority crowded along the border. Long lines of trains nosed right up to the starting line. Detachments of cavalry held back the mob until the blast of a bugle at noon sent a wild stampede into the new territory. One train rider—the trains, by the way, had to run at a set speed so their occupants didn't obtain an unfair advantage—described the scene:

I saw excited men jump from the windows of crowded coaches even before the train stopped and rush off to stake out claims in a cornfield that by noon the next day was a busy tent city of 10,000 people.

As one historian quipped: "Within a few hours virtually every tract had one claimant, and most had three or four."

Seventy-four years after this event we find

ourselves on the borders of space. We are now in Year Six of the Space Age, and each month brings more astounding progress in the conquest of outer space. Six years ago an orange-sized object in orbit filled the headlines. Today men live in orbit for days in spacecraft weighing thousands of pounds. Six years ago a vehicle launched hundreds of miles into space was a sensation. In 1962 the United States sent a vehicle to Venus to find out what the planet was like. After 110 days of flight at 15,000 miles per hour the vehicle sent radio impulses 36 million miles back to earth with the following message:

Venus is hot, 800 degrees Fahrenheit. There is heavy cloud cover; it is impossible to see the landscape. The atmosphere contains no oxygen or water. Life as we know it is generally impossible.

Clearly our scientific capacity is permitting us to rush into space with impressive speed. Is our capacity for law and organization in space equal to the challenge? The first sooners, as it were, are already in outer space. Can we avoid a space "stampede" and achieve orderly progress?

¹Address made before the Section on International and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association at Chicago, Ill., on Aug. 10 (press release 413 dated Aug. 9, revised).

Lest anyone take this analogy too literally, I hasten to add that I do not envision a flood of settlers leaving shortly for outer space. Washington is uncomfortable this time of year, but Venus appears to be even more so.

The question of concern to lawyers and diplomats is whether nations as they increase their activities and interests in outer space can develop adequate ground rules to prevent conflicting claims and international violence. These ground rules may be embodied in articulated legal principles. But, especially in the beginning, much of the law of outer space may grow quietly out of the mutual restraints and reciprocal concessions which nations accept tacitly out of enlightened self-interest. Law will also grow out of specific projects of functional cooperation.

Development of Law for Outer Space

When the question is approached from this broad perspective, one sees considerable progress in developing law for outer space:

—General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI)² affirmed that international law, including the U.N. Charter, applies to outer space and celestial bodies and that outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all states and are not subject to national appropriation.

—The members of the U.N., responding to another part of this same resolution, have started an ambitious program of worldwide weather forecasting and research, making use of satellites as well as earth-based instrumentation.³

—U.N. members have also begun, through the International Telecommunication Union, to tackle the technical problems involved in using outer space for telephone, radio, and television communication. Following creation of the U.S. Communications Satellite Corporation, we have begun discussions on the creation of a single global satellite communication system, with wide participation in ownership

and management, and operated so as to realize economic and political benefits to all nations.

—The United States and the Soviet Union have concluded a bilateral agreement⁴ calling for the coordinated launching of weather satellites and the exchange of weather information, the coordinated launching of satellites to map the earth's magnetic field, and cooperative experiments with communication satellites.

This record hardly confirms the view that no law is being made to govern the relations of states in outer space. And yet it is true that the efforts in the U.N. to reach agreement on specific legal principles beyond those contained in Resolution 1721 have so far been in vain.

What has been the cause of the difficulty? Is there any way it can be resolved?

As most of you know, the Soviet Union insists that there can be no further agreement on any legal questions unless and until there is agreement on a comprehensive code of space law along the lines of the Soviet declaration of basic principles.⁵ Thus the drafting of agreements on specific questions such as liability for space vehicle accidents and assistance to and return of space vehicles and their personnel—matters on which a broad consensus already exists—is being held up by the Soviets pending agreement on more controversial political issues.

Until recently the Soviet Union adopted a similar attitude in the test ban negotiations. It refused to consider an agreement to ban tests above ground until a comprehensive ban was achieved embracing underground testing as well. Happily it has now changed its position, and a treaty banning tests above ground has been signed.⁶ The Soviet Union could do much to defrost the cold war if it dropped its all-or-nothing attitude in other fields as well. Cooperation in framing legal principles for outer space would be one good place to start.

The United States would like to conclude international agreements at an early date on both liability and assistance and return. We would also welcome a General Assembly resolution covering the general principles of law

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

³ For background and text of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 14, 1962, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1963, p. 21.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 963.

⁵ For text, see U.N. doc. A/5181 (Annex III, A).

⁶ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314.

which should govern the activities of states in outer space. If there is a willingness on all sides to concentrate on the principles which unite rather than divide us, we can speedily get unanimous agreement for a resolution on general principles at the next General Assembly.

Such a resolution could contain the following elements on which a consensus already exists:

- the freedom of outer space for exploration and use by all states;
- the unavailability of celestial bodies for national appropriation;
- the applicability of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, to relations among states in outer space;
- the retention by the launching authority of jurisdiction over the ownership of space vehicles;
- assistance to astronauts in distress and return of space vehicles and their personnel; and
- liability for injury or damage caused by space vehicle accidents.

Controversial Principles in Soviet Declaration

So much for the principles on which there is general agreement. Let me turn now to the four principles included in the Soviet declaration which cause problems for us and most other members of the United Nations.

First, there is the Soviet principle which would prohibit the use of outer space for "propagating war, national or racial hatred or enmity between nations." The United States is understandably skeptical about discussing this subject in view of the fact that the Soviet Union, after initiating lengthy negotiations on war propaganda in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, refused at the last minute to sign the declaration which had been unanimously agreed upon. We cannot believe the Soviets would let the question of war propaganda stand in the way of agreement if other questions could be resolved.

Second, there is the Soviet principle that space activities shall be carried out "solely and exclusively by States." This provision, which would bar private enterprise from space activities, is an attempt to impose socialist principles on an important sector of human activity and is

an obvious attack on Telstar and our communication satellite legislation. The United States sees no reason why private enterprise should be prevented from flying in space any more than it is from sailing on international waters.

On the other hand, we can certainly reaffirm our view that a state bears international responsibility for its activities in space and for the activities of its nationals. We can also reaffirm that space operations carried on by private parties require government authorization and supervision. A principle phrased along these lines meets the problem of liability and prevents any irresponsible use of outer space by private parties.

Third, there is the Soviet principle that prior discussion and agreement must take place on any measures to be undertaken by a state which "might in any way hinder the exploration or use of outer space for peaceful purposes by other countries." While this provision might appear innocent enough at first glance, it would effectively extend the veto into space.

One can imagine the difficulties that would result from a multilateral clearance system. Space exploration could be slowed down or halted entirely by red tape or political obstructionism. We cannot accept a Soviet veto over anything we do in space.

The partial test ban has eliminated testing in outer space from the list of issues to which this Soviet principle is addressed. On the potentially harmful effects of other space experiments some agreement may be possible. We are prepared to support the principle that a state should undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with a space activity if it has reason to believe that its activity may create a significant risk of harm.

Such a principle would be in accord with existing U.S. practice, as reflected in the handling of our West Ford experiment.⁷ Project West Ford placed a large number of tiny filaments in a short-lived orbital belt around the earth. The purpose was to determine the feasi-

⁷For text of a letter dated June 6, 1963, from Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson to the U.N. Secretary-General regarding Project West Ford, see *ibid.*, July 15, 1963, p. 104.

bility of using such filaments as passive reflectors to relay communications.

Project West Ford was carefully considered in advance by both the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences. The full details of the experiment were made known well in advance to all interested scientists from other countries. While some expressed concern, there was no serious scientific objection to the experiment on the grounds that it would impede radio astronomy or other scientific research.

West Ford is now almost 3 months old, and to date there has not been a single report of interference or damage to space activities and experiments. The results of the West Ford experiment will be distributed for the information and use of the international scientific community.

Fourth, there is the Soviet principle that the collection of intelligence from space is "incompatible with the objectives of mankind in its conquest of outer space." The fact is, of course, that observation and photography from outer space are consistent with international law and the U.N. Charter, as are observation and photography from the high seas. Moreover, space observation can contribute to the reduction of the risk of war by accident or miscalculation inherent in dealings with a closed society. Observation from space may some day help the United Nations to monitor an armistice or patrol a border. It may play a part in the verification of a disarmament agreement. Even Premier Khrushchev, according to C. L. Sulzberger in the New York *Times* of July 15, admits that satellites can be used for disarmament inspection.

Quite apart from the undesirability of banning observation from space for military purposes, it is becoming increasingly difficult to make meaningful distinctions on this subject. Major Gordon Cooper believed he could distinguish roads, fires, and even his own home while he was in orbit. Equipped with a spyglass and a Brownie camera, could Major Cooper be classified as a reconnaissance satellite? What about the Soviet astronauts who were members of the Red Air Force and carried

cameras when they passed over U.S. territory? What about satellites for mapping and weather observation?

Clearly all these forms of observation from space are legally permissible and socially desirable. We cannot agree to any principle which casts doubt on this proposition.

Military Uses of Outer Space

This brings me naturally to some concluding remarks about the military uses of outer space. It should be obvious that the attempt to build peaceful space cooperation and a regime of law for outer space does not eliminate the need for military space programs to maintain the security of the United States and the entire free world. There is no inconsistency in moving simultaneously on both fronts. For the foreseeable future, we need military space programs to help keep the peace and civilian space programs to help us live better in peace.

The test of the legitimacy of a particular use of outer space is not whether it is military or nonmilitary but whether it is peaceful or aggressive. Russian cosmonauts are members of the Soviet Air Force, but this is no reason to challenge their activities. There is, in any event, no workable dividing line between military and nonmilitary uses of space. A navigational satellite in outer space can guide a submarine as well as a merchant ship. Thus the United States has military space programs, but all of our space activities will continue to be for peaceful, i.e. nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes.

Space is not a new subject—only a new place where all the old subjects come up. Whether we are speaking of meteorology, communications, or military uses, the things that take place in space are inextricably bound up with the things that take place on the surface of the earth. Those people are living in a dream world who think that space can be wrapped up in a nice new sanitary package and insulated from terrestrial reality.

In the interest of the security of the free world the United States cannot refrain unilaterally from all military activities in space until military activities on earth have been regulated by disarmament agreements. When the mili-

tary problems on earth are solved, the military problems in space will be solved: They are part of the same problem.

Avoiding an Arms Race in Space

This does not mean that nothing can be done to save outer space from the arms race on earth with all its dangerous features. On the contrary, if we cannot insulate space completely from earthly tensions, we may at least be able to prevent a stampede of space weapons into orbit.

Today both the United States and the Soviet Union have the capacity to place thermonuclear weapons in orbit. But, according to the best military advice available, there is now no rational military purpose in doing so. To put it another way, any purely military advantage that might be gained by either side from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit could now be achieved with less cost through alternative weapons systems—hardened ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles] or missile-firing submarines.

To be sure, the deployment of a thermonuclear weapon in orbit would have a serious political and psychological effect. If international tensions are to be reduced and world peace assured, it is necessary that countries refrain from making use of terror weapons of this kind.

The United States, for all these reasons, has no intention of placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit unless compelled to do so by actions of the Soviet Union. We earnestly hope that the Soviet Union will likewise refrain from taking steps that will extend the arms race into outer space.

Some critics have charged that statements to this effect by American leaders are tantamount to unilateral disarmament in outer space. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Such critics have failed to distinguish between preparation and deployment. What we are saying is that we hope to avoid an arms race in space and will not precipitate one ourselves. We are not saying that we are neglecting preparations in the event that our hopes are disappointed. On the contrary, the United States is taking measures to insure that we will

be in a position, if need be, to deal with threats to our security from outer space.

For the record you might like to know that the budget for fiscal year 1962 included \$1.1 billion for military space projects. For the fiscal year just ended, this amount was raised 36 percent to \$1.5 billion. These figures do not include expenditures on fundamental research done by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In addition to these amounts, a considerable portion of the Pentagon's research and development budget—a proposed 20 percent for this fiscal year—is devoted to the military uses of outer space.

In outer space, as on earth, the conduct of American diplomacy requires the coordinated use of law and power. Those who emphasize the one without the other do no service to the national security of the United States.

Air Transport Agreement With Mexico Extended

Joint Statement

Press release 424 dated August 14

Delegations of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States have now concluded the negotiations which began in Mexico City on July 22, 1963,¹ to consider the air transport agreement² which was signed in 1960 and which is due to expire on August 14, 1963.

Following a thorough study of actual experience under the agreement, the two Governments, by an exchange of notes, have extended the agreement for 1 year.

The talks which have resulted in the understanding mentioned herein were conducted in the same spirit of friendship and desire for close cooperation which have marked previous discussions between the two Governments on civil aviation matters of mutual interest.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 27, 1963, p. 840.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4675.

EEC: A Federation in the Making

by *Andreas F. Lowenfeld*
*Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs*¹

That the whole is equal to the sum of its parts may be an acceptable maxim for the mathematician. Not so for the lawyer, economist, or political scientist. The European Economic Community exists to fashion from six separate states and economies something more than the sum of its parts. Whether the goal is quite so ambitious as to the American version of the maxim *e pluribus unum*, we cannot yet tell. But the goal—a single economic area governed by a single set of rules—is an ambitious one. Its achievement depends ultimately upon the political, social, and economic currents at work in Europe today, and upon the extent to which these currents can overcome the conflicting traditions not faced by our own founding fathers.

There are three European communities, the European Economic Community, EURATOM (the European Atomic Energy Community), and the European Coal and Steel Community. The three are part of a single historical progression. They share, in part, common institutions. Although I will focus today on the organizational structure of the EEC, that structure can only be understood as part of a broader institutional framework.

In 1950 French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman made his now-famous proposal to place French and German coal and steel under a common authority. This proposal led to the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1951, which set up a European Coal and Steel Community. The

builders of a united Europe received a setback when the European Defense Community, modeled in large part on the Coal and Steel Community, failed of ratification. But economic integration had proved its value, and it was on the momentum of the Coal and Steel Community that the builders of a united Europe were able to proceed. In 1957, 6 years after the Treaty of Paris and 3 years after the EDC had been rejected, the Rome treaties were signed. By article 1 of the treaty, "the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Economic Community."

Organizational Structure of the Community

Following in general the organizational structure of the Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome creates four organs for the management and governance of Europe's economic activity—the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliamentary Assembly, and the Court of Justice. Under the treaty, and a related convention, the parliament and the Court of Justice of the EEC supersede those of the Coal and Steel Community and serve all three communities.

Thus, although the EEC, EURATOM, and the Coal and Steel Community are created and governed by separate charters and have separate executive organs, they share in common a parliament and a court. In addition, they have joint legal, statistical, and press and information services.

Executive authority for the EEC is lodged in the Commission and the Council of Ministers. This authority is of great importance and illustrates the supranational character of the

¹ Address made before a joint session of the Sections on Corporation, Banking, and Business Law and International and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association at Chicago, Ill., on Aug. 12 (press release 414).

Community. Decisions of the Commission or the Council are directly binding in the territory of member states and do not need to be implemented by national legislation. The Community can issue regulations and orders directed to private persons and firms, its investigators and inspectors have direct access to the books of private firms, and it may impose fines or infringement of its regulations.

The Commission consists of nine persons appointed for 4-year terms by the governments of the member states "acting in common agreement." By the terms of the charter they are required to be of "indisputable independence" and to perform their duties as servants of the Community. States are obligated to respect this independence.

While the Rome Treaty is silent on the organization of the Commission, in fact each of the Commissioners is assigned certain responsibilities, somewhat like a cabinet minister. Thus one Commissioner is charged with agricultural policy, another with competition, another with external trade, and so on. Each major area has a directorate-general headed by a senior civil servant, who in turn supervises the work of a number of directors and their staffs. The Commissioners themselves, while independent of their national governments and servants of the Community, are clearly political, as contrasted with civil service, officers.

The Commission has two major tasks. First, it initiates actions and draws up proposals for the Council of Ministers, much as our executive branch does. Second, the Commission is charged with insuring the proper execution of the treaty and of decisions taken by organs of the Community. It can issue regulations and directives addressed to private businesses and individuals as well as to governments. And it can call both governments and individuals to account for failing to fulfill their obligations under the treaty.

The second branch of the executive is the Council of Ministers, comprised of one minister from each member state. It is the only organ of the Community whose members represent governments. The primary function of the Council is to pass on proposals of the Commission. It does so in most cases by weighted voting, France, Germany, and Italy having

four votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands two each, and Luxembourg one vote. Proposals of the Commission can in general be accepted or rejected by a qualified majority, normally 12 of the 17 votes assigned, but they can be modified only by unanimous vote. This gives the Commission considerable leverage in getting its proposals accepted since the Council is often faced with the alternatives of accepting them or leaving the problems unsolved. In practice the Commission often serves as mediator between member states in the Council, modifying its own proposals until it can secure a qualified majority for accepting them. On the other hand, as the recent poultry negotiations with the United States have shown,² the Commission may consider that its authority in a particular matter is limited and may go to the Council of Ministers for authorization to take certain actions.

Many fundamental matters require a unanimous vote in the Council, although the treaty provides for the progressive elimination of the veto. For example, article 101 directs the Commission to consult with member states whenever a disparity between their legislative or administrative provisions "distorts the conditions of competition." If the consultations fail to resolve the problem the Council is empowered to issue directives to the states concerned. The exercise of this power required unanimous vote during the first of the three transition stages but now requires only a qualified majority.

This brief description necessarily oversimplifies the relationship between the Commission and the Council. By the terms of the charter, neither is subordinate to the other and they jointly dispose of the decisionmaking power of the Community. The treaty leaves vague the details of their collaboration, providing only that it shall be settled "by mutual agreement."

European Parliamentary Assembly

The third organ is the European Parliamentary Assembly, composed of 142 parliamentarians, 36 each from Germany, France, and

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1963, p. 996.

Italy, 14 each from Belgium and the Netherlands, and 6 from Luxembourg. The parliamentarians are now elected by, and from the membership of, national parliaments, but eventually they will be elected by direct universal suffrage. The parliament has already drawn up a draft agreement of 23 articles providing for European elections, but this agreement has yet to receive the unanimous approval of member states.

Even though they are now appointed by and from national legislatures, the parliamentarians are not national representatives. The treaty refers to them as "representatives of the peoples of the States united within the Community." They arrange themselves along party and political lines, rather than in national groups. And the rules of procedure of the parliament provide for the formation of supranational political parties. These parties, of which there are several, have permanent secretariats, are financed in part by Community funds, and correspond to the major political parties in Europe.

On paper the parliament has only one significant power. It can, by a two-thirds vote, censure the Commission and oust its members. In a variety of ways, however, the parliament has made itself a more important body than the treaty suggests. It has, for example, an elaborately developed committee structure, with 13 standing committees. And it has put to good use its right to propose oral and written questions to the Commission and the Council. In part the significance of the parliament lies simply in the fact it exists and that some day it may form a significant element of a Europe unified politically as well as economically.

Court of Justice

The importance of the fourth institution—the Court of Justice—will not surprise the American lawyer, though it seems to have surprised some European observers not so familiar with the problems of federalism and economic regulation by a central organization. The Court is composed of seven judges appointed for 6-year terms, again "by the Governments of Member States acting in common agreement." The judges must be qualified for the

highest judicial office in their respective countries or be jurists of recognized competence. The statute of the Court, which is a protocol to the Rome Treaty, provides that the Court's deliberations "shall be and shall remain secret." Following the continental legal tradition, this has been interpreted as precluding dissenting opinions. Hearings of the Court are public, and the judgments of the Court must be supported by a statement of reasons and must be read in open court.

Two advocates-general assist the Court. Their function is to act as a friend of the court, that is to present reasoned opinions to the Court on all issues of law raised by a case, whether or not these issues have been argued by the parties. The advocates-general participate in proceedings before the Court but not in its deliberations. The Court is, of course, free to disregard the conclusions of the advocates-general.

In contrast to the International Court of Justice, the Community court exercises compulsory jurisdiction. Its writ extends to member states, to organs of the Community, and to individuals. Judgments of the Court are enforceable against member states, and judgments and orders against individuals are to be enforced with the aid of instrumentalities of the member states.

The Commission can summon a member state before the Court for failing to fulfill its obligations under the treaty. So can another member state. Under article 171 of the Rome Treaty,

If the Court of Justice finds that a Member State has failed to fulfil any of its obligations under this Treaty, such State shall take the measures required for the implementation of the judgment of the Court.

On the other hand, an organ of the Community, or any natural or legal person with an interest in an action or decision of the Council or the Commission (including a failure to act), can secure judicial review of such actions by the Commission or Council. The Court's jurisdiction also extends to civil actions for damages against the Community, to arbitration in which the Community is a party, and to disputes concerning employees of the Community.

Finally, the Court has a federal-question jurisdiction similar to that of our Supreme

Court, although it is exercised in a somewhat different manner. In addition to its original jurisdiction over questions concerning the interpretation of the treaty, the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community, and the interpretation of statutes of any bodies established by the Council, the Court may render preliminary decisions for use in municipal proceedings when any such question is raised. Under article 177 lower national courts may refer such questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary decision. But any domestic court or tribunal from whose decisions no appeal lies under domestic law must refer such questions to the Court, prior to the rendering of its own final judgment. Thus the procedure is the reverse of ours, presumably to avoid the embarrassment of appeal from the highest court of a sovereign state. But the function is the same. The Community court sees to it that the treaties are applied in a uniform manner.

How the Common Market Works

In this assembly of lawyers it seems appropriate to discuss in some detail at least one case, which has been the subject of much comment and which sheds a good deal of light on the way the Common Market works.

Bosch, the well-known German automotive and appliance manufacturer, had since 1903 had an agreement with a Dutch company, van Rijn, whereby van Rijn had exclusive rights to sell all of Bosch's products in the Netherlands. In order to safeguard this right and similar arrangements with other countries, Bosch had agreed to include in every sales contract within Germany a condition that the product sold could not be directly or indirectly exported without the written consent of Bosch.

In the years 1959 and 1960—i.e. after the effective date of the Rome Treaty but before the regulations under the antitrust articles had been issued—defendant imported Bosch refrigerators into the Netherlands, apparently from a firm in Germany selling the refrigerators in violation of its contract with Bosch. Bosch and van Rijn thereupon brought suit in Holland against the Dutch importer, seeking, in effect, damages and an injunction. Defendant admitted the essential facts but said that the

action was based on a contract contrary to the Common Market treaty, in particular to article 85 prohibiting any agreements "which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market." Under article 85(2) "Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be null and void." Therefore, said the defendant, no action can lie against him based on the contract made by Bosch with van Rijn or with the German purchaser.

The District Court in Rotterdam found for plaintiffs, on the grounds that articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty were not self-executing—i.e. they could not have the effect of annulling a contract between private parties without the promulgation of rules by the Commission. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals in The Hague ruled that the question should be referred to the Community court. Plaintiffs petitioned to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands to quash the judgment of referral and then argued to the Community court that it could not decide the question because the judgment of the Hague court was not final. Briefs were submitted by the parties and also by the EEC Commission and the Governments of France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

The Community court held first that it did have jurisdiction. Article 177, as it said, was designed precisely for questions referred by a domestic court prior to final judgment. The Court also rejected a contention by the French Government that it had no jurisdiction since the regulations under article 87 had not yet been issued and therefore the Commission still had exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation of the competition articles.

On the merits the Court decided (contrary, incidentally, to the argument of the advocate-general) that articles 85 and 86 were not directly effective in the absence of the issuance of the Commission's regulations and proceedings thereunder. The Court said that the treaty contemplated restrictive arrangements which would be permissible and that a contrary ruling would have the intolerable consequence that an arrangement that had been annulled could subsequently be declared valid. As to the question

of whether the particular arrangements would be in violation of article 85, which the Netherlands court had also asked, the Court of Justice said only that it would not exclude the possibility but would not now rule on the question.

I do not propose here to discuss the correctness of the decision or what, if anything, it portends for the implementation of antitrust law in the Community. I think the case is interesting, however, not only for what it shows about the relation between the Court and the Community but for what it shows about the role of the Commission and about the problems of applying general principles of economic regulation to specific cases.

Barriers to Trade

In discussing the Common Market in this country we think generally of common external tariffs and internal tariff reductions. But tariffs are only the first step. If the aim of the Common Market is to avoid the distorting effects of national boundaries and to "promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities" (article 2), it is evident that a great many other matters besides tariffs become subjects of common concern. Cartel policy, of course, has been the subject of much Community activity, particularly in the area of coal and steel, and we are told this will increase steadily. But once these obvious forms of distorting factors have been dealt with, other factors of economic life emerge as significant barriers to international trade.

Freight rates, for example, can distort competitive patterns. In at least one instance the Community was seriously concerned over a situation in which rates for coal from the Ruhr to steel manufacturing plants in Germany were lower than the comparable rates from the Ruhr to steel plants in France. Varying national taxes, particularly the turnover or value-added taxes of which the Europeans are so fond, could distort competitive positions resulting from the removal of tariff barriers. Tax policy in turn cannot rationally be formulated without some attention to monetary and fiscal policy. All of these matters are under study by the Commission and by working parties throughout the six countries.

It is difficult to know where this trend will end. For example, as goods, capital, and credit can move freely among the six countries, what about the movement of labor? Speculation about the extent of this development is both beyond my competence and beyond the scope of this discussion. I do want to point out, however, that the above examples suggest an inevitable interaction of economic and political consequences and a gradual narrowing of the field of choice for the member states. If, for instance, not only tariffs but tax rates and policies, interest rates, and economic growth in general are governed by Community decisions, what will be the issues in elections in the member states? I do not, of course, suggest that there will be no issues. But it seems not too farfetched to suggest that something like the diminution of the area of control experienced by our own States vis-a-vis the Federal Government will be experienced by the members of the Community.

With this development, the Court, as arbiter of the state-Community relationship, is bound to assume increasing importance. Our own case law under the commerce clause demonstrates that economic and political problems are not easily detached from the mainstream of political and social life. While the analogous provisions to our own commerce clause are at once more limited and more detailed, it is interesting to note that the Rome Treaty has its own "necessary and proper" clause. Article 23 says:

If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the functioning of the Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in cases where this Treaty has not provided for the requisite power of action, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote in a proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions.

We can expect, I think, that the importance of the Supreme Court in our country, which always surprises continental observers, will surprise them less and less. Already they are beginning to see that a decision agreed to by the Community and, through the Council, by all of the member countries may hurt individual whose own government will not provide them with a remedy. But the Community's Court

of Justice will hear their cases and may provide direct relief.

In recent months the Common Market has not enjoyed quite the glamor and elation which we had witnessed in the past few years. The primary reason, of course, was the French veto last January of British membership in the Community. Aside from this rather blunt act, and perhaps not unconnected with it, the Market has seen uncertainty in the movement toward a common agricultural policy, problems with harmonization of transportation rules, and in general a leveling in the growth rate both in economic production and in institutional development.

But since 1959, trade among the member states has increased 73 percent, trade between the Common Market and the rest of the world has increased 27 percent, and the gross national product of the Community has increased by 24 percent. We have already seen in the preliminary skirmishes prior to the "Kennedy Round" of tariff negotiations that the Six are a powerful bargaining unit and can wield an influence comparable only to our own. The Community is already too intertwined to be unraveled even if the members wished to do so, and there is no reasonable expectation that they will.

Perhaps I have strayed somewhat from the stated topic, which was the organization of the Community. But even in its short life, it seems to me, the Community has achieved its own dynamism, and its organization cannot be discussed meaningfully without saying something of its movement and direction. In closing, I can do no better than to quote the description of the European Community given by the Chairman of the EEC Commission in a recent speech at Columbia. "The European Community," in the words of Professor [Walter] Hallstein, "is not just a new power bloc or a new coalition. It is not . . . just the magnification of 19th-century nationalism to a more than national scale. It is the embodiment of a new method and a new approach to the relations between states. . . . While it is not some brand of 'Instant Federalism,' it is an attempt to build on a federal pattern a democratically constituted Europe. Essentially, the Community may be described as a federation in the making."

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at Boston

The Department of State announced on August 8 (press release 410) that it will hold its next regional foreign policy conference at Boston on September 11 with the cooperation of the Boston World Affairs Council. Representatives of the press, radio, television, and nongovernmental organizations concerned with foreign policy, and community and business leaders from the six New England States are being invited to participate.

This will be the eleventh in the series of regional conferences which began in July 1961 at San Francisco and Denver. The purpose of these regional meetings is to provide an opportunity for senior Government officials who carry responsibility for foreign policy to meet with community leaders, media representatives, and other interested persons to explore in depth and exchange views on matters of current import in world affairs.

Officials of the Government participating in the conference will be W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Frank M. Coffin, Deputy Administrator for Operations, Agency for International Development; Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; Mrs. Katie Louchheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; and Mose L. Harvey, a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State.

Letters of Credence

Pakistan

The newly appointed Ambassador of Pakistan, Ghulam Ahmed, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on August 13. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 419 dated August 13.

Conference on Export Expansion Called by President

The White House announced on August 15 that a national conference on export expansion will be held at Washington September 17 and 18 to spur the sales of American goods abroad. President Kennedy will address the opening session on September 17.

Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges will preside. Vice chairmen of the conference will be Neil C. Hurley, Jr., chairman, National Export Expansion Council, and chairman of the board and president, Thor Power Tool Company; Fred C. Foy, honorary chairman, National Export Expansion Council, and chairman

of the board, Koppers Company, Inc.; and Thomas J. Watson, Jr., chairman of the board, International Business Machines. Over 200 business leaders have been invited to participate. A Federal interagency committee under the direction of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Under Secretary of Commerce, is organizing the conference.

Other speakers include Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, Ambassador Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and Senator Warren G. Magnuson, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Scheduled September Through November 1963

U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Tungsten: Working Group	New York	Sept. 2-
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 14th Session	Port Moresby, Papua	Sept. 5-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee	Geneva	Sept. 9-
GATT Action Committee	Geneva	Sept. 9-
FAO Group on Coconut and Coconut Products: 5th Session	Rome	Sept. 9-
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space	New York	Sept. 9-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Extraordinary Session	London	Sept. 10-
U.N. Human Rights Seminar on the Status of Women in Family Law.	Bogotá	Sept. 10-
52d Conference of the Interparliamentary Union	Belgrade	Sept. 12-
GATT Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration	Geneva	Sept. 16-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 8th Session.	Bangkok	Sept. 16-
5th FAO Conference on Wood Technology	Madison, Wis	Sept. 16-
IMCO Council: 9th Session	London	Sept. 16-
Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.	Tokyo	Sept. 16-

¹Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 13, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

U.N. General Assembly: 18th Session	New York	Sept. 17-
CAO Limited Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Bangkok	Sept. 17-
2th Pan American Child Congress	Buenos Aires	Sept. 23-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.	Washington	Sept. 23-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee	Geneva	Sept. 23-
AEA General Conference: 7th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 23-
TU CCITT Working Parties of Study Group IV	Geneva	Sept. 24-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: Symposium on the Measurement of Abundance of Fish Stocks.	Madrid	Sept. 25-
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 10th Session.	Geneva	Sept. 30-
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 9th Session	Bangkok	Sept. 30-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 51st Statutory Meeting.	Madrid	Sept. 30-
LO Technical Conference on Employment Policy	Geneva	Sept. 30-
Caribbean Organization Council: 4th Meeting	San Juan	September
IAHO Executive Committee: 49th Meeting	Washington	September
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification	Geneva	September
4th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	September
U.N. Conference on Cocoa	Geneva	September
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 3d Session.	Paris	September
ECD Ministers of Science	Paris	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 21st Session	Geneva	Oct. 7-
CEM Executive Committee: 22d Session	Geneva	Oct. 7-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payment Restrictions	Geneva	Oct. 7-
TU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference To Allocate Frequency Bands for Space Radiocommunication Purposes.	Geneva	Oct. 7-
CEM Council: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 14-
MCO Assembly: 3d Session	London	Oct. 16-
1th Pan American Railway Congress	México, D.F	Oct. 18-
U.N. ECE Committee on Trade	Geneva	Oct. 21-
IRPI: Committee of Experts on Problems of Less Developed Countries in Field of Industrial Property.	Geneva	Oct. 21-
U.N. ECA Conference on African Electric Power Problems	Addis Ababa	Oct. 21-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 21-
PU Consultative Committee on Postal Studies: Management Council.	Washington	Oct. 28-
CAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 3d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 28-
CAO Visual Aids Panel: 3d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 28-
MCO Council: 10th Session	London	Oct. 29-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 15th Meeting.	Bangkok	Oct. 31-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 7th Session	Geneva	October
South Pacific Commission: 25th Session	Nouméa	October
IMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 4th Session	Vienna	October
A-ECOSOC: 2d Regular Annual Meeting at the Expert Level.	São Paulo	October
A-ECOSOC: 2d Regular Annual Meeting at the Ministerial Level.	São Paulo	October
ECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Growth).	Paris	Nov. 4-
U.N./FAO Intergovernmental Committee on the World Food Program: 4th Session.	Rome	Nov. 4-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Nov. 4-
GO Governing Body: 157th Session (and its committees)	Geneva	Nov. 4-
TU CCITT Working Party of Study Groups V and XV	Geneva	Nov. 6-
AO Council: 41st Session	Rome	Nov. 11-
U.N. ECE Iron and Steel Symposium	Prague	Nov. 11-
TU CCITT Study Group V (Protection)	Geneva	Nov. 11-
TU CCITT Working Party of Study Group XV (Transmission Systems).	Geneva	Nov. 11-
AO Conference: 12th Session	Rome	Nov. 16-
MCO Working Group on Tonnage Measurement	London	Nov. 18-
CAO Panel of Teletypewriter Specialists: 5th Meeting	Montreal	Nov. 18-
WHO/FAO/IAEA Seminar on the Protection of the Public in the Event of Radiation Accidents.	Geneva	Nov. 18-
ECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 19-
CAO Meteorology/Operation Division	Paris	Nov. 19-
GATT Contracting Parties: 21st Session	Geneva	Nov. 21-
TU CCIR/CCITT Plan Committee for the Development of the International Network.	Rome	Nov. 25-
CAO Airworthiness Committee: 6th Session	Montreal or Paris	November
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 10th Meeting.	Vancouver	November

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letter dated July 9, 1963, from the representative of the U.S.S.R. addressed to the President of the Security Council regarding the situation in northern Iraq, S/5345, July 9, 1963, 2 pp., and S/5345/Corr. 1, July 10, 1963, 1 p.; letter dated July 10, 1963, from the representative of Iraq in reply, S/5346, July 10, 1963, 2 pp.

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting to the Security Council the report of the Trusteeship Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands covering the period from July 17, 1962 to June 26, 1963. S/5340. July 11, 1963. 62 pp.

Letter dated July 19, 1963, addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitting the Committee's report on territories under Portuguese administration (A/5446/Add.1). S/5356. July 19, 1963. 89 pp.

Letter dated July 23, 1963, from the deputy representative of Spain addressed to the President of the Security Council regarding an assertion made by the representative of the U.S.S.R. concerning the presence of Spanish troops in Portuguese territory, S/5369, July 24, 1963, 1 p.; and letter dated July 25 from the deputy representative of the U.S.S.R. in reply, S/5371, July 25, 1963, 1 p.

Letter dated July 1, 1963, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Haiti addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting a copy of a memorandum from the Haitian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States regarding a report of the OAS committee responsible for studying the dispute between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. S/5374. July 26, 1963. 14 pp.

General Assembly

United Nations Conference on Consular Relations. Guide to the Draft Articles on Consular Relations adopted by the International Law Commission. A/CONF.25/5. January 8, 1963. 170 pp.

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories. Summaries of information transmitted to the Secretary-General for 1961 on African and adjacent territories. A/5401. March 12, 1963. 254 pp.

International Law Commission:

Digest of Decisions of National Courts Relating to Succession of States and Governments. A/CN.4/157. April 18, 1963. 140 pp.

Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock. A/CN.4/156/Add.2, April 30, 1963, 23 pp., and A/CN.4/156/Add.3, June 5, 1963. 4 pp.

Question of Extended Participation in General Multilateral Treaties Concluded Under the Auspices of the League of Nations. Report by Sir Humphrey Waldock. A/CN.4/162. June 25, 1963. 14 pp.

Addendum to First Report on Relations Between States and Intergovernmental Organizations by Abdullah El-Erian. A/CN.4/161/Add. 1. June 2, 1963. 4 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Letter dated June 6, 1963, from the U.S. representative addressed to the Secretary-General regarding Project West Ford. A/AC/105/15. June 7, 1963. 7 pp.

The Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Letters addressed to the Secretary-General from representatives of various countries regarding General Assembly Resolution 1761 (XVII): Byelorussian S.S.R., A/5427, June 7, 1963, 2 pp.; Cameroon, A/5449, July 19, 1963, 3 pp.; Costa Rica, A/5425, June 6, 1963, 2 pp.; Czechoslovakia (note verbale), A/5451, July 19, 1963, 2 pp.; India (note verbale), A/5452, July 19, 1963, 6 pp.; Poland, A/5439, July 16, 1963, 2 pp.; Ukrainian S.S.R. (note verbale), A/5424, June 6, 1963, 2 pp.

Second Interim Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. A/5453. July 19, 1963. 53 pp.

Views on payment of arrears in financial contributions. Letter dated June 10, 1963, from the representative of the U.S.S.R. addressed to the Secretary-General. A/5431, June 11, 1963, 3 pp.; note verbale dated June 17, 1963 from the representative of Czechoslovakia addressed to the Secretary-General, A/5433, June 20, 1963, 3 pp.

Constitutions, Electoral Laws and Other Legal Instruments Relating to the Political Rights of Women. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. A/5456. July 24, 1963. 47 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Law of the Sea

Convention on fishing and conservation of living resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 28, 1958.¹

Ratification deposited: Venezuela, July 10, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.¹

Signatures affixed at Washington: Iceland, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, August 12, 1963; Costa Rica, Iraq, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, August 13, 1963; Algeria, Burma, Japan, Pakistan, August 14, 1963; Paraguay, August 15, 1963; Colombia, Libya, Venezuela, August 16, 1963.

¹ Not in force.

Patents

Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of invention relating to defense and for which applications for patents have been made. Done at Paris September 21, 1960. Entered into force January 12, 1961. TIAS 4672.

Ratification deposited: Greece, August 15, 1963.

Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, July 3, 1963.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Accession deposited: Liechtenstein, July 25, 1963.

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952, with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.

Notification of approval: Liberia, May 20, 1963.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

Notifications of approval: Liberia, May 20, 1963; Mali, April 26, 1963.

Trade

Protocol for the accession of Spain to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 30, 1963.

Acceptance: Spain, July 30, 1963.

Enters into force: August 29, 1963.

Women—Political Rights

Inter-American convention on the granting of political rights to women. Done at Bogotá May 2, 1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949.¹

Ratification deposited: Paraguay, August 5, 1963.

BILATERAL

Dominican Republic

Agricultural commodity agreement. Signed at Washington August 13, 1963. Entered into force August 13, 1963.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement extending the agreement of August 2, 1955, as extended (TIAS 3464, 4062, 4490, 4854), relating to the lease of air navigation equipment. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn July 1 and 24, 1963. Entered into force July 24, 1963.

Viet-Nam

Agreement supplementing the agreement of November 5, 1957 (TIAS 3932), so as to provide for additional investment guaranties authorized by new U.S. legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon August 8, 1963. Entered into force August 8, 1963.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

M. Carl Walske as scientific attaché to the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations at Paris, effective August 12. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 421 dated August 13.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of July 29, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara November 21, 1962. Entered into force November 21, 1962. TIAS 5235. 3 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Nigeria. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lagos August 28 and December 24, 1962. Entered into force December 24, 1962. TIAS 5237. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Greece—Signed at Athens October 22, 1962. Entered into force October 22, 1962. With related letter. TIAS 5238. 7 pp. 10¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with the Ivory Coast. Exchange of notes—Signed at Abidjan December 1, 1961. Entered into force December 1, 1961. TIAS 5242. 5 pp. 5¢.

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan, amending and extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kabul September 25 and November 7, 1962. Entered into force November 7, 1962. TIAS 5243. 3 pp. 5¢.

Aviation—Continued Application of Certain Agreements to Scheduled Services Between the United States and Jamaica. Agreement with Jamaica. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kingston October 25 and November 29, 1962. Entered into force November 29, 1962. TIAS 5244. 3 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with India. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi November 13 and 21, 1962. Entered into force November 21, 1962. Operative retroactively December 20, 1961. TIAS 5247. 4 pp. 5¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Protocol for the accession of Portugal to the agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force with respect to the United States July 1, 1962. TIAS 5248. 67 pp. 25¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Protocol for the accession of Israel to the agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force with respect to the United States and Israel July 5, 1962. TIAS 5249. 68 pp. 25¢.

Indian Ocean Expedition—International Meteorological Centre. Agreement with India. Exchange of notes—Dated at New Delhi September 28 and October 5 and 9, 1962. Entered into force October 9, 1962. Operative retroactively October 1, 1962. TIAS 5262. 3 pp. 5¢.

Reciprocal Trade. Agreement with Switzerland, modifying Schedule I of the agreement of January 9, 1936, as modified. Exchanges of notes—Signed at Geneva and Bern January 18 and December 20 and 28, 1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963. TIAS 5264. 6 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Furnishing of Articles and Services. Agreement with Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima December 17 and 20, 1962. Entered into force December 20, 1962. TIAS 5265. 4 pp. 5¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Procès-Verbal extending the Declaration on the Provisional Accession of Argentina to the agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Geneva November 7, 1962. Entered into force for the United States January 1, 1963. TIAS 5266. 6 pp. 5¢.

Trade—United States Compensatory Concessions Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Agreement with Japan. Signed at Geneva December 31, 1962. Entered into force December 31, 1962. TIAS 5267. 4 pp. 5¢.

Trade—United States Compensatory Concessions Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Agreement with United Kingdom. Signed at Geneva December 10, 1962. Entered into force December 10, 1962. TIAS 5268. 6 pp. 5¢.

Trade. Interim agreement with Spain, relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva December 31, 1962. Entered into force December 31, 1962. TIAS 5269. 21 pp. 15¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Jamaica. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kingston December 11, 1962 and January 4, 1963. Entered into force January 4, 1963. TIAS 5270. 5 pp. 5¢.

Visas—Waiver of Fingerprinting Requirements for Nonimmigrant Visas. Agreement with Cyprus. Exchange of notes—Signed at Nicosia July 11, 1962 and January 11, 1963. TIAS 5271. 2 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Extension of Loan of Vessel. Agreement with Norway. Exchange of notes—Signed at Oslo November 8, 1962 and January 14, 1963. Entered into force January 14, 1963. TIAS 5272. 2 pp. 5¢.

Narcotic Drugs—Limitation and Regulation of Poppy Plant Cultivation and Production of, Trade in, and Use of Opium. Protocol with other Governments. Done at New York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5273. 89 pp. 30¢.

Antarctica—Measures in Furtherance of Principles and Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Recommendations adopted at the second consultative meeting under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, at Buenos Aires, July 28, 1962. Effective January 11, 1963. TIAS 5274. 5 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Loan of Vessel. Agreement with Pakistan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi January 15 and 16, 1963. Entered into force January 16, 1963. TIAS 5275. 5 pp. 5¢.

Meteorological Research—Projects in Barbados. Agreement with United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bridgetown January 7 and 15, 1963. Entered into force January 15, 1963. TIAS 5276. 3 pp. 5¢.

Whaling. Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention—Signed at Washington on December 2, 1946. Adopted at the fourteenth meeting of the International Whaling Commission, London, July 6, 1962. Entered into force October 9, 1962. TIAS 5277. 1 p. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Trinidad and Tobago. Exchange of notes—Signed at Port-of-Spain January 8 and 15, 1963. Entered into force January 15, 1963. TIAS 5278. 5 pp. 5¢.

Visas—Waiver of Visa Fees for Performing Artists and Groups. Agreement with Poland. Exchange of notes—Dated at Warsaw December 17, 1962 and January 21, 1963. Entered into force January 21, 1963. TIAS 5279. 2 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 12-18

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to August 12 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 410 of August 8 and 413 of August 9.

No.	Date	Subject
414	8/12	Lowenfeld: American Bar Association.
*415	8/12	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*416	8/12	Loeb sworn in as Ambassador to Guinea (biographic details).
417	8/12	Extradition of Pérez Jiménez to Venezuela.
418	8/12	Rusk: nuclear test ban treaty.
419	8/13	Pakistan credentials (rewrite).
*420	8/13	Itinerary for visit of King and Queen of Afghanistan.
*421	8/13	Walske appointed scientific attaché, USRO (biographic details).
*422	8/14	Lodge sworn in as Ambassador to Viet-Nam (biographic details).
*423	8/14	Bowdler designated Deputy Coordinator for Cuban Affairs (biographic details).
424	8/14	Air talks with Mexico.
425	8/16	Rusk: news conference.
*426	8/15	Ross sworn in as Ambassador to Central African Republic (biographic details).
*427	8/16	Century of Negro Progress Exposition.
*428	8/16	Cultural exchange (Cambodia).

*Not printed.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
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September 9, 1963

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United States Policy in the Pacific

by Roger Hilsman
*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I am pleased to have been invited to speak before this 16th annual meeting of the National Legislative Conference in Hawaii. The locale you have chosen for your meeting—these lovely islands in the midst of the Pacific—is symbolic. For Hawaii is not merely our westernmost State but our easternmost. It recalls that for us the so-called Far East is in fact our “Near West” and the United States is as much a country of the Pacific as the Atlantic.

Let us talk, then, of the stake that America has in Pacific affairs.

It is a large one. Along the Asian shores of the Pacific live 1 billion of the world's population. If you include the adjacent Indian Ocean, you must add another half billion people. And if you include as well the millions who live on the North and South American shores of the

Pacific, the total is nearly two-thirds of the world's population.

Let there be no mistake about the meaning of these figures: The Pacific is not a barrier but a highway—a great link that unites us, facilitating close trade relations and encouraging the free and friendly contacts that are basic to a peaceful world.

There is a rich diversity in the cultures of the peoples living along the Pacific shores. Many of the civilizations here have ancient and proud traditions. Some are highly industrialized. Others are on the threshold of a self-generating economic growth. And many are barely emerging from eons of a “village” economy.

But all these people share common goals. They want peace. They want a better life—doctor for their children, a school, a new crop, an all-weather road. And in the deeper sense, they want their freedom. They want the opportunity to develop their full potential

¹ Address made before the National Legislative Conference at Honolulu, Hawaii, on Aug. 20 (press release 429).

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as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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individuals and nations. They want—intensely—to modernize. But they want modernization that preserves the essence of their own cultures.

In this context it seems to me that the great tasks of United States foreign policy in this Pacific community are twofold:

First—and most dramatic in terms of daily news headlines—we Americans must help to deter aggression and to maintain peace. We must be ready and willing to respond to crises that demand the use of our military power in the pursuit of peace—the present and continuing threats to the independence of free nations.

But second, and of decisive importance in the long span of history, we must assist the peoples of the Pacific in their process of nation building. For free-world military power is a means, not an end. Free-world military power holds the ring, but it is what goes on inside the ring, behind the headlines, that builds the future. For progress is not military but political, economic, and cultural.

Let us look, then, at the problems we face and the efforts we are making on both these fronts: in the struggle for peace and independence and in the struggle for national development.

Communist China, a Source of Danger

I turn, first, to the chief sources of danger in the Pacific community: the Communist countries and, in particular, Communist China.

Since 1949 the 700 million people of mainland China have been denied the opportunity of friendly and open interchange with the rest of the Pacific community. Their Stalinist leaders have shut the Chinese people in on themselves and ordered them to regard their neighbors with suspicion and even hate. The enormous numbers of the Chinese, their remarkable human qualities, and the glories of their ancient culture and civilization only accentuate this tragedy—the tragedy of a revolution that lost its way.

The facade of Communist China is bold and dangerous looking. The Chinese Communist leaders are addicted to reckless words. Turned to creative tasks, in cooperating with the broad

mass of humanity, the numbers, energy, ability, and culture of the Chinese could be a powerful force for good in the world. But set in opposition to the rest of humanity, harnessed to the aggressive designs of a tiny, self-serving leadership, the power of China dwindles. For power is relative. The power of China when combined with the power of the rest of humanity in pursuit of common goals is quite different from the power of China in opposition to the rest of humanity and in pursuit of the selfish goals of a narrow leadership.

From one point of view the large population of Communist China may appear to be an important power asset. But from another point of view it is a grave source of weakness. The pressure of this very large population on a relatively small amount of arable land creates a most serious dilemma for the Peiping regime.

The problem is that the Chinese Communists can find a genuine solution for their agricultural problem, for example, only through methods that contradict Communist ideology and objectives. It can do so only by increasing incentives to farmers and by a major redirection of national resources away from development of industry and into agriculture. The Peiping regime moved a little way in those directions in the past year and, as a result, achieved some improvement in agriculture output. But the effort appears to be far short of the massive infusion of resources that is required. And the temporary relaxation of controls and increase in individual incentives have led the farmer to concentrate on private production and to neglect public plots. Consequently the regime recently has begun to revert to repressive practices. It is caught between irreconcilable pressures: the Government's demand for total control and the economic need for freedom.

Meanwhile, Communist China's industrial development has dwindled and many of its factories are idle or working only part time. Its overall trade has shrunk immensely, and a very large fraction of its limited foreign exchange has been used to buy food.

It seems very unlikely that the Communist Chinese can resume industrial growth on a major scale in the visible future without the kinds of controls on farm activity that have the

effect of decreasing productivity and without large-scale aid from the outside. The Soviet Union closed out its major aid program 3 years ago and is showing no interest in reviving it.

The Communist Chinese leadership itself has admitted that status as an industrial power—which in 1958 was envisaged as being just around the corner—is now perhaps 30 or 40 years away. And the Chinese Communist foreign minister has predicted that the standard of living of the Chinese people cannot be expected to rise significantly for 100 years.

What kind of model is this for the world? Who in his right mind would wish to copy such an example—especially when there are other examples in Asia of much greater success in dealing with the problems of economic development and of agricultural productivity specifically?

Let me be clear on this point: We do not gloat over the unhappy condition and dismal prospects of the people of mainland China. They are a great people, with whom we have had historic ties of friendship. In the ordeal they are suffering they have our sympathy, and their sorrow is our sorrow.

Effects of Division in Communist World

Most people realize by now that a large population can be a source of economic weakness as well as a source of economic strength. There may still be, however, a tendency to equate a large population with military strength. In the Korean war we Americans saw the Chinese Communists employing tactics involving large masses of men, with little or no regard for casualties. But let us not forget that in that war North Korea and Communist China had immense help in equipment and material from the Soviet Union. And even today the ability of the Chinese Communists to manufacture arms is limited to relatively simple weapons.

So it is pertinent to consider the possible military effects of the great division that has taken place in the Communist world—the schisms dramatized by the meetings in Moscow last month. It is now 3 years since the Soviet Union withdrew its military, as well as its non-military, technicians and drastically curtailed its shipments of military supplies and equip-

ment to Communist China. Consequently, to take one example, the Chinese Communist air force, which is substantial in size and was relatively modern a few years ago, is in a state of rapid obsolescence. Moreover, it is not believed that Communist China is any longer obtaining spare parts for existing Soviet-supplied equipment of any sort. If this situation continues for long, Communist China's ability to mount major military operations, especially outside its borders, will deteriorate. At the same time, basic economic problems have limited severely Communist China's ability to develop its own modern armaments industry and even its present capacity to sustain for a long period large-scale military operations.

We must take care not to overstate the point. Compared to any of its Asian neighbors except the Soviet Union, Communist China is a strong military power. It has a very large army. The leaders of Communist China care little or nothing for human life. And, although up to now they have behaved more circumspectly than they advised Chairman Khrushchev to behave, they may venture reckless, even desperate, actions. At the same time we cannot rule out the possibility that at some future time Peiping and Moscow will draw together again.

The free nations of Asia are by no means out of danger. Communist China is still capable of grave and costly mischief. But it is not a formidable military power in terms of modern technology. And it lacks the heavy industry, the economic margin—and the outside aid, which the Soviet Union had during the Second World War—for building a formidable military machine. It cannot become a major modern military power, overall, in the foreseeable future.

The Peiping regime does appear to be concentrating a good deal of scientific and technological effort on a nuclear program. We hope that it will change its mind and decide to adhere to the recently negotiated test ban treaty.² But if it doesn't, we can anticipate that one of these days it will explode a nuclear device. What would be the meaning of that?

It should be understood, first of all, that there is a vast difference between a first test device

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

and an ability to deliver nuclear weapons on foreign targets. As Governor Harriman has reported, Chairman Khrushchev thinks it would take quite a few years for the Chinese Communists to develop a significant nuclear force. But even if it had such a force, Peiping would be unable to calculate that the initiation of nuclear warfare would be to its advantage. For it would be within reach of main U.S. and other free-world power, while the centers of free-world power would be well beyond the reach of Communist China.

Why then is Communist China, although floundering in an economic morass, spending so much effort on trying to make nuclear weapons? One can only speculate about this. Perhaps it hopes that a nuclear capability will restore some of the prestige the regime has lost both at home and abroad. It may hope to add nuclear intimidation to the pressures it can bring to bear on its Asian neighbors.

Objectively analyzed, the effects of a Chinese Communist nuclear explosion in the measurable future would be psychological rather than military. And the psychological results—outside mainland China, at least—would be negligible if we and the free nations of Asia understand the facts about nuclear weapons that we have just discussed. The free world has the power to deter or meet aggression; it has the power to support nations under attack, as in Viet-Nam, and to help maintain their freedom; it has the determination to use this power should that be necessary; and it has the will to maintain that power at full strength for as long as it is needed.

Turning to the other Communist countries in Asia, we find in microcosm the same range of problems that we find in Communist China. North Viet-Nam and North Korea are both small rural countries laboring under the delusion, spawned by Communist theory, that the best route to economic development is a policy of autarky and of emphasizing the building of a heavy industrial base, including an advanced steel industry. Both suffer from high costs of industrial production, growing populations, low per capita output, and continuing difficulties with food supplies.

At the same time, North Viet-Nam, with

other Communist support, has been able to mount campaigns of organized terrorism and other low-level military operations in Laos and South Viet-Nam. These assaults threaten the independence of Laos and South Viet-Nam. The free world must not and will not let these aggressions succeed.

I don't want to minimize the effort it takes to eliminate terrorist aggression based on an adjoining country. But I would suggest that meeting this challenge is less directly connected with Chinese or other Communist military power or with the attraction of Communist example than with a particular politicomilitary technique for exploiting weaknesses that are typical of most new and developing countries. The free world has learned a good deal about this technique in the course of dealing with it successfully in Greece, the Philippines, and Malaya. I am optimistic about the ability of the free world to deal with it not only in Laos and Viet-Nam but wherever it may occur.

American Commitments in the Pacific Community

So much for the chief threats to the peace in the Pacific community. They are threats that have produced a resolute American commitment to the defense of those nations under Communist assault. That commitment has been tested in Korea, in the Taiwan Straits, and in Laos. It is now facing a long-term test in Viet-Nam. We may be sure that it will be tested elsewhere from time to time.

Whatever the provocation, we will stand by our defense commitments. We will do so in any case, but we will also do so in the hope that, if strength is met with strength, those who guide the policies of Asian Communist states will in time move toward more rational, peaceful relationships with their Pacific neighbors.

Such commitments have meaning, however, only where the people of a region are themselves dedicated to their own independence. To the good fortune of the free world, the dedication of Asian nations has been amply demonstrated. The Republic of Korea, with the help of United Nations forces, repelled a major Communist aggression. Malaya, the Philippines, and other nations of the area have defended themselves successfully against lesser

Communist efforts. Recently we have seen India rise to the defense of its soil against the Chinese Communists. Both Laos and South Viet-Nam are now under active Communist assault. But they—and we—are determined that they shall not lose their independence.

In free Asia generally there is a keener understanding than there was a decade ago of Communist purposes and Communist techniques. And there is a wider realization that communism is not only brutal but inefficient.

Economic Achievements in Free Asia

Let us turn now to the free peoples of the Pacific and their progress in the great task of nation building.

Despite the problems that have beset them, their experience in the postwar period contrasts very favorably with the experience of the Communist nations. Although it is difficult to generalize about the varying experiences of a large number of different countries, I would like to try to do so under three broad headings: first, economic achievements; secondly, political progress; and thirdly, success in defending their independence and finding satisfying and honorable roles in the world.

Beneath the surface of apparent difficulties in free Asia there has been major economic progress. The supreme example is Japan. While Communist China has moved from one disaster to another and has failed to raise the standards of life of its people, Japan has advanced to successive new heights of production and per capita income. It has the highest rate of investment and of growth in the world.

In agricultural production, also, the contrast between Communist China and Japan is extraordinary. Japan has only one-third as much cultivated land per person as Communist China. But while food production in Communist China has actually declined, Japan has raised its degree of self-sufficiency in food from 80 to 85 percent—despite a 10-percent increase in population. Japanese rice yields are nearly twice Communist China's.

Japan has achieved these results by precisely the kind of prescription Communist China finds it hard, or impossible, to accept—by increasing incentives to farmers and devoting major re-

sources to the support of agriculture. The incentives come from the private ownership of land, a fair return to the tiller, and the availability of a wide range of consumer goods. Japanese industry also provides agricultural equipment in substantial quantity. And perhaps the most striking indication of the extent to which Japan devotes industrial resources to agriculture is the fact that Japan uses as much commercial fertilizer on 13 million acres of cultivated land as all the other Far Eastern countries use on 822 million acres.

It may be objected that it's not quite fair to compare Communist China with Japan because although Japan had to recover from the destruction of war and did, indeed, effect a major revolution in agriculture, it already had a major industrial base. Very well then—let's look at what the Republic of China has accomplished on the island of Taiwan. In 10 years—from 1952 to 1962—it increased its agricultural production by 50 percent in value, trebled its industrial output, and doubled its real national income. Even with a high population increase—of 3.4 percent annually—it has increased per capita income by an average of 3 percent a year. Its per capita income today is among the highest in the Far East, after Japan and is at least double Communist China's.

The remarkable advance of agriculture on Taiwan stems from a major redistribution of land into small, privately owned holdings, similar to that effected in Japan, and the application of significant resources, better seeds, and modern technology, along with the stimulation of local initiative. In the gratifying progress of Taiwan a key role has been played by a unique institution, the Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction, in which we participate. That Commission and its broad program of rural development—economic, social, and political—on Taiwan are models which some other nations might profitably emulate.

Last year Taiwan's exports reached an all-time high of \$218 million. They included such new export lines as cement, canned mushrooms, polyvinyl chloride, and fluorescent lamps. In the past few years the private sector of Taiwan's industry has greatly expanded.

Likewise Malaya, Thailand, and the Philip-

nes have scored significant economic gains in recent years. In each of them agricultural production has risen on the order of 40 percent or more. In each the manufacturing sector and foreign trade have grown appreciably. In each the economic advantages of private initiative, the free way of life, are being strikingly demonstrated.

It may be contended that it is unfair to compare these countries with Communist China because they are relatively small and not densely populated. Very well then—let's look at India. Like China it has a large and growing population on a limited supply of arable land, a limited industrial base, and a low per capita income. In the past decade the population of India increased by more than 21 percent. But agricultural production expanded by more than 41 percent, its industrial production doubled, its national income increased by 43 percent, and its per capita income by 17 percent. India has a mixed economy. And it still faces grave economic problems. But it has moved ahead in the same period that per capita income and agricultural production in Communist China declined. All men who love freedom have a deep interest in the success of India, the most populous democracy in the world.

Pakistan also is advancing economically, despite serious problems. We have a deep interest in her progress, as well as in her security. Indonesia, which has had many serious troubles since independence, now seems to be grappling seriously with its economic problems. Not all the free nations of East and South Asia have made much economic headway. But most of them have done strikingly better than Communist China.

Among the great assets of the Pacific are, of course, Australia and New Zealand, to both of which we are bound by indissoluble ties. They have attained living standards among the highest in the world. New Zealand is the world's lowest cost producer of agricultural exports. Australia not only produces farm staples and minerals but has become a modern industrial nation. Last year the contribution of manufactures to Australia's gross national product was nearly double that of agriculture and mining. We rejoice in the achievements of New

Zealand and Australia and are confident that they both will continue to thrive.

Encouraging Signs of Political Progress

Some of the new nations of South and East Asia have experienced political difficulties, and in several instances these have been severely aggravated, if not caused, by the Communists. But beneath a somewhat disordered surface are both a basic stability and encouraging signs of the growth of deeper roots for democratic institutions.

One of the weakest political and administrative links in many Asian societies, as in most other developing countries, is the connection between city and village, between the central government and the countryside. Communism seeks to exploit the weakness of these links and, in doing so, forces the central government to pay more attention to them. In several Asian countries, actions taken to cope with terrorist warfare inspired by the Communists have led directly to a strengthening of democracy at the grassroots. That happened in Malaya and the Philippines. Somewhat the same process is going on today in South Viet-Nam, where the strategic-hamlet program is establishing local self-government and strengthening the administrative and political links between the rural people and their national government. This program is not only helping South Viet-Nam to defeat the Communists but will help it to advance politically and economically and socially after the Communist guerrillas have been completely eliminated. South Viet-Nam has the resources—not least the character of its people—for a quite brilliant future. Actually, its progress from the end of the Indochinese war in 1954 until 1959 was one of the most remarkable in Asia. Probably it was that striking success, especially when contrasted with the failure of the vaunted Communist "paradise" in North Viet-Nam, which prompted the latter to resume its assault of organized terrorism on South Viet-Nam in 1959.

India's large-scale community development program has, from its beginning, combined the stimulation of democratic roots with social and economic progress. Pakistan likewise has been strengthening the village roots of democracy.

Some of the new and reborn nations of Asia have not yet achieved fully functioning, stable democracies. But nearly all have democracy as their goal. A few are operating democratic institutions with creditable success. And Japan has illustrated how a democratic system can provide effective leadership that can overcome, in a single generation, the mistakes of the past and lay the social and economic, as well as the political, base for continuing democracy and freedom.

Democracy will develop in free Asia, provided that the free Asian peoples preserve their independence. And generally they have proved themselves to be thoroughly determined to preserve their independence.

We see also in free Asia some encouraging trends toward closer cooperation. Japan and Australia are undertaking larger roles in promoting the development and stability of the Pacific area. The Philippines are manifesting increasing leadership.

Recent weeks have provided striking new evidence that Asian statesmen are deeply conscious of their responsibilities to their neighbors as well as to internal development. The leaders of the Philippines, Indonesia, and the new state of Malaysia have announced their intention to bring their nations together in a "Maphilindo" confederation. They have done this despite difficult disagreements because of their clear sense that regional cooperation is the only path to regional security and prosperity.

Meanwhile, Malaya, Thailand, and the Philippines have formed the Association for South-east Asia. The cooperative activities of existing regional organizations, such as the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), have grown apace, and new organizations, such as the Asian Productivity Organization, have been created to respond to new needs as these have been recognized by the countries of the area. SEATO and ANZUS continue as important symbols of joint commitment to the independence of the countries of the area as well as important foci of cooperative activity to deal with the Communist threat. While relatively weak and relatively limited in scope and character, these cooperative activities among the nations of Asia and the Pacific reflect important long-term impulses.

In the light of long-term trends in Communist and free Asia let me now review the elements of U.S. strategy and policy. Our policy in the Far East can be summed up in these four points:

1. to stand firmly behind our commitment to the defense of independent nations and to turn back any aggressive thrust from communism;

2. to contribute as we are able to the prosperity and development of nations which request our assistance as the surest way of helping to build a system of free, viable, and strong nations in Asia;

3. to recognize the value of initiatives by the Pacific nations themselves to develop their own modes of cooperation and communication, and to stand ready to assist when called upon to do so;

4. to work patiently for the realization of a Pacific community of nations so prosperous and progressive that its attraction will prove, in the long run, irresistible to those peoples now kept by their rulers from participation in it.

The Chinese Communists and the Test Ban

The nuclear test ban treaty is a recent development of considerable importance in man's continuing search for lasting peace. While it is no more than a beginning step toward the general and complete disarmament for which all people yearn, it is a significant contribution. An immediate advantage of this treaty to the welfare of men, women, and children everywhere is the promise it holds for reduction of the radioactive pollution of the air we breathe. The Chinese Communist reaction to the treaty has been to condemn it as a "dirty fraud." They claim, in expressing this apparent indifference to the interests of humanity, that they speak for all peace-loving peoples of the world. It is clear, however, that the overwhelming majority of the people of the world have acclaimed the nuclear test ban treaty and that the Chinese Communist leaders are in a position of isolation. We hope that an awareness of the clear benefits to all mankind of the nuclear test ban treaty will eventually bring the Chinese Communists to reconsider their stand.

Perhaps at some point in the future the Chinese Communist leadership may come to realize that their policy of hostility and isolation is a barren course, perilous to them and to the whole world. Possibly the influence of time and experience will eventually persuade the leadership in Peiping to change their approach and their attitude.

Finally, I want to recall some words from President Kennedy's address "Toward a Strategy of Peace" made on June 10 at American University:³

We must . . . persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace.

There would not appear to be any immediate

likelihood of those "constructive changes," of which President Kennedy spoke, appearing on the mainland of China. But the separation between the people in mainland China and the free peoples of the Pacific is such an apparent tragedy of the modern world that it seems reasonable to hope that it is only a temporary phenomenon. The American people surely look forward to the time when all of the Chinese people are reunited with the peoples of the Pacific and the world in friendship, cooperation, and freedom.

I am confident that the lasting values we seek, for ourselves and for the peoples of the Pacific, will prevail over the dogmas of war and struggle. To do our part to build a world of peace remains our highest aim. That is our great purpose and our strategy.

The Viet-Nam Situation

by Theodore J. C. Heavner

Deputy Director, Viet-Nam Working Group¹

I feel very honored to have the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon. The Veterans of Foreign Wars organization has played a distinguished role in American life, and it is composed individually of Americans who have served their country under the most difficult and dangerous of all circumstances. As a former serviceman, as a public servant, and as an American, I am very proud to be with you.

I have been asked to discuss the Viet-Nam situation. We could begin, in the usual way, with some vital statistics about Viet-Nam. It may be of some passing interest that South

Viet-Nam has a population of more than 14 million, an area of about 66,000 square miles—somewhat smaller than the State of Oklahoma—and that its principal products are rice and rubber. But I think the most important thing to know about Viet-Nam, or indeed any country, is its people.

The Vietnamese are an ancient people, with more than 2,000 years of history behind them. They have passed through two colonial periods; one, under the Chinese, which lasted more than 1,000 years, and, more recently, a second colonial period of about 80 years under the French. Between the Chinese and the French colonial periods, the Vietnamese enjoyed almost 1,000 years of independence—a period marked, however, by frequent struggles to maintain that treasured independence.

¹ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

² Address made before the National Security and Legislative Committees at the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Seattle, Wash., on Aug. 25.

The struggle to get and keep their independence is something very near the heart of the Vietnamese. Every Vietnamese schoolboy is intensely proud, for example, of the fact that in 1284, and again in 1287, the Mongol hordes of Kublai Khan were defeated by the Vietnamese under Marshal Tran Hung Dao. There is a wonderful story about this victory.

Faced with what appeared to be overwhelming odds—the Mongol army outnumbered the Vietnamese forces by at least five to two—Marshal Tran Hung Dao summoned representatives of all the Vietnamese villages and provinces to a great meeting at Dien Hong. He told the Vietnamese leaders there assembled what they faced, what the odds were against them, and what they stood to lose if they fought and lost. He asked for their advice: Should they sue for peace or should they fight?

According to the ancient chronicles—and knowing the Vietnamese, I certainly believe this is true—the council called with one voice for war against the foreign invader.

Vietnamese "Compulsion for Freedom"

These are the same people that poured out of the Communist north nearly a million strong in 1954 and 1955 to avoid living under an alien regime. Perhaps some of you had the experience of seeing this exodus—one of the great population movements of all time—and certainly one of the most convincing rejections of communism which the world has ever seen. I am sure that all of you know Dr. [Tom] Dooley's account of that event. Of these people Dooley said: "Americans never fail to like the Vietnamese when they get to know them. It is impossible not to respect their driving compulsion for freedom. . . ."

If I may interject a personal note, I would like to say that I feel I know firsthand that the Vietnamese who are fighting Communist aggression today are very much the sons of Marshal Tran Hung Dao. Last November I was in Moc Hoa, a very small provincial capital in Kien Tuong Province, in the Plain of Reeds. I speak Vietnamese, and one hot evening, sitting on the banks of the Vai Co River, I fell into conversation with a young Vietnamese Civil Guardsman. Kien Tuong is one of the provinces most

seriously menaced by Communist guerrilla forces, and hearing small-arms fire across the river, we both assumed that someone out there in the dark was fighting the Viet Cong. It seemed natural for me to ask if he himself had encountered the Viet Cong in battle.

He pulled a decoration out of his pocket, a Vietnamese medal carefully encased in a small box and wrapped in a silk handkerchief. It was a decoration for bravery in combat. I of course asked how he had earned it. It was a simple but very significant story.

He told me that one night he and a group of Civil Guardsmen were attacked by the Viet Cong and that two corners of their position were overrun, their officer and a number of their men killed. They withdrew to their last strong point, and there, together with their wives and children, they were waiting for the final Viet Cong assault.

The Viet Cong called to them, urged them to surrender, to turn over their weapons, and promised that they would not be hurt if they gave up. The remaining defenders held a quick council of war, quite unlike the great ceremonial council of Dien Hong in appearance, you may be sure, but in spirit very much the same.

The young guardsman whom I had met urged his companions to continue their resistance, and to bolster their spirits, his wife picked up the weapon of one of the dead and took her place resolutely beside her husband in the defense of the position. They held off the attack successfully until dawn, when they were relieved by Government forces.

What I am trying to say is that the Vietnamese people not only have a long and proud history of fighting to maintain their independence, but they are still fiercely determined to maintain it in the face of Communist attack. This is perhaps the most significant fact about the Vietnamese people today.

It is not an easy struggle for them. In the hot war against Communist aggression they suffer from grave handicaps. Like Germany and Korea, Viet-Nam is a divided country, with all that means in human suffering. Viet-Nam is a country with an underdeveloped economy, an economy ravaged moreover by intermittent warfare ever since 1945. Viet-Nam is under con-

tant pressure from what is probably the most effective Communist subversive apparatus in Asia, if not in the world. And although it has a history of 1,000 years of independence before the French came, the modern state of South Viet-Nam has been in existence only 9 short years.

For these reasons the Vietnamese need help if they are to retain their treasured independence. The United States has been giving them that help.

The Buddhist Dispute

Before I turn to the Viet-Nam war, and the American role in it, I want to touch briefly on another aspect of the Vietnamese situation which has been very much in the news recently. This is the Buddhist dispute.

Let me say emphatically that this is certainly a very serious matter, and we have made our concern abundantly clear. The United States stands firmly for religious freedom, both in our domestic life and in our foreign policy. We are concerned about the Buddhist dispute in South Viet-Nam, not only because of our own ideals but also because this controversy can only help the Communist Viet Cong.

We had hoped that this issue could be promptly and justly resolved. It now appears, however, that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has instituted repressive measures against Vietnamese Buddhist leaders. This action represents a direct violation by the Vietnamese Government of assurances that it was pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the Buddhists. The United States can only deplore repressive actions of this nature.

While this is a matter which the Vietnamese must resolve themselves, we as Americans cannot fail to express our dedication not only to the freedom of all men in the political sense but also to their spiritual freedom. We are hopeful that this dispute can be promptly and justly resolved so that the Vietnamese people can go forward with one mind in the business of defending their nation against Communist aggression and building a better future for their children.

One of the most frequent questions about the Viet-Nam situation is the deceptively sim-

ple query: "How is the war going; who is winning?" I suppose people were asking this question in 1863 and in 1943, too, and it is as hard to answer now as it was then. In this case it is especially hard, because in a guerrilla war you can't show frontlines moving backward or forward on the map.

The Guerrilla War in Viet-Nam

To understand why President Kennedy said in his state of the Union message that "The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in South Viet-Nam,"² we need to consider the situation in the fall of 1961 and early 1962. The Vietnamese were quite plainly losing their fight against the Communist guerrillas then.

The Communist guerrillas, 1,500 strong, took and held overnight a provincial capital in September of 1961, and, to underline the fact, they publicly beheaded the Chief of Province there. The flow of rice into Saigon, normally a rice export center, was choked off by the guerrillas to the point where the United States sent P.L. 480 rice to Saigon in early 1962. Enemy attacks in January of last year were running at the rate of more than 120 per week. We even feared that the Communist Viet Cong might soon be able to declare "a liberated area" somewhere in the highlands.

Faced with this deteriorating situation, President Diem in December of 1961 sent a letter to President Kennedy in which he outlined the nature of the attack on his government and asked for increased American assistance.³ The United States considered this request very carefully. Vice President Johnson had visited Viet-Nam in May of 1961,⁴ and President Kennedy had sent General [Maxwell D.] Taylor to Viet-Nam again in the fall of that year. So we were very clear about the nature of the threat.

We knew that the Viet Cong attack was caused, led, and directed by the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam. This was a case of Communist aggression, although the Communists made great efforts to conceal the fact, aggression against a friendly people with whom

² BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 159.

³ For texts of President Diem's letter and President Kennedy's reply, see *ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13.

⁴ For text of a joint communique, see *ibid.*, June 19, 1961, p. 956.

the United States had strong ties. There could be little question about our decision. We promptly agreed to step up our military and economic assistance.

When we increased our assistance to Viet-Nam we issued a study of the evidence of Communist infiltration into South Viet-Nam and Communist direction of the war against the Government of South Viet-Nam.⁵ This was necessary, not just out of a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind," but because of the great and continuing Communist effort to portray the Viet Cong as an indigenous and legitimate popular movement against a repressive government. I think it is worth noting in this connection that the international body specifically established in 1954 at the Geneva conference to oversee and keep the peace in Viet-Nam—the International Control Commission, composed of India, Canada, and Poland—has confirmed the fact that Communist North Viet-Nam is engaged in an attempt to overthrow by violence the Government of South Viet-Nam. After sifting the evidence for almost a year, the International Control Commission in June of 1962 issued a special report which makes it clear that the Viet Cong are the instruments of Hanoi's deliberate attack on South Viet-Nam.⁶

If we were losing the war in the fall of 1961 and early 1962, where are we today? I think it is fair to say that the tide has now turned and that the Government of Viet-Nam is with our help slowly overcoming the Communist guerrillas. No more provincial capitals have been taken, the Communists have not "liberated" any part of South Viet-Nam, and Saigon is once again exporting rice. In fact we anticipate that Saigon will export 300,000 tons of rice this year.

Comparing Communist military activity in the first half of 1962 with the first half of this year, we see again reason for believing the Communist threat has been stopped and is begin-

ning to be rolled back. In the first half of 1962 there were 10,270 Viet Cong incidents, including more than 3,000 armed attacks. In the first 6 months of this year incidents dropped by one-third, to a little less than 7,000, while armed attacks were reduced by 36 percent. The scale of the attacks also declined. In the first half of 1962 there were 35 battalion-sized attacks and 118 company-sized attacks. This year, during the same period, there were only 7 battalion-sized attacks and 65 company-sized attacks.

The Strategic-Hamlet Program

An even more important indicator of progress against the Communists is the number of people who enjoy protection against Viet Cong terror and extortion. This is always difficult to measure, but our people in Viet-Nam estimate that in the past year nearly 1 million Vietnamese who were formerly subject to sporadic Communist incursions, or even outright Communist control, are now covered by effective Government administration and protection. This has been achieved largely through the strategic-hamlet program. This program is the heart of the war effort in Viet-Nam. It is a coordinated, across-the-board political, economic, and military response to the Communist threat.

There has been some misunderstanding about this program in the United States. The Communist charge that the strategic hamlets are "concentration camps" has even gained some currency. Let me tell you how the Vietnamese make a hamlet "strategic."

The first step in the setting up of a strategic hamlet is essentially military; a defense perimeter is established, more or less elaborate as the local security situation demands, and a hamlet militia is trained and armed.

The second step, which takes place immediately after or even at the same time as the first, is purely political. This is the election of a strategic-hamlet council. This is the first time in Vietnamese history that hamlet councils have been elected. It is also the first time in Vietnamese history that the national Government has been effectively "plugged in" to hamlet-level society.

⁵ A two-part report entitled *A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam* (Department of State publication 7308). Parts I and II are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for 25 cents and 55 cents, respectively.

⁶ For a Department statement regarding the report, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1962, p. 109.

The third step is economic and social in nature. Schools, dispensaries, maternity clinics, agricultural extension work, and cheap agricultural credit are provided. Materials and technical advice to enable the villages to undertake their own "self-help," such as access roads and irrigation works, also come from the Government.

In short, the population of the hamlet is given the means to defend themselves, plus an economic and political stake which they will want to defend. I think you will agree that this is a strange description for a concentration camp.

Mao Tse-tung has said that the guerrilla fighter must live among the people as the fish lives in the water. The strategic hamlet is the net to get the Viet Cong fish out of water. By giving the whole population the means—and the will—to defend themselves against Communist demands for food and recruits, the basic strategy of the Communist "war of national liberation" is being met and defeated.

The American Role in South Viet-Nam

The United States is spending a great deal of money in South Viet-Nam. Far more important, more than 50 American lives have been lost here as a direct result of Communist attacks or accidents. Of these Americans, President Kennedy has said:⁷

They are among the many who in this century, far from home, have died for our country. Our task now, and the task of all Americans, is to live up to their commitments.

Why did the President say this? The American role in South Viet-Nam is a difficult and relatively new one for us. It is not well understood, and I think it is worth while to dwell for a moment on how those American lives were lost and why. I would like to emphasize here just as much as I possibly can that this is a Vietnamese war. They are fighting it. They are directing it. Our role is strictly confined to what we call advisory, logistic, and technical assistance.

The question is sometimes raised as to why it should be so. If we are suffering casualties, why not direct the war effort in South Viet-

Nam? Why not put American officers in command of Vietnamese units, or even deploy regular American combat units to "clean up the mess" and get it over?

The fact is that only the Vietnamese can win this war. It is a struggle for the loyalty of a whole people, the Vietnamese people, and the main thrust of Communist propaganda is that the guerrillas are fighting for independence against an American neocolonial regime. They say that Diem is an American puppet and that the Vietnamese people must drive the Americans out in order to be free. If they are able to convince the Vietnamese people that this is true, we will have lost the struggle in South Viet-Nam. We can help the Vietnamese, but we can't do their fighting for them. And let me assure you that they don't want us to. They took 4,400 killed in action last year, and they are quite prepared to go on doing the fighting. All they ask from us is the tools and the expertise which they lack.

We have therefore given the Vietnamese American advisers and American equipment to help them improve the effectiveness of their military organization. To be good advisers, our men must frequently be at or near the scene of combat. Moreover, in a guerrilla war there are no real rear and front areas, and the Communists have made a special target of our people. These are the basic reasons that we have suffered American casualties in South Viet-Nam.

I should add here that this does not mean our people are helpless targets for the Viet Cong. American advisers are armed, and they have orders to defend themselves if threatened. I have met a great many of our advisers at their posts all over South Viet-Nam. Let me assure you that they know how to take care of themselves. They are doing a new and difficult job for America and doing it very well. We should all be very proud of them.

Besides advice in military tactics, we provide the Vietnamese with the technical skills and equipment which they lack. This has meant such things as electronics equipment and technicians, helicopters and helicopter pilots. We are training the Vietnamese as rapidly as possible so that they can fill these technical slots themselves, but it takes a long time to turn out

⁷ *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1963, p. 159.

an electronics specialist or a helicopter pilot. The Viet Cong will not wait.

The "Why" of Our Involvement

I have described the American role in the Vietnamese war—the "how" of our involvement. I would like to close by indicating something of the "why."

You can think of Viet-Nam as a piece of strategic real estate. It is on the corner of mainland Asia, across the east-west trade routes, and in a position that would make it an excellent base for further Communist aggression against the rest of free Asia.

You can think of our involvement in South Viet-Nam in terms of a moral commitment. The Vietnamese, on the frontier of the free world, are fighting not just for themselves but for all men who wish to remain free. I believe the 300–500 casualties they suffer each week is a precious contribution to the security of the whole free world.

You can think of the American role in South Viet-Nam in terms of our SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] commitment. You can regard it as a fulfillment of the implied obligation which we as a nation undertook when we said at the Geneva Conference in 1954 that we would regard any renewal of aggression in violation of the Geneva Agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

You can think of South Viet-Nam as a test case; there is good reason to believe that this is the view of the Communist bloc. In Viet-Nam we are determining whether or not the free world can help a nation defend itself against the subversion and guerrilla warfare which make up the "war of national liberation" tactics. I think it is fair to say that we have largely stopped the Communist thrust all around the world in conventional and nuclear terms. We are now confronted by a new kind of threat, and we have to a degree invented a new kind of response to meet it. All of the underdeveloped nations of the world are watching the event. If South Viet-Nam falls, their will to resist this kind of aggression will be weakened and the whole fabric of free-world strength and determination damaged thereby.

Perhaps, in more human terms, you may want to think of our support to Viet-Nam as American help to the nearly 1 million Vietnamese refugees who fled North Viet-Nam in 1954 and 1955 to avoid living under a Communist regime.

These are some of the reasons for our support to the Vietnamese people in their struggle to defend their independence against Communist attack. I think they are all good reasons. Taken together, they seem to me to be compelling.

United States Assessing Reports on Conditions in Viet-Nam

Department Statement of August 21

On the basis of information from Saigon, it appears that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has instituted serious repressive measures against Vietnamese Buddhist leaders. The action represents a direct violation by the Vietnamese Government of assurances that it was pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the Buddhists. The United States deplores repressive actions of this nature.

Department Statement of August 23¹

On the assessment of the situation on the military side, we have taken note of the statements by commanders in the field, the military administrators of the martial law, and broadcasts over the radio of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to the effect that the war against the Viet Cong will be vigorously pursued, and we have no reports from our own sources which would indicate any diminution of this effort in the field. There has been no change in our basic policy of assisting Viet-Nam in its prosecution of the war against the Communist Viet Cong.

On the political side we are continuing the process of assessing the situation on the basis of the Embassy's reports. It is too early obvious to reach any final conclusions. It is clear that the military is in physical control in that it has

¹ Read to news correspondents on Aug. 23 by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News.

assumed administrative responsibilities in enforcing martial law. Under such conditions, the functions of civil administrators, such as those of the Interior Ministry, are being superseded by the military. Contact between the Embassy and civilian officials continues.

Administration Urges Congress to Support \$4.1 Billion Aid Bill

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY¹

The House of Representatives begins this week consideration of legislation vital to the security and well-being of the United States and the free world, the mutual defense assistance bill of 1964. I hope the House will give full support to the authorization recommended by the Foreign Affairs Committee. Our foreign aid program is essential to the continued strength of the free world. It gives us increased military security at a cost far lower than if we had to carry the entire burden alone. It gives protection against Communist internal takeover to free people who are yet not able to build solidly without outside help. It provides essential assurances to the new nations of the world that they can count on us in their effort to build a free society. Only with this assurance can they continue to maintain against the pressures that are brought upon them.

This does not represent an impossible burden for the United States; indeed, it is only half as heavy as it was during the Marshall Plan. When about 2 percent of our gross national product was allocated to foreign assistance, the program today costs only seven-tenths of 1 percent. The bill before the House has already been cut \$850 million from our original estimate last January.² Fortunately, the bill now has bipartisan political support. More than half of the Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee are in favor of the

\$4.1 billion authorization now before the House. This program is not an abstract set of numbers, but a set of concrete and continued actions in support of our national security.

No party or group should call for a dynamic foreign policy and then seek to cripple this program. One wonders which concrete actions critics would like to stop. Should we scrap the Alliance for Progress, which is our best answer to the threat of communism in this hemisphere? Should we deny help to India, the largest free power in Asia, as she seeks to strengthen herself against Communist China? Do we wish to dismantle our joint defenses in Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Greece, countries along the very rim of Communist power? Do we want to weaken our friends in Southeast Asia?

This is no time to slacken our efforts. This fight is by no means over. The struggle is not finished. Therefore, as has been said on many occasions before, however tired we may get of this program, our adversaries are not tired. I don't think this country is tired, and the cause of freedom should certainly not be fatigued. Therefore I think it is necessary that we continue to make this effort. I hope the House will support it. Eighty percent of these funds are spent in the United States, and I think it is necessary and essential, as the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, General Clay, and others, that the House figure be passed.

Experience shows us that the appropriation traditionally has been less. I think it is incumbent upon us to support the action of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and I hope the House of Representatives will.

LETTER TO MEMBERS OF HOUSE

Following is the text of a joint letter from Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to Members of the House of Representatives.

Press release 432 dated August 19

AUGUST 17, 1963

DEAR MR. CONGRESSMAN: The House of Representatives takes up this week a keystone of United States foreign policy: the Foreign As-

¹ Made at the opening of the President's news conference on Aug. 20.

² For excerpts from the President's budget message, see BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 224.

sistance Act of 1963.³ The action taken on this important legislation will have a far-reaching effect upon the U.S. position, now and in the future, in the great struggle for freedom.

The President originally requested \$4,945 million for this program. He subsequently reduced this request by \$420 million.⁴ The Committee on Foreign Affairs has further reduced the request by \$438 million. Thus, the original request has been reduced by \$858 million since January. This reduction is so deep that the bill before you is already less than last year's *final appropriation*, taking into account the previous two year appropriation for the Social Progress Trust Fund.

We wish to emphasize that we know of no reason to assume that our total military and foreign policy requirements are less than those of fiscal year 1963. In fact, as we view our evolving relationship with the Soviet Union, the insistent expansionist aims of Communist China, the continuing crises in Laos and Vietnam, and the unfinished business in Latin America and in Africa, we believe we cannot now afford to retreat in our foreign assistance efforts.

Three authorizations directly involve United States' security interests: Supporting Assistance (primarily for several countries confronting the Sino-Soviet Bloc), Military Assistance, and the President's Contingency Fund. The total authorization recommended for these purposes is already \$165 million less than was appropriated last year. Although we have made reductions in these programs as rapidly as possible (over \$1 billion in three years), we believe that any further reductions here would seriously restrict the President's ability to respond effectively to major challenges to Free World security, including our own.

Any reduction in the existing yearly \$600 million Alliance for Progress authorization would give credence to those who claim that the United States lacks the will and staying power to make

³ For a statement made by Secretary Rusk before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Apr. 5, see *ibid.*, Apr. 29, 1963, p. 664; for a statement by the Secretary before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 11, see *ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 19.

⁴ For text of the President's message to Congress on foreign aid, see *ibid.*, Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.

good on its promise of long-term assistance to Latin America. Further reductions in any of the other authorizations would seriously undercut the ability of the United States to carry out its foreign policy objective of assisting independent countries to attain self-supporting status.

But adequate funds alone will not support an effective foreign policy—we must have the necessary flexibility to carry out our common objectives. A number of restrictive amendments have been proposed to cut off or drastically reduce aid to some countries or organizations whose actions disturb us. We believe that these amendments stem from an inadequate appraisal of the long-term objectives of United States foreign and military policy. Attempts to place the conduct of our foreign policy under rigid legislative restrictions will prevent us from acting in support of American interests in a rapidly changing international scene.

We strongly urge you to lend your unqualified support to this bill without further restriction or reduction.

Sincerely,

DEAN RUSK
ROBERT S. McNAMARA

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK⁵

Today's action by the House of Representatives cutting almost \$600 million from the foreign aid bill follows earlier cuts of close to \$900 million. This slices into the very muscle of our foreign policy. For almost a decade and a half we Americans have been helping the less fortunate countries to move toward strength and stability. At the moment when steady effort is being vindicated by progress this congressional action threatens our power to maintain the necessary momentum. The cut would impair our national security, weaken the Alliance for Progress, and restrict our ability to respond to new demands or crises in the world struggle for freedom. When events are working in favor of our world of freedom we Americans should not retreat. We must not quit.

⁵ Released at Washington on Aug. 23.

The Alliance for Progress Marks Second Anniversary

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY¹

Today, on the second anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, I am heartened by the advances that have been made in a short space of time. A peaceful revolution is under way in Latin America, and this gives promise of bringing a better life to millions of our fellow Americans in this hemisphere.

The advances made in the first 2 years are only a start, but they are impressive. Some 140,000 new housing units have been constructed; slum clearance projects have begun; there are 8,200 new classrooms; more than 700 new water systems have been built where there had been danger of widespread disease from contamination; land-reform and tax-reform measures have been adopted by many countries; more than 160,000 agriculture credit loans have been made and more than 4 million schoolbooks have been distributed; two common-market agreements are gaining new impetus; a revolutionary step has been taken to stabilize the price of coffee in world markets; more than 9 million children are being fed in 18 countries in a Food for Peace program; road construction, especially in some agricultural areas, is proceeding ahead rapidly.

All this is a beginning, but only a beginning. We have to do a good deal more if this is going to be the sixties, a great Decade of Development. This is a cooperative effort by all of us who live in this hemisphere, north and south—an attempt to provide a better life for our people, a better chance for children to live, a better chance for them to be educated, a better chance for them to hold jobs, better housing for them, a chance to live their older age in peace and in dignity.

These are the objectives of the Alliance for Progress. These objectives must be realized. This program must be a success. The first 2 years is only a beginning. But it is my hope that the people of my own country, the people of other countries of this hemisphere, will con-

tinue to join together in a great international effort to make this continent, to make this hemisphere, a source of credit to all of us who live here and an inspiration to all the world. We still have a good deal more to do.

It is my hope that the governments of this hemisphere, including the Government of the United States, and those who enjoy the advantages—the people who enjoy the advantages in this hemisphere, including the people of my own country—that all of us will continue to work closely together to provide a better life for all of our people. That is what the Alliance for Progress means—to provide progress, revolutionary progress through peaceful, democratic means. I think it can be done. I think we have set out on an important journey. I think it is a journey that must be finished. To the completion of that journey, I pledge the people of the United States.

STATEMENT BY VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON²

On this proud occasion I have come at the request of the President of the United States to extend his warm personal greetings to each of you and to express his confident good wishes for the continuing success of your many labors together in this vital organization. This second anniversary of the Alliance for Progress which we observe today is no written milestone. It is an anniversary which some feared and others hoped the alliance would never attain. Today it is convincing evidence that both the doubtful in our own countries and the hostile in other countries have underestimated the capacity for unity and the will among Americans.

We have lived together as neighbors for nearly 350 years.

We have worked together in the Alliance for Progress structure for only 2 years.

But we can believe that in the long reach of history what has begun in these 2 years will have far more meaning to the lives of all who shall call themselves Americans than what has gone on during the centuries before.

Survival of the alliance is no longer a real question. Henceforth we shall observe future

¹Made in the Cabinet Room at the White House on Aug. 17 (White House press release).

²Made before the Council of the Organization of American States on Aug. 20.

anniversaries as milestones of success—genuine and growing success—which we shall achieve together.

To be optimistic about the future of the alliance is not to be unrealistic. Optimism is the only realism for men who are free and who retain the prerogative and privilege of determining their own destiny.

We of the Americas are free.

We are privileged to determine our own destinies.

We are bound together by both common heritage and common hope. We share together a heritage of hatred for oppression, love of liberty, respect for the individual, and a desire for social justice in progress. We likewise aspire together for homes, for work and land, for health and schools. This century has taught us an indelible lesson that the rich can know no peace so long as there is no hope for those long oppressed by poverty, by hunger, by ill health, by illiteracy, by landlessness.

There must be a new hope—an opportunity for a new start.

We do not minimize how long is the road before us nor how steep the grade we must climb.

We acknowledge our obstacles now where we were reluctant to acknowledge any of them before. Some have been overcome. Others most certainly will arise. All obstacles may assume any dimensions under new conditions. But we are bringing our collective talents, energies, and resources to bear upon them, and this is progress of the most important order.

But it is true that from a firm foundation we have made a good beginning. A year ago we had relatively little to show in physical accomplishments of the alliance. This year there is much—8,200 classrooms, 700 well and water supply systems, 900 hospitals and health centers, 140,000 homes, 160,000 agricultural credit loans. The funds which the United States has committed over the past 2 years increasingly are being transformed into bricks and into knowledge. New programs like young trees start slowly. Our 2-year-old tree is already bearing rich fruit. Next year and in succeeding years we expect its harvest to be even heavier. The task before us, however, is not one of 2 years nor, perhaps, even of 10. For

some of our nations this task may not be completed within this generation. But together we will continue with it. Together we will succeed.

Planning groups have been created or strengthened in every nation. Seven national plans have been submitted. Fourteen nations have made reforms in their tax policy or administration. Half our nations have made or begun study of land-reform measures.

On a broader scale, we see the fruit of the growing spirit of alliance. But we do not deceive ourselves. We know there is no easy road to development. We know that enduring progress is not quickly assured. We know that such progress must be accompanied by the support of many needed changes. These are lessons we have learned—and will apply.

Most important of these lessons is the fact that, for the job before us, our resources are not comfortably abundant. What we have to work with is enough only if we carefully and wisely use it to create the growth now which will free the growth of the future.

If we are to honor the generosity of our hearts, we must heed the prudence of our heads. It would be an empty and foolish exchange to substitute mere fleeting gifts of money for the enduring gift of realistic hope—and it is the richest of hope with which we seek to endow the lives of those forgotten Americans. If identifiable needs among us seem inexhaustible, we know that measurable resources are exhaustible. Our needs must be carefully gaged against the total resources and against the efforts of each nation and each people to move toward the goal of the alliance. This may require us to perfect still further the machinery we have designed to implement the alliance. That is only a detail, not the cause for doubt or despair, when we consider that the cause before us is not one of 2 years, not even of 10. Together, as mature, stable, purposeful allies, we shall carry the alliance forward resisting distraction, rejecting revisions, resolving differences.

Above all other considerations, we recognize that the alliance can succeed only in a climate of freedom. We cannot move toward our new future by turning back toward an old task.

Progress without freedom is bread without salt.

We know dictatorial regimes are incompatible with our hemisphere's future. We know that totalitarianism is unacceptable and intolerable in our midst. If we are to keep our hemisphere moving forward, our first and foremost task together is to keep it free and in peace. This we shall do.

The Alliance for Progress is based upon the concept that we have an urgent necessity and the moral obligation to work together for the mutual advantage of all our people, and the desires of the people of the Western Hemisphere can be summed up in the trinity of freedom, peace, and progress.

There are—and there will be—alien forces which seek to disrupt our essential unity. There are—and there will be—alien voices which seek to divide us by sowing doubts as to our mutual good faith.

But I believe that the people of the Americas have the good sense to judge the sources of dissension. And I believe even more strongly that we have the capacity to live together in mutual respect and understanding and assist each other in providing freedom, peace, and progress for our countries.

By working together, we present all humanity with inspiration for the future.

These first years of the alliance are the testing years.

We can say on this second anniversary occasion that great tests have been presented to us. We have met them well: with courage, with resourcefulness, above all with unity.

We shall be tested again and again—from within, from without. But after centuries of slumber the great giant of the Western Hemisphere—unity for progress—is awakening and in that awakening a powerful new force is arising to stand on the side of freedom, peace, and justice for all the world.

Gen. Chiang Ching-kuo Visits U.S.

Press release 433 dated August 20

At the invitation of the Department of State, General Chiang Ching-kuo, Minister Without Portfolio in the Government of the Republic

of China, will visit the United States from September 6 to 17. The purpose of his trip is to visit points of interest in the United States. While in Washington, General Chiang will meet with U.S. Government officials. General Chiang last visited the United States in 1953.

Food for Peace Ships \$1.5 Billion in Commodities in Fiscal 1963

The White House announced on August 21 that President Kennedy had on that day sent to the Congress a report showing that \$1.5 billion of America's farm commodities were shipped overseas during fiscal year 1963 under this nation's massive Food for Peace program. Food for Peace shipments in the last 6 months of the fiscal year (January-June 1963) totaled \$904 million, compared with \$622 million shipped in the first 6 months of the fiscal year.

The 18th semiannual report on Public Law 480 activities revealed that total U.S. farm exports in the fiscal year 1963 were at the record level of over \$5 billion established the previous year. Total shipments under the foreign-currency and dollar-credit P.L. 480 sales programs were at an alltime high. Shipments under P.L. 480 donation programs remained at the same level, while barter transactions declined sharply. At the same time, commercial exports of U.S. agricultural commodities continued to expand: The fiscal year 1963 total of \$3.5 billion was nearly \$60 million greater than in 1962.

In submitting the report, the President's Special Assistant for Food for Peace, Richard W. Reuter, told the President that he is impressed by "the contribution of U.S. agricultural abundance to this country's total foreign assistance effort." Mr. Reuter observed that in addition to donating supplemental food to a record total of 100 million undernourished people, "Food for Peace is also providing significant stimulus to the economic development of many nations." "Food for Peace continues to be an increasingly important tool of American foreign policy," Mr. Reuter assured the President.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree on Implementation of Cooperative Space Program

NASA ANNOUNCEMENT

The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration announced on August 16 that NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. have given final approval to a Memorandum of Understanding which provides for implementing a cooperative space agreement reached in Geneva in June 1962.¹

The memorandum outlines procedures to be followed for carrying out a coordinated weather satellite program, joint experiments with communications using a passive reflector satellite (Echo II), and joint contributions of satellite data to the World Magnetic Survey to be conducted in 1965.

Basic to the coordinated meteorological satellite program is the scheduled establishment by early 1964 of a full-time telecommunications link between Washington and Moscow for the transmission of cloud photographs and other data from experimental meteorological satellites operated by each country. The memorandum provides that other countries may receive such information from this link on a cost-sharing basis. Ultimately, this program is to involve coordinated launchings of operational meteorological satellites.

The experiments with the Echo II passive communications satellite will involve transmissions between the Zemenki Observatory of the Gorky State University in the Soviet Union and the Jodrell Bank Observatory of the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom at frequencies of 162 megacycles/second. Scheduled for early 1964, these experiments will include transmissions from the United States to the

Soviet Union, using conventional facilities for that part of the link between the United States and England.

In the magnetic field survey each country will launch a specialized satellite equipped to measure the earth's magnetic field. This effort will supplement the various ground, sea, and aerial measurements undertaken internationally during the World Magnetic Survey. Results will be exchanged and compared in order to obtain the most authoritative expression of the geomagnetic field.

The bilateral space program stems from an exchange of views between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev on cooperation in space activities following the successful orbital flight of American Astronaut John H. Glenn in February 1962.²

The principal scientific negotiators have been Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA, and Anatoly A. Blagonravov, Chairman of the Commission on Exploration and Utilization of Outer Space of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

The Memorandum of Understanding was drafted at meetings between American and Soviet scientists at Rome in March and at Geneva in May of this year, subject to review by NASA and the Soviet Academy.

In response to a letter of July 8 from Dr. Dryden, Academician Blagonravov on August 1, indicated Soviet readiness to proceed with implementation of the three coordinated programs in accordance with the provisions of the memorandum, which is considered to have entered into force as of that date.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1962, p. 963.

² *Ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1962, p. 411.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

Academician Blagonravov to Dr. Dryden

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR
COMMISSION ON EXPLORATION AND
UTILIZATION OF OUTER SPACE
Moscow, August 1, 1963

No. 119-643-0

DEAR DR. DRYDEN: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR has instructed me to inform you of its consent to the recommendations on the questions of implementing the bilateral agreement on outer space between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the USA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, which were presented during the Soviet-American talks on the peaceful exploration of outer space on March 20, 1963 in Rome, taking into account Section IV of the text of recommendations (magnetic survey with the aid of artificial satellites), which were prepared on May 24, 1963 at Geneva.

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR expresses its hope that the agreement on peaceful exploration and utilization of outer space which has been reached, will promote further cooperation between Soviet and American scientists in this worthy cause in the name of scientific progress and the strengthening of peace on Earth.

Respectfully,

A. A. BLAGONRAVOV,
*Chairman of the Commission,
Academician*

To Dr. HUGH L. DRYDEN,
*Deputy Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Washington 25, D.C.*

Dr. Dryden to Academician Blagonravov

JULY 8, 1963

Academician A. A. BLAGONRAVOV
*Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
Leninski Prospekt 14
Moscow, U.S.S.R.*

DEAR ACADEMICIAN BLAGONRAVOV: In my letter of May 7, 1963,¹ I indicated that NASA had no changes to propose concerning the text of the "First Memorandum of Understanding to Implement the Bilateral Space Agreement of June 8, 1962 between the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the U.S." agreed to by us in Rome on March 20 of this year. It is now my pleasure to inform you similarly with regard to the text of the mutual understandings reached by us in Geneva on May 24 concerning the new Section IV, "Magnetic Field Survey Through the Use of Artificial Satellites."

I propose, therefore, that the First Memorandum

¹ Not printed here.

of Understanding, incorporating the new Section IV, and the changes to Section IV also agreed to by us in Geneva on May 24, become effective as of the date of your response to this letter, confirming approval by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. I hope that by this time your Academy has already approved both the original Rome document and the subsequent Geneva text, and I shall look forward to hearing from you in this regard.

Sincerely yours,

HUGH L. DRYDEN
Deputy Administrator

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

FIRST MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING TO IMPLEMENT THE BILATERAL SPACE AGREEMENT

OF JUNE 8, 1962

BETWEEN THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
OF THE USSR AND
THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE US

I—PREAMBLE

The purpose of the present Memorandum of Understanding is to begin the implementation of the sections of the bilateral space agreement of June 8, 1962 dealing with a coordinated meteorological satellite program, world magnetic survey using satellites, and a passive communication satellite experiment. It also provides for future discussions by the scientists of both countries of scientific results obtained from deep space probes (Mariner II and Mars I).

II—COORDINATED METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM

A. Exchange of Meteorological Satellite Data

The bilateral space agreement of June 8, 1962 provided that the exchange of meteorological satellite data between Moscow and Washington be of approximately equivalent interest to the two countries.

The following sections describe the data to be exchanged. It is agreed that, in general, the data exchange is to be completed within six hours of the observation time so that it will be useful in weather analysis and forecasting.

In all of the joint activities relating to meteorological satellites and exchange of meteorological data, the pertinent recommendations of the World Meteorological Organization shall be given due consideration.

1. Cloud Photographs

a. Selection of Photographs

Cloud photographs will be exchanged; the selection of those to be transmitted will be based on the following criteria:

1. Areas of the earth having few conventional observations.
2. Pictures along active international air routes, particularly oceanic.

3. Pictures containing patterns of meteorological significance such as fronts, vortices, cloud bands and streets.

b. Accuracy of Location

1. Positions of identifiable cloud elements in the pictures will be located with an accuracy of about 200 km. Where landmarks are available, this accuracy should be about 100 km. It is expected that this accuracy will be improved later.
2. The pictures will include latitude and longitude grids at 2° intervals.

c. Brightness Levels

1. At the satellite receiving stations, six to ten brightness (gray) levels⁴ will be contained in the pictures.
2. The pictures as received at the end of the communications link will contain five to six brightness levels, if possible.
3. To aid in the interpretation of cloud images, copies of some of the original pictures transmitted over the link will be mailed to the other country.

d. Resolution

1. The ground resolution provided by the pictures initially will be about 2.5 km and are expected to improve to about 1 km.

e. Field of View

1. The minimum field of view, on the earth's surface, of each picture will be about 1000 km on a side.

2. Nephanalyses

- a. Nephanalyses will be transmitted for all pictures received by the meteorological satellites.
- b. Wherever possible, format, representation, and map projections will follow World Meteorological Organization recommendations.
- c. Polar stereographic projection will be used, except in equatorial areas where Mercator projection will be used.
- d. A map scale of 1:20,000,000 or 1:15,000,000 will be used as convenient to the transmitting country.

3. Other Satellite Observations

As satellite observation techniques are developed to the point where they provide new useful information for weather forecasting, the data obtained will be considered for inclusion in this exchange program.

B. Exchange of Techniques and Results of Scientific Research

To assist in making maximum use of the satellite data in weather analysis and forecasting, there will be an exchange, on a basis of mutual interest, of techniques of interpretation and analysis.

⁴ Brightness levels should be clearly distinguishable by eye, such as the ratio of the intensities of adjacent steps being equal to the square root of two. [Footnote in original.]

It is also desirable to exchange scientific literature and data for research purposes, and to organize cooperative symposia.

C. Exchange of Conventional Meteorological Data

The establishment of a facsimile quality communications link between Washington and Moscow for the exchange of satellite data provides an opportunity, when it is not being used for the transmission of satellite data, for the exchange of related data obtained by conventional means of observations, and related maps, which will allow for improved correlation between satellite and conventional observations. Each country will indicate which of these data, available in the other, it wishes to receive and determine the priority of transmission. Some details of the exchange of the conventional data are given in an appendix and others are expected to be clarified, as they arise, by an appropriate working group.

D. Establishment of Communication Link

With the understanding that the regular exchange of meteorological data obtained from meteorological satellites will commence in the beginning of the second half of 1964, NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR consider it desirable, in the beginning of the first half of 1964, to start the occasional exchange of conventional meteorological data and experimental satellite data and for this purpose to establish the communication link between Moscow and Washington provided in the agreement of June 8, 1962.

1. Characteristics of the Communication Link

The communication link shall be arranged on a four-wire basis, for full-time use, allowing simultaneous transmission of facsimile telegraphy information in both directions. Technical parameters of the communication link shall conform to the CCITT [Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique] series T recommendations.

The link shall be equipped for non-simultaneous voice use to allow technical and meteorological coordination as necessary.

2. Characteristics of Terminal Equipment

Terminal equipment used for transmission of weather maps and charts shall conform with WMO recommendation 10.6.17/I—"Standardization of International Meteorological Transmissions by Facsimile—Equipment Characteristics." The preferred index of cooperation will be 576. The drum speed shall be 60, 90, or 120 rpm, depending upon the results of the technical tests.

Additional requirements for the terminal equipment for transmitting information obtained from meteorological satellites shall be determined during 1963. Each party shall provide and operate its own terminal equipment.

3. Routing of Communication Link

The circuit for the link shall be routed Washington—New York—London or Paris—Berlin—Poland—Moscow, assuming first that ade-

quate facilities (circuits) are available over this route and second, that tests prove this routing to be technically acceptable to both NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Technical arrangements for those sections of the link from Washington to Berlin shall be made by NASA. Technical arrangements for those sections of the link from Berlin to Moscow shall be made by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Joint technical tests of the communication link along the selected route shall be conducted during January 1964, and after this the communication link will be put into regular operation.

4. Cost of the Communication Link

NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall, within one month, agree upon a suitable mechanism for the handling of charges over the entire link in such a way as to provide for equal sharing of cost of the whole line by the two parties.

5. Reception of Meteorological Data by Weather Services of Other Countries

The desire of Weather Services of other countries to bridge the line on a receive-only basis in order to obtain meteorological data for their own use will be welcomed with the condition that each such Weather Service will make a proportional contribution to the total expenses of the communication link.

6. Coordination

NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall, within 60 days, designate representatives for continuing direct technical coordination of details concerning this link.

7. Coordinated Launchings of Weather Satellites

The Bilateral Space Agreement of June 8, 1962, provided, among other things, for the coordinated launching of operational weather satellites. It is considered desirable to initiate coordinated launchings of weather satellites towards the end of the experimental period in order to gain experience with such coordination and to provide for more frequent receipt and exchange of data of both experimental and operational value.

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR and NASA therefore agree to convene a suitable Joint Working Group by the end of 1963, so that arrangements may be made, consistent with the provisions of the June 8, 1962 agreement, for mutually agreeable launching schedules.

II—ARRANGEMENTS FOR PASSIVE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE EXPERIMENTS

A. General

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR agree to participate jointly in passive communications experiments using a large reflector satellite, Echo II, (referred to as Echo A-12" in the agreement of June 8, 1962),

which NASA is expected to launch prior to the middle of 1964.

B. Satellite Characteristics

The satellite to be used in these experiments shall be approximately 44 meters in diameter and shall be constructed of a material having a radio wave reflectivity of 98%. It will carry two telemetry transmitters (approximately 136 mc/s) to be used as tracking aids. The intended orbit will be inclined about 82° to the equator and will be roughly circular at an altitude of 1290 km.

C. Frequencies and Route

Communications experiments shall be carried out at frequencies of approximately 162 mc/s between the USSR (Zemenki Observatory, Gorky State University) and the United Kingdom (Jodrell Bank Observatory, University of Manchester).

In view of the technical desirability of carrying out communication experiments with a passive satellite using higher frequencies, NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall consider, within three months following the date of this agreement, the possibility of extending these tests into the microwave region of the radio frequency spectrum. The possibility of arranging radar and optical observations of the Echo II satellite sphere during the period of its inflation and thereafter shall be considered within the same period.

D. Arrangements

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall make necessary arrangements for use of the Gorky State University facilities. NASA shall make necessary arrangements for the use of the facilities of the University of Manchester at Jodrell Bank. Within sixty days NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall appoint representatives to begin and carry on continuing technical coordination with respect to the experiments at approximately 162 mc/s. NASA will request the appointment of a corresponding technical representative of the University of Manchester.

In case the question of using higher frequencies for carrying out the passive satellite experiments is settled positively, NASA shall arrange, through the General Post Office of the United Kingdom, for the use of the Goonhilly Downs Station and shall request that technical representatives also be appointed by the General Post Office. The technical representatives for NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also serve to carry on continuing technical coordination for these experiments or other representatives may be named for this purpose.

It is understood that there will be no mutual money reimbursements between NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR for the use of any facilities.

E. Orbital Information

NASA shall provide a prediction of the expected initial orbital elements at least two months prior to

launching of the satellite. Actual orbital elements based on tracking information will be supplied for the duration of the experimental period, at intervals of approximately once per week, or as necessary for adequate pointing of the communication antennas. The Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall provide tracking data on orbits that are visible in the USSR but not in the USA in a form to be mutually agreed on by the technical representatives.

F. Planned Types of Transmission

The passive Echo II satellite experiments shall basically consist of measurements of the quality of transmission over the circuit between the USSR and the UK for the following kinds of transmissions:

- (a) Unmodulated carrier
- (b) Single frequency modulation
- (c) Telegraphy
- (d) Facsimile and voice if feasible.

It shall also be an objective of these experiments to test the feasibility of direct communication between the US and the USSR using the Echo II satellite as a part of the link. For this purpose NASA will arrange for the part of the link from the US to the UK.

G. Exchange of Observational Data

The results of the experiments and observations shall be promptly exchanged between NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and be made generally available to the scientific and technical community. Information about the equipment used for the experiments shall be exchanged to the extent necessary for the interpretation of these data.

H. Future Plans

NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR will continue experimental research with active communications satellites under their national programs; after the completion of preliminary national tests, negotiations will be continued to discuss the possibility of joint experiments of mutual interest with active communications satellites.

IV—MAGNETIC FIELD SURVEY THROUGH THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL SATELLITES

1. Objectives

It shall be the aim of the cooperative effort at this stage to produce a mapping of the earth's magnetic field by using US and USSR Satellites flown during the International Year of the Quiet Sun (IQSY).

2. Satellite Orbits

The forms of orbits, their altitudes and inclination to the equator will be selected by the satellite-launching country, in accordance with the objective of the experiment. It is agreed that the accuracy of determining space and time coordinates for the separate magnetic measurements on the satellite be such that after necessary processing by the satellite-launching country the magnetic data would not contain errors greater than plus or minus 10 gammas.

3. Times of Satellite Launchings

The times of satellite launchings will be determined by the satellite-launching country and will take place during the IQSY. It is recommended that launchings take place in 1965 since one may expect, in 1965, that the ground-based magnetic observatory programs of all countries participating in the IQSY will be in full operation.

4. Lifetime of Satellites

It is agreed that the lifetime of each satellite be such that the minimum density of magnetic measurements from each satellite correspond to no less than one per 200 kilometer square on the earth's surface.

5. Satellite Apparatus

It is agreed that absolute magnetometers of various types be used, such as optical pumping and proton precession magnetometers. It is recommended that the sensitive elements of magnetometers be located on the satellites in such a way as to minimize the effects of magnetic fields from the spacecraft.

6. Time Variation Corrections

With a view towards the desirability of working out a common method of introducing time variation corrections into the results of observations from satellites it is agreed that each side conduct research in this direction and exchange results with the other side. The following possibilities should be considered:

- a. Comparison of satellite magnetic measurements taken at different times but corresponding to the same region of space within a diameter of 10-20 kilometers;
- b. Comparison between experimental data obtained from satellites with those from ground-based magnetic observatories.

For the compilation of a magnetic map it is agreed that the results of satellite measurements made on magnetically quiet days be utilized.

In connection with the above, an exchange is recommended between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the NASA of the USA, namely: microfilm copies of magnetograms and tables of hourly averages of magnetic elements. In addition, copies of magnetograms shall be accompanied by data on the preliminary base line values, scale values, temperature coefficients, and types of instruments.

It is agreed that these data be exchanged no later than three months after the month of observation from the following observatories:

USSR	USA
Yakutsk	Sitka
Sverdlovsk	College [Alaska]
Irkutsk	Fredericksburg
Odessa	Tucson
Tashkent	San Juan
	Guam

It is agreed that the final base line values be exchanged on a quarterly basis.

Exchange of Satellite Magnetic Measurements

It is agreed to exchange results of magnetic measurements from satellites in the form of scientific articles or reports containing information on the satellite equipment, the data, its accuracy, methods of processing, introduced corrections, and estimates of the accuracy achieved judged necessary by the authors of the experiment.

It is agreed that each side if necessary will furnish by mail to the other side any additional data which may help to clarify the questions which arise in the use of the data received by exchange to remove the difficulties in utilization of those data.

Exchange of Data from Magnetic Surveys of Other Types

It is agreed to exchange comparable amounts of data from magnetic surveys which may be necessary for the compilation of a magnetic map and which are made without using satellites (ground, sea, aerial surveys) in the form of maps or of reports with attachments giving the results of surveys in tabular form, indicating coordinates and the times to which these data refer.

International Cooperation

It is agreed that appropriate organizations under the International Council of Scientific Unions, including the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics and COSPAR, concerned with the World Magnetic Survey be kept informed of the proposed joint US-USSR contributions to the World Magnetic Survey and of the analysis of the results. Scientific data resulting from this work which is suitable for storage and dissemination through the World Data Centers will be supplied in a timely way.

V—OTHER QUESTIONS OF COOPERATION

Representatives of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and NASA consider it to be useful for further progress in the space sciences to exchange scientific data received as a result of the launching in the USSR of an automatic space station towards the planet of Mars and the launching in the USA of a space station towards the planet of Venus. For this purpose it is desirable to conduct meetings of scientists of the two countries to discuss the results of those experiments in outer space. The preliminary discussion of these questions will be held during the next meeting of COSPAR in June 1963 in Warsaw. Additional meetings may be arranged at a later date, dependent on progress in analyzing the data received from "Mars I" and "Mariner II" by the scientists of both countries.

VI—EFFECTIVE DATE

The recommendations proposed in the present document have a preliminary character and will be presented by both parties to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the US for final consideration. If

either of the two parties finds it necessary to make any corrections, additions, or deletions in the text of the prepared documents, then all of these changes should be made in the shortest possible time after the conclusion of discussions concerning the conduct of a world magnetic survey by means of artificial satellites, by correspondence, which will be sent to the following address in Moscow:

Academy of Sciences of the USSR:
Leninski Prospekt 14
Moscow
USSR

and to the following address in Washington:

National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Attention: Dr. Hugh L. Dryden
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washington 25, D.C.
U.S.A.

If in this final consideration there is failure to agree on any of the three major areas, the recommendations in the other major areas will continue in effect.

ROME, ITALY AND GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
March 20 and May 24, 1963

APPENDIX

EXCHANGE OF CONVENTIONAL METEOROLOGICAL DATA

A. Types of Conventional Data

1. Computer Processed and Checked Upper Air Data

- a. It is not anticipated that all conventional data would be processed and transmitted but rather the data for a few selected upper air levels that are particularly significant for analysis and forecasting. Criteria for the extent of this kind of data exchange would be based on the following:
 1. Limited to these stations from which the original upper air reports are received within three to four hours at Moscow or Washington. (This amounts to a "Regional" collection.)
 2. Original reports will be subjected to rapid computer processing in order to eliminate and/or correct erroneous reports and to arrange the data in a convenient and systematic form for transmission.
 3. The upper air levels useful for numerical weather prediction are 1000 mb, 850 mb, 700 mb, 500 mb, 300 mb, and 200 mb.
 4. At the levels indicated above, the following data will be transmitted: temperature, geopotential height, dew point and wind.
 5. The areas and network of stations for which the data are to be transmitted will be determined later.

2. Conventional Weather Charts

Charts prepared by objective numerical techniques in graphical form should receive priority for exchange

on the communications link. The types of charts that would contribute to improved world weather analyses and predictions are:

- a. Northern Hemispheric analyses of the 1000 mb and several upper air levels such as the 500 mb, 300 mb, and 200 mb levels.
- b. Northern Hemispheric predictions for 24 hours with the possibility of extending the period of forecast to 72 hours in the future, for 500, 300, and 200 mb.
- c. It is desirable in the future to exchange extended period forecasts of five days or longer and a selection of the important working charts or diagrams that may be used in generating these forecasts.
- d. In order to coordinate satellite and conventional observations associated with important weather developments, available detailed analyses and satellite photographs for specific areas will be transmitted on request as soon as possible.

3. *Timing and Frequency of Exchanges*

To be of maximum operational value, all information should be submitted as early as practical. Suggested items are:

- a. Processed upper air data within 4-5 hours of observation (twice per day).
- b. Analyses within six hours of observation (twice per day).
- c. Prognoses within 6-9 hours of observation (twice per day).

4. *Map Scales and Projections*

- a. Polar stereographic projections will be used for all chart exchanges.
- b. Analysis and prognostic charts having a scale of 1:30 million or 1:40 million will be used.
- c. Special charts exchanged on request would be on scales most convenient for the transmitting country.

U.S. Signs Exchange Agreements With Afghanistan and Argentina

Afghanistan

Press release 437 dated August 24

Afghanistan and the United States on August 20 signed an educational exchange agreement under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays Act).

The agreement was signed at Kabul by Ali Ahmad Popal, Minister of Education, and by John M. Steeves, American Ambassador. Under the terms of the agreement \$500,000 in U.S.-

owned foreign currency will be used for exchanges over the next 5 years.

Argentina

Press release 438 dated August 24

The Governments of Argentina and the United States on August 21 signed at Buenos Aires a new agreement putting into operation a broader program of educational exchanges under the Fulbright-Hays Act. This agreement will enlarge the scope of exchange activities between the two countries initiated under the Fulbright Act in November 1956.¹

Under this program, administered in Argentina by the binational Commission for Educational Exchange between the United States and Argentina, approximately 25 U.S. citizens and 78 Argentine nationals—professors, research scholars, teachers, and students—received grants in 1963. The grantees were in such fields as economics, American and Argentine studies, teacher education, and the physical and natural sciences. During the period 1957-63 a total of 275 Argentine nationals and 101 Americans were awarded grants under this binational educational exchange program.

While this program dates only from 1956, the two Governments have cooperated in educational exchange programs since 1940. Almost a century ago President Domingo Faustino Sarmiento of Argentina, a friend and former student of Horace Mann, inaugurated one of the first cultural exchanges with Latin America when he invited American teachers to Argentina to assist in the establishment there of normal schools for teacher training.

Letters of Credence

Afghanistan

The newly appointed Ambassador of Afghanistan, Abdul Majid, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on August 21. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 434 dated August 21.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3687.

Education: Passkey to the Future

Statement by Lucius D. Battle

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs*¹

It is a great pleasure to me personally, as well as a high privilege and honor on behalf of my delegation, to participate in this meeting of ministers of education of the member nations of the Organization of American States.

We are here for a time of accounting, of stock-taking, and of looking ahead. We have reached a stage which the conferees at Punta del Este wisely envisaged when they asked that this meeting follow the one at Santiago.²

Our combined and cooperative efforts in the education, science, and culture sector of the Alliance for Progress have already produced forward movement. We can approach the second anniversary of Punta del Este later this month with a measured optimism on the course our joint endeavor is taking.

Both the meetings at Punta del Este and at Santiago provided historic statements of our common aims and purposes in educational development and of our common commitments to target goals for this decade. But we now need to know in more detailed terms what we have done so far to move this sector of our *Alianza* forward and what concrete action steps we feel can now be taken to accelerate our progress toward our goals.

¹ Made before the Third Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education of the Organization of American States at Bogotá, Colombia, on Aug. 4. Mr. Battle was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the meeting held at Bogotá Aug. 4-10.

² Conference on Education and Economic and Social Development in Latin America, held in March 1962 at Santiago, Chile.

This approach will lead us at Bogotá to deliberations directed primarily to what needs to be done. For my delegation let me say that we welcome this context for these deliberations. In this way only can we focus our efforts more sharply toward the great ends we all seek.

I would like now to turn to our own review of the 2 years since Punta del Este.

This presentation is in two parts. One is what we have done as a partner in the alliance toward fulfillment of the goals outlined at Santiago. The second part presents some highlights of our own domestic educational effort, which is not without its own problems and difficulties.

Priority of Educational Development

First, let me speak briefly of the general context—the Alliance for Progress—in which our presentation is made. On March 13, 1961, President Kennedy, speaking at the White House before Latin American diplomats, Members of Congress, and their wives, proposed a vast cooperative undertaking by the nations of the Americas for a decade of democratic development.³ Twenty of the 21 American Republics joined together at Punta del Este to make possible this great endeavor.⁴

Education, science, and culture were given a high place in the earliest concept of the alliance.

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

⁴ For background and text of the Charter of Punta del Este, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

President Sends Message to Bogota Meeting of Ministers of Education

Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to the Third Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education of the Organization of American States, held at Bogotá, Colombia, August 4-10. The President's message was read at the inaugural session by the chairman of the conference, Pedro Gómez Valderrama, Minister of Education of Colombia.

White House press release dated August 5

On behalf of the Government and the people of the United States, and on my own personal behalf, I have great pleasure in sending greetings and good wishes to the delegates to the Third Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education, assembled at Bogotá.

Your meeting represents yet another step along the road of inter-American development that began with the Act of Bogotá in 1960 and received further impetus at Punta del Este in 1961 and Santiago in 1962. In meetings such as these positive measures can be taken to advance the great goals of our common commitment in the Alliance for Progress. Education and the development of human resources are of the utmost importance in attaining these goals, for they lie at the base of economic and social development and, accordingly, at the base of the alliance itself.

Today, more than ever before, education is a prerequisite for progress and it is the passkey to the future. We therefore applaud and encourage the increasing emphasis on education to which you are committed and your efforts to translate into concrete form the goal of wider educational opportunities for all.

With you I share the determination that before this decade comes to a close the Americas will have entered upon a new era, where the progress of the *Alianza* will truly reflect the great spiritual and cultural heritage of this hemisphere.

In your deliberations and high endeavors, I wish you every success.

Five of the ten points of the President's proposal made specific reference to education, to science and science teaching, and to cultural exchange and development. Their central place in the *Alianza* has become increasingly evident through the meetings at Punta del Este and at Santiago. There has been a widening realization in all our countries that education lies at the base of economic and social development.

Accordingly my Government has given highest priority attention to educational development in the alliance. This has not always been translatable into dollars; nor do the totals of authorized dollars for educational projects normally equal those going into programs with high basic costs, such as major construction projects. But the totals themselves already give substantial evidence of the forward movement we are developing.

Let us now look at the record. First, briefly, for the alliance as a whole.

In each of the 2 fiscal years since July 1, 1960 the United States has authorized over \$1 billion toward the objectives of the alliance. In the first year the Latin American countries provided nearly \$8 billion. In 1963 U.S. authorizations are being increasingly translated into such terms as classrooms, books, and assistance for school nutrition programs.

Let us now look at the rate of U.S. educational, scientific, and cultural investment in the alliance. The U.S. Government made available \$120 million in loans and grants in the fiscal year just concluded, many times the total of such assistance in previous years and considerably higher than the \$83 million made available in the immediately preceding year. The \$120 million total includes exchange programs, book programs, school nutrition programs, and other activities of such agencies as the Peace Corps, National Institutes of Health, and the National Science Foundation, among others.

Highlights of U.S. Aid Program

In more detailed terms, let me present now some highlights of our work, in cooperation with Latin American governments and institutions, in the light of the commitments made by the U.S. delegation at Santiago in March 1962.

Last year we sponsored participants from 16 countries and two professors from the United States for the first program in Latin American educational planning, at the ECLA [Economic Commission for Latin America] Institute in Santiago. On July 8 a second course was inaugurated in Santiago, with 38 students from 16 countries, 25 of them under our sponsorship. We have given greatly increased attention to manpower planning within our \$2 million a

ual program, which now supports general planning and training activities in various Latin American countries. In order to provide more and better prepared public administrators, our Government is also giving assistance to university-level public administration institutions in five countries and to inservice public administration training efforts in seven countries. At the same time it is offering wider fellowship opportunities for administrators on the U.S. mainland and in Puerto Rico. This has all been in response to the first and perhaps most critical problem area—relating to educational planning and administration—as seen by the U.S. delegation at Santiago.

We have also sought to give significant support to the acceleration of school construction programs. Since July 1961, the United States Government has helped finance the construction of more than 8,000 primary schoolrooms in Latin America and has made available funds to finance an additional 10,000 under a total loan and grant program which has exceeded \$10 million. We are cooperating with UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], the Government of Mexico, and others in regard to a proposed regional school building center.

A third important program relates to expanding and strengthening teacher training, to which we have devoted \$2.5 million in nine countries during the past fiscal year as well as \$100,000 for training more than 100 Latin American teachers at bilingual centers in five U.S. universities.

In order to assist the development of university centers of excellence we are supporting a \$1 million university-to-university program linking more than 50 U.S. universities and 60 Latin American institutions. Efforts are concentrated upon building outstanding faculties in the critical developmental fields, such as engineering, agriculture, science and education, and administration. For example, we are working with the Higher Education Council in Central America (CSUCA) for this purpose and have under active consideration, together with other multilateral agencies and U.S. foundations, important programs to strengthen leading agricultural centers at Chapingo, Mexico, and La Molina, Peru.

In science teaching our efforts include support of 10 contracts at the university level exclusively in this field and several more which are related. These efforts are directed toward improving both university-level and secondary teaching. A new program to be coordinated by the National Science Foundation has just been launched at a cost of \$900,000 to train secondary teachers, to provide teaching materials, and strengthen curricula in science and mathematics throughout Latin America. This program supplements an earlier effort in Central America.

In a major joint effort under the alliance, our Food for Peace program is now bringing nutritional benefits to one out of four school children in Latin America. Within not too many months it is hoped that almost half the Latin American school population can be reached with this program. Other assistance to students has included local secondary and university scholarship programs in several countries.

In terms of people served, perhaps the most dramatic of the enlarged efforts of the U.S. Government in support of Latin American educational development has been that of providing textbooks. Eight hundred and fifty thousand first and second grade readers have been distributed to Central American school children within the past few months. Work is under way to make possible the preparation of a core series of materials which will be available for the full six grades in Central America, with the expectation that 1,500,000 copies will be in the hands of Central American students by June of next year. A center to provide similar services to several South American countries is being planned for inauguration next year in Lima.

Through a \$1 million annual program, increased numbers of Spanish- and Portuguese-language textbooks and technical publications subsidized by the Agency for International Development (AID) are being published now in Mexico and soon will be in Buenos Aires. We have supported the production of science books and the distribution of scholarly journals in fields of technical interest. Free books are available to member libraries of the U.S. Book Exchange, and the U.S. Information Agency is providing thousands of books in Spanish and Portuguese translation to libraries throughout

Latin America in a program involving \$1.4 million annually.

Experimental and far-reaching programs of rural and urban education have received more than \$21 million in support from the U.S. Government in the past 2 years, including literacy and fundamental education efforts, experimental use of radio and TV, and vocational education projects, among other activities.

In the field of educational and cultural interchange under the new Fulbright-Hays Act, the Department of State has increased the level of exchange and other programs to \$8 million annually. More than 2,500 persons from both Latin America and the United States participated in these programs this past year. Forty-two community-sponsored binational schools in Latin America are also receiving support.

Projects and interests related to the alliance, including the exchange of professors, teachers, and students, have received priority in this general program. Through the AID participant training program, 1,600 Latin Americans had project-related visits to the continental United States and to Puerto Rico, and an additional number received grants to go to so-called third countries for similar observation and study. For the first 6 months of the past fiscal year, there were 1,200 such AID participants, indicating expansion in this activity. During the next year the cultural presentations program will bring to Latin America performing arts groups such as the Robert Shaw Chorale, the University of Illinois Symphony Orchestra, and the Roger Wagner Chorale.

These are only highlights of a more detailed summary which we have prepared and which I am asking the secretariat to distribute as an annex to this statement.⁵

Educational Challenges and Problems in U.S.

The second part of our presentation is a highlight summary of the status of our own domestic educational establishment, of the educational challenges and problems we face at home. As you can appreciate, our domestic requirements have a direct bearing on our overseas capabilities.

First of all, let me trace briefly the history

⁵ Not printed here.

and character of our educational system. From the earliest founding days, the people of the United States have reflected a deep faith in education. Within the framework of our Federal system, this has led to both State and national functions and, arising from our form of society, to a general system marked by a pluralism and diversity of types of institutions and sources of support. The power to provide a system of education is, however, one of the powers reserved under our Constitution to the individual States. Because of the nature of our Federal system, States and local communities have therefore over the years become our principal planning units. We have not, however, hesitated to recognize at the Federal level the need for assistance to national educational planning desired by countries at early or evolving stages of national growth.

With all our concern for more than two centuries with our own educational development and with the introduction of new techniques, we find much in the system in the United States which today needs strengthening and improving—much which needs revision and reform. One specific area, as you know, is racial discrimination as it affects equal educational opportunity, a problem on which we are making a steady attack.

Major areas where Federal action on general education problems is urgently needed are set forth in detail in the President's message to Congress earlier this year. Anyone studying this document and the report of the OAS [Organization of American States] Task Force on Educational Needs in Latin America⁶ will be struck at once by the number of problems all of us share. They may be formulated somewhat differently, they may vary in scale or be seen from different standpoints, but they present many common characteristics.

We are therefore aware of your problems because we have such problems too. We are also seeking ways of meeting these problems.

⁶ Final Report of the Special Commission for Programming and Development of Education, Science and Culture in Latin America (OAS Doc. 6 (English)). Requests for copies may be addressed to the Documentation Service, Division of Education, Inter-American Union, Washington, D.C., 20006.

Shortage of Teachers

Let us take, for example, the matter of teachers—a problem we clearly have in common. We, too, have a shortage of teachers and are seeking in every way possible to encourage greater flow of qualified persons into this profession. We have a need in the United States for more and better qualified teachers if we are to raise the quality of elementary and secondary education. The Congress is now considering a proposal which we believe will make it possible to attract to the teaching profession, and retain, teachers of the highest ability.

Basic to the proposal would be measures to raise the quality of instruction in teacher education programs, both preservice and inservice, by improving the standards, intellectual content, and organization of courses and curricula. These measures would be accompanied by efforts to raise teacher salary scales in order to bring them into line with those prevailing in other professions requiring a similar length of preparation. Attracting and holding the ablest teachers also points to the need to reduce class size and relieve teaching overload.

Adult and Vocational Education

Another educational problem we share has to do with adult education and vocational education.

In a world of rapid technological, social, and economic change the need for the whole citizenry to be literate is very great. Even though we have one of the highest educational levels in any country, it is of real concern to us in the United States that out of a total population of nearly 200 million we still have some 23 million persons 18 years and older who have completed less than 8 years of schooling, and 8 million persons aged 25 and older who have completed less than 5 years of schooling. Without a basic education of reading, writing, and arithmetic becoming increasingly difficult in today's world to be self-sustaining. Studies have been undertaken which show that it is among these millions of undereducated that the greatest percentage of unemployment is to be found—and frequently the largest number of persons supported by public welfare funds. To avoid de-

pendency, adults with limited education must work, but in many instances their basic preparation is so meager that on-the-job training in many fields becomes itself a problem.

The adult basic education bill which is presently before our Congress would make possible better instruction and increased research in adult learning processes, as well as demonstrations and pilot projects from which other programs may take inspiration. There is a close link between the efforts to provide basic education to adults and to extend opportunities for vocational education. Technological advances, shifts in market demands, and other economic changes have altered patterns of employment and thrown many individuals out of work. Increasingly, job opportunities are to be found in work requiring good educational background and specialized skills.

We recognize the need to strengthen vocational education programs, for vocational education has as its purpose the training of people to earn a living. It interweaves with general basic education a specialized education that permits individuals to be self-supporting, contributing members of their communities. Strong vocational programs related to manpower needs can do much to reduce long-term unemployment and the danger of delinquency among out-of-school youth. Success of such programs depends in no small degree upon acceptance by the academic community of vocational education as a vital part of education—as that part, in fact, which may have the greatest potential for relieving some of the social and economic burdens which confront our communities today.

Another common need we share is wider access to books and information.

These are only a small number of the educational areas in which we are all seeking improvement and greater strength.

To cope with these and other areas of education which require improvement or expansion in the United States, the Federal Government has proposed a variety of assistance through loans, grants, and scholarships. In many cases the assistance from Federal funds is only a small portion of the total sums required. Federal financing of education in the United States is about 41½ percent of the total expended, while

the States provide 39 percent, and local sources 56½ percent. Thus the aid from the Federal Government serves as a catalytic agent only, and the major responsibility and authority do, as I indicated earlier, rest with the States and local education bodies.

The status of education in the United States was the subject of recent testimony by U.S. Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel, a member of this delegation. He told a Senate committee in June, at hearings on the National Education Improvement Act of 1963, that:

The challenges that confront us today are the results of rapid changes that have taken place . . . in the last few decades, and even the last few months. The need for more and better education grows increasingly apparent with every fresh breakthrough in research and technology, with every social and economic change, with every new international development. As a result, our progress in education has become a matter of deep concern . . . to every State, community and crossroads in America.

Report of OAS Task Force

The new requirements and opportunities of a changing world have put the problems of education high on the agenda for us all.

These problems take form in the OAS task force's particularized statement of educational needs, over an entire continent, and in the consultations and commitments already undertaken both through governments and through non-governmental sources of external aid. Guided by the excellent report of the task force, we come now to a consideration of the next steps we should take.

The task force report provides us with abundant and detailed data illustrative of needs and of potentials. In this way the report encourages a healthy confrontation of potential and performance. It encourages us to get into the *specifics* of our problem.

We must, I believe, talk in specific terms if we are to meet the opportunities this conference provides. We need to be specific about what we have done, what we feel we can do, what we want to do, and how we feel we can best do it. I have long been persuaded that real progress in such meetings cannot be made without a close concern for the concrete facts of the matters we are discussing.

We will all have questions to ask—stimulat-

ing ones, I am sure—looking both to the past and to the present. Although we are not meeting here to negotiate agreements, we are meeting to consult freely. In this broad consultative framework we can usefully advance the progress of the alliance at this stage.

Our purposes, then, are to take stock of what we have done and to find ways to get on with the job. In more expanded terms, we anticipate valuable results from discussions of such priority subjects as the need for national development planning, with educational development planning as a central component; of new educational techniques that can be put into the service of national and regional plans; of new steps to improve the administrative organization of educational staffs, and their capacity to deal effectively with new programs.

Educational planning as a component of national development planning is relatively new, not only in Latin America but in other parts of the world as well. As a matter of fact the economic theory underlying our present concepts of human resource development—that value is added by investment in education—has opened a relatively new academic field.

Plotting the Forward Course

Let me say a few words as to where we may expect to go from here. Only the OAS member states can decide this course—by their individual actions. The key decisions that will plot the forward course for the total effort will be made in your legislative and executive chambers, and progress will be most marked where educational planning programs are adopted and instituted; where educational administrative machinery is reviewed and improved in the light of new and larger demands upon it; where larger proportions of internal resources are budgeted for educational development; and where well-supported plans are put forward to enlist external aid from any of the multiple sources, public and private.

These are the kinds of forces that assure forward movement. In this connection a review of the record of accomplishment with respect to the 25 immediate action projects outlined in the task force report will reveal that a great deal has already been done. Her-

we have a group of projects, largely regional ones, on which valuable consultative and cooperative experience has already been obtained by a number of states.

But there is much more to be done. And, as the task force report states, "Nothing can replace the continuous, methodical, and effectively channeled efforts that each country will have to make to achieve its objectives."

I will refer only briefly to our strong belief that the existing OAS structure for educational matters should be adapted to meet the growing demands and opportunities of the alliance. It is our view that the Inter-American Cultural Council should henceforth meet at the ministerial level, biennially rather than annually, to review and evaluate developments in the *Alianza* in this field and to prepare a report for the consideration of IA-ECOSOC [Inter-American Economic and Social Council]. With this report IA-ECOSOC would have the views of the competent technical organ of OAS in the annual review of the economic and social progress of the hemisphere assigned to IA-ECOSOC by the Charter of Punta del Este.

Further, we would favor IACC's assigning review and evaluation functions to a reconstituted and revitalized Cultural Action Committee composed of outstanding figures in education, science, and culture. A strengthening of the OAS secretariat to assist such matters would also seem to fall within the scope of the improved institutional machinery we now need.

We can all take satisfaction, I think, in the scope and magnitude of the concepts of educational development in Latin America which were affirmed at Punta del Este and at Santiago. Historians can only say, I believe, that ours was no timid generation that saw in the decade of the 1960's opportunity for a truly historic Decade of Development. This opportunity has been seen and acted upon, to be sure, in wider ones than Latin America alone. The United Nations has proclaimed the 1960's a Decade of Development. A revolution of rising expectations now reaches around the world—a revolution which has, we may note, spiritual antecedents of a century and more ago in both the Americas. Perhaps I need only mention that

Simón Bolívar and Thomas Jefferson were contemporaries in time and colleagues in spirit.

The name of Bolívar, so honored in this city and this continent, suggests a brief historical footnote I would like to add. As you may know, the Liberator's nephew and adopted son, Fernando Simón Bolívar, attended the University of Virginia in my country—with full parental consent—as a result of his deep admiration for its founder, Thomas Jefferson.

I cite this brief note because it suggests the unique way in which educational and cultural relations so often enable us to see the strong and enduring ties of spirit between nations and between peoples.

These ties with Latin America are multiplied today through exchanges and other activities which provide a two-way street, enabling us to know more about the peoples of your countries and the cultural values they have created.

These are values our *Alianza* seeks to preserve and enhance. In our educational, scientific, and cultural activities we move not only toward greater economic and social development. But through it, and beyond it, we seek greater opportunity for men to share in the fulfillment of their most deeply felt human needs—for cultural self-expression, for spiritual creativeness, for full participation in the great democratic freedoms open to all men. These great goals, too, are on the agenda of our alliance.

It is most appropriate that we should be meeting for these purposes in Bogotá, which has been the site of so many high endeavors and undertakings in the development of the inter-American system. I should like to recall that the Charter of the OAS itself was signed here, just a little more than 15 years ago, in the *Quinta de Bolívar*.

In closing, may I express the simple hope that we may come at the end of these deliberations to a declaration of substance and of meaning and in consonance with the spirit of those of Punta del Este and Santiago. In it we will have the opportunity to affirm, by forward-looking actions taken, that education is, indeed, as President Kennedy has said, the "passkey to the future" we all want for our countries and for their oncoming generations.

Thomas McGinty To Head OECD Food and Agriculture Information

The appointment of Thomas F. McGinty, information officer in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, to head the Food and Agriculture Technical Information Service of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was announced jointly on August 23 by the Department of State (press release 435) and the Department of Agriculture.

Mr. McGinty will have general responsibility for agricultural information activities, including eight language editions of the *FATIS Review*, the OECD journal of international agriculture and food.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Ratification deposited: Lebanon, August 1, 1963.

Narcotics

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5273.

Ratification deposited: Turkey, July 15, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.¹

Signatures affixed at Washington: Federal Republic of Germany, Somali Republic, August 19, 1963; Kuwait, August 20, 1963; El Salvador, August 21, 1963; Ceylon, August 22, 1963; China, Indonesia, Mali, Peru, August 23, 1963.

Trade

Tenth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Japan and New Zealand). Done at Geneva January 28, 1963.

Signatures: Japan, New Zealand, July 29, 1963.
Entered into force: August 15, 1963.

¹ Not in force.

BILATERAL

Colombia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodity agreements of June 23, 1955, April 16, 1957, as amended, and March 14, 1958, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 14, 1963. Entered into force August 14, 1963.

Korea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodity agreement of November 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5208, 5375, 5388). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul August 16, 1963. Entered into force August 16, 1963.

Mexico

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of August 15, 1960 (TIAS 4675). Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico August 14, 1963. Entered into force provisionally August 15, 1963, and definitively upon receipt by the United States of notification from Mexico that it has been approved by the Senate of the Republic.

Switzerland

Agreement relating to the effectiveness of United States schedules to the trade agreement of January 9, 1953 and supplementary trade agreement of June 8, 1955. Effected by exchange of notes at Bern July 10 and 11, 1963. Entered into force July 11, 1963.

United Arab Republic

Agreement providing for the abolition of nonimmigrant visa fees. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 3 and August 1, 1963. Entered into force August 1, 1963.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20400. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.

Arbitration—Air Transport Services. Compromised with France, relating to the agreement of March 2, 1946, as amended—Signed at Paris January 22, 1963. Entered into force January 22, 1963. TIAS 5280. pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Deposit of Philippine Pesos. Agreement with the Philippines, relating to the agreement of November 24, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila August 14 and September 1962. Entered into force September 5, 1962. TIAS 5281. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title I. Agreement with China, amending the agreement of August 31, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei January 15, 1963. Entered into force January 15, 1963. TIAS 5282. 2 pp. 5¢.

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429	8/20	Hilsman: "United States Policy in the Pacific."
*430	8/19	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†431	8/19	Rostow: "Economic Development: Some Lessons of a Common Experience."
432	8/19	Rusk and McNamara: letter to Members of House on foreign aid.
433	8/20	Visit of Gen. Chiang Ching-kuo of China.
434	8/21	Afghanistan credentials (rewrite).
435	8/23	McGinty appointed to OECD's Food and Agriculture Technical Information Service (rewrite).
†436	8/23	Williams: AMVETS, Detroit.
437	8/24	Exchange agreement with Afghanistan.
438	8/24	Exchange agreement with Argentina.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Digest of International Law Volume I

The Department of State has released the first volume of a new *Digest of International Law*. Dr. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser. The *Digest* is a successor to the Hackworth *Digest* published in 1940.

The new *Digest* is in the nature of a reference book, containing materials, official and unofficial, intended to inform the user as to the status of developments regarding particular aspects of international law.

Chapter I of Volume I treats of theories of international law, its subjects and sources, its relations to local law, and efforts toward its codification.

Chapter II deals with the legal status of present-day states, territories, and governments, and their classification. Included are listings and groupings of states and governments, with information as to origin, changes, official names, etc. Recent evolutions in the structure of the British Commonwealth and of the French Community are among the topics discussed.

Volume I of the *Digest of International Law* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$4.25.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1264



September 16, 1963

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Economic Development: Some Lessons of a Common Experience

by W. W. Rostow

*Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council*¹

The problem of economic development is sometimes discussed in the modern world as a question of the relationship between rich and poor nations. It is true that there is an enormous gap between average levels of income among the nations which share life on this small planet—a gap ranging from \$50 per head per year to almost \$3,000 measured in terms of gross national product. It is also true that the richer nations have a duty of enlightened self-interest, combined with basic impulses of religion, ethics, and humanity, to help the less advanced peoples.

But there are three things wrong with posing the question of economic development as a matter of the rich and the poor:

First, the most critical difference among nations is not whether they are rich or poor but

whether they are regularly growing or stagnant. The critical phase in the life of a nation which wishes to modernize its society is the stage in which it so adjusts its system of education, its social organization, political life, and common accepted aspirations as to develop the capacity to produce each year at a substantially higher rate than its increase in population. Regular growth is the first and critical operational objective. Historically, once regular growth begins, it has taken about three generations for a nation to absorb and diffuse to the bulk of its people what modern science and technology could provide. Compound interest—that is, steady geometric increase in output per head—is a mighty force. Compared with the centuries of fluctuating but essentially stagnant levels of life in traditional societies, 60 years is not long, and, in any case, the relatively rich in the world are not so rich and so numerous as to be able to elevate significantly the level of life of the

¹ Address made at the annual meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce at México, D.F., on Aug. 19 (press release 431).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1264 PUBLICATION 7596 SEPTEMBER 16, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$8.00; foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 1961).

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poor simply by income redistribution. The task of development for us all—whatever our citizenship—is to help aspiring nations to learn how to grow and then to make growth as regular a phenomenon as possible.

The second thing wrong with posing the question as a matter of the rich and the poor is that within most of the major nations, whatever their average level of income, there are rich and poor areas. One of the reasons that we in the United States of this generation have a reasonably good understanding of the economic development process is that we have seen an important part of the American South move into what I would call the takeoff during the last 30 years. It was not so long ago, you will recall, that Franklin Roosevelt referred to this problem (one-third of the Nation, as he called it) as the greatest single problem in the domestic life of the United States. What is true of the United States is true of most of what we regard as the more advanced nations. Italy and France, for example, still have special problems of underdevelopment in their southern regions. And in Latin America, as I shall have occasion to suggest later, many of the most critical problems of development cannot be perceived by looking at the overall statistics of growth but are, in their essence, regional; for example, the problem of the northeast in Brazil. In short, the critical problems of difference in level of income and of growth rate may not lie as between different nations but within developing nations themselves.

My third objection to the rich-poor nation formula is that there are rich citizens and poor citizens in all our societies, including societies with low average levels of income; and one of the critical problems for all of those who enjoy the benefits of high levels of income is to play a part appropriate to their advantages in the common development of their societies. This is a problem of equity and social responsibility in all nations—rich and poor alike. One of the most interesting and promising aspects of our Peace Corps, for example, is that it is inducing the organization of counterpart units in some of the developing nations, within which the educated and technically trained youth can go out to work in the villages to help lift the stand-

ard of life of their less advantaged fellow citizens. Similarly, those American firms abroad which carry out the same kinds of welfare programs as they do at home are not merely strengthening their ties to the society of which they are a part; they are also teaching one of the major lessons of our own private enterprise system: that, in the long run, good profits and good citizenship go together.

No Single Prescription for Development

What this comes to, then, is that we are all, whatever our nation's stage of growth and average level of per capita income, caught up in the development business.

The purpose of my talk to you here, in a country with a remarkable history of development, is to set down a few general lessons that I believe can be drawn from the record of the common experience, both during the postwar years and from the longer past.

Some limited generalization is possible—and some lessons can be drawn—because the development of nations is a little like the development of human beings. Each human being, in growing up, faces a fairly uniform sequence of problems. It is possible to specify in broad terms the kinds of problems which, inevitably, must be confronted by an infant of 9 months, a child of 5, an adolescent of 14, a young man of 21. The study of economic development, to the extent that it can be a science, consists primarily in identifying the sequence of problems to be overcome and the kinds of efforts to solve them which have succeeded or failed at different times in different nations.

But there the science of economic development—like the science of human development—must stop short. For each nation—like each individual—is and must be unique. As I say, there is a common sequence of problems which had to be faced, at similar stages, by, for example, Great Britain and Japan; by the United States and Mexico; by Russia and Egypt and India. But the form in which those problems arose and the solutions which were tried, succeeded, or failed could only be determined by the peoples involved. Differences of history and culture, of resources and available tech-

nology, and of political and social aspirations which inevitably affect the contours of economic development have varied and will always vary. There is no single correct prescription for economic development; there are, as in all human enterprises, only problems, some limited guidance from the experience of others, and hard, lonely choices to be made.

Against the background of these general observations, I should like to consider briefly with you today five lessons of the common experience of economic development which appear to me particularly appropriate as we look about us in the contemporary world and look forward over the next critical decade.

My first proposition—which flows directly from what I have just said—is that aid from outside a country can only be helpful to its development to the extent that the government and people of a nation organize their own resources. Economic growth is primarily a national enterprise. The amount of resources made available from outside can be a critically helpful margin; but it is a margin which will have its effect only to the extent that those receiving aid are effectively committed to the development process as they wish to see it and are effectively mobilizing their human and material resources to do the job.

It is sometimes said that the Alliance for Progress is an enterprise of the United States Government and not a cooperative venture within the hemisphere. For the simple and basic reason I have just cited, this cannot be so. The Alliance for Progress is a partnership, or it will fail. It can only work if what we organize in the United States by way of aid—and what our friends in Western Europe and Japan contribute—is merged in an orderly way with massive efforts at self-help within the nations of Latin America.

And I might add that I am personally confident about the fate of the Alliance for Progress because I feel that the forces within Latin America looking toward economic development and social equity are gathering strength. The Alliance for Progress is truly an alliance, not because we are contributing money to Latin America but because the policy of the United States is committed to work with those in Latin

America who would develop their economic and social life along lines of their own choice or make of their nations the kind of modern state they wish their children to enjoy in the light of their culture, values, and aspirations.

The Alliance for Progress is, therefore, partnership in both resources and in political commitment.

National Programing

My second proposition concerns national planning or, perhaps better, national programing. We believe national programing of the development process is required as a basis both for the domestic mobilization of resources and effective foreign aid. National programs are needed because, as Adam Smith noted long ago—when prescribing for underdeveloped Britain of the 18th century—governments must help create the basic framework within which a modern economy can develop. It is the government which must organize and finance the educational system and reshape it to the nation's changing needs. It is the government which must lay out and, in most cases, finance the fundamental social overhead projects—highways, irrigation projects, and the like—on which private agricultural and industrial development depends. It is the government which must solve problems of land tenure and create the framework within which agricultural productivity can be improved by the individual peasant. It is the government which must assure that the savings of the community are effectively mobilized by equitable taxation so that social overhead projects can be financed without inflation and on terms the people will regard as fair. It is the government which must devise policies which insure that the foreign accounts are kept in balance and that the development effort is not frustrated by a foreign exchange crisis.

These minimal functions were performed by governments even in nations most deeply committed to private enterprise, blessed with ample land and an old tradition of private entrepreneurship—like Canada and the United States.

It may seem strange that we in the United States, who are so deeply attached to the virtue of private enterprise, should be the advocate

of national programing in the underdeveloped areas. There is, in fact, no incompatibility between a belief that national programing is essential in the early stages of development and a belief in the wisdom of relying on private enterprise to conduct a wide and expanding range of economic activities. How wide that range is each country will, of course, decide for itself in the light of its own problems and possibilities. But the framework within which a modern private enterprise system can develop must, in large part, be created initially by the effort and initiative of governments. It is this perception which has drained away much of the fervor from the argument about government versus private enterprise in the development process—an argument which, even a few years ago, seemed to be central to the whole business. As nations have acquired practical experience in economic development, as they have assumed responsibility for the real tasks of growth, it is becoming increasingly clear that each of the two sectors has a job to do and that the jobs are supplementary and mutually reinforcing.

Role of Private Enterprise

Third, I should like to say something quite directly about our view of the role of private enterprise in the development process. What I am about to say not only conforms to the policy of my Government but fits what I have been able to learn, as an historian and social scientist, about the development business.

It is clear that, especially in the very early stages of development, different nations, out of their history, differ in their capacity to mount effective private enterprise systems. We in the United States, for example, had a lively private enterprise system in commerce and small-scale manufactures long before our first major surge in industrialization. The transition into a competitive private enterprise industrial system was relatively easy for us, although some of our first ventures failed. But some other nations—for example, Japan—began their industrialization with no one about to assume initial responsibility for industrial development but civil servants and military men. The first industrial plants were managed by the Government; and the first generation of private businessmen emerging in

the 1880's was drawn largely from the old warrior class—the samurai.

And so it has been with many other nations in first stages of development.

But when self-sustained and regular growth was attained—and even in the process of attaining that stage—the natural course of events appeared to be for the private sector to expand rapidly. The development of private enterprise over the past decade in India and Pakistan is, for example, illuminating. The most immediate reason for this evolution is that efficiency in producing many diverse products is hard for a government bureaucracy to attain; and besides there are not all that many competent bureaucratic managers.

The lesson of history is that the interests of an advancing society are best served when the bulk of industry and agriculture is managed by individuals or firms forced by competition to maximum efficiency, their accounts reflecting true costs, and their output responsive to the changing tastes of the people. We have learned, both in the less developed and more developed nations, when such competitive private sectors have emerged, that their emergence in no way need divert resources away from the objectives laid down in a national plan. In India, for example, the vitality of the private enterprise sector and the direction of its development are essential ingredients in current national planning. In the United States, Western Europe, and Japan we have found that there are ample indirect means for insuring that a massive private enterprise sector can keep within the bounds of the common interest and, in fact, be an essential reinforcement to it.

It is interesting to observe within the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe how the difficulties compound in attempting to manage by central state ownership and control an increasingly complex industrial system. The disciplines of competition, of honest prices and interest rates, and of the consumer's right of choice are beginning to be recognized as missing; and the gap is being discussed in the technical literature—this quite aside from the gross inefficiency of collectivized agriculture.

Let me emphasize that it is not the policy of the United States to attempt to tell other na-

tions what the appropriate relative role of private and public enterprise should be. This is, evidently, one of the most sensitive matters for national decision. But we are convinced, from the evidence of both history and the contemporary world, that the natural, if not inevitable, evolution of developing societies is to permit a large part of the process to go forward by competitive private means; and we are certain, from our own experience and that of others, that the existence of a substantial private enterprise sector is consistent with and can greatly reinforce the large objectives of a national development program.

Put another way, we are convinced that the old debate which focused on government versus private enterprise is an old-fashioned, out-of-date way to put the problem in the contemporary world. In both developing societies and in more advanced societies the most natural and fruitful relationship between public and private enterprise is one of partnership toward larger national purposes.

Agriculture in the Development Process

A fourth lesson I would draw, with particular reference to the decade ahead, concerns the role of agricultural and rural development in the growth process. In the course of our review for the presentation of the foreign aid bill to the Congress this year we discovered, somewhat to our surprise, this interesting fact: that something like 70 percent of the population of the developing areas is already living in societies which have either demonstrated quite definitely a capacity to grow regularly or, with some political stability and luck, they ought to be emerging into that category in the years ahead. While many nations are further back down the line in terms of stages of growth—notably the new African nations—the fact is that growth itself, in the form of a demonstrated capacity to produce a rate of increase in total output substantially greater than the rate of increase of population, is becoming the normal condition of a good part of the developing world.

In Latin America, for example, the statistics show that the overall rate of growth in GNP

for 1961 was over 5 percent. This is within shooting distance of the Alliance for Progress goal of an annual increase in per capita income of 2½ percent. Although there were special difficulties in Brazil and Argentina in 1962, the figure for that year is not likely to prove substantially lower, due to acceleration in Mexico and Venezuela.

On the other hand, we all know that there are many enormously difficult problems still to be confronted and solved in Latin America and in other developing nations. The great tasks of the Alliance for Progress still lie ahead. What, then, is wrong? Why is it that the measurement of growth in terms of increases in average national income per capita does not identify what our problems really are?

I would suggest that the central problem that we confront and shall confront increasingly in the developing nations is not merely the problem of developing and sustaining a sufficient overall rate of investment to produce a regular rise in average income per capita; it is the lack of regional and sectoral balance in the growth process. With a very few exceptions, what we see in the developing nations is that growth has taken hold in certain regions and certain sectors, with a marked lag in the development of the rural areas.

The takeoff has begun in many parts of the world, but it is concentrated excessively in the cities. Our common task is to diffuse this narrowly channeled momentum out over the face of the developing nations.

It is not accidental that rural development should have been generally slighted in the first phase of growth, even when development began, as it did in Mexico, with an agrarian revolution designed to give the peasant a piece of land he could call his own. There are two basic reasons for this phenomenon. First, serious modernization of rural life depends on the prior existence of an initial industrial base and an urban administrative apparatus of some competence. Second, typically—but not universally—the modernizing governments are urban coalitions of professional men, soldiers, politicians, civil servants. This has been the case in many parts of the Middle East, Asia,

Africa, and Latin America. As urban men, reacting against the traditional rural society—or removed from its old orbit—motivated strongly by a desire to see their nations assume a dignified, modern stance on the world scene, their first thoughts have turned to the more glamorous symbols of industrialization, whether they be modern weapons or steel mills. Moreover, as politicians, it is natural that their minds should turn in the first instance to their constituency, which has been primarily urban; and from this loyalty have tended to come subsidized services of various kinds, beyond the capacity of their economies and their national budgets easily to bear, and a certain neglect of rural development.

I emphasize again that the story of Mexico has special features due, in part, to the rural origins of its revolutionary thrust toward modernization. But if one attempts to generalize the situation in most of the developing countries, one can see quite remarkable enclaves of industrial and modern urban activity coincident with stagnation or very slow progress in the countryside.

Rural development is proving, however, not merely a social duty to the less advantaged portions of the population but a fundamental condition for the maintenance of a high rate of development for the society as a whole, including especially its industrial development. There are, in fact, three distinct major roles that agriculture must play in the early stages of the development process. First, obviously, agriculture must supply the food necessary to meet the inevitable rise in population, without yielding either starvation or a depletion of foreign exchange to buy food at the expense of purposes essential to industrial growth. This requirement is heightened by the typically disproportionate rise in urban populations which demand either an increased transfer of food from the countryside or the acquisition of food from abroad. Second, agricultural expansion is required as working capital for nonagricultural development: to generate raw materials for industry or to earn foreign exchange. Finally, a rise in agricultural incomes can provide an important direct stimulus to other aspects of development: It can provide expanded mar-

kets for chemical fertilizers, agricultural equipment, and manufactured consumer goods, and it can provide a critically important source of increased tax revenues.

The world about us offers a number of illustrations of what happens to societies when these dynamic interactions between industrial and agricultural development are ignored or inadequately respected.

The most remarkable example is, of course, the situation inside Communist China. There a regime committed itself to a program of heavy industrialization, linked explicitly to the modernization of its military establishment. It was prepared to substitute for peasant incentives the massive power of its control system and substitute for an adequate level of agricultural investment—notably investment in chemical fertilizers—only labor-intensive investment, carried out substantially by forced labor. The upshot, carried to a rare extreme by a purposeful and unified group of wrongheaded men, was this: first, a breakdown in agricultural supplies, such that the whole vast Chinese nation is living at a substandard diet and half of its foreign exchange—about \$500 million—must now be allocated to buy food for the coastal cities; second, a breakdown in its capacity to supply industrial materials from agriculture to its industry and in its capacity to earn foreign exchange from its agricultural sector; third, a reduction in total resources available for the industrialization process itself. Industrial output in Communist China radically declined between 1959 and 1962, by at least 30 percent, and its heavy industry program is now virtually abandoned.

The measures taken to correct this gross distortion in the Chinese Communist development process have not succeeded in producing anything like a sustained industrial revival, although disintegration has been halted. Many plants are idle or working under capacity; and millions of men and women have been thrust out of the cities to fend, as best they can, back in rural areas where, with private incentives only partially and uncertainly restored, the Chinese peasantry are struggling to keep their heads barely above water.

There has been no failure in the free world quite as dramatic as that of Communist China, but one can see a pattern of severe structural distortion in a good many countries. In parts of Latin America, for example, industrialization is damped because of a lack of a sufficiently wide popular market. An excessive amount of industry is producing goods for the relatively small urban middle class; consequently industry works with idle capacity, prices and tariffs are excessively high, profits are not plowed back into industry, and they are sometimes even withdrawn and sent abroad to the society's cost. At the same time the potentialities of modern technology in agriculture are not being rapidly diffused, and many rural regions have not moved away from the fatalism and low productivity methods of traditional life.

With a melodramatic gap between rural and urban life, the more enterprising flock from the countryside to the bright lights and cinemas of the cities, where the rate of industrial growth is not sufficient to absorb them fully in regular employment, while they impose on the public authorities heavy claims for social overhead capital (housing, schools, et cetera) which inadequate budgets cannot fully meet, in part because tax systems are ineffective, in part because income is not rising fast enough.

Further, since the potentialities of modern agriculture are not being applied, some of these countries are unnecessarily sliding into dependence on imported food and they are not exploiting the possibilities of agricultural products as a source of commercial crops for industry or for export.

Finally, the lack of industry working to a mass market limits industrial productivity and prevents the development of manufactured or processed export products which can compete in international markets and relieve the dependence on exports of traditional products with a limited future in world trade. It is no accident that the classic initial manufactured product of a developing area, capable of marketing abroad, has been cotton textiles, where generally a mass domestic market can be developed and industrial efficiency attained at an early stage.

In the broadest sense, what I am asserting is that the present state of a good part of the

underdeveloped world requires that we take seriously two of the oldest propositions in economics. One of these propositions is that agricultural output is, in the widest sense, the basic working capital of a nation in its early stage of growth. The other proposition is that industrialization depends for its momentum on a progressive widening of the market, with the specialization and efficiency that widening permits.

There is an important impulse in Latin America and in other parts of the world to widen the market by bringing nations into closer economic cooperation and reducing or eliminating the tariff barriers between them. This makes good sense, and my Government has encouraged the development of common-market arrangements in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere. It is essential, if industry is to become efficient, that it face the winds of international, as well as domestic, competition. But what I would suggest is that the most critical market to be developed in most modernizing nations is the domestic market.

It struck me some time ago that in certain of the developing areas it might be helpful to encourage a purposeful effort to manufacture locally and to market in the rural areas on a more effective basis both cheap agricultural equipment and the kinds of consumers goods likely to constitute, at rural levels of income, an incentive to accept and to apply modern methods of agricultural productivity.

This kind of effort could make a contribution to all four of the structural weaknesses to be found in many developing nations which I have described.

It could put the private industrial sector into the production and marketing of goods on a mass market basis, even in poor countries. I have in mind not merely textiles but canvas shoes, flashlights, household equipment, transistor radios, and the classic first-phase durable consumers goods—bicycles and sewing machines, as well as pails, hand tools, fertilizers, and other basic agricultural equipment.

Second, these goods, if cheaply and effectively brought into the rural areas, could provide an important incentive to rural families to increase output as well as a part of the means to do so.

The revolutionary public-private partnership in the rural life of the United States was the partnership between the knowledge imparted to the farmer by the Department of Agriculture county agent and the stimulus to effort imparted by the mail-order catalog.)

Third, by bringing something of modern life to the countryside and permitting rural areas to share at least some of the fruits of the more modern sectors of a developing society, we might help damp the excessive flow from the countryside to the urban slums.

And, finally, by developing efficient production on the basis of mass markets of goods of this kind, additional items for export could be generated.

My basic point is, then, that the time is past, if it ever existed, when we can afford to regard industrial and agricultural development as simply competing for scarce capital resources. In many parts of the developing world the initial basis for takeoff has been established in industry and in urban areas, but the maintenance of that momentum requires that the diffusion of modern technology, with all that it carries with it, be extended on a national basis and especially to the lagging rural areas, which are, at once, a relatively untapped source of food, industrial working capital, foreign exchange earning capacity, industrial markets, and taxes.

Combining Development and Human Freedom

My final point about the development process concerns this question: Is it possible, given the tremendous revolutionary changes required for modernization and the effort demanded of a relatively poor country in mobilizing a high rate of investment, to combine human freedom with the development process itself?

In one sense, standing here in Mexico City, I need not argue the case very hard. Mexico has found its way through a set of revolutionary changes affecting every dimension of its society into sustained growth; and it has done so while maintaining and enlarging the basic elements of human freedom to which it has committed out of its history and culture. There are few developing nations which better demonstrate the harmony of economic growth

and human freedom. But the question is still being asked in many parts of the world, and I think we are in a better position to answer it than we were even a few years ago.

As we look at the test cases presented by the Communist nations, it is perfectly clear that the attempt to grow food by police-state methods leads not merely to inhumanity but to gross inefficiency. There appears to be no way of developing an efficient agriculture unless that effort is rooted in the incentives of the peasant and his family. There are simply not enough policemen in the world to follow the peasant around in his long and complex daily round of life to insure that he does the things that he must do to make things grow. In underdeveloped nations the proportion of the population in rural life is often 75 percent or more. And so it becomes a technical essential to leave large areas of human freedom to the farmer if economic development in an underdeveloped area is to proceed successfully or if development in more advanced countries is not to be dragged down—as it is in the Soviet Union and in those countries of Eastern Europe which still maintain collectivized agriculture.

But this is not all. Economic development depends on engaging the energies, the talents, and the personal commitments of millions of human beings. A friend of mine who holds a high post in a developing country of the Middle East spoke recently of the major lesson he had learned from his period of responsibility: It was that, no matter how powerful a revolutionary government they created, the government could not do the job of development itself. Its major task was to provide the framework and then to stimulate and educate the people themselves to take the necessary initiatives.

It is true that a powerful police system, combined with a disciplined single party, can get many things done—especially things which relate directly to the maintenance and the extension of the system's power; but, as we watch the evolution of the developing nations of the free world and the course of events in the nations run by Communist governments and as we look back on the lessons of our own experience, there is increasing reason to believe that systems of society committed to the maintenance of individual freedom—and its essential counter-

part, individual responsibility—have proved more efficient as well as more humane than those which seek by forced draft and the power of the state to drive development forward by totalitarian methods.

Only a few years back it was common to believe that, whatever their demerits, Communist societies had the capacity to sustain much higher rates of growth than societies based on human freedom. This is a proposition which can no longer be scientifically maintained. Leaving aside Communist China, which has gone through a radical decline in its economic fortunes, here are some current growth rate figures for recent years: In 1962 the rate of growth in GNP for the nations under Communist governments was 3.6 percent. For the NATO nations the figure was 4.8 percent. The figure for the Soviet Union itself was somewhat under 4 percent; for the United States, recovering from recession, a higher than average 5.4 percent.

These data may vary over the years. But the fact is that the economic gap between the free world and the Communist bloc has widened, and the same is true, of course, in the grand historical competition between the development of Communist China and the two great nations of the Indian subcontinent, which, against great difficulties, continue to make regular progress with societies rooted in the principle of consent.

I cite these figures not because rates of growth are the decisive measures of a society's worth. Our values begin with the integrity of the individual and his equality under God and the law. They extend to the right of nations to shape their lives in the light of their own history, culture, and aspirations, protected by the principle of self-determination.

As we look about the world scene—and at the trends of the past several years—two things are clear. We face great problems ahead in the Alliance for Progress and other enterprises designed to demonstrate the compatibility of human freedom and economic development. But equally, we can go forward with the greatest underlying confidence. The underlying forces of history are clearly on the side of the great humanistic tradition of which Mexico and the United States are both a part, if we have the wit and the will, the faith and the persistence to work with them.

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Endorsed by Science Advisory Committee

President Kennedy made public on August 2 (White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.)) the following statement on the nuclear test ban treaty by the President's Science Advisory Committee.

The members of the President's Science Advisory Committee wish to record their strong support for the test ban treaty now before the United States Senate for ratification.¹ Public discussion of the treaty raises many important questions other than those of a technical nature. However, the questions raised with regard to the potential effects of the treaty on the future military capabilities of this country relative to the Soviet Union are primarily technical, and it is to these questions that this statement is principally addressed.

The Science Advisory Committee, drawing upon the assistance of outstanding scientists and engineers throughout the United States, has long been engaged in independent detailed examination of military technology as it affects our national security in its broad aspects. The Committee believes that the continued unrestricted development and exploitation of military technology by both the Soviet Union and the United States would in time lead to a net decrease in our real security.

With regard to the technical aspects of the proposed treaty, it is our judgment that:

(1) Detection technology can make it extremely difficult to carry out significant clandestine nuclear tests in violation of the treaty posing an exceedingly high risk of detection.

(2) Sufficient nuclear-weapons-effects information exists to permit design of effective U.S. ballistic missile systems, including hardened launch sites, with acceptable capability of survival.

(3) The most difficult problems of the antiballistic missile system are nonnuclear in nature and are being aggressively explored. The treaty itself will have only a minor effect on the possibility that an effective antiballistic missile system could be successfully developed by any nation.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

(4) Weapons of very large yield are in our stockpile. Weapons of still larger yield could have been produced in the past and can be produced without further testing if a military need develops.

In addition to these considerations, it is clear that further improvement in nuclear warheads is no longer the dominant factor in advancing military technology. The central questions relate to the design of integrated weapons systems for both offensive and defensive purposes. Further refinements of nuclear technology are but one aspect of a series of interrelated considerations which include: size and composition of military forces, intelligence, military doctrine, progress in other elements of military weapon systems, and the Nation's military-industrial base.

It is also important to realize that weapons systems development, production, and full deployment now require long lead time. Together with our strong industrial capabilities, this circumstance makes it extremely unlikely that a new development—such as a particular antiballistic missile or large weapons in space—can be deployed so rapidly as to upset the strategic situation. We believe that the United States would be able to detect the development and deployment of such new systems early enough to permit timely and adequate counter-measures.

It is our judgment that the present advanced state of U.S. nuclear technology and associated weapon systems makes it possible to accept the restrictions of this treaty with confidence in our continuing security. Although certain technical possibilities will have to be foreclosed, these limitations also apply to other nations. In fact, more extensive limitations under a comprehensive treaty with adequate safeguards could provide even greater confidence in our continuing welfare and security.

The treaty would provide relief from radioactive fallout and contribute significantly to

the task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, thus constituting an important step toward a safe and secure peace in the world.²

² The following are members of the President's Science Advisory Committee:

- Harvey Brooks, dean, division of engineering and applied physics, Harvard University
Melvin Calvin, professor of chemistry, University of California
Paul M. Doty, professor of chemistry, Harvard University
Richard L. Garwin, Watson Research Laboratory, Columbia University-International Business Machines Corp.
Edwin R. Gilliland, professor of chemical engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Donald F. Hornig, professor of chemistry, Princeton University
George B. Kistiakowsky, professor of chemistry, Harvard University
Colin M. MacLeod, School of Medicine, New York University
William D. McElroy, chairman, department of biology, The Johns Hopkins University
Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University
John R. Pierce, executive director, research, Communications Principles Division, Bell Telephone Laboratories
Frank Press, director, Seismological Laboratory, California Institute of Technology
Edward M. Purcell, professor of physics, Harvard University
Frederick Seitz, president, National Academy of Sciences
John W. Tukey, professor of mathematics, Princeton University
Jerrold R. Zacharias, professor of physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- In addition the following consultants-at-large to the PSAC have associated themselves with the statement:
- Detlev W. Bronk, president, The Rockefeller Institute
James B. Fisk, president, Bell Telephone Laboratories
James R. Killian, Jr., chairman of the corporation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Edwin H. Land, president, Polaroid Corp.
Emanuel R. Piore, vice president for research and engineering, International Business Machines Corp.
Isidor I. Rabi, professor of physics, Columbia University

Africa and the World: Problems of Today and Tomorrow

by G. Mennen Williams

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

Eighteen years ago, a hitherto little-known Japanese city—Hiroshima—became an international symbol.

Six weeks before Hiroshima, in San Francisco, some 50 nations had signed the Charter of the United Nations. Under the charter nations administering the affairs of non-self-governing peoples agreed to insure their just treatment and to develop self-government.

Two months after Hiroshima, on October 11, 1945, the AMVETS held their first national convention in Chicago.

Tonight I will try to relate these seemingly unrelated events of 18 years ago to the present and to each other.

For several years after Hiroshima, this nation had a monopoly on nuclear power. With this monopoly, a Hitler or a Stalin would have terrorized the world. This nation, the only one at that time which knew the full implications of nuclear power and what it would mean when the monopoly was broken, tried to keep the peace and to place the monopoly under international control. Bernard Baruch, one of our wisest men, went before the United Nations with the plan.

"We are here," he said, "to make a choice between the quick and the dead. . . . Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work

our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear."²

That plan foundered on Soviet obstructionism, as did numerous other proposals and attempts to arrive at some form of rational control over nuclear weaponry during the long years that followed. In time, the Soviet Union too, became a nuclear power; and we learned—all of us, large nation and small—to live with fear.

This nation saw to its defenses. Having, at war's end, precipitously demolished the mightiest fighting force the world had ever seen, the United States was soon forced to rebuild its own military forces and to take a leading role in organizing the defenses of the free world.

But even as we developed our own capacity to overmatch Soviet destructiveness, we did not stop our efforts to pursue in every available forum our search for peace through controlled disarmament. As it became increasingly clear that the approach of the Soviet Union and of the United States to the problem of inspection and control were irreconcilable, we undertook to explore more limited measures.

One of these was the limitation of nuclear weapons testing. There were some powerful arguments for this—arguments of the type that make ideological differences irrelevant. All men breathe. All men want children—and they want their children to be genetically sound. The meaning of strontium 90 is known and disliked around the world. Ideology is no defense

¹ Address made before the national convention of the American Veterans of World War II and Korea at Detroit, Mich., on Aug. 24 (press release 436 dated Aug. 23).

² BULLETIN of June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

against ionizing radiation. Yet despite these powerful motives, at times it seemed as if even these least efforts at arms limitation were doomed to failure.

Four weeks ago what Mr. Khrushchev called a "breakthrough" occurred. In Moscow the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water was signed.³ Already more than 78 nations of the world have signed or indicated their intention to sign it. Our own United States Senate is appraising it prior to deciding whether or not to advise and consent to its ratification.

Before developing some of the meanings that this treaty may have for us I should like to speak of AMVETS' part in making this treaty possible. For nearly 18 years all our efforts to make even a dent in the problem had failed. There was no lack of impatient rash voices to counsel against further attempts. AMVETS was not one of these.

In 1961 AMVETS International Affairs Council and Foreign Relations Committee submitted a report which was unanimously adopted by the AMVETS 17th national convention. It contained a statement of AMVETS support for "continuing search by our government for means to promote international agreements to reduce armaments through the UN and other available means." The same report contained another statement of AMVETS support for "the proposed establishment of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to centralize in our government technical planning and research for arms control."

Last year the chances of agreement seemed nil. The Soviet Union had unilaterally broken the voluntary test ban with a 58-megaton blast. Yet AMVETS National Executive Committee resolved that "the U.S. delegation should remain at Geneva and continue its efforts to find agreement on a workable test ban treaty in the interests of all mankind so long as the faintest glimmering of hope remains alive."

Let me say that it is the support of farsighted and patriotic groups such as AMVETS that makes it possible for the difficult first steps to

be taken at all. This is why I am especially heartened by the resolution of this convention concerning the test ban treaty.

Meaning of the Test Ban Treaty

What does the test ban treaty mean? Or perhaps we should ask, what does it not mean? For one thing, the treaty will not automatically remove the shadow of the fear that we have lived with for so long. All that it does is to eliminate testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under the water. It does not prevent nuclear war or the threat of nuclear war. It does not prevent an arms race.

As President Kennedy has said:⁴

This treaty is not the millennium. It will not resolve all conflicts, or cause the Communists to forgo their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance to others. But it is an important first step—a step toward peace—a step toward reason—a step away from war.

Indeed, it is not unreasonable to believe that there are powerful forces motivating the Soviet Union to seek a *détente* with the West, a relaxing of almost unbearable tensions. For one thing, the Soviet people have as much, if not more, reason than you and I to hate war. For they have seen a great deal of it and have suffered much, having had their cities and countryside devastated and having lost some 20 million people during World War II. Upon his return from Moscow, Under Secretary Harriman reported that within the Soviet Union this agreement has been hailed as a great event and that the Russian people long for a relief from the tensions and fear of war.

This, to my mind, is a very significant fact. Particularly since there is ample evidence that what the Soviet people want is increasingly important to their leaders. Furthermore, there is good evidence that the Russian people, even as the people of the rest of the world, are anxious to improve their standard of living. It is possible that Khrushchev may feel it easier to satisfy this desire if he can save some of the expense of testing.

What the future will bring no one can pre-

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

dict. We certainly should not expect a sudden dramatic "leap forward" into disarmament and peace. But there has been a change of direction and a step in the right direction. In the test ban there is something which both sides have found to be in their self-interest. There may be other steps which both sides can find mutually beneficial. The U.S. is prepared and determined that the search for these progressive steps shall go on.

But, however much we may desire peace, however much we move toward peace, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that the Soviets are changing their ideological beliefs or their aims at world domination. The most we can expect is that the future will convince the Soviets that the only way to a world worth living in—be it Communist or otherwise—is through peaceful competition.

This is the kind of competition we should welcome.

In signing the test ban treaty Khrushchev put the world on notice. The Russians had no intention of abandoning their efforts to communize the world. He still threatens to make our grandchildren Communists. For our part, the United States continues to strive to build a world of free choice, to give Khrushchev's grandchildren the option of freedom or communism—and we have no doubt what their free choice will be. The Communist must say, "The Communist way is the only way." (Although it would now appear that there is more than one Communist way—that of Moscow and that of Peiping.) We are not so hampered. We can—and do—say to the nations of the world: "Be independent. Be free. Develop your own society in your own way, with the consent of the governed. For we know if you seek your own free, independent destinies you will help build the kind of world in which we all can live in peace and honor."

This, of course, has been the guiding principle of our Government's policy toward the newly independent and emerging nations of the world since the end of the war—really since the Declaration of Independence. The basic objectives of our diplomacy and of our foreign aid programs are to assist other countries to

maintain their independence and to develop into self-supporting nations.

The record of accomplishment over these years has been very good. Of the 49 nations to gain independence since 1943, not one has chosen a Communist form of government.

But we cannot sit back and content ourselves with the record of yesterday. It is about today and tomorrow that we must think.

The Paramount Problem in Africa

In Africa the paramount problem of today and tomorrow is that there are still millions of people denied the right of self-determination and of adequate means of achieving that right. This problem is still acute over the entire southern portion of the continent, an area larger than two-thirds of the United States—or 3 times larger than our New England States or four times the size of Alaska—with a population of 38 million people. More than 34 million of these people (more than the combined populations of New York and California) have little or no voice in their own government.

Within this area, the situation in the Portuguese territories and the situation of the non-whites in the Republic of South Africa present particularly urgent problems.

Your AMVETS position has never been ambiguous on these questions. The basic foreign policy statement of your national convention of 1953 and again of 1961 urged the United States Government to "encourage the independence movement in Africa and to use our strongest influence on the nations who have the responsibility for administration of the territories to prepare these territories for self-government."

Your conventions also "deplored and condemned the continued actions of the current government in South Africa against the native population."

Between your resolutions of 1953 and of 1961 no less than 23 African nations were born. Since August 1961 five more have achieved full independence. Two more, Kenya and Zanzibar, will achieve full independence this winter. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are expected to achieve full internal self-government within a matter of months.

The attainment of self-government and independence on the part of so many states in so short a time makes the situation of southern Africa more of an anomaly. The recent moves toward African unity on the part of most of the independent states of Africa are impressive. One of the focal points around which they can unite is this matter of self-determination for the African peoples who still do not enjoy this right. At Addis Ababa, last June, the African nations organized a nine-member Committee of Liberation. That Committee has been quite active in formulating its plans for the future.

In the meantime, the unrest in the Portuguese territories continues, to the point where a large percentage of the Portuguese armed forces is tied down in Africa.

Further south, the Republic of South Africa continues in its policy of *apartheid*, seemingly blind to the abyss ahead.

Self-Determination and Apartheid

Our positions on both of these subjects are matters of record. With regard to the Portuguese territories we have for some years urged Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination and give it practical effect for the peoples in its territories. With regard to *apartheid*, this is what our Ambassador to the United Nations said before the Security Council just a few weeks ago:⁵

All of us sitting here today know the melancholy truth about the racial policies of the Government of South Africa. Our task now is to consider what further steps we can take to induce that Government to remove the evil business of *apartheid*, not only from our agenda but from the continent of Africa.

What are we doing about it? What can we do about it? Our practical position is perhaps best exemplified by our voting on the two recent Security Council resolutions this summer. On the resolution deprecating the policies of the Portuguese in their territories, we abstained.⁶ In abstaining, we explained that we could agree with much of the substance of the resolution, but we could not agree that its language and

wording were suited to encourage the dialog which is so vitally needed between the Portuguese and the Africans.

We voted "Yes" to the Security Council resolution condemning the policy of *apartheid* and calling upon all states to stop the sale and equipment of arms, ammunition of all types, and military vehicles to South Africa. In voting affirmatively we stated that we had already adopted a policy of terminating the sale of all military equipment to the Government of South Africa by the end of this year. We also reserved the right to interpret this policy in the light of any future requirements for the common defense effort in assuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

In adopting these positions we have been in the middle. We have, admittedly, pleased neither side. But we have a more important purpose to serve than to please—namely, to work toward a peaceful solution.

In the cases of South Africa and the Portuguese territories in Africa there appear to be irreconcilable positions, yet in recent history we have seen many similar irreconcilable positions become manageable.

Such a stalemate was the nuclear testing issue. This stalemate was broken because men refused to give up—and continued to work patiently and imaginatively even when it seemed hopeless.

So, in Africa—as in the rest of the world—we will continue to work patiently and, we hope, imaginatively toward the building of a world where the differences between men and nations can be solved and the rights of men can be attained in a peaceful manner.

In dwelling at such length upon the more urgent political problems that face Africa—especially the politicians of Africa, I may have unwittingly painted a false picture of that vast continent and its people.

There are, indeed, dangerous tensions in Africa. But for the ordinary Africans, for the millions who are engaged in trying to get along and improve their own lot a little, there is more hope than ever before. We are happy to have some part in helping these Africans help themselves build a more stable and peaceful continent. The principal thrust of our integrated

⁵ For background and text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 333.

⁶ For background and text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1963, p. 303.

economic assistance program operated by the Agency for International Development lies in economic and technical cooperation, in education, and in the development of human resources.

A most significant contribution to African development is being made by the Peace Corps. Nearly 1,500 trained and dedicated American men and women are giving a part of their lives to help build better societies in Africa and to give Africans a glimpse of American idealism in action.

Role of Private Organizations

These governmental activities are supplemented by a variety of African programs sponsored or operated by private U.S. organizations. At last count—in 1961—there were nearly 600 American organizations—colleges and universities, foundations, religious and missionary organizations, business groups, and organizations concerned with African culture, education, and training—conducting activities relating to Africa.

Here at home there is a role for organizations such as the AMVETS. Keep informed, study all facets of the problems, and make your views known. Above all, do not look for quick and easy solutions. And do not despair if peaceful solutions are not even in sight. In the 18 years since your first national convention many changes have taken place. The pace of decolonization, for instance, has been phenomenal. At the time you held your first convention, roughly a third of the world's people were living in territories whose laws were made elsewhere, without the consent of the governed. Today, barely 2 percent of the world's people live in non-self-governing or dependent territories. The vast majority of these people saw independence come *without* violence.

But when we talk of the fundamental rights of man, we cannot allow ourselves to be bemused by percentage points. It is small comfort for men seeking to attain some measure of control over their own destinies to know that there are only a few of their kind left. They must not, they will not, be forgotten.

Neither must we forget that we still have some unfinished business here at home. America's

race relations, for instance, clearly have an effect on the forcefulness of United States influence abroad. These problems are American problems that must be solved satisfactorily and permanently by the efforts of our Government and by our own efforts. Africa especially has been watching with great interest the progress of our civil rights program. Its success or its failure in the months and years ahead will mean more than all the diplomacy, all the aid, all the technical assistance we can offer. Africans know what our moral ideals are. They have long heard them from our missionaries. They have read them in our Declaration of Independence and in our history. Knowing what we say we believe, they are interested in seeing these beliefs translated into action. That part of the job is up to you and your fellow citizens.

World Affairs Conference To Be Held at Albany

Press release 446 dated August 29, for release August 30

The Department of State, with the cooperation of the World Affairs Council of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy and *The Knickerbocker News*, will hold a World Affairs Conference at Albany on September 30.

Invitations will be extended throughout New York State, with the exception of the New York City metropolitan area, to members of the press, radio, television, and nongovernmental organizations concerned with foreign policy and to business and community leaders.

The purpose of the meeting is to bring together citizen leaders and media representatives with Government officials responsible for formulating and carrying out foreign policy.

Officials participating in the conference will be McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President; Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; Clare H. Timberlake, Chairman, Disarmament Advisory Staff, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and William S. Gaud, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development.

Netherlands Compensation Program for Nazi Victims Broadened

Press release 449 dated August 29

The Department of State has been informed that the Netherlands compensation program for Nazi victims, previously announced,¹ became effective on August 1, 1963, when the financial treaty between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed on April 8, 1960, and providing, *inter alia*, for payment of compensation to Netherlands victims of Nazi persecution, entered into force.

The program has been broadened to include not only persecutees who were Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the time the persecution commenced but also persecutees who were residents of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on May 10, 1940, or at the time persecution commenced and were not Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the time persecution commenced. However, persecutees qualifying by virtue of residence must possess Netherlands nationality at the time of filing their claims for compensation.

The program's original requirement of Netherlands nationality at the start of persecution for both persecutee and heir has also been broadened. Heirs who were not themselves Netherlands nationals at the start of persecution but who are at the present time may also qualify if the persecutee was a Netherlands national at the time persecution commenced or if the persecutee was an alien or a stateless person at the time persecution commenced and was a resident of the Kingdom of the Netherlands either then or on May 10, 1940.

In cases where the claimants were not Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the start of the persecution, no compensation is given in respect of persecution suffered prior to May 10, 1940.

Compensation may not be claimed if the persecutee or heir lost Netherlands nationality by entering the civil or military service of another country without the consent of the Queen of the Netherlands for purposes other than op-

position to a National Socialist, Fascist, or similar regime.

The prerequisite of current Netherlands nationality does not apply to persecutees who were actually Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the time the persecution commenced and who have subsequently obtained another nationality. Neither is current Netherlands nationality required of the heir if both he and the deceased persecutee were Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the start of persecution.

Persons qualifying for compensation who are domiciled outside the Netherlands must file their claims before December 1, 1963.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Staffing Procedures and Problems in the Soviet Union.

A study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations to the Senate Government Operations Committee. May 15, 1963. 62 pp. [Committee print.]

Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 5490, to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes. Part V, May 15-16, 1963. 179 pp.; Part VI, May 20-23, 1963, 160 pp.; Part VII, May 27-29, 1963, 207 pp.; Part VIII, June 3-5, 1963, 187 pp.; Part IX and Appendix, June 6-10, 1963. 150 pp.

Export Controls. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the House Committee on Banking and Currency. June 5, 1963. 36 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 1276. June 11-26 and July 11, 1963. 764 pp.

Administration of National Security. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Part 2. June 14 and 17, 1963. 69 pp.

Exclusion of Communist Political Propaganda From the U.S. Mails. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Postal Operations of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. June 19 and 20, 1963. 64 pp.

Foreign Service Buildings—Philippine War Damage Claims. Conference report to accompany H.R. 5207. H. Rept. 497. July 1, 1963. 5 pp.

U.S. Representatives to the United Nations. Report to accompany H.R. 6283. H. Rept. 498. July 2, 1963. 26 pp.

Attendance at Meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Report to accompany S. Res. 168. S. Rept. 342. July 2, 1963. 2 pp.

Amending the Joint Resolution Providing for U.S. Participation in the International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 64. S. Rept. 343. July 2, 1963. 6 pp.

¹ BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 142.

Senate Delegation to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (Kuala Lumpur, Malaya). Report to accompany S. Res. 168. S. Rept. 353. July 10, 1963. 1 p.

Questions and Answers on Arms Control and Disarmament. July 11, 1963. 9 pp. [Committee print.]

The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination. A study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations to the Senate Committee on Government Operations. July 15, 1963. 159 pp. [Committee print.]

Contribution to the Expenses of the International Commission for Supervision and Control of Laos. Report to accompany S. 1627. S. Rept. 357. July 15, 1963. 18 pp.

Authorizing One Additional Assistant Secretary of State, and for Other Purposes. Report to accompany S. 1512. S. Rept. 358. July 15, 1963. 12 pp.

Prohibiting the Location of Chanceries or Other Business Offices of Foreign Governments in Certain Residential Areas in the District of Columbia. Report to accompany S. 646. S. Rept. 360. July 16, 1963. 4 pp.

Special Message on the Balance of Payments. Message from the President of the United States. H. Doc. 141. July 18, 1963. 12 pp.

Expropriation of American-Owned Property by Foreign Governments in the Twentieth Century. Report prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. July 19, 1963. 41 pp. [Committee print.]

Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program. Report, together with minority views, to accompany S. 1703. S. Rept. 372. July 22, 1963. 10 pp.

Supplementary Slavery Convention. Message from the President transmitting the supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery, signed at Geneva September 7, 1956. S. Ex. L. July 22, 1963. 12 pp.

Convention on the Political Rights of Women. Message from the President transmitting the convention on the political rights of women, signed at New York March 31, 1953. S. Ex. J. July 22, 1963. 10 pp.

Members Named to Arts Advisory Committee and Drama Panel

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE ARTS

The Department of State announced on August 30 (press release 450) that the Advisory Committee on the Arts, which gives guidance to the Department of State in conducting its program of sending cultural presentations to other countries, has been completed with the appointments of John Brownlee, director of the Manhattan School of Music and former Metropolitan Opera Company singer, and Oliver Rea, administrative director of the Tyrone Guthrie Theater in Minneapolis.

Membership of the Committee, which is au-

thorized by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (the Fulbright-Hays Act), is limited to 10. The other members are:

Roy E. Larsen (*chairman*), chairman of the executive committee, Time, Inc., and vice chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Lew Christensen, director of the San Francisco Ballet
Warner Lawson, dean of music, Howard University
Peter Mennin, composer and president of the Juilliard School of Music

Theodore Roszak, sculptor

George Seaton, motion picture writer, producer, and director

George Szell, musical director of the Cleveland Orchestra

Nina Vance, managing director of the Alley Theater, Houston, Texas

The Committee and the Department are assisted by several panels of experts, each concerned with a particular field of the performing arts and each evaluating and recommending performers within its field.

With this assistance the Committee (1) provides guidance and assistance to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department on types of attractions that would be most effective in meeting specific objectives of the cultural presentations program in various areas of the world, and (2) provides guidance and counsel on other governmental international activities concerned with the arts.

AD HOC DRAMA PANEL

The Department of State announced on August 31 (press release 451 dated August 30) that a special drama panel composed of 15 persons associated with the stage—in producing, directing, writing, staging, lighting, and other capacities—has been appointed to study problems of presenting theatrical attractions abroad under the Department of State's cultural presentations program. The *ad hoc* panel will function under the Advisory Committee on the Arts.

The program has suspended for the current season the sending abroad of dramatic or other theatrical productions until the expert advice of members of the *ad hoc* panel can be obtained. Their advice is being sought on problems of cost relating to production, scenery, lighting, and

transportation and on innovations and economies that may be possible through advance planning. The committee will also be asked to suggest criteria for determining play content that will be effective abroad even though not performed in the local language. By such a review at this time it is hoped the dramatic medium can be used with maximum effectiveness in the presentations program.

Miss Nan Martin, actress, New York, has been appointed chairman, and Robert Whitehead, producer, New York, vice chairman. Other members are:

Richard L. Coe, drama critic, *Washington Post*
 Robert Dowling, chairman of the board of directors,
 American National Theater and Academy (ANTA),
 New York
 Hal Holbrook, actor, New York
 Edward Kook, lighting expert, New York
 Jerome Lawrence, writer, Malibu, Calif.
 E. G. Marshall, actor, New York
 Kevin McCarthy, actor, Beverly Hills, Calif.
 Joseph Mielziner, stage designer, New York
 Dick Moore, actor and editor of *Equity*, New York
 Chester Morris, actor, New York
 Donald Oenslager, scene designer, New York
 Alan Schneider, stage director, New York
 Miss Peggy Wood, actress and president of ANTA, New
 York

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Adjourned During August 1963

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 36th Session	Geneva	July 2-Aug. 2
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Industrial Development and Financing of the Private Sector: 2d Session.	San José	July 26-Aug. 3
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Health, Housing, and Com- munity Development: 2d Session.	San José	July 26-Aug. 3
U.N. ECA Conference of African Finance Ministers for the Establish- ment of an African Development Bank.	Khartoum, Sudan	July 26-Aug. 9
International Coffee Council: 1st Session	London	July 29-Aug. 24
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee	Geneva	July 31-Aug. 1
Inter-American Ministers of Education: 3d Meeting	Bogotá	Aug. 4-10
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Basic Products	Washington	Aug. 5-9
UNESCO/BIRPI African Study Meeting on Copyright	Brazzaville	Aug. 5-10
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Geochemical Prospecting Methods and Techniques.	Bangkok	Aug. 5-14
U.N. Seminar on the Rights of the Child	Warsaw	Aug. 6-19
CEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 8th Session	Athens	Aug. 19-24
OECD Ministers of Science: Advisory Panels on Agenda Items 1 and 2.	Paris	Aug. 22-23

in Session as of September 1, 1963

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament . .	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962-
7th International Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 18, 1963-
ICAO International Conference on Air Law	Tokyo	Aug. 20-
U.N. Conference on Travel and Tourism	Rome	Aug. 21-
14th International Feature Film Festival	Venice	Aug. 24-
ILO Iron and Steel Committee: 7th Session	Cardiff, Wales	Aug. 26-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 23, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

United States and Japan Conclude Arrangement for Cotton Textile Trade, 1963-65

Press release 441 dated August 26, for release August 27

JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Governments of the United States and Japan on August 27 announced the conclusion of a bilateral arrangement covering trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States for the period 1963 through 1965. The purpose of this arrangement is to provide for the orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States. The notes effecting the arrangement, which was negotiated under article 4 of the Geneva Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles of February 9, 1962,¹ were exchanged on August 27 by Ambassador Ryuji Takeuchi and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs G. Griffith Johnson. Representatives of the Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor participated in the negotiations with the Embassy of Japan and with other representatives of the Japanese Government. Principal features of the bilateral arrangement are as follows:

1. For calendar year 1963 the level of Japanese exports of cotton textiles to the United States, as listed in annex A to the arrangement, is 287.5 million square yards equivalent. Within this aggregate limit, limits or ceilings are also provided for particular categories and groups of textiles.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

2. The overall limit, and the limits or ceilings on groups and categories, will be increased 3 percent for calendar year 1964, and the levels will be increased by 5 percent for calendar year 1965.

3. The two Governments will exchange statistical data on cotton textiles as are required for the effective implementation of the arrangement. A set of conversion factors specified in annex C of the arrangement to express various categories of cotton textiles in terms of a square yard equivalent.

4. The two Governments agree on procedures that would be applied in the event that an excessive concentration of Japanese exports of any particular product of cotton textiles, for which no limit or ceiling is specified, or of items made from a particular type of fabric should cause or threaten to cause disruption in the United States market.

5. The two Governments also agree on procedures which would be applied in the event that questions should arise concerning certain items not included in annex A of the arrangement.

6. The two Governments also agree to consult on any problem that may arise during the term of the arrangement.

Except as otherwise provided by the arrangement, the terms and provisions of the Long-Term Arrangements will continue to be applicable to the trade between Japan and the United States in cotton textiles.

CHANGE OF NOTES EFFECTING THE ARRANGEMENT

Japanese Note

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1963.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions held in Washington by the representatives of the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, and to confirm, on behalf of the Government of Japan, the understandings reached between the two Governments that, pursuant to the provisions of Article 4 of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 1962 (hereinafter referred to as "the Long-Term Arrangements"), permitting "mutually acceptable arrangements on other terms not inconsistent with the basic objectives of this Arrangement", and with a view to providing for orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, the bilateral arrangement attached hereto will be applied by the two Governments for the period of three years beginning January 1, 1963 subject to the provisions thereof.

I have further the honor to request you to be good enough to confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of the Government of the United States. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

Excellency
N. RUSK,
Secretary of State
the United States of America.

ATTACHMENT

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING TRADE IN COTTON TEXTILES BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 4 of the Long-Term Arrangements, permitting "mutually acceptable arrangements on other terms not inconsistent with the basic objectives of this Arrangement", the following arrangement will be applied by the two Governments for the period of three years beginning January 1, 1963 subject to the provisions herein.

The purpose of this Arrangement is to provide for orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States. To achieve this purpose:

The United States Government shall cooperate with the Japanese Government in promoting orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, and

b. The Japanese Government will maintain, for the period of three years beginning January 1, 1963, an annual aggregate limit for exports of cotton textiles to the United States, and annual limits for major groups and annual limits or ceilings for certain products within those groups, subject to the provisions of this Arrangement.

2. The annual aggregate limit for 1963 shall be 287.5 million square yards. This limit shall be subdivided into four major groups as follows:

	Million square yards
Group I—Cotton cloth	125.5
II—Made up goods, usually included in U.S. cotton broad woven goods production	41
III—Apparel	111
IV—Miscellaneous cotton textiles	10
TOTAL	287.5

Within these major groups, annual limits or ceilings for specific products are set forth in Annex A. Within the annual aggregate limit, the limits for Groups I, II, III and IV may be exceeded by not more than 5 percent, provided that this provision for "flexibility" shall permit an increase only in the "Other" categories referred to in each group in Annex A.

Each group set forth above shall be deemed to contain the following Categories which are defined in Annex B:

- Group I, Categories 5 through 27.
- Group II, Categories 28 through 36, and part of Category 64.
- Group III, Categories 39 through 62, and part of Category 63.
- Group IV, Categories 1 through 4, 37, 38, and part of Categories 63 and 64.

3. The aggregate limit for 1964 shall be increased by 3 percent over the limit for 1963. The aggregate limit for 1965 shall be increased by 5 percent over the limit for 1964. These increases for 1964 and 1965 shall be applied to each limit for the groups and to each limit or ceiling within the groups.

4. Wherever it is necessary for the purposes of this Arrangement to convert units other than square yards (e.g., dozens, pieces, pounds, etc.) into square yard equivalents, the conversion into equivalent square yards shall be at the rates specified in Annex C.

5. a. The two Governments undertake to consult whenever there is any question arising from the implementation of this Arrangement.

b. If instances of excessive concentration of Japanese exports in any products within the scope of this Arrangement, except those included in categories for which limits or ceilings are specified in Annex A, or if instances of excessive concentration of Japanese exports of end products made from a particular type of fabric should cause or threaten to cause disruption

of the United States domestic market, the United States Government may request in writing consultations with the Japanese Government to determine an appropriate course of action. Such a request shall be accompanied by a detailed, factual statement of the reasons and justification for the request, including relevant data on imports from third countries. During the course of such consultations, the Japanese Government will maintain exports in the products in question on a quarterly basis at annual levels not in excess of 105 percent of the exports of such products during the first 12 months of the 15 month period prior to the month in which consultations are requested or at annual levels not in excess of 90 percent of the exports of such products during the 12 months prior to the month in which consultations are requested, whichever is higher.

c. The provisions in sub-paragraph b above should only be resorted to sparingly. In the event that the Japanese Government considers that the substance of Annex A would be seriously affected due to the consultations in sub-paragraph b, the Japanese Government may request that the consultations include a discussion of possible modifications of Annex A.

6. The two Governments recognize that the successful implementation of this Arrangement depends in large part upon mutual cooperation on statistical questions. Accordingly, each Government agrees to supply promptly any available statistical data requested by the other Government. In particular, the United States Government shall supply the Japanese Government with data on monthly imports of cotton textiles from Japan as well as from third countries, and the Japanese Government shall supply the United States Government with data on monthly exports of cotton textiles to the United States.

7. As regards products in any category under specific limits or ceilings specified in this Arrangement, the United States Government shall keep under review the effect of this Arrangement with a view to orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, and shall furnish the Japanese Government once a year with available statistics and other relevant data on imports, production and consumption of such products such as would clarify the impact of imports on the industry concerned.

8. If the Japanese Government considers that as a result of limits and ceilings specified in this Arrangement Japan is being placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a third country, the Japanese Government may request consultations with the United States Government with a view to taking appropriate remedial action such as a reasonable modification of this Arrangement.

9. The two Governments understand that the terms and conditions of the Long-Term Arrangements shall be applicable to trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States except as provided in this Arrangement. The United States Government agrees that insofar as the exports from Japan of the products

falling within the scope of Annex A of this Arrangement are conducted within the framework thereof the United States Government shall not invoke Article of the Long-Term Arrangements with respect to such products.

10. a. This Arrangement shall continue in force through December 31, 1965, provided that either Government may terminate this Arrangement prior thereto effective at the beginning of a calendar year by giving sixty days' written notice to the other Government.

b. Each Government may at any time propose modification of this Arrangement. The other Government shall give sympathetic consideration to such proposals.

ANNEX A

1. a. The following specific limits shall apply with the total annual limit of 125.5 million square yards for Group I—"Cotton cloth":

	Thousand Square Yards
(1) Gingham (Categories 5 and 6)	46,200
(2) Velveteens (Category 7)	2,700
(3) Typewriter ribbon cloth (Category 17)	900
(4) All Other Fabrics (Categories 8 through 16 and 18 through 27)	75,500

b. Within the specific limit for "Ginghams", the export of "Ginghams, combed" (Category 6) shall not exceed 75 percent of the above specific limit.

c. Within "All Other Fabrics", the following specific ceilings shall not be exceeded:

	Thousand Square Yards
(1) Sheeting (Categories 9 and 10)	30,000
(2) Poplin and broadcloth (Categories 15 and 16)	30,000
(3) Print cloth, shirting type, 80 x 80 type, carded yarn (Category 18)	20,000
(4) Other shirting (Categories 19, 20 and 21)	32,000
(5) Twill and sateen (Categories 22 and 23)	39,000
(6) Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s. (Categories 24 and 25 and part of Category 32)	29,000
(7) Duck (Part of Categories 26 and 27)	1,700

d. Any shortfall below the limits specified in (1) (2) and (3) of paragraph 1 a may be transferred (4)—"All Other Fabrics".

e. Within "All Other Fabrics" total exports of fabrics made from combed warp and filling shall not exceed 34.65 million square yards.

f. Within "Yarn-dyed fabrics", total exports of handkerchief cloth shall not exceed 2.25 million square yards.

2. a. The following specific limits shall apply with the total annual limit of 41 million square yards for Group II—"Made-up goods, usually included in U.S. cotton broad woven goods production":

	Unit	No.
(1) Pillowcases, plain (Categories 28 and 29)	1000 nos.	5,400
(2) Dish towels (Category 30)	1000 nos.	7,200

	Unit	No.
(3) Handkerchiefs, except for dedicated handkerchief cloth (Part of Category 32)	1000 doz.	1, 260
(4) Table damask and manufactures (Category 33)	1000 lbs.	3, 100
(5) Sheets (Categories 34 and 35)	1000 nos.	2, 940
(6) All Other Made-Up Goods (Categories 31, 36 and part of Category 64 as specified in paragraph 5, below)	1000 syd. equiv.	2, 494

b. Any shortfall below the limits specified in (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of paragraph 2 a may be transferred to (6)—“All Other Made-Up Goods”.

3. a. The following specific limits shall apply within the total annual limit of 111 million square yards for Group III—“Apparel”:

	Unit	No.
(1) Gloves and mittens (Category 39)	1,000 doz.	472. 5
(2) T-Shirts, knit (Categories 41 and 42)	1,000 doz.	535
(3) Knit shirts, except in T and Sweatshirts (Category 43)	1,000 doz.	809
(4) Men's and boys' dress shirts, not knit (Category 45)	1,000 doz.	382
(5) Sportshirts, whether or not in sets, not knit (Category 46)	1,000 doz.	717. 5
(6) Raincoats, $\frac{3}{4}$ length or over (Category 48)	1,000 doz.	60
(7) All other coats (Category 49)	1,000 doz.	120
(8) Trousers, slacks and shorts, outer, whether or not in sets, not knit (Categories 50 and 51)	1,000 doz.	1, 500
(9) Blouses, whether or not in sets (Category 52)	1,000 doz.	1, 775
(10) Dresses, not knit (Category 53)	1,000 doz.	45
(1) Playsuits, sunsuits, wash-suits, rompers, creepers, etc. (Category 54)	1,000 doz.	180
(2) Nightwear and pajamas (Category 60)	1,000 doz.	120
(3) All other Apparel (Categories 40, 44, 47, 55 through 59, and 61, 62 and part of Category 63 as specified in paragraph 5, below)	1,000 syd. equiv.	1, 428

b. Any shortfall below the limits specified in (1) through (12) of paragraph 3a may be transferred to (3)—“All Other Apparel”.

c. Within the specific limit of 1.5 million dozen for Trousers, slacks and shorts, outer, whether or not in sets, not knit”, the following specific ceilings shall not exceeded:

	Unit	No.
(1) Men's and boys' (Category 50)	1000 doz.	500
(2) Women's, misses' and children's (Category 51)	1000 doz.	1, 162. 5

d. The aggregate volume of exports of the following apparel items manufactured of corduroy, where the chief weight of the item is corduroy, shall be limited to 21.35 million square yards equivalent based upon the conversion factors for the items in question which appear in Annex C.

Category No.	Description
46	Sport shirts
48	Raincoats
49	All other coats
50-51	Trousers
54	Playsuits

4. a. The following specific limits shall apply within the total annual limit of 10 million square yards for Group IV—“Miscellaneous cotton textiles”:

	Unit	No.
(1) Zipper tapes, n.e.s. (U.S. “Schedule A” No. 3230 273)	1000 lbs.	810
(2) Other (Categories 1 through 4, 37, 38, and parts of Categories 63 and 64 as specified in paragraph 5, below)	1000 syd. equiv.	6, 274

b. Any shortfall below the limit specified in (1) in paragraph 4a may be transferred to (2)—“Other”.

5. With regard to Categories 63 and 64 referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above, the following items or products as identified by present U.S. “Schedule A” numbers or parts thereof shall be included:

CATEGORY 63 (To be included in Group III except as noted otherwise)

3113	000 ¹	3114	165
3113	362	3114	175
3113	365	3114	180
3113	958 ¹	3114	225
3113	962 ¹	3114	235
3113	965	3114	240
3113	969	3114	245
3113	970	3114	255
3113	971	3114	715 ¹
3113	972	3114	720 ¹
3113	973	3114	895
3113	974	3114	900
3113	975	3114	905
3113	995	3114	925
3114	001	3114	950
3114	155	3114	955

PART OF:

3113	997 ³
3113	998 ³
3114	260 ³
3114	960 ³
3114	965 ³

[See footnotes, p. 444.]

I.E.	Pullovers	Diaper sets
	Aprons	Scarves
	Altar cassocks	Dress shields ¹
	Beach wear sets	Sash belts ¹
	Swim wear	Apparel with bib
	Baseball uniforms	Bibs ¹
	Sleeping bags for infants	Belts for apparel ¹ , and
	Halters	Shoulder straps for brassieres ¹
	Men's and boy's coveralls and overalls	

CATEGORY 64 (To be included in Group IV except as noted otherwise)

3030	000	3159	020 ²	3220	202 ²
3030	100	3159	120 ²	3220	205 ²
3081	510	3163	001	3220	207 ²
3081	530	3163	002	3220	212 ²
3081	600	3163	003	3220	862
3081	710 ²	3163	004	3220	865
3081	730 ²	3163	005	3220	868
3081	812 ²	3163	006	3224	000
3081	815 ²	3163	580 ²	3224	050
3081	818	3163	600 ²	3224	100
3081	852 ²	3163	690 ²	3224	150
3081	855 ²	3166	000	3224	200
3081	858	3166	200	3224	300
3081	912 ²	3166	300	3224	500
3081	915 ²	3166	692	3230	240
3081	918 ²	3166	695	3230	273
3083	500 ²	3168	001	3230	350
3083	700 ²	3168	002	3230	401
3083	900 ²	3168	003	3230	410
3084	112 ²	3168	004	3230	431
3084	400 ²	3168	005	3230	500 ²
3086	600 ²	3168	006	3230	682 ²
3086	730	3168	007	3230	685 ²
3118	200 ²	3168	008	3230	688 ²
3124	200 ²	3168	009	3903	300
3134	200 ²	3168	010	3969	010
3144	200 ²	3200	012 ²	3230	232
3154	200 ²	3200	015 ²	3230	235
3158	020 ²	3200	400 ²	3230	278
3158	120 ²	3220	130 ²	9439	950 (excluding in sets)

ANNEX B

Definition of Cotton Textile Categories

List of Categories	Unit
1. Cotton yarn, singles, carded, not ornamented, etc.	lbs.

¹ These items or products shall be included in Group IV. [Footnote in original.]

² These items shall be included in Group II. [Footnote in original.]

³ The two Governments shall consult as to whether or not any product other than the seventeen products enumerated below the footnoted items may be classified as an addition to these items. Such consultations shall not cover shoe uppers, Japan items, belts (other than sash belts and belts for apparel), suspenders and braces. [Footnote in original.]

List of Categories	Unit
2. Cotton yarn, plied, carded, not ornamented, etc.	lbs.
3. Cotton yarn, singles, combed, not ornamented, etc.	"
4. Cotton yarn, plied, combed, not ornamented, etc.	"
5. Gingham, carded yarn	sq. yds.
6. Gingham, combed yarn	"
7. Velveteens	"
8. Corduroy	"
9. Sheeting, carded yarn	"
10. Sheeting, combed yarn	"
11. Lawns, carded yarn	"
12. Lawns, combed yarn	"
13. Voiles, carded yarn	"
14. Voiles, combed yarn	"
15. Poplin and broadcloth, carded yarn	"
16. Poplin and broadcloth, combed yarn	"
17. Typewriter ribbon cloth	"
18. Print cloth, shirting type, 80x80 type, carded yarn	"
19. Print cloth, shirting type, other than 80x80 type, carded yarn	"
20. Shirting, carded yarn	"
21. Shirting, combed yarn	"
22. Twill and sateen, carded yarn	"
23. Twill and sateen, combed yarn	"
24. Yarn-dyed fabrics, n. e. s., carded yarn	"
25. Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s., combed yarn	"
26. Fabrics, n.e.s., carded yarn	"
27. Fabrics, n.e.s., combed yarn	"
28. Pillowcases, plain, carded yarn	numbers
29. Pillowcases, plain, combed yarn	"
30. Dish towels	"
31. Towels, other than dish towels	"
32. Handkerchiefs	doz.
33. Table damasks and manufactures	lbs.
34. Sheets, carded yarn	numbers
35. Sheets, combed yarn	"
36. Bedspreads, including quilts	"
37. Braided and woven elastics	lbs.
38. Fishing nets	"
39. Gloves and mittens	doz.
40. Hose and half hose	doz. prs.
41. Men's and boys' all white T. shirts, knit or crocheted	doz.
42. Other T. shirts	"
43. Knitshirts, other than T. shirts and Sweatshirts (including infants)	"
44. Sweaters and cardigans	"
45. Men's and boys' shirts, dress, not knit or crocheted	"
46. Men's and boys' shirts, sport, not knit or crocheted	"
47. Men's and boys' shirts, work, not knit or crocheted	"
48. Raincoats, ¾ length or over	"
49. All other coats	"

<i>List of Categories</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Category Number</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Conversion Factor</i>
0. Men's and boys' trousers, slacks and shorts, outer, whether or not in sets, not knit or crocheted	doz.	46	doz.	24.457
		47	"	22.186
		48	"	50.0
1. Women's, misses' and children's trousers, slacks and shorts, outer, whether or not in sets, not knit or crocheted	"	49	"	32.5
		50	"	17.797
		51	"	17.797
		52	"	14.53
2. Blouses, whether or not in sets	"	53	"	45.3
3. Women's, misses', children's and infants' dresses (including nurses' and other uniform dresses), not knit or crocheted	"	54	"	25.0
		55	"	51.0
		56	"	9.2
		57	"	11.25
4. Playsuits, sunsuits, washsuits, creepers, rompers, etc. (except blouses and shorts; blouses and trousers; or blouses, shorts and skirt sets)	"	58	"	5.0
		59	"	16.0
		60	"	51.96
		61	"	4.75
5. Dressing gowns, including bathrobes and beachrobes, lounging gowns, dusters and housecoats, not knit or crocheted	"	62	lb.	4.6
		63	"	4.6
		64 ¹	"	4.6
6. Men's and boys' undershirts, (not T. shirts)	"			
7. Men's and boys' briefs and undershorts	"			
8. Drawers, shorts and briefs (except men's and boys' briefs), knit or crocheted	"			
9. All other underwear, not knit or crocheted	"			
0. Nightwear and pajamas	"			
1. Brassieres and other body supporting garments	"			
2. Other knitted or crocheted clothing units or lbs.	"			
3. Other clothing, not knit or crocheted	"			
4. All other cotton textile items	"			

United States Note

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, August 27, 1963

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of today's date and the bilateral arrangement attached thereto concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States which reads as follows:

"EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions held in Washington by the representatives of the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, and to confirm on behalf of the Government of Japan, the understandings reached between the two Governments that, pursuant to the provisions of Article 4 of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Long-Term Arrangements'), permitting 'mutually acceptable arrangements on other terms not inconsistent with the basic objectives of this Arrangement', and with a view to providing for orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, the bilateral arrangement attached hereto will be applied by the two Governments for the period of three years beginning January 1, 1963 subject to the provisions thereof.

"I have further the honor to request you to be good enough to confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of the Government of the United States.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration."

I have further the honor to confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of the Government of the United States of America.

¹ Floor coverings shall be measured by actual square yardages. [Footnote in original.]

ANNEX C			
Conversion Factors			
Category Number	Unit	Conversion Factor	
1	lb.	4.6	
2	"	4.6	
3	"	4.6	
4	"	4.6	
28	no.	1.084	
29	"	1.084	
30	"	.348	
31	"	.348	
32	doz.	1.66	
33	lb.	3.17	
34	no.	6.2	
35	"	6.2	
36	"	6.9	
37	lb.	4.6	
38	"	4.6	
39	doz.	3.527	
40	"	4.6	
41	"	7.234	
42	"	7.234	
43	"	7.234	
44	"	36.8	
45	"	22.186	

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

Enclosure:
Arrangement.

His Excellency
RYUJI TAKEUCHI,
Ambassador of Japan.

EXCHANGES OF LETTERS

United States Letter

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, August 27, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: With reference to Annex A of the Arrangement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States effected by the Exchange of Notes today, I wish to state the understandings of my Government that if any problem arises regarding the classification in the implementation of the Arrangement, the two Governments shall consult each other with a view to finding an appropriate solution. Particularly, when questions arise whether certain products fall within the scope of Annex A, the two Governments shall study such questions taking into account, *inter alia*, such international standards as B.T.N. and S.I.T.C.

In view of the fact that Category definitions may be affected as a result of possible future changes in the United States "Schedule A", I hereby wish to state further our understandings that such changes shall be promptly notified to the Japanese Government, and that consultations shall be held to make such adjustments in the Arrangement as may become necessary as a result of the changes.

I should be grateful if you would confirm these understandings if they are acceptable to your Government.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

Japanese Reply

WASHINGTON, *August 27, 1963.*

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 27, 1963 which reads as follows:

[Text of United States letter.]

I wish to confirm on behalf of my Government the understandings set forth in your letter.

Sincerely yours,

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

United States Letter

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, August 27, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: On the occasion of the Exchange of Notes with the Arrangement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States effected thereby, I wish to state that there are certain items included in Annex A of the Arrangement but which are classified as "cotton textiles" by the United States Government. A list of these items, identified by the United States "Schedule A" numbers, is attached to this letter. It is the understanding of the United States Government that the Japanese Government does not consider some of the products within the first 7 items to be cotton textiles and does not consider any of the last 7 items to be cotton textiles.

Nevertheless, in the event imports from Japan in any of the items or products enumerated in the attached list should cause or threaten to cause disruption of the United States domestic market, the United States Government may request consultations with the Japanese Government for the purpose of finding an appropriate course of action.

The consultations shall be conducted in the manner provided in paragraph 5 of the Arrangement if the item or product in question is considered a cotton textile by the Japanese Government, or in any other manner agreeable to both Governments if the item or product in question is not considered a cotton textile by the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government shall promptly notify the United States Government whether or not it considers the item or product in question to be a cotton textile.

While the United States Government agrees and prefers to seek a mutually satisfactory solution through the means mentioned above, it reserves the right, if such a settlement cannot be reached expeditiously, to invoke Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962, concerning the items or products enumerated in the attached list.

I should be grateful if you would confirm the understandings if they are acceptable to your Government.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

ATTACHMENT

(1) 2061	400	(6) 3230	238	(11) 3230	712
(2) 3224	800	(7) 3230	275	(12) 3970	010
(3) 3224	900	(8) 3230	277	(13) 3971	010
(4) 3226	110	(9) 3230	352	(14) 3971	020
(5) 3226	300	(10) 3230	451	(15) 3971	110

3) 3971 210 (21) 3114 960¹ (26) 3224 700
 7) 3971 430 (22) 3114 965¹ (27) 3230 461
 8) 3113 997¹ (23) 2061 000 (28) 3230 670
 9) 3113 998¹ (24) 2067 610 (29) 9439 950
 0) 3114 260¹ (25) 2067 710 (in sets only)

Japanese Reply

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1963.

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 27, 1963 which reads as follows:

[Text of United States letter.]

With regard to the above stated understandings of the United States Government, I wish to confirm, on behalf of my Government, that these are also the understandings of the Government of Japan with the following reservation.

In the event the United States Government exercises the right to invoke Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangements, the Japanese Government may exercise its rights as an exporting country in accordance with the various relevant provisions of the Long-Term Arrangements, including the right to bring questions of interpretation or application of the Long-Term Arrangements to the GATT Cotton Textiles Committee in accordance with Article S of the Long-Term Arrangements.

Sincerely yours,

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

Japanese Letter

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1963.

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: With reference to Annex A of the Arrangement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America governing trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States effected by the Exchange of Notes of May 1960, I wish to state our understanding that the exports of uniquely Japanese products called "Japan Items" shall not be included in Annex A of the Arrangement. The attachment to this letter provides the definition of "Japan Items" and enumerates the products which have been and are likely to be exported to the United States as "Japan Items". Additional items may be added to the above attachment through agreement after consultations as may become necessary in the future.

It is further understood that the exports of "Japan Items" shall be made with certification by the Japanese Government. In the event that the United States Government finds that any particular products imported from Japan as "Japan Items" should not be properly classified as such, the United States Government may request consultations with the Japanese

part of these items included, i.e. shoe uppers, belts (other than sash belts and belts for apparel), suspenders and braces. [Footnote in original.]

Government with a view to finding the appropriate classification of the products in question within Annex A of the Arrangement.

I should be grateful if you would confirm these understandings if they are acceptable to your Government.

Sincerely yours,

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

ATTACHMENT

1. Definition of "Japan Items"

"Japan Items" to be kept outside Annex A of the said Arrangement are the items which are uniquely Japanese products. Whether a particular product should be considered as "Japan Items" or not will be determined on the basis of the following criterion.

Designed for the use in the traditional Japanese way of life, wearing "Kimono", living in "Tatami" rooms, decorating for traditional Japanese ceremonies or festivals, playing Japanese sports etc. In other words, not in use in the regular western way of life except for hobbies or special likings.

2. List of "Japan Items"

The names of the items which have been and are likely to be exported as "Japan Items" are as follows:

(a) Cloth

Kimono	Traditional Japanese style dress.
Yukata	A type of Kimono, summer-wear made of Yukata-Ji (Plain-woven light fabrics printed in simple colors).
Juban	Underwear for Kimono, fundamentally same style as Kimono.
Haori	Overcoat for Kimono, usually less than $\frac{3}{4}$ length.
Wafukukoto	Raincoat or duster coat to be worn over Kimono, basically same style as Kimono, different from Haori in not being open in front and longer than $\frac{3}{4}$ length.
Happi	Workers' overcoat, similar style with Haori but not dressy.
Judogi	Kimono-style sports wear for Judo, usually accompanied by slim and $\frac{3}{4}$ length trousers and by belts.
Kendogi	Kimono-style sports wear for Kendo, usually accompanied by Hakama (men's skirts, full length). Different from Judogi in being lighter, tighter and half-sleeves.
Kappogi	Apron to be worn over Kimono with broad sleeves, chest and shoulders covered.
Momohiki	Carpenters' or Rikishamen's trousers, often coveralls to be worn in combination with Happi. Different from western style trousers

	in being extremely light and small in lower ends, usually black in color. Combination sets of Happi and Momohiki are often traded as "Carpenter Apparel".
Sashiko	Quilted coat which is almost like Happi, typically used by firemen.
(b) <i>Clothing accessories</i>	
Obi	(1) Wide thick belts for Kimono, usually a few inches wide or more. (2) Wide, thin belts for mens' Kimono or Yukata, both longer than western style belts by a few times. (3) Judo belts, narrow but approximately twice as wide and longer than western style belts, no buckles.
Obishime	Woven decorative belt to be used on top of the Obi (1) above.
Tabi	Socks to be worn when one wears "kimono" made of woven fabrics, tightly in the form of foot, having a separate division for the big toe. Reaches just above the ankle and is fastened at the back by means of an overlap having metal hook tabs.
Koshihimo	Narrow, soft belt to be used between Obi and Kimono, or Kimono and Juban.
Erisugata	A length of stiff cotton cloth to be sewn inside "Eri" collar to give a form or shape.
Sodeguchi	Extra broad sleeves which are based on the short sleeves of Juban.
Homaekake	Men's working apron, thick and heavy. Big in size, usually simple in color.
(c) <i>Household goods</i>	
Futon	Japanese style bedding, mattress and thick, large blankets. Mattress different from western style in the stuffing much softer and the covering cloth lighter. Blankets are as thick as an inch or more, also with soft stuffing.
Futon-Cover	Cover for "Futon". Different from sheets as it covers the stuffing directly, also different in sizes as it is made to contain voluminous stuffing, usually printed or dyed.
Zabuton	Cushion to sit on in Japanese "Tatami" rooms. Approximately a yard square, a few inches thick with soft stuffing.
Furoshiki	Wrapping cloth of about one and a half yard square. Different from scarf in the thickness of the fabric.
Koinobori	Artificial carp to fly on top of a long pole on the occasion of "Boys'

Noren

Tenugui

Festival" in the Japanese custom. Shop curtain to hang at the entrance of shops, short, with vertical cuts in several parts.
Oblong towel, woven, usually with Japanese decorative design.

United States Reply

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, August 27, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 27, 1963, which reads as follows:

[Text of Japanese letter.]

I wish to confirm on behalf of my Government the understandings set forth in your letter.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

United States Letter

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, August 27, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: With reference to paragraph 5b of the Arrangement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States effected by the Exchange of Notes today, I wish to inform you of the views and intentions of the United States Government:

The United States Government recognizes that exports of the end products containing fabrics potentially falling under the so-called concentration clauses are themselves subject to limits established in Annex A of the Arrangement. It further recognizes that changing demands in the United States market may from time to time, lead to changes in the types of fabric appearing in imports into the United States. Considering these and other circumstances, the United States Government does not intend to invoke paragraph 5b on any type of fabric except in the case of a sharp and substantial increase from present levels in imports from Japan of that fabric in the form of end items. It is to be understood that a sharp and substantial increase would be considered to apply only in those cases where present levels of imports from Japan of the fabric concerned in the form of end items already are in substantial volume in relation to total consumption in the United States.

In any event, the United States Government would give the Japanese Government advance notice prior to any invocation of the clause under discussion.

I should be grateful if you would acknowledge on behalf of your Government the receipt of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

Japanese Reply

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1963.

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: I acknowledge, on behalf of my Government, receipt of your letter of August 27, 1963 which reads as follows:

[Text of United States letter.]

Sincerely yours,

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

U.S. and Japan Agree on Exports of Zipper Chain From Japan

Press release 447 dated August 28

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States Government announced on August 28 the conclusion of an agreement with the Government of Japan on the export of zipper chain from Japan to the United States.

Zipper chain is the long strip of fabric and metal which goes into the making of zipper. Under the terms of the agreement the Government of Japan agrees to limit exports to the United States of zipper chain chief value of \$100 to 85,000 pounds for calendar year 1964. The Government of Japan also agrees that there will be no further shipments of zipper chain chief value of cotton during the remainder of this year. The last shipments occurred in early August. For its part the United States Government agrees to admit shipments now en route to the United States.

The exchange of letters between Ambassador Ryuji Takeuchi and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs G. Griffith Johnson effecting this agreement follows.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

Japanese Letter

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1963.

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: With reference to the recent discussions held in Washington between representatives of the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America with regard to the export of zipper chain from Japan to the United States, I wish to state the understandings of my Government:

With regard to the shipment of approximately 54,000 lbs. of zipper chain in chief value of cotton now in transit to the United States and fully described in the attached shipping schedule, it is agreed that the United States Government shall use every available means to facilitate customs clearance of such shipments.

On its part, the Japanese Government confirms that there are no valid export licenses for the export to the United States of zipper chain in chief value of cotton now outstanding. In addition, the Japanese Government will suspend issuance of export licenses on the exports of zipper chain in chief value of cotton to the United States, from the present date to the end of 1963.

For the year 1964, the total amount of exports from Japan to the United States of zipper chain in chief value of cotton will be limited to 85,000 lbs.

If either Government considers it appropriate to make any arrangement concerning the product in question for the year 1965, the two Governments shall consult on the matter.

I should be grateful if you would confirm these understandings if they are acceptable to your Government.

Sincerely yours,

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

The Honorable G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON,
Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs,
Department of State.

ATTACHMENT

SHIPPING SCHEDULE OF ZIPPER CHAIN			
Name of Vessel	Port	Date	Quantity
Brooklyn Maru	Yokohama	August 3, 1963	13,485 lbs.
Mizukawa Maru	New York	August 29, 1963	
President Taylor	Yokohama	August 7, 1963	6,950 lbs.
	Los Angeles	August 21, 1963	
	Yokohama	August 10, 1963	33,098 lbs.
	Los Angeles	August 21, 1963	
TOTAL			53,533 lbs.

United States Reply

AUGUST 28, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 28, 1963, which reads as follows:

[Text of Japanese letter.]

I wish to confirm on behalf of my Government the understandings set forth in your letter.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

His Excellency
RYUJI TAKEUCHI,
Ambassador of Japan,
Embassy of Japan.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI. A. 3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at Vienna October 4, 1961. Entered into force January 31, 1963. TIAS 5284.

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, August 22, 1963.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹

Accession deposited: Malagasy Republic, July 31, 1963.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹

Accession deposited: Malagasy Republic, July 31, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.¹

Signatures affixed at Washington: Chad, Switzerland, August 26, 1963; Cameroon, Dahomey, Morocco, August 27, 1963; Uganda, August 29, 1963; Korea, Nepal, Upper Volta, August 30, 1963.

Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Accessions deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), Nigeria, August 2, 1963.

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, for the protection of industrial property revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, and at London June 2, 1934. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Congo (Brazzaville), June 26, 1963.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Poland, July 8, 1963.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Kabul August 20, 1963. Entered into force August 20, 1963.

Argentina

Agreement relating to the effectiveness of United States schedules to the trade agreement of October 14, 1941 (56 Stat. 1685). Effected by exchange

¹ Not in force.

of notes at Buenos Aires July 24, 1963. Entered into force July 24, 1963.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Buenos Aires August 21, 1963. Entered into force August 21, 1963.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Buenos Aires November 5, 1956. Entered into force November 5, 1956. TIAS 3687.

Terminated: August 21, 1963 (superseded by agreement of August 21, 1963, *supra*).

Agreement amending the agreement of November 5, 1956 (TIAS 3687), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes. Signed at Buenos Aires February 26 and December 27, 1957. Entered into force December 27, 1957. TIAS 3992.

Terminated: August 21, 1963 (superseded by agreement of August 21, 1963, *supra*).

Agreement amending the agreement of November 5, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3687, 3992), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires May 8 and May 17, 1961. Entered into force May 17, 1961. TIAS 4000.

Terminated: August 21, 1963 (superseded by agreement of August 21, 1963, *supra*).

EURATOM

Amendment to the additional agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy of June 11, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4650, 5100). Signed at Brussels and at Washington August 27, 1963. Enters into force on the day on which each party shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Iraq

Cultural agreement. Signed at Baghdad January 1, 1961.

Entered into force: August 13, 1963.

Japan

Arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 27, 1963. Entered into force August 27, 1963.

Mexico

Convention for the solution of the problem of Chamizal. Signed at México August 29, 1963. Enters into force upon exchange of instrument of ratification at México.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Consulate at Durban Raised to Consulate General

The Department of State announced on August 19 (Department notice) that on August 19 the American consulate at Durban, Republic of South Africa, was elevated to the rank of consulate general. Francis Allen, the principal officer, has been appointed consul general.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to August 26 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 431 of August 19 and 436 of August 23.

No.	Date	Subject
*439	8/26	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*440	8/26	Harriman: Central Committee of the World Council of Churches (excerpts).
441	8/26	Textile arrangement with Japan.
*441-A	8/27	Descriptions of "schedule A" numbers in U.S.-Japan textile arrangement.
†442	8/27	Manning: "Foreign Policy: Building Amid Turbulence."
*443	8/27	Itinerary for visit of King and Queen of Afghanistan.
*444	8/27	Cultural exchange.
†445	8/29	Vice President Johnson's visit to north European countries (rewrite).
446	8/29	World Affairs Conference, Albany, N.Y.
447	8/28	Agreement with Japan on zipper chain.
†448	8/29	Convention with Mexico on Chamizal.
449	8/29	Netherlands compensation program for Nazi victims broadened.
450	8/30	Appointments to Advisory Committee on Arts (rewrite).
451	8/30	Drama panel to study problems of presenting theater abroad (rewrite).
*454	8/30	U.S. participation in international conferences.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Digest of International Law Volume I

The Department of State has released the first volume of a new *Digest of International Law*. Dr. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser. The *Digest* is a successor to the Hackworth *Digest* published in 1940.

The new *Digest* is in the nature of a reference book, containing materials, official and unofficial, intended to inform the user as to the status of developments regarding particular aspects of international law.

Chapter I of Volume I treats of theories of international law, its subjects and sources, its relation to local law, and efforts toward its codification.

Chapter II deals with the legal status of present-day states, territories, and governments, and their classification. Included are listings and groupings of states and governments, with information on their origin, changes, official names, etc. Recent evolutions in the structure of the British Commonwealth and of the French Community are among the topics discussed.

Volume I of the *Digest of International Law* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$4.25.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1265



September 23, 1963

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Foreign Policy: Building Amid Turbulence

by Robert J. Manning
*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

The transfer from the world of journalism to the world of government, particularly in the field of foreign affairs, requires less transformation than some might suspect. I made this transfer less than 2 years ago and have found that there are numberless similarities between the journalistic job of trying to make foreign policy intelligible and the governmental job of trying to make it work. Of the many similar problems, one of the most exasperating and—when the chips are down—most perilous is the problem of arriving at a sufficient state of certainty about what is going on and what it all means.

In both government and journalism the temptation is always strong to wait for more of the facts, more of the returns, before committing the front page to a headline or a national government to a deed. For journalism, the temptation is arbitrarily removed by the arrival of

the deadline. For government, except in instances of the most decisive international event the temptation to wait is not so clearly or easily erased. The germs of procrastination sit in the system of even the most active government activist. Obviously there are many perils in the process of making decisions or launching policies before all the facts fit into a neat computation that says, "This is precisely how it is," and "This is precisely what we must do." But there are perils, too, in putting off action in the hope that another day or another week will produce information that makes the decision more obvious. The newspaper must meet its deadline. The government must act before it is too late to forestall adversity or to seize opportunity. What is more, the procrastination frequently proves to be profitless.

Perhaps I may illustrate this with a seemingly frivolous anecdote. Once, on a news reporting visit to an East African country, I met an American who had taken up residence there some months before. He complained of the difficult

¹ Address made before the American Hospital Association, at New York, N.Y., on Aug. 27 (press release 442).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1265 PUBLICATION 7599 SEPTEMBER 23, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$8.50; foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 1, 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as a source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

of clearly understanding the thinking of many of the officials he was required to deal with. "The more specifically and deliberately one of them speaks or writes, the less meaning you should attach to it," he decided. "It is when he gets vague that you should look for meaning." As an example he told of discovering one morning that a new cafe had opened not far from his roominghouse. A sign proclaimed its name: "The Open and Closed Cafe." Puzzling over what had inspired the proprietor to use that particular name, he was relieved one day to see a sign painter at work, obviously altering the cafe's sign. He thought that at last there might be some clarification. When he went to examine the results, he saw that the sign had indeed been altered. It now read: "The Open and Closed Cafe—100%." The American was, of course, even more puzzled than before.

This prolog must serve as a caveat for this occasion. In our time of fast-multiplying and swiftly moving international events no man can stand before you and review such events—and the policies that are fitted to them—with the certainty that all the assessments of the moment will look the same in tomorrow's sunrise. But the odds are that tomorrow's new information will leave the situation still as imprecise and still as demanding of the calculated risks and visceral decisionmaking that is a necessity of modern-day foreign policy. With that in the background, I should like today to discuss some of the overriding themes of American foreign policy in the 1960's and some precise cases of that policy in action.

American Involvement Throughout the World

The phrase "Building Amid Turbulence" implies what is both most difficult and most ambitious about this country's foreign policy. It would be difficult enough were this country faced only by the job of coping with and containing the turbulence that engulfs the world today. The task far surpasses that. The job, which we have in part inherited and in part assumed by our assumption of what human existence is—or ought to be—about, is not only to maintain the peace, to protect and promote our narrow national interests, and to keep the tur-

bulence at bay. That might be a description of the America of the past, when we tried to turn our backs on the world, tend our own gardens, and hum "River stay 'way from my door." We have found since the war that the achievement of these relatively limited aims is not enough; that our true security and our true guarantee of life, liberty, and the pursuit of what passes for happiness lie in a far more ambitious involvement throughout the world—an involvement that engages us as leader of the struggle of the world of choice against the world of coercion; an involvement that requires us to build, or help others to build, new economic and social institutions, to build new channels through which the riches of the world can be more widely distributed and injustices erased, to transform a climate of fear into an atmosphere of trust and stability.

No corps of engineers sets out to build a huge dam without first diverting the course of the river so that strong foundations may first be laid. Yet those who would build the better and safer world must do their building amid the very torrent of events.

That is why foreign policy reaches today into every American home. That is why our overseas economic commitments are such that we require a favorable gap of more than \$5 billion between our exports and our imports merely to stay even on the books. That is why 600,000 Americans in uniform now serve overseas and the largest defense establishment in all history stands behind them. That is why throughout the world, wherever the torrents of change and of trouble run high, there can be found an interest, an impulse, a danger, or an involvement that has a direct pertinence to American interests. The torrents of today on every continent are torrents of change; the direction in which that change takes the many nations and peoples involved has a direct bearing on our own lives and our own nation's future. If the direction is toward the world of coercion, this basic interest is directly threatened. Where else, then, can we or should we be but in the middle of the torrents?

There may be many differences of opinion in this country about when, where, and how the building ought to be done. We have been seeing in recent days in the Congress one serious mani-

festation of that difference of opinion. I refer to the unfortunate aberration in the House of Representatives last week when deep cuts were made in the United States overseas aid program.² Unless restored, those cuts will undermine one of the Government's most basic means of furthering the national interest. I am aware that this association does not have to be convinced of the importance of a healthy foreign aid program. And I cannot believe there is any deep-down doubt in most American minds that our massive involvement in nation building and institution building is a necessity. The simple fact is that if we don't try, others will keep trying anyway—to the detriment not merely of American ideals but, to repeat, also to the detriment of American interest.

In spite of the manifestations in the current fight over AID appropriations it is evident that the big essentials, the gut interests of today's foreign policy, still rest on a very broad bipartisan acceptance of the realities of the day and of the national objectives. It would be of little value merely to list a rollcall of those realities, as they appear to Washington, and the infinite variety of individual policies and objectives. Instead, I might more usefully single out three or four of the major foreign policy matters that currently preoccupy the country. First and foremost, of course, is the basic conflict between communism and the non-Communist world.

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The cold war has become intensely more complex and subtle in recent years. But let us face the most important reality first: It is still very much with us and will be for a long time to come. The limited nuclear test ban treaty signed in Moscow and considered for consent to ratification before the United States Senate³ represents a significant sunbeam in a long and cloudy siege of deadlock and crises. Its culmination repre-

² See p. 476.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314; for a statement by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, see *ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1963, p. 350.

sents an acceptance in the big-power capitals of an assumption that has underlaid the disarmament efforts of all three of our Presidents in the nuclear age: the beliefs of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy that the risks of an unlimited nuclear arms race are eminently greater than those inherent in a careful, safeguarded progress toward arms control. There are understandable concerns and reservations about the limited test prohibition. You may hear some of them from your next speaker today. But it is inconceivable to me that any should find cause for fear or for mourning in the fact that man may have taken the first slight step away from the mechanism by which he can demolish himself and his planet. Obviously, once the limited treaty goes into effect, this country must take all the steps needed to protect our present nuclear position and to avoid being trapped into disadvantage by sudden violations.

The meticulous scrutiny which the Senate is devoting to the nuclear test ban treaty gives every American an opportunity to assay what it provides and what it does not provide. Admittedly, with such powers as Communist China and France thus far refusing to go along, the treaty will not in itself halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the existence of such a treaty signed by perhaps as many as 90 governments will surely have an inhibiting effect on the indiscriminate spread of nuclear power. It is significant in this regard that in one of the most volatile parts of the world, both the Israelis and the Arabs are signing the treaty.

Perhaps the mutual interest that has brought Moscow around to the limited test ban can lead to other steps that slow down or, one hopes, actually reverse the deadly spiral of nuclear armament. In concert with its NATO allies the United States will explore any means that can carry the cold-war antagonists further into that little-explored, thinly populated geography known as the area of accommodation. But this limited first step has required years of patient willingness on the part of the West to refuse to take no for an answer. If there is to be further progress in the near future, it will be limited at best, revolving chiefly around those particularly dangerous postures and confronta-

tions that pose for each side the risk of incidents that could lead to unwanted war.

We must resist groundless optimism about early prospects for further important advances in East-West relations. As President Kennedy made clear in his American University address of June 10,⁴ the United States will stubbornly pursue all possible roads to a safe and workable accommodation with the Soviet Union. This country will keep working to solve or at least defuse those problems between the great powers that are dangerous and could lead to war. In the case of the limited test ban it is obvious that all the negotiating parties—Moscow, Washington, and London—were motivated by the belief that a cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space furthers their individual national interests. As Secretary of State Rusk said to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Khrushchev shares with us “a mutual interest in avoiding mutual destruction.”

It will be at best a long time before the fundamental differences between the Communist and free worlds disappear. This basic fact should temper all rejoicing at the limited progress achieved last month in Moscow. The deep ideological conflict remains. The Russians still believe in and seek a world that will be all Communist. We believe in a pluralistic society, a world in which choice is free, in which the tyranny of one is precluded by the tolerance of many. As recently as January, Mikhail Suslov, one of Mr. Khrushchev's most authoritative dogmatists, reaffirmed communism's enmity to peaceful coexistence in the realm of ideology. Coexistence with democratic social systems was possible, he said, but coexistence with democratic ideas was “impossible and unthinkable.” This, as Arthur Schlesinger remarked recently, is “an authorized characterization of the impotence of communism before non-Communist ideas.” More than that, it is fair warning that the Moscow goal, like the Peiping goal, remains a monolithic world, a world made over to the image of communism's dogmatic ideology. Russian leaders and the Russian press still talk of continued ideological, economic, and political

struggle and they still support, as we know from Viet-Nam, from Cuba, and elsewhere, the violence and infiltration which Mr. Khrushchev attempts to ennoble by equating them with “national liberation.”

Healthy Debate in Western Alliance

One great factor in the ability and willingness of the West to prevail in the long ideological conflict that still lies ahead will be the outcome of the ferment now under way within our own alliance family. Though you may hear many versions, the fact is that this ferment is both healthy and inevitable. It is important to distinguish between what is deeply and basically agreed among the North American and European allies and what is currently being debated and negotiated among us. What is deepest and most basic is the unanimous agreement on the necessity for the alliance, its military security and its mechanisms for enhancing the political and economic cooperation of its members. What is also agreed is that NATO's concerns and responsibilities extend far beyond the geography of its members. What is also agreed is that the circumstances that attended NATO's birth 14 years ago have radically changed with the rise of Western Europe from destruction to a prosperity and an economic strength that equals our own. Out of this have arisen issues and questions that preoccupy the NATO governments. These are not questions about the value or the advisability of maintaining the alliance; they are questions about where we go from here, about how we build and conduct the alliance for the business that lies ahead. In short, the questioning and the debate are about *how* we continue to work together in close military, economic, and political concert, not *whether* we so continue.

It is important to keep this distinction in mind as in the months and years to come we discuss and negotiate with the Western European governments the important trade, monetary, and military questions that are posed by Europe's rise to prosperity and by its accompanying increase of rights and responsibilities. Short term, the most pressing issues within the alliance are those concerned with trade, with

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

deficiencies and imbalance in the shares of the load borne by individual allies, and with adjustments made necessary by the failure of Britain thus far to gain entry to the Common Market. In the trade negotiations that are to develop in earnest next year this country has, of course, a heavy stake. The negotiations are not going to be easy. Some will result in arrangements that will cause some pain and require some adjustments here at home. Some may induce considerably more stress and strain within the alliance. It is probably fair to say, however, that all the NATO countries see a mutual stake in expanding trade to the maximum. This is important not only for its benefit to the countries. It is also essential if the rich and productive nations are going to tackle—as they must—the inequable division of the things of life on this planet.

A longer term issue within the alliance is the perplexing problem of nuclear management. As the West European allies have gained in strength, they have also come to desire a greater role in the supervision of their primary military power, the West's nuclear arsenal. Almost all of the nuclear strength available to NATO sits in the United States arsenal. In response to the Allies' desires this country has taken steps to bring the NATO governments into closer participation in the supervising and targeting of this arsenal as it relates to the security of Europe. This Government also has offered to consider with the Allies more specific measures to assure outright alliance participation in the control of nuclear power. Thus far, some general American ideas for solving this control problem through a seaborne multilateral nuclear force have elicited interest in several Allied capitals. Their experts are now meeting regularly in Washington to plot details of the proposed force. It seems to me that one certainty dictates that a solution will be achieved: That is the fact that by the very nature of the alliance and of the nuclear age the West's nuclear deterrent is indivisible. It is inconceivable that there could be an alliance in which separate national nuclear establishments would plan nuclear strategy or employ nuclear weapons independently of the strategies and actions of other Allied governments.

Progress on this question need not be speeded. The West's nuclear position is excellent, and Western Europe's security is assured by its existence and the deployment of U.S. nuclear strength. So we have time to thrash out the many complexities of this issue, and I believe we can be confident that in the long term a workable arrangement will evolve.

Complexities of Vietnamese Situation

In that vast portion of the world where new nations are rising, new institutions are being shaped, and choices of social systems and ideologies are being made, one could talk at length of the dangers and problems that are posed for us.

Time does not permit this, but it is not possible to range over U.S. foreign policy today without some mention of the situation in Vietnam. My expertise on this subject is flimsy indeed, but I did have the opportunity to visit Viet-Nam recently, as the trouble there was building up to crisis proportions.

In spite of the martial law and censorship that now prevail the newspapers are keeping you well up to date on the steps the Vietnamese Government has taken against Buddhist and other anti-Government demonstrators in the country. The United States deplores the Vietnamese Government's acts of violence and suppression and has made that plain.⁵ What happens next in that unhappy situation is obviously of the most serious concern to the country, for here, in a way that is of the most complex and trying variety, United States policy is deeply involved.

First, let us examine the nature of the American involvement. The United States is spending a great deal of money in South Vietnam—to help the Vietnamese fight to save their country from communism. Several thousand American military men are stationed in Vietnam to advise and guide the Vietnamese in the war. It is a war of the dirtiest, trickiest kind in which Communist guerrillas, supplied and directed from outside, mingle combat with terrorism against civilians and depredation of the countryside. It is a war for the loyalty of the whole people. Our role is difficult, quite un-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 9, 1963, p. 398.

y we have played elsewhere. The war is a Vietnamese war. They are fighting it; they are directing it. Our role is confined to advisory, logistic, and technical assistance. Admittedly some of this is of the most intimate kind—intimate that more than 50 Americans have even their lives.

But it is only the Vietnamese who can fight this war. We can help the Vietnamese, but we cannot do the job for them. Nor do they ask us to; the Vietnamese took 4,400 dead last year, and they have shown that they are prepared to go on doing the fighting.

The Vietnamese war can be looked at through any angles of a prism. The country is an important piece of strategic real estate, potentially an excellent base for further Communist aggression against the rest of free Asia should the Communists win it. It represents a moral commitment with the Vietnamese, on the outskirts of the free world, fighting not just for themselves but in behalf of all free men. Our part in it can be looked upon variously as a part of our commitment to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; as a fulfillment of an obligation we acquired at the Geneva Conference of 1954 that we would regard any renewal of aggression as a violation of the Geneva agreement; as a human commitment to help the nearly 1 million Vietnamese who have fled from the north to avoid living under communism; as an important test case of whether the free world can and will help a nation defend its freedom. No matter through which prism you look, you can see clearly and undeniably that all the many elements of American policy and American interest that I have tried to describe earlier are represented in the one fierce and demanding crucible of Viet-Nam.

Obviously, any development that distracts or discourages the people of Viet-Nam from continuing their brave fight must be viewed with alarm. Such is the development that has taken place in the last 3½ months in the Government's dispute with the Vietnamese Buddhists. Though its origin lay in certain religious grievances felt by some Buddhist leaders, the protest has only had expanded into major political unrest at the time that the government of President Diem moved to crack down.

Especially ironic is that stability within Viet-Nam should be so disturbed at a time when the military and political experts had concluded that the tide had turned in Viet-Nam. Through 1961 and much of 1962 the Communists were gaining and the Vietnamese people were losing. Beginning last year, the trend turned the other way. No more provincial capitals have been taken by the Viet Cong guerrillas. Saigon is once again exporting rice, where before production was cut and delivery prevented by Viet Cong strength in the rural areas. Communist military activity in the first half of 1962 compared with that in the first half of this year provides other evidence of progress. In the first half of 1962 there were 10,270 Viet Cong incidents, including more than 3,000 armed attacks. In the first 6 months of this year incidents dropped by one-third, while armed attacks were down by 36 percent. The scale of attacks also declined. More important—because this is not just a fighting war but also a struggle to build up the security and living standards of the population—it is estimated that in the past year the Government of Viet-Nam added nearly 1 million people to the number of its citizens which it effectively protects from the Viet Cong. This has been done chiefly through the so-called strategic-hamlet program, which is an across-the-board political, economic, and military response to the Communist threat.

There are disturbing spots in the picture, and in some parts of the country the fighting and the hamlet program are not moving as effectively as in other areas. But the point is that through the long ordeal freedom has been gaining in Viet-Nam and the evidence is strong that the Vietnamese can win their war and save their nation.

Will the current troubles in Viet-Nam undo this progress and enhance the opportunities of the Communists? One can well ask, but one cannot wisely offer a very precise answer at this juncture. It seems evident, however, that, with a stake so great as that I have tried to describe and with the possibilities of victory so demonstrable, we must exert every effort to see that it does not happen. Plainly this is no easy task. The United States does not run the sovereign Government of Viet-Nam. It cannot lightly

abandon the main fight out of anger at policies that it deploras. There is no easy formula whereby the current situation can be righted quickly, but we must hope that the Vietnamese leaders will find the means to a peaceable settlement before the dispute undermines Viet-Nam's more fundamental need—to win the war.

For the United States, obviously the consideration must be that Viet-Nam maintains a real will to keep fighting the Viet Cong.

In any event, one who attempts, as I have attempted here, to demonstrate some of the perplexities and complexities of foreign policy could not ask for a more dramatic example than the one offered by the Vietnamese situation.

It should be neither surprising nor dismaying that we find ourselves involved in such perplexities. If we are not yet accustomed to it, we must learn to be. In the years ahead we will face such choices and such demands many times over, for these are the unavoidable trials of a people that chooses to lead the fight for freedom. I think we are showing as a nation that the task is not too great for us, that we have the will and resources to help make real a belief once movingly stated by the late William Faulkner: "I decline to accept the end of man. It is easy enough to say that man is immortal simply because he will endure. . . . I believe that man will not merely endure; he will prevail. . . ."

It has become customary in this day of nuclear hazard to punctuate that credo with a question mark. It is an intolerable doubt, and we should experience elation as we pursue policies designed to exorcise that doubt in ways that lead mankind not only to prevail but to prevail with the freedom of consent, the freedom of action, and the freedom of mind that are the reasons why prevailing is worth the battle. That is what I think foreign policy is all about.

General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1963

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS, as we work toward political, social, and economic freedom for all nations everywhere, we remember the time when we ourselves were not free;

WHEREAS we recall with gratitude the gallant efforts of men of other nations who helped us to win our independence; and


WHEREAS a leader among those men was Casimir Pulaski, who opposed foreign interference in his native Poland, who joined the cause of American independence by volunteering in the Continental Army, and who served that cause brilliantly until his death on October 11, 1779, from a wound incurred during a cavalry charge in the city of Savannah; and

WHEREAS, in remembering General Pulaski's contribution to our past, we are reminded of our debt to the future to further the cause of universal freedom;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Friday, October 11, 1963—the one hundred and eighty-fourth anniversary of his death—as General Pulaski Memorial Day; and call upon officials of the Government to display the flag of the United States on Government buildings on that day. I also invite the people of the United States to observe the day with appropriate ceremonies in recognition of General Pulaski's dedication to liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 27th day of August in the year of our Lord ninety-six hundred and sixty-three and of the Independence of the United States of America one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3550; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 9559.

The Uses of Diversity

by Harlan Cleveland

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

The Secretary-General, who honors us by his presence here this morning, will welcome you to the United Nations. My pleasure is to welcome you to the State of New York and to the United States of America.

You are meeting, as well you know, in the world's most antique democracy. I think you will find it also one of the world's liveliest. Ever since our forefathers got carried away with some heady ideas about human dignity and personal freedom and equal rights for all when we have been having a lively time trying to make good on their promises. Right now we are busy trying to correct the worst and the widest gap between promise and performance. You will have to pardon us if we sometimes seem to be too busy arguing among ourselves to argue with our visitors.

Perhaps, Mr. Secretary-General, you will recall some words spoken several years ago about the nature of this democracy of ours. You might recall them because they were spoken in this city by a former Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, with whom you were associated before he left your national launching pad, as Dag Hammarskjöld used to say, and went into orbit as servant to the international community.

U Nu had spent several days in a hospital on the East River, and he spoke at a luncheon in the honor of the amazing sights and the overwhelming size of this metropolis. Then he said:

One night I sat up on the terrace roof well past my bedtime and gazed out on the city. I was away from

¹Address made before the World Federation of United Nations Associations at New York, N.Y., on September 9 (press release 460, revised).

the noise and distraction. Here I seemed to sense the great pulse that beats under the surface of your city. And I thought that the power of New York lies not in any of these massive physical characteristics. . . . It seemed to me that the greatest thing of all was the living lesson that New York offers the world: that peoples from many lands, many races, many cultures, many religions can live together and work together; not only can they co-exist, but all of them seem to draw at least some little something from each other that makes them more complete and that adds vigor and endurance to their lives. . . .

Perhaps out of this kind of ferment, out of this kind of contact between peoples of such varied backgrounds, out of this kind of diversity can come the new ideas and the new way of looking at things that are so badly needed in our world. . . .

Those words were well received here, because we glory in the description of our society as the "great melting pot." It is, of course, nothing of the sort.

The racial and ethnic and national groups that came here, and read a sign in the harbor saying, "Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me . . .," didn't fly apart after they became Americans. They clove to each other; they huddled together for protection against the other groups that had already come, and against those further waves of strangers that kept rolling in past the Statue of Liberty and populating a continent with a nation of foreigners.

No, the relevant cliché is not the melting pot but U Nu's word: "diversity." The newer Americans and the older Americans learned in time to tolerate each other. They rubbed up against each other, and they discovered not that all men are brothers—that is an early, easier lesson—but that all brothers are different, which is a later, harder lesson because it means learning about the value of difference.

You who visit us for a few weeks may find us in consequence a little confusing. Some of you come from societies which can describe their goals and define their "system" with well-honed words from ancient texts or modern manifestoes. Don't ask us for our manifesto—all you will get will be a blank stare.

For we don't have a "system." We have, if anything, a protected plurality of systems. The Englishman, Edmund Burke, in his famous speech about how to get along with those wild men across the Atlantic, said in despair that our religion is "the dissidence of dissent." Americans, he thought, were "a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the bone of manhood." What makes it so hard for our own historians to capture and record the American way of life is precisely that our way of life is a living denial of the dogma that any one man's view of society, or any one group's view of society, is the correct, approved version.

The one essential thing about American democracy is this: that no individual or group ever gains the exclusive right to say authoritatively what American democracy is.

U.N., a Citadel of Diversity

You are meeting today in the very citadel of diversity, the seat of an organization with the misleading name United Nations. United we certainly are not. We are gloriously, irretrievably diverse—diverse in social organization, in economic theories, in political ideas; diverse in attitudes and alliances, in wealth and power; diverse, too, in the stages of development.

Because we are diverse, our United Nations is an intensely practical organization. For what makes diversity work, as we have found here at home, is not men's ability to agree on philosophy or broad principles but the fact that they can agree on what to do next, while continuing to disagree about why they are doing it.

Some may agree to take the "next step" because they see their interests served thereby; others may see a mandate for the same "next step" in some religious text or economics textbook; still others may go along because they don't want to offend those who are proposing

the step be taken. The reasons for common action can be mutually inconsistent—in any large organization I think they often are, and in the United Nations almost always so.

If we had to wait around until two-thirds of the delegates who meet in this place could agree as to why they were agreeing, no resolution would ever be passed and the United Nations would not today be spending more than half a billion dollars a year for peacekeeping and nation building.

What unites this diversity, then, is not so much a paper agreement on philosophy as a practical consensus on procedure, a pragmatic agreement on how decisions will be made and who will carry them into action. It is no accident that the Charter of the United Nations contains 4 pages of philosophy followed by 40 pages of procedure.

A marvelously practical system it is; if we sat down in this place to write the charter again, it is highly improbable that we would do as well.

As the U.N. has grown in maturity, in strength, and in relevance to the major issues of the day, it has collected enemies in every nation as well as friends. Your United Nations Associations in every land bear the brunt of defending the organization against political attack; so there is no need to remind you of the gloomy forecasts that have regularly been made about it.

The onset of the cold war, the crisis in Korea, the chronic warring in the Middle East, the chaotic ordeal in the Congo, the growing gap between the rich countries and the poor countries—each test of international cooperation has produced its crop of doomsayers. The detractors of the forties were certain the organization would die of anemia; the latter-day detractors are more inclined to predict the organization's demise from overindulgence.

But they share a common characteristic: They are wrong.

The U.N.'s capacity to act—which is its most precious asset—has grown from year to year. It has outlived a succession of threats to its existence—each time, like Ulysses, emerging stronger from the trial. As Adlai Stevenson has said, the United Nations was built for trouble and thrives on it.

Today's U.N. Machinery Inadequate

No organization can double in membership in less than two decades without putting an enormous strain on the original machinery. The machinery devised to serve the 51-member organization of 1945 is plainly inadequate for the 111-member organization of today.

For example:

—The General Assembly is cumbersome—it is, for example, the only parliamentary body in the world which still tries to do most of its work through committees of the whole.

—Some of the councils and commissions are too small to include voices from all parts of the newly independent world.

—The Office of the Secretary-General is still handling an extraordinary range of peacemaking tasks by putting an impossible burden on a handful of overworked men.

—The United Nations has now undertaken 10 peacekeeping operations, but the Secretariat needs more of the military planning skills that the next emergency, and the one after that, will require.

—There is no doubt that technical aid and preinvestment work—the development of projects that make sense and the training of people who can make them work—is now the main bottleneck in the whole development process. The U.N., which teaches public administration all over the world, still has administrative improvements to make in unifying the contribution to this process of all the U.N. agencies.

The Rules of the Game

But the biggest question about the United Nations today is not whether it will be more or less efficient. The biggest question is whether its members will stay on the course they have laid out for themselves in the charter.

In every country today voices are raised to ask: Do we really want an international organization with a significant capacity to keep the peace?

In all of the big countries this question is asked to justify a growing resistance to paying for international peacekeeping. A new slogan—"our way or no pay"—is today the official policy of several member governments, includ-

ing two of the permanent members of the Security Council.

But the rest of us can hardly claim an unsullied virtue in the matter. Our debates on U.N. financing reveal strong minority opinions to the same effect: If we are paying part of the piper, shouldn't we be calling all of the tune?

The doubts about international peacekeeping also show up among those who advocate change at any price, and those who think keeping the peace means keeping things just as they are.

In Africa today the U.N. and most of its members are in the middle—determined to bring self-determination to all peoples but anxious, and obligated under the charter, to pursue this goal by peaceful means. In every society we have citizens who in their pursuit of laudable goals are quite prepared to take the law into their own hands, convinced in their own minds that a little bloodshed will lubricate the machinery for change. The U.N. would be endangered if any of its members came to think that way.

The magnificent record of decolonization gives hope that we can yet devise in the U.N. the methods of peaceful change which will enable all the people of the southern part of Africa to exercise the rights to which the charter and their own natural dignity entitle them. But if the United Nations is going to play a central part in this process, as most of us believe it should, all parties are going to have to be willing to talk and do something about change—while maintaining the peace.

Let me say it again: A world of diversity will only work if there are some agreed rules; and rules have to be taken most seriously at moments of maximum annoyance and frustration. If a car in front of you at the stoplight fails to move when the light turns green, it is permissible to blow your horn or even to call in the proper authorities to help induce the other driver to move. It is not permissible to express your sense of outrage by ramming his car from the rear, nor can that be done without getting hurt yourself.

A related threat to the organization has developed from this same frustration about the persistence of colonial rule and racial discrim-

ination in the southern third of Africa. In several conferences this summer one group of U.N. members has tried to eject other members from the meetings. On several occasions the resulting clamor has brought important work to a standstill—and has brought disrepute to the United Nations.

There is no doubt that if a large caucus of member states is unified and determined, and is willing to ignore legal rulings and the chairman's gavel, they can succeed in making a shambles of any parliamentary body. There are plenty of instances, in the tortured history of democratic institutions, of frustrated minorities becoming so incensed that they took their frustration out on the rules of the game of democracy itself.

The claim in these instances has always been the same—that the end justified the means, that if democratic procedures frustrate purposes of obvious nobility, then democratic procedures must be cast aside. The boomerang effect of such an attitude is perhaps the clearest and most obvious lesson in all the history of freedom. All of us who owe our freedom, and our national independence, to the presence in the world of democratic procedures should think long and carefully before we cast them aside as an obstacle to the early achievement of our own immediate aims.

The specific remedy for all the viruses that currently afflict the United Nations—financial delinquency, the tension between peace and change, and the temptation to set aside the democratic rules of the charter—is simple. It is for all of us to remember, and repeat with our prayers, that what keeps a world of diversity from blowing itself into eternity is a consensus on how decisions will be made—lawyers would prefer to call it law—and a willingness to talk at tedious length with people whose principles you hate.

Importance of "Next Steps"

The creation of the U.N. did not end the competition for power among nations. It did broaden that competition, bringing in peoples and leaders from all around the globe. It did provide a place to contain the struggle—an

arena for diversity. And it may in time civilize the settlement of disputes among nations.

If we are going to have an arena, we are going to have to have rules of the game, the deadly serious game, we play there. Without them, or when they are violated at will, the civilizing game disintegrates into a free-for-all. A free-for-all is bad enough in a sports arena. In the United Nations it is a formula for nuclear-powered jungle war.

The future of these Nations United in diversity does not hang on their ability to meld their differences into the dull and unstable amalgam of resolutions on general principles. It hangs on the "next steps" we can take together in this place, to make this a world as safe as it is exciting to live in.

The action we take together had better contain the peril we share, for we all have to be brothers whether we like it or not.

Ninth Anniversary of SEATO

Statement by Secretary Rusk

Press release 456 dated September 8, for release September 8

September 8 marks another anniversary of the signing in Manila of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.¹ For 9 years now SEATO has served the cause of peace and progress in the treaty area through the principle of collective security.

The application of collective security is based on strength and in unity of purpose. Our combined strength is ample to meet the menace of Communist power threatening the area from the north. The persistence of Communist attempts to undermine SEATO offers continuing evidence of our alliance's value as an obstacle to the achievement of Communist objectives.

This anniversary provides me the opportunity to reaffirm that the United States remains firm in its resolve to meet its SEATO obligations so that, in cooperation with the efforts of other members, SEATO's influence on behalf of peace and security in the troubled area of Southeast Asia will be maintained.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

The International Monetary Fund: Its Work and Its Future

by Mortimer D. Goldstein

The Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund will hold its 18th annual meeting at Washington, D.C., from September 30 through October 4, 1963. It is likely that this meeting will attract an unusual degree of public attention in the United States. As a result of their growing consciousness of the U.S. balance-of-payments problem and of the measures taken to solve it, Americans are becoming more interested in international finance. Interest in the Fund, in particular, has been stimulated by the President's recent announcement that the United States had made arrangements to draw on the Fund's resources for the first time.¹

This article has been prepared in response to the heightened interest in the International Monetary Fund. It provides basic information on the Fund—why it was established, what its policies are, how it operates—and explains the ways in which its work is of direct concern to the United States. Also reviewed are some of the current proposals for modifying the Fund in order to strengthen the international monetary system. Ideas of this kind may well receive further attention at the Governors' meeting.

Establishment and Purpose of the Fund

In July 1944, responding to the deep-seated desire to organize the peace even while fighting the war, 44 nations met at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, N.H., to consider how they might establish postwar financial conditions conducive

¹For the President's special message to the Congress of July 18, 1963, on the balance of payments, see *THE JOURNAL* of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 250.

to international economic harmony, stability, and growth. The main achievements of the conference were embodied in the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The central purpose of the Fund, in the words of the Articles, is:

To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.

The Articles also enumerate various purposes that support the central objective: to promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly foreign exchange arrangements, to avoid competitive depreciation of exchange rates, and to assist in establishing a multilateral system of international payments for current transactions and in eliminating foreign exchange restrictions. Finally, the Articles state that the Fund is designed:

To give confidence to members by making the Fund's resources available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.

The Fund, in short, was created out of the recognition of the interdependence of the na-

• *Mr. Goldstein is Deputy Director of the Office of International Finance and Economic Analysis.*

tional economies of the world. The Fund's charter reflects the conviction that, by establishing a code of conduct for international monetary affairs, by providing the machinery for continuing consultation and cooperation on financial matters, and by assuring reasonable access to financial resources to meet national foreign exchange stringencies, the countries of the world will find it possible to avoid the overpowering financial movements of the interwar years and put an end to the aggressive, self-centered, and internationally irresponsible financial policies that characterized much of that period.

Membership, Quotas, and Structure

The Fund's membership now includes more than 90 countries, encompassing every economically advanced country in the free world, except Switzerland, and nearly all of the less developed countries.² Each member country is assigned a quota determined after consultation between the Fund and country in the light of the size of the country's economy (volume of trade, gross national product, etc.). Fund quotas, which now total some \$15 billion, as shown in the accompanying table, are important in that each member must pay a subscription to the Fund equal to its quota, partly in gold (normally 25 percent) and the remainder in its own currency. Each member's voting power is weighted according to its quota, and, as explained below, the amount that a member may borrow from the Fund is directly linked to the size of its quota. The United States has a quota of \$4,125 million, the largest in the Fund, and one-fourth of the voting power.

The Fund deals only with the treasuries and central banks of members and not with the general public. Its day-to-day business is done at its Washington headquarters by a board of Executive Directors and a staff of international civil servants. Each of the five members having the largest quotas is entitled to appoint one Executive Director;³ 13 Executive Directors are elected by the other members. The Executive

² Membership in the Fund is a precondition for membership in the International Bank and its affiliates.

³ The Executive Director for the United States is William B. Dale; his alternate is John S. Hooker.

Directors select a chairman, an international civil servant, who also is the Managing Director⁴ and directs the staff of the Fund.

A Board of Governors, which comprises one Governor and an alternate designated by each member country, holds the final power in the Fund.⁵ It meets annually to review the work of the Fund and the state of the international economy.

Membership in the Fund signifies the acceptance of important commitments that give meaning to the concepts of cooperation and fair play in monetary affairs. By joining the Fund a member commits itself to provide regular information on its financial position, to maintain orderly rates in its exchange market within 1 percent of a fixed par value established with the Fund, and to change the exchange rates or par value for its currency only after prescribed discussions with the Fund. Members are also committed to maintain the gold value of the Fund's assets. Thus, when a member devalues its currency, for example, it is obliged to make a payment to the Fund equal to the reduction in the gold value of the Fund's holdings of its currency.

The obligation of members with regard to currency convertibility is expressed in the general rule that, without the Fund's approval, a member may not impose restrictions for making payments for current international transactions or engage in discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices.

An important exception to this rule allows members temporarily to maintain exchange restrictions as a transitional matter, subject to annual consultation with the Fund. When a member surrenders its resort to this exception and becomes bound by the general rule on convertibility, its currency is regarded as convertible under the Articles. Twenty-four currencies, which finance the bulk of world trade and are issued by members with about two-thirds of the total quotas in the Fund, have thus far been

⁴ The Managing Director is Pierre-Paul Schweitzer of France, who recently succeeded the late Per Jacobson, of Sweden. His deputy is Frank A. Southard, Jr. of the United States.

⁵ The Governor for the United States is the Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon. His alternate is George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: QUOTAS AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES, JUNE 30, 1963
(Millions of U.S. dollars, equivalent)

	Quota in IMF	IMF currency holdings ¹		Commitment to lend to IMF ²
		Amount	Percent of quota	
All members.....	\$15,260.1	\$11,696.4	-----	\$6,000
Members with convertible currencies, ³ total.....	9,957.1	6,851.1	-----	5,750
United States.....	4,125.0	3,016.3	73	2,000
United Kingdom.....	1,950.0	1,455.5	75	1,000
France.....	787.5	351.9	45	550
Germany, Federal Republic of.....	787.5	267.9	34	1,000
Canada.....	550.0	688.2	125	200
Netherlands.....	412.5	214.9	52	200
Belgium.....	337.5	211.1	63	150
Italy.....	270.0	67.3	25	550
Mexico.....	180.0	135.0	75	-----
Sweden.....	150.0	102.5	68	100
Others ⁴	407.1	340.5	-----	-----
Other members, total.....	5,303.0	4,845.3	-----	250
India.....	600.0	794.8	133	-----
China.....	550.0	-----	-----	-----
Japan.....	500.0	320.0	64	250
Australia.....	400.0	300.0	75	-----
Argentina.....	280.0	440.0	157	-----
Brazil.....	280.0	377.0	135	-----
Indonesia.....	165.0	206.2	125	-----
Pakistan.....	150.0	146.5	98	-----
South Africa.....	150.0	112.5	75	-----
Spain.....	150.0	105.0	70	-----
Venezuela.....	150.0	112.5	75	-----
Others ⁵	1,928.0	1,930.8	-----	-----

The Fund also held \$2,244 million in gold and \$800 million in its gold investment account.
Commitment to lend to the Fund under the general borrowing arrangements of 1962; lending commitments expressed in national currencies.
As defined in the Fund Articles.

⁴ Canada has not yet notified the Fund of its adherence to the general borrowing arrangements.

⁵ Members with quotas of less than \$150 million.

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, August 1963.

de convertible in this sense. Though these members are not obliged to consult annually with the Fund, they are doing so in order that the Fund may keep fully informed on their financial policies.

The extent of the establishment of currency convertibility is a notable accomplishment of the Fund and its members. The maintenance of the Fund's regime of convertibility will go a long way to insure that the worst features of prewar international economic relations will not reappear.

of the Fund's Resources

A country that experiences balance-of-payments deficits may have open to it a variety of measures to rectify its position, but it is often the case that the quick-acting measures will be unhelpful nationally or internationally, or both,

and that the more desirable, slow-acting measures will require more foreign exchange than the country can comfortably afford to spend out of its reserves. It is specially important to note that in the postwar world governmental commitments to the maintenance of full employment have made it practically impossible to counter a payments deficit by deflationary policies. One of the main functions of the Fund therefore is to tide a member over temporarily while it adjusts its policies to deal with a strain in its balance of payments. The Articles include various rules on the amount of money the Fund may provide, the charges members must pay, and other conditions for using the Fund's resources; and the Fund has enunciated certain policies to supplement the provisions of the Articles. Before exploring this area, however, it would be useful to review the processes of borrowing from and repaying the Fund.

The Fund holds large amounts of member currencies initially received as subscriptions (ordinarily 75 percent of quota). When the Fund makes a loan, it provides foreign currencies from its holdings to the borrower, and the borrower pays the Fund an equivalent amount of its own currency. Thus a loan—more properly called a drawing—represents a purchase by a member of a foreign currency with its own currency; a repayment represents a repurchase by the member of its own currency with another currency (or gold).

A member's position in the Fund, then, is reflected by the amount of its currency held by the Fund. If the United States, for example, draws (borrows) from the Fund, its debt will show up as an *increase* in the Fund's holdings of dollars. When the United States pays its debt, its improved position with the Fund will show up as a *decrease* in the Fund's holdings of dollars. Similarly, when, say, Mexico draws dollars from the Fund, the position of the United States is improved. And when Mexico repurchases its own currency from the Fund by paying dollars, the position of the United States in the Fund is affected as though the United States had itself put dollars in the Fund in exchange for a foreign currency.

To sum up, the position of a country in the Fund is represented by the Fund's holdings of its currency in relation to its quota, the "normal" position being represented by holdings equal to 75 percent of quota. A decline in that percentage means an improvement in the member's position (credit) on the Fund's books; an increase in that percentage, of course, has the opposite significance.

The Fund Articles provide that a member may not, without a waiver by the Executive Directors, draw more than the equivalent of 25 percent (net) of its quota in a period of 12 months, nor may it draw beyond the point at which the Fund's holdings of its currency equal 200 percent of its quota.⁶ The 25-percent limitation has frequently been waived by the Fund; the 200-percent limitation has not yet been waived.

⁶ The 200-percent limitation means, in effect, that, starting with a currency subscription of 75 percent, a member may not make net drawings in excess of 125 percent of its quota without a waiver.

Policies on Drawings

In deciding on a member's request to draw the Fund observes the following policies:

1. For a drawing that does not raise the Fund's holdings of the member's currency above 100 percent of its quota, the member will receive the overwhelming benefit of the doubt. This policy means that a member has virtually automatic access to Fund assistance in an amount equal to its initial gold subscription, adjusted by any Fund operations in its currency.

2. For a drawing that does not raise the Fund's holdings above 125 percent of quota, the Fund will approve if the member shows that it is making reasonable efforts to deal with its financial problems.

3. For a drawing beyond this point, the Fund requires a substantial justification: a showing that the member has set up a sound program aimed at establishing or maintaining the enduring stability of its currency at a realistic rate of exchange. Such programs of currency stabilization are often worked out by members in consultation with the Fund, and the main commitments of a stabilization program may be formally embodied in the terms on which the Fund approves the member's request to draw.

It is possible for a member that perceives the likelihood of a need to draw on the Fund in the near-term future, rather than immediately to enter into a standby arrangement with the Fund. Under such an arrangement, which normally runs for a year, the member is assured of access to the Fund's resources up to an agreed amount, ordinarily without further Fund action. In some instances drawings under a standby arrangement are contingent on the maintenance of economic policies agreed to between the member and the Fund.

The criteria followed by the Fund in approving standby arrangements—permissible amounts, terms and conditions, etc.—are the same as those that are applied to immediate drawings. The standby technique has proved to be a highly useful creation of the Fund more often than not in recent years drawings have been made pursuant to, rather than in the absence of, a standby arrangement.

As a general rule a member that draws from the Fund undertakes to repay within a maxi

imum period of 3 to 5 years. Earlier repurchases are often made, either voluntarily or according to a requirement that a member make a repurchase if its monetary reserves increase sufficiently. Of course, a member's repurchase obligation is reduced to the extent that other members draw its currency from the Fund. Repurchases must be made in gold or in a convertible currency that is below the 75-percent level in the Fund.

Drawings and repurchase operations of the Fund affect the position of both the country engaging in them and the country whose currency is used. A country in balance-of-payments difficulties of its own, for example, might find its problems complicated by drawings in its currency, though it would probably welcome repurchases made in its currency. It is therefore the policy of the Fund, following consultation with interested members, to use its influence to guide drawings and repurchases into specific currencies in the light of the balance-of-payments and reserve positions of the members and of the size of the Fund holdings of various currencies.

From the time the Fund began operations in 1947 until June 30, 1963, the members have drawn close to the equivalent of \$7 billion. In the period 1947-55 the Fund's operations were quite small; drawings averaged less than \$150 million a year. The level of activity of the Fund turned up sharply after 1955, and in the period 1956-62 drawings averaged almost \$800 million a year. Though two large drawings by the United Kingdom were important factors in raising the average, drawings by the smaller countries, particularly the less developed countries, greatly increased in number. For example, leaving aside the United Kingdom, 21 members drew the equivalent of almost \$1 billion in 1961; 15 members had standby facilities in force with the Fund at the end of the year.

The increase in the Fund's activity in recent years can be attributed in considerable part to a greater awareness in the Fund of the problems of the less developed countries and a greater awareness in those countries of the ways in which the Fund can help in the solution of their problems. A new feature of the Fund's policy on drawings that has special

relevance for the less developed countries is discussed below.

Recent Developments in the Fund

The tempo of the development of the Fund's activities and policies has picked up markedly in response to changes in the status of the currencies of the industrialized countries and the increased attention that the world is giving to the problems of the less developed areas. The restoration of the external convertibility of the main Western European currencies at the end of 1958 may be marked as a critical point in the evolution of postwar monetary affairs.

At about the same time the Fund decided to go forward with a study of the desirability of an expansion in the size of member quotas to meet prospective needs for international liquidity. This study was promptly followed by positive action; Fund quotas were increased from about \$9 billion in 1958 to \$14 billion in 1959 and to over \$15 billion a year later. Quotas were generally raised by 50 percent, with the quotas of certain countries in a position to provide an extra measure of support to the Fund—Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan—raised by an even greater percentage. Special increases were also made available to members with small quotas. By this forehanded action the Fund was equipped to deal with the new problems that arose for the monetary system when, following the restoration of convertibility, traders and investors began to move funds internationally on a large scale.

The monetary system was put to repeated tests of its resiliency after 1959. In 1960, for example, the United States suffered its largest annual payments deficit and an exceptionally heavy gold outflow that was accompanied in the autumn of the year by an extraordinary rise in the price of gold in the free market in London. In the spring of 1961 sterling experienced severe pressures; and, in the spring of 1962, the Canadian dollar was hard-pressed. Though all of these disturbances were successfully dealt with—in some instances with the assistance of drawings on the Fund—it became clear by 1961 that additional measures were needed to assure that the Fund could play its

proper role in absorbing shocks to the monetary system and, by its manifest strength, discourage speculative forays against the currencies that play a significant role in the system.

After extensive negotiations within the Fund and with the countries particularly interested, the Fund in January 1962 formulated arrangements with 10 member countries⁷ whereby it could borrow up to the equivalent of \$6 billion, including \$2 billion from the United States, when it needed supplementary resources to forestall or cope with an impairment of the international monetary system in the new conditions of widespread convertibility, including greater freedom for short-term capital movements.

These general borrowing arrangements do not provide for enlarged quotas for the members; however, by establishing the Fund's access to additional resources, they provide assurance that the Fund will be able to meet its needs for usable currencies to honor fully the drawing rights under existing quotas. This assurance is of paramount importance to the United States in view of the size of its quota, which is more than double the second largest quota in the Fund.

Compensatory Financing

The recent progress of the Fund has not been confined to matters of mere size. In the past few years its framework of policy and procedure has been improved and elaborated in a number of important respects in response to the requirements of the evolving world economy. One of the innovations is of special interest to the less developed countries. In March of this year, following detailed studies in the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Fund itself, the Fund created new compensatory financing arrangements supplementary to its policies on drawings described above, designed to broaden its balance-of-payments support to member countries that rely heavily on the export of primary products.

Under its established practices the Fund has in the past financed deficits resulting from declines in export earnings, and frequent drawings have been made for this purpose. The new

⁷ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187.

facility, which would not normally exceed 2 percent of a member's quota, would be available when the Fund is satisfied that a member experiencing a temporary export shortfall is attributable largely to circumstances beyond its control. The Fund must also be satisfied that the member will cooperate with the Fund in an effort to find, where required, appropriate solutions to its payments difficulties. The Fund is prepared to authorize a drawing under the new facility even if it should require a waiver of the 200-percent limitation described above.

United States Interest in the Fund

The United States has had a deep and continuing interest in the International Monetary Fund from the first days of its planning. The U.S. Government saw in the nationalistic and aggressive economic policies that characterize much of the interwar period the breeding ground of international discord and even war or at best a source of economic weakness and instability. The United States believed that its own interest in a peaceful and prosperous world could be served only by an international system that, by and large, was based on the decentralized competition of the marketplace pursued according to general rules of nondiscrimination and fair play. This was the concept at the heart of Cordell Hull's reciprocal trade agreements program; broadly applied in postwar financial planning, it shaped the fundamental character of the Fund.

If this were the only link between the United States and the Fund, the relationship between the two would nevertheless be strong, but there are, of course, many other factors of significance to be considered. As the Fund member with the largest quota, the United States has held a leading position in the Fund's affairs. This position has been enhanced by the profoundly important fact that until 1961 the U.S. dollar was the only major currency that was convertible under the Fund Articles. (About 2 years elapsed between the restoration of the external convertibility of Western European currencies, in practice, and the establishment of their broader convertibility in the sense of the Fund Articles.) This meant that the business of the Fund was done mainly in U.S. dollars.

With only a few exceptions, drawings were made in dollars as a matter of choice; repurchases were made in dollars as a matter of law since, under the Articles, repurchases may not be made with an inconvertible currency.

U.S. Standby Arrangement

Over the years drawings in U.S. dollars (net of repayments and other transactions) had the effect of reducing the Fund's dollar holdings by 1959 to about \$800 million or about 30 percent of the U.S. quota at the time. This provided the United States with a large creditor position in the Fund, usable as a cushion against market pressure later on. In the period 1960-62 the Fund received about \$1,000 million (net) through heavy transfers of dollars to the Fund in repurchase operations. These transfers meant that there were fewer dollars owned by other holders who might offer them for sale in the exchange markets, adding to pressure on the dollar, or use them to acquire gold from the U.S. Treasury.

By the beginning of 1963, however, this form of relief to the dollar ended as the Fund's holdings of dollars approached 75 percent of the United States quota. As indicated earlier, the Fund may not accept a currency in a repurchase operation when the 75-percent level has been reached. In these circumstances a member holding U.S. dollars could not use them to make a repurchase from the Fund. To obtain the means to pay the Fund, the member would have to sell its dollars in the market for another convertible currency, perhaps at a discount from par, or present them to the U.S. Treasury in exchange for gold. To avoid this inconvenience to other countries and the potential, unnecessary drain on the U.S. gold stock, the United States in July 1963 requested and received approval for a standby arrangement with the Fund under which the United States may draw up to \$500 million in foreign currencies over the ensuing 12 months.⁸

Drawings under the standby arrangement are to be made primarily to obtain other convertible currencies that will be sold at par for dollars to countries about to make repurchases of their own currencies from the Fund. These countries

will then be able to make their repurchases with the currencies bought from the United States. In this way the dollar will continue to be readily available to carry out one of its functions as a key currency.

The standby arrangement is of considerable interest technically; but of far greater significance is its opening up of a new, fundamental aspect of United States relations with the Fund. It is now an established fact that the United States is prepared and able to call upon the Fund's resources in appropriate circumstances.

The standby arrangement of the United States with the Fund, even if wholly utilized, will cover only about 10 percent of the U.S. drawing rights within the 200-percent limitation described above. As the result of the strengthening of the Fund through the general borrowing arrangements of last year, the Fund is in a position to organize the resources for a much larger drawing than the United States may make under the standby or would expect to request otherwise. The existence of this reserve of strength for the Fund adds confidence in the ability of the international monetary system in general, and the U.S. dollar in particular, to withstand the pressures that arise from time to time in the exchange markets whether because of speculation, international differences in interest rates, or other factors.

Various gold transactions of the Fund have been of special interest to the United States. The United States has paid to the Fund more than \$1 billion in gold as part of its subscription. In the other direction the Fund has sold gold amounting to \$750 million to the United States to replenish its dollar holdings. The Fund has also utilized \$800 million of its gold holdings to invest in U.S. Treasury bills in order to augment its income and build up its reserve account under an arrangement which permits the Fund to reacquire the same amount of gold as it invested. At the moment, however, the gold so invested is part of the gold stock of the United States.

The Fund has exercised an influence on trade and financial policy that has been of substantial value to traders and business firms around the world and, in some ways, of exceptional sig-

⁸ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 258.

nificance to United States firms. As indicated earlier, it is the purpose of the Fund to facilitate the expansion of world trade and to assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments and the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions. The Fund has had a great deal of success in the furtherance of these objectives.

Until a few years ago the U.S. dollar was virtually the only important currency that was convertible. The United States therefore was not only adversely affected by the trade and currency restrictions of other countries but suffered the sharper edge of the sword when such restrictions were applied in a discriminatory manner. Thus, though the Fund's success in promoting freer trade and payments benefited the free world in general, it had certain extra, incidental benefits for the United States and for the other countries of the so-called dollar area in helping to rid their trade and financial relations of the discriminatory barriers imposed by other countries.

Help to Less Developed Countries

The Fund's work has also been of interest to the United States in the way it has contributed to the solution of difficulties experienced by countries to which the United States has provided economic development assistance. Although for temporary periods economic development and currency stability may appear to be competing objectives in a particular country, in the longer run they are partners in the sense that sustained economic growth is deterred rather than stimulated when a country's money no longer commands the respect of the saver and the entrepreneur at home and the investor abroad.

The Fund, through its technical missions and its periodic consultations with members, has provided guidance on financial policy and training in financial techniques that have supported the formulation and maintenance of responsible fiscal programs and monetary standards. It is not uncommon to find serious political and administrative barriers in the way of maintaining moderate financial policies, and the existence of a disinterested body like the Fund, willing to assume the responsibility for giving difficult

advice, has been of crucial importance to the officials of many countries. In addition, in its provision of standby arrangements and drawings of foreign exchange, the Fund has assisted a number of the less developed countries in balance-of-payments difficulties to avoid interruptions in their economic development programs that might otherwise have been virtually inevitable.

In these respects the work of the Fund has helped to reinforce programs of economic assistance financed by the United States and other industrialized nations. In some countries, in fact, financial stabilization programs have been jointly financed by the country concerned and the Fund, along with governmental bodies and commercial banks in Western Europe and the United States.

The Future of the Fund

The 18 years since the war have witnessed profound changes in the political and economic environment in which the Fund must function. This period has been marked by the emergence of dozens of new sovereign nations as colonial structures have been dismantled. Political independence has brought with it a deep desire for rapid economic development, often accompanied by a strong sense of economic nationalism. At the same time, the world has witnessed the remarkable recovery of the economies of Western Europe and the unprecedented movement toward their integration. And the world has been experiencing the phenomenon of a large and prolonged deficit in the United States balance of payments which, along with the measures that are being employed to reduce the deficit, has necessarily had important repercussions outside the United States.

These developments have made their mark on the international monetary system—on the policies of the Fund and other international institutions; on the forms and scope of monetary cooperation; on the strength and convertibility of national currencies and, in particular, on the position of the main reserve currencies, the dollar and the pound sterling; on the functioning of the foreign exchange and gold markets; and on the conceptions of what is and what is not appropriate, sound, and timely in national and

international financial policy. Though we can perceive that far-ranging changes in the monetary system have already been produced by the underlying political and economic forces of the postwar period, there is no reason to believe that the transformation of the system is finished. A significant lag between cause and necessary effect is a norm in human affairs; finance, a conservative discipline, is more likely to follow the norm than to be an exception to it. It is therefore reasonable to expect the continuation of significant change in the financial system even after the pace of political and economic change slows down.

The character of the international monetary system is fundamentally affected by the way in which countries maintain their monetary reserves. In the postwar period, with a slow growth in the reserves of monetary gold and with the dollar commonly used for private international business transactions outside the sterling area, banks, business firms, and official financial institutions have depended heavily on the accumulation of dollars to meet their needs for reserves and working balances. The dollars acquired for these purposes have come from, or have contributed to, the deficits in the U.S. balance of payments which continued throughout the 1950's (with the exception of 1957) even when the world was talking about the "dollar shortage."

The restoration of the external convertibility of sterling and the other currencies of Western Europe at the end of 1958 produced a basic change in the significance of the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments. The European countries, by their joint actions, acknowledged that they had achieved a major, if not the central, objective in the recovery and reconstruction of their finances that they had sought since the start of the Marshall Plan. From this point, the U.S. payments deficit began to change from a boon—at least for the countries eager for additional liquidity—to a problem. When the United States recognized that this stage of postwar economic progress had been reached, it became necessary to devote deliberate attention to the reduction and elimination of the deficit.

The United States' determination to achieve

payments equilibrium, though generally welcomed as necessary and desirable and though still short of fulfillment, has given rise to a new concern: the possibility—some would say certainty—that the world's needs for additional liquidity may run ahead of the liquidity provided by gold (new supplies from free-world gold production, sales by the Soviet Union, and dishoarding). As a consequence, in the absence of the liquidity in the form of dollars provided by U.S. payments deficits, the growth of the world's production and trade would be seriously inhibited, to the detriment of both the industrialized and the less developed countries. Yet it is recognized that, in time, continued U.S. deficits would so increase liquid foreign claims against the dollar as to undermine confidence in its strength and stability. Thus is the liquidity dilemma posed and debated by financial specialists in and outside governments.

Proposals for Solving Liquidity Problem

Although the general debate seems to be producing a consensus on some questions, many deep-seated differences of opinion are evident, particularly among the nongovernmental experts. There is an apparent consensus that the world does not suffer from a general shortage of international liquidity at present and is not likely to in the immediate future. And there is a growing sense of uncertainty whether the international monetary system as currently constituted can avoid a shortage of international liquidity over the long term. Though there is no consensus on the probability or timing of the emergence of such a shortage, a general sense of uncertainty or unease where assurance would be highly desirable can prove to be a forceful stimulus to action.

On the other hand, there has been no crystallization of expert opinion on the best way to act, or to be prepared to act, in advance of the emergence of a liquidity problem. A wide range of contradictory proposals has been presented on this question, mainly by experts outside of official circles. A few that have attracted public interest will be briefly described here.

Some of the experts are not so much concerned with institutional arrangements as they

are about other aspects of the monetary system. In this area proposals have been made to increase international liquidity by raising the price of gold to a new, fixed level. A step of this kind, which would constitute a general devaluation of currencies in terms of gold, is designed both to stretch existing gold supplies and to stimulate gold production. Some of its proponents see such action as a prerequisite for a return to the gold standard, which they desire; others, however, do not regard that objective as realistic or desirable.

Pointing in quite a different direction, proposals have been made for abandoning fixed currency values and operating the monetary system with flexible exchange rates. Under such a system, it is argued, the need for official reserves would be largely eliminated since pressures on a country's payments position would rapidly become dissipated through their effect on the exchange rate for the country's currency. A system of flexible rates is, of course, inconsistent with one of the basic principles of the Fund's charter, and its introduction would imply a fundamental transformation of the operations of the exchange system as we know it today.

Perhaps the most widely debated of the proposals that look toward changes in the institutional framework of the monetary system are those of Professor Robert Triffin of Yale University. His early writings on the liquidity dilemma did much to precipitate the discussions of the past several years. He would transform the International Monetary Fund by empowering it to create international credit (liquidity) in amounts determined by international agreement. Countries would no longer hold dollars, sterling, or other currencies in their reserves but would deposit them, including the large holdings already in existence, in the Fund where they would not constitute a threat to the stability of the exchange markets. A part of a country's gold reserves would also be deposited with the Fund. Thus, under the Triffin proposals, the Fund would become a "central bank of central banks," standing in relation to the central banks of member countries roughly in the way the Federal Reserve banks stand in relation to the commercial banks in the United

States. The assignment of such power to an international institution is one of the most controversial features of the Triffin proposals.

A different approach to the modification of the Fund has been presented by Edward M. Bernstein, formerly director of the Research Department at the Fund. Mr. Bernstein would strengthen the monetary system by providing for a "reserve settlement account" in the Fund to be used to offset the effects of capital movements and by incorporating into the monetary reserves of members their rights to draw on the Fund. The reserve settlement account would be financed by borrowing from the member (i.e. selling them Fund debentures); the integration of drawing rights into national reserves would follow from the establishment of much greater automaticity in the Fund's lending operations than exists today.

Another suggestion of special interest was presented at last year's meeting of the Board of Governors of the Fund by Reginald Maudling, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Governor of the Fund for the United Kingdom. He proposed that study could usefully be given to the development of a system of cooperation among the leading trading countries in the form of a mutual currency account in the Fund. He indicated that he had in mind a multilateral arrangement under which a country enjoying a payments surplus could deposit its net receipts of foreign currencies in a special Fund account, thereby acquiring claims which it could use when its own payments position turned adverse. The Chancellor made clear that his suggestions were not intended to represent the final views of his Government or to preclude the development or consideration of other ideas. It seems possible, therefore, that the British Government may present new or additional conceptions as its study of these questions progresses.

U.S. Position on Long-Term Liquidity

The position of the United States on long term liquidity issues has been stated most comprehensively by the President in his message of July 18, 1963,⁹ as follows:

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

Our efforts to strengthen these defenses [i.e. the defenses of the international monetary system against raids on a major currency] will continue. While this process is taking place, the United States will continue to study and discuss with other countries measures which might be taken for a further strengthening of the international monetary system over the longer run. The U.S. interest in the continuing evolution of the system inaugurated at the time of Bretton Woods is not a result of our current payments deficit—rather it reflects our concern that adequate provision be made for the growth of international liquidity to finance expanding world trade over the years ahead. Indeed, one of the reasons that new sources of liquidity may well be needed is that, as we close our payments gap, we will cut down our provision of dollars to the rest of the world.

As yet, this Government is not prepared to recommend any specific prescription for long-term improvement of the international monetary system. But we are studying the matter closely; we shall be discussing possible improvements with our friends abroad; and our minds will be open to their initiatives. We share their view that the problem of improving the payments mechanism is one that demands careful joint deliberation. At the same time, we do not pretend that talk of long-range reform of the system is any substitute for the actions that we ourselves must take now.

The defenses mentioned by the President have been developed over the past 2 years by the United States in cooperation with a number of other countries. They include the \$6 billion borrowing arrangement for the Fund as well as techniques of more limited scope. For example, the United States and other countries have been effectively carrying out joint operations through the Bank of England to maintain stability in the London gold market. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting for the Federal Reserve System and for the Treasury, now actively intervenes in dollar exchange markets, forward and spot, in order to resist speculative disturbances and promote orderly market conditions. The Federal Reserve system has established a network of swap arrangements with most of the major foreign central banks which provide ready access, on a reciprocal basis, to specified amounts of short-term credit in foreign currencies aggregating more than \$1.5 billion. And the Treasury has introduced, on an experimental but nevertheless substantial scale, new forms of U.S. Government securities—including nonmarketable medium-term certificates denominated in for-

eign currencies—that have been tailored to meet the needs of foreign central banks and have thus proved useful in reducing the possibility of calls on the U.S. gold stock.

The United States includes in its international reserves the convertible foreign currencies acquired by these and other means. To the extent that the acquisition of such currencies may properly be enlarged when the present payments deficit is ended, the United States could avoid curtailing the supply of international liquidity now provided by the deficit. This approach to meeting the liquidity needs of an expanding world economy was indicated by the Federal Open Market Committee in its authorization of February 1962 for the foreign exchange operations of the Federal Reserve System. The practical exploration of its potential scope will necessarily await a reversal in the U.S. payments position.

Although, aside from the long-term aspects of the foregoing measures, the United States has not made any proposals for the reform of the monetary system over the long run, U.S. officials have made it plain that they regard certain proposals to be unacceptable. In a current statement, for example, the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, Robert V. Roosa, has explained once again why the U.S. Government is convinced that neither a change in the price of gold nor the adoption of a system of flexible exchange rates would contribute to a strengthening of the monetary system.¹⁰ In the conclusion of this statement Mr. Roosa has summarized the main lines of probable inquiry for future governmental study of the reform of the international monetary system. There is one common feature of the several alternatives for reform that he enumerates, namely, an enlargement of the resources or of the powers of the International Monetary Fund.

As Mr. Roosa indicates, it is too early to judge whether the international monetary system will be able to meet the requirements of the world through the ordinary evolution of its present principles and institutions or whether

¹⁰ See "Reforming the International Monetary System," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 42, no. 1, Oct. 1963, pp. 107-122.

governments will eventually conclude that a more decisive reshaping of the system is needed. But whatever the outcome, the world—both the industrialized and the less developed countries—will surely require more rather than less monetary cooperation and will probably need, in time, enlarged access to a centralized source of international liquidity. To follow the logic of the argument is to conclude that the world will place increasing responsibility on the Fund over the years and that, important as the Fund has been in influencing the economic welfare of the free world in the past, it is likely to be even more important in the future.

President Kennedy and General Clay Urge Restoration of Aid Funds

Following is a transcript of remarks made by President Kennedy and Gen. Lucius D. Clay, chairman of the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, at a news conference held at Squaw Island, Hyannis Port, Mass., on August 30.

White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.) dated August 30

President Kennedy: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. General Clay and Mr. [David E.] Bell, the Director of the mutual security program, and I have met this morning to consider what actions we could take to strengthen the mutual security program to be sure that they are adequately financed and to make every possible effort to assure that the security of the United States and the effectiveness of its foreign policy will be maintained in the coming months.

This matter is now before the Congress¹ but, in a very real sense, it is before all of the American people.

This program of mutual security has helped protect the independence of dozens of countries since 1945. Most importantly, it has protected

¹ For a statement made by President Kennedy at his news conference on Aug. 20, together with the text of a letter to Members of the House of Representatives from Secretary Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and a statement made by Secretary Rusk on Aug. 23 following action by the House on the foreign aid bill, see BULLETIN of Sept. 9, 1963, p. 399.

the security and the best interests of the United States. This effort is by no means over. We are going to have a difficult struggle in the 1960's. The peaceful coexistence which is frequently talked about will be very intense in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America. This struggle is going on every day, and I think that the United States has a part in it, as do other countries, and I am confident the American people will recognize this effort involves their security, the maintenance of freedom, and our peace.

I am particularly glad General Clay came up this morning, as he studied this program very carefully and he continues to be head of the committee which oversees the aid program and advises with us on it.² He might have a word to say on the matter.

General Clay: We are, of course, fully aware of the action that has been taken with respect to the foreign aid bill. We on the committee are greatly concerned in two fields particularly—it has endangered the whole program—and that is in the reduction of the funds available for our military aid and, further, in the reduction in the Alliance for Progress. We think these reductions in the authorization have gone too far and that they could seriously endanger these programs.

We are certainly most anxious that these programs continue; that there be sufficient authorization for the appropriations to permit the jobs to be done. Above all, we hope that they will be considered as in the best interest of the American people on a nonpartisan basis. It is to this end that certainly we on the committee are going to work, Mr. President.

President Kennedy: Thank you very much, General.

The Press: Mr. President, what strategy are you going to try to use to get the total amount increased now?

President Kennedy: It is not a question of strategy. We are trying to point out very clearly how significant these programs are.

General Clay has already pointed out the effect of these cuts on Latin America, which is

² For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1962, p. 1007; Mar. 4, 1963, p. 329; Mar. 25, 1963, p. 431; and Apr. 16, 1963, p. 574.

perhaps the most critical area in the world today, the effects on our military assistance programs in Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, South Viet-Nam, Thailand, South Korea.

I think that it is important that the American people understand that this is a matter which involves the security and the balance of power all over the world. So we are going to continue to work with the Congress.

General Clay and his committee will continue to make an effort to bring this home to the American people as well as to the Members of Congress.

This is a matter which involves very greatly the security of our country. This is the same view that was held by President Eisenhower, the same view that was held by President Truman, and it is no accident that three Presidents in a row, sitting where they do and bearing particular constitutional responsibilities for foreign policy, should all feel that this program is most important, most effective, most essential, and we hope that the American people will come to share that view.

The Press: Mr. President, do you feel there has been a significant swing in the public's move away from support for foreign aid?

President Kennedy: I don't think people enjoy carrying this burden. I never thought they did. I always thought in the forties and the fifties and the sixties that there were reservations about it. I think that is quite obvious, but I think in the final analysis most of them realize that it is as essential a part of our effort as the appropriations for national defense. This money is spent, nearly all of it, in the United States, and it helps keep the freedom of this country of ours. It represents much less of a percentage of our wealth than it did during the Marshall Plan days. I think the American people realize that freedom does not come cheaply or easily.

The Press: Mr. President, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not completed its action on the authorization bill. Is there any possibility of getting a higher figure and then at conference getting a fairly reasonable one?

President Kennedy: We hope so.

The Press: Mr. President, are you going to

seek the restoration of the entire amount cut by the House from the Senate, or is there some new figure that you gentlemen have agreed upon?

President Kennedy: No, we are going to try to get a figure as close to the recommendations. Obviously, we won't get all the recommendations but as close to the recommendations as we can in the Foreign Relations Committee and in the Senate. Then there must be a conference. After that, there must be consideration by the Appropriations Committee. So I think it is important that the Senate give us as much help as it can in this program.

The Press: Mr. President, does this program look differently to you now that you are in the White House than it did when you were in Congress?

President Kennedy: No. I supported it very strongly in the Congress as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Obviously, a President has a particular responsibility in the field of foreign policy, as I have said, constitutionally. Therefore, as I see very clearly how vital this program is in all of the countries of Latin America—you can see it week in and week out—as well as in these other countries, I perhaps feel it more strongly in the same sense that General Eisenhower did. But I supported this program in the Senate, and I think it is essential. I think it is essential. I think, as I say, I put it right alongside of our defense appropriation.

The Press: Mr. President, in your meeting this morning was there any discussion of revamping the program in terms of what the House has done?

President Kennedy: No. This program we set up. Then General Clay and his group, which included Mr. Eugene Black of the World Bank, Mr. [Robert A.] Lovett, and others, looked at it. They made some proposals.³ We reduced our request of the authorization after their report came in. They recommended a

³ *The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs: Report to the President of the United States from The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, March 20, 1963; available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (price 15 cents).*

figure of over \$4 billion. This figure now, of course, in the House is almost \$600 million less than that.

As I say, we have not even gone through the appropriating procedure, which is usually less than the authorization. This will mean, as Mr. Bell pointed out, that the United States will not fulfill its commitments under the Alliance for Progress and we are going to say to the Latin American people that we are not going to do what we said we were going to do. It will mean that we will have to cut back on our military assistance to countries which are right on the firing line, and it will mean that a good many of these programs in countries of long-term development loans will come to an end. I think it will limit very much our ability to influence events in these areas. That is why I am very anxious to see the program restored.

The Press: Thank you, Mr. President.

United States Tariff Schedules Made Effective by President

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS I have caused the Tariff Schedules of the United States to be published in the *FEDERAL REGISTER*² in conformity with Section 101(d) of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-456, 76 Stat. 72);

WHEREAS I have taken such action as I deem necessary to bring the United States schedules annexed to foreign trade agreements into conformity with the Tariff Schedules of the United States as provided for in Section 102 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, as amended (P.L. 87-456, 76 Stat. 72, as amended by

¹ No. 3548; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 9279.

² Part II, F.R. of Aug. 17, 1963, 28 F.R. 8599, as corrected by F.R. of Aug. 20, 1963, 28 F.R. 9131. [Footnote in original.] The schedules, annotated for statistical purposes, are on sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, at a subscription price of \$5.00 (\$1.25 additional for foreign mailing). The subscription price includes supplementary material for an indefinite period.

Section 257(g) of P.L. 87-794, 76 Stat. 882); and

WHEREAS I have determined that the rates and provisions proclaimed in paragraph 1 of this proclamation are required or appropriate to carry out foreign trade agreements to which the United States is a party:

NOW, THEREFORE, I JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority of the Constitution and statutes, including Section 102 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, as amended, do proclaim:

1. The rates of duty in column numbered 1, Schedules 1 to 8, inclusive (except the rates for the items listed in Annex A³ which is attached and made a part of this proclamation), and the other provisions of the Tariff Schedules of the United States which relate thereto;

2. The temporary modifications set forth in Part of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States;

3. The additional import restrictions set forth in Part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States; and


4. The nations or areas and countries set forth in general headnote 3(d) of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (relating to the treatment of products of certain Communist-dominated nations or areas).

The Tariff Schedules of the United States shall become effective as to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after August 31, 1963.

As to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after August 31, 1963, the provisions of all prior proclamations which provide for customs treatment inconsistent with the Tariff Schedules of the United States are hereby superseded.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-first day of August in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:
GEORGE W. BALL,
Acting Secretary of State.

³ Not printed here; for text, see 28 *Fed. Reg.* 9280.

Vice President Johnson Visits Five North European Countries

The Department of State announced on August 31 (press release 445 dated August 29) that Vice President Johnson would leave Washington on September 2 to pay state visits to north European countries.

The Vice President will represent President Kennedy and the Nation on a 15,000-mile mission to Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. He will also visit Thule Air Force Base in Greenland and will return to Washington about September 19.

The Vice President will hold private talks with the prime ministers and other high-ranking officials of the five nations. Discussions are expected to center primarily around the effect that new world trade patterns will have on Scandinavia.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letter dated July 18, 1963, from the Secretary General of the Organization of American States addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, transmitting an OAS Council resolution on the situation between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. S/5373. July 26, 1963. 65 pp.

Table dated July 28, 1963 from the President of the Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States addressed to the President of the Security Council in support of Afro-Asian draft resolution on liberation of still dependent African territories. S/5376. July 29, 1963. 1 p.

Letter dated July 31, 1963, from the representative of the Republic of South Africa addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting a message from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding that Government's decision not to participate in the Council's discussion of South African policy. S/5381. July 31, 1963. 3 pp.

Letter dated August 2, 1963, from the representatives of Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council on the situation in Southern Rhodesia. S/5382. August 5, 1963. 9 pp.

Telegram dated August 5, 1963, from the Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the situation in the Caribbean, S/5383 and Corr. 1 and 2,

August 6-7, 1963, 5 pp.; letter dated August 8, 1963, from the representative of Haiti addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/5391, August 12, 1963, 2 pp.

General Assembly

The Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa:

Note by the Secretary-General enclosing an International Labor Organization document concerning South African participation in ILO. A/5454. July 23, 1963. 44 pp.

Note verbale dated July 24, 1963, from the representative of Nepal addressed to the Secretary-General. A/5457. July 25, 1963. 2 pp.

Letter dated July 25, 1963, from the representative of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General. A/5458. July 26, 1963. 2 pp.

Comments received from governments and international organizations and institutions regarding the technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law. A/5455. July 25, 1963. 65 pp.

Reports of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. South West Africa, A/5446/Add.2, July 26, 1963, 72 pp.; Southern Rhodesia, A/5446/Add.3, July 30, 1963, and Corr. 1, August 3, 1963, 114 pp.

Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Notes by the Secretary-General: A/5459, July 29, 1963, 6 pp.; A/5460, July 29, 1963, 2 pp.

Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum. Note by the Secretary-General. A/5461. July 29, 1963. 1 p.

Draft International Covenants on Human Rights. Note by the Secretary-General. A/5462. July 29, 1963. 3 pp.

Measures To Accelerate the Promotion of Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Report of the Economic and Social Council. Note by the Secretary-General. A/5463. July 30, 1963. 2 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament.

Reply of the Government of the Polish People's Republic, E/3736/Add. 4, June 4, 1963, 2 pp.; reply of the Government of France, E/3736/Add. 7, June 25, 1963, 1 p.; reply of the Government of Yugoslavia, E/3736/Add.8, 3 pp.

World Economic Trends: Economic Projections and Development Planning. Progress report by the Secretary-General including a work programme for the Economic Projections and Programming Centre of the Bureau of General Economic Research and Policies. E/3764. June 5, 1963. 29 pp.

Proposals for a Priority Programme of Co-ordinated Action in the Field of Water Resources Within the Framework of the United Nations Development Decade. Report of the United Nations Water Resources Development Centre. E/3760. June 6, 1963. 25 pp.

Decentralization of the Economic and Social Activities of the United Nations and Strengthening of the Regional Economic Commissions. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3786. June 10, 1963. 28 pp.

United Nations Conference on International Travel and Tourism:

Facilitation of Governmental Formalities Regarding Travel. Report of the International Civil Aviation Organization, giving an account of the perti-

nent conclusions reached at the sixth session of its Facilitation Division, Mexico City, March 19-April 3, 1963. E/CONF.47/10. June 10, 1963. 37 pp.

Reports prepared by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. E/CONF.47/11. June 11, 1963. 36 pp.

Definition of "Tourist" or "Temporary Visitor." Report submitted by the International Union of Official Travel Organisations. E/CONF.47/12. June 12, 1963. 32 pp.

Financing of Economic Development: United Nations Capital Development Fund. Report of the Secretary-General regarding views expressed by various governments. E/3790. June 14, 1963. 24 pp.

World Economic Survey, 1962, Part II: Current Economic Developments. Introduction, E/3761, June 20, 1963, 14 pp.; chapter 1, Recent Trends in Industrial Countries, E/3761/Add.1, May 27, 1963, 63 pp.; chapter 3, Recent Trends in the Centrally Planned Economies, E/3761/Add.3, June 7, 1963, 71 pp.

Committee for Industrial Development: Questionnaire on Industrial Planning and Development. Reply of the Government of Portugal. E/C.5/24/Add.35. July 15, 1963. 62 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Mexico Sign Convention Settling Chamizal Boundary

Press release 448 dated August 29

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

A Convention between the United States of America and the United Mexican States for the Solution of the Problem of the Chamizal was concluded at Mexico City on August 29. Ambassador Thomas C. Mann signed for the United States, and the Foreign Minister of Mexico, Manuel Tello, signed for Mexico. A copy of the English version of the convention is attached.

This convention comprises essentially the proposed terms of settlement announced by the Department of State and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations on July 18 and approved by the Presidents of the two countries.¹

The convention will now be submitted to the respective Senates of the two countries for ad-

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 5, 1963, p. 199.

vice and consent to ratification. If it meet with the approval of the two Senates, the Department will seek enabling legislation and appropriations from the United States Congress to provide for execution of its terms so far as the United States is concerned. Thereafter in accordance with the convention, the United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission would proceed to acquire the lands and structures to be transferred to Mexico, and when the lands have been evaluated, and the structures passing intact to Mexico have been paid for by a Mexican banking institution, these lands and structures would be transferred to Mexico. The Mexican Government would at the same time transfer to the United States approximately one-half of Cordova Island, a Mexican enclave north of the present channel of the Rio Grande. The International Commission would then relocate the Rio Grande at El Paso so that all Mexican territory in that area would be south of the new river channel.

This is the first bilateral treaty concluded with the Government of Mexico since 1949 and the first major boundary agreement reached since 1933. The Department of State looks upon the Chamizal convention as a notable achievement in inter-American relations and as a major contribution in the peaceful settlement of boundary disputes.

TEXT OF CONVENTION

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE CHAMIZAL

The United States of America and the United Mexican States:

Animated by the spirit of good-neighborliness which has made possible the amicable solution of various problems which have arisen between them;

Desiring to arrive at a complete solution of the problem concerning El Chamizal, an area of land situated to the north of the Rio Grande, in the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez region;

Considering that the recommendations of the Department of State of the United States and the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Mexico of July 17, 1963, have been approved by the Presidents of the two Republics;

Desiring to give effect to the 1911 arbitration award

in today's circumstances and in keeping with the joint communique of the Presidents of the United States and Mexico issued on June 30, 1962;² and

Convinced of the need for continuing the program of rectification and stabilization of the Rio Grande which has been carried out under the terms of the Convention of February 1, 1933,³ by improving the channel in the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez region,

Have resolved to conclude a Convention and for this purpose have named as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America, Thomas C. Mann, Ambassador of the United States of America to Mexico, and

The President of the United Mexican States, Manuel G. G. G., Secretary for Foreign Relations,

Who, having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

In the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez sector, the Rio Grande shall be relocated into a new channel in accordance with the engineering plan recommended in Minute No. 14 of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico. Authentic copies of the Minute and of the map⁴ attached thereto, on which the new channel is shown, are annexed to this convention and made a part hereof.

Article 2

The river channel shall be relocated so as to transfer from the north to the south of the Rio Grande a tract of 823.50 acres composed of 366.00 acres in the Hamizal tract, 193.16 acres in the southern part of Cordova Island, and 264.34 acres to the east of Cordova Island. A tract of 193.16 acres in the northern part of Cordova Island will remain to the north of the river.

Article 3

The center line of the new river channel shall be the international boundary. The lands that, as a result of the relocation of the river channel, shall be to the north of the center line of the new channel shall be the territory of the United States of America and the lands that shall be to the south of the center line of the new channel shall be the territory of the United Mexican States.

Article 4

No payments will be made, as between the two Governments, for the value of the lands that pass from one country to the other as a result of the relocation of the

international boundary. The lands that, upon relocation of the international boundary, pass from one country to the other shall pass to the respective Governments in absolute ownership, free of any private titles or encumbrances of any kind.

Article 5

The Government of Mexico shall convey to the Banco Nacional Hipotecario Urbano y de Obras Públicas, S.A., titles to the properties comprised of the structures which pass intact to Mexico and the lands on which they stand. The Bank shall pay the Government of Mexico for the value of the lands on which such structures are situated and the Government of the United States for the estimated value to Mexico of the said structures.

Article 6

After this Convention has entered into force and the necessary legislation has been enacted for carrying it out, the two Governments shall, on the basis of a recommendation by the International Boundary and Water Commission, determine the period of time appropriate for the Government of the United States to complete the following:

(a) The acquisition, in conformity with its laws, of the lands to be transferred to Mexico and for the rights of way for that portion of the new river channel in the territory of the United States;

(b) The orderly evacuation of the occupants of the lands referred to in paragraph (a).

Article 7

As soon as the operations provided in the preceding article have been completed, and the payment made by the Banco Nacional Hipotecario Urbano y de Obras Públicas, S.A., to the Government of the United States as provided in Article 5, the Government of the United States shall so inform the Government of Mexico. The International Boundary and Water Commission shall then proceed to demarcate the new international boundary, recording the demarcation in a Minute. The relocation of the international boundary and the transfer of lands provided for in this Convention shall take place upon express approval of that Minute by both Governments in accordance with the procedure established in the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Treaty of February 3, 1944.⁵

Article 8

The costs of constructing the new river channel shall be borne in equal parts by the two Governments. However, each Government shall bear the costs of compensation for the value of the structures or improvements which must be destroyed, within the territory under its jurisdiction prior to the relocation of the international boundary, in the process of constructing the new channel.

⁵ 59 Stat. 1219.

² *Ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 135.

³ 48 Stat. 1621.

⁴ Not printed here.

Article 9

The International Boundary and Water Commission is charged with the relocation of the river channel, the construction of the bridges herein provided for, and the maintenance, preservation and improvement of the new channel. The Commission's jurisdiction and responsibilities, set forth in Article XI of the 1933 Convention for the maintenance and preservation of the Rio Grande Rectification Project, are extended upstream from that part of the river included in the Project to the point where the Rio Grande meets the land boundary between the two countries.

Article 10

The six existing bridges shall, as a part of the relocation of the river channel, be replaced by new bridges. The cost of constructing the new bridges shall be borne in equal parts by the two Governments. The bridges which replace those on Stanton-Lerdo and Santa Fe-Juarez streets shall be located on the same streets. The location of the bridge or bridges which replace the two Cordova Island bridges shall be determined by the International Boundary and Water Commission. The agreements now in force which relate to the four existing bridges between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez shall apply to the new international bridges which replace them. The international bridge or bridges which replace the two Cordova Island bridges shall be toll free unless both Governments agree to the contrary.

Article 11

The relocation of the international boundary and the transfer of portions of territory resulting therefrom shall not affect in any way:

(a) The legal status, with respect to citizenship laws, of those persons who are present or former residents of the portions of territory transferred;

(b) The jurisdiction over legal proceedings of either a civil or criminal character which are pending at the time of, or which were decided prior to, such relocation;

(c) The jurisdiction over acts or omissions occurring within or with respect to the said portions of territory prior to their transfer;

(d) The law or laws applicable to the acts or omissions referred to in paragraph (c).

Article 12

The present Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Mexico City as soon as possible.

The present Convention shall enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

DONE at Mexico City the twenty-ninth day of August, nineteen sixty three, in the English and Spanish languages, each text being equally authentic.

*For the Government
of the United States
of America,*
THOMAS C. MANN

*For the Government
of the United
Mexican States,*
MANUEL TELLO

TEXT OF MINUTE

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION

UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

CIUDAD JUÁREZ, CHIHUAHUA,

August 28, 1963

MINUTE NO. 214

ENGINEERING CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO RELOCA- TION OF THE RIO GRANDE AT EL PASO, TEXAS, AND CIUDAD JUAREZ, CHIHUAHUA.

The Commission met at the Offices of the Mexican Section, at Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, on August 28, 1963 at 10:00 a.m., to consider the engineering criteria and plans required to put into effect the joint recommendations for relocation of the channel of the Rio Grande at El Paso-Ciudad Juárez, referred to in the Memoranda of July 17, 1963 entitled "Recommendations to the Presidents of the United States and Mexico by the Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Relations for a Complete Solution of the Chamizal Problem".⁶

The Commissioners reviewed the engineering aspects of the new channel of the river recommended in the Memoranda under reference, and the studies and computations which, under instructions from their respective Governments, they made of those aspects during the preparation of the Memoranda. They reviewed the "Preliminary Plan, Relocation of Rio Grande, El Paso, Texas-Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua", which is attached to this Minute as an Exhibit⁷ and forms part hereof, as well as the engineering studies and criteria on which it is based and the preliminary cost estimates of the new channel and of the bridges which are to replace those presently in service.

They noted that the centerline of the proposed new channel would diverge from the centerline of the present channel at point "A" shown on the Exhibit. Beginning at that point, the centerline is described as follows, with distances approximate: It would be aligned easterly along a curve of 2,300-foot radius and 0.44 mile in length, and a tangent of 0.62 mile, approximately parallel to the present channel and from 600 to 900 feet to the north of it; thence northeasterly along a curve of 1,640-foot radius and 0.32 mile in length, and a tangent of 0.22 mile; thence easterly along a curve 2,080 feet in radius and 0.35 mile in length and a tangent of 0.62 mile, crossing the western boundary of Cordova Island at a point 200 feet to the south of Monument No. 3 and approximately 1,000 feet to the south of the north boundary of said Island and 3,500 feet to the north of the present channel of the river; the line would continue to the southeast along a curve 1,910 feet in radius and 0.38 mile in length, which would cross the east boundary of Cordova Island 330 feet to the east of Monument No. 3 and thence also southeasterly along a tangent 0.3

⁶ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 5, 1963, p. 201.

⁷ Not printed here.

tie; thence easterly along a curve of 5,730 feet in radius and 0.53 mile in length to connect with the present channel. The total length of the new channel would be approximately 4.3 miles.

The Commissioners found that the hydrologic studies, together with the consideration that the business districts of the two cities require a high degree of flood protection, support the criterion that the new river channel should be designed to carry a flood of 18,000 cubic feet per second with 3.3 feet of freeboard, as shown on the preliminary plan. They found that the proposed alignment of the new concrete-lined channel would be free of abrupt turns which might cause a significant rise in flood stages; that notwithstanding the fact that the new channel would have a greater length and curvature than the present channel, water elevations for the design flood would be lower in the new channel because of reduction in friction losses due to its concrete lining; that the lined channel requires considerably less width of right-of-way through the high-cost urban areas, with substantial savings in costs of land and improvements for right-of-way and in construction of new bridges; and that the preliminary plan also provides for inlet works to allow entrance of storm drainage, and for check structures in the new channel to be able to provide a water depth of six feet or more.

The two Commissioners noted that the relocation of the Rio Grande at El Paso-Ciudad Juárez requires approval of a Convention by the two Governments.

The Commission then adopted the following resolution, subject to the approval of the two Governments:

A. The Commission finds engineeringly sound the new location of the river at El Paso-Ciudad Juárez as recommended, and as shown on the Exhibit, and approves the preliminary plan and cost estimates shown hereon, subject to such modifications as the Commission may agree upon in final design and construction.

B. The Commission specifically approves the following findings of the preliminary plan:

1) The precise areas which would be affected by relocation of the river, which in the aforementioned Memoranda and the maps attached thereto are given approximately to the nearest acre and hectare, are as follows: South of the centerline of the relocated channel and north of the present channel of the Rio Grande there would be a tract of 823.50 acres comprised of 26.00 acres in the Chamizal Tract, 193.16 acres in the northerly part of Cordova Island, and 264.34 acres to the east of the Island. North of the centerline of the relocated channel would be a tract of 193.16 acres which presently is the northerly part of Cordova Island.

2) The new channel of the Rio Grande as shown on the Exhibit would be concrete-lined, with cross-section as narrow as compatible with the capacity required to carry the design flood.

3) The new channel would provide a high degree of flood protection and a stable channel which could be properly operated and maintained by the two Governments through their respective Sections of the Commis-

sion. The new lined channel would provide a stable international boundary, would permit more effective sanitary control of the river, and would contribute to improvement and beautification of the border between the two countries at El Paso-Ciudad Juárez.

C. The Commission recommends the following joint measures by the two Governments to implement the plan:

1) That when the Convention relating to the relocation of the river comes into force, the International Boundary and Water Commission:

a) Make the necessary topographic surveys for demarcation of the new boundary.

b) Prepare detail plans and perform all other engineering work preliminary to and preparatory for relocation of the river as may be required by the Convention.

c) Undertake, at the earliest practicable date, the construction of the new bridges required to replace the six existing bridges and such portions of the new river channel as might be feasible and desirable as determined by the Commission. The bridge or bridges required to replace the two existing Cordova Island bridges shall be located as determined by the Commission, and each Section of the Commission shall assume responsibility for operation and maintenance of the portion of such bridge or bridges in its country, with the understanding that each Section may make arrangements if deemed necessary or desirable with local authorities of its country for operation and maintenance of its part of such bridge or bridges or for repayment of costs of said operation and maintenance.

2) That when such prerequisite measures as are set forth in the Convention have been effected:

a) Each Government, in the territory under its jurisdiction, remove all structures from the right-of-way for the new channel as delineated by the Commission.

b) The Commission demarcate the new boundary line.

c) The Commission, after the two Governments have approved the new boundary line, proceed to complete the relocation of the river channel and all related engineering operations.

D. The Commission recommends that the equal division between the two countries of total costs of constructing the new channel and bridges, as recommended in the Memoranda of July 17, 1963, be effected by each Government performing, through its Section of the Commission, a portion of the construction work corresponding to one-half of the total cost.

E. The Commission recommends that in carrying out the construction of works allotted to it, each Section of the Commission may make use of any competent public or private agencies in accordance with the laws of its country.

F. It is recommended that each Section of the Commission observe, in the works which it may have to

execute in the other country, the laws of that country, with the exemptions and facilities hereinafter stated:

1) All materials, implements, equipment and repair parts intended for the construction, operation and maintenance of such works shall be exempt from taxes relating to imports and exports. For this purpose, each Section of the Commission shall furnish verification certificates covering all materials, implements, equipment and repair parts intended for such works.

2) The personnel employed either directly or indirectly on the construction, operation or maintenance of such works shall be permitted to pass freely from one country to the other for the purpose of going to and from the place of location of the works, without any immigration restrictions, passports, or labor requirements. For this purpose, each Section of the Commission shall furnish adequate means of identification to the personnel employed by it on the aforesaid works.

G. The Commission recommends that construction of the works built in pursuance of the provisions of the Convention not confer upon either of the two countries any rights either of property or of jurisdiction over any part whatsoever of the territory of the other, and that the jurisdiction of each country be limited by the international boundary, which would be marked on the works.

H. The Commission recommends that to effectuate the provisions of the Convention each Government through its respective Section of the Commission obtain and retain direct ownership, control and jurisdiction over the part of the new channel of the river and the right-of-way in its own territory as shown on the Exhibit, the structures and improvements located there in except for the new bridges to replace the four that presently exist between El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, as well as over such other rights-of-way as each Government may require in its territory.

The meeting then adjourned.

J. F. FRIEDKIN
Commissioner of the United States

D. HERRERA
Commissioner of Mexico

J. D. WALSTROM
Secretary of the United States Section

FERNANDO RIVAS S.
Secretary of the Mexican Section

Ratifications of FEN Treaty Exchanged With Belgium

Press release 452 dated September 3

Instruments of ratification of the treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of

Belgium were exchanged on September 3. The exchange was made by Secretary Rusk and the Belgian Ambassador, Louis Scheyven, at brief formal ceremony. This action completes the procedures required for bringing the treaty into force. By its terms the treaty will enter into force on October 3, 1 month after the date of the exchange of ratifications.

The treaty, which was signed at Brussels on February 21, 1961, has been approved by the U.S. Senate and the Belgian Parliament. It will supersede upon its entry into force a brief and less detailed treaty entered into in 1877.

The new treaty is one of a series of more than 20 similar treaties that have been negotiated by the United States in recent years. Its principal purpose is to provide a comprehensive legal basis, framed in modern terms and responsive to modern conditions, for the further development of general economic and other relations between the two countries.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.¹

Signatures affixed at Washington: Ivory Coast, September 5, 1963; Luxembourg, September 3, 1963; Nigeria, September 4, 1963; Western Samoa, September 6, 1963.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London April 11, 1962.¹

Acceptance deposited: Liberia, August 21, 1963.

Safety of Life at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.¹

Acceptance deposited: Cuba, August 22, 1963.

Trade

Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying results of the 1960-61 tariff conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force for the United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5255.

Acceptance deposited: Tanganyika, July 1, 1963.

Procès-verbal extending the period of validity of the declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 18, 1960. Done at Geneva November 7, 1960. Entered into force January 1, 1963. TIAS 5266.

Signatures: Brazil, July 8, 1963; Yugoslavia (subject to ratification), August 6, 1963.

¹ Not in force.

protocol for the accession of Spain to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 30, 1963. Entered into force August 29, 1963. Signatures: Austria,² July 29, 1963; Canada, August 22, 1963; Denmark, July 19, 1963; Federal Republic of Germany,² July 16, 1963; Italy,² August 23, 1963; Sweden, July 30, 1963; Switzerland, July 26, 1963.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation, and protocol. Signed at Brussels February 21, 1961. Ratifications exchanged: September 3, 1963. Enters into force: October 3, 1963.

Japan

Agreement amending the agreement of January 11, 1958, as amended (TIAS 3982, 4635), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo August 23, 1963. Entered into force August 23, 1963. Understandings with regard to export of zipper chain from Japan to the United States. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington August 28, 1963. Entered into force August 28, 1963.

Paraguay

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Asunción August 20, 1963. Enters into force on the date of notification from the Government of Paraguay that the agreement has been ratified in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Spain

Agreement amending the agreement of January 21, 1952 (TIAS 2471), relating to the reciprocal waiver of visa fees for nonimmigrants. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid May 11 and July 5, 1963. Entered into force July 5, 1963.

United Kingdom

Agreement extending the agreement of May 10 and 13, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3843, 4156, 4895), relating to the disposition of equipment and materials to include machine tools. Effected by exchange of notes at London August 28, 1963. Entered into force August 28, 1963.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Consulate at Calgary Raised to Consulate General

Department notice dated August 22

Effective August 21 the American consulate at Calgary, Alberta, Canada, was elevated to the rank of

Subject to ratification.

consulate general. Consul general William H. Christensen will continue in charge at Calgary.

On the closing of the consulate at Edmonton, Alberta, Canada,¹ the Edmonton consular district will be transferred to Calgary, effective September 7. The new district for the consulate general at Calgary will be the Province of Alberta and the District of Mackenzie (Northwest Territories).

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.

Weather Stations—Amendment to Annex II-A of the North Atlantic Ocean Stations Agreement of February 25, 1954. Recommendation approved by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization at the forty-seventh session, at Montreal, December 14, 1962. Entered into force December 14, 1962. TIAS 5283. 2 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy. Amendment to the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Approved at Vienna by the General Conference of the Agency at the fifth regular session, October 4, 1961. Entered into force January 31, 1963. TIAS 5284. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with China, amending the agreement of November 19, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei January 24, 1963. Entered into force January 24, 1963. TIAS 5285. 7 pp. 10¢.

Education—Establishment of Commission and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Malaya. Signed at Kuala Lumpur January 28, 1963. Entered into force January 28, 1963. TIAS 5286. 6 pp. 5¢.

Mapping—Cooperative Program. Agreement with Ethiopia. Signed at Addis Ababa January 25, 1963. Entered into force January 25, 1963. TIAS 5287. 4 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Radiation Medicine Centre. Agreement with India. Exchange of notes—Dated at New Delhi January 4 and February 1, 1963. Entered into force February 1, 1963. TIAS 5288. 4 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Relinquishment of United States Naval Radio Transmitting Facility at Bagobantay, Quezon City. Agreement with the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila December 31, 1962, and January 11, 1963. Entered into force January 15, 1963. TIAS 5289. 3 pp. 5¢.

Aviation—Certificates of Airworthiness. Agreement with Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washing-

¹ For an announcement, see BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1963, p. 328.

ton February 1, 1963. Entered into force February 1, 1963. TIAS 5290. 6 pp. 5¢.

Tracking Stations. Agreement with Australia, amending the agreement of February 26, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at Canberra January 9 and February 11, 1963. Entered into force February 11, 1963. TIAS 5291. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Bolivia. Signed at La Paz February 4, 1963. Entered into force February 4, 1963. TIAS 5292. 8 pp. 10¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima January 25, 1962. Entered into force January 25, 1962. TIAS 5293. 5 pp. 5¢.

Economic, Technical and Related Assistance. Agreement with the Central African Republic. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bangui February 10, 1963. Entered into force February 10, 1963. TIAS 5294. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Iceland. Signed at Reykjavik February 6, 1963. Entered into force February 6, 1963. With memorandum of understanding. TIAS 5295. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of May 3, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington January 26 and February 1, 1963. Entered into force February 1, 1963. TIAS 5296. 2 pp. 5¢.

Economic Assistance—Settlement of Postwar Economic Assistance. Agreement with Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo February 19, 1963. Entered into force February 19, 1963. TIAS 5297. 7 pp. 10¢.

Defense—Loan of Additional Vessels. Agreement with the Republic of Korea. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul December 14, 1962 and February 11, 1963. Entered into force February 11, 1963. TIAS 5298. 3 pp. 5¢.

Surplus Property—Waiver of Restriction in Paragraph 4 of Memorandum of Interpretation and Understanding to the Agreement of October 1, 1959. Exchange of notes with Korea—Signed at Seoul February 1, 1963. Entered into force February 1, 1963. TIAS 5299. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Iran. Signed at Tehran October 15, 1962. Entered into force October 15, 1962. Exchanges of notes—Dated at Tehran October 15, December 30, 1962, and February 3, 1963. TIAS 5300. 11 pp. 5¢.

Boundary Waters—Pilotage Services on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River. Agreement with Canada, amending the agreement of May 5, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 23, 1962 and February 21, 1963. Entered into force February 21, 1963. Operative retroactively October 15, 1962. TIAS 5301. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Turkey. Signed at Ankara February 21, 1963. Entered into force February 21, 1963. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5303. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Chile, amending the agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago February 14, 1963. Entered into force February 14, 1963. TIAS 5304. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam, amending the agreement of December 27, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon March 8, 1963. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5305. 3 pp. 5¢.

Friendship, Establishment and Navigation. Treaty and protocol with Luxembourg. Signed at Luxem-

bourg February 23, 1962. Entered into force March 28, 1963. TIAS 5306. 29 pp. 15¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Guatemala. Exchange of notes—Signed at Guatemala December 29, 1962. Entered into force December 29, 1962. TIAS 5307. 5 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with the Republic of the Congo. Exchange of notes—Signed at Léopoldville October 25 and November 17, 1962. Entered into force November 17, 1962. TIAS 5308. 10 pp. 10¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Declaration on Provisional Accession of the United Arab Republic to agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force with respect to the United States and the United Arab Republic May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title I. Agreement with the Ryukyu Islands. Signed at Naha, Okinawa, January 22, and at Washington February 1963. Entered into force February 6, 1963. With memorandum of understanding. TIAS 5310. 6 pp. 5¢.

Migratory Workers—Mexican Agricultural Workers. Agreement with Mexico, amending the agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Mexico January 10 and February 25, 1963. Entered into force February 25, 1963. TIAS 5311. 4 pp. 5¢.

Statutes of the International Bureau of Education. Adopted at Geneva July 25, 1929. Entered into force with respect to the United States July 12, 1958. TIAS 5312. 10 pp. 10¢.

Defense—Polaris Sales. Agreement with the United Kingdom. Signed at Washington April 6, 1963. Entered into force April 6, 1963. TIAS 5313. 11 pp. 10¢.

Highways—Termination of Development of Transportation Facilities Agreement of January 2 and 6, 1961. Agreement with Nepal, and India. Signed at Kathmandu January 10, 1963. Entered into force January 10, 1963. TIAS 5314. 2 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 2-8

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to September 2 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 442 of August 27 and 445 and 448 of August 29.

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452	9/3	Ratifications exchanged with Belgium on FEN treaty.
*453	9/3	Anderson sworn in as Ambassador to Portugal (biographic details).
*455	9/5	Harriman: Economic Club, Detroit (excerpts).
456	9/6	Rusk: ninth anniversary of SEATO.
†457	9/5	Office of Special Representational Services established (rewrite).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Education, Culture and Science
Financing the U.N.
Keeping the Peace
Increasing World Food Supplies
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Decade of Development
The New Nations
Toward a World of Law

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN



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Unfinished Business

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

Tonight I want to talk about some unfinished business of vital importance to the security of the United States. For the security of the United States is a central concern of the Department of State. The old notion that the diplomats handled affairs in time of peace and the military took over in time of war is incompatible with the harsh realities of the world struggle in which we are now engaged. Today the military men and the diplomats work together in the closest cooperation to protect the safety and the vital interests of the American people.

Incidentally, I wore the uniform of the United States Army for 25 years, including more than 5 years of active duty. As for the striped pants, I wore them on Inauguration Day—and I can't recall that I have worn them since. We are long past the day when most of our diplomats and Foreign Service officers and

¹ Made before the American Legion Convention at Miami Beach, Fla., on Sept. 10 (press release 464; as-delivered text).

State Department officials were well-heeled socialites—with or without degrees from exclusive colleges. Today they come from all parts of the United States and all walks of life. In fact, of the three highest ranking career officers now on duty in the Department, one was born in Colorado and two were born in rural Kansas. One graduated from the University of Colorado, one from Occidental College in California, and one from the University of Nebraska.

Appointments to our Foreign Service are the basis of severe competition, and promotion is for demonstrated competence and hard work.

We have a great many war veterans in the Department of State and in our Foreign Service. And we have a vigorous Legion Post, which I am proud and glad to be a member of. We have our full share of dedicated men and women serving with gallantry in many a difficult and disagreeable and, often these days, dangerous post.

I understand that some of your posts have

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1266 PUBLICATION 7602 SEPTEMBER 30, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$8.00; foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as a source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

proposed resolutions asking for congressional investigation of the Department of State. It's not a bad idea. In fact, it's such a good idea that at least a half a dozen committees and subcommittees of Congress are looking us over all the time and in great detail. Therefore I think I have a better idea for the American Legion, which I shall propose to your National Commander. Come and look at us yourself. Come and do this job yourself. Let the appropriate persons representing the Legion come in and look us over in great detail, just as much as you have interest in, or time for, because I am quite sure that both of us could benefit by becoming better acquainted.

We have some real problems. We're dealing with 112 countries. Did you know that in this calendar year there will be changes of government—most of them scheduled, some of them not scheduled—in perhaps 40 of those 112 countries? And of course we have some real security problems, as every foreign office of every great power throughout the world has, because we are the targets of attempts to penetrate us all the time. And the vigilance is never-ending in order to resist this attempt to penetrate the Government of the United States.

Need for Powerful Military Defenses

As advocates of powerful military defenses, in the Department of State are second to none—and the record since World War II will prove it. It is essential that we maintain strategic deterrents so strong that sane men would never dare attack us or, if insanity prevails, to insure the destruction of the aggressor. It is equally essential, of course, that our adversaries know that we have the will to use these forces in defense of the vital interests of the free world. It is also important that, with our allies, we have powerful and flexible and mobile conventional forces. And it is important to continue to increase the capabilities of the free world to deal with guerrilla warfare.

President Kennedy, in recognition of the harsh situation in which we find ourselves in a modern world, with the full support of the Congress, has, as the Legion knows, substantially increased our defense forces: a 20-percent increase in the defense budget—making it pos-

sible to add 100 percent to the warheads and the strategic nuclear alert force, a 60-percent increase in the tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe alone, and a 200-percent increase in our counterinsurgency forces.

But it is impossible to enhance or even to preserve the security of the United States by military means alone. Indeed, there is no security for anyone in an unlimited arms race.

Since 1947 the defense budget of the United States has necessarily increased by more than four times. And yet we cannot truthfully say that we are safer today than we were at that time, however necessary those increases were. And therefore we must find a way, if possible, to preserve the peace and protect our vital interests by means short of war.

Two Recent Agreements With Soviet Union

Recently we have reached two agreements with the Soviet Union. One was on the so-called "hot line"—a direct line between the Kremlin and the White House, for use in emergency.² The need for reliable and direct and rapid contact was underscored during the crisis over Cuba last fall, when events began to outrun the ability of our two Governments to communicate by ordinary means. We hope there will be no crisis requiring the "hot line," but in a fast-moving and dangerous situation it might prevent miscalculation or a fateful misunderstanding.

The second agreement is, of course, the treaty banning atomic tests in the air, in space, and under water. The hearings on it conducted under the leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explored thoroughly every relevant question. And yesterday the Senate as a whole took up that debate.³

I am convinced myself that this treaty safeguards fully the security of the United States. This conviction is supported by the great weight of testimony of our scientific and military leaders, including the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the military risks in the treaty are acceptable.

We know that we hold in this country an overall superiority in nuclear weapons, that the

² BULLETIN of July 8, 1963, p. 50.

³ See p. 496.

formidable military power represented by these and other weapons is ever-increasing, and that we have and will maintain the strongest military arsenal in the world.

We know that since 1945 the danger of a nuclear holocaust has increased. With this increase in danger there has been an increase in the destructive power of modern weapons. For almost two decades, beginning with the moment of the use of the first bomb, we have diligently searched for an alternative to the nuclear arms race. Now within our grasp lies at least a small opportunity to begin a reversal if possible of the trend of the race itself.

We are confident in the adequacy of our nuclear forces to deter a Soviet attack and to inflict a devastating damage against anyone who might attack us or our allies. Given our present nuclear capabilities, now is an appropriate time to restrict further nuclear testing, at least in those environments in which we may assure ourselves that the Soviet Union is doing likewise.

We know the effect this treaty can have on potential nuclear powers. A dozen nations have the capability of developing nuclear weapons within the next decade. Yet all but one, Red China, are among the some 90 signatories not yet nuclear powers who have signed the agreement. In the absence of a treaty most of them probably would feel obliged to elect another course for themselves.

We will continue a testing program underground. More than 90 underground tests have provided the most significant information. The treaty is self-policing. Our own detection system will monitor the ban. As additional insurance, our testing facilities affected by the treaty will be maintained on an alert standby basis. And if the interests of our country are jeopardized, we can withdraw from the treaty—promptly if need be. These are safeguards based on practical requirements. And I want to emphasize that this treaty does not rest upon trust and confidence.

We must consider also the consequences of a rejection of the treaty. In my judgment they would be extremely grave, both for our position in the world and for the prospects for peace. The possibility of exercising any control over

armaments would almost certainly vanish. The possibility of settling dangerous political problems would be greatly reduced.

Our rejection would lend weight to the Chinese Communist contention that peaceful coexistence with the West is impossible. It would cost us the confidence of many countries in the free world—allies and nonaligned alike.

The limited nuclear test ban treaty has been aptly characterized by President Kennedy as step toward peace and away from war.⁴ This is a step which I believe that we should take, for rejection of the treaty would lead to more intensive rounds of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, an upward surge in the arms race spiral, further pollution of the air, increased tensions and distrust, and increased prospects of a war which Khrushchev said to the Chinese the survivors would envy the dead.

Other Possible Agreements

Realistically, what do we hope to accomplish through any further discussions with the Soviet Union?

There can be no assured and lasting peace until Communist leaders abandon their goal of a world revolution. They are quite frank in declaring that they don't intend to do that.

After the test ban treaty was signed, Chairman Khrushchev said again that there can be "no coexistence in ideology—that conflict," says, "goes on." His proclaimed objective is to "bury" all non-Communist societies. He used this phrase again in a speech on June 1 of this year. He made it plain that he was speaking just of an alleged historical inevitability.

Thus the Soviet Communists, as well as the Chinese Communists, remain committed to Communist domination of the world. Indeed, they have indicated that they will try to intensify the struggle, at least in its nonmilitary aspects, and the present quarrel between them started over an argument about how best to accomplish this result.

But we think the Soviet leaders realize that it would be disastrous for them to try to "bury"

⁴ BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

by military means. Nor do we ourselves want war, nor need it to insure success for the cause of freedom. We believe that the Soviet Union and the United States therefore have a mutual interest in avoiding a war of total devastation. And we think that the Soviet leaders are beginning to recognize this.

So we hope that it will be possible to reach agreements on possible other safeguards against war by accident, or miscalculation, or surprise attack—limited steps—as yet no agreement in sight. We favor also, though this will be more difficult to achieve, some possible slowing down of arms production and reductions in level of armaments—with fully adequate safeguards and inspection. We and our allies are of course interested in eliminating or reducing the crisis potential of Berlin and other points of friction. And we think the Soviet Union could serve its larger interests, as well as ours, by joining us in its peacemaking activities of the United Nations.

We are prepared to explore the possibilities of a freer flow of both information and peoples between the Soviet Union, and the Eastern European countries generally, and the United States. We would like to expand existing exchange agreements. And we would hope that more people and information might move back and forth in a natural and normal way, because opening up the doors of that society can be in its most profound interests of freedom. In this connection, we have noted with satisfaction that during the last 3 months the Soviets have not banned broadcasts to the U.S.S.R. by the Voice of America or by the BBC.

We would also join with the U.S.S.R. in undertakings to serve our own and all other peoples in the unending battle against disease and other hazards of nature, against poverty and ignorance. We believe that good can come from pooling efforts on various frontiers of science including the peaceful potentialities of space and nuclear energy.

These are not bilateral issues between us and the Soviet Union; they involve our allies and uncommitted countries as well. These other countries must play, and they do play, a large part in such discussions—in the United Nations, NATO, at Geneva, and in other forums.

Communist World Ambitions

In seeking understandings with the Soviet Union along the several lines I have indicated, we do not expect to effect a miraculous change in Soviet intentions toward us. Our aim is to keep the conflict within tolerable bounds—to defend and build freedom if possible without a thermonuclear war.

However, it must be an object of policy to move the Communist world by all available means to abandon their program of world domination. It is evident that Communist ambitions entail severe costs and risks for the Soviet Government and people. Even now we see some suggestive signs of restiveness about the burdens and risks of their commitments to the world Communist movement—which, incidentally, no single government can now fully control.

Herein lies, perhaps, the greatest significance of the schism between the Soviet and Chinese Communists. I have repeatedly emphasized that we should not take cheap comfort from that historic break. It eliminates none of the dangers that hang over us and makes none of our immediate tasks appreciably easier. But the Chinese Communists have brought emphatically to the attention of the Soviet Government and people the sharp conflict that exists between the requirements of the Communist world revolution and Soviet national interests. The Chinese Communists insist that Communist world ambitions, as interpreted by themselves, must come first, no matter what the cost, including the destruction of the present Soviet leadership—and even the thermonuclear devastation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders have drawn back from the abyss the Chinese Communists have prepared for them. We would hope that they would go on from there, by putting aside the illusion of that eventual Communist triumph.

There is reason to believe that the Soviet people are more interested in improving their living standards than in Communist world ambitions. And in the Soviet Union, as well as in other Communist states of Eastern Europe, we see the stirrings of desire for more individual freedom. Processes of evolution are at work.

In the long run they favor the great ideas of freedom, of government by consent of the governed, of individual rights and dignity.

But we must be careful not to confuse what we hope will happen with the actual situation now before us. For nothing has happened yet to justify us in relaxing even in the slightest. We must carry on energetically with all of our unfinished business: such as building and improving the Atlantic partnership and all that this entails in going forward with trade negotiations, and with political and military cooperation, including the proposed multilateral nuclear force; with helping the newly independent and other less developed countries to find firm political and economic footing; and we must maintain unfailingly, with our allies, the means to defend the free world against aggression by whatever means are required.

The Cuban Problem

One of the items of unfinished business about which all of us are especially concerned is Cuba. The emergence of a Marxist-Leninist regime has been unanimously rejected by the nations of this hemisphere. When the introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba directly threatened our security, President Kennedy moved promptly to remove that threat. But Cuba remains a major obstacle to normal relations between us and the Soviet Union because, as has been repeatedly said, the political or military intrusion of Moscow into this hemisphere and the continued ambition of Castro to interfere in the affairs of other nations in the hemisphere are neither acceptable nor negotiable.

A series of actions have been taken to support this policy. Our Armed Forces have been given missions to insure that Cuba not become a military threat to us or to any other of its neighbors. We have been working successfully with the other countries of the hemisphere on measures to block the movement of Castro subversives. Cuba's economic and political links with the Western World have been dramatically reduced, and it is increasingly clear that the present regime in Cuba is a growing burden for the Cuban people as well as for those elsewhere who try to sustain it in power.

Disillusionment with the Castro regime continues to spread both within Cuba and among Castro's former admirers in other countries. The example of Castro's Cuba is not one which any sane person who wishes a better life for his own people can any longer think of imitating. Moreover, it is unthinkable that the brave and talented people who inhabit Cuba will long endure this subjection into which they have been betrayed by a fanatical minority.

There are some who have urged that the Cuban problem be solved quickly by acts of war against that island. If such proposals are made with a readiness to accept the total consequences—in Cuba, here, throughout the rest of the world—of such actions, the proposal has at least the virtue of consistency. But if the proposal is made on the assumption that the other side would simply collapse, the proposal has no roots in reality. Those who carry the full responsibility must determine the nature of any such threat and take the measures appropriate to the threat itself. We saw last year in Cuba a threat which required us to face the immediate prospect of war. The elimination of that threat gives us a chance to pursue other means the unanimous determination of the hemisphere that a free Cuban people will take their place again in the family of the Western Hemisphere.

Foreign Aid

Perhaps the most serious weakness in our national security at the present time is the lack of understanding of our stake in the developing countries of the rest of the world. We have tended, I think, too long and too much to think of our help to these countries as largess, "moral responsibility," or do-goodism, or dispensable waste. The blunt truth is that our own security is directly involved in the success of these countries in preserving their independence, which in turn requires economic and social progress as well as the will to remain independent. Our assistance—military, economic, and technical—to these countries in many cases is indispensable to their very survival. The Kremlin understands this. Some years ago it paid us the high compliment

trying to imitate our foreign aid programs—and in some instances on a much larger scale. One of the main features of the Communist design for world domination is the separation and alienation of the developing countries from the West, and particularly from the United States.

An undeviating Communist objective in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Europe can be summed up in three words: "Yanks, go home."

Why the Communists want us to come home is perfectly obvious. But why Americans want us to come home, surrendering the field to the communists, taxes my understanding. Yet that is what those who advocate deep cuts in our foreign aid would have us do.

In the kind of world in which we live, we can defend the United States itself only if we prevent the absorption of one free country after another by a movement dedicated to our destruction.

Since President Truman's special message to Congress in March 1947,⁵ it has been the bipartisan policy of this country to prevent Communist expansion by assisting free peoples who are trying to preserve their independence. We saved Greece and Turkey without fighting a major war. And then, through the Marshall Plan and related programs, we and the West Europeans went on to win one of the greatest and most decisive victories in history. It was also one of the least costly, for, even in dollars, it cost only a tiny fraction of what we spent to liberate Europe in the Second World War. And it was a bloodless victory.

We stand to win or lose an equally important victory through the Alliance for Progress. If we have the good sense to carry on with this undertaking, not for just a year or two but for whatever time it takes, we will guarantee freedom in this hemisphere more surely than we could through military efforts alone.

Would the Americans who want to abandon the Alliance for Progress, or starve it out of existence, favor our standing aside if, for example, Venezuela were invaded by Communist forces? It is cheaper in dollars—and infinitely

cheaper in lives—to save countries by helping them to develop the strength to maintain their independence.

A considerable part of our foreign aid goes to build and maintain the defenses of countries on the frontlines of the free world. Secretary of Defense McNamara has testified that a \$225 million cut in military assistance would be a more serious blow to our national security than a comparable cut in our defense budget. Do the advocates of heavy cuts want us to abandon or weaken Korea, in which we have so heavy an investment in blood and treasure? Or Formosa? Or Southeast Asia? Or Pakistan or India?

Our security is intimately involved in the political stability—hence in the economic and social progress—of many underdeveloped countries which are not immediately threatened around the rim of the Communist world. But we can't say to the Communists: "Yes, you can have the world, so long as you do not win it by military means." Yet that would be the effect of deep cuts in our economic and technical assistance programs.

There has been talk about waste in our foreign aid. Undoubtedly there has been some. I must confess that the battle against waste is real—and must never end. But you can't expect every dollar to be spent frugally in a country that is defending itself against Communist aggression—that is struggling with Communist guerrillas—or especially if it is a country with relatively few experienced administrators and technicians. And at the end of the trail, if we do not succeed, is the frightful waste of war itself.

There is talk about ingratitude. But we do not seek gratitude. We seek security for the United States, which requires that other countries be able to maintain their independence.

Experience has taught us a great deal about the effective planning and execution of foreign aid. And the program is in the hands of men who are both highly competent and mindful of the value of a dollar. The amount recommended by the President was close to rock-bottom to meet essential needs. A deep cut in the total would, it seems to me, be a reckless act

⁵*Ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1947, p. 534.

of unilateral disarmament on our part—a great victory for the Communists, one of their most important victories in many years.

‘The Consent of the Governed’

I would like to comment very simply in conclusion on two or three additional matters. About one out of every seven Americans is a veteran. This brings foreign policy into every home in the country. We have about a million men in uniform, perhaps slightly less, outside the continental United States, in every continent, carrying their share of this great struggle for freedom. Those men deserve our backing and support. And that backing and support is more than defense budgets, more than volunteer contributions to USO and Red Cross, however important those are; it includes also the resources we need to get the job done if possible without committing those men to combat. This is where foreign aid comes in.

I would also like to remind you that a simple notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed is still the most explosive political force in the world today, making itself felt in every country and regardless of political system—making itself felt behind the Iron Curtain, in the uncommitted world, and, of course, in the great free world with which we are allied. This notion is one to which we ourselves are deeply attached. It is a notion that gives us kinsmen among the ordinary men and women throughout the earth, who wish us well and who at times of crisis are not half so neutral as you might suppose, because they feel that common dedication to a notion that is as self-evident as that a human being, a child of God, simply does not want to be pushed around too much.

Now this central political idea which we share with so many others is as strong as our nuclear forces, as our economic might, and gives us allies in every country. Therefore I would urge every citizen and every organization, when considering an attitude toward any of our great public issues involving our foreign relations, to try to ask themselves a relatively simple question: Does my attitude on this subject strengthen and support and promote the great struggle of freedom, which is the motion of history for

the past several centuries? Is what I am doing helping in that struggle in the world in which we live, or does my attitude mean that I am ready to quit?

Now these are the issues which we must face today. Are we ready to stay with it at a time when we are on the forward edge of great events—when there is great change in the year ahead of us, behind the bloc, in the free world in the direction of freedom? This is a question we must ask ourselves because we dare not lose this struggle. We are not losing the struggle—and the peoples of the earth do not wish to see this struggle lost. This is not the time to quit. This is a time to stay with it, and, staying with it, we and our children can walk the earth in confidence and courage and live up to the great tradition to which the Legion itself has contributed so much.

President Urges Senate Approval of Test Ban Treaty

LETTER TO SENATE LEADERS

White House press release dated September 11

SEPTEMBER 11, 1963.

DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD AND SENATOR DIRKSEN: I am deeply appreciative of the suggestion which you made to me on Monday morning that it would be helpful to have a further clarifying statement about the policy of this Administration toward certain aspects of our nuclear weapons defenses, under the proposed test ban treaty now before the Senate. I share your view that it is desirable to dispel any fears or concerns in the minds of Senators or of the people of our country on these matters. And while I believe that fully adequate statements have been made on these matters before the various committees of the Senate by the Secretary of State,² the Secretary of D

¹ For background and text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234; for the President's message transmitting the treaty to the Senate, see *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1963, p. 316.

² For a statement by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, see *ibid.* Sept. 2, 1963, p. 350.

ense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless I am happy to accept your judgment that it would be helpful if I restated what has already been said so that there may be no misapprehension. In confidence that the Congress will share and support the policies of the Administration in this field, I am happy to give these unqualified and unequivocal assurances to the members of the Senate, to the entire Congress, and to the country:

1. Underground nuclear testing, which is permitted under the treaty, will be vigorously and diligently carried forward, and the equipment, facilities, personnel and funds necessary for that purpose will be provided. As the Senate knows, such testing is now going on. While we must all hope that at some future time a more comprehensive treaty may become possible by changes in the policies of other nations, until that time our underground testing program will continue.

2. The United States will maintain a posture of readiness to resume testing in the environments prohibited by the present treaty, and it will take all the necessary steps to safeguard our national security in the event that there could be an abrogation or violation of any treaty provision. In particular, the United States retains the right to resume atmospheric testing forthwith if the Soviet Union should conduct tests in violation of the treaty.

3. Our facilities for the detection of possible violations of this treaty will be expanded and improved as required to increase our assurance against clandestine violation by others.

4. In response to the suggestion made by President Eisenhower to the Foreign Relations Committee on August 23, 1963, and in conformity with the opinion of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, set forth in the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations,³ I am glad to emphasize again that the treaty in no way limits the authority of the Commander-in-Chief to use nuclear weapons for the defense of the United States and its allies, if a situation

should develop requiring such a grave decision. Any decision to use such weapons would be made by the United States in accordance with its Constitutional processes and would in no way be affected by the terms of the nuclear test ban treaty.

5. While the abnormal and dangerous presence of Soviet military personnel in the neighboring island of Cuba is not a matter which can be dealt with through the instrumentality of this treaty, I am able to assure the Senate that if that unhappy island should be used either directly or indirectly to circumvent or nullify this treaty, the United States will take all necessary action in response.

6. The treaty in no way changes the status of the authorities in East Germany. As the Secretary of State has made clear, "We do not recognize, and we do not intend to recognize, the Soviet occupation zone of East Germany as a state or as an entity possessing national sovereignty, or to recognize the local authorities as a government. Those authorities cannot alter these facts by the act of subscribing to the test ban treaty."⁴

7. This Government will maintain strong weapons laboratories in a vigorous program of weapons development, in order to ensure that the United States will continue to have in the future a strength fully adequate for an effective national defense. In particular, as the Secretary of Defense has made clear, we will maintain strategic forces fully ensuring that this nation will continue to be in a position to destroy any aggressor, even after absorbing a first strike by a surprise attack.

8. The United States will diligently pursue its programs for the further development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes by underground tests within the terms of the treaty, and as and when such developments make possible constructive uses of atmospheric nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the United States will seek international agreement under the treaty to permit such explosions.

I trust that these assurances may be helpful in dispelling any concern or misgivings which any member of the Senate or any citizen may

³ *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive Order 12807, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Aug. 12-27, 1963*, p. 76.

⁴ *BULLETIN* of Sept. 2, 1963, p. 350.

have as to our determination to maintain the interests and security of the United States. It is not only safe but necessary, in the interest of this country and the interest of mankind, that this treaty should now be approved, and the hope for peace which it offers firmly sustained, by the Senate of the United States.

Once more, let me express my appreciation to you both for your visit and for your suggestions.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

The Honorable MIKE MANSFIELD
The Honorable EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

NEWS CONFERENCE STATEMENT ⁵

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I want to stress again how important it is that the United States Senate approve the pending nuclear test ban treaty. It has already been signed by more than 90 governments, and it is clearer now than ever that this small step toward peace will have significant gains, and I want to commend to the American people the two distinguished and outstanding speeches by Senator Mansfield and Senator Dirksen, the majority and minority leaders, who in the great tradition of American bipartisanship and national interest I think put the case most effectively.

This treaty will enable all of us who inhabit the earth, our children and children's children, to breathe easier, free from the fear of nuclear test fallout. It will curb the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, thereby holding out hope for a more peaceful and stable world. It will slow down the nuclear arms race without impairing the adequacy of this nation's arsenal or security, and it will offer a small but important foundation on which a world of law can be built.

The Senate hearings and debate have been intensive and valuable, but they have not raised an argument in opposition which was not thor-

⁵ Made by President Kennedy at the opening of his regular news conference on Sept. 12.

oughly considered by our military, scientific, legal, and foreign policy leaders before the treaty was signed. This nation has sought to bring nuclear weapons under international control since 1946. This particular kind of treaty has been sought by us since 1959. If we are to give it now only grudging support, if this small, clearly beneficial step cannot be approved by the widest possible margin in the Senate, then the Nation cannot offer much leadership or hope for the future.

But if the American people and the American Senate can demonstrate that we are as determined to achieve a peace and a just peace as we are to defend our freedom, I think future generations will honor the action that we took.

President Discusses Viet-Nam on CBS and NBC News Programs

President Kennedy was interviewed on September 2 by Walter Cronkite of the Columbia Broadcasting System and on September 9 by David Brinkley and Chet Huntley of the National Broadcasting Company. Following are transcripts of portions of each program in which the President discussed the situation in Viet-Nam.

CBS INTERVIEW, SEPTEMBER 2

White House press release dated September 2

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, the only hot war we've got running at the moment is of course the one in Viet-Nam, and we have our difficulties there, quite obviously.

President Kennedy: I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Viet-Nam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people

support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people.

The repressions against the Buddhists, we felt, were very unwise. Now all we can do is to make it very clear that we don't think this is the way to win. It is my hope that this will become increasingly obvious to the Government, that they will take steps to try to bring back popular support for this very essential struggle.

Mr. Cronkite: Do you think this Government is time to regain the support of the people?

President Kennedy: I do. With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel, I think it can. If it doesn't make those changes, I would think that the chances of winning it would not be very good.

Mr. Cronkite: Hasn't every indication from Saigon been that President Diem has no intention of changing his pattern?

President Kennedy: If he does not change it, of course, that is his decision. He has been there 10 years, and, as I say, he has carried this burden when he has been counted out on a number of occasions.

Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that; but in the final analysis it is the people and the Government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear. But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away.

We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also are to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.

THE INTERVIEW, SEPTEMBER 9

The House press release dated September 9

Mr. Huntley: Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that

our Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it difficult to alter or shift that policy?

The President: Yes, that is true. I think in the case of South Viet-Nam we have been dealing with a Government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better. Since June, however—the difficulties with the Buddhists—we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn't been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may spread. So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the Government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the Government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time, and we must be patient, we must persist.

Mr. Huntley: Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?

The President: I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost—a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that.

Mr. Brinkley: Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called "domino theory," that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?

The President: No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it.

Mr. Brinkley: In the last 48 hours there have been a great many conflicting reports from there about what the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] was up to. Can you give us any enlightenment on it?

The President: No.

Mr. Huntley: Does the CIA tend to make its own policy? That seems to be the debate here.

The President: No, that is the frequent charge, but that isn't so. Mr. [John A.] McCone, head of the CIA, sits in the National Security Council. We have had a number of meetings in the past few days about events in South Viet-Nam. Mr. McCone participated in every one, and the CIA coordinates its efforts with the State Department and the Defense Department.

Mr. Brinkley: With so much of our prestige, money, so on, committed in South Viet-Nam, why can't we exercise a little more influence there, Mr. President?

The President: We have some influence. We have some influence, and we are attempting to carry it out. I think we don't—we can't expect these countries to do everything the way we want to do them. They have their own interest, their own personalities, their own tradition. We can't make everyone in our image, and there are a good many people who don't want to go in our image. In addition, we have ancient struggles between countries. In the case of India and Pakistan, we would like to have them settle Kashmir. That is our view of the best way to defend the subcontinent against communism. But that struggle between India and Pakistan is more important to a good many people in that area than the struggle against the Communists. We would like to have Cambodia, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but there are ancient differences there. We can't make the world over, but we can influence the world. The fact of the matter is that with the assistance of the United States and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], Southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has been maintained independent against a powerful force, the Chinese Communists. What I am concerned about is that Americans

will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.

Soviet Charge on Introduction of Aircraft Into Laos Rejected

*Department Statement*¹

This Soviet charge released by Tass September 6, that the United States has violated the Geneva Accords² by introducing aircraft into Laos illegally, is false. The Royal Government itself issued a communique August 30 branding the charge, which had already been made by the Pathet Lao faction, "pure propaganda."

The United States has provided the Government of Laos, at the request of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, six T-28 aircraft as replacements for six T-6 aircraft of the Royal Air Force which had become worn out. The T-28 aircraft are propeller-driven. This military equipment was furnished to the Royal Government in full accordance with article 1 of the Geneva Protocol.³

It is ironic that the Soviet Government, chosen to publicize, in its capacity as co-chairman of the Geneva conference, a charge made by the leader of the Pathet Lao faction. On June 20 Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma sent a message to the cochairmen specifically charging that North Vietnamese troops were present in Laos and military supplies to support Pathet Lao forces were being received from North Viet-Nam. The Soviet Union has been conspicuously silent on this matter.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Sept. 6 by Robert I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 261.

The 18th General Assembly: A Testing Ground of Hopes and Opportunities

by Richard N. Gardner

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

The 18th session of the United Nations General Assembly opens next week. It is the first assembly since the conclusion of the partial test ban agreement. Men and women around the world are looking to their representatives at the United Nations to consolidate and extend this hopeful beginning: to defrost the frozen issues of the world's agenda, to settle irritating and peace-threatening disputes, to exploit opportunities for international cooperation, and to accelerate the orderly modernization and development of the less developed areas of the world.

The United States will do its best to vindicate these hopes. It is in our national interest to sustain the momentum of the test ban agreement, to demonstrate that despite their differences all U.N. members share common interests in peace and welfare, and to increase the incentives on the Soviet leadership to pursue a policy of genuine peaceful coexistence.

This is the spirit in which we approach next week's General Assembly. But—and this is a sobering “but”—none of us really knows whether the slightly warmed atmosphere will bring us nearer to solutions of the chronic problems and whether during the next 3 months at the U.N. we will find it possible to take quantum leaps toward realistic and acceptable solutions of the big problems. This, frankly, still remains to be tested.

Moreover, we must recognize that the job of following up the test ban is largely one for

quiet diplomacy. The Assembly will probably be more important this year as a center of communication—as a place where quiet talks can take place between foreign ministers—than as an instrument where significant substantive actions are taken.

So perhaps the best way to approach next week's General Assembly is in a pragmatic mood: in the mood of political exploration.

Today I should like briefly to review with you in candid and realistic terms the issues and problems that we will face next week and for the next 3 months at the U.N. General Assembly. I believe there are opportunities, but there is no certainty that we can make great headway.

Some enthusiasts for the U.N. think of U.N. issues and of the people who handle them as somehow purer and more open to reason than hard-shell diplomats. Some people like to believe that foreign policy issues somehow are transmuted in the U.N. atmosphere, that they are purified of nationalist pressures and prejudices. If we are really to make progress on these subjects, I cannot emphasize strongly enough what should be a truism but is often overlooked: that the foreign policy “stuff” that Under Secretary Harriman and my other colleagues have just described to you is the self-same “stuff” that we deal with in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. We are not a sanitized and morally superior enclave in the Department of State that concerns itself with lifting up these issues to a more sublimated sphere. We are concerned with what contribution the international organizations, especially the U.N., can make to the achievement of the

¹Address made before a regional foreign policy conference held by the Department of State in cooperation with the World Affairs Council of Boston at Boston, Mass., on Sept. 11 (press release 465 dated Sept. 10).

purposes of our foreign policy—which I regard as uplifting enough.

The U.N., and specifically the General Assembly, is an arena of practical politics. If it were not, very few people would pay attention to it. The U.N. offers us a repertory of instrumentalities for influencing world opinion, for mediation and quiet diplomacy, for putting a “third man” into the middle of contentious issues, for helping along the orderly process of transferring political power in dependent areas, for channeling skills and resources into nations that badly need them.

The U.N. is not a substitute for the exercise of national power; it is only a new arena in which that power is exercised. It is not a substitute for national interest; it is a place where nations work together to promote their national interests on those matters where they cannot get adequate results by acting alone.

The U.N. has no mysterious power of its own that transforms issues—whether these are East-West issues or North-South issues—and what it produces is the end result of the input of its members.

If nothing else, the financial crisis in the U.N. should bring home to us the immutable fact: The U.N. machine is not self-propelling. It must be fueled by the political and financial commitments of its members.

With these sobering thoughts in mind, we can regard this forthcoming Assembly as a testing ground of hopes and opportunities. And that is how we propose to use it—honestly and realistically.

We will be testing to see whether the Soviet Union is ready to depart from previous rigid positions and commit itself to constructive courses of action which will concretely advance the settlement of problems to our mutual advantage.

We will be watching for the moments when members in arrears reach for the checkbook as well as the script of their speeches.

We will, above all, test progress by whether the Assembly concentrates on the rhetoric of ringing resolutions which try to outdo each other in defining Utopia or on the commitment of practical steps toward disarmament and decolonization and development and the enlargement of fundamental freedoms.

Now let us look at the issues and items on the agenda.

An academic friend of mine, who has been closely observing the doings of the General Assembly since its creation, recently remarked that he could not recall a single item that had ever been removed from the agenda. This is a slight exaggeration, but it is true as a general proposition that most chronic issues remain and new ones are added each year. The General Assembly has been enlarging its scope of interest and will be debating this year an amazing number and variety of subjects. Last year the General Assembly passed 124 resolutions, which ranged from an appointment to fill a vacancy on the Board of Auditors to a four-part resolution on peaceful uses of outer space. This year there are already inscribed about 100 items on the plate is not yet out of the kitchen. Let us see if we can discern some order in this collection and at the same time try to preview what United States foreign policy will face in wrestling with it.

The business of the 18th General Assembly can be analyzed in terms of seven big issues.

Disarmament and Nuclear Issues

First, this Assembly will be discussing disarmament and nuclear issues in a more promising atmosphere than has prevailed for a number of years.

Installation of the “hot line” between Washington and Moscow² and the conclusion of the partial test ban agreement³ has set the stage for a new look at old issues.

The United States will continue to seek the goal of general and complete disarmament, containing appropriate safeguards and secured international institutions capable of preserving the peace, as contained in the United States outline of a disarmament treaty.⁴ But in view of recent Soviet statements and recent discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference the focus of attention will be next steps after the partial test ban that could help to slow down the arms race and reduce the risks of war.

² For text of agreement, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1963, p. 50.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 234.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 747.

On these matters the General Assembly can serve most usefully as a forum to encourage understanding of basic issues. It can guide and endorse, but it is primarily the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference which is the workshop for negotiation.

Peacekeeping

Second, the General Assembly will inevitably be concerned with measures to improve the United Nations' peacekeeping role.

The link between disarmament and peacekeeping is obvious: The fact is that nations will never be willing to eliminate their arms until they have some substitute means of protecting their territorial integrity and vital interests.

The United States outline of a disarmament treaty recognizes the inescapable relationship between peacekeeping and disarmament when it states at the outset that the objective of the treaty is to insure that disarmament is accompanied "by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

The outline goes on to specify a number of measures for the development of the U.N.'s peacekeeping role—among them, the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the improvement of nonjudicial methods of peaceful settlement, the establishment of a U.N. peace observation corps for information and factfinding, and the buildup by the end of the disarmament process of a U.N. peace force with "sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge."

It is an unhappy fact of life that the Soviet Union has never accepted this concept of a disarmed world under law. A highly publicized difference between ourselves and the Soviets has been on the subject of inspection. But our difference on the peacekeeping role of the United Nations has been no less wide and no less fundamental.

Recently Chairman Khrushchev stated that the U.S.S.R. "passionately wishes the U.N. to . . . develop as an instrument of strengthening peace

and organizing cooperation between states." In the months ahead we will be watching to see whether these words are matched by deeds. The real long-term interests of the Soviet Union, as well as of the United States, would be served by a stronger U.N. which could help promote great-power disengagement from dangerous confrontations and prevent brush-fire conflicts from triggering a thermonuclear war.

In an age when the Soviet Union and the United States have in their arsenals weapons each of which has the destructive power of all the bombs dropped in the Second World War, in an age when no matter how many weapons one side may build neither side can escape unimaginable destruction in a nuclear holocaust, in an age when the danger of war by accident or miscalculation grows with the increasing complexity of weapons systems—in such an age there is no rational alternative for both sides but to develop a civilized system of peacekeeping under the aegis of the United Nations.

In the coming months the United States will seek support for a number of specific measures to strengthen the U.N. as a peacekeeping institution: enhancement of the political and mediatory role of the Secretary-General, appointment of conciliators in contentious cases, greater use of U.N. observers, broadened recourse to the International Court of Justice in both advisory and adversary proceedings. The Congo experience also underlines the need to improve the U.N.'s policing resources: The Secretary-General needs an enlarged and more diversified military staff, and we would hope to see more countries follow the example of the Scandinavians, who are taking steps to earmark and train national forces to be available for U.N. service on a standby basis.

The U.N. is now fielding three major peacekeeping operations—in the Congo, on the Israel-U.A.R. border and demarcation line, and in Yemen. On the first two of these the General Assembly will take action. The U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC) is scheduled to continue to the end of the year. The Government of the Congo, supported by many of its neighbors, has asked that the U.N. Force remain, perhaps in reduced numbers, for an additional 6 months or so. The problem is to find

the necessary political and financial support in the General Assembly to approve the extension of the U.N. Force and to provide for an acceptable formula of financing.

The continuation of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East will require an Assembly resolution assessing UNEF's anticipated costs for 1964, which may go as high as \$20 million. There is a general consensus that this Force, which polices the line between Israel and Egypt, is performing an effective job and that it should be retained.

The 200-man U.N. observation mission in Yemen, which is observing the disengagement agreement between the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia, has not been a matter of formal concern of the General Assembly since its costs are being met by the parties concerned. But as a major peacekeeping operation of the U.N., the success of the mission in facilitating the disengagement agreement will be watched with close attention. While the United Nations Secretary-General has reported that the progress of this operation has not been encouraging, he has also stated that both parties have expressed a willingness to cooperate in good faith with the United Nations mission and that, on the whole, they have done so. Recently, they have agreed to pay for the costs of the mission for 2 more months. Since the U.N.'s role has been limited to observing and not policing the disengagement agreement, the responsibility for a successful outcome rests squarely on the parties concerned.

The Financial Crisis

Third, the General Assembly can hardly fail to be concerned with the U.N.'s financial crisis.

The refusal of some members to pay their assessments for meeting the costs of the expensive peacekeeping operations is at the core of the difficulty. The International Court has ruled that these assessments are binding upon members as "expenses of the organization," and the General Assembly last year "accepted" this ruling by an overwhelming vote.⁵ The fourth special session of the General Assembly this past June called for collection of arrears and assessed members for the costs of the two main

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan 7, 1963, p. 30.

peacekeeping operations for the last 6 months of 1963.⁶

Nevertheless, some \$100 million in peacekeeping assessments remain to be paid. Let the members vote with their pocketbooks on what kind of U.N. they want, in the choices so dramatically defined by Dag Hammarskjöld in his last report: a static conference machinery serving solely as the instrument for discussion or as a dynamic organism with the capacity to take executive action in peacekeeping and nation building.

The United States position on this point is crystal clear. We believe the legality of these assessments has been established beyond question. We believe further that, apart from legalities, the organization cannot thrive or even operate at a satisfactory level of horsepower unless all members (and the Soviet bloc is not the only culprit in this respect) accept the obligation of collective financial responsibility. Members cannot order from the menu offered by the U.N. and turn away when the check is presented. We also believe that there is no question about the automatic application of article 19, which deprives a member more than 2 years in arrears of its vote in the General Assembly. Application of article 19 to a number of countries, including those in the Soviet bloc, comes up next year, unless payments are made on arrears, and the issue is bound to come over this year's session.

Colonial and Racial Issues

The fourth principal focus of the Assembly concern embraces colonial and racial issues although the two should be clearly distinguished.

Since the end of World War II some 50 nations have achieved their independence. For the most part, this independence has been gained without large-scale violence, and not one of these new nations has succumbed to Communist totalitarianism. The existence of the United Nations has helped fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of old colonial regimes and has assisted orderly progress toward independence and responsible self-government. While the record has been far from

⁶ *Ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 178.

perfect, it is undoubtedly a good deal better than it would have been had the United Nations never existed.

With all but 2 percent of its population now freed from Western colonial rule, the world finds itself confronted with the last "hard core" colonial problems. The drive to liquidate the remnants of dependency, particularly in Africa, animates the leaders of recently formed African states. The most proximate target is the Portuguese territories.

Just 6 weeks ago the frictions generated by this problem produced heated discussions in the Security Council and culminated in a resolution which deprecated the continued refusal of Portugal to implement previous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling for self-determination in Portugal's African territories, determined that the situation in the territories seriously disturbed the peace and security of Africa, called on Portugal to take measures to bring about self-determination "with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected," and requested all states to refrain from assisting Portugal in its repression and to prevent the sale of arms and military equipment for this purpose.⁷ If the Secretary-General is unable to report progress in the implementation of these provisions by October 31, the deadline set by the resolution, it is certain that the issue, further inflamed, will engage the attention of the General Assembly.

What is the United States view? We believe these territories are non-self-governing within the meaning of the charter. We have also come out clearly for the application of the right of self-determination to these territories and for accelerated political, economic, and social advancement of their inhabitants. We believe that the U.N. has a vital role to play in facilitating a meaningful dialog between Portugal and appropriate African leaders. Moreover, the U.S. has been following a policy of providing no arms to Portugal for use in these territories.

At the same time, the U.S. has emphasized that change in this situation must be brought about peacefully, in accordance with principles and processes defined in the charter, and that

we must relentlessly strive for a solution to this problem through the creative paths of peace, difficult though these paths may often seem.

Another intractable issue in this area, of course, is that of South African racial policies. Here the General Assembly debate is likely to be even more heated should the Secretary-General on October 30 report no progress on implementing the Security Council's resolution of last month.⁸ This resolution, which we supported, strongly deplored the policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination as being inconsistent with the principles of the charter and contrary to obligations of member states and called on all states to cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition, and all types of military vehicles to South Africa.

The United States view on this issue is clear and consistent, as Ambassador Stevenson noted in the Security Council last month. We have often affirmed our belief that *apartheid* is abhorrent and incompatible with the constitutional and moral foundations of our society. We believe this matter is of proper and legitimate concern to the U.N. We believe that the General Assembly can properly consider questions of human rights which are a member's official policy and are inconsistent with obligations of that member under articles 55 and 56 of the charter. Moreover, as we stated in the Security Council, that *apartheid* policy has led to a situation the continuation of which is likely to endanger international peace and security. At the same time, we have made repeated representation to the Government of South Africa to take steps to reconsider and revise its racial policies. We have appealed to the Government to change course and embark on a policy of national reconciliation and emancipation. We repeat the hope that the Government of South Africa will have a change of heart so that this agonizing problem can be solved through the ways of peaceful change.

Human Rights

Fifth, the General Assembly will be involved in fundamental issues of human rights.

The issues of decolonization and *apartheid* are not only political. They are better appre-

⁷ *Ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1963, p. 303.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 333.

ciated as aspects of the politicomoral realm, of those human relationships which constitute the bedrock of all free societies and which in the U.N. go under the rubric of "human rights and fundamental freedoms." These are often dismissed as marginal concerns in the nuclear age. But President Kennedy summed up the operative link between these relationships and the primary concern of the world of the charter in his American University speech last June when he asked, "And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights. . . .?"⁹

Although "human rights" is formally entered on the General Assembly agenda in just a few items, the issue of human rights may be a cardinal concern of the Assembly. It will pervade the deliberations of every committee. Our own struggle here at home to enlarge the area of freedom for all our citizens and to make emancipation real will be followed by every delegate. The charter makes the advancement of human rights one of the main purposes of the organization, and in articles 55 and 56 members specifically assume the obligation to take action to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, and religion. But beyond this, members have come to recognize that the denial of human rights tends to spill over borders and, if not remedied, to disturb international peace and security.

Quite apart from specific human rights problems, the General Assembly will have before it a proposed draft declaration on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. This declaration condemns all forms of discrimination; calls on states to revise governmental practices which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination; declares the right of every person to take part in the government of his country and to participate in elections; and declares that the U.N. and the specialized agencies should do all in their power to insure the elimination of all forms of discrimination based on race, color, or ethnic origin. We expect to support this declaration with minor modifications to make it a more appropriate international instrument.

⁹ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

The United States Government has embarked on a new policy of considering U.N. human rights conventions on their merits. The President recently submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification three U.N. conventions dealing with forced labor, practices akin to slavery, and political rights of women.¹⁰ Each of these deals with an important human right already guaranteed by our Federal Constitution and by existing Federal law. We believe their ratification can play a significant part in cultivating an international environment congenial to American interests.

The U.N. cannot replace national codes and national commitments to human rights with international codes and international pressures. Obviously only rules that are internalized in each society can evoke meaningful practices. But the U.N. can play a vital role in defining standards, in clarifying experiences, in exposing to the conscience of the world denials of those rights that should be the heritage of all human beings. The U.N. can also help the newly developing countries in building their constitutions to serve and extend human rights.

Cooperation in Outer Space

A sixth area in which we can realistically test our hopes is that of cooperation in outer space.

During the past year we can record both progress and stalemate. In bilateral talks we have agreed with the U.S.S.R. to cooperate in the coordinated launching of weather satellites, a geomagnetic survey, and space communications experiments.¹¹ Following creation of the United States Communications Satellite Corporation, we discussed with European nations the project for a global satellite communication system with broad sharing of ownership and management. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) inaugurated an international weather research and forecasting program.¹²

Contrasted with such progress in the scientific and technical field is the lean record of accomplishment by the U.N. Committee on Outer Space in the development of space law

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 320.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 9, 1963, p. 404.

¹² For background, see *ibid.*, May 13, 1963, p. 740.

The Committee has been frustrated by the "all or nothing" attitude of the Soviet Union—the insistence that agreement on such questions as liability for space accidents and assistance to astronauts must be held up pending agreement on controversial political questions. If we are indeed in a new political climate, we should now find it possible to move beyond the resolution adopted by the 16th General Assembly,¹³ which affirmed that international law applies to outer space and that outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all and not subject to national appropriation.

Economic and Technical Programs

Seventh, the Assembly will be concerned with extending the U.N.'s economic and technical programs.

We are entering the third year in that imaginative complex of technical and economic and social programs which we inspired two Assemblies ago under the name of the United Nations Development Decade. U Thant well summed up the importance of this work by characterizing it as "second only to safeguarding peace itself." Most of the energies of the U.N. and the bulk of its employees are engaged in the economic, social, and technical work of the U.N. itself and of its specialized agencies.

The General Assembly will be talking about the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development scheduled for next spring¹⁴ and about U.N. technical aid and preinvestment programs in nearly 100 countries throughout the world. Let me say a word about the promise that lies in each of these.

No new action is required by the General Assembly in preparation for the Trade and Development Conference, but the eyes of many delegates will be focused on it. The developing countries seek growing markets and improved and stable prices for their exports. We believe the U.N. can play a more effective role in helping these countries deal with the internal and external obstacles to expanding their export trade.

¹³ U.N. doc. A/RES/1721 (XVI); for text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

¹⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 173.

U.N. assistance to economic development has grown steadily. The U.N. system is spending some \$300 million a year in feeding the hungry, healing the sick, teaching the illiterate, training key personnel, and helping countries draw up rational development plans. And the U.N. financial institutions are lending over \$1 billion a year for productive development projects.

These activities of the U.N. are a useful supplement to our bilateral assistance program: They secure financial contributions from other countries and facilitate recruitment of foreign experts who may be more suited to the needs of developing countries. And in certain situations aid and advice may have a greater impact on the recipient if it comes under the auspices of the United Nations.

Yet despite impressive achievements, much remains to be done in improving the U.N. assistance programs. The combined \$150 million target set 2 years ago for the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund remains unfulfilled. OPEX—the program to supply operational and executive personnel to developing countries—badly needs to be expanded. The activities of the U.N. and specialized agencies need to be better coordinated and focused on the most urgent requirements of the developing countries. The forthcoming Assembly can make itself heard on these and other practical questions in the implementation of the Development Decade.

If these seven subjects on the Assembly's agenda which I have just previewed sound a bit mundane and workaday, if they seem to promise little drama or the kind of antics which so delighted the Sunday supplements in previous years, this is all to the good. If the U.N. has grown up to its 18th birthday, it will prove its maturity by dealing with these matters in a serious and businesslike manner.

The United States will not be displeased if the Assembly produces no juicy quotes or sensational headlines. We would rather it produced a record of accomplishment—of resolve to undertake practical disarmament measures, of the strengthening of peacekeeping operations, of commitments to financial responsibility, of peaceful change in dependent terri-

tories, of the enlargement of the frontiers of human rights and fundamental freedoms, of the launching of new legal principles for outer space, and of cooperative endeavors in aid to developing nations.

We on our part are prepared to approach the 18th General Assembly in this spirit. We do not underestimate the difficulties. But we welcome the opportunity to test man's hopes and opportunities.

The International Aviation Policy of the United States

by G. Griffith Johnson

*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

In asking me to talk to you about our international aviation policy, Mr. Wilburn [Raymond Wilburn, executive director, Bureau of Conferences and Institutions, New York University] was kind enough to give me some latitude to decide upon what particulars I should focus. As you know, we do have a more or less formal exposition of governmental aviation policy set forth in a statement by the President on April 24.² You have all read the President's statement, and I do not see any reason why I should dwell in detail on every aspect of it. With your permission, I would like this morning to devote myself, first, to the background of the policy statement and next to talk about the organization within the Federal Government for carrying out the President's policy. Then, finally, I wish to talk with you about routes, rates, and capacity.

Background of Policy Statement

From its beginnings and by its very nature, international aviation has been bound up with fundamental issues of national sovereignty and with international relationships generally. During and immediately after World War II there was established a framework of internationally accepted principles within which gov-

ernments and airlines were to operate. The Chicago Convention,³ and the Bermuda Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom,⁴ laid down a basic pattern of understandings and guidelines which for the most part still obtains.

In retrospect, we must agree that the framers of Chicago and Bermuda were gifted with unusual wisdom and foresight. The principles they established have been flexible enough to allow the international industry to expand rapidly and precise enough to permit governments to negotiate within them. Even so, no amount of human wisdom could have devised the means to reconcile all of the forces that play upon international aviation. For one thing, although the industry is worldwide, one market, the United States, is overwhelmingly important. Our large population and our relatively high income levels make it inevitable that we will provide more passengers and more cargo than any other national unit. But we are sovereign only over our own airspace. If we wish to fly elsewhere in the world, then we must get permission from other sovereign states. Typically, the other sovereigns consider that rights to enter their airspaces should be exchangeable for reciprocal rights into the United States.

Even this requirement for the exchange of rights between basically unequal trading partners might have been fully adjusted to, had the

¹ Address made before the New York University Air Transport Conference at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 10 (press release 462 dated Sept. 9).

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 20, 1963, p. 784.

³ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1591
⁴ TIAS 1507, 1640, 1714, 3338, 3675, 3719.

industry's technology stood still. In fact, however, aviation has been characterized by so dynamic a technology that it has never been possible for the adjustment processes to be worked out in full.

In large part because of rapid technological change, particularly the introduction of jets, governmental operations and policymaking in international aviation were in serious trouble in the late 1950's. By the end of the decade, our carriers were unhappy—perhaps that is an understatement—with what they considered unwise governmental actions, other governments were unhappy with us and with one another, and our own policymaking and operating agencies were unhappy with other governments and with one another. In this situation, forward movement on the governmental front was virtually impossible. Bilateral issues were piled up, negotiations were stalemated, and tempers rose, in many cases, to dangerously high levels.

Against this background, the new administration in 1961 decided we had better take a new look at international aviation. This was done with considerable care and thoroughness. A private contractor was engaged to undertake a basic study of policy issues and policy alternatives. He turned in a report of two very substantial volumes. Then an interagency committee, representing the several departments and agencies concerned with aviation policy, set out to frame recommendations for the President, using the contractor's report as a part of its background material. The steering committee was in session over a period of 7 or 8 months. Its internal deliberations were supplemented by consultations with industry and labor. After an immense amount of discussion and argumentation, it agreed on the recommendations which the President accepted and restated in his April 2, 1963, statement.

I believe that the policy statement has helped greatly to clear the air and to permit us to go forward again with governmental business in the field of international aviation. Strictly speaking, the statement does not strike out in new or revolutionary directions. It accepts the reality that international aviation will not be allowed to operate in a wholly unregulated environment, but it rejects the proposition that

we should therefore adopt a system of thoroughgoing governmental restriction and control. In fact it is fair to interpret the policy statement as falling strongly on the side of giving competitive forces freedom to operate.

After looking at the alternatives, in effect, the statement harks back to Bermuda and to Chicago and finds the policymakers of those days were in the main on the right track. It restates the basic objectives of the United States policy in terms that the negotiators at Bermuda would, I am sure, have found acceptable. That restatement is as follows: "to develop and maintain an expanding, economically and technologically efficient international air transport system best adapted to the growing needs of the Free World, and to assure air carriers of the United States a fair and equal opportunity to compete in world aviation markets so as to maintain and further develop an economically viable service network wherever a substantial need for air transportation develops."

Interagency Relationships

Let me turn now to the question of organization and interagency relationships in this area.

As you know, the President has written to Secretary of State Rusk directing him, in the President's words, "to provide . . . a focus of leadership for this vital area of foreign policy."⁵ The President's directive to the Secretary expressed his wish that the Secretary take the lead within the executive branch in identifying emerging aviation problems, in advising the President about them, in giving continuing attention to international aviation policy, and in assuring necessary followup actions.

In making clear the responsibilities of the Secretary in this field, the President made it equally clear that the Department of State would be expected to consult with and work in collaboration with the other agencies concerned. He mentioned by name the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

⁵ For text of a letter of June 22, 1963, from President Kennedy to Secretary Rusk, see BULLETIN of July 29, 1963, p. 160.

There has been established, pursuant to the President's directive, a new interagency committee on international aviation policy. Secretary Rusk has made Under Secretary Harri- man the chairman of this committee, while Najeeb Halaby of the Federal Aviation Agency serves as its vice chairman.

Within the Department we have made some organizational changes, the most important of which has been to establish the Office of International Aviation as a separate unit within the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Mr. Allen Ferguson has come in from the Rand Corporation to head the new office, and we are in the process of a modest expansion of staff.

All of these I would characterize as tidying-up and clarifying actions. The place of the Secretary of State in international aviation policy derives directly from his role as the President's chief foreign policy adviser. International aviation is a piece of our foreign relations, and the Secretary must have a close concern for it if he is to discharge his general responsibilities to the President.

At the same time, we in the Department fully recognize that international aviation affairs should not be and cannot be an exclusive foreign policy preserve. Other agencies, and in particular the Civil Aeronautics Board, are obliged by statute to participate intimately in the development and conduct of international aviation policy. Even where there are no statutory requirements, we are very much aware that other agencies have capabilities and interests that bring them into the field of international aviation policy. The task the President has laid on the Secretary of State is to lead, not to preempt. We intend to operate according to the spirit and the letter of the President's directive.

Routes, Rates, and Capacity

Let me take up now some of the substance of policy, in the way of routes, rates, and capacity.

The existing structure of air routes around the world has been built up, sometimes painfully, mainly through the negotiation of bilateral air agreements. The United States has been a leader in creating the existing route structure. On the whole we have succeeded

fairly well in establishing our own flag lines on the main traffic arteries of the world.

I am aware that our industry, or parts of the industry, have not always been enthusiastic about the route exchanges that have been negotiated. I have heard it asserted that we have bargained badly, in the first place, and, moreover, that the United States Government often has given up valuable traffic rights in order to advance other international policies. During the reexamination of our policy, this subject was given very close scrutiny. We found precious little to support the proposition that we had been outbargained or that your Government had been in the habit of giving away aviation interests to achieve other objectives.

Our conclusion was rather that American negotiators had done a reasonably satisfactory job of placing our carriers on the routes that we needed to build an adequate system of international civil air communications. Obviously, as I have already said, the United States has always bargained from a position of being the largest single source of traffic in the world. If we had insisted on absolute economic equivalence in all of our bilateral agreements, we would have had very few agreements, or routes. What we set out to get, and what we did get, is a network of rights for our flag carriers which makes it possible for an American traveler to go by air in an American-owned and -operated aircraft to most of the places in the world that he is likely to wish to visit.

Now, in any event, we have this rather fully developed system of routes. The statement of aviation policy says that we should go cautiously in expanding it. In particular, the statement warns against adding more carriers to the North Atlantic route and against proliferating the number of carriers over thin routes.

The guidance of the policy statement is unexceptionable in principle. In practice, it is easy to foresee that we are going to have a very difficult time ahead. Even though the principal route network is fairly well developed, we have some unfinished business so far as our own carriers are concerned. We also have left over, from the past, route exchanges in which rights

have been accorded but not exercised. These are commitments of the United States, and we are going to have to honor them if we are called upon to do so.

In the case-by-case operation of route policy, we are going to be faced with hard choices. In working within the policy guidelines laid down, we will not have an easy time obtaining traffic rights that American carriers would like to have and that we would like to get for them. One can predict that there are going to be instances where carriers and government negotiators are going to be pulled in one direction by our broad policy interests and in another by the immediate desires and interests of our flag lines. I hope that we can find imaginative and successful solutions to the tough cases. But I have been around long enough to expect that there will be occasions when we will have to make decisions on routes that will not please our industry.

Next for rates.

I want to say, first of all, that the Department of State does not intend to become a ratemaking agency. We do not have a statutory mandate to substitute for the CAB, nor do we have the staff or the expertise to do the Board's job. We do have an interest in rates, however, not only because they bear on the health of the industry but also because international air rates bear upon relations with other governments. I need only recall to your mind the fare dispute of last spring to make the point that the Secretary of State can come to have a lively concern indeed with the way in which fares on international air carriers are established or not established.

Now, the Department agreed with the Civil Aeronautics Board last spring that the Chandler fares⁶ were unnecessarily high. We participated with the Board in subsequent intergovernmental talks about the Chandler rate decisions. We have joined with the Board in supporting legislation that would give the CAB power to control international air rates. We believe that the legislation requested by the Administration is a necessity if your Government is to be able to operate with full effective-

ness in this area of international relations.

So far as the immediate future is concerned, we accept the Civil Aeronautics Board's judgment that lower fares, especially on the North Atlantic, are justified in the light of cost considerations and in terms of market development. It seems to us also that experiments with lower fares on the North Atlantic will move the capacity problem to a solution faster than anything else. From the point of view of our balance of payments, we would be interested in a fare structure that would contribute to an increasing flow of tourists to the United States. With the New York World's Fair just around the corner, now would be an especially apt time for designing promotional fares that would facilitate tourism into this country.

The President's policy statement deals with the rate question. It accepts the IATA mechanism as the most practical means available for developing rate proposals. But it stresses that our Government in accepting the IATA mechanism is not prepared to abdicate its responsibilities for assuring reasonable rates for the air traveler and the shipper of air cargo. We have told other governments that we interpret the President's guidance to mean that the United States Government will take an active and even an aggressive part in seeking to assure that rates are in fact reasonable.

Since our own carriers have made clear that they stand for lower international fares, there should be no difference between industry and Government on the rate issue. I take it that we both hope and wish that the decisions taken in Salzburg⁷ will be ones that the CAB can readily approve. A number of European governments have expressed approval of the philosophy of lower fares, and this is a heartening sign. If our hopes are disappointed, however, then you may be justified in expecting that your Government will be consulting urgently with other aviation powers to see what can be done about getting a more acceptable answer.

This brings me to the capacity question.

In our policy review, we looked most carefully at possible alternatives to the capacity

⁶The International Air Transport Association reached a rate agreement at Chandler, Ariz., in 1962.

⁷The International Air Transport Association Conference convened at Salzburg on Sept. 9.

guidelines laid down in the basic Bermuda Agreement. We considered at great length, also, the possibility of suggesting that legislation be submitted to the Congress to permit the Civil Aeronautics Board to regulate the capacity offerings of foreign carriers serving United States gateways. In the end, we recommended to the President that the United States should continue to base its policies on the Bermuda capacity principles. We did *not* recommend legislation to give the CAB authority control over foreign air carrier capacity.

I believe that we were right. The Bermuda rules, with all their ambiguities and all the room they leave for differing interpretations, still provide a set of principles compatible with the objective of an expanding international aviation industry. As for capacity legislation, I think that it would be a most unfortunate mistake for the United States to provide an example which could be taken to justify restrictionism by other national governments.

Much of the argument on capacity has been over the kinds of capacity being offered by international carriers. There has been a vast amount of discussion about fifth-freedom capacity and, as a further refinement, sixth-freedom capacity. Disputes over fifth- and sixth-freedom questions no doubt will continue to arise, even though the jet airplane has altered greatly the condition under which at least the sixth-freedom question came into being. At the same time, the more difficult and the more persistent capacity problem of the remaining years of the subsonic jet age is likely to involve allegations of disproportionately large capacity offerings, without regard for the freedom classification of the traffic.

It has always been our governmental policy, and it continues to be our policy, to insist that carriers should be given a maximum amount of management freedom to decide in the first instance their own capacity offerings. It has been our position that if a carrier considers that a substantial increase in its capacity will help earnings, either on a short- or long-term basis, then the carrier should be permitted to make its own decision, subject to intergovernmental review after an appropriate period of operating

experience. We have argued—and I think correctly—that added capacity tends to bring added demand and that, in any case, governments should not substitute their judgments for those of management about what traffic may be available.

It would be an exaggeration to say that our philosophy has been fully accepted around the world, even though our practice has generally been allowed. The future, however, is likely to bring more strenuous challenges to our position. There is an important body of opinion in parts of the international aviation community that favors arrangements for market sharing and for advance agreement on capacity increases. I do not expect that this point of view will disappear. Rather, I anticipate that some lively discussions will be arising from it.

So far as our policy is concerned, the President's statement gives no color of support for the division of markets or for intercarrier or intergovernmental arrangements to control capacity offerings in advance. Our writ, of course, does not run beyond our own carriers and our own bilateral agreements. If foreign carriers and foreign governments choose to experiment with market sharing beyond the arrangements already in being, we probably will normally have only an onlooker's interest. But we are not prepared to become an active participant in a system which we believe would have the effect of dampening down the very dynamic qualities that have made international civil aviation the burgeoning industry that it has become.

The Air Transport Industry and the Government

Let me close with a word about the relationships between your industry and Government.

I suppose that nobody nowadays would argue seriously that there should be no government interest in a public utility operating in an international environment. There is a constitutional requirement that the executive branch be concerned with the agreements under which our carriers conduct their business abroad. There is an obvious element of public interest in an industry in which only a limited number of carriers can be allowed to carry on the business of international air transportation.

The case for the intervention of the Government thus is perfectly clear. On the other hand, it is implicit in our system that the decisionmaking role of the Government ought to be circumscribed. Government officials need constantly to remind themselves that even industries touched heavily with a public interest have managements and stockholders who have responsibilities and interests too.

Unhappily these generalizations do not provide much guidance in particular cases. When we negotiate a bilateral air agreement, we inevitably touch on the basic concerns of the people who manage and own our carriers. Governmental decisions need to reflect these concerns as well as considerations of international policy and domestic welfare. For this, there is no substitute for close communication between industry and government.

Traditionally, our carriers have been kept well informed about the progress of the Government's business in international aviation. In our negotiations, a carrier representative has customarily been at hand to advise the Government negotiators. I see no reason for change in this respect. We are not always going to agree with one another. Probably it would not even be desirable for us to aim at constant agreement. But we do need to know pretty fully what the other party to the relationship is doing or thinking and why. I can speak for the Department of State—and I think for the whole of the executive branch—when I say that we intend for our part to keep the lines of communication with the industry open.

S. To Conduct Inspection Antarctica

Department Statement

Press release 469 dated September 13

The United States will conduct an inspection of Antarctica during the 1963-1964 austral summer season (November-March). Planning for the conduct of such an inspection has been under way for some time, and the United States has advised the other signatory powers of its intention to inspect.

The inspection is in keeping with provisions of the 12-power Antarctic Treaty, signed on December 1, 1959,¹ which was subsequently ratified by the 12 powers and entered into force on June 23, 1961. The treaty stipulates that "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only." Article VII provides for inspection "to promote the objectives and ensure the observance" of the treaty.

This inspection is not based on any anticipation that there have been treaty violations by any signatory power. Indeed, the United States believes that any inspection conducted under the treaty, whether by the U.S. or any other signatory power, will in fact reinforce the basis of mutual confidence that prevails in Antarctica. In this respect the United States has informed the other signatory powers that it will welcome inspection of its stations.

The 12 powers to the treaty are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Mr. Cleveland Discusses U.N. Affairs at NATO Session

The Department of State announced on September 9 (press release 463) that Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, would take part in special consultations of the North Atlantic Council at Paris on September 10 and 11.

Consultations will cover a wide range of United Nations matters. This NATO session is another part of the broad process through which the United States consults with other U.N. members about the agenda of the upcoming United Nations General Assembly, which opens at New York on September 17.

Mr. Cleveland will be accompanied by Elmore Jackson, Special Assistant for Policy Planning in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

¹ For background and text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 911.

Some Perspectives on the Current Debates on Aid

by Frank M. Coffin

Deputy Administrator for Operations, Agency for International Development¹

In addressing this distinguished foreign policy conference I shall not try, in 15 minutes, to say everything that should be said on the subject of aid. I recognize that all of you possess more than an ordinary interest in foreign policy, or you would not be here. I therefore view my role as that of adding some perspectives to the current debates on aid.

Perspective is perhaps most difficult to achieve when we are, as at present, in the throes of our annual decision. It is all the more difficult when such issues as the test ban treaty and civil rights claim the interest and passions of the Nation.

But it is precisely because perspective may be squeezed out of major policy determinations that it is important for groups such as this to maintain the ability to look through passing events, moods, and personalities to some underlying and dominant facts and purposes. After all, the words "look through" are the root words of "perspective."

Let us, therefore, pause to look through some of the realities of the day.

The first, and most obvious, is that aid "is in trouble" in Congress.

To say this does not require such access to inside information as to qualify one as a legislative expert. But there are one or two things which can appropriately be said to such a conference as this about the kind of trouble we face.

First, since most of us obtain most of our knowledge about the aid debates from the news-

papers, radio, or TV, it is useful to go to the primary source and look at some of the sentiments one hears expressed. The vigor of the remarks underscores the intensity of feeling about aid.

A scanning of the *Congressional Record* reveals these opinions from the Senate, which I quote exactly:

—Why should this country, which stood so firm against the nationalization of industries, now pour out money for the aid of a government which has declared itself bent upon going further into the nationalization of industries?

—We have no basic international policy, having definitely ignored the 125-year-old Monroe Doctrine . . . In its place has been substituted a hodge-podge of executive orders and gifts of large sums of money to foreign nations, founded upon no principle at all. . .

—It is the road to bankruptcy, and not a very long road at that.

—If I believed the expenditure of this amount of money would stop the spread of communism, I would support it. . . . But in the light of history, in the light of facts, how can any Senator rise on this floor and say it will stop communism . . . ?

Even stronger statements have been voiced in the House of Representatives where the following statements have been made:

—They are deliberately selling America short. . . . Our Uncle (Sam) in his flirtations has become the easy prey of foreign and domestic grafters, vampires, and gold diggers.

—In place of governing ourselves, in place of looking after our own people, we are now trying to bribe and govern the world.

—Congress is lost in the dismal swamps of foreign intrigue.

Yes, one does not have to be a prophet to say there is rough sledding ahead. Now there is one other fact you should know about these remarks.

¹ Address made before a regional foreign policy conference held by the Department of State in cooperation with the World Affairs Council of Boston at Boston, Mass., on Sept. 11.

I have quoted from the *Congressional Record*.

The remarks in the Senate were not made in 1963. They were made in 1948, during the Marshall Plan debate, by former Senators [George W.] Malone and [Chapman] Revercomb. The House quotes were taken from Congressman [William] Lemke's remarks in the 1950 debate on Point 4.

The lesson is plain. Aid has always been "in trouble" in the sense that not even the programs which today are acknowledged as overwhelming successes have escaped the hot crucible of prolonged and acrimonious debate.

The fact of controversy is dangerous only if we forget the past and assume that it is a new phenomenon, a sea change of American opinion. It is healthy to remember the arguments of the past. It is reassuring to recall how wrong they were. And it is pertinent, for the same arguments parade the parapets today. No one is a better witness to the lineage of today's arguments than your luncheon speaker, Under Secretary [W. Averell] Harriman. For he not only chaired the committee which prepared the case for the Marshall Plan, but he was its key official abroad in its critical years.

The Aid Program Today

There is another perspective to add to the current controversy. While we assume that controversy is new, when it is not, we also approach aid today as if it had not changed, when it has.

How often have we read the sage comment of a columnist that, while he agrees with the basic policy of aid, the basic problem is how it is administered. He predictably concludes that what is needed is a massive reappraisal. The last time I came across this wisdom was last week. As for Congress, it wearily assumes that it is dealing with the same program it has reviewed for 15 years.

The fact is that aid today is not what it was 10 years ago, or even 5 years ago. There is no function of government which has been so studied and reorganized. It has passed through even structural changes and no fewer than eight Presidential committees. These committees, headed by such men as Gordon Gray, Nelson Rockefeller, Clarence Randall, Benjamin Fairless, the late Eric Johnston, William

Draper, and—most recently—General [Lucius D.] Clay, have not essentially differed on the why, what, when, and how of aid. They have laid the basis for a national consensus on aid: one integrated organization with overall responsibility, development based on programs tailored to each country, emphasis on loans over grants, increased procurement of goods and services in the United States, meaningful concentration among countries, aid geared to self-help, a broader role for private enterprise, and termination of aid when countries become able to maintain their own momentum.

Here is the record. Aid is now planned and largely administered through the Agency for International Development. The reorganization of 1961 is now completed. Planning is now done on a country rather than a project-by-project basis. Loans have increased from 10 percent to 60 percent of economic aid. Loan terms, now all repayable in dollars, have hardened for a number of countries. U.S. procurement has increased from about 40 percent to over 80 percent, with aid-financed exports tripling from \$600 million in 1962 to \$2 billion in 1964. Military and supporting assistance have decreased by one-half.

As for concentration, 80 percent of economic assistance goes to 20 countries; 80 percent of military assistance goes to 10 countries. Projects and programs are increasingly tied to self-help. Investment guaranty agreements have been signed with almost 20 additional countries in the past 2 years, with guaranties themselves running at three times the rate of 2 years ago. A number of missions in the field have been consolidated with embassies. Procedures are being updated and simplified. At least half the missions have had an infusion of new executive leadership. Increasing use is being made of land-grant colleges, cooperatives, savings and loan associations. Instead of helping European countries, these same countries are now furnishing 40 percent of free-world aid.

The irony is that at the very time when the planning and execution of aid is better than ever before, the general view is that nothing has changed in 10 years. The historic fact is that U.S. aid has steadily evolved through the past decade and a half, acquiring new tools,

finishing the job in many countries, moving to new areas of concern to the United States, and developing new principles. It is now ready, given steady support from the people and the Congress, to play a major foreign policy role in the formative years of the uncommitted one-third of the globe.

Development Assistance

The timing could not have been better. Development assistance will play an even more important part in terms of our leadership, respect, and influence should there be a genuine lessening of world tensions. In this we shall not be alone. The nations of Western Europe, Canada, Japan, and Oceania have also moved into this field, almost equaling our capital aid and maintaining 14 times as many technicians abroad as we do. Their increasing participation depends on our steady support of what is becoming truly a free-world aid movement.

The field will not be uncontested. Already the Sino-Soviet bloc has over 10,000 nationals abroad in aid work in over 30 countries. Even more to the point are the new efforts and incentive of Red China, which has shown its determination to extend its influence, not only from Korea westerly to India and Pakistan but even in Africa and Latin America.

At the same time, we can point to a concrete record of achievement in every part of the world where development assistance has been made available in any substantial amount.

Politically, we can cite two kinds of achievements. Either by generating rapid economic growth from within or by resisting aggression from without, we helped to bring about the rebirth of Europe, the survival of Greece and Turkey, the emergence of a free and prosperous Japan, the rapid building of Taiwan and Israel, and continued, if contested, independence throughout the Far East. There has been a second kind of achievement, less precise but no less real. By offering, through assistance, an alternative to either the extreme right or left, we have exerted a continuing and growing influence on development. In Africa it can be seen in the rejection of reliance on Communist economic ideology by the very nations which have experimented with it. In Latin America

we can point with hope to the dramatic reduction of juntas and dictators which has taken place over the past decade. In view of the worldwide confrontation of ways of life, it is remarkable that of the 46 nations that have won their independence since World War II, not one has elected to become a bloc satellite.

The Record on Economic Development

What about economic development? There are some who would say aid should frankly be used only for short-run political purposes, because real development is a hopeless task. Let's look at the record.

Of the 41 major aid-receiving countries we have helped since 1945, these are the results:

—Fourteen—Western Europe, Japan, Spain, and Lebanon—have not only reached a satisfactory growth rate of at least 1.5 percent for 5 successive years but are no longer dependent on aid.

—Ten more have reached this record of growth, have made progress in limiting dependence on aid; and several, such as Israel, Greece, and Taiwan, will soon be independent of external aid.

—Nine more countries have attained a satisfactory growth rate but will continue to depend on substantial aid.

—Only eight cannot be said to have reached a satisfactory rate of growth. Seven of these are in Latin America, where aid in substantial amounts has only just begun.

What about social and political progress in these countries? Does aid help or hinder? In virtually all of the 24 countries in the first two groups democratic institutions have been strengthened or less democratic regimes have been liberalized.

We should not claim too much. The development of nations with free institutions, with the capacity to manage effectively, is a long and arduous process, with many unpredictable turns in the road. But it is clear that United States aid has already built a record of significant achievement.

We can look forward with satisfaction to the graduation to self-sufficiency of at least half a dozen countries. The transition from dependence on aid has started with loan terms being

such as to make the element of U.S. subsidy minimal. These same nations are already beginning to assist others.

The international coordination of aid is becoming increasingly effective through the Development Assistance Committee in Paris, the World Bank and the International Development Association, and the consortia arrangements for such countries as Pakistan, India, Greece, and Turkey.

This very moment of time, therefore, is characterized on the one hand by the evolving competence of the U.S. aid effort, the increased efforts of our allies, and a record of demonstrable achievement, while, on the other hand, we see a renewed interest in the economic arena with a release of tensions, a focusing of efforts on development by the Soviet Union and its satellites, and stepped-up probings, economic and military, by Red China.

This Year's Congressional Action

This is the backdrop against which to measure the implications of congressional action this year. If not substantially modified, the cuts already made will be tantamount to a policy of withdrawal at the very moment in history when we have so much to gain by a posture of steadiness.

Let me rehearse what has happened in Congress this year. The pattern of other years was varied this year in a significant way. After President Kennedy reviewed the findings of the Clay Committee, he voluntarily reduced his request of Congress by over \$400 million.² The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which for the past 4 years has averaged a cut of only \$200 million, made a further cut of \$438 million—*notwithstanding* the President's earlier action. At this point the aid request had been slashed four times as much as at the same stage in an average year.

The House of Representatives then proceeded to debate the bill. On Thursday, August 22, it debated and voted until late at night, having more teller votes than any aid bill has

seen in recent history. All cuts were fought off by separate votes after separate debates. On what is already being called Black Friday, a major policy was made by the simple device of adding up all of the amounts of cuts which had been defeated, except one, and making, in effect, a motion to cut it by that total figure. The motion carried, for a further cut of \$585 million. The bill had been pared by almost \$1.5 billion, or nearly 30 percent—including the President's reduction—and all this before the Appropriations Committees had acted.³ When one reflects that the average cut made over the past 4 years by the House Committee on Appropriations has been an additional \$1.1 billion, the significance of this surgery becomes apparent.

What was the policy that was made by the catchall motion to cut? Bear in mind that these were cuts that went beyond the judgment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and had been individually turned down by the House of Representatives itself.

The policy implicit in the cuts—whether recognized or not—was just as clear as if the House had said four things:

First, by bringing the authorized level for military assistance down to about 70 percent of the President's request and 75 percent of what was actually appropriated last year, the House was really saying that conventional defensive strength along the Sino-Soviet border from Greece to Korea should be diminished by as much as one-third in a number of key countries.

Second, by bringing the contingency fund down to one-half the request of \$300 million, and 60 percent of what was actually appropriated last year—the lowest since it was established as a separate fund in 1959—the House was adopting a policy of much more sharply limited Presidential flexibility to deal with the political and economic crises of a fast-changing and unpredictable world.

Third, by cutting Alliance for Progress lending authority 25 percent, to a level \$75 million below what was actually appropriated a year ago, the House signaled a curtailment of incentive at the very time when many of the Latin

² For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress on foreign aid, see *BULLETIN* of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.

³ For remarks by President Kennedy and General Clay at a news conference on Aug. 30, see *ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1963, p. 476.

American countries had readied themselves to comply with the alliance requirements of planning and self-help and when Peru and Argentina have placed themselves in a position to make dynamic progress.

Fourth, by reducing the authorization of development loans for the rest of the world by 15 percent, to \$900 million, the House was saying in effect: Fulfill our lending commitments to India, Pakistan, Turkey, Nigeria, and Tunisia, but do little or nothing more. The cut of \$160 million is equivalent to all of the loans made last year to all of Africa and the Far East.

Can it be argued that these implicit policy determinations strengthen the forces of freedom—or are we to assume that there is such a thaw in the cold war that we can unilaterally lead the way?

Is this consistent with the concern being manifested by opponents of the test ban treaty?

Does this improve or hinder our chances of seeing the developing world grow in freedom?

Does anyone think that this will reinforce the will of our allies to enlarge their efforts?

Would anyone contend that this will increase the deterrence to Communist Chinese expansionism?

If we are still concerned about Latin America, can one seriously claim that this increases our chance of success?

Obviously all of these questions are rhetorical. The answer to all is no. If this is so, what would be achieved by this set of Black Friday policies?

Will it help our balance of payments? Perhaps many voted on the assumption that it would. But new military assistance and development lending, accounting for over 90 percent of the cut, are almost completely tied to U.S. procurement. As AID Administrator David E. Bell has pointed out, the particular cuts made would have almost no effect on the balance of payments.

But U.S. exports would be reduced by almost the total amount of the cut, over half a billion dollars. Where lies the U.S. interest in this kind of action, if it strengthens us neither at home nor abroad?

The answer, I think, lies in an attitude of frustration that the countries we are helping do not do everything we would like to see them

do—and immediately. It stems from an exaggerated expectation of the power of aid, which in most cases is between 1 percent and 3 percent of a country's gross national product. Yet this is the lever which is expected to bring about overnight, in each developing country, a solution to border disputes, the abandonment of a posture of nonalignment, a full range of sophisticated monetary, fiscal, and social policies, the institution of full-fledged democracy, favorable votes in the United Nations, and a host of other equally desirable objectives.

The Basic Purpose of Foreign Aid

Just because of our frustrations, perspective is most critically needed to keep our eye on our basic purpose. Aid is a limited but important instrument of our foreign policy. It accounts for seven-tenths of 1 percent of our gross product, and one-twelfth of our budget for defense and security. It is far less, both absolutely and proportionately, than what we were willing to commit in the days of the Marshall Plan, when we were less than half as rich as we are today.

But it is an important instrument of security and freedom. In the world in which we live there are no guarantees for either. But one thing is sure. So long as we remain in the contest, so long as we are involved, there is the chance of success with which history has rewarded our perseverance in the past. Equally certain is it that when we withdraw from any area of the world, when we furl the banner of freedom and retreat, we have foreclosed the chance for victory. We have made an irreversible decision. We may save some money for the time being, but we will have paid a price.

It is this facing of alternatives that is the highest task of diplomacy today. One seldom hears it discussed by the ardent foes of aid. But there have been eloquent voices raised. Let us hear them now. They were not partisan voices. One was that of a Democrat, the other a Republican.

One voice said:

The United States—the richest and most powerful of all peoples, a nation committed to the independence of nations and to a better life for all peoples—can no more stand aside in this climactic age of decision than we can withdraw from the community of free nations.

The other voice said:

The greatest nation on earth either justifies or surrenders its leadership. We must choose. There are not blueprints to guarantee results. We are entirely surrounded by calculated risks . . . those who disagree . . . have not escaped to safety by rejecting or substituting this plan. They have simply fled to other risks, and I fear far greater ones.

The first voice was that of President Kennedy in April 1963. The second was that of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg as he closed debate on the Marshall Plan in the spring of 1948.

These statements reflect the makings of a consensus. But they are statements separated by a decade and a half. Can we, in 1963, synthesize the voice of the past with the voice of the present? Can Congress today pursue with steadiness a program which faith initiated, history has vindicated, and the times now so urgently require?

North Pacific Fishery Conference Held at Tokyo

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated September 10

Ambassador Benjamin A. Smith II will lead the delegation being sent to Japan to discuss with Japan and Canada international arrangements for the conservation and use of fishing resources in the North Pacific Ocean. The discussions, which are scheduled to begin on September 16, represent the second attempt to reach agreement on the questions raised by Japan about the restrictions upon its rights under an existing convention relating to fishing in the North Pacific.¹ The first attempt was made last June.² The abstention principle, which calls for the fishing restrictions when certain criteria occur,

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2786, 14992.

² BULLETIN of June 10, 1963, p. 914.

will be the central issue in the new discussions. I believe this principle is sound and reasonable. Without restraints of this nature the nations of the world would run serious risks of depleting fisheries. We have already seen Atlantic halibut fisheries decline from 13,500,000 pounds to 300,000 pounds. In Bristol Bay, the record catch of 24.7 million salmon in 1938 has fallen to a level of 2.8 million. On the other hand, research and careful regulation have restored depleted Pacific halibut fisheries from a low of 40 million pounds in 1923 to an annual average of 70 million pounds.

It is obvious that unless international conservation agreements are strictly enforced there is grave danger of permanent injury to our ocean resources. I hope that it is possible to implement Senate Resolution 392, which called for an international fishery conference so that such damage can be avoided.

In dealing with the North Pacific fisheries problems we shall be mindful of our responsibility for the preservation of vital fishing resources. When the convention criteria called for the removal of Bering Sea halibut from abstention, this was done despite the disadvantage to American fishermen.³ We shall hope for the same understanding from other nations—to retain the abstention principle when appropriate—for only in this way will it be possible to reach agreement in the common world interest.

William Matson Roth Confirmed Deputy for Trade Negotiations

The Senate on September 9 confirmed the nomination of William Matson Roth to be a Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador. For biographic details, see White House press release dated July 30.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 15, 1963, p. 574.

Soviet Union Vetoes U.S.-U.K. Resolution in Security Council on Israel and Syrian Complaints

Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representatives Adlai E. Stevenson and Charles W. Yost, together with the text of a draft resolution sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom.

STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, AUGUST 28

U.S./U.N. press release 4237

The first order of business for us today is to consider Israel's complaint¹ regarding the wanton murder of two of its citizens. The picture of two innocent farmers, murdered in cold blood by a raiding party which struck them down at work in their own fields, must distress us all.

We can sympathize with the sense of outrage felt by the people of Israel, especially since this slaughter follows so close upon the Syrian abduction of three Israeli subjects, including two young girls, who were boating on Lake Tiberias. The United States deeply deplores these incidents.

The evidence cited in the report of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization² is admittedly circumstantial, but its implications are clear enough. The testimony of the survivor of the attack who saw the uniformed men shooting down his companions; the tracks which the United Nations officials found leading to the scene of the crime and continuing in the direction of Syria; the spent bullets, cartridge cases,

and grenade fragments found in the vicinity of the attack; and the departure afterward in the same direction, all add up to a clear picture which permits objective observers to draw the same conclusions about the origin of the attack.

Also we have before us a Syrian countercomplaint³ about incidents of August 19, 1963, which the U.N. investigation has not corroborated.

As the Security Council is well aware, these incidents are the latest in a long history of unrest and bloodshed on these frontiers.

Difficulties on the Syrian-Israeli frontiers have broken out periodically ever since the signing of the General Armistice Agreement back in 1948. Indeed this Council has devoted nearly 200 sessions—one-fifth of all its meetings—to this subject. The nature of the alleged violations of the agreement varies somewhat from time to time, but the fundamental cause of the difficulties remains the same; it springs from the failure of the two parties to live in peaceful—if armed—truce in accordance with the armistice agreement. This failure is at the cost—now as in the past—of human lives lost and continuing threats to peace. Although we find ourselves back in session again on the same general issue, I would like to emphasize that the United States does not consider either past or present efforts of this Council to be vain. Above all, we wish to state that we consider any other remedy for these difficulties than resort to the United Nations to be dangerous to peace and intolerable to the international community.

¹ U.N. docs. S/5394 and S/5396.

² U.N. docs. S/5401 and Adds. 1-4.

³ U.N. doc. S/5395.

In the present connection we believe there are some hopeful signs. During the debate in the Security Council on the Tiberias incident in the spring of 1962,⁴ the United States representative stressed repeatedly the necessity for shunning direct unilateral action in the face of provocation and for appealing to this body to cope with threats to the peace. We are gratified to note that these new complaints have been brought to the Security Council. Of course, we also continue to believe that fuller recourse should be had to United Nations machinery provided locally for dealing with such complaints.

Now that the Council has been summoned to act, it must accept its responsibilities and act with courage and wisdom in the light of the best evidence available to it. For us the course which this body should follow is clear. In all justice and in the interests of law and order in international affairs, we believe this reprehensible act of murder on August 19 deserves the strongest condemnation. Only then can it be made clear that outrages of this kind cannot pass without the stern disapproval of the international community.

In our consideration of this case we are fortunate to have before us the report submitted by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. We all here owe a debt of gratitude to the new Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Lieutenant General Odd Bull, and to other United Nations officials, for the excellent work they are doing in this area. General Bull's skill and tact in obtaining the agreement of both parties to observe a cease-fire and to permit visits by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to both the demilitarized zone and defensive areas are highly commendable.

This brings me to what we regard as the heart of the troubles which have erupted so often on the Israel-Syrian frontier. It is evident that, largely as a result of the conflicting interests of the two parties and the varying interpretations which they have chosen to place upon the

meaning of the General Armistice Agreement, the United Nations peacekeeping machinery is unable to function as effectively as was originally intended and expected. This problem came to the attention of the Security Council during its meetings on this subject in April of 1962, and you will recall that the resolution of April 9, 1962,⁵ endorsed the measures recommended by the then Chief of Staff for the strengthening of the Truce Supervision Organization in its tasks of maintaining and restoring the peace and detecting and deterring future incidents and called upon the Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist the Chief of Staff in their early implementation. Unfortunately no notable progress resulted from that section of the resolution.

We now have before us some recommendations which General Bull has in mind for the strengthening of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization machinery. These recommendations have been proposed by General Bull in the light of his 3 months' study of the problem. We believe the proposals are wise ones and have been advanced in full appreciation of the special points of view of the two sides. We believe that one element in his proposals is absolutely vital. Without it none of the others is likely to be very meaningful. I refer to paragraph 41 in the report. In it General Bull calls for the parties to "comply fully with the order contained in the Security Council resolution of 11 August 1949 to observe an unconditional cease-fire and should also abstain from any acts of hostility as provided in the General Armistice Agreement." General Bull adds (and we fully endorse his statement): "I cannot therefore subscribe to any policy by the parties based on the use of force, nor can I condone any firing for whatever purpose across the Armistice Demarcation Line."

We believe details of the plan for strengthening the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization should be worked out by the Chief of Staff in consultation with the Governments of Israel and Syria. What is vital is the full and willing cooperation, without reservation, of the two sides with the Chief of Staff in what he

⁴ BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1962, p. 735.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 737.

is trying to accomplish. He will be able to strengthen the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization only if the two sides are willing to cooperate with him in his efforts. Ultimately the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization can only be as useful as the two sides want it to be.

Our belief is that the United Nations peacekeeping organization, strengthened by such measures as the Chief of Staff proposes, could prevent many of the kinds of incidents which both sides in this controversy are complaining about to the Security Council today. And if these incidents can be avoided, surely the tension which has gripped the frontiers of Syria and Israel can be relaxed and the danger of raids and retaliation significantly reduced. This would be in the interests of both Israel and Syria and in the interests of peace in the Near East.

We do not believe that anybody can lightly refuse to extend his full cooperation. The peace and well-being of the people of the area depend too much upon it. The judgment of the United Nations and the world community is based upon it. In the interests of all we bespeak that cooperation vital to the success of our efforts here today in behalf of international peace.

STATEMENT BY MR. YOST, SEPTEMBER 3

U.S./U.N. press release 4239

I have asked for the floor to explain briefly the United States position on the amendments submitted by the distinguished delegate of Morocco [Dey Ould Sidi Baba] contained in document S/5410 to the resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and my own delegation. We understand the spirit which has prompted the Moroccan delegation in putting forward these amendments, and we have given the most careful consideration to them. However, our conclusion is that we cannot support them.

The first two amendments in our view significantly change the meaning and the balance of our resolution. We consider that they fail to take into account the evidence surrounding the incident at Almagor as presented to the

Council in the Secretary-General's report, and by this omission, if adopted, would cause the resolution to fail to deal with the first complaint which the Council is meeting to consider.

The distinguished representative of Morocco has given us today a rather detailed interpretation of the events at Almagor. Frankly, we have not felt justified in engaging in an interpretation of these events but have felt it wise for the Council simply to limit itself to the facts as set forth in the Secretary-General's report. That is what we have attempted to do in paragraphs 1 and 2 of our resolution. The proposed revisions of these paragraphs would, in our opinion, simply leave this whole incident pending in the air. We do not believe, therefore, that these amendments would be compatible with our resolution.

We cannot support the third amendment suggested by the representative from Morocco. My delegation certainly regrets any infringement of the General Armistice Agreement, but we believe the more useful and significant action for the Council to take in this connection is, as proposed in paragraph 3 of the United Kingdom and United States draft, to note that, while there was an exchange of fire on August 20, there was not a substantial and menacing show of force in the demilitarized zone as had been claimed.

With regard to the fourth amendment proposed, the United States had repeatedly expressed its regret that the Armistice Commission has not functioned as envisaged in the General Armistice Agreement. However, in this case, the Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization proposed a number of measures which, in his estimation, could lead to the alleviation of tension and restoration of tranquillity in the area. We do believe it important for the Security Council to support the Chief of Staff in his efforts, but we would not consider it helpful to him if the Council were to single out for special emphasis only one aspect of his suggestions—suggestions which he made as a whole to the parties concerned and which depend for implementation on the parties concerned. We believe the most effective approach for the Council is to support the need

or measures such as those proposed by the Chief of Staff, to call upon the parties to co-operate with the Chief of Staff, but at the same time to allow him full discretion in his consultations with the parties concerned. This we feel is the better way to achieve progress rather than attempting to prejudge which issue or issues should receive the most or the first attention.

For these reasons, Mr. President, the United States will abstain on the amendments submitted in document S/5410.⁶

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION ⁷

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic,

Taking into consideration the report of the Secretary-General dated 24 August 1963,

1. *Condemns* the wanton murder at Almagor in Israel territory of two Israel citizens on 19 August 1963;

2. *Calls* the attention of the Syrian Arab Republic to evidence in the Secretary-General's report to the effect that those responsible for the killings appear to have been an armed group who entered Israel territory from the direction of the Jordan River and afterwards continued in the same direction;

3. *Notes* with satisfaction that the report of the Secretary-General indicates that, although there was an exchange of fire, there was no substantial show of force in the demilitarized zone on 20 August 1963;

4. *Appeals* to the parties to co-operate in the early exchange of prisoners in accordance with the suggestion contained in paragraph 49 of the Secretary-General's report;

5. *Notes* from the report of the Secretary-General that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization has proposed to the parties concerned certain measures to alleviate tension and restore tranquillity in the area;

6. *Calls upon* the parties to offer to the Chief of Staff all possible co-operation in the pursuit of this end in conformity with the General Armistice Agreement;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council by 31 December 1963 on the progress made in regard to the measures proposed by the Chief of Staff.

⁶ The Moroccan amendments were defeated on Sept. 3 by a vote of 2 to 0, with 9 abstentions.

⁷ U.N. doc. S/5407; not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council. The vote on Sept. 3 was 8 to 2 (Morocco, U.S.S.R.), with 1 abstention (Venezuela).

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Telegram dated August 21, 1963, from the Secretary General of the Organization of American States addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General concerning OAS action taken with regard to Haiti situation. S/5398. August 21, 1963. 1 p.; letter dated August 16, 1963, from the Secretary General of the OAS addressed to the Secretary-General of the U.N. transmitting a copy of the resolution approved by the OAS in connection with situation between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, S/5399, August 23, 1963, 2 pp.

Syria-Israel dispute:

Letter dated August 20, 1963, from the acting permanent representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/5394. August 21, 1963. 2 pp.

Letter dated August 21, 1963, from the permanent representative of Syria addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/5395. August 21, 1963. 1 p.

Letter dated August 21, 1963, from the permanent representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/5396. August 22, 1963. 6 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General concerning recent incidents in and near the demilitarized zone created by article V, paragraph 5, of the Israel-Syria armistice agreement, S/5401, August 24, 1963, 47 pp.; Add. 1 and Corr. 1, August 26, 1963, 11 pp.; Add. 2, August 26, 1963, 13 pp.; Add. 3, August 27, 1963, 12 pp.; Add. 4, August 27, 1963, 4 pp.

General Assembly

Letters dated July 29 and 30, 1963, from the alternative representative of Mexico addressed to the Secretary-General regarding Mexico's intention to sign the limited nuclear test ban treaty. A/5469. July 31, 1963. 2 pp.

Comments received from governments regarding consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. A/5470, August 7, 1963, 47 pp., and Add. 1, September 6, 1963, 5 pp.

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Letter dated August 2, 1963, from the representative of Guinea addressed to the Secretary-General, A/5472, August 2, 1963, 2 pp.; letter dated July 25, 1963, from the representative of Mali addressed to the Secretary-General, A/5474, August 8, 1963, 2 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance. A/5473. August 9, 1963. 77 pp.

Note verbale dated August 7, 1963, from the permanent mission of Bulgaria addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the limited nuclear test ban treaty. A/5475. August 9, 1963. 4 pp.

Note verbale dated August 5, 1963, from the representatives of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Republic addressed to the Secretary-General concern-

ing cessation of nuclear weapon tests. A/5476. August 12, 1963. 5 pp.

Economic and Social Council

United Nations conference on trade and development. Report of the group of experts, E/3756, June 27, 1963, 107 pp.; report of the preparatory committee on its second session, E/3799, July 5, 1963, 131 pp., and Corr. 1, July 11, 1963, 5 pp.; statement of financial implications submitted by the Secretary-General, E/3818, July 17, 1963, 14 pp.

Report of the Commission on Human Rights. E/3806. July 8, 1963. 10 pp.

Communication from the head of the Soviet delegation addressed to the President of the Economic and Social Council requesting inclusion in the agenda of the 36th session an item entitled "The policy of genocide which is being pursued by the Government of the Republic of Iraq against the Kurdish people." E/3809. July 9, 1963. 5 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1963.

Notifications received of undertaking to seek ratification or acceptance: Congo (Léopoldville), Costa Rica, July 25, 1963; Federal Republic of Germany, July 19, 1963; Haiti, July 25, 1963; Spain, July 9, 1963; Switzerland, July 25, 1963; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, July 26, 1963.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Peru, July 16, 1963.

Cultural

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.¹

Acceptance deposited: Ivory Coast, July 19, 1963.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signatures: Gabon, Mauritania, September 10, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signatures: Gabon, Mauritania, September 10, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.²

Signatures affixed at Washington: Gabon, September 10, 1963; Austria, Sierra Leone, September 11, 1963; Mauritania, September 13, 1963.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London April 11, 1962.²

Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, August 28, 1963.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.

Extension to: Swaziland, July 12, 1963.

Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force October 14, 1962.

Signature: Yugoslavia (subject to ratification), August 6, 1963.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force April 27, 1963.¹

Signatures: Austria (subject to ratification), June 20, 1963; Brazil, July 8, 1963; Tanganyika, July 1, 1963; United Arab Republic, June 24, 1963.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

Accessions deposited: Brazil, September 6, 1963; Guatemala, August 29, 1963; Iceland, September 10, 1963.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 15, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5061 and 5333). Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro August 22, 1963. Entered into force August 22, 1963.

India

Agreement relating to the exemption of United States military aircraft from landing and housing fees. Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi March 5 and July 22, 1963. Entered into force July 22, 1963.

Iraq

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Baghdad August 27, 1963. Entered into force August 27, 1963.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on September 9 confirmed the following nominations:

Henry A. Byroade to be Ambassador to the Union of Burma. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 470 dated September 13.)

William O. Hall to be Assistant Administrator for Administration, Agency for International Development. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated August 20.)

Graham A. Martin to be Ambassador to Thailand. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 477 dated September 17.)

Gen. Herbert B. Powell, U.S. Army, retired, to be Ambassador to New Zealand. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 466 dated September 11.)

Foreign Service Selection Boards Meet

The Department of State announced on September 5 (press release 468) that the 1963 Foreign Service Officer Selection Boards had convened on that day to consider promotions for Foreign Service officer and Foreign Service Reserve officer personnel.

Some 4,000 officers whose performance files will be reviewed staff the more than 300 embassies, legations, and consulates located in over a hundred countries with whom the United States conducts foreign relations. In addition these officers serve in Washington and at the Department of State and other executive agencies, including AID, ACDA, Commerce, Defense, Labor, Treasury, and USIA.

The Boards are expected to complete their review within 2 months.

Members of the eight Selection Boards include Foreign Service officers, public members drawn from private life, and members and observers from other executive agencies which have significant foreign affairs interests.

In recognition of the purpose and importance of the selection system the Department has called on a number of ambassadors to serve on the Boards. Among the Boards' chairmen are John O. Bell, Ambassador to Guatemala; Wymberley DeR. Coerr, Ambassador to Uruguay; Thomas S. Estes, Ambassador to the Republic of Upper Volta; Raymond A. Hare, Ambassador to Turkey; Robinson McIlvaine, Ambassador to Denmark; Murat W. Williams, Ambassador to El Salva-

dor; Bernard A. Gufler, former Ambassador to Finland; and Thomas W. McElhiney, Deputy Chief of Mission, Khartoum.

Also serving on the Boards are David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Philip M. Kaiser, Ambassador to Senegal and Mauritania; Phillip Bonsal, former Ambassador to Morocco; and Elbert G. Mathews, Director of the Office of Inter-African Affairs and former Ambassador to Liberia.

The public members are Charles N. Hall, industrial engineer, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO; William Figy, insurance executive, Denver, Colo.; Jerome Keithley, City Manager of Palo Alto, Calif.; Russell M. Stephens, president, American Federation of Technical Engineers; and Harold F. Wendell, department store executive, Portland, Ore.

Voting members from other executive agencies are Oliver Bongard, director, Exhibits Participation Division, Department of Commerce; G. Huntington Damon, public affairs officer, USIA, Seoul, Korea; George Day, foreign agricultural marketing specialist, Department of Agriculture; Kenneth Douty, European area specialist, Labor Department; and Harold Heck, director, International Trade Analysis Division, Department of Commerce.

Observers serving on the Boards are Herbert J. Cummings, director, Performance Evaluation Division, Department of Commerce; Edwin H. Bryant, Consultant to the director, Office of Commercial Services, Department of Commerce; Lowell B. Kilgore, business analyst, Department of Commerce; William R. Hayden, chief, Program and Facilities Evaluation Section, Department of Commerce; Edward Sylvester, deputy bureau administrator, Department of Labor; James D. Hoover, Far Eastern area specialist, Department of Labor; Patrick S. Cooney, chief, Overseas Service Branch, Department of Labor; and Mary Cannon, international relations officer, Department of Labor.

Department Sets Up Office for Special Representational Services

The Department of State announced on September 5 (press release 457) the establishment of the Office for Special Representational Services and the abolition of the Special Protocol Services Section. The new office, directed by Pedro A. Sanjuan, will perform virtually the same functions formerly discharged by the abolished section—also headed by Mr. Sanjuan. In the organizational change, the new office will report directly to William J. Crockett, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

The change reflects the Department's need to provide many special services to the Washington diplomatic community, which has expanded rapidly during the past few years. A new responsibility given the new office is the development of guidelines on civil rights for use in the Department and at overseas posts.

Other responsibilities of the Office of Special Representational Services will include:

- providing assistance to diplomatic missions in Washington regarding such matters as orientation in the United States, housing and schooling, and travel;
- handling matters relating to the establishment, expansion, or relocation of diplomatic missions in Washington, including questions of zoning;
- handling complaints and incidents involving foreign government representatives, whether received directly or referred by the Office of Protocol or regional bureaus, including those which might result from racial discrimination;
- helping coordinate arrangements for travel for foreign dignitaries and for foreign visitors who come to the United States under Federal sponsorship.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.

Health and Sanitation—Cooperative Program. Agreement with El Salvador, extending the Program Agreement of February 29, 1944, as extended and supplemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador June 17 and 27, 1960. Entered into force June 27, 1960. TIAS 5315. 3 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Israel relating to the agreement of August 7 and 8, 1952, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem February 5 and 20, 1963. Entered into force February 20, 1963. TIAS 5316. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India amending the agreement of November 26, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi April 1, 1963. Entered into force April 1, 1963. TIAS 5317. 2 pp. 5¢.

Claims—Settlement of Certain Claims Against Members of United States Armed Forces (Including Dependents) Insured by Brandaris Insurance Company in Germany. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of letters—Signed at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn February 28 and March 14, 1963. Entered into force March 14, 1963. TIAS 5318. 5 pp. 5¢.

Naval Matters—Furnishing of Certain Supplies and Services to Naval Vessels. Agreement with Australia, amending the agreement of December 19 and 31, 1956. Exchange of notes—Signed at Canberra March 28, 1963. Entered into force March 28, 1963. TIAS 5319. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia, amending the agreement of February 12, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz March 29, 1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963. TIAS 5320. 3 pp. 5¢.

Education—Educational Foundation and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with the Philippines Signed at Manila March 23, 1963. Entered into force March 23, 1963. TIAS 5321. 6 pp. 5¢.

Trade. Agreement with Paraguay, postponing the termination of the agreement of September 12, 1946, as postponed and brought up to date. Exchange of notes—Signed at Asunción February 27 and March 29, 1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963. TIAS 5322. 3 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 9-15

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to September 9 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 457 of September 5.

No.	Date	Subject
*453	9/9	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*459	9/9	Delegation to U.N. General Assembly (biographic details).
460	9/9	Cleveland: "The Uses of Diversity" (revised); see BULLETIN of Sept. 23.
†461	9/9	Deadline for claims under Austrian persecutee fund.
462	9/9	G. Griffith Johnson: "The International Aviation Policy of the United States."
463	9/9	Cleveland participating in NATO consultations (rewrite).
464	9/10	Rusk: "Unfinished Business" (as-delivered text).
465	9/10	Gardner: "The 18th General Assembly: A Testing Ground of Hopes and Opportunities."
*466	9/11	Powell sworn in as Ambassador to New Zealand (biographic details).
*467	9/11	Harriman: regional foreign policy conference, Boston (excerpts).
468	9/11	Foreign Service Officer Selection Boards (rewrite).
469	9/13	Decision to conduct Antarctica inspection.
*470	9/13	Byroade sworn in as Ambassador to Burma (biographic details).
†471	9/14	G. Griffith Johnson: "The Climate of World Trade and United States-Canadian Trade Relations."
†472	9/14	Cleveland: "The 18th General Assembly: Fair and a Little Warmer, With Scattered Thunderstorms."

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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In this new leaflet, released August 1963, the following subjects are briefly discussed:

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Keeping the Peace
Increasing World Food Supplies
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Decade of Development
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Toward a World of Law

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN



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New Opportunities in the Search for Peace

*Address by President Kennedy*¹

Mr. President—as one who has taken some interest in the election of Presidents, I want to congratulate you on your election to this high office²—Mr. Secretary-General, delegates to the United Nations, ladies and gentlemen:

We meet again in the quest for peace.

Twenty-four months ago, when I last had the honor of addressing this body, the shadow of fear lay darkly across the world. The freedom of West Berlin was in immediate peril. Agreement on a neutral Laos seemed remote. The mandate of the United Nations in the Congo was under fire. The financial outlook for this organization was in doubt. Dag Hammarskjöld was dead. The doctrine of *troika* was being pressed in his place, and atmospheric nuclear tests had been resumed by the Soviet Union.

¹ Made before the 18th session of the U.N. General Assembly at the United Nations, N.Y., on Sept. 20 (White House press release (New York, N.Y.); as-delivered text).

² Carlos Sosa Rodriguez, of Venezuela, was elected President of the 18th session on Sept. 17.

Those were anxious days for mankind, and some men wondered aloud whether this organization could survive. But the 16th and 17th General Assemblies achieved not only survival but progress. Rising to its responsibility, the United Nations helped reduce the tensions and helped to hold back the darkness.

Today the clouds have lifted a little so that new rays of hope can break through. The pressures on West Berlin appear to be temporarily eased. Political unity in the Congo has been largely restored. A neutral coalition in Laos, while still in difficulty, is at least in being. The integrity of the United Nations Secretariat has been reaffirmed. A United Nations Decade of Development is under way. And, for the first time in 17 years of effort, a specific step has been taken to limit the nuclear arms race.

I refer, of course, to the treaty to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, concluded by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States and already signed by nearly 100 countries. It has

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1267 PUBLICATION 7603 OCTOBER 7, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$8.50; foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

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been hailed by people the world over who are thankful to be free from the fears of nuclear fallout, and I am confident that on next Tuesday at 10:30 o'clock in the morning it will receive the overwhelming endorsement of the Senate of the United States.

The world has not escaped from the darkness. The long shadows of conflict and crisis envelop us still. But we meet today in an atmosphere of rising hope and at a moment of comparative calm. My presence here today is not a sign of crisis, but of confidence. I am not here to report on a new threat to the peace or new signs of war. I have come to salute the United Nations and to show the support of the American people for your daily deliberations.

For the value of this body's work is not dependent on the existence of emergencies—nor on the winning of peace consist only of dramatic victories. Peace is a daily, a weekly, a monthly process, gradually changing opinions, slowly eroding old barriers, quietly building new structures. And however undramatic the pursuit of peace, that pursuit must go on.

Today we may have reached a pause in the cold war, but that is not a lasting peace. A test treaty is a milestone, but it is not the millennium. We have not been released from our obligations; we have been given an opportunity. And if we fail to make the most of this moment and this momentum, if we convert our new-found hopes and understandings into new walls and weapons of hostility, if this pause in the cold war merely leads to its renewal and not to its end, then the indictment of posterity will rightly point its finger at us all. But if we stretch this pause into a period of cooperation, if both sides can now gain new confidence and experience in concrete collaborations for peace, if we can now be as bold and farsighted in the control of deadly weapons as we have been in their creation, then surely this first small step can be the start of a long and fruitful journey.

Peace, an Undertaking for All Nations

The task of building the peace lies with the leaders of every nation, large and small. For the great powers have no monopoly on conflict or ambition. The cold war is not the only ex-

pression of tension in this world, and the nuclear race is not the only arms race. Even little wars are dangerous in a nuclear world. The long labor of peace is an undertaking for every nation, and in this effort none of us can remain unaligned. To this goal none can be uncommitted.

The reduction of global tension must not be an excuse for the narrow pursuit of self-interest. If the Soviet Union and the United States, with all of their global interests and clashing commitments of ideology, and with nuclear weapons still aimed at each other, today can find areas of common interest and agreement, then surely other nations can do the same—nations caught in regional conflicts, in racial issues, or in the death throes of old colonialism.

Chronic disputes which divert precious resources from the needs of the people or drain the energies of both sides serve the interests of no one, and the badge of responsibility in the modern world is a willingness to seek peaceful solutions.

It is never too early to try, and it's never too late to talk; and it's high time that many disputes on the agenda of this Assembly were taken off the debating schedule and placed on the negotiating table.

Basic Differences Between U.S. and U.S.S.R.

The fact remains that the United States, as a major nuclear power, does have a special responsibility in the world. It is, in fact, a three-fold responsibility—a responsibility to our own citizens, a responsibility to the people of the whole world who are affected by our decisions, and to the next generation of humanity. We believe the Soviet Union also has these special responsibilities and that those responsibilities require our two nations to concentrate less on our differences and more on the means of resolving them peacefully. For too long both of us have increased our military budgets, our nuclear stockpiles, and our capacity to destroy all life on this hemisphere—human, animal, vegetable—without any corresponding increase in our security.

Our conflicts, to be sure, are real. Our concepts of the world are different. No service is performed by failing to make clear our dis-

agreements. A central difference is the belief of the American people in self-determination for all people.

We believe that the people of Germany and Berlin must be free to reunite their capital and their country.

We believe that the people of Cuba must be free to secure the fruits of the revolution that has been betrayed from within and exploited from without.

In short, we believe that all the world—in eastern Europe as well as western, in southern Africa as well as northern, in old nations as well as new—that people must be free to choose their own future, without discrimination or dictation, without coercion or subversion.

These are the basic differences between the Soviet Union and the United States, and they cannot be concealed. So long as they exist, they set limits to agreement and they forbid the relaxation of our vigilance. Our defense around the world will be maintained for the protection of freedom, and our determination to safeguard that freedom will measure up to any threat or challenge.

But I would say to the leaders of the Soviet Union, and to their people, that if either of our countries is to be fully secure, we need a much better weapon than the H-bomb—a weapon better than ballistic missiles or nuclear submarines—and that better weapon is peaceful cooperation.

We have, in recent years, agreed on a limited test ban treaty, on an emergency communications link between our capitals, on a statement of principles for disarmament, on an increase in cultural exchange, on cooperation in outer space, on the peaceful exploration of the Antarctic, and on tempering last year's crisis over Cuba.

New Steps Toward Peaceful Cooperation

I believe, therefore, that the Soviet Union and the United States, together with their allies, can achieve further agreements—agreements which spring from our mutual interest in avoiding mutual destruction.

There can be no doubt about the agenda of further steps. We must continue to seek agreements on measures which prevent war by acci-

dent or miscalculation. We must continue to seek agreement on safeguards against surprise attack, including observation posts at key points. We must continue to seek agreement on further measures to curb the nuclear arms race, by controlling the transfer of nuclear weapons, converting fissionable materials to peaceful purposes, and banning underground testing, with adequate inspection and enforcement. We must continue to seek agreement on a freer flow of information and people from East to West and West to East.

We must continue to seek agreement, encouraged by yesterday's affirmative response to this proposal by the Soviet Foreign Minister, on an arrangement to keep weapons of mass destruction out of outer space. Let us get our negotiators back to the negotiating table to work out a practicable arrangement to this end.

In these and other ways, let us move up the steep and difficult path toward comprehensive disarmament, securing mutual confidence through mutual verification and building the institutions of peace as we dismantle the engines of war. We must not let failure to agree on all points delay agreements where agreement is possible. And we must not put forward proposals for propaganda purposes.

Finally, in a field where the United States and the Soviet Union have a special capacity—in the field of space—there is room for new cooperation, for further joint efforts in the regulation and exploration of space. I include among these possibilities a joint expedition to the moon. Space offers no problems of sovereignty; by resolution of this Assembly,³ the members of the United Nations have forsworn any claim to territorial rights in outer space or on celestial bodies and declared that international law and the United Nations Charter will apply. Will it therefore, should man's first flight to the moon be a matter of national competition? Will should the United States and the Soviet Union in preparing for such expeditions, become involved in immense duplications of research, construction, and expenditure? Surely we should explore whether the scientists and astronauts of our two countries—indeed, of all the world—cannot work together in the conquest

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

of space, sending some day in this decade to the moon not the representatives of a single nation but the representatives of all of our countries.

All these and other new steps toward peaceful cooperation may be possible. Most of them will require on our part full consultation with our allies, for their interests are as much involved as our own and we will not make an agreement at their expense. Most of them will require long and careful negotiation. And most of them will require a new approach to the cold war—a desire not to “bury” one’s adversary but to compete in a host of peaceful arenas, in ideas, in production, and ultimately in service to all mankind.

The contest will continue—the contest between those who see a monolithic world and those who believe in diversity—but it should be a contest in leadership and responsibility instead of destruction, a contest in achievement instead of intimidation. Speaking for the United States of America, I welcome such a contest. For we believe that truth is stronger than error and that freedom is more enduring than coercion. And in the contest for a better life, all the world can be a winner.

Improving the Conditions of Man

The effort to improve the conditions of man, however, is not a task for a few. It is the task of all nations—acting alone, acting in groups, acting in the United Nations—for plague and pestilence, and plunder and pollution, the hazards of nature, and the hunger of children are the foes of every nation. The earth, the sea, and the air are the concern of every nation. And science, technology, and education can be the ally of every nation.

Never before has man had such capacity to control his own environment—to end thirst and hunger, to conquer poverty and disease, to banish illiteracy and massive human misery. We have the power to make this the best generation of mankind in the history of the world—to make it the last.

The United States since the close of the war has sent over \$100 billion worth of assistance to nations seeking economic viability. And 2 years ago this week we formed a Peace Corps to help interested nations meet the needs for

trained manpower. Other industrialized nations whose economies were rebuilt not so long ago with some help from us are now in turn recognizing their responsibility to the less developed nations.

The provision of development assistance by individual nations must go on. But the United Nations also must play a larger role in helping bring to all men the fruits of modern science and industry. A United Nations conference on this subject, held earlier this year at Geneva, opened new vistas for the developing countries. Next year a United Nations conference on trade will consider the needs of these nations for new markets. And more than four-fifths of the entire United Nations system can be found today mobilizing the weapons of science and technology for the United Nations Decade of Development.

But more can be done:

—A world center for health communications under the World Health Organization could warn of epidemics and the adverse effects of certain drugs, as well as transmit the results of new experiments and new discoveries.

—Regional research centers could advance our common medical knowledge and train new scientists and doctors for new nations.

—A global system of satellites could provide communication and weather information for all corners of the earth.

—A worldwide program of conservation could protect the forest and wild game preserves now in danger of extinction for all time, improve the marine harvest of food from our oceans, and prevent the contamination of air and water by industrial as well as nuclear pollution.

—And finally, a worldwide program of farm productivity and food distribution, similar to our country’s Food for Peace program, could now give every child the food he needs.

“Human Rights Are Indivisible”

But man does not live by bread alone, and members of this organization are committed by the charter to promote and respect human rights. Those rights are not respected when a Buddhist priest is driven from his pagoda, when a synagog is shut down, when a Protestant

church cannot open a mission, when a cardinal is forced into hiding, or when a crowded church service is bombed. The United States of America is opposed to discrimination and persecution on grounds of race and religion anywhere in the world, including our own nation. We are working to right the wrongs of our own country.

Through legislation and administrative action, through moral and legal commitment, this Government has launched a determined effort to rid our nation of discrimination which has existed too long—in education, in housing, in transportation, in employment, in the Civil Service, in recreation, and in places of public accommodation. And therefore, in this or any other forum, we do not hesitate to condemn racial or religious injustice, whether committed or permitted by friend or foe.

I know that some of you have experienced discrimination in this country. But I ask you to believe me when I tell you that this is not the wish of most Americans—that we share your regret and resentment and that we intend to end such practices for all time to come, not only for our visitors but for our own citizens as well.

I hope that not only our nation but all other multiracial societies will meet these standards of fairness and justice. We are opposed to *apartheid* and all forms of human oppression. We do not advocate the rights of black Africans in order to drive out white Africans. Our concern is the right of all men to equal protection under the law—and since human rights are indivisible, this body cannot stand aside when those rights are abused and neglected by any member state.

New efforts are needed if this Assembly's Declaration of Human Rights, now 15 years old, is to have full meaning. And new means should be found for promoting the free expression and trade of ideas—through travel and communication and through increased exchanges of people and books and broadcasts. For as the world renounces the competition of weapons, competition in ideas must flourish—and that competition must be as full and as fair as possible.

The United States delegation will be prepared to suggest to the United Nations initiatives in

the pursuit of all the goals. For this is an organization for peace, and peace cannot come without work and progress.

Support for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

The peacekeeping record of the United Nations has been a proud one, though its tasks are always formidable. We are fortunate to have the skills of our distinguished Secretary-General and the brave efforts of those who have been serving the cause of peace in the Congo, in the Middle East, in Korea and Kashmir, in West New Guinea and Malaysia. But what the United Nations has done in the past is less important than the tasks for the future. We cannot take its peacekeeping machinery for granted. That machinery must be soundly financed—which it cannot be if some members are allowed to prevent it from meeting its obligations by failing to meet their own. The United Nations must be supported by all those who exercise their franchise here. And its operations must be backed to the end.

Too often a project is undertaken in the excitement of a crisis, and then it begins to lose appeal as the problems drag on and the bills pile up. But we must have the steadfastness to see every enterprise through.

It is, for example, most important not to jeopardize the extraordinary United Nations gains in the Congo. The nation which sought the organization's help only 3 years ago has now asked the United Nations presence to remain a little longer. I believe this Assembly should do what is necessary to preserve the gains already made and to protect the new nation in its struggle for progress. Let us complete what we have started, for "No man who puts his hand to the plow and looks back," as the Scriptures tell us—"No man who puts his hand to the plow and looks back is fit for the Kingdom of God."

I also hope that the recent initiative of several members in preparing standby peace forces for United Nations call will encourage similar commitments by others. This nation remains ready to provide logistic and other material support.

Policing, moreover, is not enough without provision for pacific settlement. We should

increase the resort to special missions of fact-finding and conciliation, make greater use of the International Court of Justice, and accelerate the work of the International Law Commission.

The United Nations cannot survive as a static organization. Its obligations are increasing as well as its size. Its charter must be changed as well as its customs. The authors of that charter did not intend that it be frozen in perpetuity. The science of weapons and war has made us all, far more than 18 years ago in San Francisco, one world and one human race, with one common destiny. In such a world absolute sovereignty no longer assures us of absolute security. The conventions of peace must pull abreast and then ahead of the inventions of war. The United Nations, building on its successes and learning from its failures, must be developed into a genuine world security system.

A Lever To Move the World

But peace does not rest in the charters and covenants alone. It lies in the hearts and minds of all people. And in this world out here no pact, no treaty, no organization can hope to preserve it without the support and the wholehearted commitment of all people. So let us not rest all our hopes on parchment and on paper; let us strive to build peace, a desire for peace, a willingness to work for peace, in the hearts and minds of all of our people. I believe that we can. I believe the problems of human destiny are not beyond the reach of human beings.

Two years ago I told this body that the United States had proposed, and was willing to sign, a limited test ban treaty. Today that treaty has been signed. It will not put an end to war. It will not remove basic conflicts. It will not secure freedom for all. But it can be a lever, and Archimedes, in explaining the principles of the lever, was said to have declared to his friends: "Give me a place where I can stand, and I shall move the world."

My fellow inhabitants of this planet, let us make our stand here in this Assembly of nations. And let us see if we, in our own time, can move the world to a just and lasting peace.

King of Afghanistan Visits United States

Their Majesties the King and Queen of Afghanistan made a state visit to the United States September 4-16. Following is the text of a joint communique between President Kennedy and King Mohammed Zahir issued on September 7 at the conclusion of the Washington portion of the visit, September 5-7.

White House press release dated September 7

At the invitation of President and Mrs. Kennedy, Their Majesties King Mohammed Zahir and Queen Homaira of Afghanistan are paying a state visit to the United States. They have just completed the Washington portion of their visit.

His Majesty was accompanied by the Court Minister and Chief of the Royal Secretariat His Excellency Ali Mohammed, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance His Excellency Abdullah Malikyar and the Minister for Press and Information His Excellency Sayyid Kasem Rishtiya.

During the course of the visit His Majesty had an exchange of views with President Kennedy on matters of mutual interest to Afghanistan and the United States and on the current world situation. The United States has followed with interest and sympathy the efforts being made by Afghanistan, under the leadership of His Majesty, to achieve economic development and social progress. President Kennedy assured His Majesty of the continuing desire of the United States to cooperate with Afghanistan in economic and technical fields and by so doing to contribute to the success of the efforts which Afghanistan is making to provide a better life for its people.

In international relations both countries are dedicated to the furtherance of the cause of world peace and to efforts designed to bring about the elimination or reduction of tensions between nations. They are deeply convinced of the indispensable role of the United Nations in advancing the cause of peace and of the necessity of supporting its efforts directed to this end. It was noted that Afghanistan's traditional policy is the safeguarding of its na-

tional independence through nonalignment, friendship and cooperation with all countries. The United States for its part places great importance on Afghanistan's continued independence and national integrity.

Both sides agreed that the visit of His Majesty has contributed to better understanding between the United States and Afghanistan and to a strengthening of the already friendly relations existing between the two countries.

The Role of Germany in the Evolution of World Politics

by W. W. Rostow

*Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council*¹

I have come here today to talk to you about the role of Germany in the evolution of world politics.

If one looks at contemporary Germany and thinks back over the history of this century, it is clear that the internal condition of the Federal Republic of Germany and its role on the world scene represent an extraordinary achievement—certainly one of the greatest achievements of the postwar generation.

I am not referring here simply to the miracle of German economic recovery, in which a devastated nation, with an important part of its territory temporarily withdrawn, absorbed some 11 million refugees and then went on to rebuild itself and to create new levels of economic and social life for all its people.

I am thinking, rather, of the emergence of a stable, democratic government, rooted in a broad national consensus on foreign and domestic affairs transcending the major parties, freed of much of the bitterness and fragmentation which have marked democratic politics in parts of Europe in the past.

I am thinking of the steady loyalty of the Federal Republic of Germany to the concepts of both European integration and the Atlantic partnership.

I am thinking of the expanding role of Germany as a constructive force in many parts of the world outside of Europe.

And I am thinking, too, of the combination of poise and determination with which the German people look to their ultimate reunification by peaceful means in the face of steady Communist provocation and the Communist attempt to portray their just concern for their fellow and their just aspiration for national self-determination as a desire for bloody revenge for defeat in the Second World War.

History of Modern Germany

To understand the scale of this achievement one must look back at the history of modern Germany and the four major elements which converged to make that history difficult—difficult for Germany, for its neighbors, and for the world.

First, Germany was formed late among the modern nations. France, Britain, Russia, even the United States, had acquired a clear sense of national identity and nationhood when the German peoples were still struggling in the mid-19th century to form an effective union. This accident of history tended to give Germany a sense that it had a lot to make up in a hurry before it could assume its rightful place

¹ Address made at the University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, on Sept. 18 (press release 475 dated Sept. 17).

in Europe and on the world scene. It made Germany at once less certain and more assertive in defining its national destiny.

Second, in its initial phase, German unity was dominated by the province of Prussia. That northeastern region had an old history of militarism, and it had been somewhat distant from the liberal currents of thought and feeling which ran through Western Europe, including Western Germany, in the late 18th century and, especially, during the French Revolution and its aftermath. There is a sense in which contemporary Germany represents the victory—and I believe the final victory—of the men who organized the liberal Frankfurt Parliament in 1848, although the revolution of 1848 was at the time captured by Prussia and the German nationalists.

Third, there is the simple fact of German energy, competence, and will to express its national feeling and identity in a large way on the world scene. In the context of European power politics between, say, 1860 and 1945, this thrust periodically created the greatest problems, since German ambitions clashed head-on with the vital interests of other nations, although there were substantial intervals when Germany found peaceful channels for the expression of its talent and national ambitions, enriching international life in many directions—for example, in science, education, literature, and every other dimension of Western cultural life.

Finally, there is the fact of geography: Germany is located astride the balance of power in Europe. It represents a critically important area, population, and concentration of resources between the East and the West. In the past some Germans have been able to dream of using that position to dominate Europe. From the communist point of view, in the pursuit of world power Germany remains the greatest possible prize.

Taken together, these elements of history, national gifts, and geography have been the cause of severe difficulty; but in the postwar years the lessons of experience, painfully learned, have been given a constructive turn by the German people themselves, by their Western European neighbors, and, to a degree, by ourselves.

Building the Atlantic Community

For we in the United States made important mistakes in our European policy between the two world wars and also had painful lessons to learn and to apply. By not joining the League of Nations and by not making our presence and military potential a steady factor in European security calculations, we helped create a situation which made it possible for Hitler to dream of German domination of Europe and European domination of the world. As I recall the diaries of Count Ciano, with their detailed account of the diplomacy of the Axis in the 1930's, there were virtually no references to the United States. Hitler and Mussolini dreamed their dreams and made their plans as if the United States did not exist as a factor in Europe's power balance. Our isolationism between the wars helped encourage this tragic parochialism.

Reading this lesson in the immediate postwar days, the American Government sought to make a policy toward the European Continent which would avoid the mistakes of earlier times.

As it became clear in the winter and spring of 1946 that the Soviet Union would not permit the unification of Germany and Europe on the basis of political freedom, we began to shape a policy that still stands; namely, a policy of helping to build a prosperous and united Western Europe which would be closely linked in military and other great affairs to the United States and Canada and which would move back onto the world scene as a great power, broadly in concert with North America.

Four elements converged to produce this policy.

First, there was Germany. It was judged essential that we create a strong, integrated European structure which could receive as an equal partner a Germany that was likely to be split for some time to come, a structure which would give to Germans an opportunity to mobilize their great energy and resources along constructive lines in the face of the inevitable strains that history and geography have placed upon them. Chancellor Adenauer has well said that German membership in an integrated European Community is the best assurance against a revival of nationalist tendencies in Germany.

Second, there was Moscow. Europe faced a unified adversary consolidating his empire up to the Elbe, seeking to exploit every schism or lesion he could find in the West. A united Europe linked to the United States appeared the only tolerably safe framework of organization to deal with this centralized, increasingly powerful locus of active hostility.

Third, there was the perception to which many men had come on both sides of the Atlantic as the major historic lesson of the Second World War; namely, that in the world of the second half of the 20th century the individual nation-states of Europe could only execute effectively a major role on the world scene if they were to unite, and if that unity were to take the form of genuine integration rather than a loose grouping of wholly sovereign states. The arena of world affairs had widened out to embrace the whole of the planet; and the technology of effective power had outstripped the scale of the old states of Europe. The historic competition for power and status among them could only be pursued at the cost of their common effectiveness as a voice in world affairs, as well as at the risk of their common security.

And, finally, there was the economic argument: The full economic potentialities of Europe could only be developed on the basis of a spacious, highly competitive, continental market.

As a minor official in the Department of State when these matters were first debated, early in 1946, I can recall vividly that the dangers of this policy for the United States were laid on the table: How could we be sure that a united Europe would, in fact, pursue policies consonant with American interests? Would it not be safer to conduct a bilateral set of relations with Europe which, given the potentialities of our bargaining power, might permit us to assure United States influence in European affairs over a longer period?

We decided that the larger interests should prevail. And we went forward in support of European integration. Behind this decision was an act of faith—faith that the ultimate logic of the Atlantic connection, already tested in two world wars and then under a third test by Stalin, would prevail and that a united Europe would build its policy on the funda-

mental overlap in our respective interests, not on the potential cross-purposes and divergencies—which were, and are, evident enough.

It was on this view of the problem of Europe and Germany that we built the Marshall Plan. We played our part in constructing NATO; we backed the Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM; and we supported the Common Market. It was within this policy, to which German leadership creatively responded, that the Federal Republic of Germany has found its way back to a role of dignity, equality, and leadership within Western Europe itself, in the councils of the Atlantic community, and on the world scene.

The Unity of Europe

I believe the German people and their political leaders understand better than most that the real problems they confront and we in the West confront can only be solved by integrated European action and Atlantic partnership.

In terms of history, they have—with authentic insight and sincerity—put aside the old rivalry with France and made the Franco-German *rapprochement* a major long-term object of policy, to be achieved within the framework of an integrated European Community and sound Atlantic partnership.

In military affairs the Germans live, after all, on an exposed frontier of the free world. They understand that the protection of that frontier and of West Berlin has been achieved over the years, not by gestures or by self-imposed Communist restraint, but by a massive mobilization of military resources and an evident will to use them. They understand that the military strength of the United States—in underground silos, in Polaris submarines under the seas, on aircraft carriers, alert on airbases all over the world, standing in ready reserve in the United States—is a critical and irreplaceable component of their security, along with the United States garrison in Berlin and United States troops side by side with their own on German soil, and with all the other contingents and commitments that NATO represents.

With their economic life interwoven intimately with that of every part of Europe, they understand that their prosperity hinges on an

outward-looking policy of trade, with policies that widen rather than narrow the areas embraced within a low-tariff trading system. They have supported the concept of genuine economic integration in Europe—common organs with substantial powers of decision—and have been willing to make substantial sacrifices to make it work.

They have, moreover, seen economic integration as a way station to other forms of European unity, involving political as well as economic relations among the other European states.

Shorn of colonies by history, and freed in this generation from the responsibilities and burdens of helping manage the great transition from colonialism, Germany has been able to approach the problems of the underdeveloped countries on a worldwide basis and with a fresh vision of the task and its opportunities.

With some quarter of a million American troops located in Germany for the defense of an essentially common frontier, the German government has understood the strain on our balance of payments imposed by our commitment to the collective defense of the free world and has been sympathetic and helpful in cushioning some of its consequences.

Finally, looking to the East and to those 18 million Germans still held against their will within an essentially occupation regime, but understanding also the nature of the nuclear age, the Germans have pursued the struggle for self-determination and for national unity by peaceful means and as part of the Western coalition.

In short, reading the lessons of their experience and the common experience of this century, looking soberly at their problems as a nation, studying modern military technology and the nature of modern communications, the Germans have understood that none of us in the West—including, of course, the United States—can solve our problems unless we make a common cause, unless we build policies on a common loyalty to Western values and the great Western tradition of which we are all a part. They have understood that the task with which they have been confronted since 1945, and which they still confront, includes, but transcends, older

concepts of nationalism, national defense, and national destiny.

The United States and Germany

We have every reason to believe that the cast of German policy is firmly set in all the major political parties and in the minds and hearts of the German people—including the younger generation now emerging, which never really knew the days of Hitler. But the modern world is so intimately interwoven that we in the United States bear a part of the responsibility for maintaining the continuity of German policy.

First, we must remain not merely a reliable ally to Germany but a true partner with Germany in helping maintain within NATO the defense of the Western frontier, including West Berlin. The German contribution to its own and to Western defense has expanded and matured. We are both engaged, with some of our NATO allies, in exploring the setting up within NATO of a multilateral nuclear force, which would offer European nations self-respecting participation in nuclear deterrence without leading to national nuclear proliferation. We are both engaged with all our NATO allies in refining our strategic doctrine, in moving toward an agreed NATO defense policy for the nuclear age, and in designing the courses which would make that doctrine steadily effective.

The stability of German policy hinges on the continued success of the collective defense of Western Europe and on Germany's role as a respected senior partner in that effort.

We have demonstrated in the past 2 years in the Berlin and Cuban crises that the commitment of the United States to collective defense has survived the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons and the Soviet ability to damage the United States grievously in a nuclear war. The Soviet tactics of nuclear blackmail mounted in 1958 against Berlin, and pursued down to 1962, failed. The first condition for the stability of the West is that such tactics continue to fail, should they be again attempted.

Second, in a period when we are seeking to reduce the dangers and tensions of the cold war and to establish how far we can move safely

toward the control of armaments, it is essential that we consult in greatest intimacy with our allies where their interests may be involved. It is for that reason that we resisted in Moscow all pressures to link the nuclear test ban to a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw powers. The Atlantic partnership is more than a defensive alliance. It is a group of nations with a common heritage and large abiding common interests. We are evidently prepared to fight together. But we must learn to work with equal intimacy in exploring the opportunities for moving gradually toward a more peaceful world.

We consulted almost daily, in the greatest operational detail, in dealing with the Berlin crisis of 1961-62. We intend to consult with equal intimacy in exploring the possibilities which may open up in the months ahead for easing the dangers and tensions of the cold war. And in these consultations the issue of Germany still split, its people still denied the rights of self-determination, must be dealt with by Germany and Germany's allies with the greatest concern and seriousness.

Third, we must support Germany, within whatever degree of unity Europe comes to achieve, to play a maximum role in all the great creative enterprises of the free world, already extensive but still expanding: in the adventure of aid to the underdeveloped countries; in designing policies of trade, not merely within Europe and as between Europe and the United States but on a world basis, where all of us must find ways of creating a trade framework beneficial at once to the more developed and less developed nations of the free-world community; and in monetary affairs, where we must fashion in the 1960's new ways of underpinning a flow of trade and capital movements which is increasing much faster than the world's gold supply.

The Larger Vision of World Peace

Although our bilateral relations with Germany are intimate and intensive—and they should be, since together we bear a very high proportion of the burden of European defense—we are ultimately bound together by

loyalty to a larger vision. The vision has three parts: the unity of Europe; the building of the Atlantic community; and the systematic deployment of the energies and the resources of the Atlantic community for the larger purposes of world peace and prosperity.

This vision is evidently still incomplete. European unity is in an interval of pause and debate—by no means the first such interval since 1945. Involved in this debate is, of course, Britain's longrun relationship to the European Continent. Partly because the European debate also concerns the appropriate longrun relation between the United States and a united Europe, certain issues in the transatlantic partnership remain stalled, although there is more quiet progress forward than the newspapers record.

It should neither surprise nor dismay us that movement toward these goals—supported equally by all three of our postwar Presidents—should be slow. This is the biggest piece of international architecture ever undertaken at a time of peace by sovereign nations. Great issues are at stake in each country, reaching deep into both their history and their current politics.

But as President Kennedy made clear on his trip to Europe in June of this year,² we remain firmly committed to support the highest degree of European unity Europeans themselves can organize, within the larger framework of an Atlantic partnership.

We remain loyal to this vision—now embedded in United States policy for almost a generation—not because of inertia and not without understanding the difficulties inherent in its pursuit. We remain committed to it because it best serves the interests of the United States, the interests of Europe, and the interests of freedom everywhere.

Although this policy took shape in response to Stalin's immediate postwar effort to take over an impoverished and disheartened Western Europe, it is not dependent, in our judgment, on the persistence of active Soviet thrusts against the West of the kind we have seen, for example, over Berlin in the period 1958-1962. We need a unified Europe working in partnership across the Atlantic for reasons that go deeper into the

² BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 114.

times in which we live and the problems we shall face.

The nature of military technology—and Communist nuclear capabilities—decrees that the Atlantic community is about the smallest unit which can organize a rational and effective defense of Europe. The problem of organizing a community of independent nations embracing both the advanced nations of the northern part of the free world and the rapidly emerging nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America equally requires that we work in concert across the Atlantic. The problems posed for us by negotiations with Moscow looking toward control of atomic weapons touch vital interests of each nation of the Atlantic community, which require resolution within the family; and so, ultimately, does the problem of Communist China, its present aggressive disposition and its future, notably when Communist China acquires a nuclear capability.

Peering ahead with all the imagination of which we are capable we cannot conceive of a time relevant to current planning in which it would not be to the advantage of Europe to unite and to work in concert with North America. Put another way, we can see nothing but danger to us all if Europe should separate itself from the United States or if it should regard its great prosperity and the recent easing of tensions with Moscow as an occasion in which old-fashioned nationalism can again be given free rein.

Communist authorities have said two things which are worth noting about the recent period of relaxed tension. First, that there shall be no ideological coexistence. This means that they conceive of the present negotiations as limited to one phase—one important phase—of the cold war; namely, efforts to reduce the danger that nuclear war might come about which would be neither to their interests nor to ours. It means also that the Communists intend to persist, with every other means at their disposal, to press for the expansion of Communist power and influence. All the information at the command of the Government, watching the behavior

Communists in every quarter of the globe, suggests that they have in no way reduced their

efforts to expand their power and influence at the expense of the West.

The second thing they have said is that they hope and expect in a period of slackened tension that what they call the “inherent contradictions” of the West will increasingly assert themselves. They hope and expect that, with the crises in Berlin and elsewhere somewhat less acute, we in the West will not have the wit to stick together; and they evidently intend to exploit any schisms among us that might open up.

These are warnings we should take seriously; and they relate to the maintenance within Germany of the kind of politics and policy which, as I said earlier, represent one of the greatest collective achievements of the postwar.

I am confident that Germans and German policy will remain loyal to the concepts of European unity and the Atlantic partnership and to the collective defense of the values of Western civilization which underlie that policy. But this means that Germany's allies in Europe and North America must also remain actively committed to this policy.

The issues on our common agenda in the West have changed in recent months, as indeed they have often changed over the period since about 1947, when the present policy was launched. The policies of the Atlantic nations have exhibited in these two decades a great resilience. We have survived problems and crises of many kinds, leaving the bone structure of NATO still intact and the impulse toward European unity still vital. We have dealt with problems of economic reconstruction in Europe and foreign aid in the developing nations, with a wide range of issues in trade and monetary affairs. We have dealt with thrusts against Turkey and Greece and twice with major thrusts against Berlin. We have adjusted our common strategy from a time when the major threat was the Red Army on the ground to the increasing complexity of an era when the Soviet Union commanded a nuclear arsenal and the means to deliver it with missiles. We are in the process of moving from a time of U.S. nuclear monopoly to one where the burdens and responsibilities of nuclear defense are increasingly shared. We have seen moments close to war and have

had substantial intervals of relatively relaxed tension between Moscow and the West. We have seen relations between the West and Eastern Europe move from the black despair of Stalin's time to a period where men on both sides of the Iron Curtain can look forward with greater hope to increasing degrees of national independence and human freedom in the East, and to rebuilding old lines of connection that derive from the common religions and cultural basis of Eastern and Western Europe. We have seen Western Europe survive a series of difficult crises in the old colonial areas and move toward new relations of association and partnership with the former colonies and with other nations now emerging into the world under the banners of national independence and modernization.

All of these adjustments have not gone easily; and being democratic societies, the difficulties have been there for all to see. Our debates are out in the open. But we have every reason for faith that the policies, machinery, and attitudes of mind built up in the past generation will evolve in ways which will enhance the unity of the West—not fragment it.

To this end Germany has now a great role to play. No nation has a greater stake in the success of a collective policy in the West or more capacity to give it substance. Germany's post-war security, prosperity, domestic tranquillity, and growing stature on the world scene are rooted in that policy; and what Germans and Germany have already achieved now makes it possible for them actively to lead in carrying it forward into the next phase of Western history. But so interconnected is the world in which we live that the steadfastness of one is dependent on the steadfastness of all. In particular, we in the United States—still the inescapable leaders of the West—must remain steadily on course.

If we retain as a nation our loyalty to the large objectives of European unity and the Atlantic partnership—which the President so strongly reaffirmed on his trip to Europe in June—we can feel confident not merely of the stability of German policy but of the steady progress of the cause of freedom in every quarter of the globe.

U.S. Comments on U.N. Secretary General's Findings on Malaysia

*Department Statement*¹

The Department of State has noted the report issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations which concludes that the majority of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak desire the inclusion of their two states in Malaysia, to be proclaimed on September 16. The United States welcomes Malaysia and looks forward to close and cordial relations between our two nations.

The initiative taken by the leaders of the Federation of Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines in seeking the assistance of the Secretary-General to ascertain the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak as set forth in the Manila Agreement is indicative of the confidence we all share in the United Nations as an instrument for promoting harmony among nations and for helping peoples achieve their independence.

Now that the Secretary-General has issued his findings, we believe that all concerned should direct their national efforts toward mutually beneficial goals in the wider interest of stability and economic progress in the area.

Edward Gudeman Named to Business Advisory Committee

Under Secretary Ball announced on September 18 (press release 479) the appointment of Edward Gudeman, a former Under Secretary of Commerce, as a member of the Advisory Committee on International Business Problems.

The Committee, chaired by Clarence B. Randall, will advise the Secretary and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development on the handling of specific business problems confronting American firms abroad. The public members previously announced are Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Jacob Blaustein, and C. Daggett Harvey.²

¹ Read to news correspondents on Sept. 14 by Richard I. Phillips, director of the Office of News.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 540. Lloyd N. Cutler resigned in June 1963.

The Climate of World Trade and U.S.-Canadian Trade Relations

by G. Griffith Johnson

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹

You have requested that I discuss with you this evening the climate of world trade in which commerce between Canada and the United States must develop. The choice of this subject is clear evidence of recognition that the development of closer United States-Canadian trade relations must take place within the larger context of our trading relationships with other nations. This is a large subject, for it must also take into account the overall relations of our two countries with one another and with the rest of the world.

Looking at the international economic picture today, one is struck by the extent to which attention and activity is being focused throughout the world on international trade policies and arrangements. In the 19th century there were perhaps times when this was similarly true, but during the last generation the problems of depression and war and reconstruction have tended to occupy the center of the stage. Now we are in a period when, fortunately, throughout much of the Western World these problems have faded into the background and we can once more concentrate on issues relating to the normal commercial intercourse among nations.

The increasing attention to this area is not a matter of theory or doctrine but is rooted in the economic realities of the postwar world. I am sure I don't need to refer to the classical arguments regarding comparative advantage and the advantages of freer trade which have commended themselves to college students over the

years. In the present world, however, there are two aspects which are of unusually compelling importance—perhaps more so than they have been in the past.

The first of these is the necessity of having a mass market in order to take advantage of modern technology. In the United States we have for some time, by reason of our geographic character, been somewhat used to the mass-market psychology, but a large part of the world has not been accustomed to this. Only since the war has the great pressure of technology been felt, in this sense, throughout a large part of the world. And this pressure of modern technology, this need for mass markets, is one of the principal factors behind the efforts for regional development, such as the European Economic Community and the Latin American free-trade area.

The other aspect of importance to be noted in connection with the role of trade policy today is that the freeing-up of international trade channels is one of the few, and also one of the most effective, methods of maintaining competitive pressures in the face of the large industrial combines which are, for technological or other reasons, so characteristic of modern industry. This is more than a theoretical advantage. Sometime ago the London *Economist*, in commenting on the remarkable progress of recent years in England and on the Continent, made the remark that this was an "export-led" expansion and therefore an "efficiency-led" expansion. It has become increasingly apparent in recent years that industries operating behind high tariff walls and with limited markets are, generally speaking, inefficient in-

¹Address made before the Pacific Northwest Trade Association at Harrison Hot Springs, British Columbia, Canada, on Sept. 15 (press release 471 dated Sept. 14).

dustries and sources of weakness to the countries involved.

These are of course primarily economic aspects. I need not mention the compelling political imperatives which require us to work toward a more closely knit world at a time when the jet age will shortly be replaced by the supersonic age.

Since the end of World War II we have made great progress in reducing restrictions, in lowering tariff barriers, and generally freeing up the channels of international trade. The enormous growth in the volume of world trade is witness to this fact, and this in turn has been one of the basic causes of the phenomenal rise in living standards. We should recognize, however, that underlying this progress in the trade field has been increasing acceptance of the principle—which the United States and Canada have long accepted—that international trade should be conducted on a non-discriminatory, multilateral basis, with a minimum of restrictions and with mutual advantage to all. Under this principle of most-favored-nation treatment, notable progress has been made in reducing impediments to world trade, and in fact it is hard to see how any alternative principle could have made possible the same degree of progress.

Challenges to World Trade Structure

Now, however, we should frankly recognize that there are several developments in the world scene which, if indeed they do not threaten this principle, at least require a carefully thought-out structure of relationships in order to permit further progress along the lines achieved in the past. I should like to mention specifically three of these current challenges to the structure of free-world multilateral trade which present special difficulties at the present time.

There is, first, the growth of regional economic organizations such as the European Economic Community and the Latin American Free Trade Association. To the extent that such entities develop as outward-looking, liberal-trading organizations, they can make a notable contribution to the further advancement of mutually advantageous international trade. But if

these regional groups are inward-turning and protectionist, the work of many years in liberalizing world trade could be undone. The difficulties—and dangers—involved in this matter are emphasized by the discrimination against third countries which is inherent in a customs union type of arrangement. In the case of the European Community this inherent discrimination has been exaggerated by the mathematical method used in computing the common external tariff. It will require conscious and conscientious efforts to adjust these new arrangements to the requirements of the world trading system.

A second major challenge to the world trade structure arises from the trade problems of the less developed countries and from certain of the measures which are being suggested for dealing with them. Although these problems are commonly referred to as new, the fact is that they have long been with us, though unfortunately largely neglected. What is new is the recognition that the industrialized countries of the free world must, in their own interest, help the less developed countries to participate more effectively in international trade in order that they can advance economically and politically and contribute increasingly to free world strength. At the same time, also new is the energy and ingenuity with which effort and emotions are being directed toward illusory or self-defeating policies. The problems involved in development are difficult—indeed at times frustrating—but they cannot be solved by slogans.

Finally, the Soviet trade offensive, the third new aspect of the international trade picture, is a direct challenge to the multilateral trading system of the free world. Conducting their trade on the basis of bilateral bargaining, the Soviets offer tempting arrangements which the less developed countries, in particular, frequently find it difficult to resist. Yielding to the lure of close trade ties with the Soviets such countries may find their political as well as their economic freedom threatened. This consideration, of course, greatly increases the urgency of finding solutions to the trade problems of these countries—and to do this in a way which avoids the proliferation of bilateral, bar-

or, or special preferential arrangements. Throughout the free world the problem of establishing a climate in which international commerce can best thrive and flourish is, as I have observed, receiving unprecedented attention today. It is being studied by private groups organized on a national basis, by bilateral organizations such as your Pacific Northwest Trade Association, and by still others which are organized on a multinational basis. At every level of government in most nations of the world and in a wide range of international organizations and regional groups, problems are being discussed, policies are being developed, and actions are being taken in recognition of the vital role of foreign trade in the overall relations of the nations of the world.

Next week in Washington, at the eighth annual meeting of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, Cabinet officers of both Governments will consider economic and trade matters of common concern to the two countries.²

Within the broad spectrum of United States-Canadian economic relations, the Joint Committee is certain to consider the trade negotiations conference convening in May of next year under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. On the part of both Governments, and in fact throughout the world, there is full appreciation that the results of this new conference can substantially influence the climate in which world trade will operate in the years ahead.

Preparations for New Tariff Negotiations

The President has directed that optimum utilization be made of the unprecedented tariff-making authority which the Congress gave to me last year in the Trade Expansion Act. Key successful negotiations, however, will be the willingness of all trading countries to participate in negotiations of broad scope. The GATT ministers reached decisions at their meeting in Geneva last spring³ which prepared the way for multilateral negotiations on a broad basis,

but much work remains to be done before the conference is convened.

The principles laid down by the ministers recognize the realities of today's trading patterns and depart from the time-honored but outmoded negotiation procedures used by the GATT since 1947.

The basic principle for the tariff negotiations will be substantial equal linear reductions with a minimum of exceptions. By contrast, former rounds of negotiations involved a long, laborious process of negotiating tariff concessions on a product-by-product basis. This procedure is not adequate for the broad negotiations now contemplated.

For the first time nontariff barriers to trade will be dealt with along with tariffs. This provides insurance against frustration of the benefits expected from tariff concessions.

Also for the first time, the trade problems of the less developed countries will be given special attention in the trade negotiations.

And, confirming the broad scope of this important new trade conference, it was agreed by the ministers that the negotiations will cover trade in agricultural products as well as industrial goods.

You will appreciate that reaching agreement on these principles was not easy. Some of the topics dealt with by the ministers brought out a diversity of points of view. As you probably know, there was extended discussion about the problem of so-called tariff disparities between the tariffs of the European Economic Community and that of the United States and it was agreed that special rules would be developed to make sure that tariff cuts in fact reflected mutual benefits where differences in tariffs between the two parties had a significant effect on trade.

It was also recognized that there were special circumstances in the cases of certain countries, for example those whose exports are largely concentrated on a narrow range of products, or those whose secondary industries may still need some time before they can compete strongly in world markets.

We have now moved to the next stage of preparations. Committees established by the ministers to work out detailed negotiating rules

²For text of a joint communique, see p. 548.

³For text, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1963, p. 995.

and procedures and to examine particular problems in detail are meeting in Geneva. Sometime next month we expect to begin the process of public discussion and review of our tariffs.

In the upcoming negotiations we have four principal goals: a significant reduction in the tariff levels among the principal trading areas; progressive elimination of nontariff barriers; market access for agricultural commodities; and the expansion of trade with the developing countries.

Reductions in the common external tariffs of the Common Market are of particular importance to the expansion of world trade. The formation of the customs union of the Common Market is proceeding at a more rapid rate than that set in the Rome Treaty, and the accompanying change in trade patterns is likewise accelerated. In the two sets of tariff changes involved—the dismantling of tariffs on internal trade among the member states and the establishment of a common external tariff toward outside countries—the process is now 60 percent complete. At the end of the transitional period, probably by 1970, there will be completely free trade among the member states, while the rates in the common external tariff will be charged on imports from outside countries.

On industrial goods, take as an example addressing machines, where the Italian rate of duty was formerly 25 percent, whether the imports came from the United States, Canada, Germany, or any other of the countries supplying this product. Now, however, the rate to Germany and other EEC member states has already been reduced to 10 percent by successive steps and will reach zero in a few years, probably by 1970. At the same time Italy will have completed the process of making the transition to the common external tariff rate of 13 percent. This 13-percent rate is the result of tariff bargaining between the United States and the EEC in the last round of GATT tariff negotiations, in which the EEC agreed to a reduction of the 16-percent rate previously set in the common external tariff. But even at the reduced rate of 13 percent, the German supplier will have a \$26 advantage over outside suppliers on every \$200 addressing machine imported by

Italy. Multiply this example by the vast number of dutiable products in which the United States has traditionally had a supplier position in the member states, and the reason for our concern about maintaining and expanding our export opportunities in the Common Market is clear.

The results achieved in the new negotiations will also have major significance for trade between the United States and Canada. Last year our two countries exchanged goods valued at more than \$7 billion. Each is the other's largest single market and its largest source of imports. Canada buys almost 20 percent of U.S. exports and provides over 20 percent of U.S. imports, while the United States buys slightly more than half of Canadian exports and is the source of nearly two-thirds of Canada's imports. If the Geneva negotiations result in substantial reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers on a multilateral basis, further growth can be expected in our two-way trade. In addition, there will be new opportunities for both Canada and the United States to expand their markets in other countries around the world.

I know that your association has given special thought to the effect that tariff reductions on both sides might have on Canadian–United States trade and is planning to continue to study this subject in detail. I am sure that you have heard, and will continue to hear, expressions of concern and disquiet on both sides of the border at the prospect of a substantial loss of protection against import competition. But I am sure there is also general recognition that increased efficiency must be stimulated by even more available means, including exposure to increased import competition, if we are to focus our productive efforts in the most effective way so that we can compete in the markets of third countries, and if the efficiency of our own economies is to be stimulated.

As I mentioned, one of the important principles on which the ministers agreed at Geneva was that nontariff barriers were to be dealt with in the trade negotiations. Previously the reduction of tariffs was the sole aim sought in the GATT multilateral negotiating conferences. But the progress made through the years in reducing tariffs and in removing quan-

tative restrictions imposed for balance-of-payments reasons has highlighted the trade-supeding effects of a variety of regulations and practices which have become established through the years. The range of these trade-supeding effects of a variety of regulations and ss. So long as impediments of this kind remain, it would be vain to expect that tariff reductions alone could produce the trade liberalization that we need.

Question of Agricultural Exports

Certainly one of the most difficult areas with which the negotiators will have to deal at Geneva is trade in agricultural products. Here again no country is without fault. None allows the forces of a free market to work on agriculture. None has solved the problems accompanying the remarkable increases in agricultural productivity in recent years as a result of improved technology. Each employs some system of subsidies and supports for its agriculture and in turn insulates its agriculture from import competition. Thus domestic and import policies applicable to agriculture are closely intertwined, and the liberalizing of international trade in agricultural products requires parallel consideration of domestic policies in both importing as well as exporting countries. The United States has made clear that it is willing to have its own domestic policies reviewed in a general examination of national agricultural policies.

For the farmers of both the United States and Canada, the EEC is a key market for agricultural produce. United States agricultural exports to the EEC run at the rate of about \$1.2 billion a year, nearly a quarter of total U.S. agricultural exports. Over the longer run, at least a third of these exports could be affected by the common agricultural policies of the EEC. Continued access to this important market is of great interest to agriculture in both the United States and Canada. And the interests of the Europeans, it can be argued, would be best served by agricultural policies that keep food prices at reasonable levels and leave reasonable freedom of access to their markets for efficient producers outside the Common Market area.

In addition to our concern for our own agri-

cultural exports, we recognize the precarious position of major agricultural exporters such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, whose earnings from foreign trade depend very substantially on their agricultural exports. Also, many of the less developed countries are in a similar situation, though their exports are generally tropical types of agricultural produce rather than the temperate zone products of principal concern to the United States and Canada.

The GATT ministers recognized the need to examine the feasibility of special arrangements for international trade in grains as well as meats and dairy products, where the problems are complex and difficult. In each case, a special working group has been instructed to explore the situation in detail and to recommend solutions to the GATT Contracting Parties. The world trade climate will be fundamentally affected for better or for worse by the solutions found for agriculture. The difficulties are a challenge to the ingenuity and good will of the countries that will be participating in the trade negotiations at Geneva.

Trade of Less Developed Countries

The trade of the less developed countries is another problem area which the GATT ministers agreed should be given special consideration. They recommended that in the trade negotiations every effort should be made to reduce barriers to exports of the less developed countries but recorded their recognition that the developed countries cannot expect to receive reciprocity from the less developed countries. Thus the general terms have been outlined for participation of the less developed countries in the 1964 negotiating conference, though the specifics remain to be elaborated.

Concern about the acute trade and development problems of the less developed countries led to the calling of a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to convene in Geneva next March.⁴ The basic purpose of this conference is to examine ways in which international trade can be made a more effective means of promoting the development of the less developed countries. For the first time the United Nations will be considering at one time and

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 173.

place all aspects of international commerce affecting the trade and development of the less developed countries. Complex issues of trade policy will be posed for all the major trading countries. Both Canada and the United States are now engaged in preparations for the conference.

The economies of most of the less developed countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa are still geared to the production of a few basic export commodities. Prices of these commodities in world trade fluctuate widely. Demand for some is declining due to the rise of synthetics and other technological developments. For others, prices are declining due to failure of consumption to keep pace with production. The outlook for significant expansion of export earnings from trade in primary commodities is thus not encouraging. As a consequence, the plans and aspirations of the developing countries for economic progress are jeopardized with severe repercussions on their ability to maintain political stability and independence. Unless these countries are helped to participate more effectively in freer world trade, the aid programs of the industrialized countries cannot achieve their aims in these areas.

In special instances it may be that international commodity arrangements hold some prospect of ameliorating the situation. These can succeed only where substantial agreement can be reached on a global basis by both producing and consuming countries. An example is the new coffee agreements, whose purpose is to stabilize international market until solutions can be worked out for the basic problems of overproduction. Longrun stability in commodity markets depends on bringing supply and demand into reasonable balance. Commodity agreements can only buy time in which to bring this about. For coffee and for other of their export products, some of the resources which less developed countries are now devoting to the production of surplus commodities must be shifted to other activities, in most cases processing and manufacturing.

The earnings of these countries from exports of their primary commodities cannot possibly meet their growing import needs even if all present barriers to trade in primary products could be wiped out overnight. The exports of

the labor-intensive manufactures which the less developed countries are now beginning to produce must also find a place in world markets. The industrialized countries have no reasonable choice but to open their markets to increasing imports of manufactured goods from the less developed countries. The alternatives are entirely unacceptable—continuation of foreign aid on an indefinite and ever larger basis, ignoring the aspirations and hopes of the less developed countries and leaving the field to the Communists.

Unlike the climatic conditions imposed by nature, which man has not yet succeeded in influencing in the slightest, the world trade climate is in large measure what men and governments make it. It could be profoundly influenced by the outcome of major intergovernmental undertakings such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the GATT trade negotiating conference. It is affected for better or for worse by programs and actions of national governments and of regional organizations. And it is responsive to efforts made by groups such as yours to create understanding and to promote the liberalization of trade between our two neighboring countries. The geographical proximity of Canada and the United States, our common cultural heritage and ideals, the similarity of our objectives, provide both the circumstances and the necessity for productive collaboration between us on these matters.

U.S.-Canada Economic Committee Concludes Eighth Meeting

The eighth meeting of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held at Washington September 20 and 21. Following is a joint communiqué released at the conclusion of the meeting.

Press release 484 dated September 21

The 8th Meeting of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held in Washington, September 20 and 21, 1963.

2. This was the first meeting of the Committee since January 1962.¹ The members, therefore, took the occasion to review the basic economic relationship between the two countries. The unique nature and importance of this relationship were emphasized. The Committee considered ways of further strengthening these close and mutually advantageous trade and economic ties. It was agreed that early consideration would be given by the two Governments to the best means of elaborating and strengthening the basic principles of economic cooperation between Canada and the United States.

3. As background to the discussions on trade and economic matters, the United States Secretary of State and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs reviewed the current international situation.

4. The Committee noted recent favourable economic developments in both countries and the encouraging prospects for the near future. At the same time they agreed on the importance of continuing policies which will further stimulate economic growth and provide more employment.

5. The Committee discussed the balances of payments of both countries and the measures at each is taking to reduce its deficit. The United States members reviewed recent developments in some detail and called attention to some problems, including increased exports of long term private portfolio capital for which the proposed interest equalization tax was designed as a partial remedy.

6. Canadian Ministers stated the determination of the Canadian Government to take positive and constructive measures to reduce the substantial deficit in Canada's international trade in goods and services. Meanwhile, however, Canada would continue to need net capital imports to offset this deficit. There was a full and frank discussion of the proposed United States interest equalization tax and the proposed Canadian investment tax measures.

7. The Committee established a technical working group which will review the balances of payments of the two countries.

8. The members of the Committee emphasized the importance they attached to the suc-

cess of the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. They agreed that satisfactory progress in reducing barriers to world trade in agricultural products would be a key element in these negotiations.

9. It was noted that each country is the other's largest export market. Canadian Ministers urged that access of Canadian exports to the United States market should not be obstructed by special measures. In this connection they referred to quota restrictions maintained by the United States on imports of lead and zinc, Canadian matured cheese and to problems of access for certain other products of importance to Canadian trade. United States members took note of these points, and explained the importance of continued access for U.S. products to the Canadian market, and their concern over any possible measures which might adversely affect such access.

10. There was a frank discussion of the views of the two Governments on the trade between Canada and the United States in automobiles and automotive parts. The Canadian members explained their view of the nature of the problem in relation to Canada's balance of payments and the urgent need to deal with it. The United States members expressed concern that any measures adopted should not artificially distort the pattern of trade in this industry or interfere with the normal exercise of business judgment. The discussion helped to bring about a better understanding of the problem and the attitudes of the two Governments.

11. The Committee discussed the economical and efficient development of the raw material and energy resources of the continent and agreed on the importance of a better utilization of these resources. Arrangements were therefore made for a working group of the Joint Committee to examine energy relations between the two countries.

12. The Committee agreed on the usefulness of continuing to consult closely together on agricultural matters of common interest to the trade of the two countries. The Committee reaffirmed in this regard the value of the quarterly meetings on wheat and related matters which facilitate effective cooperation in respect of world trade in grain.

¹BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 168.

13. The Committee agreed on the importance of continuing to assist the economic development of the less developed countries. Canadian Ministers indicated that the Canadian Government was reviewing its aid programmes with the aim of increasing the volume of its economic assistance. Both countries recognized the need for international action to expand the trading opportunities of less developed countries.

14. The Committee met under the Chairmanship of Mr. Dean Rusk, United States Secretary of State.

15. The Canadian Delegation included Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. Walter Gordon, Minister of Finance; Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and Commerce; Mr. Harry Hays, Minister of Agriculture; Mr. C. M. Drury, Minister of Industry; the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. C. S. A. Ritchie; the Governor of the Bank of Canada, Mr. L. Rasminsky and other advisers.

16. The United States Delegation included Mr. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Mr. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce; Mr. Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; Mr. George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Mr. Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; Mr. John M. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of the Interior; the United States Ambassador to Canada, Mr. W. W. Butterworth; Mr. Walter W. Heller, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers; Mr. Frank Coffin, Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development and other advisers.

Deadline for Claims on Austrian Persecutee Fund Is October 31

Press release 461 dated September 9

The Department of State calls attention to the approaching deadline for former persecutees in Austria to file claims for awards under the additional \$24 million program established by the Austrian Government in 1962.¹

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1962, p. 971.

Awards will be made for occupational or professional damage suffered as a result of Nazi persecution and for damage caused by the termination or interruption for more than 3 1/4 years of occupational (professional) or pre-occupational (preprofessional) training. Award will be made to persons persecuted "on political grounds whatever their nature (*inter alia*, also because of origin, religion or nationality)."

Persons who were Austrian citizens on March 13, 1938, or who, during a period prior to March 13, 1938, had their uninterrupted place of domicile and permanent residence in the territory of the Republic of Austria, may apply for awards under the fund. In addition, persons who on March 13, 1938, possessed German nationality and emigrated from Austria because of political persecution may also apply.

The Department has been informed that as of July 31, 1963, the number of claims which had been filed amounted to 31,397, of which 15,341 had been filed by applicants in the United States.

The deadline for filing claims is October 31, 1963. Application forms are available from the *Fonds zur Milfeleistung an Politisch Verfolgte*, Taborstrasse 4-6, Vienna II, Austria, from the Austrian Embassy, Washington, D.C., and from Austrian consulates throughout the United States.

President Proclaims Protocol for Spain's Accession to GATT

A PROCLAMATION¹

PROCLAMATION OF PROTOCOL FOR THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

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(A) Agreement Supplementary to a Prior Trade Agreement

(B) Termination of Prior Trade Agreement Proclamation

¹ No. 3553; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 9859.

PART I—PURPOSES

The purposes of this proclamation are:

- (a) To proclaim an agreement for the accession of Spain to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A11)²
- (b) To terminate in part a proclamation relating to a prior trade agreement with Spain.

PART II—IDENTIFICATION AND JUSTIFICATION

(A) Agreement supplementary to GATT

(1) *Identification of Agreement.* The protocol of July 1, 1963 for the accession of Spain to GATT, containing no new tariff concessions by the United States, supplements provisions of GATT which have been proclaimed. This protocol includes a schedule to GATT of United States concessions (hereinafter referred to as "schedule XX" Spain—1963) which comprises the concessions provided for in the schedule of United States concessions annexed to the Interim Agreement of December 31, 1962,³ signed by the United States and Spain, and proclaimed by Part III (A) of Proclamation 3517 of January 31, 1963 (28 F.R. 1195). Schedule XX Spain—1963) became a schedule to GATT on August 9, 1963. A copy of the protocol of July 1, 1963, is annexed to this proclamation.⁴

(2) *Determination that It Is Required or Appropriate that GATT be Supplemented.* As President, I have determined that it is required or appropriate, on and after August 29, 1963, that those provisions of GATT and of agreements supplementary thereto which have heretofore been proclaimed be applied as supplemented by the protocol of July 1, 1963 (identified in paragraph 1) of this subpart).

(B) Termination of prior trade agreement proclamations

As President, I determine that on and after August 29, 1963 it is required or appropriate that Part III (A) of Proclamation 3517 of January 31, 1963 (28 F.R. 1195) be terminated in part insofar as it relates to the Interim Agreement of December 31, 1962 (identified in subpart (A) (1) of this part). This termination re-

² That agreement of October 30, 1947, has been proclaimed by Proclamation 2761A of December 16, 1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1103) which proclamation has been supplemented by subsequent proclamations. [Footnote in original.]

³ For a Department announcement and schedule of U.S. concessions, see BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1963, p. 146. The agreement annexed to this proclamation has been published by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the United States Trade Representative, and the United States Customs Service agency for the publications of which is the Columbia University Press. The English text of the general provisions of this agreement and the schedule of United States concessions will be published in Treasury Department (Customs) with this proclamation. The agreement will be published by the Department of State in Treaties and Other International Act Series (TIAS) and eventually in United States Treaties (UST). [Footnote in original.]

sults from the proclamation in Part III (A) of this proclamation of schedule XX (Spain—1963) comprising the same concessions as were proclaimed by the proclamation of January 31, 1963.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, under the authority vested in me, as President, by the Constitution and statutes, including section 350 (A) (6) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1351(a)(6)), do proclaim that:

PART III—PROCLAIMING PART

(A) Agreement supplementary to a trade agreement


On and after August 29, 1963, those provisions of GATT and agreements supplementary thereto which have heretofore been proclaimed shall be applied as supplemented by the protocol relating to Spain of July 1, 1963 (identified in Part II (A) (1) of this proclamation).

(B) Termination of prior trade agreement proclamation

On or after August 29, 1963, the proclamation of January 31, 1963 (identified in Part II (B) of this proclamation) is terminated in part as specified in Part II (B) of this proclamation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this sixth day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor.

Message from the President transmitting the convention concerning the abolition of forced labor (convention no. 105), adopted by the International Labor Conference at its 40th session, Geneva, June 25, 1957, S. Ex. K. July 22, 1963. 9 pp.

Wild Birds and Wild Animals. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 1839, an act to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to provide for the free importation of wild animals and wild birds which are intended for exhibition in the United States. July 23, 1963. 41 pp.

Export-Import Bank Act Extension. Conference report to accompany H.R. 3872. H. Rept. 578. 2 pp.

Promoting the Economic and Social Development of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 3198. H. Rept. 605. July 30, 1963. 19 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Scheduled October Through December 1963

OECD Ministers of Science	Paris	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 22d Session	Geneva	Oct. 2-
GATT Working Group on Preferences	Geneva	Oct. 7-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 21st Session	Geneva	Oct. 7-
ICEM Executive Committee: 22d Session	Geneva	Oct. 7-
ITU CCITT Study Group B (Intercontinental Automatic Network)	Melbourne	Oct. 7-
ITU CCITT Study Group XI (Telephone Switching)	Melbourne	Oct. 7-
ITU CCITT Study Group XIII (Automatic Networks)	Melbourne	Oct. 7-
ITU Extraordinary Radio Conference	Geneva	Oct. 7-
South Pacific Commission: 25th Session	Nouméa	Oct. 10-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: Working Party	London	Oct. 14-
ICEM Council: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 14-
IMCO Assembly: 3d Session	London	Oct. 16-
11th Pan American Railway Congress	México, D.F.	Oct. 18-
U.N. ECE Committee on Trade	Geneva	Oct. 21-
U.N. ECA Conference on African Electric Power Problems	Addis Ababa	Oct. 21-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 21-
FAO Working Party for Rational Utilization of Tuna Resources in Atlantic Ocean.	Rome	Oct. 25-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 3d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 28-
ICAO Visual Aids Panel: 3d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 28-
IMCO Council: 9th Session	London	Oct. 29-
OECD Agriculture Committee	Paris	Oct. 29-
IA-ECOSOC: 2d Regular Annual Meeting at the Expert Level	São Paulo	Oct. 29-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 15th Meeting.	Bangkok	Oct. 31-
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 4th Session	Vienna	October
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 7th Session	Geneva	Nov. 4-
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Growth)	Paris	Nov. 4-
U.N./FAO Intergovernmental Committee on the World Food Program: 4th Session.	Rome	Nov. 4-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.	Geneva	Nov. 4-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Nov. 4-
ILO Governing Body: 157th Session (and its committees)	Geneva	Nov. 4-
ITU CCITT Working Party of Study Groups V and XV	Geneva	Nov. 6-
FAO Council: 41st Session	Rome	Nov. 11-
ITU CCITT Study Group V (Protection)	Geneva	Nov. 11-
IA-ECOSOC: 2d Regular Annual Meeting at the Ministerial Level	São Paulo	Nov. 11-
ITU CCITT Working Party of Study Group XV (Transmission Systems)	Geneva	Nov. 11-
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 12-
FAO Conference: 12th Session	Rome	Nov. 16-
IMCO Working Group on Tonnage Measurement	London	Nov. 18-
ICAO Panel of Teletypewriter Specialists: 5th Meeting	Montreal	Nov. 18-
WHO/FAO/IAEA Seminar on the Protection of the Public in the Event of Radiation Accidents.	Geneva	Nov. 18-
OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 19-
ITU CCITT Working Parties of Study Groups V and VI	Geneva	Nov. 20-
GATT Contracting Parties: 21st Session	Geneva	Nov. 21-
ILO Meeting of Experts on Conditions of Work of Public Servants	Geneva	Nov. 25-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Sept. 20, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international téléphonique et téléphonique; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

ITU CCIR/CCITT Plan Committee for the Development of the International Network	Rome	Nov. 25-
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 6th Session	Montreal or Paris	November
12th Pan American Child Congress	Buenos Aires	Dec. 1-
FAO Council: 42d Session	Rome	Dec. 6-
U.N. ECAFE Asian Population Conference	Manila	Dec. 10-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Combined Transport Equipment	Geneva	Dec. 11-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	London	Dec. 16-
NATO Ministerial Council	Paris	Dec. 16-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 36th Session (resumed)	New York	December

The 18th General Assembly: "Fair and a Little Warmer, With Scattered Thundershowers"

by Harlan Cleveland

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

It's the new season—for school and college, for opera at the Met and situation comedies on TV, for the legitimate theater and that other drama, also legitimate we hope, called football. In the year-round histrionics of foreign policy it's a new season too—a time for hopes and qualms, for euphoria and indigestion and plain hard work. In other words, it's time again for the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Our children are leaving for college this weekend, checking their datebooks and their class schedules—in that order. Our wives are looking over the fall show bills, and wincing at the fall due bills. And the members of the American delegation to the General Assembly,² and their backstopping colleagues in Washington, have spent the past several weeks examining the show bills and due bills for the seven-act drama of passion and procedure in the greatest arena of politics on earth.

Those of you who have read the official agen-

da³ for the 18th session of the General Assembly—and that smaller number of you who managed to stay awake all the way through reading it—must have thought you were reading a Volkswagen advertisement. It's the same design, the same size, the same shape every year. But politicians and diplomats, like manufacturers, practice their own kind of built-in obsolescence. On the outside General Assemblies look alike. But in the corridors and committee rooms of the United Nations building each season has its own special atmospherics.

Last year the United Nations met under the gathering thunderheads of Red China's attack on India and lived through an electrical storm called the Cuba missile crisis. This year's session meets in the uncertain sunlight of the test ban treaty, and most of the heat lightning around is produced by fission in the Communist bloc.

Political weather is not any easier to predict than the meteorological kind. But, as of this afternoon, the forecast looks like "Fair and a little warmer, with a good chance of scattered thundershowers." The United States delega-

¹ Address made before the American Association for the United Nations at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 15 (press release 472 dated Sept. 14).

² See p. 556.

³ See p. 556.

tion, which will be sworn in by the President in Washington tomorrow noon, will be coming to New York in its shirtsleeves, ready to work at making peace; but they provided themselves with sweaters and galoshes just in case.

The Promising Directions of Change

The agenda of a General Assembly deals with the raw stuff of human affairs. Since the stuff of human affairs is change, the sameness of agenda items obscures a dynamic process in the real world outside the U.N.

First, the agenda has to do with the making and keeping of peace—which means finding ways for change to happen without organized bloodshed.

Second, the agenda deals with the building of nations—which is, whether in growth or decline, a process of change.

Third, the agenda deals with human rights, the evolving story of man's humanity (or otherwise) to man—which is also a process of change.

The beginning of a political process may be hidden in the nature of man; its end may be obscured in the mystery of a distant future; and its evolution—though predictably erratic—is more likely to be marked by subtle alteration than by radical change. Single events can, of course, have a profound impact on world affairs—mainly by tipping the scales which accelerate or reverse a trend. But history does not record as many “turning points” or “watersheds” as get mentioned in State Department speeches and reported in the breathless segments of the press.

I suppose, nonetheless, that when the 18th General Assembly opens on Tuesday some of us will be smitten with the conscious or unconscious expectation that some fateful decision, some sudden act, some auspicious agreement will untangle the troubles of this tumultuous planet and trumpet the new dawn in human affairs.

And I suppose others will nurse the fear that if this issue or that conflict does not get settled once and for all, our world will plunge inevitably down the slippery slope to chaos, war, and the end of civilization.

Of course, the General Assembly will pro-

duce no apocalyptic revelation; nor will it lead to Armageddon. It will be just what its name says it is: the 18th annual meeting—the one that comes between the 17th and the 19th—of an important political organ of an international organization which is trying to deal with a vast range of problems and prospects through a diversified collection of institutions, most of which work around the year and many of which work in a highly practical fashion around the world.

It is no mean achievement for the United Nations each year to collect together in the same room a great variety of people and nations—and live to tell the tale. But the test of an institution is not whether it can attract a big crowd to talk all at once in a dialog of the articulate deaf. The relevant test is whether the institution can point all these varied delegates, with their many conflicting interests, in the same direction—and whether that direction then becomes the direction of history.

What Saint Exupéry said of love could equally be said of international cooperation: “To love is not to look at each other, but to look together in the same direction.” Given our many conflicting aims and our own common interest in survival and growth, it is not very useful for us to agree on general principles and distant aims. What counts is whether we can agree on next steps, on actions to be taken in common. (We will certainly not agree as to why we are acting, but that is the essence of democratic process: to act together for reasons as diverse as our colors and our cultures.)

Taking as our baseline the real state of affairs right now, what are the promising directions of change in the General Assembly that opens on Tuesday?

Disarmament

The world asks, after the test ban, “What?” A couple of years ago we agreed to stop arguing about ultimate aims since the ultimate aim of disarmament was obviously general and complete disarmament. That agreement on principles left us free to tackle the really difficult part of the job—to decide together what first steps to take, in what order, on what schedule.

Progress in the business of arms control and

Disarmament is measured not in golden words or quantum leaps but in orderly moves that are the result of reams of technical staff work and long professional negotiations among experts. We have now agreed to two such moves—the test ban⁴ and the “hot line.”⁵ To make some more moves in this direction requires, not more polemics in the General Assembly, but more hard work behind closed doors in Geneva and in foreign offices and defense ministries of many countries.

The General Assembly's contribution to this process will be in inverse proportion to the noisy argument it generates—in direct proportion to the courtesy and restraint we all exercise during the disarmament debate and the speed with which these important matters are sent back to the negotiating table.

Peacekeeping

In the Middle East and Yemen the U.N.'s watchful eye serves to keep the tenuous peace from vanishing in a headlong clash for power. The U.N. Force in the Congo has mastered successive armed challenges in its noble but difficult efforts to convert chaos into order. Now that it nears the end of its task, the U.N.'s members are naturally getting impatient to close down the peace force and end the U.N.'s emergency aid to the Congo's economy. A few more months and a few more millions of dollars will probably be needed to secure the gains so dearly won. But it is false economy that puts the whole house on the block to evade the last payment on the mortgage.

Nothing is more fundamental to the future of the U.N. than its capacity to keep the peace. That capacity will surely be tested again, but with finer calipers, in other crises. The organization must meet the measure by fashioning sharper and better tools for the job.

To keep the peace costs money—a fraction of the cost of war, but harder by far to raise. The General Assembly faces the problem of those members, a small but very important minority, who have adopted as their financial slogan “Our pay or no pay.” We would all like to have our

⁴For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 314; Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314; and Sept. 2, 1963, p. 350.
⁵*Ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

way 100 percent and pay only part of the cost of peace. But the imperative of peace in the nuclear century is more complicated than that: The decisions have to be shared, and the bills for carrying them out must also be shared. The alternative is too close to the jungle for comfort or safety.

Races and Rights

Issues of racial discrimination, of racial apartness, and of the self-determination of peoples will again be high on the General Assembly agenda. And in these matters this Assembly will be a crucial test of maturity—for the United Nations Organization itself and for important groups of its members.

All of us seek basic human rights for others, and all of us still have unfinished business in our own countries to bring the rights described in the charter to every citizen. The maturity of the organization will be measured by its capacity to effect peaceful change in the direction of “fundamental freedoms”; neither change without peace nor peace without change will suffice.

The maturity of some of the U.N.'s members will be judged by their ability to work dispassionately toward the changes they most passionately desire in the world. And the maturity of all members whose governments deny fundamental freedoms to their own people will be judged by the vigor of their efforts to modify law and practice to conform to the sweep of history—the history of freedom for individual men and women.

No corner of our world can reasonably expect to escape the winds of change, and the direction of those winds is clearly charted for all to see in the prescient and precious words of the preamble and article 1 of the United Nations Charter.

The hardest question before the General Assembly—a question that members are just beginning to ask—will only be raised, and not answered, in the 18th General Assembly. The question is: What should the United Nations be doing, besides talking, to help its members carry out their charter obligations to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all . . .”?

Let's remember the unfulfilled promise of the

charter, like the unfulfilled promise of our own Declaration of Independence, is fundamental freedoms and unalienable rights, not for some, but for all.

U.S. Policy in the U.N.

I have mentioned three kinds of issues in the new-model General Assembly: the sequel to the test ban, the future of U.N. peacekeeping, the implications of an awakening world interest in human rights. There are half a hundred other issues, including a complex of decisions about how the organization can get on faster, and concentrate its efforts better, in helping the newly developing nations with that familiar yet still mystic process called development.

The United States delegation is about to be subjected to great rivers of words—and the American delegates will contribute at least their full share to the ceaseless flow. If you want a measure of the value of these words, I can only suggest the simplest test possible. Are they leading to action *by* the organization or merely to more words *in* the organization. The policy of the United States in the United Nations is rather simple after all: to build an organization that can act for peace, for development, and for human rights.

It is man's capacity to organize that makes the United Nations possible. But it is his growing capacity to create trouble and commit suicide that makes the United Nations mandatory.

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 18th U.N. General Assembly

The Senate on September 13 confirmed the following to be representatives and alternate representatives of the United States to the 18th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to serve no longer than December 31, 1963:

Representatives

Adlai E. Stevenson
Edna F. Kelly
William S. Mailliard
Francis T. P. Plimpton
Charles W. Yost

Alternate Representatives

Mercer Cook
Charles C. Stelle
Jonathan B. Bingham
Sidney R. Yates
Mrs. Jane Warner Dick

For biographic details, see Department of State press release 459 dated September 9.

Agenda of the 18th Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly ¹

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Pakistan.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the eighteenth session of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. General debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of five members of the International Court of Justice.
16. Election of three non-permanent members of the Security Council.
17. Election of six members of the Economic and Social Council.
18. Election of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
19. United Nations Emergency Force:
 - (a) Report on the Force;
 - (b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force.
20. Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian): report of the Secretary-General.

¹ Adopted by the General Assembly on Sept. 20 (U.N. doc. A/5550).

1. Report of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter.
2. Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: report of the Secretary-General.
3. Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
4. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the International Co-operation Year.
5. Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Improvement of the Methods of Work of the General Assembly.
6. Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
7. Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: report of the Secretary-General.
8. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
9. The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.
10. The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and replies by Member States under General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII).
11. Effects of atomic radiation:
 - (a) Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation;
 - (b) Report of the World Meteorological Organization.
12. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
13. Economic development of under-developed countries:
 - (a) Planning for economic development: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Activities of the United Nations in the field of industrial development: report of the Economic and Social Council;
 - (c) Decentralization of the economic and social activities of the United Nations and strengthening of the regional economic commissions;
 - (d) Accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance to the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (e) Establishment of a United Nations capital development fund: report of the Committee on a United Nations Capital Development Fund and comments thereon by the Economic and Social Council.
34. Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament: report of the Secretary-General.
35. United Nations training and research institute: report of the Secretary-General.
36. Progress and operations of the Special Fund.
37. United Nations programmes of technical co-operation:
 - (a) Review of activities;
 - (b) Confirmation of the allocation of funds under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance;
 - (c) Technical assistance to Burundi and Rwanda: report of the Secretary-General.
38. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
39. Co-operation for the eradication of illiteracy throughout the world: report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
40. Draft Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages: report of the Economic and Social Council.
41. Measures to accelerate the promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms: report of the Economic and Social Council.
42. Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance: report of the Secretary-General.
43. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.
44. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance.
45. Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum.
46. Freedom of information:
 - (a) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information;
 - (b) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information.
47. Measures designed to promote among youth the ideals of peace, mutual respect and understanding between peoples.
48. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights.
49. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations: reports of the Secretary-General and of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories:
 - (a) Political and constitutional information;
 - (b) Information on educational, economic and social advancement;
 - (c) General questions relating to the transmission and examination of information.
50. Dissemination of information in the Non-Self-Governing Territories on the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples: report of the Secretary-General.

51. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General.
52. Question of the continuation of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.
53. Election, if required, to fill vacancies in the membership of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.
54. Special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Secretary-General.
55. Question of South West Africa:
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa: report of the Secretary-General.
56. Financial reports and accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 1962, and reports of the Board of Auditors:
 - (a) United Nations;
 - (b) United Nations Children's Fund;
 - (c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
 - (d) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
57. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1963.
58. Budget estimates for the financial year 1964.
59. United Nations Operation in the Congo: cost estimates.
60. Review of the pattern of conferences: report of the Secretary-General.
61. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
 - (b) Committee on Contributions;
 - (c) Board of Auditors;
 - (d) United Nations Administrative Tribunal;
 - (e) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.
62. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions.
63. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency:
 - (a) Earmarkings and contingency allocations from the Special Account of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance;
 - (b) Earmarkings and allotments from the Special Fund.
64. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency:
 - (a) Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
 - (b) Inter-organizational machinery for matters of pay and personnel administration: report of the Secretary-General.
65. Administrative and budgetary procedures of the United Nations:
 - (a) Report of the Secretary-General on administrative and financial procedures to be followed by the General Assembly at the time peace-keeping operations are authorized;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General on his consultations concerning the desirability and feasibility of establishing a peace fund.
66. Personnel questions:
 - (a) Geographical distribution of the staff of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Proportion of fixed-term staff;
 - (c) Other personnel questions.
67. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.
68. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General.
69. Report of the International Law Commission of the work of its fifteenth session.
70. Question of extended participation in general multilateral treaties concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations.
71. Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
72. Technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law: report of the Secretary-General with a view to the strengthening of the practical application of international law.
73. Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.
74. Denuclearization of Latin America.
75. Question of Southern Rhodesia.
76. Means of promoting agrarian reform.
77. The violation of human rights in South Viet-Nam.
78. Question of Oman.
79. Designation of 1968 as International Year for Human Rights.
80. Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.
81. Question of the composition of the General Committee of the General Assembly.
82. Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

Security Council Considers Southern Rhodesian Question

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson

*U.S. Representative in the Security Council*¹

At the request of 32 African states, the Security Council is considering the question of Southern Rhodesia. On the fifth of August, the members of the Council received the request² from the delegations of Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic that the Security Council consider the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

At that time we studied that letter carefully, and, as most of the members of the Security Council no doubt know, we had reservations, despite the contentions set forth in the explanatory memorandum, on whether the situation in Southern Rhodesia required Council action and that there was any significant change in the situation since it had been considered by the Committee of 24.

In this connection it should be noted that the Committee of 24 on the 20th of June³ drew the attention of the Security Council to what it termed the deterioration of an explosive situation which prevailed in Southern Rhodesia. My delegation did not support that decision in the Committee of 24, but we note that the Committee of 24 did no more than draw the attention of the Security Council to the situation. It did not call for Security Council consideration. Despite our reservations my delegation did not oppose Council consideration of this question.

Since the opening of this discussion we have listened with care and attention to the presentations and the arguments set forth by the delegations of Ghana, Tanganyika, Mali, the United Arab Republic, and Uganda. We believe the thoroughness and detail of these presentations facilitated the work of the Council. We have studied carefully the position set forth with equal clarity by the representative of the United Kingdom, which has such particular and

special responsibility vis-a-vis Southern Rhodesia. We have carefully examined the presentations of the four African delegations in the light of the charter, and we have weighed their views as to why Security Council action is called for at this time. In so doing we have attempted to determine whether there are any new developments in the situation in Southern Rhodesia which would warrant consideration or action by the Security Council.

The representative of Ghana and the other African delegations in their presentations to the Security Council argued that the transfer of certain powers to the Southern Rhodesian Government in accordance with the agreements reached at the Victoria Falls conference for the dissolution of the Federation, in particular, the transfer of an air force and an army, constituted an action which could endanger international peace and security.

In the first place, it is necessary to emphasize the point made by the delegate of the United Kingdom that, strictly speaking, what is taking place as a result of the Victoria Falls agreement is a reversion to that Government of certain powers which it exercised for many years before 1953, which in that year were transferred to the Federation, and which with the dissolution of the Federation now revert to Southern Rhodesia. This reversion of powers is intimately involved with the long-established constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia, on which is based of course such powers as the United Kingdom still exercises in Southern Rhodesia.

Mr. President, I think there is a related factor which we must carefully consider in deciding whether to take action on this question. The African delegations have suggested that certain provisions of the agreement on the dissolution of the Federation reached with considerable difficulty at Victoria Falls should be nullified for the reasons I have covered earlier. Regardless of whether one agrees with these reasons, it cannot be denied that to take any action or recommend any action with regard to these provisions must necessarily affect the whole structure of the agreement reached at Victoria Falls. This agreement involves, as the members of the Council know, the future of Nyasaland and

¹ Made in the Council on Sept. 11 (U.S./U.N. press release 4245).

² U.N. doc. S/5382.

³ U.N. doc. A/AC.109/45.

Northern Rhodesia. No one, I think, could contend that the dissolution of the Federation is unresponsive to the will of those two peoples. To suggest changes in the provisions of the Victoria Falls agreement, which represents the mechanism for the dissolution of the Federation, risks upsetting that agreement and setting back the progress toward independence of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Sir Patrick Dean, the United Kingdom representative, made further significant and reassuring points in his statement to the Council yesterday. He pointed out that reversion of the armed forces in no way changed the degree of control exercised by the United Kingdom Government over those forces. In other words, their deployment and use either outside or inside the territory of Southern Rhodesia was not, in fact, changed by their reversion to the Government of Southern Rhodesia.

Thus my delegation concludes that, whatever may be the views of members about the disposition of armed forces, there has in fact been no factual deterioration in the situation in Southern Rhodesia resulting from the action agreed upon at the Victoria Falls conference such as would require Security Council action in accordance with its responsibilities under the charter. We were further reassured by the statement of the United Kingdom representative that his Government has always retained and will continue to retain, until such time as there is a change in the constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia, ultimate responsibility for all external relations and actions of Southern Rhodesia.

We are confident that the United Kingdom will exercise its full authority to assure that these forces, whether nominally pertaining to the Federation as they are now or pertaining to the Government of Southern Rhodesia, will not pose a threat to the security of Southern Rhodesia's neighbors in Africa or the peace and security of that continent. With regard to the maintenance of internal security, which is, of course, the responsibility of the Southern Rhodesian Government, we understand from the representative of the United Kingdom that these forces "are no less available for these pur-

poses under existing arrangements than they will be when they revert to Southern Rhodesian control."

The United Kingdom representative in his statement to the Council also gave us certain reassurances on the possibility of Southern Rhodesia becoming independent under the current terms of franchise or under conditions not acceptable to the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia. First of all, he stated categorically that the reversion of the former Federation powers to the Southern Rhodesian Government did not in any way change the status of the constitutional relationship of Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom. Thus Southern Rhodesia will be neither more nor less sovereign than it is today, and its relationship with the United Kingdom remains unchanged. He assured us there were no pledges "secret or otherwise" concerning the question of independence and that this question remains completely open for further discussion. He reiterated that the position of his Government was that, before further consideration of the question of independence was possible, the Government of Southern Rhodesia must make proposals for amendments of its constitution which would result in broadening the basis of representation in the legislature to take effect as soon as practicable. The Southern Rhodesian Government, he stated, has been so informed, and this is where the matter lies.

These are in the view of my delegation the central issues in the question we are examining. Other contentious issues have been raised, but as the precise status of Southern Rhodesia with respect to article 73 of the charter and the question of General Assembly resolutions. While they concern the overall question of Southern Rhodesia, they do not touch on the situation there which will ensue following the implementation of the Victoria Falls agreement. Without passing judgment on these questions or others which have been raised, I think that the debate so far has revealed three significant points:

First, that the projected developments resulting from the Victoria Falls conference and the dissolution of the Federation, specifically the reversion of powers to the Southern Rhodesian Government, are no less available for these purposes under existing arrangements than they will be when they revert to Southern Rhodesian control."

overnment and in particular the disposition of the armed forces, will not produce deterioration of the existing factual situation in Southern Rhodesia.

Second, that such transfer of powers in no way affects the current status of Southern Rhodesia or the constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia. Third, that the United Kingdom Government is not contemplating independence for Southern Rhodesia without amendment to the constitution which would significantly broaden the franchise.

Mr. President, none of the foregoing considerations should be construed to have altered the reiterated views of the United States on the internal conditions in Southern Rhodesia.

On June 22, 1962,⁴ again on October 26 of that year,⁵ and most recently on March 25 last,⁶ American spokesmen expressed identical hopes for the people of Southern Rhodesia. The United States desires progressive liberalization of the franchise in Southern Rhodesia to permit the emergence of a government that derives its just powers from the consent of all of the peoples it governs. The United States desires an end to racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia as it does elsewhere in the world. The United States wants full and free self-determination for Southern Rhodesia to lead to tranquillity between its peoples at home and peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with its neighbors.

We have repeatedly expressed our concern with the unsatisfactory situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia as well as our concern for the possible impact of the situation throughout the African Continent. We have repeatedly stressed the need for increased efforts to stimulate what the representative of the United

Kingdom in another forum has referred to as a "political climate favorable to liberal and orderly constitutional development." Finally, we have repeatedly voiced our anxiety, as I noted earlier, over the possibility that independence should be granted before a more satisfactory situation has been achieved within the territory.

We have taken the view that the United Kingdom has special responsibilities with regard to Southern Rhodesia, and the United Kingdom has again reasserted its ultimate international responsibility for Southern Rhodesia. We have in the past urged and we continue to urge the United Kingdom to use its special influence toward the rapid broadening of the franchise and the rapid elimination of racial discrimination. We believe the United Kingdom is now embarked on this course, a course entirely consistent with its record in other territories, which has already been acknowledged by previous speakers, and a course which, if pursued urgently with the cooperation of all parties, will produce the solution sought not only by the members of this Council but first and foremost by the peoples of Southern Rhodesia.

For all the foregoing reasons, Mr. President, my delegation considers that the Council should take no action on this item at this time.

U.S. Continues To Oppose Capital Development Fund

*Statement by Jonathan B. Bingham*¹

The general debate in this Committee opened with an observation that the question of a United Nations Capital Development Fund has been under consideration for 12 years. Subsequent speakers have observed that there are two main issues involved in our discussion; viz., the volume of assistance and methods of providing it.

¹ Made in the Committee on the United Nations Capital Development Fund on Sept. 9 (U.S./U.N. press release 4242 dated Sept. 10). Mr. Bingham is U.S. representative on the U.N. Economic and Social Council.

⁴ For text of a statement by Jonathan B. Bingham in the 17th ordinary session of the U.N. General Assembly, see *GA RESOLUTION* of Aug. 20, 1962, p. 299.

⁵ For text of a statement by Ambassador Bingham in the 17th Committee IV (Trusteeship), see U.S. delegation press release 4075 dated Oct. 26, 1962.

⁶ For text of a statement by Sidney R. Yates in the 17th Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, see U.S. press release 4168 dated Mar. 25, 1963.

By both standards a great deal of progress has been made during the past 12 years. The flow of capital and assistance to the developing countries stood at \$3.2 billion 12 years ago. By 1960 it had more than doubled, to a figure exceeding \$7 billion. During that year the United States accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total capital and donations received by the 35 developing countries for which data were available.²

Substantial progress has also been made with regard to methods. First, there has been a great increase in the use of international institutions. In 1951 loans from the World Bank to the developing countries were relatively minor. A decade later the World Bank and the International Development Association were lending about \$1 billion a year, almost all of it to the developing countries.

Within the United Nations itself a remarkable increase has occurred in technical cooperation activities. From a level of \$20 million 12 years ago, these resources are currently more than six times that amount. U.N. activities in the field of technical cooperation have expanded not only in quantity but in quality as well. The establishment of the U.N. Special Fund 4 years ago brought into being a new international instrument which carried the concept of technical cooperation a long step forward into the vital area of preinvestment.

New instruments were also created in the area of financing. The Inter-American Development Bank, with a capital of over \$960 million and a social progress trust fund of some \$394 million, was established in 1960. The International Development Association was also established in 1960, with a capital of almost \$1 billion. IDA provides credits for up to 50 years with no interest charge and a 10-year grace period. This type of credit was not given even bilaterally in 1951, and now there is an international institution furnishing such credits. Loans on similar terms are also provided by the Development Loan Fund of the United States. Another new institution, the International Finance Corporation, brought a new type of as-

sistance to private enterprise, particularly entrepreneurs in the developing countries. The United States takes pride in the fact that it was either singly or jointly an initiator of all these new advances.

Representatives of developed and developing countries can agree on the progress made over the last 12 years. We regret that there is still some disagreement about the need for a United Nations Capital Development Fund. As for the United States, we continue to believe that the establishment of such a new fund would serve no useful purposes. The existing spectrum of international institutions covers every type of assistance required by the developing countries and can be adapted in the light of any new requirements.

We can understand the viewpoint of representatives of developing countries who desire still another fund. It is difficult for a country which continues to need assistance to oppose a new channel or any new window. We hope that the representatives of the developing countries will also understand our position. The United States has provided massive sums of aid to developing countries, despite a difficult balance-of-payments position. These funds have come from taxpayers—from farmers, factory workers, teachers, and great numbers of people who do not find it easy to meet these burdens. The Congress of the United States, as a body of the people's representatives, must react to and reflect the viewpoint of the taxpayers. In existing circumstances, it would be illusory to expect acceptance of a new capital fund.

Several delegations have alluded to the possibility of expanding the activities of the Special Fund to include the financing of capital development projects. It is difficult for us to consider this possibility when, as yet, the initial target for the Special Fund has not been met. For 1963 only about 75 percent of the target has been pledged. As for the United States, we have pledged \$60 million toward the joint target of \$150 million for the Special Fund and the Expanded Program, providing that our contribution shall not exceed 40 percent of total contributions.

The need for more resources to enable

² Report by the Secretary-General on "International Flow of Long-Term Capital and Official Donations, 1959-1961" (U.N. doc. A/5195/Rev. 1).

Special Fund to fulfill its *present* mandate in the field of preinvestment was spelled out by the Secretary-General, who served as the first chairman of the Committee on the United Nations Capital Development Fund. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the organization for the year ending 15 June 1963,³ U Thant said:

The Special Fund, for its part, has continued to fulfill the General Assembly's intention that it be "a constructive advance in United Nations assistance to the developed countries"

These accomplishments reflect not only sound criteria on the part of Governments and wise management principles on the part of the Special Fund; they are also the result of effective contributions by the United Nations and its related organizations which serve as executing agencies for the Special Fund. There is, however, one major disappointment which must be voiced: governmental pledges to enable the Fund to finance new projects in 1963 were some 25 per cent below the \$100 million target. It is therefore to be hoped that all participating Governments will enable the Fund to obtain the \$100 million it urgently requires in 1964. The scale of the major programme of the United Nations Development Decade must be adjusted somewhat more closely to the needs of the low-income countries, more closely to their capacity to absorb its assistance and more closely to the ability of the Special Fund and the executing agencies to help meet those needs.

The need for more multilateral development assistance is very real. The time for meeting that need is rapidly growing shorter, because the processes of development are inevitably protracted—training is a vast, long and difficult as well as essential task, social and economic transformations are not easily prepared nor readily accomplished, and investment on the scale required to achieve the aims of the Development Decade will not be forthcoming unless pre-investment work is completed in time.

Thus the Secretary-General has underlined the urgency of providing the Special Fund with additional resources to enable it to proceed with preinvestment work which it is so well fitted to undertake. Surely our first concern must be to solve that problem. In these circumstances, Mr. Chairman, it is clearly premature to discuss any proposal to add capital financing to the scope of the Special Fund.

It has also been suggested that the organization of the IDA be modified and its membership increased to provide greater representation for

developing countries. I should like to comment briefly on this suggestion.

IDA has 77 members. Sixteen additional countries have applications pending, and most, if not all, will in all likelihood become members within a month. With these accessions, IDA's membership will include virtually all developing countries and all countries which make important contributions to United Nations programs. There is no inherent limitation on further growth. We seriously doubt whether revision of IDA's charter along the lines suggested this morning would enhance its acceptability or its effectiveness. On the contrary, we believe such revision might jeopardize current negotiations to provide additional resources for IDA.

The present organization of the IBRD and the IDA has won full confidence of taxpayers in the United States and other major contributor countries. Any basic changes might well jeopardize the support of these countries, which is essential for IDA's success.

Mr. Chairman, bearing in mind the desires and concerns of the representatives of both the developing and the developed countries, we pledge that the United States will continue to give its full cooperation to continuing consideration of the capital requirements of developing countries. We shall do so not only in this forum but in all other forums where a practical contribution can be made.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

IAEA Meeting on Desalting Water

The Department of State announced on September 16 (press release 474) that Under Secretary of the Interior James K. Carr will head a special team of experts to consider the use of nuclear power to desalt sea water at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency to be held at Vienna, Austria, beginning September 23. Commissioner James T. Ramey of the Atomic Energy Commission will serve as co-chairman with Mr. Carr and represent the

³U.N. doc. A/5501/Add. 1.

Government's nuclear interests in the discussion.

The 2-day panel discussions will be held just prior to the general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Fourteen countries will participate in the panel. The scientists will review the latest developments in the technology of desalting water by using nuclear power as a source of heat.

Representative Chet Holifield, vice chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, who will attend the International Atomic Energy Agency conference as congressional representative, will also participate in the panel discussions. The United States group will also include John C. Calhoun, science adviser to the Secretary of the Interior; W. Sherman Gillam, research director, Office of Saline Water, Department of the Interior; and Robert W. Ritzmann, senior evaluation engineer, Atomic Energy Commission.

General Conference of IAEA

The Department of State announced on September 19 (press release 481) that President Kennedy had appointed Glenn T. Seaborg,¹ Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, as U.S. Representative to the seventh regular session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The conference will be held at Vienna, September 24 to October 4.

The IAEA is an 83-nation body established in 1957, largely on U.S. initiative, to encourage and assist research and development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world. The Agency is headed by a Director General appointed by the Board of Governors with the approval of the General Conference, which meets annually at Vienna, the Agency's headquarters.

The President also appointed the following alternate representatives:¹

Henry D. Smyth, U.S. Representative to the IAEA, Vienna

Frank K. Hefner, Deputy U.S. Representative to the IAEA, Vienna

¹ Confirmed by the Senate on Sept. 13.

John G. Palfrey, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission

James T. Ramey, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission

Other members of the delegation are:

Senior Scientific Adviser

Isidor I. Rabi, Consultant-at-Large to the President Science Advisory Committee

Congressional Advisers

Chet Holifield, vice chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Craig Hosmer, member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Melvin Price, member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Jack Newman, counsel, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Senior Advisers

R. E. Hollingsworth, Atomic Energy Commission

Charles Wilson Thomas, Department of State

Algie A. Wells, Atomic Energy Commission

Ashton J. O'Donnell, U.S. Mission to the IAEA, Vienna

Advisers

Raymond C. Ewing, U. S. Mission to the IAEA, Vienna

George M. Fennemore, Department of State

Betty C. Gough, U. S. Mission to the IAEA, Vienna

Carl W. Schmidt, American Embassy, Vienna

Robert N. Slawson, Atomic Energy Commission

Marvin Sorkin, U. S. Information Service, Vienna

Irwin M. Tobin, Executive Office of the President

William Yeomans, U. S. Mission to the IAEA, Vienna

Special Assistant to the U.S. Representative

Arnold R. Fritsch, Atomic Energy Commission

The principal items to be considered at this session include the extension of the IAEA safeguards system, which has since 1961 applied only to reactors having power outputs of less than 100 megawatts (thermal), to apply to reactors of all types, particularly to those having large power outputs; the amendment of article XIV of the IAEA statute to provide for the merging of the present administrative budget (financed by assessment of the members) and the present operational budget (financed by voluntary contributions) into a single budget financed by assessment of the members; the program and budget of the IAEA for 1964; report of the Board of Governors for 1962-63; election of members to the Board of Governors; applications for membership in the IAEA; and the relations with other organizations in the United Nations.

Current U.N. Documents: Selected Bibliography

Micrographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letter dated August 28, 1963, from the representative of Ghana to the President of the Security Council, enclosing a "Memorandum in regard to Southern Rhodesia submitted to the Security Council on August 2, together with documents and notes supplementary thereto." S/5403. August 28, 1963. 84 pp.

Letter dated August 28, 1963, from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council enclosing the texts of a resolution adopted by the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission on August 5 and a statement by the chairman of the Commission. S/5405. August 28, 1963. 3 pp.

Letter dated August 29, 1963, from the representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council regarding the Palestine question. S/5406. August 29, 1963. 3 pp.

Letters dated August 28 and September 10, 1963, from the representatives of Yemen and the United Kingdom to the President of the Security Council regarding alleged British acts of aggression. S/5408, August 29, 1963, 2 pp., and S/5424, September 10, 1963, 4 pp.

Letters dated August 30 and September 3, 1963, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Haiti to the President of the Security Council requesting a meeting of the Council to reconsider the Haitian-Dominican question. S/5411, August 30, 1963, 1 p., and S/5416, September 5, 1963, 3 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the U.N. Yemen Observation Mission and the implementation of the terms of disengagement. S/5412. September 4, 1963. 6 pp.

Letter dated September 12, 1963, from the representative of the U.S.S.R. to the Secretary-General, transmitting a letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko regarding the Security Council resolution of July 31 on the situation in territories under Portuguese administration. S/5427. September 16, 1963. 2 pp.

General Assembly

Selection of five members of the International Court of Justice. Memorandum by the Secretary-General, A/5480, August 12, 1963, 5 pp.; list of candidates nominated by national groups, A/5478, August 12, 1963, 5 pp., and Corr. 1, August 28, 1963, 1 p., and Add. 1, September 6, 1963, 1 p.; curricula vitae of candidates nominated by national groups, A/5479, August 2, 1963, 49 pp., and Add. 1, September 12, 1963, 1 pp.

Letter dated August 22, 1963, from the permanent representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States addressed to the Secretary-General concerning international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. A/5482. August 26, 1963. 24 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.

Ratification deposited: Libya, September 9, 1963.

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at Vienna October 4, 1961. Entered into force January 31, 1963. TIAS 5284.

Acceptance deposited: Libya, September 9, 1963.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signature and acceptance: Trinidad and Tobago, September 16, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signature and acceptance: Trinidad and Tobago, September 16, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.¹

Signatures affixed at Washington: Dominican Republic, September 16, 1963; San Marino, September 17, 1963; Tanganyika, Togo, September 18, 1963; Rwanda, September 19, 1963; Panama, Senegal, September 20, 1963.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.

Adherences deposited: Jamaica, August 29, 1963; Mongolia, August 24, 1963.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Peru, July 25, 1963.

Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes and schedules, and protocol of provisional application. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700.

¹ Not in force.

Admitted as contracting party (with rights and obligations dating from independence): Dahomey, September 10, 1963.

Declaration on the provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960; for the United States April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.

Ratification: Brazil, July 8, 1963.

Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May 21, 1960; for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4498.

Signature: Yugoslavia (subject to ratification), August 6, 1963.

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade done at Tokyo November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 9, 1961. Entered into force for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4958.

Signature: Yugoslavia (subject to ratification), August 6, 1963.

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration of November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

Signature: Brazil, July 8, 1963.

Declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force January 9, 1963; for the United States May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309.

Signatures: Ceylon, May 21, 1963; Cuba, July 2, 1963; Yugoslavia (subject to ratification), August 6, 1963.

BILATERAL

India

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 26, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5225 and 5317). Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi September 4, 1963. Entered into force September 4, 1963.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

H. Freeman Matthews as Chairman of the United States Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States-Canada, effective September 14. (For text of a letter to Mr. Matthews from President Kennedy, see White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated September 14.)

Confirmations

The Senate on September 13 confirmed Frank K. Hefner to be the deputy representative of the United States to the International Atomic Energy Agency. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated July 25.)

Legation at Usumbura, Burundi Raised to Embassy Status

Department notice dated September 18

On September 16, 1963, the Legation at Usumbura, Kingdom of Burundi, was elevated to the status of Embassy. Minister Donald Dumont has been appointed United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Burundi.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 16-22

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to September 16 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 461 of September 9 and 471 and 472 of September 14.

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*473	9/16	U.S. participation in international conferences.
474	9/16	Delegation to IAEA meeting on desalting water (rewrite).
475	9/17	Rostow: "The Role of Germany in the Evolution of World Politics."
†476	9/17	Rusk: White House Conference on Export Expansion.
*477	9/17	Martin sworn in as Ambassador to Thailand (biographic details).
*478	9/18	Delegation to Joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.
479	9/18	Gudeman appointed to Advisory Committee on International Business Problems (rewrite).
*480	9/19	Cultural affairs (Latin America).
481	9/19	Delegation to IAEA General Conference (rewrite).
†482	9/20	Martin: "Cuba, Latin America, and Communism" (as-delivered text).
*483	9/20	Cultural exchange (Dominican Republic).
484	9/21	Communique of Joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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October 14, 1963

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Dedication of Church Center for the United Nations

A Church Center for the United Nations, built by the Methodist Church and administered by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., was dedicated at New York, N.Y., on September 22. Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, brought greetings from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and Secretary Rusk was one of the principal speakers at the convocation ceremony. Following are texts of the Secretary's address and Ambassador Stevenson's remarks.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY RUSK

All of us are grateful for occasional moments of deep and quiet satisfaction, and this is surely one of them: the consecration of the Church Center for the United Nations.

There was a time when foreign policy, including the ultimate issues of war and peace, was decided by kings and emperors—with or without the advice of a privileged few in an isolated royal court. In the earlier days of democracy, foreign policy was for specialists or practitioners who tended to hold such matters aloof from the hurly-burly of domestic

politics and the scrutiny of public discussion and consent.

But not so today. Especially since the end of World War II, foreign affairs have become personal affairs for every citizen. Democratic governments of our day must take public opinion into fullest and serious account in the conduct of foreign affairs—and nowhere more than in this country.

This is as it should be. For what happens along the Congo, the Mekong, and the Spree is of vital concern to people living along the Mississippi. The people of the United States have shouldered heavy burdens to defend freedom and to preserve peace. Foreign policy reaches into every home in the United States. There is no frontline any more.

But the conduct of foreign policy is a complex business because the world has become extremely complex. And I would hope that one of the results of the activities of the Church Center for the United Nations will be to help illustrate and illuminate the characteristic complexity of most of the basic issues of our day.

But to find our way through the complexity, we need a clear view of fundamentals. And here religious values are among those distant stars by which we chart our course. For re-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1268 PUBLICATION 7607 OCTOBER 14, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

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gious values are concerned not only with man's relations to God but with man's relation to man—with what we call the moral values.

When we speak of moral values we speak of what is permanent within seas of political change, what is fundamental beneath the surface, and what is simple within complexity.

Let me say quite simply that we need to hear the voice of enlightened public opinion; we need to feel the pressure for reason in the midst of turbulent events; and we need evidence of broad support for our largest goals and purposes.

As we struggle in Washington with complex foreign policy problems on behalf of an open, vigorous, and diverse society, we are subject to pressures from many who do not have your grasp of the underlying moral values which animate policy and make luminous the Charter of the United Nations.

We hear from those who nourish hatred because they are frightened.

We hear from those who want to withdraw from the world because they dislike it.

We hear from those who are supercautious because they trust nothing but physical power.

We hear from those who insist upon the non-existent easy answers, the quick solutions which solve nothing, and issues involving the rights and interests of others.

And we hear from those who are just plain confused because they lack the anchor of the simple moral values.

Over the years, the National Council of Churches has kept its focus on basic goals and has given steadfast support to policies and programs designed to move us, and all mankind, toward those great goals.

Foreign Aid

You have supported our foreign aid programs.

Over the years those transfusions of strength from this country to others have accomplished great results. Of the 41 major recipients of our aid since 1945:

—Fourteen—twelve in Western Europe, Japan, and Lebanon—have not only reached a satisfactory growth rate of at least 1½ percent per capita annually for 5 successive years, but they no longer depend on aid.

—Ten more have reached this rate of growth and are becoming less dependent on aid, and several will require no more concessional aid.

—Nine more have attained a satisfactory rate of growth but will continue to require for some time substantial amounts of aid.

There are many other nations which have not attained a satisfactory rate of growth. The struggle of the new nations to modernize their economies and societies and achieve political stability in freedom is difficult. In some instances it may be slow. The main job must of course be done by the citizens of the developing nations. But the more fortunate nations of the world must help. And to this end we have pledged our support to the Decade of Development, as the United Nations has aptly termed the 1960's.

The United States and other free nations are committed to helping the less developed nations, in the words of President Kennedy,¹ "not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right."

The United States has carried the major assistance burden of the world since the end of World War II, but other countries are increasingly sharing the burden. But if the Decade of Development is to be successful, we must all do more and every prospering nation must carry a full load.

We are concerned about the cuts made by the House,² concerned about the 25-percent reduction in the Alliance for Progress, concerned about the 15-percent reduction in development loans, the severe limits on Presidential flexibility in dealing with crisis situations. Therefore we hope this will not be Congress's final answer.

Disarmament

You have supported disarmament. But you have recognized that disarmament is one of the most difficult and complex problems in front of us. It involves an attack upon those issues which bring men to wish to fight each other. It involves the distrust which breeds distrust,

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1963, p. 476.

ambition and the fear of ambition, pride and the resentment of pride, and other feelings which appear to be rooted in a distant past we little understand.

Since undergraduate days at the end of the twenties, I have followed closely the repeated effort of governments and peoples to strengthen peace through the laying down of arms and have been officially involved in this effort, in one way or another, since the end of World War II. Reviewing the many attempts there is much frustration, much tedium, much disillusionment—and even bitterness. But today I would merely say that we must try again and once again to find some way to impose restraints upon a lawless world and curbs upon an arms race which could engulf us all. Taking the longest view, I am encouraged by the fact that the causes for war appear to be diminishing in variety, and I am also encouraged by the growing and sobering realization of what war itself can mean.

I do not see on the immediate horizon dramatic and sweeping solutions to divisive and dangerous problems. But we must work at them steadily, and patiently, and ceaselessly. Small steps are worth taking because we might find them to be the key to larger ones. The arrangements we make for limited measures may prove the small foundations upon which confidence can grow and security, which has no assurance through destructive power alone, may be allowed to grow, because men come to see that we need not be the only species of life bent upon its own destruction.

The United Nations

You have stalwartly supported the United Nations. Indeed, representatives of our churches made significant contributions to drafting the charter itself and were effectively on hand at the organization meeting in San Francisco 18 years ago. Since then, the churches as a whole have contributed greatly to public understanding of the activities and purposes of the United Nations.

This new center here in U.N. Plaza is a heartening symbol of your devotion to that organization. But it is much more than a sym-

bol, for it is a place of action and a multiplier of action.

Thousands will come here from church organizations for leadership training in U.N. affairs. They will study, no doubt, the intricacies of the charter; but with their own roots in moral values, they know in advance that the essence of the charter is a similar set of values and that this is what draws them to it.

Your trainees will study the complexities of disarmament and the techniques of resolving conflicts; but they know in advance that the United Nations was organized first and foremost "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

They will study some of the administrative problems of technical assistance and the transfer of technology from one culture to another; but they know in advance that the United Nations also was organized "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."

They will learn something of human rights issues which agitate the U.N.'s agenda; but they know in advance that the United Nations is committed to "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small."

In short, those who come to this center, like those who direct its affairs, already know that the Charter of the United Nations projects on a world scale the values they already cherish.

And I know of no better statement of the basic goals of the foreign policy of the United States than those set forth in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. These goals harmonize with the central teachings of the great majority of mankind.

In a sentence from one of your basic statements of policy: "God, still Sovereign amid the unleashing of the atom and the probing of space, seeks a world community in which all His children have access to every resource for human welfare and growth."

What you do in this new center—and all that radiates out from it—is quite literally an essential part of the foreign policy of the American people. Your program represents both morality at work and democracy in action.

I congratulate you on the completion of this concrete symbol of aroused and intelligent interest in world affairs. And I wish you all possible success with your impressive and important program for the future.

REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

U.S./U.N. press release 4247 dated September 23

In the United States Mission to the United Nations we have watched this splendid building rise, floor by floor, impatient for it to be finished so that the important work it will house can begin—and the noise stop!

The National Council of Churches has been carefully observing the work of the United Nations for many years. Now its scrutiny will be closer, and those of us who toil across the street welcome it. For the truth about the United Nations—the truth that can best be learned at close range—is what makes it strong.

Seeing so many United Nations veterans here—I am one, too, and proud of it—today I am reminded of the spirit in which the United Nations was born. Winston Churchill expressed this spirit when he said, before the war was over, "The little people will have won the war, and it will be their right to say what the future will be."

The charter itself reflects that spirit. Instead of beginning with the traditional phrases about "governments" or "states" or "high contracting parties," it says, "We the peoples of the United Nations . . ."

There were plenty of difficulties then which we couldn't foresee. Perhaps that was just as well. If we had been able to look ahead, we might never have tried to create the United Nations at all! But now we have the courage to carry on, encouraged and sustained by the hopes, fears, and faith of most of the people of the world.

A large share of the credit for the confidence the United Nations enjoys in this country goes to you. Your seminars and training courses have had a significant effect upon public opinion among 40 million church members. The Church Center for the United Nations, thanks to this location, will provide new and sharpened

perspective for church leaders and laymen. They will return to their congregations, wiser for their experience and better equipped to increase understanding and respect for this bold, vigorous, and unique experiment in security and social economic progress by collective action.

It is easy and—in some shrill quarters—popular to attack the United Nations with half-truths and distortions. But to refute even the most careless charges, one must be armed with facts. And here at the United Nations is an arsenal of facts to help you do battle for the truth.

The churches have been with us from the beginning. They have been both clear-sighted and foresighted, never expecting miracles and never, to put it another way, confusing this meeting place of the kingdoms of the world with the kingdom of heaven.

This week 111 nations began a new session of the General Assembly in an atmosphere of rising hopes. However, political weather is not any easier to predict than the meteorological kind, and the forecast is: "Fair and a little warmer, with a good chance of scattered thundershowers."

But we are used to thundershowers, and even lightning. The headlines about the United Nations are made by disputes, not by agreements; by intemperate words, not by harmonious actions. Sometimes a torrent of such words threatens to drown our hopes that the United Nations will ever become that real community of nations which would guarantee peace in the world. But let us not forget—to pursue the metaphor—that rains and storms do produce fruitful results. To the question "What does constant sunshine produce?" the answer is "a desert."

To those who see only the shortcomings of the United Nations I would repeat that the United Nations is a mirror of the world. And if we don't like what we see, let's not blame the mirror. The better people understand that any weakness of the organization is but a reflection of our own weakness, the sooner this complicated and remarkable instrument for peace—the best man has contrived—will do an even better job of fulfilling mankind's oldest dream.

Yet I don't wish to mislead anybody. And

I like that fine line of Robert Frost:

But islands of the blessed—
Bless you, son,
I never came across a blessed one.

Even so, when we come to count our present-day blessings, I would put the United Nations, with all of its shortcomings, high on the list.

Indeed, I feel a little like an Irish peasant who said to the poet Yeats: "Sure, I believe in fairies. Never seen any, but it starts to reason."

And it stands to reason that to survive in this age mankind has no choice but to erect a mighty fortress of safety and sanity.

Cuba, Latin America, and Communism

by Edwin M. Martin

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

During my 18-month tenure as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs it has been estimated that as much as a third of the time of the top staff of my bureau in the State Department has been spent on the problem of Cuba. In a sense I have found this an extravagant overinvestment of time and effort on the affairs of a small island of 7 million people, when the responsibility of the bureau as a whole takes in the formation and implementation of United States foreign policy toward 22 countries in one of the most strategic areas in the world for the United States, and having a total population of over 200 million.

In another sense, however, we dare not underestimate the increased danger to Latin America, and through it to the United States, posed by the continued presence of a Communist regime in Cuba tied to the Soviet bloc. Therefore I feel that our investment of time and talent on the problem is more than justified.

I need not remind you that only a year ago we went to the brink of thermonuclear war over the emplacement of Soviet missiles on the island. Secretary Rusk just 10 days ago² reminded the

world that, despite relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union on other issues since the October crisis, Cuba remains a major obstacle to normal relations between us. Paraphrasing the President, who has repeatedly stated this policy, Secretary Rusk made it plain that we will neither accommodate nor negotiate on the political or military intervention of the Soviets in this hemisphere. Neither will we stand idly by should Castro attempt to interfere by force in the affairs of other nations.

In the meantime we shall spare no effort to induce the Soviet Union to continue to remove its military personnel from the island. As you are aware, the President at a recent press conference [August 20] reported that the Soviets have been withdrawing forces from the island through most of the summer. But we will not relax our pressure until all these forces are gone from the Caribbean.

What is the position of Cuba in the hemisphere today? Very briefly, it is an island under military interdiction, by sea and air, with United States forces poised to stop either the reintroduction of strategic weapons systems or the embarkation of any military expedition to neighboring countries. Its government, rejected by the nations of this hemisphere as a Marxist-Leninist regime incompatible with the

¹ Address made before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council at Los Angeles, Calif., on Sept. 20 (press release 482; as-delivered text).

² BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1963, p. 490.

traditions of freedom and democracy of the inter-American system, is a pariah in the Western World. Its people are being inexorably delivered into the bondage of a slave society, their revolution and its once bright promise utterly betrayed by leaders who have sold them out to the Communist world. Their abiding hope, evidenced by the continuing stream of refugees from oppression, is to be again free to organize an independent government on their own responsibility.

To this end, the United States is vigorously enforcing a policy of isolation of the Castro regime. Revolutions led by egomaniacs like Castro must be fed new successes, one after another, to stay alive. Our objective is to deprive this revolution of new successes at home or abroad. But we do not stop there; a standstill stalemate is not good enough. Conspicuous failure on every front must be made the daily lot of Castro and his associates. A revolution in reverse is a revolution destroyed, awaiting only some fortuitous incident to cause its collapse and reveal its internal decay.

Abroad, the policy of isolation seeks to seal off Castro's Cuba and to prevent his program of violent revolution from exploiting the social unrest that infects much of Latin America. A number of measures, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral, which I shall outline in a moment, are being employed in this effort. Thus his boastful claims to be the leader of the wave of the future in Latin America will be shown to be only the rantings of a vain demagog, not of a revolutionary genius.

Domestically, isolation will keep the economy descending its present downgrade until it is clear to all that the glowing promises of a better life for all Cubans, which proved so alluring at the outset of the July 26th movement, can never be fulfilled by Castro and his cohorts but must be sought from new leaders.

It is frequently said that the isolation policy can't work or that it can't take effect fast enough to avoid catastrophe in Latin America. We are convinced it will work, and we are pushing forward on several fronts to insure that the pressure on the regime continues to tighten.

To those who urge "stronger action," I can say only, as the President has, that while military action against Cuba sounds like a simple

proposition of "going in and getting it over with," this involves awesome risks. The terrible costs that very likely would be involved in such a course of action should be borne in mind when it is lightly proposed that those who bear the full responsibility opt for "action." Neither should it be forgotten that what might ensue from a "tougher policy" against Cuba could not necessarily be limited to a clean-cut military operation in the Caribbean. The interrelation of our global foreign policies practically insures that such an operation could not be delimited but rather could be expected to spill over into other areas, with unpredictable results.

Effects of Isolation Policy

In its essentials the isolation policy is designed to deny to the Castro regime the where-withal and the plaudits of success that it requires to consolidate itself. And by increasing the costs to the Soviets of their maintenance of Castro, and eliminating their prospect of gains in Latin America, we are determined to convince Moscow that it is backing a sure loser, and an expensive one at that.

In large part because of our isolation policy, Cuban trade with the free world has slowed to a trickle. Free-world exports to Cuba in 1959, Castro's first year in power, totaled \$680 million; in 1962 they were \$85 million and are expected to decline even further this year. Free-world purchases from Cuba, primarily sugar, have declined almost as much. The rising costs to the Soviets of keeping their satellite afloat in the Caribbean, an enterprise that becomes more dubious as time goes on, thus are obvious.

We estimate, for example, that bloc-Cuban trade this year—Cuba now does more than four-fifths of her trade with the Communist world—will total about \$1 billion, \$600 million in bloc exports to Cuba and around \$400 million in Cuban shipments to the bloc. This trade gap, which the Soviets must finance, is expected to be equally large next year. In addition to Cuba's deficit on trade account, the bloc has invested well over \$350 million in military aid to Cuba since mid-1960 and has committed itself to provide another \$500 million in economic capital aid to the island. It should be noted,

though, that actual deliveries against this latter commitment have totaled only \$40 to \$50 million.

Regarding free-world shipping to Cuba, a subject about which much has been said in this country, we have been able to discourage this traffic to the extent that there has been a two-thirds decrease in the number of calls at Cuban ports by free-world ships in the first 7 months of this year, compared with the same period in 1962. While there was a gradual increase in these calls between January and July of this year, there has been a period of leveling off during midsummer, and a downturn in August. It should be pointed out that many of these ships arrived at Cuba empty, calling only to pick up sugar cargoes. Even so, we are by no means satisfied with this performance and will continue to press our friends and allies to take additional unilateral measures to reduce further the ocean transport capacity that has been available to the regime.

The isolation of Cuba by air has been much more complete. At the present time there is only one free-world flag carrier—Spain's Iberia Air Line—providing scheduled service to the island. Except for this outlet, scheduled air service between the free world and Cuba is available only on Cuban flights to Mexico, which operate on an irregular basis and are carefully watched. Castro has been making rather frantic efforts to open up new channels of communication, but without much success. It is no accident that the 59 American students covered the 90 miles to Cuba via Prague going and via Madrid coming home.

In the financial field the United States this summer closed out Cuba's access to a large part of the international financial system when it froze all dollar transactions with Cuban Government entities or citizens of Cuba.³ A central objective of this move was to reduce sharply the amount of dollars available to the Castro regime to finance its subversive apparatus in other countries of Latin America.

This unrelenting squeeze, in which I might say we have had more wholehearted cooperation from our friends in Latin America and Western Europe than most people are aware

of, has substantially eroded the economic foundation on which the Castro regime must depend. Notwithstanding the glowing propaganda from the regime, and even the testimony of some recent but not very observant visitors to the island, the Cuban economy today is shambles.

A heavy contributing factor, it should be added, has been the monumental mismanagement of the regime itself over the past 4 years.

Cuba's "Economic Dry Rot"

Rather than raising living standards, as Castro promised in the early days, communism has dramatically reduced them. The Cuban gross national product last year was estimated to be 25 percent below the 1958 level; in per capita terms the real GNP has fallen 30 percent in Castro's 4 years. It is expected that, as the regime improvises in a desperate effort to correct its early errors, output will continue falling this year.

With most basic foodstuffs rigidly rationed, average caloric intake is estimated to be 15 to 25 percent less than it was in pre-Castro years. Consumer goods generally, and spare parts for the Cuban industrial base in particular, are in even shorter supply, frequently being unobtainable. Shortages are reported daily of electricity, power and water, while the once highly efficient transport network continues to crumble.

The economic dry rot that has set in is forcing even more rigorous efforts to control and collectivize the economy Soviet-style. The doubled efforts of the regime to check the deterioration have largely eliminated private economic activity and, through the multiplication of massive bureaucracies, created even more chaotic conditions. All this is bringing in its train declining worker productivity, increasing absenteeism, and, more frequently of late, the execution of quiet but nonetheless effective sabotage.

Nowhere has the Castro failure been more evident than in agriculture, and particularly in the production of sugar. Because the early economic planning of the regime envisaged a rapid leap forward into industrialization, the idea encouraged by the Soviets with the promises of hundreds of factories, the Castro

³ *Ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 160.

regime deemphasized the production of sugar cane. To them, traditional Cuban dependence on this single crop was the symbol of "imperialist" oppression of the pre-Castro era.

As the hard facts of economic life bore down on them, however, Castro-Communist planners began to face the reality that Cuba's destiny as a viable nation depended in the final analysis on sugar. After the relatively small harvest this year—3.8 million tons in contrast with the average annual production of 5 million tons during the past 5 years—the regime within the past few months has swung 180 degrees and begun heavily to emphasize sugar production; thousands of acres taken out of cane during the years of deemphasis on sugar are to be rushed back into sugar production next year. Why?

On his return from Moscow in May, Castro announced that henceforth Cuba's economy would be governed by the "international division of labor," meaning that Castro had accepted the higher judgment of the Soviets that Cuba's role in the Communist bloc had to be that of a producer of raw materials.

Consciously or not, Castro had yoked Cuba to the modern-day mercantile system of Soviet imperialism that has the mother country, in this case Russia, using its colony, here Cuba, as a source of raw materials and a captive market for manufactures. And the machine of the Cuban Government now is trying to apply Moscow's dictate to practice. It is clear, if Castro's decision was a conscious one, that the Soviets had convinced him they could not continue pouring money down his rathole unless he put his economy in order and on their terms. To do that it was necessary to jettison all the fine slogans about industrial diversification and enroll the population in a new campaign to produce sugar.

Efforts already are under way in this and other fields to force the Cuban worker to increase production through various means, including the establishment of work norms on the Soviet model, the so-called "emulation" campaign, and controls on wages that further reduce both the workers' real incomes and their individual liberties.

It also is clear that part and parcel of the Soviet instruction to Castro to consolidate his regime economically was an order that he build

up the single Communist Party in Cuba. It will be interesting to see if this order is carried out, implying as it does the further downgrading of Castro's most reliable base of support, the largely non-Communist 26th of July movement.

Castro's Shift to Peiping

For a time, on his return from Moscow, Castro seemed to observe the Soviet dictate that he should follow a "peaceful coexistence" line and mute his strident calls to other Latin American nations to rise in violent revolution in order to concentrate on his domestic economic problems. It was no small surprise, then, when on July 26, the 10th anniversary of his movement, he ignored the domestic problems he was expected to discuss and launched into a long exhortation renewing his appeal for revolution in the Americas on the Cuban model. That this was no accident, with Fidel merely carried away by his own rhetoric, can be seen in the fact that at the same time "Che" Guevara, the brain of the revolution, in which Fidel is the heart and Raúl the fist, began issuing polemics designed to convince the activist revolutionaries in other Latin American countries that not only had they the duty to rise up; they had the capacity. Thus the head and the heart of the revolution currently seem to be in accord again that now is the time for the extreme left to make a forceful bid for power in the hemisphere, resuming the theme they dropped last January in favor of a softer line.

Whether this is only another shift in Castro's erratic course of the past year remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen what response it evokes in Latin America, for, with the exception of Venezuela, the extreme left has tended largely to follow the "peaceful" Moscow line, preferring infiltration and political means to achieve power rather than the violent path. To most of these groups, the resort to violence is a confession of weakness, coming at a time when they are trying to pose as respectable political movements; moreover, they fear that violent tactics might produce strong counterreactions in many of these countries.

This shift raises interesting questions about Castro's stance in the Moscow-Peiping quarrel.

It clearly puts him on record in favor of a policy line in Latin America which, while both necessary to his political future in Cuba, where he needs early successes, and congenial to his personal penchant for revolutionary violence, would appear to put him much closer to Peiping than to Moscow in what is becoming an increasingly bitter struggle. It is also not without interest that Cuba is the only Communist country tied closely to and dependent on Moscow that has not signed the nuclear test ban treaty. It is on the same side of the fence as Communist China and Albania on this issue. But we have seen how dependent Cuba is on the Soviet bloc economically. Castro's heart seems again to have shifted to Peiping, leaving his stomach in Moscow. This hardly seems a prescription for a long life.

It is interesting also that in view of the reluctance of most of the older Moscow-line Communist parties of Latin America to embark on violence, Castro has been forced to depend on assorted extremists—anarchists, Stalinists, Trotskyites, et cetera. His dogmatic imperative would appear to be violence and terror rather than any one of the Marxist ideologies.

Meeting the Challenge of Communism

Regardless of Castro's immediate prospects with this new tactic, there remains in Latin America a combination of elements that, with or without him, promises to advance the cause of communism in the hemisphere unless checked by resolute action on the part of the forces of democracy and freedom. The social rigidities of many Latin American countries, plus widespread economic want, are, of course, most fertile areas for Communist incubation.

And Marxist teaching and Communist propaganda and infiltration, it should be remembered, did not arrive in the hemisphere with Castro. Even today Communist parties in Latin America have a life and a force of their own and are not wholly dependent on outside nourishment or guidance. A clear pattern has been established, for example, in accordance with which communism in recent years has been able to advance by making common cause with indigenous leftist, ultranationalist groups. Indeed, I often wonder which—the Latin American Commu-

nist or the destructive ultranationalist—is the more dangerous adversary to freedom and progress.

The steps we are taking in concert with our Latin American partners in the Alliance for Progress, which I shall touch on later, constitute the most effective long-term check on these subversive elements. The revolutionaries know this too, and the increased emphasis on violence reflects, first, the loss of hope of early access to power by political means resulting from the loss of popular support and sympathy at the time of the missile crisis, and second, a growing sense of the urgency of preventing the success of the alliance. Violence and terror are means to the end, whether they lead to such disorder that the private investment, on which the economic goals of the alliance so much depend, will not take place, or whether they lead to rightist coup military or civilian, which not only stop violence but stop progress as well and thereby magnify the appeal of the Communists. We must remember that the leaders of the current terrorism in Venezuela got their training and their clear dedication to violence in fighting the Venezuelan military dictator, Pérez Jiménez.

To meet this challenge, we now have under way a number of specific programs for confronting and defeating communism in Latin America. Earlier I mentioned the United States military interdiction of Cuba, which is in part designed to thwart any attempt to export arms or men to other countries in Latin America in support of local subversion campaigns. The blocking controls limit the dollar assets which might be used to finance these campaigns. The absence of any free-world ship passenger service to Cuba and the very limited contact by air sharply reduce the means by which the regime can move agents into and out of these countries.

In the sphere of bilateral arrangements, at the request of the governments concerned the United States is supporting extensive internal security programs in most countries to increase the capability of the police and military forces to prevent and suppress Communist-inspired disorders, terrorism, sabotage, or guerrilla operations.

As part of our cooperation with the Organization of American States, the United States is working diligently to improve the capability of

the hemisphere to counter effectively Castro communism in Latin America. The Council of the OAS last July approved an important list of measures for attacking Communist subversion and urged their prompt implementation by the member governments. The Central American countries and Panama have worked out special security arrangements for the isthmian area, in which we are assisting.⁴

While in the aggregate these measures constitute a formidable defense for the free nations of this hemisphere, they are, I must repeat, only a short-term defensive posture designed to give us time to deal with the fundamental problems which have produced the phenomenon of communism in the Americas. Latin America cannot realize its destiny by anticommunism alone. In fact, if there were not a Communist ideology to exploit these problems, something else would take its place. The problems cannot be buried or forgotten. People will find ways to make their needs known and to get their demands met.

Objectives of Alliance for Progress

The real long-term solution, of course, lies in the correction of these underlying problems, and it is to this that the Alliance for Progress is devoted.

A detailed outline of our mutual achievements so far and an appraisal of our prospects for ultimate success would alone require a speech or two, probably rather dull ones too. I would like therefore just to philosophize a few moments about what the alliance is really trying to do and about the United States role in it.

While there are many facets to the alliance, I group them under some five closely interrelated objectives:

1. Political development toward greater stability and wisdom.
2. Institutional change.
3. Social development.
4. Economic development.
5. Individual attitude change.

Many people think of the problems of the developing world almost exclusively in terms of economic growth. I put political development first, because I think it comes first from

nearly every standpoint. For the individual to be able to participate freely in a successful political system is a good in itself. But political maturity also is essential to sound institutional change and to economic and social development. Without it, private enterprise does not find the assurances it needs to risk its capital. Without it, resources cannot be commanded or wisely utilized for public infrastructure. Social services will be inefficient or lacking. The legal framework for the life of the community will be inappropriate, or laws will remain dead letters. Our lives must be touched at every turn by government in order for our complex modern social system to function with a minimum of friction and disorder. We all therefore have a fundamental interest in the quality of government in the developing countries which must cope with the tensions of rapid change.

Institutional reform, a central feature of the alliance concept, is largely a function of political decisions and can be no better than the political wisdom of the people and their government. At the same time, basic reforms are essential to political stability. Without a wider distribution of political and economic power, unrest and tension can block the development of mature, efficient, perhaps even democratic political institutions. And the continued lack of opportunities for advancement on the basis of ability, without regard to social or economic status, will not only feed unrest but deprive the society of urgently needed human resources.

There is something of a chicken-and-egg problem here, and it will appear again, for change will not wait but must take place before conditions can exist for it to be surely sound and wise. There will therefore inevitably be mistakes and injustices and disorder. And progress, as perhaps always in human history, will be a sawtooth rather than a smooth curve—but hopefully with an upward trend.

Closely related to institutional change is social development. Its importance derives from the necessity for providing direct and immediate improvements in the lives of the underprivileged. This is so not only for humanitarian reasons, justified as these are in most cases. It is also because we are in an era of rising expectations in which it is not politically possible to wait for improved economic activity to be re-

⁴For background, see *ibid.*, May 6, 1963, p. 719.

flected eventually in improved social conditions. Funds and effort must be consciously directed to the correction of present evils, and largely by government action.

Important as these reasons for social development programs are, they overlook a fundamental longer term economic dividend from such investments. For, far from being only a naturally deferred result of substantial economic growth, investment of capital in health, education, and housing programs has repeatedly been demonstrated to bring big returns in productivity in factories and on farms. Production costs are higher in Latin America than in most less developed countries, and one reason is certainly health and education deficiencies. We in the United States have long recognized the vital role early investments in our educational system played in making possible our unprecedented rate of economic growth.

Economic development is so much the center of attention that there is little I need add. It depends in substantial part on rapidly increasing investment of both domestic and foreign private capital. This, in addition to the development of markets, depends on a reassuring climate for private enterprise which governments can do much to make or destroy. To governments we look for public order, for adequate provision of the public infrastructure on which private capital everywhere depends, and for fiscal and financial policies which will insure that revenues collected produce commensurate public benefits and that budget deficits do not cause ruinous inflation which scares off sound private investment.

In its turn, economic growth has a most important contribution to make to political stability. It provides a larger base from which to secure public revenues and thus makes it easier to meet the demands of social and economic development on the public purse without incurring budget deficits of the kind which provokes widespread crises. And of course, even more than health and education or housing, most Latin Americans, like Americans, want above all a job. Unemployment is the most basic source of political unrest and dissatisfaction.

Millions in Latin America are thus involved in a vicious circle, for it is hard for one who has been unemployed or seriously underemployed

for years to see that the present private enterprise system has done much for him. It is not surprising that it is hard for him to understand why he should be interested in protecting it and expanding it.

This leads us to one of the most basic obstacles to an adequate rate of economic development in Latin America today. For it takes a substantial amount of capital to put a man to work, and it is difficult to see where it will all come from if population keeps growing at its present rate. At 2.8 percent per year, it is the highest rate of any major area of the world. The Alliance for Progress goal is a per capita increase of 2.5 percent per year in GNP during the 1960's. The population rise therefore requires a 5.3 percent total increase, a rate seldom achieved by any country over a long period. Too much capital has to go into providing jobs, and too little is left for productive investment that will increase incomes over the longer term.

The fifth and final major area in which the alliance must work is a sort of shadowland—that of changing individual attitudes. Such changes are, of course, an essential ingredient of all the preceding programs. This is not just a matter of superficial points of view, nor of passing enthusiasms, helpful as these may be. Rather, it is a question of changing attitudes molded by a cultural tradition of four centuries in this hemisphere and many more in the Iberian Peninsula and pre-Columbian America. This culture is less alien to the traditions of modern industrial Atlantic society than those of the Middle and Far East and Africa and has thus suffered less shock and erosion than they from conflict with it and is therefore less malleable. Yet at crucial points its very values impede the successful development of a 20th century scientific and industrial culture whose material and other benefits are so much desired.

Attitudes and values deriving from long lived institutions are not changed quickly. The history of the human race prior to the last three or four centuries has been characterized by repetition more than change; man is not well adapted to abandoning quickly the way his ancestors thought and acted. We in this country can perhaps better understand what is involved in view of the crises of attitudes we are going through as the result of accelerated prog-

ress in equal treatment for Negroes, some hundred years after they were legally emancipated and given an equal treatment under the law.

Many kinds of changes in attitudes and values are involved. Among them is a view of the importance of precision in measurement, whether of time, or costs, or distances; a pragmatic rather than doctrinaire approach to the solution of differences and problems; an appreciation of the value of work with the hands and of scientific knowledge as compared to humanistic studies; a sense of public responsibility and public trust and through this of more respect for the contribution of good government to the public welfare; more team spirit and less individualism; an understanding of the importance of social and economic opportunity and mobility guided by performance rather than status.

Thousands of Latin Americans understand these matters and have made these changes, but it must become millions.

The U.S. and the People of Latin America

So much for a general outline of the areas in which unprecedented progress must be made in the decade of the sixties if the Alliance for Progress is to succeed, or, even more important, if the minimum of essential improvements in the conditions and opportunities of life for the vast majority of the people of Latin America are to be made. That they must be made is beyond question. Latin Americans no longer are willing to accept a 20th-century standard of living that is one-tenth that of the average in the United States and one-half that of Western Europe. President Kennedy recognized this when he said, ⁵ "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable."

What must we in the United States do as partners in this unprecedented effort, bearing in mind that we are the junior partners and that the vast bulk of the decisions and sacrifices and work falls on the Latin Americans themselves? Our problems are largely ones of attitudes too. The first requirement of us is that we be tolerant and patient of the turmoil, the disappointments, the disorder, the bitter criticisms of the alliance from both right and left extremes, that are as

certain as history to accompany a period of change of the kind in store for Latin America.

Secondly, United States policy in Latin America puts primary emphasis on assisting the countries and peoples of the area to realize *their* aspirations for a richer and fuller life, for a greater participation by all citizens in the cultural, material, and spiritual benefits which the 20th century has to offer.

We want the peoples of each of the 22 countries of the area, including Cuba, to be free to choose the political and economic and social system which *they* think will best fulfill their aspirations and to be able periodically to review and revise that choice and elect those leaders who can help them reach their goals.

We believe there is no better way for a politically mature people to assure that their government is responsive to their needs. We also believe that no government which is not so chosen by its citizens can command the support and sacrifices necessary to enable a society to put its full energies into the task of breaking both the old habit patterns and the physical limits of the past.

We are therefore convinced that the drive to develop can only have real vitality if the end and means are of a people's own choosing as the best for them. We cannot look for carbon copies of the United States to succeed or even for all the Latin American countries to follow similar paths. Our resources, our histories, our individual wants and capacities are all different, and so must be our futures if they are to have depth and meaning and enrich the lives of those to come.

Rightfully proud as we are of the success of our way of doing things, we must therefore accept the fact that they will and often should do things differently. We must try to help them out of our own experience to reach their objectives, and by their own routes. Our role calls for an attitude of tolerance toward differences that will not be an easy one for a country as proud of its great achievements as we are to maintain.

A third attitude we will need to cultivate is that of patience. It is important for us to keep aware of our history, past and current, to realize how long it has taken us to solve some of the problems with which the Latin Americans are

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1962, p. 539.

struggling and to remember how many of them we are still wrestling with. Racial equality, tax reform, honesty in government, nepotism, the spoils system, the right division of roles between government and private enterprise, how to give our children the education they need for tomorrow's world and how to pay for it, how to handle our farm surpluses, are just a few of the problems we share. These are all tough ones for which we are still seeking answers, and we should not expect overnight miracles from those who start with fewer assets to solve them than we.

Fourthly, I wish to stress that we shall never succeed in giving them of our best—and they want and need it—unless our giving puts primary emphasis on people. Attitudes are changed by people much faster than by books or money. Education is at heart a person-to-person process. Friends are made by people, not dollars. Unless enough Americans of talent and dedication are willing to spend some part of their lives, often under physically uncomfortable conditions, sharing what they have learned, we cannot hope to reap credit for fulfilling our role. And from many I have talked to, it ends up not in just “spending” but in “collecting” an experience of satisfaction in achievement, in an impact on people's lives, now and for the long-term future.

But, of course, while I put people and attitudes first, we cannot succeed without money. We must help prime the pump and get the engine of development moving fast enough and soon enough to defeat the hopes of our enemies, the Communists. An amount which is small in relation to what we have left for luxuries can be the difference between physical and mental and moral starvation and an opportunity to live a decent life with hope for a better future, for their children if not themselves. It is this ability to hope, to see a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel, which is crucial to keeping people believing that our way of life is worth working for and, if need be, fighting and dying for.

These are heavy demands on us, but no greater than we have met before in our history in developing this great and rich continent. I am confident that our people are increasingly becoming aware of what is needed and that they will measure up to the task.

U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference To Be Held at Washington

Press release 491 dated September 26

The Second U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange will be held at Washington, October 16-22, the Department of State announced on September 26.

Heading the American delegation will be Hugh Borton, president of Haverford College and scholar in Japanese history, who was also chairman of the American delegation at the first conference at Tokyo in January 1962. Other American delegates will be Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs; Charles B. Fahs, Minister-Counselor for Cultural and Public Affairs of the American Embassy at Tokyo; Richard McKinnon, associate director of the Center for Asian Arts, University of Washington; Edward R. Murrow, Director of the U.S. Information Agency; Donald Oenslager, stage designer and theater consultant; John D. Rockefeller III, president of the Japan Society; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., historian and Special Assistant to the President; and Joseph K. Yamagiwa, chairman of the Department of Far Eastern Languages and Literature, University of Michigan.

The Japanese delegation will be headed by Tatsuo Morito, president-emeritus of Hiroshima University and currently president, Japan Scholarship Foundation (Nihon Ikuei Kai), and chairman, Central Council for Education, Ministry of Education. Other Japanese delegates are Isao Amagi, director of Research Bureau, Ministry of Education; Shintaro Fukushima, Japanese delegate to the United Nations and president of the Japan Times; Shoji Hamada, ceramic artist, now in the United States; Hideo Kishimoto, director, Tokyo University Library; Yoshinori Maeda, vice president of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK); Saburo Matsukata, president of Japan International Television Film Exchange, Inc.; Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary Susumu Nakagawa, Japanese Embassy, Washington, D.C.; Takashi Sugawara, playwright; Shohei Takamura, president of Keio University; Kogoro Uemura, vice president of the Japanese Federation of Economic

Organizations; Kikuchi Yonezawa, director of the Society for International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai).

Five major topics will comprise the agenda for the conference. The conference will open with reports from both delegations on the progress achieved on the recommendations made at the Tokyo meeting. The other topics are: improving the exchange of educational television programs between the two countries; increasing the translation and abstracting of Japanese scholarly information; broadening Japanese

studies in the United States and American studies in Japan; and promoting wider exchanges in the performing arts.

Agreement to hold a binational conference on cultural and educational interchange was reached during the talks between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda in June 1961 in Washington.¹ The present conference was called for in the final communique issued at the close of the first meeting.

¹ BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 57.

Vice President Johnson Visits Northern Europe

Vice President and Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson, with their daughter Linda Bird, made a trip to northern Europe, leaving Washington on September 2 and returning on September 17. Following is the text of one of the addresses made by the Vice President in each of the countries he visited, together with a press statement agreed upon and issued jointly at Helsinki by Mr. Johnson and President Urho K. Kekkonen on September 10 at the conclusion of the Vice President's visit to Finland.

City Council, Göteborg, Sweden, September 4

We are most grateful for this opportunity to visit your historic city—from which so many of your fine countrymen sailed to become our countrymen in America.

In my land, Göteborg is most often known as "Gothenburg." In the same manner, many families who left your land as Jonssons or Johanssons are known in America as Johnsons. While I cannot claim direct kinship, I can say that as an American—and as a Johnson—I feel very much at home in Sweden, wherever we go.

Your friendly reception has drawn us even closer in those happy and honorable bonds which the people of Sweden and America have shared for so long. We can hope—and expect—that in the future, as in the past, the most conspicuous differences between us will be

no more significant than matters of spelling.

It is especially appropriate that our journey of friendship should bring us here. In years past, your port was the gateway to America for hundreds of thousands. Today it is, as you proudly say, the gateway to northern Europe. Your country—and your region—is making a most significant and growing contribution to the remarkable surge of vitality among the free nations. Swedish skills, science, and standards of quality are universally admired and envied, just as the traditional Swedish traits of stalwartness and perseverance have so long been universally respected.

We of America anticipate a role of increasing importance for all of northern Europe in the economic upsurge of the promising years immediately ahead. It is good to come to this important center and find among you that spirit of confidence, enthusiasm, and optimism so widespread in the Atlantic community now.

If you were to visit my country—as we hope you will—you would find such a new spirit present, also. Our union of many peoples, many interests, and many States has often presented us with many unique problems and challenges—as it does now. But today, as in the past, optimism and confidence are the unfailing characteristics of the American people. We feel now that for ourselves, as for the world,

this is the beginning of a new and most hopeful time.

Thirty years ago, when the United States was launched upon its great and long-sustained advance toward industrial maturity and economic abundance, we were a nation of 123 million persons. Today there are 180 million of us. Yet we are even now required to prepare for a population in the 1970's which will be twice the size of the prewar years.

It is a measure of the dynamic nature of this period that, currently, our population over 65 increases by 1,000 every day; our population of 16-year-olds will this year increase by 20,000 every week. We are challenged throughout this decade to create 200,000 new jobs every month.

The challenges are imposing, but the continuing vitality of our system is reassuring. Seventy million Americans are employed today—a new peak in our history. Average wages for our factory workers also have reached a new peak this year—of more than \$100 weekly. Only a few days ago, the legal minimum wage in our economy advanced to \$1.25 an hour. We are engaging in new programs to retrain workers for new employment in the 4 million jobs which are now unfilled.

We recognize that the necessary expansion of this period imposes extraordinary demands upon the private sector of our economy. We are, among other efforts, seeking to reduce the burden of tax rates and stimulate new investment to accelerate the growth and modernization of our industry. We are committing our resources and talents on an unprecedented scale in support of scientific research and development.

As your guest, I speak reluctantly of our affairs at home. But it is important, I believe, for others of the free world to appreciate the tides which are now running in the United States. When the facts of the dynamic American market are considered, it is clearly unrealistic for any to believe that so vital an economy as that of the United States can be excluded or ignored in the shaping of the free world's future prosperity.

We of America believe that prosperity, no less than security, is a mutual concern, a mutual activity, and a mutual responsibility among free nations. We have prepared ourselves with

new legislation to participate more effectively in the support of our traditional goal of more liberal trade among all nations. We do not believe the free world can be both prosperous and protectionist. In our attention to the many details of this present period, it is important for us all—in all regions of the free world—not to lose sight of the indispensable source of the mutual success we are privileged to enjoy together.

Foreign trade, foreign shipping, foreign policy are all important to us. But our past, present, and future success rests upon our respective policies at home—and, most especially, upon our continuing concern for the individual: the individual family, the individual youth, the individual aged, the individual worker, the individual businessman, the individual farmer and fisherman.

This cannot be overemphasized. The necessities of the age require governments to take large roles in relations and negotiations with other governments which intimately affect the lives of individuals. But we who cherish the values of the free societies would lose much if we cannot afford to lose by allowing government to eclipse or overshadow the essential dignity of the individual.

In the domestic debates and discussions of our country, we traditionally express our interest in and concern for the status of what we call the "little man." We believe that the individual without great economic power or great political power must be served by his government. His opportunity must be preserved. His right to his liberty, his human dignity must be protected against those forces which he is powerless to control alone. The "little man" is very big in the affairs of America. We believe it is a necessary goal of free societies everywhere to help the "little man" stand tall against the forces which would make him subservient—including the power of government itself.

We recognize that this tradition in America is akin to your traditions and the motivations of your own domestic objectives. In Sweden you would permit no man to starve; you want every family to live in comfort, no child to mature without education, no aged citizen to languish without care for his illnesses. In America you would find these same values not only in the

hearts of the people but in the heart of the public policies as well.

We believe government must keep its head without losing its heart. If there is kinship between us in this spirit, we can—and I am sure we do—mutually respect the fact that kinship in values does not require emulation or duplication in design of our institutions and policies.

At this particular period the independent peoples of the free world can appreciate that their strength and vitality benefits richly from the absence among us of attempts to impose universal dogma and doctrine. We are not expending our creative energies and capacities attempting to bind either the future or each other by rigid concepts or preachments of the past. This is a source of strength we must cherish and guard ourselves against temptations to compromise in our own relations.

We in America have evolved for our own needs a system of responsible private enterprise. We have no thought of departing from this system and its precepts. We aim not to enlarge the powers of government over the individual but to strengthen the power of the individual to stand against the challenges he encounters. We believe government must concern itself with maintaining a floor under the lives and opportunities of the people without becoming itself a ceiling over their aspirations or attainments.

In this context perhaps the policies and directions of our American system may be more readily understood. We believe government must serve all sectors without becoming the partisan of one or the master of others. Hence we believe government should be concerned with the earnings of workers and the earnings of capital alike. We believe government should be concerned with opportunity for youth—and opportunity for investors.

We believe that our Government serves its responsibility by working for freer trade among all nations while at the same time taking measures necessary to assure our nation of a private maritime capacity. America's commerce is great and growing, the largest volume of any nation. Our Congress does not regard it as restrictive when 90 percent of that commerce is open to competitive bidding by carriers of other nations, with only 10 percent reserved for shipment in American bottoms—to assure a base for

our own maritime capability in the event of international emergency.

We work, in all that we do, for the greater prosperity of all—for Americans, for the people of Sweden, the peoples of all lands. In our efforts we are guided by the friendly and steadfast desire for your success as well as our own. We believe that in attitudes of mutual respect, understanding, and cooperation we shall succeed together as we stand together.

**Finnish-American Society, Helsinki, Finland,
September 7**

Mr. President, friends of the Finnish-American Society: Our visit to Finland is a visit Mrs. Johnson and I have long anticipated. We have heard much about the beauty and wonders of your country from Ambassador and Mrs. Seppälä, who are here tonight and who were guests at our ranch home in Texas earlier this year. Finland surpasses even your Ambassador's considerable gifts of description.

Your heartwarming welcome, the impressiveness of this thriving capital city of Helsinki, the friendliness of your people, the graciousness of your elected leaders, all have impressed us. We shall return to America with gratifying memories of these eventful days in Finland.

Having seen your country firsthand, it is possible to appreciate even more those characteristics which have made Finnish Americans such valued citizens of our country through the years. Those who have come to America from Finland have brought sturdiness and enterprise, but, even more, they have contributed to us those special Finnish talents of imagination and creativeness in many fields.

The character of a nation in relations with other nations is a reflection of the character and purposes of its own citizens and their relations with one another.

Since the beginning of our history we in America have been challenged to perfect a successful system while uniting many strains from many regions of the world. To the extent we have succeeded, it is because we have devoted ourselves to fulfilling the founding concept of our system, expressed in our Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they

are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."

This great ideal did not come into being full-blown. For 180 years it has been the constant work of our American system to give this goal a broader meaning for all our people. We are justly proud that the history of the United States is a history of adding to—rather than taking from—the personal liberty, independence, and individual dignity of our people.

Whatever his status in life, every citizen has the constitutional guarantee of the right of petition, the right of free speech, the right to publish and distribute his peaceful protests and comments without fear of reprisal.

We maintain an open society without concealment, without suppression. We are not fearful of the world knowing our shortcomings or our problems because we are confident of the capacity of our own system to overcome those shortcomings and cure those problems.

Today, Americans who are a racial minority—those of Negro ancestry—are petitioning in our land for greater fulfillment of the promises of our democratic system. Their petition is being heard and heeded. Our system does not permit—and will not tolerate—those devices of deportation, confinement, or persecution by which, under one system, majorities shut off the appeal of minorities.

We are proud of the responsibility and the contributions such Americans are making to our society. We are especially proud to be represented in Finland by one of our most outstanding young Americans—my good friend and close associate, whose absence from Washington we regret so much, Ambassador Rowan.

Ten years ago one of our leading American organizations studied the achievements and talents of all our young men and on a competitive basis selected Carl Rowan as one of the 10 most outstanding young Americans. Carl won many honors for his work in Minneapolis, which is the leading city of the State of Minnesota, one of the States where many persons of Scandinavian origin settled. We felt especially fortunate that he accepted this important post because few young Americans are so well qualified for service here.

In recalling the pattern of our American con-

cepts and beliefs, I described for you the essential foundation of America's policy in the world. Our purposes in this century in all regions of the world reflect the values and objectives of our life at home. We have designs against neither the territories of other nations nor the independence of other peoples. Only within the past 2 weeks our Government returned to the Government of Mexico a segment of territory in my own State of Texas to which Mexico had a just claim.¹ We live in peace with our neighbors, sharing friendly and open common borders with both Mexico and Canada. It is indicative also that, only within the past few years, our Union has increased from 48 to 50 States because the people of both Alaska and Hawaii have petitioned and consented to a voluntary union with us.

Having learned and proved from our own experience that men can overcome the most ancient of hostilities and suspicions to live together in peace, harmony, and cooperation, it is repugnant to us that people and territories should ever be absorbed by force or threat of force—whether in Europe, Asia, or elsewhere. We do not believe any doctrine or dogma is valid or worthy when it rests upon precepts of conquest, subversion, or domination of other peoples against their will.

We do not believe that right is determined by might. We do believe free nations must be prepared and ready to use their might in support of right.

Twenty years ago the United States alone possessed the power of the atomic bomb. We used this awesome new force to end the aggression of those who were attempting to enslave the world. When peace was obtained, the United States promptly renounced the use of this power under the terms of the Baruch plan which it offered to the world. Unfortunately this was not accepted by those who wished to add atomic power to the power of their massive land armies.

Since then, we of the United States have worked unceasingly for effective controls on the power of the atom and to channel its use to peaceful purposes. We have labored long

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 23, 1963, p. 480.

patiently, and untiringly to secure the limited test ban treaty in Moscow²—and we welcome the support of Finland's signature to this first significant agreement. The new treaty is only a beginning, and we recognize it as such. But it will serve to protect the people of the world—and certainly the people of Finland—from the hazards of radioactive fallout.

In working as we do work for peace, we labor for the triumph of right—not the triumphs of power. While some believe otherwise, we of the United States deeply believe that the affairs of nations in their relations with each other must finally rest upon standards and concepts of international morality. If there were no concepts of international morality—if there were no standards of values among all mankind—there would be no Charter of the United Nations. Under that charter, no nation—large or small—is to use force or threaten to use force against a nation which does not threaten it. To this concept we of the United States—like you of Finland—give our strongest and most unwavering support.

As fellow members with you of the United Nations, we of the United States compliment and congratulate Finland for the responsible role you have taken in the work of this vital organization. Where others have not, Finland has consistently met its financial obligations to the United Nations. In the Suez, in Lebanon, and in Kashmir, your officers and men have filled valued roles in times of emergency. Your support has helped maintain the peacekeeping operations in the Congo. And just the other day you announced your intention to create a standby military force which can be a most useful addition to the peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations.

Finland has, in fullest measure, lived up to the principle enunciated by your President himself in 1961 that the United Nations should concern itself with constructive efforts—and realizable objectives. Finland, furthermore, contributes both financially and in terms of talent to the United Nations technical assistance program in less developed countries, and certainly the progress of your own land should be an inspiration and guide to those who are

organizing their new societies. You have learned and applied, as we in the United States have done also, the lessons of the benefits to be achieved from industrialization through the processes of a liberal democracy.

This mission which brings us to your country comes at a timely moment of hope, both in the affairs of the world and in the affairs of our own country. We of the United States are experiencing the beginning of a further decisive upward surge of our economy, and we are making important progress in the greater unity and strength of our society. We hopefully believe this progress will not be—and need not be—unique to our own land.

Over the years since World War II, more new nations have been formed by their people than in any comparable period of world history. It is of greatest significance, we believe, that the people of these new lands have consistently and unfailingly rejected an ideological totalitarianism and chosen freedom without domination by or submission to alien ideologies or systems. Free societies and free systems are the basic tools of men everywhere when they assume the privilege and right of determining their own affairs.

We believe the years immediately ahead will see the entire world reap a bountiful harvest from this choice. A new day of broader prosperity and common abundance is dawning for humankind. We who have enjoyed good fortune and success in our own American system work and pray for the day when all men of every land may enjoy a more bountiful and satisfying life together.

Whatever the future may hold, you may know that the bonds of friendship between Finland and America will remain strong and steadfast.

Joint Press Statement, Helsinki, September 10

During his visit to Finland, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson had two meetings with President Kekkonen. During their meetings the President and Mr. Johnson had an exchange of views on the international situation as well as on relations between Finland and the United States. President Kekkonen and the Vice President agreed that the treaty on a partial nuclear test ban was a hopeful first step toward the

² *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314.

lessening of world tensions and toward general disarmament. They agreed that the United Nations is a vital force for maintaining world peace. While expressing awareness of the obstacles that still lie in the way of securing peace, they reaffirmed their conviction that all disputes between nations must be solved by peaceful means in accord with the principles of the U.N. Charter. In this connection President Kekkonen paid tribute to the efforts made by the President of the United States on behalf of international peace and cooperation.

President Kekkonen and Vice President Johnson noted with satisfaction that relations between the United States and Finland are not burdened by any outstanding political problems and that the traditional ties of friendship between the two countries had been further strengthened. They also discussed a number of matters relating to trade between Finland and the United States. They agreed that both nations had a vital interest in increasing trade between themselves as well as in promoting the further development of international trade.

Dinner Given by Prime Minister John Lyng, Oslo, Norway, September 11

Mr. Prime Minister, friends of Norway: At the end of this first day in your country and among your people, there is a warm flame of good friendship and closeness in our hearts. At Bodö yesterday, in Oslo last night, and again today in our talks and travels about your city we have felt the strength of the resolute Norwegian people in every friendly contact. The high point of these hours was, of course, our privilege in being the guest and enjoying the inspiring exchange with His Majesty [King Olav V] at noon.

Through many years and many seasons the people of the United States have admired the character and courage of the people of Norway. We have been drawn close by the ties of kinship established by those natives of Norway who have honored us by coming to live on our shores.

Today, at this season in world affairs, it is a matter of great pride for us to be able to stand with Norway as allies in NATO and as allies in the greater and broader work of preserving both freedom and peace.

Here in this land, we of America feel a special sense of historic debt. It was the great Viking heroes who first crossed the sea between us to discover the New World where America was born. Long before there was an American in history—or a United States—an impressive civilization flourished here.

Today our common concern is the future, not the past. Where yesterday brought us together in common purpose, common values, common principles, and common hopes, it is our belief now that the common experience of the future can and will present more opportunities for closer unity in both purpose and effort.

We of the United States live with the belief today that the world is entering one of the most hopeful periods in the history of mankind.

We recognize, as you recognize, that the age of peril and danger is still with us. The time has not come when free men can drop their guard or cease their vigilance. It is doubtful that such a time would ever come, for eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. But we can look about the world—and especially to the nations of the North Atlantic community—and see now the existence of great new strength and potential.

There is greater hope for maintaining and assuring world peace. We do not overestimate the first tentative steps toward that high goal, but we do find it more hopeful and more encouraging that such steps can be taken at all.

There is cause for greater confidence in the ultimate spread of universal freedom. This is not a nebulous and vague conjecture. Very tangible evidence exists in support of this faith. Since the end of World War II, more new nations have come into being than ever before. Of these new nations, not one has chosen to place itself under an ideological totalitarianism; all have sought to establish and perfect a free system.

There is a strong, fresh tide running for freedom, for justice, for individual integrity and decency. Furthermore, there is among free peoples a will to succeed in helping the world to raise the standards by which all men live.

As we look ahead into the immediate years to come we can see uncharted seas where we have need of the explorers of the human mind and spirit carrying forward the Norwegian tradition.

tion of independence of thought and intrepidity of action. The free world has need of modern-day Nansens and of Amundsens if it is to understand the new era and to reach the new world of assured peace, sustained prosperity, and international good will.

What we need to see together is this. The economic foundations of modern civilization are shifting—from exclusive dependence on products made from basic materials of earth and sea to those requiring a higher content of the mental capacity of man. The era of iron, of coal, of unskilled mass labor is passing. In its place is coming the rapid development of a world economy based on precision instruments, on computer machines, on electronics, on petrochemicals. This is a new industrial age—a second industrial revolution.

What attracted so many of the sons of Norway to the United States in decades gone by were the broad empty acres of the Middle West farmlands. There, with their characteristic energy and determination, they performed heavy manual and physical labor to feed the growing millions. Today, with the technical revolution applied to farming, less than 11 percent of our population feeds the rest of the country. Each American farmer produces enough food for himself and 27 other persons, and we are privileged to have surplus supplies which are being used to help feed millions in other lands.

Youthful descendants of those respected and honored Norwegian settlers are found today less and less on farms working with their muscles and more and more in schools, universities, and technical institutions working with their minds. The emphasis today and in the future will be on quality and above all on the quality of the mind and heart.

Here we believe is Norway's opportunity. Norway's population may be smaller and your natural resources more limited. But there is no limit to the capabilities and genius of your people—especially your young. Economic resources will be measured less and less by coal production or supply of workers. It will be measured more and more by products of the test tube and the laboratory. In the marketplace of ideas small powers and great powers need to become equal.

It is in the field of international affairs where progress needs most to be made and where urgency is greatest. Here Norway has been a pioneer. Norway's influence in world councils as a democratic, progressive, forward-looking country is high. My Government looks ahead with anticipation to a close collaboration with your new Government in the future even as we have with the previous Norwegian governments in the past. Norway's influence in the councils of the United Nations has not been reckoned by the size of its population or the amount of its natural resources. It has provided men and money through the United Nations to keep the peace and strengthen this great world institution.

In the North Atlantic Council the wisdom and courage of Norway have played an important role. It is the strength of the NATO alliance, the devotion and sense of dedication of its members, which provide the solid foundation from which we all hope to make further steps toward a more assured peace and a relaxation of tensions as symbolized by the nuclear test ban treaty, of which Norway was one of the early signatories.

Your country and mine are connected by the broad reaches of the Atlantic Ocean. We seek together to build and strengthen an Atlantic community to which we both belong—a community of likeminded nations, not shackled by an imposed ideology but united by common ideals of democracy and freedom, depending for our strength on the soaring minds of free men. We must cooperate together to build and maintain an international way of life which will allow the new era which we see rising before us to fulfill its promise as an era of hope and progress, of peace and prosperity.

**Danish Student Association, Copenhagen,
Denmark, September 14**

May I express to you of this audience, and to the officers of the Student Association, my deep gratitude for making this occasion such a memorable climax to a most heartening day.

Over the past 2½ years, as Vice President of the United States, it has been my privilege to visit in some 25 countries. Many of those experiences have been heartwarming and unforgettable. But I can truthfully say to you,

as a grateful guest—and as an appreciative American—that no visit will live longer in our memories than this stay in Denmark.

From my Government's viewpoint, the conversations with your able leadership have been most significant and important. Our meetings have been entirely frank and entirely friendly, and I shall return to Washington with a report on Danish-American relations which I know President Kennedy will find most gratifying.

I have personally expressed my appreciation to the Prime Minister [J. O. Krag] for our gracious reception in your country. I want, also, to express my gratitude to the people of Copenhagen for the warmth of their welcome. We shall take our leave on Monday reluctantly and anticipate our return most enthusiastically.

Our mission to all of Scandinavia—to Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Iceland, as well as Denmark—represents the first time that a President of the United States has asked the Vice President to come to this region. This is, of itself, a measure of the importance the United States attaches to both the present achievements and the future potential of the good neighbors of northern Europe.

It is another measure of our feeling that for the vital post of Ambassador to your country President Kennedy has sent one of America's most outstanding and widely known public figures, Ambassador Blair. We regret not having the Ambassador and his gracious lady in Washington, but we all appreciate the warmth you have extended to them here.

May I say that we in Washington are grateful to you for sending to us such able representatives as your Ambassador [Count Kield Gustav Knuth-Winterfeldt] and his wife—whom Mrs. Johnson and I are proud to count as our personal friends.

On this occasion tonight I want to talk with you, as I have with the officials of your Government, about certain of America's programs and purposes in the realm of space exploration. My purpose is not to talk of what America is doing alone but, rather, to suggest what, in the years ahead, America and Denmark and all the countries of the world can be doing together.

The space program of the United States today is the largest effort ever undertaken by any nation, at any time in history, to advance

the frontiers of human knowledge. Our budget this year will exceed \$7 billion for this program—an amount exceeding \$1,000 per resident of Denmark.

Why are we doing this? Why is the American taxpayer willing to support a program of such magnitude? Who will be the ultimate beneficiary of this enterprise?

Those questions are answered in part by the initial declaration of the Johnson-McCormack Space Act, which I was privileged to authorize 6 years ago as a Senator at the beginning of this age of space. In our basic law, establishing civilian control over our space activities, Congress declared that America's space effort "should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." Furthermore, that law expressly provides for "cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in work pursuant to the Act and the peaceful applications of the results thereof."

We are now observing both the letter and the spirit of that direction.

We have instituted programs of cooperation in outer space activities with more than 60 nations. More than 4,000 leading scientists from 54 countries have studied and worked with our space program because we are not proceeding behind a cloud of secrecy attempting to hide our failures or monopolize our successes.

Only two nations have the capability at present of launching rockets into space. For our part, we of the United States have established cooperative agreements with 11 other nations, including Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—to use our rockets and share scientific information together. Just this week such cooperation produced effective dividends again with the fifth successful ionospheric probe launched cooperatively by your country, Norway, and the United States.

Our weather satellites are being used to provide valuable information to 35 nations—they have provided several countries with advance warnings of ocean storms, hurricanes, and typhoons which have permitted the saving of many lives and much property.

International cooperation in space—assisted by the American people and their Congress—is already an accomplished and significant fact. But what we see today is only the smallest forerunner of what is to come.

We are not engaged in a mere race for national prestige. We are engaged in a great joint adventure to improve life for man upon this earth. Some may question today whether the exploration of space has practical meaning and value. I am sure that centuries ago those great masters of the sea who sailed from your shores to explore the Atlantic and discover the New World were asked such questions too.

But we believe the objectives of the space program answer the questions forcefully and effectively.

Does it have value for a farmer to know how much rain there will be for his crops during the coming season? Does it have meaning for a fisherman to know when and where there will be storms over the seas during the next 2 weeks or the next 2 months? Does it have value for us to be able to detect fires smoldering on the floors of our great forests before they can consume the trees—or to predict in advance the spring-ne runoff from melting snows?

These are not fanciful questions. In a very few short years, projects now underway will provide us with such capabilities.

This is by no means all. In future years scholars in distant lands will be able to receive and use the contents of all the great libraries of the world, with books as lengthy as the Bible transmitted and delivered around the globe in much less than a minute. International businessmen will be able to see and talk with colleagues on every continent—or the masters of ships on the seas. Researchers in faraway South Asia will be able to solve their intricate problems on computers located in Scandinavia. I could give countless other examples of what is to be—what is coming far faster than we realize. The inventions of the early 20th century—such as the radio, telegraph, telephone, and others—evolved over a period of decades. The age of space is not yet 6 years old, yet in our own country this dynamic new period has brought 5,000 new businesses into being and produced more than 3,000 new inventions, products, and processes of practical application.

We are living in a new age—an age of science which promises us the potential of being able someday to eradicate human poverty and misery. Ninety percent of all the scientists who have ever lived are living today. The

entire sum of human knowledge is being increased by 100 percent every 10 years.

No generations have ever lived in more exciting times—or times of such unlimited potential—as we who are living today.

What is the meaning of this for you, for your country, and for other countries like Denmark? The meaning is most profound.

It is clear that your nation of highly skilled people, a nation which has always produced some of each age's most talented minds, will have a large role in this future, a role which will not be limited by Denmark's geographic size or resources or population.

If one calls the roll of gifted minds which tamed the atom and stressed its peaceful use, the name of your Niels Bohr stands high on that list. In all the sciences, in medicine, in literature, in every intellectual realm, Denmark has contributed many figures respected and honored the world over.

But the new age now developing will not restrict the contribution of Danish talent to rare genius alone. There will be a rising demand for employment of the particular gifts and talents of Danish working men and women—to manufacture the exacting products required for space exploration and other scientific advance. You, like we, will face the challenge of providing the manpower required for the higher level, higher paying, higher skilled work of this new age.

This new age will especially bring new opportunity to increase Danish exports—and the commerce of all our free nations. Last year the United States exported some \$175 million of products to Denmark—much of it was grain, soybeans, machinery, and aircraft. You sent some \$145 million to the United States, mostly canned meats, ships, and furniture. But the time is clearly foreseeable when we shall be buying from you many of the essentials of this new age of science—products which will mean increases in the dollar volume of your exports and further increases in the standard of living for your people.

The implications of what is now before us give us all great satisfaction—satisfaction over the sacrifice and labors we have invested together as allies in maintaining the shield of strength over the flowering of Western talents

and creativity. We must keep that shield of our NATO alliance aloft, held firmly by our continuing unity and continuing resolve.

We must at the same time continue progressing forward in the work of building a better world. We of the United States know and admire your efforts in bringing young people from less developed countries to study in Denmark, in sending out the Danish equivalent of our Peace Corps, in sending your doctors to Korea and later to the Congo, and in committing Danish officers and men to stand guard in the Middle East and Africa on the peacekeeping works of the United Nations.

The works of peace are many, but the rewards of such work are many too. We believe that the space program of the United States is one of the major contributions ever made toward genuine peace among men and nations. We are only grateful that our resources and circumstances permit us to undertake such an effort, and we shall feel fully rewarded if, in years to come, our children and your children can live together in a world of universal peace, universal justice, and universal freedom.

Joint Meeting of Vardberg Icelandic American Society and Society for Western Cooperation, Reykjavik, Iceland, September 16

We are most grateful for the honor you pay our country—and the friendship between our people—by welcoming us as you have today and by coming to this assembly tonight.

This is a visit to which I have long looked forward. We in America learn early in life the story of your great explorer Leif Ericsson. Along with that story we acquire—and carry through life—an image of the people of Iceland as courageous, stalwart figures from an almost legendary land. It has been a lifelong ambition for me to come to Iceland and meet your people. This day has fulfilled my expectations many times over.

Our visit to your country comes at the end of a gratifying and rewarding mission to each of the northern lands—Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and now Iceland. With each of these lands, we in the United States have many proud and binding ties of common heritage, common values, and common goals. We cherish the his-

tory, both ancient and more recent. But we find now a new and exciting promise for the future, and it is of this future that we come to talk together tonight.

In our world today there is an encouraging sense of global community uniting the people of all continents in more and more common endeavors. We hope and expect this tide in the affairs of man will continue to run and bring us to new shores of achievement for all mankind.

But hopeful as this prospect may be, realism requires us to acknowledge that for the present—in the here and now—there remain marked distinctions in the stage of development attained by societies of different global areas.

My country is privileged to be actively associated and allied with those groups of countries which have enjoyed the most marked advance. We recognize the blessings and good fortune which have come to us, and to our people, because of the places and time we occupy in the world and in history. But we regard this not as a basis for claiming privilege to exercise dominion over others. On the contrary, we regard these circumstances as demanding of us and requiring of us the most exacting exercise of responsibility.

We believe the success of the developed societies shall have been achieved in vain unless the successful concern themselves with the aspirations of the less developed.

We believe the strength of the strong societies shall have been built in vain unless the strong concern themselves with assuring peace.

We believe the freedom of the free societies cannot have its fullest meaning until all men and all societies live under freedom.

These beliefs are—and will continue to be—basic to the policies, programs, and purposes of the United States. While we hold these convictions with the strongest dedication, we of the United States do not regard dedication as justification for dogma. If free men are to be truly free, they must be able to set their own course, fashion their own societies, hold to their own values, fulfill their own destinies and opportunities. This requires defense against the enemies of freedom who would impose an alternative will, be it with armed aggression or subversion.

But it also means that the dignity of each society must be free from the dogma of any others—whether enemy or friend.

In the North Atlantic alliance—of which Iceland and the United States are part—the world has been offered an inspiring and convincing example of what can be achieved in this regard. Our alliance in NATO is based on the modern realism that free societies must stand together if they are to resist subjugation by international aggressors. But our alliance for a common purpose is not based on compliance with or submission to a standard dogma, and this is a vital source of our alliance's capacity to endure.

Within NATO there are nations representing 15 heritages, 15 traditions, 15 distinctive cultural histories. We trace our ethnic heritages to many different origins. Of these differences and distinctions, we are justly and rightfully proud individually and have no thought of sacrificing them or permitting their compromise.

Our systems and laws are equally distinctive, country to country. Economies are different, and our economic interests differ. But the supreme fact of our alliance is that none of us are required to submit to the dogma or dictation of those with whom we are so proudly allied.

This is our strength, and we must preserve it. We have rejected—and we shall continue to reject—the concept of an alliance eroding the integrity of any of our cultures. We accept—and we shall continue to accept—the concept of an alliance based not alone on the interests of mutual security but on the values of mutual respect.

Ours is the only such alliance in the world today where allies and partners are not forced to defend themselves against the designs and dogma of fellow allies and partners. Because we are not turning inward, because we are not reduced to suspicions of one another, because we are devoted to common principles, we can believe that our alliance will endure long after more rigid and less trusting alliances have shattered.

We of the United States have particular understanding for the desire of individual peoples to retain their identity and integrity. One hundred and eighty years ago our central gov-

ernment was formed from a union of 13 distinctive States. Under our constitutional system, the 50 States of today retain their identity as 50 equals under our system. Because of our own experience at home, it is repugnant to Americans even to think of alliances which are callous and unfeeling toward the pride and heritage of any members.

We regard the Western alliance as an alliance of equals. We regard it as an alliance which draws its essential unity from common devotion to the same basic ideals of freedom and democracy.

We know that your people—and our people—share such devotion with common fervor.

In terms of population, Iceland is the smallest of the NATO nations. But we respect, as the world respects, Iceland's traditional genius for making contributions to the world far out of proportion to population size. Icelanders have made historic contributions to the exploration of our planet. In the forums of international relations, such as the United Nations, Iceland exercises a significant influence for responsibility.

All this befits a country and a people which gave the world the model of the parliamentary systems which support our democratic systems today. Amid the challenges of the most rugged forces of nature, you have for many centuries forged a vital, stable, constructive, and inspiring society—making contributions far beyond your shores. We are proud to be allied with you and look to you to continue Iceland's uniquely valuable leadership in the progress of Western civilization.

As a nation bounded on two sides by the oceans, we also have developed our history in close affinity with the seas, and we understand and appreciate your achievements in fishing and the commerce of the sea. We look with greatest satisfaction upon your desire now to broaden your economic base and to diversify the elements of production for the benefit of all your people.

We believe that a new age is dawning for mankind in the present great undertaking of space exploration. In this new day we know that space technology will have the most constructive influence for all nations—nations as

large as ours, nations as small in population as yours.

The measure of a nation's role in the world's space effort will not be resources or wealth or population, but, rather, it will be the talent and genius of its people and their minds.

Out of the projects already underway in our space program, we expect in the not-distant future to see such things as these made possible:

Fishermen and seafarers will be able to know 2 weeks or 2 months in advance about the storms on the seas.

Navigators will be able to pinpoint their positions from manmade "stars" with unprecedented accuracy at any hour of night or day, in any kind of weather.

Distress calls from ships—or even life rafts—will be detected and plotted in seconds from satellites hundreds of miles in the sky.

We shall be able to foretell the patterns of nature far in advance, from the formation of storms to the runoff of melting spring snows.

We shall see—in the very next few years—the longest strides of progress man has made in modern times in many realms—weather communication, navigation, medicines, and many more.

The benefits of these gains will be benefits for all mankind, because the basic law governing the space effort of the United States expressly directs that such benefits be shared with other nations. It offers to nations like Iceland the opportunity to make contributions to the development of space capabilities.

The role of your people will not be limited by geography or climate or resources or population or national wealth. The world will need and will seek the finest of minds and put those talents to use in a great cooperative effort for human betterment.

We welcome this stimulating and hopeful prospect. We believe that the space era now opening will afford particular opportunity for fulfillment of the promise and potential of the nations of the north.

We believe, furthermore, that at the end of the long road before us—the road of understanding as allies and cooperation as free men—

there lies for us all universal peace, universal justice, and universal freedom. It is the prospect of attaining this goal that inspires our continuing joint efforts and leads us to trust our ability always to reach mutual understanding.

We are allied as equals in the greatest cause of man on earth. We are working together as respectful and self-respecting partners and friends. We can and do believe that some day we shall be able to stand together, side by side, in a world of freedom and peace.

Vice President Johnson To Open Food Exposition at Amsterdam

Press release 493 dated September 27

At the request of Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, Vice President Johnson will open the 18-day U.S. Food and Agriculture Exposition-Symposium in Western Europe at Amsterdam on November 7. This exposition is the largest U.S. agricultural export promotion ever staged; it will be held in Amsterdam's ultramodern exhibition center.

A cooperative activity of the Department of Agriculture and the agricultural and food industries, the exposition will be an entirely American display. Several thousand U.S. food items will be displayed, demonstrated, and sold in an American-style self-service market. Among the other features will be a "Food in Space" exhibit arranged by NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration], a specially produced motion picture on liberal trade and an exhibit on quality and wholesomeness of U.S. food.

During the second week, November 11-12, there will be a European-American symposium on food and agricultural trade attended by approximately 500 international leaders.

Discussions are currently in progress with the Governments of the Netherlands and Luxembourg regarding their desire for an extension of the Vice President's itinerary to include official visits to the capitals of these countries.

White House Holds Conference on Export Expansion

Following are texts of three addresses made on September 17 before the White House Conference on Export Expansion, which met at Washington September 17-18.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release dated September 17

I want to stress a very warm welcome to all of you. We appreciate your coming down here. It is our hope that out of this meeting will come not only a very candid consideration of what we as Government are doing to assist you in developing your exports but also some proposals as to what we might do in the future which will improve this program.

The Federal Government is a partner of yours in this effort. We are anxious to do everything we can to make your way easier. What we want from you is a renewed concentration by American industry in expanding our markets abroad. This ties into our foreign policies, it ties into our national security, it ties into the prosperity of our people; and therefore we hope that this meeting will be a two-way street.

On the one hand we stimulate those who are not here because quite obviously your presence here indicates your interest. We stimulate those who are not here to look at what they may now regard as a marginal market and make it a significant market. It can mean economic resources for them, but it can mean even more for our country.

Now, I am quite well aware if a major company has a larger domestic market—and after all this is the greatest market in the world here in the United States—it does sometimes not appear to be useful to make the concentrated effort to take the risk which goes with building a market which can by your best judgment only amount to 10, 15, or 20 percent at best of your domestic market. You really may feel it is bet-

ter to concentrate here, that this is the area for the future.

I hope that in making that economic judgment and weighing those economic factors you will also consider the national interest. Every dollar you earn abroad is in our interest. As long as we spend what we must spend to maintain our defenses, as long as we spend what we must spend to assist those countries who are in the frontline of freedom, as long as we spend what we must spend to maintain our other obligations abroad, then we must earn our way. The Federal Government cannot earn the way for you. You have to do it yourself. But earning your way, earning helps us. So I regard this as a very important meeting.

We can meet our problem in one of two ways, either by cutting down or by building up. I don't think the cutting down is the way to do it. It may be finally the only way to do it, but I think we have another opportunity and that is to expand our markets. If we cut down, it means reducing defense, it means reducing aid, and I think that in the final analysis, if you can just add 10 percent to the exports of last year, which should not be beyond the possibilities for this very resourceful group of entrepreneurs in the United States, we could meet all of our balance-of-payments problems.

Our ratio of exports to gross national product is only 4 percent—about one-half of what it was a century ago. If the volume of our commodity exports last year had maintained the same share of world trade that we had only 6 years ago, we would have exported \$4.5 billion more than we actually did, more than enough to eliminate our entire balance-of-payments deficits.

We are not talking about dumping our great productive resources abroad. The fact of the matter is there are enough dollars to pay for what we want to export through tourists and all of the other means. We spread a good many

dollars throughout the world. We are asking that there be a rising tide in trade which will benefit all the countries—which will lift all the boats. We are not novices at export trade. Indeed, one of the factors which led to the American Revolution was an attempt to limit our access to foreign markets. And during much of the 19th century American exports were aggressively merchandised around the globe. As a matter of fact, the motto of the City of Salem is "To the farthest reaches of the Indies." So that we have a long tradition.

We still have a larger volume of exports than any other country. Our merchandise exports exceeded imports by over \$4 billion last year. Even after deducting those exports financed by Government grants and loans, the favorable balance was \$2 billion—not enough—not enough.

There is no reason why this nation should be able to export only 4 percent of its gross national product when Germany exports 16 percent, Italy 10 percent, Japan 9 percent, Sweden 19 percent, Switzerland 22 percent, and the Netherlands a staggering 35 percent.

This performance, of course, came in the most part from sheer necessity. They either had to export or die. We never had that kind of pressure, but we do have a pressure today and I hope that a country as large as ours, with our large domestic market, will increasingly look abroad.

The Congress of the United States in passing the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 voiced its confidence in the capacity of our nation and its businessmen to show purpose and determination in selling all over the globe. The act of Congress was an act of faith in the capacity of the United States to compete and compete successfully.

We are now committed in the Trade Expansion Act to full participation in a world market of vast dimensions. We have left the house of partial protection and tariff stalemate to begin a much larger involvement in world trade. We ask other nations to do the same.

Exports and the National Interest

There are four reasons, it seems to me, in the national interest why it is desirable for us to expand our exports:

First, export expansion means more jobs. Excess unemployment has plagued us for years because of the insufficient demand for products of American industry. The tax reduction bill, which I hope the Congress will pass, represents our principal attack on this problem, but demand can also be created abroad.

Second, by expanding our exports we can end the persistent deficits in our balance-of-payments program. This is a far better solution than crippling cuts in vital national security programs or retreat into protection or other measures of restriction instead of expansion.

Third, increased exports mean increased profits, and profits are the basis of the free enterprise system.

Fourth, and finally, the entire free world benefits from an expansion of our exports. We seek no unfair competition and no injury to others. On the contrary, our efforts rest on the fundamental principle that both parties to a transaction benefit from it. Increased trade increases international income. It sharpens efficiency and improves productivity and binds nations together.

Although export expansion is primarily a task for each individual firm, the Federal Government has special responsibilities:

- to pursue tax policies which promote increased efficiency;

- to negotiate vigorously for the reduction of tariff and nontariff barriers against our products;

- to refrain from placing unnecessary barriers in the way of exports;

- to furnish positive help in the form of credits, guarantees, and other technical assistance.

I hope this conference will discuss candidly the extent to which the Federal Government and its representatives overseas are meeting these responsibilities. If we are not doing what we want to hear from you. If you are not getting the kind of help which you feel you are entitled to get, we want to hear from you. If you feel that the businessmen of other countries are getting more assistance from their governments of a particular kind and more assistance from their representatives overseas, in the Department of State or in Commerce or wh-

ever it may be, we want to hear from you. We can't do anything about it unless you tell us about it, but I can assure you that if you tell us about it we will look at it and analyze it and, if we feel it is in the interest of the United States, we will do something about it.

The passage of the pending tax reduction bill will aid the competitive position of American industry as it did last year in the case of last year's investment credit and depreciation liberalization. We talked about that for a year. Secretary Dillon [Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury] will recall and Governor Hodges Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce—a good many businessmen opposed it. The fact of the matter is it has done a good deal of good in stimulating investment, making it possible for you to write off some of your machinery and capital investment faster than otherwise. It puts us on a more satisfactory competitive basis with some of your competitors from abroad, but there may be other things.

In the field of credit assistance, we have now provided the same facilities for our exporters as those provided by other industrial nations, through the Export-Import Bank and a program of Government guarantees and insurance. But it is possible that we can improve this program.

The coming round of tariff negotiations at Geneva will determine the climate in which American exporters will operate for years to come. Our objective will be the reduction or the removal of all nontariff restrictions. But in the final analysis, the success of our negotiations depends on you. Our negotiators can help to create new opportunities, but you must take advantage of them.

Western Europe itself offers maximum possibilities. The Common Market countries alone have a gross national product of \$218 billion. It is a prosperous and expanding market. With an increased demand for American products—consumer products—our exports concentrate far too much on such traditional items as raw materials, semimanufactured, and capital goods. Consumer products account for less than 10 percent of our sales. Yet it is our consumer goods that have earned the highest reputation around the world.

Other parts of the world offer, too, I think,

export opportunities. The developing nations need machinery and transport and capital goods and equipment, and I see no reason why this country should not sell them. This is a valuable market which our much abused foreign aid program has been instrumental in opening up for American business and industry.

Relation of Aid Program to Exports

I wish American businessmen who keep talking against the program would realize how significant it has been in assisting them to get into markets where they would have no entry and no experience and which have traditionally been European and come to the aid of this program in the coming months and years. Last year 11 percent of our exports were financed under our aid program. And the importance of this aid to our exports is increasing as our developing assistance is increasing, now almost entirely tied to American purchases.

This program which we talk about is tied to the United States. As the program is cut, business is cut and jobs are cut here in the United States. We are not giving away goods in those cases on a loan basis which will be paid back and which must be spent here in the United States. Almost one-half of the railroad equipment exported by American manufacturers was paid for by AID [Agency for International Development]. Ten percent of the trucks and buses sold abroad were sold under AID. One-third of the fertilizer shipped abroad was shipped under AID contracts.

But the real measure of the impact of these AID-financed exports lies in the future. Today most of our exports go to industrialized nations. Fifteen developed countries received two-thirds of our exports. Ninety lesser countries received one-third.

In the long run, the greatest gains for American U.S. exports will come when nations are capable of purchasing our products, and AID can help pave the way. For example, we began 15 years ago to help rebuild the markets of Western Europe and Japan. Even after their remarkable resurgence enabled us to do away with aid, our markets in those areas continue. Our exports to Europe have doubled and to Japan have tripled. The same story has been

repeated in other lands where aid combined with the efforts of the people themselves has brought strong economic progress.

In the last 5 years, for example, our exports to Taiwan increased 14 percent, to Colombia by 28 percent, to Israel by 76 percent. In Iran our share of their imports has grown $2\frac{1}{2}$ times since pre-World War II days. In Pakistan our share of their imports in that same period has increased by over 5 times, and our commercial exports have gone up 50 times.

I stress these facts because I don't think that businessmen and the country realize the role foreign aid plays in acquainting the people and the countries with our goods, and, as they move into a period of prosperity and the aid is dispensed with, there is a tradition of dealing with the United States and knowledge of our goods which can lay the groundwork for sounder export trade. Otherwise, their traditional ties are in Europe and Europe will be the beneficiary.

Too little attention, in short, has been paid to the part which an early exposure to American goods, American skills, and the American way of doing things can play in forming the tastes and desires and customs of these newly emerging nations which must be our markets for the future.

In one country, a little over a decade ago, to cite another example, it was extremely difficult for American contractors to bid upon jobs because the specifications were tied to bidders from other countries. Now, largely because of our AID program, American bidders are able to participate successfully in these contracts.

No foreign aid program, of course, can and should substitute for private initiative, but it can assist in breaking the path, and that is one important reason—though there are even more vital reasons in this critical year of 1963—for us all to give it support.

These aid expenditures are not the cause of our balance of payments. AID can help our balance of payments by helping exports, and the recent cuts in this program by the House of Representatives saved only \$20 million in American dollars on our balance-of-payments exports. It will have, unfortunately, a severe impact upon our exports abroad—to Latin

America and all the rest. That is why, even though this meeting is not called for this purpose, there is an interrelationship.

Expanding the Export Market

I was glad to see the Chamber of Commerce yesterday support the Alliance for Progress. This is a program meshed in with the other actions which the Government can take which I think will assist you in the long run to develop our export markets which assist the United States.

Trade, in short, is not merely a matter of Europe. If we are to reverse the flow of dollars in gold, we must expand our efforts to Bangkok and Nairobi and Bangalore, in Bogotá, in São Paulo, as well as in Frankfurt and Paris.

There will be difficulties and disadvantages. The domestic market will loom very bright. Our firms will need ingenuity and patience, but the results will be rewarding to the people of America as well as to the business. For an American truck in Pakistan or a machine tool in Colombia or a bulldozer in Kenya form a link between our nation and our people and, therefore, I ask you today to commit yourselves to even more intensive efforts abroad and also encourage your fellow members of the American business community to look abroad. Looking abroad, I think they can serve their responsibility as businessmen to their companies and also serve the country.

This is a matter of vital importance. Trade is a matter which is very high on our agenda and I cannot think of any way that we can solve our problems more easily—happily—than to encourage you and to assist you in developing increased exports.

As everyone has said, we are talking about a \$20 billion trade, an increase of 10 percent which is not beyond us. Bringing in an extra \$2 billion would bring our balance of payments into balance without taking steps which are restrictive.

So we ask your assistance on it.

As I said at the beginning, what we want to hear from you today is specifically what it is that we are now doing that we could do better

how we can organize our problems to assist you; what it is the United States Government should do. I am sure you hear once in a while complaints about what is being done in Washington. We want to hear them here. We want you to tell us how to improve our assistance to you. We want you to tell us as much as you can what countries abroad are doing so we can do the same or better. And we want to ask you on our part to make this a priority issue in the same way that our forefathers did to the benefit of our country and to the benefit of our system.

I want to particularly thank all of you who have come down here. You are all busy men; you have a lot of other responsibilities. We would not ordinarily hold this meeting—and it is one of the few meetings of its kind that we have held in the last 2½ years—unless we thought it deserved the attention of all of you. I express our thanks to you.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 476 dated September 17

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

The President has set forth the importance of port expansion.

Expansion of trade has been one of the main objectives of our policy ever since Benjamin Franklin went abroad as our first Ambassador. We in the Department of State, just as you in business, have been taking a fresh look at problems and opportunities for trade as we have moved from a period of relatively easy sales to one of keen competition.

The central goals of our foreign policy are familiar to you. Work toward these goals involves many elements. We must maintain our ability to deter Communist aggression in all its forms. We must build the free world's strength—and one way of doing that is to multiply the ties of commerce. We must continue our aid to the underdeveloped nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in modernizing their economies and social systems. This requires, among other things, spreading the technical and managerial skills of modern industry and agriculture, as well as the provision of American goods and equipment which will help these economies progress.

A strong and expanding domestic economy is, of course, essential to our foreign policy. So is an expanding foreign trade.

The Balance-of-Payments Problem

You are familiar with the balance-of-payments problem with which we are struggling. I would like to emphasize that large reductions in our essential overseas defense expenditures and in the resources needed to build the strength of the free world would involve grave risks. No international agreement which has been reached, and none which seems likely to be achievable in the immediate future, justifies letting down our guard. Although they differ as to pace and method, both of the leading branches of the Communist movement remain committed to the communization of the world. A central objective of both may be summed up in three words: "Yanks, go home." When we come home, the Communists begin to take over. It would be folly for us to cooperate with them by slashing our overseas expenditures for defense and foreign aid.

Recent cuts in the aid program, if sustained, would be a matter of real concern. The reduction of 30 percent in the President's request for military assistance funds would require a cut-back in assistance to a number of key countries along the southern rim of the Sino-Soviet border. The Alliance for Progress reduction of 25 percent signals a lack of U.S. confidence at the very time that a number of Latin American countries have started to move forward and when several others are almost ready to start. Other reductions would further impair the ability of the President to protect our national interests and security.

A major reason cited by many for making these cuts is the adverse balance of payments. But an analysis of the effect of the most recent reduction by the House indicates that approximately \$565 million of the \$585 million cut would have been spent entirely in the United States for American goods and services. Thus the effect on our balance of payments would be insignificant.

If the gap in our balance of payments is to be closed without serious risks to our security and without curbing the growth of the free-world

economy, it must be done mainly by expanding our exports. An increase of only 10 percent in our current export volume of \$21 billion would be a substantial contribution. This is not an impossible goal—perhaps it is too modest—when we realize that our exports have increased by more than \$5 billion since 1959 and that world trade, although not expanding at the rapid rate of 2 or 3 years ago, continues to grow.

There is no magic formula for expanding our exports. In this highly competitive world, exports cannot be self-generating; they require hard and persistent work. The main job is for business. But the Government can help.

We hope that negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will produce mutually advantageous reductions in tariffs.

The role of our foreign aid program in promoting American exports is increasing. In 1962 our foreign aid program, including sales of farm surpluses, accounted for approximately \$2.3 billion, or 11.5 percent, of our exports.

Much more important, our foreign aid program is helping to build future markets. When nations grow, when people have hope for the future, freedom advances—and with it the national interest of the United States. But the consequences are even more than a safer and generally better world. Economic growth in other countries means a larger market for American goods.

The decade of the 1950's was marked by the tremendous economic resurgence of Western Europe and Japan, initially aided by the United States. Their economic advance meant not only that our aid could cease but that our exports could continue to grow. From 1950 to 1962 our exports to Europe doubled. In the last decade our exports to Japan have tripled.

Many of the less developed nations which have made progress toward self-support have at the same time increased their capacity to buy U.S. exports. This should be a continuing process. If we in the United States are alert, I believe that our commercial trade with the less developed countries will increase significantly over the long run.

And we should not underestimate the importance of foreign aid in making the less developed countries more familiar with American goods and services. The returns to the United

States will be measured for decades to come.

We in Government are fully mindful that, as one of our ambassadors put it, "There is no substitute for the direct dialog between the seller and the buyer." On the domestic side, the Department of Commerce is trying energetically to attract more American firms, especially medium-size and small establishments, into the export field and at the same time to encourage those already engaged in foreign trade to increase their export operations. Outside the United States, the commercial officers and staffs of our Foreign Service carry the Government's primary trade promotional responsibilities in overseas markets.

Government Services to American Business

As a result of these efforts, at home and abroad, and of growing opportunities in world trade, the number of businessmen calling upon our posts for services, personally and through the Department of Commerce, is increasing sharply. A recent survey of 71 Foreign Service posts revealed that they had more than 47,000 American business visitors in 1962, compared with some 37,000 during 1961—an increase of 28 percent in one year and almost double the number of 1960. Local business callers increased from some 46,000 in 1961 to 65,000 in 1962.

In addition to helping business visitors, our commercial staffs must handle voluminous business correspondence and prepare a variety of reports of service to American firms, including trade opportunities, *World Trade Directory* reports, and trade contract surveys. They are active also in the trade promotional aspects through specialized programs of the Department of Commerce abroad, namely, the Trade Mission Program, the Trade Center Program, and the Trade Fair Program. I hope you are finding these activities useful to you and that you will suggest ways in which they can be improved.

The Government's efforts abroad to promote exports are not confined to our commercial staffs. Last fall I instructed our chiefs of mission¹ to take an active personal part in assisting

¹ For text of a letter of Oct. 19, 1962, from Secretary of State Rusk to American ambassadors abroad, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1962, p. 682.

American firms to expand export markets. Since then, I have had many gratifying reports. In a letter of August 2 of this year,² I pointed out to our chiefs of mission the emphasis which we in Washington attach to the Export Expansion Program for balance-of-payments reasons. In order to pinpoint our problems, I asked that our embassies prepare for my guidance and that of the Secretary of Commerce a summary of the specific ways in which they have found it possible to give support to this program. I also asked for fresh information on particular difficulties encountered and for suggestions for overcoming these, as well as for suggestions for improving our export expansion work as a whole.

Our officers abroad are accustomed to pursue their duties without thought to fanfare or public recognition. Against this background of modesty, I am happy to note that an increasing number of businessmen are writing to us expressing satisfaction with the services rendered by our officers abroad.

I could cite many specific examples where trade opportunities submitted by our posts and publicized by the Department of Commerce have led to new transactions valued from a few dollars to several million. Naturally, there are many tips that cannot be openly advertised for various reasons, including the protection of our trading interests in highly competitive situations until they conclude their contracts.

Let me outline a typical case. Our embassy in country *x* learns that there is a prospective purchaser for certain equipment. Embassy officers make it clear at the highest levels of the local government and industry concerned that American companies can provide this equipment and that the United States Government is interested in seeing to it that they have a full and fair opportunity to compete for this business. At the same time they take steps, through the Department of Commerce, to alert the American producers. They establish and maintain close contacts with the Cabinet officers whose ministries must approve various aspects of the transactions and with the top officials of the respective purchasing company, as well as with many senior staff officers in both local govern-

ment and industry. In due course, they arrange for the American companies concerned to send their top officials to country *x* to conduct demonstrations timed for the greatest impact on the contractual discussions and decisions. This is the sort of cooperation which produces new business.

I feel sure that, through mutual help, business and Government can further improve the Export Expansion Program. I wish you well in your present deliberations.

ADDRESS BY CHRISTIAN A. HERTER¹

I join with the President and with the distinguished members of his Cabinet who have already welcomed you to this conference. The warmth of your reception is a good measure of the great value which all of us in Government attach to your counsel and your help. The presence here of so many distinguished leaders of commerce and industry gives, in turn, heartening evidence of your appreciation of the central importance of expanded exports to our economy and our position in the world.

We value highly the initiative and—to use a word which is heard from time to time in Washington—the vigor of American enterprise. We should like to see it directed increasingly to searching out new markets in the four quarters of the globe. We in Government want to work together with you in partnership to this purpose.

The function of my office—that of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations—is to seek a general and very substantial reduction in tariffs and other barriers to trade. We are preparing for negotiations to this purpose next year in Geneva, under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—GATT, for short.

We most certainly need your full cooperation in preparing for these negotiations. And I am happy to say that we have been able to enlist outstanding businessmen in the work of our office.

These negotiations will be the most important and comprehensive trade talks in history.

¹ Mr. Herter is the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

² For text see *ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1963, p. 290.

They will involve more than 50 nations, ranging from the highly industrialized countries which border the North Atlantic to many of the less developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

As you know, the President's authority to negotiate is contained in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It gives him the power to reduce, on a basis of mutual benefits, virtually the entire range of our tariffs by as much as 50 percent, staged over five annual installments. In certain cases the act enables the President to cut tariffs more than 50 percent—indeed, to eliminate them altogether. It gives him particular authority to take account of our special trade interests in the European Economic Community. Finally, the trade interests of the less developed countries are specifically taken into account.

There are three principal goals which Congress sought to achieve through this legislation:

1. To increase the security and well-being of the United States and the free world through the expansion of trade, with the consequent benefits to industries and workers.
2. To strengthen Atlantic ties and enlarge the area of interdependence within an Atlantic community and with industrialized countries such as Britain, Japan, Australia, and Canada.
3. To stimulate the economic growth of the less developed nations by offering access to world markets for their products and encouraging commercial policies on their part which are conducive to their own development and to fruitful world trade.

The Trade Expansion Act has vested my office with primary responsibility in preparing for and conducting these trade negotiations. But this is in every sense a team effort, involving many Departments and agencies of Government, and they have shared generously with us their rich resources of knowledge and experience.

We have a powerful bargaining tool in the Trade Expansion Act. But that does not by itself assure success. We must be prepared to put it to good use, and we have begun that process in the past few months.

The first major milestone on the road to next year's negotiations was the GATT ministerial

meeting in Geneva this spring. High-ranking representatives of 50 nations gathered there to lay the groundwork for next year's talks.

Results of GATT Ministerial Meeting

After vigorous and far-ranging discussion they unanimously adopted a resolution⁴ declaring that a significant liberalization of world trade is desirable and that comprehensive negotiations to this end should be held, with the widest possible participation. They should be conducted, it was decided, on a most-favored-nation basis and in accordance with the principle of reciprocity.

The resolution also provided that the trade negotiations should cover all classes of products and deal not only with tariffs but also with non-tariff barriers. It was further decided that they should be based upon a plan for substantial and linear tariff reductions, with a bare minimum of exceptions.

In this connection, the issue of so-called "disparities" was raised by our Common Market friends. The U.S. and the Common Market tariff schedules average about the same. But the United States has more high rates and more low rates, while the Common Market tariffs tend to be bunched in the middle ranges. What to do about this was one of the main subjects of discussion at the Geneva meeting. In the end a compromise was worked out, in the following language:

In those cases where there are significant disparities in tariff levels, the tariff reductions will be based upon special rules of general and automatic application.

In presenting this language, the chairman of the conference, Dr. Hans Schaffner of Switzerland, added for the record that disparities which are "significant" are those which are "meaningful in trade terms" and that this is to be considered an essential part of the agreement.

The ministers further resolved that, in view of the importance of agriculture in world trade, the negotiations shall provide for acceptable conditions of access to world markets for agricultural products.

It was decided, finally, that every effort shall be made to reduce barriers to the exports of the less developed countries but that the fully de-

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1963, p. 995.

veloped countries cannot expect to receive reciprocity from the less developed ones.

The Geneva meeting took action to put its decisions into effect. It established a Trade Negotiations Committee and instructed it to prepare a trade negotiating plan in keeping with the principles it had set forth. Recognizing that trade in some major agricultural commodities presents particularly troublesome problems, it agreed that special groups on cereals, meats, and possibly dairy products should work on them.

The principles adopted at Geneva represent a new and creative approach to negotiations under the GATT. Efforts to clear away non-tariff barriers are to be coupled with tariff negotiations, thus insuring that the concessions given will be genuinely meaningful in terms of liberalizing trade. Also for the first time, the general approach to tariff concessions will be on an equal, linear basis, rather than by negotiating reductions item by item. This new plan will greatly facilitate the work of the negotiators. It will also result in wider exchanges of tariff cuts by putting the negotiations on a broad basis, rather than the haggling involved in tedious and time-consuming decisions for or against putting each of several thousand individual items.

Two issues seem likely to dominate our talks with our trade partners, as we tool up for next year's negotiations—the disparities question and trade in agriculture.

Speaking of the disparities issue at the close of the Geneva meeting, the German Vice Chancellor, Dr. Ludwig Erhard, commented very aptly: "We are agreed on the shell of an egg. What will be in the egg, we do not know."

This is precisely what we have been seeking to determine in the Trade Negotiations Committee. It met in Geneva in July and made good progress in identifying the issues. It will resume work this month, and we look forward confidently to an eventual and mutually satisfactory agreement.

Problem of Trade in Agriculture

In the longer run, the problem of trade in agricultural products is likely to present more difficulties. From the beginning, we have made clear that the coming trade negotiations *can-*

not be limited to industrial goods. The level of the U.S. exports depends to an important degree on our overseas markets for farm products. In the Common Market alone, our agricultural market amounted to almost \$1.2 billion last year.

Agriculture has *always* raised thorny problems in international trading relationships. It is a longstanding problem, and the time is overdue for coming to grips with it. In so doing, we shall, of course, have to take a long and hard look at our own farm policies and practices.

We and our negotiating partners must seek a solution which will take account of the legitimate interests of everyone concerned. This will require a real effort of statesmanship. We must tackle these many difficulties as problems we share in common—and deal with them in common, and not simply in response to the internal domestic pressures to which all our governments are subject. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how we can move forward along the road to partnership.

We have already experienced, in the current dispute over poultry, the problems involved in dealing with agricultural restrictions. After seeking for over a year, patiently and persistently, to negotiate the reduction of the heavy charges imposed upon our poultry exports, we have been compelled—reluctantly, I assure you—to move toward restoring the balance through the withdrawal of tariff concessions benefiting the EEC [European Economic Community]. Last month we announced the scheduling of public hearings for the purpose of deciding the specific items on which we would act.⁵

These hearings were concluded last Thursday, and their results are now being analyzed. When this analysis has been completed, we shall—unless, as we would much prefer, the dispute can be otherwise resolved in the meantime—give the member nations of GATT the required 30 days' notice of the withdrawal of concessions on the items selected.

However, we must not let our current concerns over U.S. relations with the Common Market dominate the wider trade and economic spectrum, of which the EEC is only one part.

⁵ For text of the notice of a public hearing, see *ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 331.

Japan, Canada, Britain and her fellow members of the European Free Trade Association, and other industrialized countries all have an important role to play. I was heartened, for example, by the statement on Britain's trade policy which Prime Minister Macmillan recently made in Stockholm. He said:

To expand trade, to reduce tariffs, to take away barriers to trade as far as possible—quotas, protectionism, and all the rest of it—that is our broad purpose in Great Britain.

I have heard similar views expressed everywhere I have traveled in recent months—in Japan, in Canada, and in the principal capitals of Europe—although, to be candid, I have also found pockets of protectionism everywhere.

The less developed countries are also keenly interested in expanding their trade—in a wholly commendable desire to earn more of their own way in the world. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the GATT meeting this spring was the very active part they took in it. And they are likewise taking a very lively interest in preparations for the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, which is scheduled for next spring.⁶

Preparations for Tariff Negotiations

These are the issues which will face us in Geneva next year. And we are busy here in the United States getting ready to deal with them.

To begin with, a great deal of detailed work has to be completed in order to define clearly the President's tariff-reducing authority. To take one example, he has the authority to reduce to zero tariffs on items for which the present duty is 5 percent or less. But to determine what these are is a time-consuming task. Many such items carry a specific tariff rate rather than a percentage one, and many of these have not moved in trade for a number of years. Thus, the Tariff Commission must determine what their price *would* have been had they been traded and then what the specific rates come to in percentage terms.

Nevertheless, we expect that, within a month or so, the President will proclaim a "public list" including all items on which tariff modifications may be contemplated. In order to avoid

the taking of arbitrary decisions before all the evidence is available, it has been decided that this list will include all items except those exempted by statute.

The appearance of an item on the public list merely signifies that it will be considered for possible inclusion among the items on the negotiating list. This latter and final list will be compiled after the conclusion of hearings on the public list before the Tariff Commission and the Trade Information Committee,⁷ an inter-agency committee chaired by a representative of my office.

We view these hearings as the fairest way of determining what the real economic effect of tariff reductions will be. Under this procedure every American industry and branch of agriculture can have its "day in court," so to speak.

The President, taking into account advice from the Tariff Commission, from my office, and from such other agencies as he may choose, has complete discretion under the Trade Expansion Act to reserve any items from the negotiation in addition to those reserved by law.

Government Needs Help of Business Leaders

This is what we have done and what we plan to do. Equally important to ultimate success in these negotiations is your support and cooperation at every step on the way.

I need not remind you of the great stake that you as businessmen have in the success of these negotiations. They could, if fruitful, establish an international climate for trade in which you can push ahead even more confidently with an export drive of the magnitude you are discussing here today and tomorrow.

We need your help, first, in creating the kind of atmosphere here in America which will put us in the strongest possible position at the bargaining table, by establishing beyond any reasonable doubt the credibility of our dedication to liberalizing trade. We cannot afford to have that credibility undermined abroad by indulgence in protectionism at home.

We shall need your more specific help when

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 173.

⁷ For text of regulations of the Trade Information Committee, see *ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 330.

The Trade Information Committee holds its hearings. While any matter relevant to the trade negotiations can be brought before the committee, we should like its hearings to focus largely upon determining which foreign tariffs and trade restrictions are most burdensome to U.S. exporters. We hope, therefore, that you will take full advantage of this opportunity to share with us this vital information, which your firsthand experience in the markets of the world uniquely qualifies you to give.

Through the Trade Information Committee, we are seeking to give greater importance and emphasis to the work formerly carried on by the committee for Reciprocity Information. I am acting in accord with the emphasis in the Trade Expansion Act on the requirement that, in the performance of my functions, I am to seek information and advice from the representatives of industry, agriculture, and labor. The Trade Information Committee provides one meaningful channel for this two-way communication. What is good for America is good for business, and vice versa. I have no hesitation in saying this, even if I paraphrase a statement which, when Charlie Wilson made it some years ago, I objected him to much criticism—unfair criticism, may I add.

It is in this spirit that we look to you, as leaders in business and industry, for help and guidance, counsel and support, in this common enterprise which is so important to you both as businessmen and as prominent citizens of the United States.

S. Regrets EEC Council Action on Poultry Issue

*Statement by Christian A. Herter*¹

It is a matter of regret that measures to restore reasonable access for U.S. poultry to the European Economic Community have not been taken by the EEC Council of Ministers. In place of such measures (in accordance with the information) the Council has proposed that

Released to the press on Sept. 24. Mr. Herter is President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

the U.S. forgo its negotiating rights in return for a small and uncertain modification of poultry levies.

The United States had not yet received a reply to its offer to agree on adjudication under GATT auspices of the amount of trade affected by the EEC restrictions.

While proceeding with its preparations for restoring a balance of tariff concessions, the United States continues to believe that acceptance of this offer would minimize the trade repercussions of the poultry issue.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1963. *Notification received of undertaking to seek ratification:* India, July 29, 1963.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signatures and acceptances: Algeria, September 26, 1963; Uganda, Mali, September 27, 1963; Guinea, Congo (Léopoldville), September 28, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signatures and acceptances: Algeria, September 26, 1963; Uganda, Mali, September 27, 1963; Guinea, Congo (Léopoldville), September 28, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.

Signatures and acceptances: Central African Republic, August 27, 1963; Mauritania, September 10, 1963; Dahomey, Trinidad and Tobago, September 16, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.¹

¹ Not in force.

Ratification advised by the Senate: September 24, 1963.

Signatures affixed at Washington: Guatemala, Malagasy Republic, September 23, 1963; Niger, September 24, 1963; Ecuador, September 27, 1963.

Safety of Life at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea. Done at London June 17, 1960.¹

Acceptance deposited: Paraguay, September 11, 1963.

Trade

Spain accepted on June 30, 1963, the following instruments by accepting protocol of accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to annexes and texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 7, 1955. Entered into force January 23, 1959. TIAS 4186.

Third protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Geneva July 15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 3629.

Fourth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Federal Republic of Germany and Norway). Done at Geneva July 15, 1955. TIAS 3630.

Fifth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden). Done at Geneva July 15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 3631.

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.¹

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force June 30, 1956. TIAS 3591.

Seventh protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Bonn February 19, 1957. Entered into force August 21, 1959. TIAS 4324.

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.¹

Eighth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Cuba and the United States). Done at Habana June 20, 1957. Entered into force June 29, 1957. TIAS 3882.

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.¹

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.¹

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.¹

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C.

¹ Not in force.

1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Rio de Janeiro September 11, 1963. Entered into force September 11, 1963.

Canada

Agreement amending the agreement of May 5, 1961, amended (TIAS 4806, 5301), governing the coordination of pilotage services on the Great Lakes St. Lawrence River. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 23 and September 10, 1963. Entered into force September 10, 1963.

Ecuador

Agreement supplementing the agreement of March 29, 1955 (TIAS 3230), so as to provide additional investment guaranties authorized by United States legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Quito September 4, 1963. Entered into force September 4, 1963.

Peru

Agricultural commodity agreement. Signed at Washington September 23, 1963. Entered into force September 23, 1963.

Tunisia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodity agreement of September 14, 1962 (TIAS 5190). Effected by exchange of notes at Tunis September 1963. Entered into force September 13, 1963.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to September 23 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 476 of September 17 and 482 of September 20.

No.	Date	Subject
*485	9/23	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*486	9/23	Hummel designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
†487	9/24	Williams: "Women in the New Africa."
*488	9/24	Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.
†489	9/26	Schaetzel: "The Nuclear Problem and Atlantic Interdependence."
†490	9/26	Manning: "Policy and People" (as delivered text).
491	9/26	U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange.
†492	9/26	U.S.-Spain joint declaration on cooperation.
493	9/27	Vice President Johnson to open Food and Agriculture Exposition at Amsterdam.
†495	9/27	Cleveland: "Health for Peace and Vice Versa."

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1269



October 21, 1963

STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

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Strengthening the International Monetary System

Following are texts of remarks by President Kennedy and statements by Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball before the Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association, which held their annual meetings at Washington, D.C., September 30–October 4.

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT, SEPTEMBER 30

White House press release September 30; as-delivered text

Mr. Dillon, gentlemen: This is the second time that I have had the opportunity to welcome you to Washington,¹ and I do so with the greatest pleasure and satisfaction. Yours is a very vital role in the defense of the free world. Your contribution to financial and economic stability among the nations of the world is essential, and the results of these efforts will determine in a very large measure whether or

¹ For text of remarks made by President Kennedy on Sept. 20, 1962, see BULLETIN of Oct. 15, 1962, p. 573.

how much each nation can use its resources as generous as they are, in the best interests of our people.

Since I last met with you, we have suffered the loss of one of the great leaders of the International Monetary Fund, Per Jacobsson. He served the Fund with skill and dedication, and he combined a great deal of wisdom with good humor. We will miss him, but the indelible mark that he left upon your work and upon the monetary systems of the world and upon the IMF will continue to guide us.

To his successor, Mr. Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, I extend my best wishes as he now guides the Fund. We are grateful to France for releasing him for this service. His broad talents and experience equip him admirably for the heavy responsibilities which now press upon him.

I am glad, too, that the Bank was able to find a talented successor to Mr. Eugene Black. Black's genius helped give this institution the best reputation any bank or banker can have for combining prudence with constructive generosity. I am pleased that George Woods has been selected to sustain this tradition.

Twenty years ago, when the architects

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as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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These institutions met to design an international banking structure, the economic life of the world was polarized in overwhelming, and even alarming, measure on the United States. So were the world's monetary reserves. The United States had the only open capital in the world apart from that of Switzerland. Sixty percent of the gold reserves of the world were here in the United States. The war-torn nations of Europe and the Far East faced difficult tasks of reconstruction with depleted and inadequate capital resources. There was a need for redistribution of the financial resources of the world and the financial strength of the free world. And there was an equal need to organize a flow of capital to the impoverished and underdeveloped countries of the world.

All this has come about. It did not come about by chance but by conscious and deliberate and responsible planning. Under the Marshall Plan and its successors, liberal assistance was given to the more advanced nations to help restore their industrial plant, and development plans were given to less developed countries. In addition, private American capital was made freely available, and there was a steady liberalization of our trade policies. In this effort, our institution and, more recently, a growing number of industrialized countries have played an increasingly important role.

We are now entering upon a new era of economic and financial interdependence. The rise of trading blocs such as the Common Market offers a new and greater challenge for trade liberalization. The United States has prepared itself to take advantage of those opportunities by legislation permitting an unprecedented reduction of trade restrictions and trade barriers. Our gold reserves are a healthy but not excessive 40 percent of the world's holdings.

The Balance-of-Payments Problem

Largely as a result of these changes, this nation today is engaged in an effort to bring our international accounts into equilibrium and to maintain the necessary strength behind the dollar. This is not merely, I believe, in our interest. It is in the interest of all those who have placed their faith in the dollar.

To this end we have taken several steps to

reduce the drain on our balance of payments.

First, we are making a major effort to increase our exports in the flow of trade between the United States and other free nations.²

Secondly, we are initiating further savings in our overseas dollar expenditures.

Third, we are seeking to slow down the very rapid increase in overseas demands on our capital markets as well as to retard the outflow of short-term capital resulting from interest rate differentials.

Fourth, we intend to maintain stable prices and to increase the attractiveness of investment here in the United States.

We do not seek by precipitous acts to improve our position at the expense of others. We do seek by comprehensive effort, consistent with our international responsibilities, to reduce outflows which are weakening our capacity to serve the world community. In short, every nation in the world has a direct interest, for the dollar is an international currency and the security of the dollar therefore involves the security of us all.

The operations of the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association all play important roles in this effort. Their techniques of cooperative action and the availability of their resources permit capital to be deployed around the world in the most effective and efficient manner.

In a special message to the Congress on the balance of payments,³ I announced that the United States had for the first time entered into a standby arrangement with the Fund. The attendance of all of you at this meeting underscores the extent of world involvement in these institutions and the determination for so many nations to work together for mutual strength. We have been able to do this in so many fields and we have done it, it seems to me, with such success in recent months and years that I am confident that that intimate association will continue to grow and to prosper.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 14, 1963, p. 595.

³ For text of the President's message of July 18, 1963, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 250.

During the past year many of you have cooperated either through the international organizations or through your own central banks in an improved approach to the problems of foreign exchange and gold markets. Credit facilities and reserve-holding techniques have been improved. The international monetary systems met with ease the Cuban crisis last autumn, the strains upon sterling early in 1963, and the evidence that our own payments situation had not developed as well as we hoped in the first half of this year. This performance has benefited every nation, large and small, but success should not, I believe, be an encouragement to inaction. This nation—the United States—must continue its efforts to meet the balance-of-payments problems now confronting us, and we must all assure ourselves by preparations now that we will be ready to meet the international monetary problems of the future.

Increasing International Liquidity

I am pleased to learn that studies of these problems and of appropriate measures to deal with them are about to be launched. There is a sharp distinction, however, between long-term questions of international liquidity and the current problems of international imbalance. We do not intend to neglect the latter while pursuing the former.

This Government considers our tax reduction and reform program which has recently been approved by one House of the Congress to be the most important action that Congress can take now to improve our long-range position. It should help attract capital investment, improve our ability to sell goods and services in world markets, stimulate the growth of our economy and the employment of our people, give greater freedom to monetary policy, and play a vital supporting role in our determination to achieve equal rights and opportunities for all of our citizens.

In other areas, including the interest equalization tax and the other steps that I have noted, and the forthcoming trade negotiations, we are proceeding in our efforts to bring our payments into balance. We are proceeding

with caution. We are fully aware of the effect of our actions on our friends, but no one should confuse caution with any lack of determination. We are determined to do whatever must be done in the interest of this country and, indeed, in the interest of all to protect the dollar as a convertible currency at its current fixed rate.

We are determined—and I believe in your interest as well as our own—to maintain the relationship of gold and the dollar at the present price of \$35 an ounce, and I can assure you we will do just that.

We recognize that the reserve position of other countries is a mirror image of our own, and as the United States moves toward equilibrium, it will be more difficult for others to increase their reserves. Some nations will be more handicapped than others, but no nation should be forced to make drastic alterations in its domestic and trading policy because of short-run movements in its reserve position. The United States, therefore, stands ready to support such measures as may be necessary to increase international liquidity.

Patience will be required in working out these matters. The balance of payments is no simple problem to be cured by a single all-purpose medicine. Each country is challenged to find the appropriate blend of fiscal, monetary, trade, and other policies that will enable it to play its proper role in sustaining rather than straining the system of international payments. But patience is not the enemy of progress, and I think the last 20 years have provided impressive proof of the benefits of international financial cooperation. We are linked so closely together; our economies are tied so intimately that it is so essential that all of our people benefit and prosper that I am confident that you gentlemen who occupy a position of high responsibility, working intimately together, will maintain our system so that we remain its center. For us to move in an opposite direction, of course, would be not only distressing but inimical to our common interest.

The men who gathered at Bretton Woods 20 years ago were criticized by both those who said that no institutions were needed and those who said nothing useful could be done. Their efforts and the success which crowned it are a warning

with against pessimism and excessive self-satisfaction.

Today we all believe in the achievements of intelligent cooperation; and under the wise and imaginative leadership of the Governors here assembled, I feel sure this cooperation can be enlarged and extended. There is no more important group, it seems to me, in the free world than you gentlemen who are here; no group it seems to me bears greater responsibility. If you are able to conduct your affairs with success, it benefits all of the people all around the globe, and therefore we regard this meeting as perhaps the most important that takes place in the Capital this year. Your success will make possible all of the great efforts of the free world which have had such an astonishing and, I think, dazzling effect upon international relations and the security of the West. Our role, therefore, I regard as essential, and we believe in the achievements of a determined and intelligent cooperation which will benefit all of our people.

I look forward in the years ahead to continued progress, to continued gain, to continued expansion toward the goal of economic health for all nations, for this goal—second in urgency to the quest for peace, only to the necessity of peace—is surely indispensable to the free world.

Ladies and gentlemen, I greet you with great satisfaction and we wait on your deliberations with great hope and confidence. Thank you.

STATEMENT BY MR. DILLON, OCTOBER 1

At the outset of my remarks, I ask you to join with me in paying tribute to our late, great colleague and good friend, Per Jacobsson. Fully dedicated throughout his long and distinguished career to the cause of financial stability, he guided the International Monetary Fund with a deep understanding of the needs and realities of his times. The responsibilities of Managing Director have now passed into the capable hands of Pierre-Paul Schweitzer. His willingness to assume these duties provides us with fresh assurance that the Fund, building on its current strength and influence at the center of the international monetary system, will

successfully meet the fresh challenges that lie ahead.

It is also a pleasure to welcome to the Fund family an unusually large number of new members, bringing our group to more than 100. The election of a 19th Executive Director, who will cast the votes of a group of the many new African members, is symbolic of the increasing usefulness of the Fund to the emerging nations.

I am sure that each of these new members will profit from the important assistance the Fund can render to their further development through its expanding program of technical assistance in the areas of central banking and fiscal practices and policies, through its regular consultations, and by providing timely financial support for well-conceived stabilization programs. In addition, the new compensatory financing facilities announced last March mark an important and constructive advance in the services available to members heavily dependent upon exports of primary commodities.

These activities in support of balanced, dynamic growth are, of course, complemented by those of the Fund's companion Bretton Woods institution, the World Bank and its affiliates, now under the able direction of George Woods. I should mention particularly at this year's meeting the work of the International Development Association, whose activities in so short a span of time offer so much promise for the future. Action by the Part I countries on the proposals for increasing its resources will mark another milestone in the work to which it is dedicated and in which we are all joined together.

The successive annual reports of the International Monetary Fund have expertly traced the evolution of our international monetary system since World War II. They have also made clear that new problems have a way of emerging as older ones are solved. The report for 1963 is no exception. In particular, it deals at some length with the adequacy of existing arrangements for providing international liquidity during the coming years. The authors point out that liquidity is not simply a matter of the aggregate of official holdings of gold or foreign exchange, and they review the progress

made in recent years—in considerable part under the auspices of the Fund itself—in supplementing these resources with international credit. But the report also recognizes that the needs of nations for assured means of financing balance-of-payments deficits—either by drawing upon a stock of liquid assets or by means of borrowing—can be expected to increase over time. At the same time, as the deficit in the balance of payments of the United States is narrowed and closed, that deficit will no longer contribute to the liquidity of other nations in the manner and magnitude of the last few years.

The Fund's report has now been supplemented by the thoughtful and important statement of its new Managing Director. Mr. Schweitzer indicated that the Fund expects to study the problem of international liquidity and has expressed the Fund's readiness to cooperate with others in such a study. He points out that studies of this problem are timely even though there is at present no sign of any shortage in international liquidity. He has also given us his view that the Fund should be at the center of whatever strengthening of the international monetary system may prove to be desirable. The United States finds itself in general agreement with all of these thoughts.

But in discussing this matter I would like to make one point crystal clear: The United States does not view possible improvements in the methods of supplying international liquidity as relieving it of the compelling and immediate task of reducing its own payments deficit. Indeed, it is largely the prospect of the elimination of the United States payments deficit that makes it necessary and advisable to undertake these studies.

The Process of International Adjustment

Nor can the provision of appropriate facilities for international liquidity relieve nations of their joint responsibilities for effective and timely action to eliminate such imbalances in trade and payments as may arise in the future. In a world of fixed exchange rates and convertible currencies, deficits and surpluses emerge from a wide variety of causes, both domestic and international. The necessity to make cash outlays for defense and aid, shifts

in the basic pattern of demand for internationally traded goods, the development of new products, resources, and production techniques (and developments in capital markets) can be just as important as changes in average price levels and aggregate demand within countries.

The adjustments necessary to correct trade deficits and surpluses take time if they are to proceed in an orderly fashion, without damaging consequences for either domestic growth and stability or the free flow of trade among nations. That is why, as part of the adjustment process, a country experiencing deficits needs reserves to draw upon, or credit that it can rely upon. That is also why a country receiving the counterpart in surpluses needs assets of assured value, in amounts and forms that will not disrupt its own economy. But the last analysis, without effective adjustment by both deficit and surplus countries, no amount of liquidity will enable us to achieve the mutual benefits of a closely integrated world economy within a framework of steady growth accompanied by monetary stability.

The challenge implicit in this situation is clear. Side by side with our studies of possible liquidity needs, we must consciously seek means of improving the process of international adjustment itself, while preserving our separate abilities to meet our respective domestic needs.

This is a large order, but one that is well within our capacities. Much has been learned from the experience of recent years. We have come to recognize that in shaping domestic policies and choosing from the various tools available for use, their varying impact upon our external accounts and upon those of our trading partners must be taken fully into account. There is greater awareness of the need to identify and eliminate those market rigidities that inhibit the process of adjustment. And we are learning that new techniques must be developed for assisting the process of adjustment that are consistent with domestic growth and competitive markets.

Much of this can be illustrated by analyzing the position of the United States, faced as we are with the twin tasks of achieving moderate rapid growth at home while simultaneous

IMF "Group of 10" Agrees To Undertake Study of International Monetary System

The following statement was issued at Washington on October 2 on behalf of the "Group of 10" members of the International Monetary Fund by the chairman of the group, Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.

1. In the course of the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund, the Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the 10 countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States) participating in the agreement of December 1961¹ to supplement the resources of the International Monetary Fund met in Washington, together with Mr. Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Director of the Fund. In this meeting, they discussed the international payments situation and reviewed the functioning of the international monetary system now and in the future in the light of their common aims as reflected in the Fund's Charter.

2. They agreed that the removal of the imbalances still existing in the external accounts of some major countries was the most important objective to be pursued over the near future. For this reason they welcomed the recent efforts of certain deficit countries to improve their balances of payments, as well as actions by a number of countries designed to reduce or remove surpluses, as evidence of progress toward a better basic international equilibrium. The Ministers and Governors reaffirmed the objective of reaching such balance at high levels of economic activity with a sustainable rate of economic growth and in a climate of price stability.

3. In examining the functioning of the international monetary system, the Ministers and Governors noted that the present national reserves of member countries, supplemented as they are by the resources of the IMF, as well as by a network of bilateral facilities, seemed fully adequate in present circumstances to cope with possible threats to the stability of the international payments system. In

this connection, the Ministers reviewed the "General Arrangements To Borrow" in the International Monetary Fund and reiterated their determination that these resources would be available for decisive and prompt action.

4. In reviewing the longer-run prospects, the Ministers and Governors agreed that the underlying structure of the present monetary system—based on fixed exchange rates and the established price of gold—has proven its value as the foundation for present and future arrangements. It appeared to them, however, to be useful to undertake a thorough examination of the outlook for the functioning of the international monetary system and of its probable future needs for liquidity. This examination should be made with particular emphasis on the possible magnitude and nature of the future needs for reserves and for supplementary credit facilities which may arise within the framework of national economic policies effectively aiming at the objectives mentioned in paragraph 2. The studies should also appraise and evaluate various possibilities for covering such needs.

5. The Ministers and Governors have noted with approval the statement by the Managing Director that the International Monetary Fund will develop and intensify its studies of these long-run questions. They, for their part, have now instructed their Deputies to examine these questions, and to report to them on the progress of their studies and discussions over the course of the coming year. They requested the Deputies in carrying out these studies to maintain close working relations with the International Monetary Fund and with other international bodies concerned with monetary matters. Any specific suggestions resulting from the studies by the Deputies will be submitted to the Ministers and Governors for consideration.

6. The Ministers and Governors believe that such an examination of the international monetary system will further strengthen international financial cooperation, which is the essential basis for the continued successful functioning of the system.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187.

...ing the troublesome gap in our balance of payments. And many of the lessons of this experience, I believe, will prove sooner or later more generally applicable to the problems of international adjustment.

Business activity in the United States has continued to expand over the past year at a very steady pace. Total output has now

reached a rate of over \$585 billion a year—in real terms more than 13 percent above the level of early 1961.

Measured against other peacetime expansions of the past 40 years, this performance has been encouraging. All but one of these recovery periods have now been equaled or exceeded in terms of percentage increase in output, and

that single exception took place only after the steep declines in production during the early 1930's. Prices of manufactured goods have remained virtually unchanged during the current expansion, extending the period of stability that has existed since 1958. However, unemployment is still excessive. And we are not fully utilizing our available savings or our existing productive plant capacity. True, investment activity has risen in response to increases in demand and to measures introduced a year ago to liberalize the tax treatment of depreciation and provide an investment tax credit. But new investment still remains below the levels required to support a full employment economy and to assure the position of our industry among the leaders in technological progress.

At the same time, our overall balance of payments has responded slowly to the series of measures we have undertaken since 1961. The overall deficit was reduced to \$2.2 billion in 1962, from \$3.9 billion in 1960, and \$2.4 billion in 1961. But the deficit grew markedly larger during the first half of 1963.

When this situation first became apparent, we made a thoroughgoing review of our entire balance-of-payments program, which culminated in a series of decisions announced by the President on July 18. Resulting programs now underway will, by the end of next year, bring a reduction of \$1 billion in the annual rate of dollar expenditures abroad for defense, aid, and other Government programs. Savings of similar magnitude are also expected on capital account as a result of the proposed interest equalization tax and the firmer structure of short-term interest rates accompanying the recent one-half percent increase in the Federal Reserve discount rate. We can already see indications that the deterioration in our accounts during the first half of the year is being arrested.

These new actions will complement and reinforce the longer run measures we have been taking to achieve both external balance and more rapid domestic growth. Basic to our strategy for achieving these twin goals is a broad program of individual and corporate tax reduction totaling \$11 billion, which, after passage by our House of Representatives last week, is now before our Senate. It will provide an

impetus to the domestic economy in a manner consistent with our international position. It will give increased flexibility to our monetary authorities in meeting balance-of-payments requirements. The added incentives for use of capital in the United States will enhance the relative attractiveness of investment here for Americans and foreigners alike. At the same time, the increased productivity associated with rising investment, together with greater incentives to develop and market new products and to apply more rapidly the fruits of our vast research capabilities, will reinforce the efforts we are making to increase our exports.

Expanding Production

Our ability to expand production—which is implicit in our current unemployment, in our rapidly growing labor force, and in our margin of underutilized industrial capacity—provides protection against upward price pressures and the stimulus from the tax program takes hold. Meanwhile we are continuing successfully to finance our budgetary deficit outside the banking system. For instance, in the year that ended August 31, the latest date for which figures are available, the combined holdings of Government debt in the hands of our Federal Reserve and commercial banks declined by more than \$1½ billion. We have also made further progress in improving the maturity structure of our marketable debt. As a result of our latest advance refunding, the average life of that debt exceeded 5¼ years for the first time since 1956. We are not faced, therefore, with the kind of excessive liquidity that could fuel inflationary developments as our economy moves toward fuller employment.

Perhaps most significant of all in terms of the outlook for prices, our manufacturing labor costs per unit of output have declined over the past 3 years—the first time since World War II that this basic measure of our competitive strength has improved for so long a period, during a time of substantial recovery. And the rate of wage increases in our manufacturing industry is holding within the range of past and anticipated productivity increases.

In this way we are encouraging basic corrective forces in terms of costs and prices th

should provide a firm base for improving our trading position, thus contributing to the orderly adjustment of our entire balance of payments. Highly tentative, but nonetheless encouraging, signs of an improvement in our international competitive position are developing. But it is clear that the contribution that exports can make to overall balance will be heavily dependent upon the adjustment policies of other nations as well. By this I do not, of course, mean to suggest that surplus nations have a responsibility to inflate, any more than it would be consistent with our internal needs to force deflation. Nor, in our particular situation, would it be reasonable to look only—or primarily—on increases in our commercial trade balance as the solution for our payments problem.

But opportunities do exist for surplus nations, in instances where inflationary pressures are evident, to serve the interests both of their own domestic stability and of external balance by reducing or eliminating barriers to imports, including those from the United States. In the search for effective adjustment mechanisms within the context of a convertible currency system, this kind of action, it seems to me, can come, for surplus countries, a modern substitute for the inflationary price adjustments that we must all do everything we can to avoid. A basic factor in our own deficit position has been the heavy burden we carry for the defense of the free world and for assisting the development of less favored nations. This burden, in wider context, is an inescapable part of the kind of world we live in. But we are also learning that methods of handling these Government outpayments, and more appropriate distribution of their balance-of-payments impact, can also contribute to the adjustment process without subverting their essential purpose.

Important savings have already been made in this area, reducing net outflows under our defense and aid programs from \$3.8 billion in 1960 to \$3.0 billion in 1962. A large portion of this improvement can be traced to the recognition by some European countries of their growing capacity to assume a greater share of the foreign exchange costs of the common defense. As a result, the drain on our payments from maintaining our troops in Germany and Italy

is now virtually fully offset by their purchase of military equipment and supplies from the United States—equipment which, because of the size and flexibility of our defense industry, can be produced more rapidly and more economically in the United States than in their own countries. Thus these arrangements have simultaneously strengthened the free world's military and economic defenses.

In addition, we have adopted a policy of providing the great bulk of our economic aid to developing countries in the form of goods and services, so that it can be brought within the limits of our capacity without impairing its effectiveness. When current commitments are fully reflected in actual disbursements, only some 10 percent of the aid from our various foreign assistance programs will be provided in the form of dollars. At the same time, I believe that we must guard against any tendency to make the "tying" of aid into a subtle new form of protection for home industries. Rather, the logic of our efforts to expand multilateral trade and promote international efficiency through competition among the producers of all nations demands that it be used as a temporary device, reserved for periods of balance-of-payments strains.

With forces of adjustment underway in both our Government and our commercial trade accounts, the most pressing problem in terms of our balance of payments has been the recent acceleration in the outflow of long-term capital. The net outflow of such capital during the first half of this year reached an annual rate of \$3.8 billion. This was fully \$1.3 billion higher than the already substantial figures for 1962 and nearly double the rate maintained over the years 1959-1961. While some of this recent increase stemmed from direct investment, a flood of new foreign borrowings totaling nearly \$1 billion in only 6 months was the major factor. This is considerably more than three times the volume we have been accustomed to.

It is entirely consistent with restoration of full equilibrium in international payments that the United States, with its capacity to generate large savings, continue to supply reasonable amounts of capital to aid the development of other nations. But it is perfectly clear that

maintenance of outflows at the recent pace, far from being a constructive force in world payments, would soon put intolerable strains on the international monetary system as a whole.

As our program of tax reduction takes hold and there are stronger incentives to employ a larger portion of our savings at home, normal market forces will work strongly in the direction of reducing this outflow of long-term capital to more tolerable levels. But the experience of the past year makes clear that we cannot rely on these longer term forces of adjustment to meet our immediate problems. Nor is it feasible to speed the process of adjustment by artificial attempts to force our entire structure of long-term interest rates sharply and suddenly higher. If possible at all in the face of the huge supply of savings flowing into our markets, this course of action would require so drastic a tightening of credit as to seriously jeopardize the prospects for domestic expansion.

Interest Equalization Tax

In this situation, we have recommended enactment of a temporary interest equalization tax which will have the effect of raising the costs of portfolio capital in our market by 1 percent for borrowers in the developed countries abroad. This will bring these costs into a rough alinement with those in most other industrialized countries. The purpose is quite simple—to speed the essential redirection of capital flows in a manner comparable to an equivalent, but presently impracticable, rise in our entire structure of interest rates.

We view this tax solely as a necessary—but temporary—expedient to meet a specific situation that has arisen in large part out of a structural imbalance in the capital markets of the free world. Borrowers from deficit and surplus countries alike converge upon the New York market, not only because of our lower structure of long-term interest rates—since equivalent or lower rates can be found in at least two other countries—but because it is still the only source for international capital in whatever size and form desired, freely available to any borrower able to meet the normal market test of creditworthiness, and offering highly efficient dis-

tribution facilities with low issuing costs. In contrast, potential alternative markets are in most cases subject to official controls or have the difficulty in supplying the needed funds in the volume required. And, with few exceptions, they are characterized by high and rigid interest structures. In the face of this situation, the Fund must temporarily help to redirect the demand pressing on our market through a tax that will increase the costs of long-term borrowing by foreigners.

The impediments to the development of adequate European capital markets are presently under close and continuing study with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and progress is beginning to be visible. As efforts to improve European capital markets come to fruition and the remaining controls and restrictions are eliminated—and as our own domestic demands for capital put increased pressures upon our supply of savings—there is every reason to believe that the need for extraordinary action of the type we are now taking will be eliminated.

When the Fund was established, there was great apprehension that sudden and massive short-term capital movements might again become a disruptive influence as they had in the disturbed climate of the 1930's. Gratifying progress has been made in developing strong defenses against such threats to our convertible currency system through the concerted cooperative efforts of the industrialized countries. A chain of new facilities for coping with these pressures is now in place and tested, and there are grounds for confidence that the process of adjustment can be shielded from perturbations by speculative flows in the future.

With the restoration of convertibility, however, it has become apparent that a sizeable volume of capital is ready to move from country to country in response to relatively small shifts in interest rates. Thus the stability of exchange rates and freedom of markets to which we have all worked in the postwar period carries with it the implication that short-term interest rates in the major trading countries must inevitably be kept reasonably well in line with each other.

Both problems and opportunities are im-

in these circumstances. Domestic objectives will sometimes limit the practicable range of fluctuation in interest rates that can be undertaken for facilitating balance-of-payments adjustment. But, since the margin between rate relationships that attract or repel short-term funds is likely to be relatively narrow, it will usually be feasible to encourage small changes in short-term rates in the interest of speeding restoration of international equilibrium without disturbing the domestic economy.

Consultation and Cooperation

Most promising of all in terms of facilitating the adjustment process is the increasingly close and continuous consultation on these matters that has developed in the forums provided by this institution, by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and by the Bank for International Settlements. This has been particularly evident in the area of short-term capital flows and interest rates. But we are also coming to understand that this same kind of consultation and cooperation is essential in other areas as well. We know that any adjustment demands offsetting changes in the position of deficit and surplus nations. We also know, in the last analysis, that these adjustments must take place, for no workable international monetary system will allow a nation to continue to run a deficit—or for that matter a surplus—for an indefinite period.

The critical question is how the adjustments are to be made. Balance can be—and too often in the past has been—forced by measures that endanger domestic stability or the prospects for growing trade. Those alternatives are not open to us today if the bright promise of all that has been accomplished since Bretton Woods is to be fulfilled. Nor can the industrialized countries afford to undermine the defenses of freedom or withdraw their support of the developing nations.

The only realistic solution is to find effective means for reconciling the requirements of a convertible currency system based on fixed exchange rates with the freedom of each nation to pursue domestic growth and stability. No methods will work instantaneously, and one prerequisite to their proper functioning is the

availability of adequate liquidity—in the form of international reserves or ready access to credit. The studies now being launched provide fresh assurance that these liquidity needs will be met effectively in the more distant future, just as they are being met effectively today.

But adequate liquidity will not make our machinery of adjustment work automatically, nor can its development be safely put off until emergencies arise. Instead, its effective use will require governments of all nations with a stake in a liberal trading order to work together continuously in many areas: in developing a mix of domestic policies appropriate to external circumstances, in adjusting trade policies, in sharing the burdens of aid and defense, in providing long-term capital, and in eliminating rigidities and inefficiencies in their economies that impede and distort the adjustment process. That willingness, I believe, is now being demonstrated more fully than at any time in the past. This is the real source of my confidence, not only that the United States will restore balance in its own accounts—for we intend to carry out that responsibility in any event—but also that a true equilibrium can be restored within a framework of expanding trade, flourishing growth, and monetary stability.

STATEMENT BY MR. BALL, OCTOBER 2

Press release 500 dated October 2

We meet this year under new captains. The Bank has a new President, the Fund a new Managing Director. Many of us have known Mr. Woods and Mr. Schweitzer before. Those of us who are now meeting those two gentlemen for the first time have been impressed and encouraged by the wise and perceptive words that each has spoken in his inaugural address. All of us convening here this week can carry home the heartening news that both of the Bretton Woods institutions are in firm and experienced hands.

In the course of the past year, the Bank has acquired not only a new leader but new members—20 in number. Most are nations only recently independent. We welcome their presence here this morning, and we look forward to their participation in our common effort.

In his inaugural address on Monday, President Woods spoke both of the Bank's achievements and of its plans. The Bank has increased its rate of lending in recent months, and we welcome Mr. Woods' statement—phrased with the caution characteristic of a good banker—that “the prospect is not for a downward trend in the Bank's operations.”

Yet, as we all know, the achievements of the Bank cannot be measured merely by the rate of its lending. During its almost two decades of active life the Bank has come to cast a long shadow. Today its influence is felt on many financial relationships. The way in which the Bank does its business, the sound counsel given by its President and staff, have significant influence on the whole free-world financial community.

Bank and Fund Complementary

In speaking of the Bank in this context, we must necessarily take account of its functional relation to the Fund. These two organizations were, after all, created at the same time, by a common inspiration, to serve a single common objective.

A central purpose of the Fund, as set forth in its Articles of Agreement, is “to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade” by preventing the kind of financial warfare among nations that had proved so disruptive in the 1930's. The World Bank also has, as one of its purposes, “to promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments. . . .”

I need not point out to you, therefore, that these two institutions are complementary in objective and operation.

The Fund has specific responsibility for the effective conduct of the international payments system. But the Bank also, if it is to fulfill its purposes of encouraging development and expanded trade, must be concerned that its own activities contribute to the effective operation of the international payments system and that its efforts are not frustrated by the development of distortions and imbalances in that system.

This was, of course, a constant preoccupation of Eugene Black while he was President of the

Bank, and Mr. Woods has made it known by his thoughtful statement on Monday that he is concerned with this problem.

Development Lending and Balance of Payments

The Bank can, through its operations, for example, affect the payments system by its lending and borrowing activities. Mr. Woods showed an acute awareness of the importance of development lending to the balance of payments of borrowing countries when he spoke so lucidly of the “debt problem.” Effective development requires, of course, that less developed countries acquire foreign exchange resources in order to sustain a volume of imports of technology and capital goods essential to the building of a sound economy. Until the development process is well advanced, these countries must depend upon a substantial input of foreign capital to meet their foreign exchange requirements, and, to the extent that the foreign capital is made available upon credit terms, it must be repaid. This means that the terms of the credits must be carefully related to the ability of a borrowing nation to meet its foreign exchange obligations.

Most of the new countries that have come into being during the postwar period have been born with relatively little external debt. But their eagerness for rapid development means that many of the developing nations have paid little attention to the effective scheduling of their mounting indebtedness. They have contracted much of it on short term and have piled up a burden of repayment obligations that they are compelled to face long before the development process has begun to pay off in increased earning capacity. Mr. Woods mentions the situation of one major geographic area where half of the present debt has to be paid during the next 5 years. The danger we face—as we all know—is a series of foreign-exchange crises, on top of the other, that can result in serious harm to the developing countries, inject an element of uncertainty into international trade, and cause a serious disturbance to the international payments system.

This is a problem that lending and borrowing countries must face together. It is a major problem on which there should be more

ultation on the part of lending nations, both with borrowing nations and with one another. Too often less developed countries have accumulated debt haphazardly in a series of bilateral arrangements made by the borrowing nation with many different governments and institutions. In many instances the lending nation does not know the exact structure of debt of a nation to which it is extending credit, and loans are all too often made without regard to the concentration of repayment obligations.

Debt Structure of Developing Nations

In its preoccupation with this problem, the World Bank has taken the lead, as it has with many other problems in the field of economic development. From the beginning it gave careful attention to the debt-servicing ability of its loan recipients—initially to assure that borrowing countries would be able to service loans made by the Bank itself. The remarkable payment record for Bank credits is testimony to the wisdom of this approach.

Later, however, as the Bank broadened its activities to take more comprehensive responsibility for the problems of developing nations—as it moved into the field of economic surveys and technical assistance—it began to look upon the debt structure of its borrowers as one indicator of the pace at which a country could achieve orderly growth.

As a result, the Bank has become a repository of extensive information regarding the external capabilities of its developing members. It uses this information not only in assessing the repayment prospects on its own loans but also in advising its borrowers as to the difficulties that they may confront if they do not achieve an orderly phasing of debt repayments.

The Bank has employed this store of information in reaching decisions regarding its own policies concerning the terms of its loans. Its awareness of the debt-servicing problem was a compelling argument for creating the International Development Association.

My Government has also recognized that it can be more effective in helping a less developed country if it has full knowledge of the structure of the debt which that country has contracted. This necessarily means that we must inform

ourselves in some detail as to the nature, size, and terms of aid—both grants and credits—extended by other developed countries.

Such detailed information is, however, often difficult for a lending nation to obtain. It can be made most readily available if the lending nations pool their information. With this in mind, we have encouraged the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD—the DAC—to build on the activities of the Bank and serve as a kind of clearinghouse for gathering data as to the credits each lending country is extending to each less developed country. The information so far collected by the DAC has been of great value to my Government and, I am sure, to others as well. Within the last few months the Bank and the DAC have made great progress in this common effort. In the interests of both developed and developing nations, we believe, however, that the time has come to move farther in collecting and consolidating this information for the use of lending and borrowing nations alike.

We would hope that, through the increased cooperation of these two institutions, information can be periodically made available to lending nations regarding the debt structure of developing countries. The lending nations should then be able more effectively to design the credits they are themselves extending so as to make the burden of repayment obligations easier for the borrowing nations. They can thus help to free the less developed countries from the ordeal of successive balance-of-payments crises.

Liberalizing Terms of Credit

But even the most comprehensive information regarding debt structures will be of little use unless the lending nations liberalize the terms of their credits to accord with the capacities of the recipients. The Bank has long recognized this problem and has played an evangelical role in admonishing lending nations to reduce their interest rates and provide longer maturities.

In this connection, we welcome Mr. Woods' suggestion that the Bank may, in appropriate cases, modify the terms of its lending so as to lengthen grace periods and extend maturities.

My Government has, of course, been a pioneer in this direction. Development lending by the United States Agency for International Development for most developing nations has been on the basis of 40-year maturities, grace periods extending to 10 years, and interest rates of three-fourths of 1 percent. We have added our powers of persuasion to those of the Bank's in an effort to induce other nations to shape their lending terms more generously, and this has been one of the principal efforts of the DAC as well.

Last spring the DAC recommended to its members that the terms of aid should be related to the circumstances of each underdeveloped country and that this would mean, in practice, a liberalization of the terms of many lenders.

All of this effort has not been without result. Today the terms upon which many governments are providing aid have been substantially improved. We are gratified to note, for example, that the British Government in its recent White Paper has announced the decision "in suitable cases" to provide loans for periods of up to 30 years with extended grace periods of up to a decade and to reduce the burden of interest payments by waiving interest for 7 years.

Yet, in spite of all the progress that has been made, this problem of debt terms is still with us. We must frankly examine the relationship between long-term, low-cost loans and the funding of short-term commercial credits. Properly used, short-term credits can play a constructive role in the economic life of a country. Unwise use of such credits can and has led to the need for a series of creditor consolidation arrangements which are damaging to borrowers and lenders alike.

Moreover, we should, all of us, realize that lending nations which periodically roll over short-term debt are not thereby making available any new resources to the debtor country. In fact, the need for continual rollovers injects a serious element of uncertainty into the economic life of new nations, makes financial and development planning precarious, and creates a crisis-like atmosphere that is conducive neither to development nor to the achievement of stability in international accounts.

I think it essential, therefore, that if we are to get on with this business of assisting the less developed countries on a rational and effective basis, the economically advanced countries should reach a common understanding that effective development assistance must necessarily be tailored to the repayment abilities of developing countries and that the excessive concentration of repayment obligations must be scrupulously avoided.

International Development Association

The International Development Association provides an instrument by which many of the more advanced countries—and particularly those that do not conduct large aid programs of their own—can make resources available to finance development on terms that will not unduly burden the debt structures of the borrowing nations. The recent proposal for the \$75 million replenishment of the resources of the association by 17 governments will assure the continued activity of this important organization and will enable it to play an even greater role in the development task. IDA extends loans, as we all know, for terms of 50 years with a 10-year grace period and a service charge of three-fourths of 1 percent. And its experience could well serve as a guide for member nations in the conduct of their own bilateral assistance programs.

Financial Problems of Surplus Countries

I have spoken so far of the need to avoid policies that will embarrass the balance of payments of less developed countries. But the world payment system is also faced with distortions and disequilibria that result from the financial problems of advanced nations. A considerable part of the discussion during the annual meeting of the Fund is, in fact, related to the situation of surplus and deficit countries—and particularly to the balance-of-payments problems of my own country.

That deficit, as the whole world knows, is not of a classical pattern. It does not arise from an adverse merchandise balance, nor from inflation, but rather from the very great exertion that my country is making in three directions

—first, in providing means for the defense of the free world;

—second, in providing resources for the less developed countries; and,

—third, in maintaining a highly organized and efficient capital market available to the whole free world.

The United States deficit, therefore, is the outward and visible manifestation of the vast effort my country is making throughout the world for the benefit of free men everywhere.

We could solve this problem by cutting back the programs that produce its outward symbol. But the costs of such action would fall heavily on many nations and people.

The best way to reduce this imbalance in exertion is *not* for the United States to lower the level of its own effort but for other economically advanced nations to raise the level of theirs. If we are to solve this problem without restrictionist measures, I think we must straightforwardly face the fact that the surplus countries should, in principle, increase their efforts, not merely in defense and foreign assistance but also in modernizing their capital markets—many of which are still organized along 19th-century lines and available only for domestic use.

Broadening Market for Bank's Securities

As in other matters, the Bank has shown a steady awareness of the problem of the imbalance in payments among the developed nations—particularly in the manner in which it has obtained the capital resources needed for its operations. In essence, the Bank serves as a mechanism for channeling the funds of advanced countries into productive use in the less developed countries. It has developed a variety of imaginative techniques for mobilizing public and private capital for this purpose. It has sold bonds and notes to private investors and central banks. It has sold early maturities on outstanding loans. It has arranged participations by private lending institutions in loans made by the Bank, and it has linked its lending to efforts by borrowing countries to sell obligations on foreign capital markets.

Through the use of these techniques the Bank has found sources of funds that would not

otherwise have been available for the development of its member countries.

In its early years the Bank relied principally on the United States investment market for its capital. But, as it has become possible to do so, the Bank has developed sources of funds in other countries. The broadening of the market for the Bank's securities has enabled it to tap the resources of surplus countries. It has thus strengthened the position of the Bank without adding to the disequilibrium in the payments system. During the Bank's last fiscal year, for instance, all of its borrowings were undertaken outside the United States, and today more than half the Bank's bonded indebtedness is held outside the United States.

In addition, by selling its 2-year dollar bonds and notes to central banks in the so-called surplus countries, it is helping to reduce excess exchange reserves and is putting them to work in the essential task of development.

Exploring New Ground

By confining my remarks today to the contributions of the Bank's activities to the better working of the international payments system, I have, of course, touched only limited segments of the Bank's affairs.

In many ways, the most heartening aspect of Mr. Woods' speech on Monday was his willingness—indeed his eagerness—to explore new ground. For the Bank, like any healthy organism, must learn to live in a world of change and to be responsive to the new demands and responsibilities that events impose on it. Like every organism also the life of the Bank is marked by certain cyclical alterations. Its early years were preoccupied with the heavy tasks of reconstruction. Since the ending of this period, the Bank has focused its efforts on the great unfinished business of assisting the less developed countries to achieve a better level of life.

Throughout its brief but intensely useful existence the Bank has been accumulating experience and achieving deep insights. It is quite ready, in our view, to move forward. And I can promise today that my Government will cooperate fully in exploring the new terrain suggested by the Bank's new President.

U.S. Policy on Viet-Nam

*White House Statement*¹

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor reported to the President this morning and to the National Security Council this afternoon. Their report included a number of classified findings and recommendations which will be the subject of further review and action. Their basic presentation was endorsed by all members of the Security Council and the following statement of United States policy was approved by the President on the basis of recommendations received from them and from Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge.

1. The security of South Viet-Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet-Nam.

2. The military program in South Viet-Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.

3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Oct. 2 by Pierre Salinger, Press Secretary to the President.

training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdrawn.

4. The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet-Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.

5. It remains the policy of the United States in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society.

U.S. Stops Aid to Dominican Republic and Honduras

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

We view the recent military coups in the Dominican Republic and Honduras with the utmost gravity. The establishment and maintenance of representative and constitutional government is an essential element in the Alliance for Progress. Stable and effective government, responsive to the popular will, is a critical factor in the attainment of social and economic progress.

Under existing conditions in the Dominican Republic and Honduras there is no opportunity for effective collaboration by the United States under the Alliance for Progress or for normalization of diplomatic relations. Accordingly we have stopped all economic and military aid to these countries and have commenced orderly reassignment of the personnel involved.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Oct. 4 by Robert J. McCloskey, Department press officer.

The Next Steps Toward Peace: Some Notes on the Two-Legged Process

by McGeorge Bundy
*Special Assistant to the President*¹

We have all heard a great deal in recent months about steps toward peace, large and small, and in taking them as my topic I do not intend to try to say which the next steps may be, or even whether we can now look forward to rapid progress in the fulfillment of hopes we share with other men everywhere. Certainly we can agree that there is more reason for hope than there was a year ago. Certainly also we can agree that much remains to be done. As we meet, discussions are proceeding both with our allies and with the Soviet Government on a wide range of possibilities. So this is not the time, and I am not the person, to attempt any general prediction.

What I want to do instead, and what I think may be more useful, is to offer a description of one aspect of the reality of international affairs which is likely to be characteristic of many of the next major events in our affairs. What I want to suggest is that, when there is a debate on these great issues among us, there is almost always both an element of truth and a danger of error in each of the opposed positions. And I want to suggest further that, precisely because we are now entering a period in which tension is lower and the sharpness of danger less apparent, it is important in thinking about these issues not to ignore one aspect of the truth in concentration on another.

The most general form of this proposition, of course, is that all steps toward peace rest upon adequate readiness for defense, at every level of force. The prospect for peace now is better

than it was last September; the major cause of this improvement is the resolution displayed by the people and Government of the United States in the crisis of October 1962. The indispensable connection between military strength and the maintenance of peace is obvious—and frequently forgotten.

It is crucial to the understanding of international affairs that we should never separate the idea of peace from this requirement of vigilance in defense. It follows that, when we think of steps toward peace, we should not think only of disarmament, or international agreement, or cooperation among nations. We should think also of successful resistance to subversion, of proper planning for the defense of the free world, and of our own strength and health as a free society. The specific cases on which I wish to comment are related to these areas too, and I hope you will agree that it is right to think of all of them as elements in our national pursuit of peace.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty

As I say, my central proposition is that in nearly all of these great matters, where feelings become strong and difference of opinion becomes evident, there is some truth on every side and also some danger of error. One way of stating the problem of statesmanship is to see it as a matter of the resolution of arguments in which both sides are partly right and each runs a risk of error. Before I apply this proposition to current issues, it may be helpful to begin with the recently concluded debate on the test ban treaty. That debate is familiar, I

¹ Address made before a World Affairs Conference at Albany, N.Y., on Sept. 30.

am sure, to most of us, and it happens that it illustrates my point quite neatly.

The central arguments for the test ban treaty, as the President put them in his first report to the country,² are four in number: first, that it can be a step toward reduced world tension; second, it can be a step toward freeing the world from radioactive fallout; third, it can be a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; and fourth, it can limit the arms race in ways which strengthen our security far more than the continuing of unrestricted testing. These four arguments withstood the test of national debate, and the vote in the Senate records the consensus of the country that, in sum, they justify the treaty.

Yet at the same time, and in the same speech, the President took note of the requirement that under this treaty the United States should observe and maintain a substantial vigilance, in defense of its interests and those of all free men, against the risk of violation or evasion and also against the danger of unwarranted relaxation in our defense. As the debate developed, the President and his administration were always ready to respond to requests for reassurance on this point, and in successive statements, culminating in the President's letter to Senator [Everett McKinley] Dirksen of September 10,³ it was made plain that with this limited treaty the United States will, because it must, maintain strong weapons laboratories, an energetic program of underground testing, a readiness to resume tests in the atmosphere in the event of violation of the treaty by others, and of course a full constitutional respect for the rights and obligations of the Senate if at any time this treaty should be amended.

The limited test ban treaty, then, is an opportunity for hope but not a reason for relaxation, and the national consensus which has emerged rests upon both hope and vigilance. It is this balanced spirit which has governed both the executive branch and the Senate, and it appears very plainly in the eloquent statements supporting the treaty made by such leaders as Senators [Mike] Mansfield, Dirksen, and [J. W.]

² BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1963, p. 496.

Fulbright. The best advocates of disarmament like Senator [Hubert H.] Humphrey, have always understood the requirement of vigilance and determined supporters of our nuclear strength, like Senator [John O.] Pastore, have understood the necessity for hope.

But not everyone in the country observed the same balance, and in the national debate there were on each side errors of excess. On the one hand, in their emphasis on hope, some of those supporting the treaty were inattentive to the problem of safeguards and appeared to believe that it was somehow not in the spirit of the treaty that the United States should make clear the need for vigilance. And on the other hand, some of those most concerned about safeguards and vigilance were blind to the real hopes represented in the treaty and unwilling to entertain the possibility that any agreement with the Soviet Union could conceivably be in the interest of both sides. I am not now debating the overall merits or demerits of the treaty as such, but only pointing out the hazard of a one-sided concern for either its dangers or its hopes, taken alone.

The limited test ban treaty is more a beginning than an end in itself. It may or may not lead onward. But it does indeed offer the foundation of kinds of hope of which the President spoke, and it does indeed require the safeguards he has stated. So when we sift the arguments, we find much to keep from both sides; and what it is wise to reject, in the main, is the conclusion and attitude which rests primarily upon a total rejection of the concerns of others. Those supporting the treaty uncritically have been wrong mainly where they have too much resisted the concerns of those more cautious than themselves. Those who have opposed it root and branch have erred mainly in neglecting or underrating the reality of the hope it represents. My suggestion is that there has been more truth in the affirmative beliefs of both sides than in their criticisms of each other.

And what I wish to do next is to suggest that this same conclusion has some validity in four other fields: our adventure in space, our policies toward Europe, our effort for freedom in South Viet-Nam, and our hope for improvement in relations with the Soviet Union.

U.S. Position on Cooperation in Space

I take the problem of space first because in a measure it is the simplest. Here we have a single national policy with two major strands. The first is our national effort to develop the technical, industrial, and human resources which are necessary for the extension of man's capacity from the earth toward outer space. This wide undertaking is symbolized as it is stimulated by the national decision taken 2 years ago to aim at the landing of a man on the moon within this decade. But it is the wider program and purpose, and not the single personal adventure, which shapes our policy and justifies this effort.

Parallel to this national effort, and steadily sustained over a 5-year period, is our purpose of cooperation in space. This purpose was dramatically reaffirmed by the President 10 days ago in his address to the United Nations;⁴ there he urged that we should explore the possibility of joining with the Soviet Union, even in sending men to the moon. And again, it is the broad purpose of cooperation, and not only the possible sharing of a single great personal adventure, which is at the center of our policy.

The question which has been raised in this last week is whether there is somehow a contradiction between the national effort and the purpose of cooperation. The position of your Government is that these two undertakings are part of a single program, each reinforcing the other. As the President put it last week in a letter to Representative Albert Thomas:

This great national effort and this steadily stated readiness to cooperate with others are not in conflict. . . . We do not make our space effort with the narrow purpose of national aggrandizement. We make it so that the United States may have a leading and honorable role in mankind's peaceful conquest of space. It is this great effort which permits us now to offer increased cooperation with no suspicion anywhere that we speak from weakness. And in the same way, our readiness to cooperate with others enlarges the international meaning of our own peaceful American program in space.

It is right then, we believe, to press on with the space program of the United States and to press on also in the effort to find wider paths to greater cooperation. In this policy we ac-

cept great parts from each of two kinds of arguments—those urging we must be strong in space, and those urging that we must miss no opportunity for cooperation with the Soviet Union.

At the same time, as in the case of the debate on the test ban treaty, it is also necessary to reject some parts of the two different arguments. On the one hand, we do not believe that the very limited progress which has been made so far in real cooperation with the Soviet Union in any sense justifies a weakening or slackening in the national space effort. To abandon or attenuate our clear national commitment to a major effort in space, on the strength of hope and good will alone, would be as wrong as accepting a test ban treaty without proper safeguards.

On the other hand, we must also reject the notion that the national program in space is somehow weakened or endangered by a peaceful program of cooperation. We have not entered space only in fear or in hostility. Our strength and our readiness to meet any hazard—in this and other areas—do not require that we turn our back on every prospect of cooperative effort. In this instance, then, as in that of the test ban treaty, there is truth on both sides of the argument, and error comes mainly not from support of one's own position but from suspicion of the other man's.

Atlantic Partnership and European Unity

I turn now to the politics of Europe. This problem is more complex, and the subtleties of a full-scale argument are impossible here; I must content myself with a sketch. But I think it clear that once again the great hazard is in the tendency to think of "either-or" instead of "both-and." There is a belief that somehow there must be either an Atlantic or a European focus to the policy of the Western nations. And the argument rages over the head of reality, between men who fear that the greatness of Europe may be somehow drowned in the Atlantic and men who seem to believe that the Atlantic partnership may be endangered by growing strength and unity in Europe. The policy of the United States is to reject this false choice—to assert, in every field and on all occasions, the interlocking and mutually supporting ideas of

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

Atlantic partnership and European unity. The clearest and most authoritative statement of this position is in the President's address at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt on June 25 of this year,⁵ and I cannot do better than to quote to you these sentences which state the double commitment of our policy:

We are partners for peace—not in a narrow bilateral context but in a framework of Atlantic partnership. The ocean divides us less than the Mediterranean divided the ancient world of Greece and Rome. Our Constitution is old and yours is young, and our culture is young and yours is old, but in our commitment we can and must speak and act with but one voice. Our roles are distinct but complementary—and our goals are the same: peace and freedom for all men, for all time, in a world of abundance, in a world of justice. . . .

The future of the West lies in Atlantic partnership—a system of cooperation, interdependence, and harmony whose peoples can jointly meet their burdens and opportunities throughout the world.

That was the Atlantic commitment, but the President went on to Europe:

It is not in our interest to try to dominate the European councils of decision. If that were our objective, we would prefer to see Europe divided and weak, enabling the United States to deal with each fragment individually. Instead we have and now look forward to a Europe united and strong—speaking with a common voice, acting with a common will—a world power capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner.

This is in the interest of us all. For war in Europe, as we learned twice in 40 years, destroys peace in America. A threat to the freedom of Europe is a threat to the freedom of America. . . . And that is why we look forward to a united Europe in an Atlantic partnership—an entity of interdependent parts, sharing equally both burdens and decisions and linked together in the tasks of defense as well as the arts of peace.

Here again, as in our previous examples, there is truth in both concepts, and error comes mainly from hostility to one or the other. It is not necessary, in the construction of the new Europe, that the ties of partnership across the Atlantic should be cut. Still less is it required, for the effectiveness of the Atlantic community, that there should be any hostility to the idea of Europe. This is what American policy has recognized; it is also what the greatest men of Europe have understood and preached.

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 22, 1963, p. 118.

The Situation in South Viet-Nam

The difficult situation in the troubled country of South Viet-Nam is one which I have a great desire to discuss, in substantive terms, though I have taken as examples the other questions I have taken as examples. The important mission of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and General Maxwell D. Taylor is only just ending, and it would be wholly inappropriate for me to comment on the course of action which may be chosen in the light of this mission and of the continuing consideration which is going forward in Saigon under the leadership of Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge, and also in Washington.⁶

Yet it is not wrong, I think, to suggest that in this case again there are two propositions, both of them true, and two kinds of error which can result from an unwillingness to accept them both. And again both propositions have been stated clearly by the President.⁷ The first is that the object of American policy in this part of the world is to assist in a most difficult and important struggle against Communist subversion—military, paramilitary, and political. The commitment of the United States to the independence of South Viet-Nam goes back many years. This commitment was intensified and reinforced 2 years ago, and since then a major cooperative effort has been carried forward with increasing energy—and at least until recently with increasing success—Americans working closely with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam. It is the policy of the United States to sustain this effort.

Yet it would be folly for the United States to neglect, or to regard with indifference, political developments of recent months which raise questions about the ability of the Government and people of South Viet-Nam to support each other effectively in their contest with communism. The President has made it clear that the United States is not indifferent to these events and regards them with great concern. It must be the policy of the United States Government to make clear its interest in what

⁶ See p. 624.

⁷ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 1 and Sept. 30, 1963, p. 498.

ever improvements it judges to be necessary, always of course with a proper regard for responsibilities which rest in the first instance upon the people of South Viet-Nam.

It is no secret that observers of the scene in South Viet-Nam have often differed sharply in their interpretation of events. From these differences there have come divergent recommendations for policy. There is nothing discreditable in the existence of such differences. In a situation in which easy solutions do not exist and in which commitments of purpose and hope are high, it is only natural that there should be a tendency in each observer to emphasize the part of the truth to which he is nearest. If a particular antisubversive effort is going well, the man who is working on that effort is bound to see that part of reality as very large. If in the cities there is repression and alienation of public support, men living in those cities, with responsibilities more civil than military, will feel a special and intense concern. Where danger comes is not in these equally right perceptions of important phenomena but in the human tendency, here as in each of my preceding examples, to suppose that one's own reality is the only reality, so that the observation of the other man is somehow misleading.

The requirement upon statesmanship, once again, is to seek ways of meeting both the need for effective prosecution of the struggle and the need for a workable relation between the people and government of a friendly country. No one can say that this task is easy. No one can even say it is certainly possible. But what can be said, and what the President has said already, is that the United States will not shrink from this responsibility or attempt to make it easier than it is by pretending that only one part of it is important.

U.S. Relations With the Soviet Union

Finally, returning to the wider arena, I come to the question of our relations with the Soviet Union. And again I offer two propositions. The first is that we must and will seek for improvement in our relations with the Soviet Government, for a reliable and extended easing of tensions, for the "next steps"—in the direct sense—after the first small step of the limited

test ban treaty. But the second proposition is that in this purpose and process the United States will give no comfort or support to those who believe that it is right or even possible to lie down in trust with Communists and their supporters in the free societies of the West or in places where communism subsists only by force and fraud, as most notably today in Cuba.

The first proposition hardly requires elaboration, I think, in the light of the President's own address at the United Nations. We seek a reliable easing of tensions. We never intend to be second in this honorable search, and, while we will always insist on the proper rights and interests of our allies, and especially on the legitimate purpose of reunification which animates the people of Germany, we believe that there can be real progress toward peace and security between the West and the Soviet Union whenever the Soviet Government is really ready.

It is the other proposition which needs more emphasis. Too often in the past, at moments of lower tension or of surface cordiality, free men have been tempted to suppose that a change in the atmosphere is the same as a reversal of basic Communist purpose. History since 1920 is littered with the wreckage of such illusory hopes. The largest wrecks are those left from the period of the Popular Front between 1935 and 1939, but smaller and instructive shipwrecks of hope occurred after the summit meeting of 1955 and even at the time of the aborted summit of 1960. So now it is essential to distinguish between the real and serious hope of sustaining our progress toward less critically dangerous relations with the Soviet Government, and the equally real and serious necessity of unrelenting hostility to Communist subversion, whether sustained by force, as in Cuba, or by political intrigue and Soviet support, as among Communist parties throughout the world.

In this case, as in the others, the danger of error comes from rigid rejection of either half of this double reality. There are some, preoccupied with the danger of letting down our guard against subversion, who believe that it is wrong to seek any improvement at all in the relations between the great powers. There are others who concentrate their attention so sharply on the hope for improvement in our re-

lations with Moscow that they disregard the need for respect to our allies and wariness against a bogus atmosphere of general reconciliation which would serve only the implacable underminers of liberty among us.

Balancing Both Aspects of Reality

I have finished with my five cases—one just settled and four still before us, but all of present importance. I want now to offer one general comment on all five—and to offer it as a suggestion only, with no attempt at detailed demonstration. I believe that in each of these five cases the balanced acceptance of both aspects of reality is in fact essential to the purposes which seem central to those who themselves emphasize only one side. Let me offer 10 sentences, without proof, in support of this suggestion. I think that:

On the test ban

1. The test ban treaty helps our security by enlisting hope as well as fear.
2. Safeguards help toward disarmament by permitting confidence.

On space

3. Our national effort in space is the essential underpinning of a plausible and self-respecting purpose of cooperation.
4. Our purpose of cooperation can attract support and understanding both at home and abroad for the national space effort.

On policy toward Europe

5. Our loyalty to Atlantic partnership is a prerequisite of the growth of self-confidence and self-reliance in Europe.
6. Progress toward the unity of Europe is essential to the coherence of the Atlantic community.

In Viet-Nam

7. Resolute perseverance in the effort against the Viet Cong is essential to political improvement in that country.
8. U.S. concern for political improvement in Viet-Nam is a necessary part of our loyalty to the effort against communism there.

In our relations with communism

9. The search for honorable improvement in

our relations with the Soviet Union is an essential part of our policy of opposing Communists and their sympathizers in the West. It deprives them of the argument that the responsibility for the cold war rests with us.

10. Alert and determined opposition to Communist force and fraud among us is an essential prerequisite to any sound and lasting settlement with the Soviet Government, which will never respect a West it can hope to divide or subvert.

I have come a long way through a number of complex issues, and it may be that I have pressed my thesis too strongly in one instance or another. Moreover, there is always the hazard that, in weighing conflicting considerations, one may unfairly tilt the scales in favor of one's own notion of the properly balanced position. So, in closing, I would urge upon you not the specific wisdom of the specific propositions I have supported but the general wisdom of the general concept that there is usually some truth in what is urged by both sides in our great debates on foreign affairs. And whatever may be our attitudes on specific issues, the acceptance of this more general proposition can lead to the generosity of spirit and breadth of understanding which are essential to sustained good will and effective action in the dangerous age in which, even in these days of growing hope, we are required to live.

Vice President To Visit Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands

Department Statement

Press release 496 dated September 30, for release October 1, 1963.

At the invitation of the Governments of Belgium and Luxembourg and at the request of Secretary Rusk, Vice President Johnson will pay an official visit to these allied countries toward the end of October and beginning of November. He will also pay an official visit to the Netherlands in conjunction with his previously announced visit to open the U.S. Food and Agriculture Exposition in Amsterdam.¹

He will visit the three capitals, Brussels,

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 14, 1963, p. 594.

Luxembourg, and The Hague, to meet with high officials of the respective Governments. The Vice President will discuss our interest in developing actively the close commercial ties between Europe and America. He will also exchange views with these firm allies on other matters of mutual interest.

Senate Consents to Ratification of Limited Test Ban Treaty

The Senate on September 24, by a vote of 80-19, gave its advice and consent to ratification of the limited test ban treaty signed at Moscow on August 5.¹ Following are texts of statements released to the press that day by President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk.

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release (Milford, Pa.) dated September 24

The action of the United States Senate in giving its advice and consent to the nuclear test ban treaty is a welcome culmination of this effort to lead the world once again to the path of peace. The wide support of Senators of both parties given to the treaty after an extensive and wide-ranging debate is evidence not only that the treaty has wide public support but also of the collective judgment that this instrument is good for the people of the United States and people all over the world. I congratulate the Senate for its action and wish to particularly commend the painstaking work of the leaders of both parties in the Senate and Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas in bringing the treaty to this highly satisfactory vote.

Statement by Secretary Rusk

U.S./U.N. press release dated September 24

The Senate's consent to the ratification of the limited nuclear test ban treaty is a cause for deep satisfaction for the people of the United States and for the peoples of the world. The Senate's consideration of the treaty was in the great tradition of that body and fully developed the issues for the information and debate of our democratic society.

Pioneers for Peace

Remarks by President Kennedy¹

I appreciate your welcome, and I am very proud to be back in this historic building and have an opportunity to say a few words on some matters which concern me as President and I hope concern you as citizens. The fact is, I take strength and hope in seeing this monument, hearing its story retold by Ted Moss [Senator Frank E. Moss], and recalling how this State was built and what it started with and what it has now.

Of all the stories of American pioneers and settlers, none is more inspiring than the Mormon Trail. The qualities of the founders of this community are the qualities that we seek in America, the qualities which we like to feel this country has—courage, patience, faith, self-reliance, perseverance, and, above all, an unflagging determination to see the right prevail.

I came on this trip to see the United States, and I can assure you that there is nothing more encouraging for any of us who work in Washington than to have a chance to fly across this United States, and drive through it, and see what a great country it is, and come to understand somewhat better how this country has been able for so many years to carry so many burdens in so many parts of the world.

The primary reason for my trip was conservation, and I include in conservation first our human resources and then our natural resources, and I think this State can take perhaps its greatest pride and its greatest satisfaction for what it has done, not in the field of the conservation and the development of natural resources but what you have done to educate your children. This State has a higher percentage per capita of population of its boys and girls who finish high school and then go to college.

Of all the waste in the United States in the 1960's, none is worse than to have 8 or 9 million boys and girls who will drop out, statistics tell us, drop out of school before they have finished, come into the labor market unprepared at the very time when machines are taking the place

¹ Made at the Mormon Tabernacle, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Sept. 26 (White House press release (Salt Lake City, Utah) ; as-delivered text).

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234; Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314; and Sept. 2, 1963, p. 350.

of men and women—9 million of them. We have a large minority of our population who have not even finished the sixth grade, and here in this richest of all countries, the country which spreads the doctrine of freedom and hope around the globe, we permit our most valuable resource, our young people—their talents—to be wasted by leaving their schools.

So I think we have to save them. I think we have to insist that our children be educated to the limit of their talents, not just in your State or in Massachusetts but all over the United States. Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, who developed the Northwest Ordinance, which put so much emphasis on education—Thomas Jefferson once said that any nation which expected to be ignorant and free hopes for what never was and never will be. So I hope we can conserve this resource.

The other is the natural resource of our country, particularly the land west of the 100th parallel, where the rain comes 15 or 20 inches a year. This State knows that the control of water is the secret of the development of the West, and whether we use it for power or for irrigation or for whatever purpose, no drop of water west of the 100th parallel should flow to the ocean without being used, and to do that requires the dedicated commitment of the people of the States of the West, working with the people of all the United States, who have such an important equity in the richness of this part of the country. So that we must do also.

As Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot did it in years past, we must do it in the 1960's and 1970's. We will triple the population of this country in the short space of 60 or 70 years, and we want those who come after us to have the same rich inheritance that we find now in the United States. This is the reason for the trip, but it is not what I wanted to speak about tonight.

Strength at Home and Strength Abroad

I want to speak about the responsibility that I feel the United States has, not in this country but abroad, and I see the closest interrelationship between the strength of the United States here at home and the strength of the United States around the world. There is one great

natural development here in the United States which has had in its own way a greater effect upon the position and influence and prestige of the United States, almost, than any other act we have done. Do you know what it is? It is the Tennessee Valley. Nearly every leader of every new emerging country that comes to the United States wants to go to New York, to Washington, and the Tennessee Valley, because they want to see what we were able to do with the most poverty-ridden section of the United States in the short space of 30 years, by the wise management of our resources.

What happens here in this country affects the security of the United States and the cause of freedom around the globe. If this is a strong, vital, and vigorous society, the cause of freedom will be strong and vital and vigorous.

I know that many of you in this State and other States sometimes wonder where we are going and why the United States should be so involved in so many affairs, in so many countries all around the globe. If our task on occasion seems hopeless, if we despair of ever working our will on the other 94 percent of the world population, then let us remember that the Mormons of a century ago were a persecuted and prosecuted minority, harried from place to place, the victims of violence and occasionally murder, while today, in the short space of 100 years, their faith and works are known and respected the world around and their voices heard in the highest councils of this country.

As the Mormons succeeded, so America can succeed, if we will not give up or turn back. I realize that the burdens are heavy, and I realize that there is a great temptation to urge that we relinquish them—that we have enough to do here in the United States and we should not be so busy around the globe. The fact of the matter is that we, this generation of Americans, are the first generation of our country ever to be involved in affairs around the globe. From the beginning of this country, from the days of Washington, until the Second World War, this country lived an isolated existence. Through most of our history we were an unaligned country, an uncommitted nation, a neutralist nation. We were by status as well as by desire. We had believed that we could live behind our two

oceans in safety and prosperity in a comfortable distance from the rest of the world.

The end of isolation consequently meant a wrench with the very lifeblood, the very spine, of the Nation. Yet, as time passed, we came to see that the end of isolation was not such a terrible error or evil after all. We came to see that it was the inevitable result of growth—the economic growth, the military growth, and the cultural growth of the United States. No nation so powerful and so dynamic and as rich as our own could hope to live in isolation from other nations, especially at a time when science and technology was making the world so small.

It took Brigham Young and his followers 108 days to go from Winter Quarters, Nebraska, to the valley of the Great Salt Lake. It takes 30 minutes for a missile to go from one continent to another. We did not seek to become a world power. This position was thrust upon us by events. But we became one just the same, and I am proud that we did. I can well understand the attraction of those earlier days. Each one of us has moments of longing for the past, but two world wars have clearly shown us, try as we may, that we cannot turn our back on the world outside. If we do, we jeopardize our economic well-being, we jeopardize our political stability, we jeopardize our physical safety.

To turn away now is to abandon the world to those whose ambition it is to destroy a free society. To yield these burdens up after having carried them for more than 20 years is to surrender the freedom of our country inevitably, for without the United States the chances of freedom surviving, let alone prevailing, around the globe are nonexistent.

Americans have come a long way in accepting in a short time the necessity of world involvement, but the strain of this involvement remains and we find it all over the country. I see it in the letters that come to my desk every day. We find ourselves entangled with apparently unanswerable problems in unpronounceable places. We discover that our enemy in one decade is our ally the next. We find ourselves committed to governments whose actions we cannot often approve, assisting societies with principles very different from our own.

The burdens of maintaining an immense military establishment with one million Ameri-

cans serving outside our frontiers, of financing a farflung program of development assistance, of conducting a complex and baffling diplomacy, all weigh heavily upon us and cause some to counsel retreat. The world is full of contradiction and confusion, and our policy seems to have lost the black and white clarity of simpler times, when we remembered the *Maine* and went to war. It is little wonder, then, in this confusion, we look back to the old days with nostalgia. It is little wonder that there is a desire in the country to go back to the time when our nation lived alone. It is little wonder that we increasingly want an end to entangling alliances, an end to all help to foreign countries, a cessation of diplomatic relations with countries or states whose principles we dislike—that we get the United Nations out of the United States and the United States out of the United Nations, and that we retreat to our own hemisphere, or even within our own boundaries, to take refuge behind a wall of force.

This is an understandable effort to recover an old feeling of simplicity, yet in world affairs, as in all other aspects of our lives, the days of the quiet past are gone forever. Science and technology are irreversible. We cannot return to the day of the sailing schooner or the covered wagon, even if we wished, and if this nation is to survive and succeed in the real world of today, We must acknowledge the realities of the world. And it is those realities that I mention now.

The Realities of the World

We must first of all recognize that we cannot remake the world simply by our own command. When we cannot even bring all of our own people into full citizenship without acts of violence, we can understand how much harder it is to control events beyond our borders. Every nation has its own traditions, its own values, its own aspirations. Our assistance from time to time can help other nations preserve their independence and advance their growth, but we cannot remake them in our own image. We cannot enact their laws, nor can we operate their governments or dictate their policies.

Second, we must recognize that every nation determines its policies in terms of its own interests. No nation, George Washington wrote, is

to be trusted farther than it is bound by its own interest, and no prudent statesman or politician will depart from it. National interest is more powerful than ideology, and the recent developments within the Communist empire show this very clearly. Friendship, as Palmerston said, may rise or wane, but interests endure.

The United States has rightly determined in the years since 1945 under three different administrations that our interest, our national security, the interest of the United States of America, is best served by preserving and protecting a world of diversity in which no one power or no one combination of powers can threaten the security of the United States. The reason that we moved so far into the world was our fear that at the end of the war—and particularly when China became Communist—Japan and Germany would collapse and these two countries, which had so long served as a barrier to the Soviet advance and the Russian advance before that, would open up a wave of conquest of all of Europe and all of Asia, and then, the balance of power turning against us, we would finally be isolated and ultimately destroyed. That is what we have been engaged in for 18 years, to prevent that happening, to prevent any one monolithic power having sufficient force to destroy the United States.

For that reason we support the alliances in Latin America; for that reason we support NATO to protect the security of Western Europe; for that reason we joined SEATO to protect the security of Asia, so that neither Russia nor China could control Europe and Asia and, if they could not control Europe and Asia, then our security was assured. This is what we have been involved in doing, and however dangerous and hazardous it may be, and however close it may take us to the brink on occasion—which it has—and however tired we may get of our involvements with these governments so far away, we have one simple central theme of American foreign policy which all of us must recognize because it is a policy which we must continue to follow. And that is to support the independence of nations so that one bloc cannot gain sufficient power to finally overcome us. There is no mistaking the vital interest of the United States in what goes on

around the world. Therefore, accepting what George Washington said here, I realize that what George Washington said about no entangling alliances has been ended by science and technology and danger.

And third, we must recognize that foreign policy in the modern world does not lend itself to easy, simple, black-and-white solution. If we were to have diplomatic relations only with those countries whose principles we approve of, we would have relations with very few countries in a very short time. If we were to withdraw our assistance from all governments who are run differently from our own, we would relinquish half of the world immediately to our adversaries. If we were to treat foreign policy as merely a medium for delivering self-righteous sermons to supposedly inferior people, we would give up all thought of world influence or world leadership, for the purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our own sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape real events in a real world. We cannot adopt a policy which says that if something does not happen, or others do not do exactly what we wish, we will return to Fortress America.

That is the policy in the changing world of retreat, not of strength.

More important, to adopt a black-and-white all-or-nothing policy subordinates our interests to our irritations. Its actual consequences would be fatal to our security. If we were to resign from the United Nations, break off with all countries of whom we disapprove, end foreign aid and assistance to those countries in an attempt to keep them free, call for the resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing, and turn our back on the rest of mankind, we would not only be abandoning America's influence in the world; we would be inviting a Communist expansion which every Communist power would so greatly welcome. And all of the effort of so many Americans for 18 years would be gone with the wind. Our policy under these conditions in this dangerous world would not have much deterrent effect in a world where nations determined to be free could no longer count on the United States.

The Tide of History

Such a policy of retreat would be folly if we had our backs to the wall. It is surely even greater folly at a time when more realistic, more responsible, more affirmative policies have wrought such spectacular results. For the most striking thing about our world in 1963 is the extent to which the tide of history has begun to flow in the direction of freedom. To renounce the world of freedom now, to abandon those who share our commitment and retire into lonely and not so splendid isolation, would be to give communism the one hope which in this twilight of disappointment for them might repair their divisions and rekindle their hope. For after some gains in the fifties the Communist offensive which claimed to be riding the tide of historic inevitability has been thwarted and turned back in recent months. Indeed, the whole theory of historical inevitability, the belief that all roads must lead to communism sooner or later, has been shattered by the determination of those who believe that men and nations will pursue a variety of roads, that each nation will evolve according to its own traditions and its own aspirations, and that the world of the future will have room for a diversity of economic systems, political creeds, religious faiths, united by the respect for others and loyalty to a world order. Those forces of diversity which served Mr. Washington's national interest—those forces of diversity are in the ascendancy today, even within the Communist empire itself. And our policy at this point should be to give the forces of diversity—as opposed to the forces of uniformity, which our adversaries espouse—every chance, every possible support. That is why our assistance program, so much maligned, of assisting countries to maintain their freedom I believe is important.

This country has seen all of the hardship and the grief that has come to us by the loss of one country in this hemisphere, Cuba. How many other countries must be lost if the United States decides to end the programs that are helping these people, who are getting poorer every year, who have none of the resources of this great country, who look to us for help?

But on the other hand cases look to the Communists for example.

That is why I think this program is important. It is a means of assisting those who want to be free, and in the final analysis it serves the United States in a very real sense. That is why the United Nations is important, not because it can solve all these problems in this imperfect world, but it does give us a means in those great moments of crisis—and in the last 2½ years we have had at least three—when the Soviet Union and the United States were almost face to face on a collision course—it does give us a means of providing, as it has in the Congo, as it now is on the border of the Yemen, as it most recently was in a report of the United Nations on Malaysia—it does give a means to mobilize the opinion of the world to prevent an atomic disaster which would destroy us all wherever we might live.

That is why the test ban treaty is important as a first step, perhaps to be disappointed, perhaps to find ourselves ultimately set back, but at least in 1963 the United States committed itself, and the Senate of the United States, by an overwhelming vote,² to one chance to end the radiation and the possibilities of burning.

It may be, as I said, that we may fail, but anyone who bothers to look at the true destructive power of the atom today and what we and the Soviet Union could do to each other and the world in an hour and in a day, and to Western Europe—I passed over yesterday the Little Big Horn, where General Custer was slain, a massacre which has lived in history, 400 or 500 men. We are talking about 300 million men and women in 24 hours.

I think it is wise to take a first step and lessen the possibility of that happening. And that is why our diplomacy is important, for the forces making for diversity are to be found everywhere where people are, even within the Communist empire. And it is our obligation to encourage those forces wherever they may be found. Hard and discouraging questions remain in Viet-Nam, in Cuba, in Laos, the Congo, all around the globe. The ordeal of the emerging nations has just begun. The control of nu-

² See p. 631.

clear weapons is still incomplete. The areas of potential friction, the chances of collision, still exist.

But in every one of these areas the position of the United States, I believe, is happier and safer when history is going for us rather than when it is going against us. And we have history going for us today. But history is what men make it; the future is what men make it.

We cannot fulfill our vision and our commitment and our interest in a free and diverse future without unceasing vigilance, devotion, and, most of all, perseverance—a willingness to stay with it, a willingness to do with fatigue, a willingness not to accept easy answers, but, instead, to maintain the burden, as the people of this State have done for 100 years and as the United States must do the rest of this century until finally we live in a peaceful world.

Therefore I think this country will continue its commitments to support the world in freedom, for as we discharge that commitment we are heeding the command which Brigham Young heard from the Lord more than a century ago, the command conveyed to his followers, "Go as pioneers to a land of peace."

Foreign Minister of Italy Holds Talks in Washington

Attilio Piccioni, the Foreign Minister of Italy, was in Washington on September 20 for talks with Secretary Rusk and on September 23 for a meeting with President Kennedy. Following is the text of a joint communique released by the White House on September 23.

White House press release dated September 23

The President of the United States today received Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Attilio Piccioni. In the course of the meeting, they further examined those issues raised during the visit of President Kennedy to Italy last July¹ and in the talks between Secretary of

¹ For text of an address made by President Kennedy on July 2 at the NATO headquarters at Naples, see BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 134.

State Rusk and Foreign Minister Piccioni in Washington on September 20.

The President and Foreign Minister Piccioni reaffirmed the close friendship uniting the two Atlantic allies and the identity of views of the two governments on major international problems. They reviewed the international situation since the signing of the limited Test Ban Treaty and questions that have arisen regarding the evolution of Europe and the development of Atlantic cooperation in the political, economic and defense fields.

The President and the Foreign Minister also reaffirmed their mutual strong commitment to the related goals of a united and democratic Europe and Atlantic solidarity. They believed that a constant and patient exploration of the means for easing international tensions and achieving world peace should be pursued in close consultation and agreement with their allies.

Women in the New Africa

by G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs¹

In the *Aeneid*, Virgil wrote: *Varium e mutabile semper femina*—a free translation of which is, "A woman's will is changeful and uncertain still." This adage succinctly describes the status of women in the new Africa.

In the wake of the flood of freedom and independence that has swept across Africa in recent years women are exerting their wills with increasing vigor. They are seeking and obtaining a higher status in the newly independent nations of that continent. Women are winning this larger role partly because of their contribution to independence and political struggles and partly because of their active leadership in efforts to raise living standards in Africa's developing nations.

The role of women in African life is not well understood in the United States. For the most

¹ Address made before the Women Lawyers' Association of Michigan at Detroit, Mich., on Sept. 24 (press release 487).

part, they are represented in popular writing as having a status little better than that of slaves or, at best, servants. Such interpretations reflect the difficulty Westerners have in understanding and communicating the mores and traditions of peoples raised in Islamic or tropical African cultures. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that cultural patterns are changing at varying rates in different parts of Africa, and it is hard even to make broad generalizations about the status of women.

In the Islamic areas, for example, the institution of *purdah*—the seclusion of women in the home and the wearing of veils in public—is principally an urban phenomenon. This institution is not part of the Moslem religion, incidentally, but is social in its origin. It is rare to find women of the desert or Moslem women in sub-Saharan Africa veiled. But even in areas where the veil is worn, the strength of ancient customs is weakening in the new Africa. I can recall visiting Marrakech, Morocco, 2 years ago and wondering whether I should intrude and shake hands with the veiled women who stood about. But when I shook hands with their children, it was quite clear that they didn't want to be excluded from the greetings, for they smiled gently as they shyly extended their hands.

Although *purdah* is dying because of new laws and the determination of educated women to break with the past, it is not yet dead. I can recall a story told me by a prominent young North African woman. Her father had been very progressive in his attitude toward women, but she had married a man of the old school. She said that one day a friend of her husband's had come to the house in her husband's absence. After he had knocked she went to the door and without opening it told him that her husband was not at home. When her husband learned of this, he was furious with her because, in his view, she had been so open and brazen.

On the other hand, such a law as Tunisia's law of August 2, 1956, which gives women equality with men, has opened new horizons to women. Where marriages were arranged sight unseen in the past, a woman's consent is now required for marriage. Formerly, a husband could repudiate his wife and in effect divorce

her, but legal divorce on specific grounds is now required. Under this law, a woman can for the first time institute divorce proceedings against her husband and, if granted, can be awarded alimony and custody of the children. And polygamy, once a common institution, is now prohibited by law in Tunisia.

In Algeria the emancipation of women has been greatly expedited by the wonderful bravery that women displayed during the war of liberation. As a result, many Algerians have recognized that women should have greater rights, and today several women sit in the Algerian National Assembly. On several occasions President Ahmed Ben Bella has expressed his determination to assure increased rights for women in that country.

In tropical Africa the status of women often appears to be very low in the eyes of Westerners. Brides are purchased by their husbands and are regarded as property by their families. Women are assigned all the family and agricultural tasks and appear to be the bond servants of their men.

Yet in many places women have rights to property which are more advanced than those of American women and which cannot be infringed upon by their husbands. In many West African cities women control all the retail trade in the area and, indeed, have the most important voice in some countries' economies. I have been told by a vigorous governmental leader that theirs is the only voice he disregards at his peril.

In tropical Africa, as in Islamic Africa, law and education are bringing about great changes in the status of women. In both areas, while it is true that African women do not have what we would consider full civil rights, they do exert a powerful influence and are treated with great respect. An African man, no matter how far he rises above his condition of birth, never outgrows his respect for and his love for his mother.

This also is true to a considerable extent with regard to wives. Some African men, by virtue of their higher educations and responsible government positions, have advanced socially faster than their wives, who have not had equal advantages. These men are most anxious to make their wives part of their new world of public affairs, and on several occasions, I have

been told by our embassy officials, they have chosen dinners given for Mrs. Williams and me as the occasion for their wives to make their social debuts. My wife and I have been extremely pleased and honored on these occasions because we found the women charming.

As a general rule, most of Africa's woman leaders come from social and economic backgrounds that have provided them with opportunities for higher education. Although there are relatively few such leaders at present, the number of women who are obtaining higher education is increasing slowly, as Africa's educational systems expand.

Women's clubs and organizations have made an important contribution to the awakening of African women. Most of these organizations are formed to satisfy desires to know more about hygiene and sanitation, child care, food preparation, and similar fundamental skills. These desires are reflected in nationwide women's conferences, such as the First Kenya Women's Seminar, which Mrs. Williams attended last year. The agenda for that meeting was typical of the subjects in which African women are interested: education, health, economic growth, public service, and community development.

In the professions—law, education, nursing, social welfare, and government service—the impact of women is beginning to be felt. The fact that African women are included in many African delegations to this fall's United Nations General Assembly is a good index to this impact.

Nevertheless, the rate at which women are moving into career employment in many less developed countries is still slow and constitutes a great waste in human resources. It is ironic that among those countries which have the greatest development needs are nations which have not yet effectively mobilized their own manpower and womanpower to solve many of their problems and look to outside help and leadership.

One solution to this enigma is to win cultural acceptance in these countries for the participation of women in vocations presently closed to them. Over the years, cultures of certain less developed areas have been molded into set pat-

terns which do not adjust readily to change. It is my observation that, when a country sincerely believes its women can aid its progress, dynamic male leadership is needed to assure their large participation in the tasks of nation building.

Such male leadership is forthcoming in some quarters. President William V. S. Tubman of Liberia has said: "It is with a deep pride that I can say that this Administration, backed by stalwart men and women in every branch of government, has unrelentingly exerted every effort to raise the economic, social and political status of the women of our country."

And President Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea recently declared: "... African progress will be impossible and unattainable so long as the African woman is not emancipated. The emancipation of the woman is imperative, an essential condition and the decisive basis for the transformation of the living conditions of the people."

In countries where women are given freedom to develop their capabilities progress comes more rapidly than in lands where there are restrictions. However, encouragement and financial assistance must come from government leaders who are anxious to see their countries become economically strong and independent.

A good first step would be to extend basic education to all women, thus increasing the possibilities for later training. Too often girls are the last to be considered for schooling, partly because of expense and partly because of their traditional role in the manual work of the home and the field.

Beyond the first stage of basic education for women the challenge facing most less developed countries is that of providing specialized training. Nurses, women doctors, teachers, and scientists are most economically trained in the home countries, as prolonged overseas study is too expensive for the large numbers of individuals rapidly needed by developing nations.

In some countries an increase in women's earning power has had a marked effect upon the economy as a whole. As more women become wage earners, they develop new markets which in turn provide broader employment for their countries. For example, increased earning power among women leads to home moder-

ization, better food-buying facilities, and additional clothing purchases.

Organizations of women comprise another important factor in encouraging women's entrance into the labor force. In some countries women do all of the buying and selling of market goods. Organizations of market women have and will continue to become politically forceful in promoting the betterment of women. These groups sometimes support centers where women can learn the basic skills needed for careers and where they can keep abreast of the rapid pace of the world today. These organizations can do much to promote better health and provide basic teaching which can encourage women to be active in nurseries, clinics, hospitals, and training centers for midwifery and nursing.

Also, international organizations such as the

United Nations can continue to help women to acquire the skills needed to become effective members of the labor force. Such international bodies as WHO, UNESCO, and UNICEF can be sources of much experienced advice and help in guiding women toward their rightful responsibilities.

In conclusion it is clear that the role of women in many countries is in a process of change. It is also clear that their growing ability to contribute to nation building comprises a formidable resource for these developing nations.

The most encouraging fact about the current status of African women is that women want to make progress and have the force and determination to change present patterns. And I am happy to note that many male leaders are joining them in their far-reaching efforts.

Policy and People

by Robert J. Manning

*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

Two elements are needed for the conduct of a nation's foreign relations: policy and people. Today I would like to talk briefly about both of those elements.

"Policy" is one of those all-inclusive words that lends itself to many definitions and is subject to many intellectual convolutions. When, in the 1956 presidential election campaign, Adlai Stevenson suggested a treaty with Russia banning nuclear testing, that was not a policy—it was a campaign proposal or, in the words of his opponents, a campaign "trick," and one for which he was roundly ridiculed. When, a few years later, President Eisenhower's admin-

istration proposed the same idea, it became a policy.

For several years that policy, accepted and carried on by the Kennedy administration, represented little more than a position held, and promoted, in the international arena by the United States and some of its allies. It was little more than a desirable goal, lacking as it did the means of realization; the agreement that would make it a fact instead of a desire was not forthcoming from the Soviet Union. Now that agreement has come, and this week, with ratification of the limited nuclear test ban treaty by the United States Senate² and its acceptance by 99 other governments, an idea of many

¹Address made at Texas Southern University, Houston, Tex., on Sept. 26 (press release 490, as delivered text).

²See p. 631.

years' standing takes on the force of a policy achieved.

Not all policy is as subject to precise definition as the policy reflected in the treaty prohibiting nuclear test explosions under water, in the atmosphere, and in outer space. Indeed, some policies can become so broad and diffuse in their intent that, unless care is taken, they cease to be policies and become only unheeded clichés.

A rather pleasant example of this sometimes unpleasant phenomenon was contributed by Justices of the Supreme Court many years ago. Under Chief Justice John Marshall, according to Gerald Carson, who has been doing research on the history of drink in the United States, the Court developed a rule that its members would take a drink only in rainy weather. "That was interpreted to mean whenever it rained within the Court's jurisdiction," Mr. Carson reports. "And it was further assumed that there was always rain falling somewhere in the continental United States."

To have any meaning and to have any effect, a nation's policies of course must elude such broad dilution. Yet not all of our major policies can be precisely defined, with their goals and their boundaries neatly delineated. Some American policies represent very specific American desires rooted in very specific American interests. Others represent broad, unfulfilled ideals or unrealized ambitions. Some are laid down specifically in law, such as the McMahon Act, with its strict prohibitions on the transfer of American nuclear knowledge and material to foreign powers. Some are based on a broad central impulse, with the specific details of execution varying according to varying needs or hopes.

An outstanding example of such a policy would be our foreign aid program. It was conceived at the war's end as the Marshall Plan and was directed chiefly at the relief and reconstruction of the countries of Western Europe. The impulse behind the Marshall Plan remains today a basic part of American foreign policy, but foreign aid in the 1960's barely touches on Western Europe and instead is directed at the weak and underdeveloped nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Some policies grow simply and naturally out of our own political traditions and instincts,

such as the American assumption that the right of self-determination and the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are the fundamental rights not of some peoples but of all peoples. Yet the ways in which that fundamental American belief is pressed as an American policy are diversely determined by the many and diverse ways in which these fundamentals are accepted or opposed in other world societies. To be "for" these fundamentals is of course not enough. Policy must additionally conceive of ways of protecting self-determination and freedom where it exists and of helping to bring it about where it does not.

Since the comparatively unambitious pre-war days of isolation, American foreign policy has become fantastically complex and immensely ambitious. It is, overall, not a foreign policy based on a simple protection of and extension of narrow American interests. Instead it is a policy based on the deep assumption—and, I think, a proven assumption—that the basic interests and security of the United States depend fundamentally on how freedom fares in the rest of the world. For that reason this country today is engaged not only in protecting its own institutions but in reaching around the world in an effort to help some protect their own institutions, to help some alter institutions that are hostile to freedom, and to help still others who are just beginning to experience independence to build the economic and social institutions that can make their independence true and meaningful. All this may sound like so many words, but it is a policy which each day involves us in tough, hard facts, in new and often risky adventures, and which brings foreign policy directly into the home of every American.

The "New Diplomacy"

The importance of policy is obvious. But foreign policy drafted without reference to the people who carry it out—the ambassadors, counselors, advisers, secretaries, couriers, and other Foreign Service personnel—is sterile. It is unlikely to work and may actually backfire.

For that reason we in the State Department consider it essential that our Foreign Service corps reflect our country not just in policy and

ideals but also in people. There may have been a time when all that was needed for a Foreign Service career was a pair of striped pants, a smattering of French, and a good backhand at tennis—frankly, I doubt it—but that is certainly not the case today.

The Foreign Service officer of the 1960's must be prepared to help oversee such programs as

—helping farmers adopt new techniques of modern agriculture developed originally in U.S. land-grant colleges,

—advising businessmen in the newer nations of Africa, Latin America, and Asia on how to modernize their plant and equipment,

—aiding governments of less developed countries as they seek to build the hospitals, schools, roads, and dams which are the building blocks of economic progress.

These are examples of what has been called the "new diplomacy." The new diplomacy is the modern expression of a native American concern about the welfare of others. It dates back to the spirit of the pioneers, who were always ready to come to the aid of a neighbor who was having hard times. In the close-knit communities of the frontier all would cooperate to ward off trouble and cope with disaster.

This tradition of community service has become an important part of the American way of life. It has taken the form of our foreign aid programs, under which we are committed to helping the less developed nations, in President Kennedy's words,³ "not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right." More recently this great American ideal has been expressed through the Peace Corps, an exciting venture in international cooperation and understanding that has given thousands of young Americans a chance to serve their country—and their conscience—by helping the people of other lands. I have just come from the United Nations, where I was struck by the fact that over half the nations now sitting in the General Assembly were dependent territories when the United Nations was founded in 1945. These are the "new" nations, with which the new diplomacy is most concerned. What we say—and more

important, what we do—occupies a special place in their horizons. As they strive to build the structures of stable, democratic government, they often look at the United States as a model. No higher compliment can be paid to a nation than the flattery of imitation. But it imposes especially challenging responsibilities.

These nations look to us not just for the glowing phrases taken from our Declaration of Independence and Constitution but for the reality behind these phrases. They regard the United States as the cradle of democracy and as a leader in the worldwide struggle for freedom, for human rights, for independence and dignity. Any failure on our part as a nation to live up to our stated ideals is consequently noted, and frequently magnified.

When we fail to fulfill our pledges of freedom and equality to all Americans, this fact is noted abroad. Racial discrimination in all its forms, overt and subtle, has important implications for our foreign relations. It disturbs our friends, and it fuels the propaganda of our enemies. This is not because such discrimination is unique to the United States. There is discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or culture in many countries in all parts of the world. But because our country is considered a model for other democracies, and because of our preeminent role as a leader of the free world, our shortcomings are given special attention.

As you know, the present administration is proposing a broad new civil rights program, which includes a special section on equal accommodations. The State Department is fully in support of that legislation—though it should be emphasized that, as citizens and Americans, we know that the foreign policy implications of civil rights are secondary. As Secretary Rusk said testifying in support of the civil rights bill:⁴

The primary reason why we must attack the problems of discrimination is rooted in our basic commitments as a nation and a people. We must try to eliminate discrimination due to race, color, religion, not to make others think better of us but because it is incompatible with the great ideals to which our democratic society is dedicated. If the realities at home

³ BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 154.

are all they should be, we shan't have to worry about our image abroad.

Opportunities for Negroes in Foreign Service

For the new diplomacy to be successful, it must be carried out by a skilled, trained Foreign Service corps qualified by reason of background, culture, geographical and social composition to speak and act on behalf of all Americans. Our Foreign Service should be—and is—to a large extent representative of our country, geographically, socially, culturally, educationally, and economically. And we are taking steps to make it more so.

However, at the present time there are fewer than 50 Negroes in the Foreign Service out of an officer corps of more than 3,800. This is a disturbing statistic, because it shows that, in this important respect at least, our Foreign Service does not reflect the composition of American society.

There are a number of reasons for the relatively small number of Negro Foreign Service officers. We in the State Department recognize that, over the years, we have not aggressively sought to encourage and attract Negroes for careers in the Foreign Service. The opportunity may have been there, but few concrete steps were taken to bring them to the attention of qualified Negro applicants. As a result, the better students were often drawn to other fields of work. Once such a pattern becomes established, it is to some extent self-reinforcing. Because there are relatively few Negro Foreign Service officers, few young Negroes actively consider applying for a Foreign Service career.

Recognizing this chain of circumstances, the State Department has embarked on a vigorous campaign to interest qualified Negroes in the Foreign Service. The Department is not alone in this effort, for it has the solid encouragement of the President. Some 25 other Federal agencies with responsibilities in the foreign affairs field are also taking part. The agencies range from the Department of Agriculture, which has an extensive Foreign Agricultural Service, to the Labor Department, which has labor attachés at most major embassies, to the Department of Defense, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force, which today have vast responsibilities in the

conduct of foreign affairs. The number of agencies and departments taking part in foreign affairs shows the wide range of opportunities available in this field.

The opportunities are real, but they are challenging. They call for the best efforts of the best people. The U.S. Foreign Service demands high standards of ability and training and rightly so, because each Foreign Service officer must be qualified to handle a wide range of problems, many of them unexpected. The Foreign Service officer not only represents the United States; in many parts of the world he *is* the United States. He is the only American that many foreign people ever see. His abilities and his deportment greatly influence the American image abroad.

Entrance to the Foreign Service begins with a stiff written examination. This is followed by an oral examination, in which candidates meet with a panel of career Foreign Service officers. Though the examination is open to all students, without respect to geography, background, or racial origin, only small numbers of Negro college students have taken it. Out of the 3,815 candidates who took the exam in 1961, only 119 were Negroes. In 1962, 110 Negroes took the exam, out of almost 3,000 candidates. We don't know yet how many Negro candidates took the examination this year, but we know the totals are not as high as we want.

Why this shortage of applicants? Part of the answer was expressed by writer Louis Lomax in a recent article in the *Saturday Evening Post* entitled "Young Negroes Aren't Ready." Author of *The Negro Revolt* and *The Reluctant African*, Mr. Lomax put it this way:

The generation of young Negroes that is doing so much to win new opportunities for itself is ill-equipped to use these opportunities. With splendid courage these youngsters are breaking down barriers of prejudice. Yet they are not qualified for the new jobs in industry and government now open to them.

Lomax, I think, overstates the case. Many young Negroes are qualified for a Foreign Service career, but they are not pointing themselves in that direction. In our free society the choice of career is a personal choice. It is one of the freedoms of the American way of life. The Government has no special claim on the talents of qualified young people. Rather than a career

in the Government or Foreign Service, many young Negroes have gone into other professions, such as teaching and the practice of law, to name just two.

It concerns me, though, that there are many able and talented young Negroes, with the potential for outstanding Foreign Service careers, who would like to serve their country abroad but who do not apply or, if they do apply, do not pass the Foreign Service examination as a result of poor preparation and background.

It concerns me because it is a problem for which there is a remedy. Ignorance is a disease—a disease for which there is a cure. The cure is education. In this case that means careful, dedicated preparation for the Foreign Service entrance exam. The State Department for its part is determined to do everything possible, as Secretary Rusk has said, to “open up the channels of opportunity to all of our American citizens regardless of racial, religious, or other background.” I challenge you to do yours.

In the convocation address at Howard University in our nation's Capital, President James M. Nabrit, Jr., the brother of your own president, urged his student body to aim for a career in the Foreign Service. He pledged his faculty to assist qualified students in preparing for the Foreign Service examination. I hope that your own college will make a similar effort so that students who do want to serve their country and their Government in a Foreign Service career will be qualified and trained to the upper limit of their abilities.

Problems Facing the U.N. General Assembly

On returning to the United Nations this week as an ex-newspaperman now working in government, I experienced at first a “This is where I came in” feeling, because I covered the first General Assembly 18 years ago as a reporter for the United Press.

But that feeling was superficial. Much has happened in those 18 years. They have been hard times—testing times—for the United Nations. Though the organization may not have fulfilled the unrealistically high hopes of some of its founding enthusiasts, it has chalked up a remarkable record of achievement. In a

world fissioned into two blocs (and now perhaps three) coldly staring at each other across a curtain of mistrust and hostility, the mere survival of an international body dedicated to the peaceful settlement of disputes would call for congratulatory toasts. But the U.N. has done much more than just survive. Sometimes quietly, as in the resolute work of the Food and Agriculture Organization, which is seeking ways to eliminate the dread desert locusts that have plagued the Middle East since Biblical times—sometimes spectacularly, as in the Congo, where a U.N. Force was instrumental in bringing the promise of peace and nationhood to the heart of Africa, the U.N. has served the interests of mankind as a whole.

As I have already mentioned, over half the nations now sitting in the General Assembly have gained their independence since the U.N. was founded. What this shows is that the doctrine of self-determination has triumphed over many of the isms that looked like fast starters in the form books of the 19th century. Nationalism as the political expression of nationhood has shown itself to have extraordinary vitality; it is the banner under which nearly all the new nations have marched to independence. So much so that the not necessarily identical goals of human freedom and national independence have become intertwined in many of the less developed countries.

To the faint of heart, the U.N. Assembly's agenda⁵ is a discouraging list. Virtually every item on it is by definition insoluble. But the organization plugs on, chipping away at the edges of solution, seeking to hold the lid on violence and danger, and trying to live up to the lofty ideals of its charter. What nourishes the U.N. is the belief that all nations have common interests which can be served by mutual agreement, however deep their differences.

This point is critical to man's hope for peace, and it was the basic theme of President Kennedy's widely hailed address to the General Assembly.⁶ The prospect for enduring peace in the 1960's and beyond lies in man's ability to search out and identify areas of common interest where agreements can be reached, then

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 556.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 530.

to enlarge the areas of common interest, moving carefully—but doggedly—from the more limited and specific to the broader and more general, from the partial toward the larger settlement.

Guiding Peaceful Change

Peace means a workable system for settling disputes and guiding peaceful change, solving the problems that crop up between nations by institutions created for that purpose. It means a trend toward world order and world law, so that men may live in freedom and security. The problems of peace aren't interesting or worth our earnest attention until they engage the world as it is, and until they deal with men as they are: diverse, contentious, fallible, stubborn, embodying vices and virtues alike.

This requires a patient search for areas of common interest—often in the midst of discord. And not just by the so-called Great Powers. There are dangerous quarrels in many parts of the world which do not involve the nations that own nuclear weapons. In Africa, for example, there are dangerous disputes, disputes stemming directly from the continent-wide striving for independence and freedom and out of stubborn efforts to prevent the realization of that goal.

The right to national self-determination has been established in recent years with such spectacular speed that future historians may well marvel at its sweep. But it has not yet swept entirely clean, for independence, and with it freedom, is still denied to millions of people in the last redoubts of the *status quo*.

This is the dilemma of Africa today. How to solve it is one of the chief problems facing the U.N. in this current meeting. It is the task of that body, and our task with them, to see to it that change, no matter how just, is carried forward peacefully. In Africa, as elsewhere, it is a profound truth that the violator of peace is no less the enemy of peace though his cause be just and that he who blocks justice in the name of peace is no less a culprit. The U.S.—and the U.N.—are dedicated to the cause of peaceful change in Africa. This means freedom and independence and peace—the true promise of self-determination.

In many other parts of the world there are issues just as crucial and obstacles just as ominous. In fact this seemingly modern, seemingly ingenious world is truly a world of unfinished business, of injustices unsettled, of ambitions unrealized or needs unserved. Wherever these conditions exist, the need for a foreign policy and the need for people to carry it out prevails. Most of you young men and women here today will move on to other careers and other vocations, but for many of you—I would hope for a large number of you—the challenge to help carry on the world's unfinished business will be the challenge that you choose to answer. As the opportunity broadening for careers in international affairs and the need for qualified, dedicated people broadening even faster. For some of you who are willing to make the effort, here is your challenge.

Foreign Policy Conference Held for Editors and Broadcasters

The Department of State announced October 2 (press release 501) that it would hold a national foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters on October 7 and 8 in Washington. Invitations have been extended by Secretary Rusk to editors and commentators of the daily and periodical press and the broadcasting industry in all 50 States and Puerto Rico.

Secretary Rusk will be the opening speaker at the conference. Other participants will include:

Christian A. Herter, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State
W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
David E. Bell, Administrator, Agency for International Development
Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Donald M. Wilson, Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency
William C. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
 Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
 Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
 Eugene M. Braderman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Commerce

The conference will be held under the "background only" rule, with the exception of the morning session on October 8, which will be on the record. The sessions will be held in the West Auditorium of the Department of State.

This will be the seventh in a series of national foreign policy conferences for editors and broadcasters. The conference program, begun in April 1961, is intended to assist the information media in making available to the American public the maximum possible information in depth on current foreign policy issues.¹

Cotton Textile Arrangement Concluded With Jamaica

Press release 503 dated October 2

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Governments of the United States and Jamaica announced on October 2 the conclusion of a bilateral arrangement covering trade in cotton textiles between Jamaica and the United States for a 4-year period extending from October 1, 1963, to September 30, 1967.

For the first year of the arrangement, an overall ceiling for Jamaican exports of cotton textiles to the United States is set at 18.5 million square yards, with planned increases of 5 percent per annum, beginning with the second 12-month period of the arrangement, except for categories 46 (men's and boys' sport shirts, not knit) and 61 (brassieres and other body-supporting garments), the increase of which is limited to 3 percent during the second year.

The arrangement provides for specific ceilings in six categories as follows:

Category	Description	Ceiling (dozen)
46	Men's and Boys' Sport Shirts, not knit	384,000
48	Raincoats, $\frac{3}{4}$ length or over	8,000
50	Men's and Boys' Trousers	48,000
51	Women's, Misses' and Children's trousers	110,000
52	Blouses, whether or not in sets	80,000
61	Brassieres and other body-supporting garments	381,000

The arrangement also provides that shipments in any category not subject to a specific export ceiling will not exceed 350,000 square yards equivalent in the first 12-month period. This limit also will increase at the annual rate of 5 percent.

The two Governments agreed on the spacing of shipments as well as on consultation in case of concentration in items made from any fabric or fabrics within certain categories, which causes or threatens to cause disruption of the United States market.

The two Governments will exchange such statistical data on cotton textiles as are required for the effective implementation of the arrangement.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF JAMAICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING TRADE IN COTTON TEXTILES BE- TWEEN JAMAICA AND THE UNITED STATES

1. The Government of Jamaica shall limit its exports in all categories of cotton textiles to the United States for the twelve month period beginning October 1, 1963, to an aggregate limit of 18.5 million square yards equivalent.

2. Within this aggregate limit, the following specific ceilings shall apply:

a. Category 46	384,000 dozen
b. Category 48	8,000 dozen
c. Category 50	48,000 dozen
d. Category 51	110,000 dozen
e. Category 52	80,000 dozen
f. Category 61	381,000 dozen

3. The square yard equivalent of any shortfalls occurring in exports in the categories with specific ceilings may be used in any category not having a specific ceiling. Annual exports in categories not having a specific ceiling shall not exceed 350,000 square yards equivalent except by mutual agreement of the two Governments.

4. With the exception of seasonal items, the Government of Jamaica shall space its annual exports within each category to the United States on a cumulative, quarterly percentage basis of 30-55-80-100.

5. In the event concentration in exports from Ja-

¹ The Department announced on Oct. 3 that President Kennedy would be the concluding speaker at the conference.

maica to the United States in any fabric or fabrics within certain categories causes or threatens to cause market disruption in the United States, the Government of the United States may call for consultations with the Government of Jamaica in order to reach a mutually satisfactory solution to the problem. The Government of Jamaica shall agree to enter into such consultations and during the course of the consultations, the Government of Jamaica shall limit its exports of the items in question at an annual level of 105% of its exports during the twelve month period immediately preceding the month in which consultations are requested.

6. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any available statistical data requested by the other Government. In the implementation of this Agreement the system of categories annexed to the Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on July 21, 1961,¹ shall apply. In categories where units other than square yards are used, the conversion into square yard equivalents shall be made on the basis of the factors listed in the Annex attached to this Agreement.

7. During the life of this Agreement the United States Government shall not invoke the procedures of Articles 6(c) and 3 of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962,² to limit imports of cotton textiles from Jamaica into the United States.

8. The limitations on exports established in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Agreement shall be increased by 5% for the twelve month period beginning October 1, 1964 and by 5% for each subsequent twelve month period during the life of this Agreement; provided that the increase applicable to categories 46 and 61 shall be 3% for the twelve month period beginning October 1, 1964 and 5% for each subsequent twelve month period.

9. The life of this Agreement shall continue until and including September 30, 1967; provided that either Government may propose revisions in the terms of the Agreement no later than ninety days prior to the beginning of a new twelve month period; and provided further that either Government may terminate this Agreement, effective at the beginning of a new twelve month period, by written notice to the other Government given at least ninety days prior to the beginning of such new twelve month period.

10. In order that the effective dates of the restraints presently in effect may be modified to coincide with annual periods applicable in this Agreement, the following modifications shall be made in the restraint levels:

- a. Category 46: from 360,000 to 330,000 dozen
- b. Category 48: from 8,000 to 4,670 dozen
- c. Category 50: from 48,000 to 44,000 dozen
- d. Category 51: from 110,000 to 64,170 dozen
- e. Category 61: from 360,000 to 330,000 dozen

These modified levels shall be effective for the periods beginning with the applicable dates of restraint until

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 337.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

and including September 30, 1963. Exports during these periods in excess of the modified levels shall be counted against the appropriate ceilings for the twelve month period beginning October 1, 1963.

ANNEX Conversion Factors

Category Number	Unit	Conversion Factor (Square Yards)
1	lb.	1/16
2	lb.	1/16
3	lb.	1/16
4	lb.	1/16
28	no.	1/16
29	no.	1/16
30	no.	1/16
31	no.	1/16
32	doz.	1/16
33	lb.	1/16
34	no.	1/16
35	no.	1/16
36	no.	1/16
37	lb.	1/16
38	lb.	1/16
39	doz.	1/16
40	doz.	1/16
41	doz.	1/16
42	doz.	1/16
43	doz.	1/16
44	doz.	1/16
45	doz.	1/16
46	doz.	1/16
47	doz.	1/16
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56	doz.	1/16
57	doz.	1/16
58	doz.	1/16
59	doz.	1/16
60	doz.	1/16
61	doz.	1/16
62	lb.	1/16
63	lb.	1/16
64	lb.	1/16

President Decides Not To Modify Duty on Clinical Thermometers

White House press release dated September 23

The White House announced on September 23 that the President has received the Tariff Commission's report concerning the escape clause restrictions which currently apply to imports of clinical thermometers and has determined not to modify the duties presently in force.

The Tariff Commission's report was submitted to the President under two provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. First,

was issued under the requirement that, as long as any tariff increase or other import restriction is in effect pursuant to an escape-clause determination under the Trade Expansion Act or under the predecessor Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, the Tariff Commission shall keep under review developments with respect to the industry concerned and shall make annual reports to the President concerning such developments. Secondly, it was based on the authority of the Tariff Commission to advise the President of its judgment as to the probable economic effect on the industry concerned of the termination of, or other modification in, an existing escape-clause measure.

The Commission's report, issued in May, was submitted to the President through Christian

A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, after having been examined in interagency committees operating under that office.

The current import duty became effective as the result of action by the President on April 21, 1958, under section 7 (the escape clause) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. At that time the President withdrew the concession in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on clinical thermometers, finished or unfinished, wholly or in chief value of glass, provided for in paragraph 218(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be effective 30 days thereafter. This action resulted in an increase in the duty on such thermometers from 42½ percent ad valorem to 85 percent ad valorem.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at Vienna October 4, 1961. Entered into force January 31, 1963. TIAS 5284.

Acceptances deposited: Afghanistan, August 8, 1963; Argentina, October 3, 1962.

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the United States and Japan of June 16, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4133, 4172), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna September 23, 1963. Enters into force November 1, 1963.

Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency, Japan, United States.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1963.

Ratification deposited: Mexico, August 1, 1963.

Notifications received of undertaking to seek ratification or acceptance: Bolivia, July 29, 1963; Honduras, July 30, 1963.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signatures and acceptances: Burundi, September 28, 1963; Malagasy Republic, September 25, 1963; Rwanda, September 30, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signatures and acceptances: Burundi, September 28, 1963; Malagasy Republic, September 25, 1963; Rwanda, September 30, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.¹

Signatures affixed at Washington: Burundi, October 4, 1963; Viet-Nam, October 1, 1963.

Satellites

Agreement between the United States, Denmark, Norway and Sweden on cooperation in intercontinental testing in connection with experimental communications satellites. Effected by exchanges of notes at Copenhagen, July 2 and September 14; Oslo, July 8 and September 11; and Stockholm, July 5 and 25, 1963. Entered into force September 14, 1963.

Trade

Spain accepted on July 30, 1963, the following instruments by accepting protocol of accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

¹ Not in force.

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

Protocol of terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955. TIAS 3438.

Protocol of rectification to French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956. TIAS 3677.

Procès-verbal of rectification concerning protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III, and protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955. Section B entered into force October 7, 1957.

Protocol relating to negotiations for establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.¹

Protocol for accession of Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962. TIAS 5249.

Protocol for accession of Portugal to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force May 6, 1962; for the United States July 1, 1962. TIAS 5248.

Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying results of 1960-61 Tariff Conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force for the United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253.

Tenth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Japan and New Zealand). Done at Geneva January 28, 1963. Entered into force August 15, 1963. TIAS 5404.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war;

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, 3365, respectively.

Adherence deposited: Somali Republic, July 12, 1962.
Notification given that it considers itself bound: Malagasy Republic, July 13, 1963.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation, and protocol. Signed at Brussels February 21, 1961. Entered into force October 3, 1963.

Proclaimed by the President: September 26, 1963.

Treaty of commerce and navigation. Signed at Washington March 8, 1875. Entered into force June 11, 1875. 19 Stat. 628.

Terminated: October 3, 1963 (by entry into force of

¹ Not in force.

treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation, *supra*).

Convention concerning trade-marks. Signed at Washington April 7, 1884. Entered into force July 9, 1884. 23 Stat. 766.

Terminated: October 3, 1963 (by entry into force of treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation, *supra*).

Canada

Agreement concerning financial arrangements for furnishing of certain supplies and services to naval vessels. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa July 21, 1955. Entered into force October 19, 1955. TIAS 3351.

Notification of termination by Canada: September 25, 1963, effective December 24, 1963.

Spain

Joint declaration concerning the renewal of the defense agreement of September 26, 1953 (TIAS 2850), with related exchanges of notes. Signed at New York September 26, 1963. Entered into force September 26, 1963.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of April 6, 1961 (TIAS 4718), for the establishment and operation of a space vehicle tracking and communications station on Canton Island. Effected by exchange of notes at London September 23, 1963. Entered into force September 23, 1963.

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of March 15, 1961 (TIAS 4701), for the establishment and operation of a space vehicle tracking and communication station in Bermuda. Effected by exchange of notes at London September 23, 1963. Entered into force September 23, 1963.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on September 26 confirmed the nomination of Dwight J. Porter to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 502 dated October 2.)

The Senate on October 2 confirmed the nomination of W. True Davis, Jr., to be Ambassador to Switzerland. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 512 dated October 8.)

Appointments

Sverre Petterssen as scientific attaché at Stockholm, Sweden, effective September 24. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 505, revised dated October 3.)

William H. Martin as education adviser, Bureau of African Affairs, effective September 30. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 507 dated October 3.)

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During September 1963

CAO International Conference on Air Law	Tokyo	Aug. 20-Sept. 16
U.N. Conference on Travel and Tourism	Rome	Aug. 24-Sept. 5
Committee of Experts of the U.N. <i>Ad Hoc</i> Tungsten Committee: Technical Working Group.	New York	Sept. 2 (1 day)
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d Meeting of the Working Party on Communications.	Paris	Sept. 2-6
U.N. Group of Experts on Explosives and Committee of Experts for Further Work on Transport of Dangerous Goods.	Geneva	Sept. 2-13
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 14th Session .	Port Moresby, Papua . .	Sept. 5-10
ATT Action Committee	Geneva	Sept. 9-13
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 30th Session (and <i>ad hoc</i> working groups).	Geneva	Sept. 9-13
U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space	New York	Sept. 9-13
AO Group on Coconut and Coconut Products: 5th Session . .	Rome	Sept. 9-18
U.N. Working Group of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders.	Caracas	Sept. 9-18
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Group on Obstacles to Development of Trade Between ECE Countries.	Geneva	Sept. 9-20
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 7th Session	London	Sept. 10-13
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Expert Group on Methods of Short-Term Forecasting.	Paris	Sept. 12-13
IMCO Council: 9th Session	London	Sept. 16-17
19th FAO Conference on Wood Technology	Madison, Wis.	Sept. 16-27
PAHO Directing Council: 14th Meeting	Washington	Sept. 16-27
WHO Regional Committee for the Americas: 15th Meeting . .	Washington	Sept. 16-27
OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel	Paris	Sept. 17-19
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: Special Committee.	San José	Sept. 17-27
OECD Board of Governors	Vicenna	Sept. 18-20
UNESCO <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on the Functions and Responsibilities of the Organization.	Paris	Sept. 18-24
Caribbean Organization Council: 4th Meeting	San Juan	Sept. 23-27
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: 58th Session (and Subcommittees on Solid Fuel Utilization and Coal Trade).	Geneva	Sept. 23-27
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments).	Washington	Sept. 27-28

Session as of September 30, 1963

Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.	Tokyo	Sept. 16-
FAO Limited Southeast Asia Rules-of-the-Air and Communications Meeting.	Bangkok	Sept. 17-
U.N. General Assembly: 18th Session	New York	Sept. 17-
UCCITT Special Study Group A (Data Transmission)	Geneva	Sept. 23-
OECD General Conference: 7th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 24-
U.N. Cocoa Conference	Geneva	Sept. 25-
UNESCO Executive Board: 66th Session	Paris	Sept. 25-
OECD Committee for Agriculture: Working Party 1 (Agricultural Policies).	Paris	Sept. 30-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 22d Session (and Working Party on Rural Electrification).	Geneva	Sept. 30-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Oct. 4, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 10th Session.	Geneva	Sept. 30-
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 9th Session . .	Bangkok	Sept. 30-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 51st Statutory Meeting.	Madrid	Sept. 30-
ILO Technical Conference on Employment Policy	Geneva	Sept. 30-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.	Washington	Sept. 30-

In Recess as of September 30, 1963

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed August 29, 1963).	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962-
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification (scheduled to reconvene October 15).	Geneva	Sept. 24, 1962-

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Bolivia, amending the agreement of February 4, 1963. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz March 29, 1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963. TIAS 5323. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of February 21, 1963. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara April 4, 1963. Entered into force April 4, 1963. TIAS 5324. 2 pp. 5¢.

Cultural Relations. Arrangement with Rumania. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bucharest April 2, 1963. Entered into force April 2, 1963. TIAS 5325. 8 pp. 10¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Venezuela. Exchange of notes—Signed at Caracas November 26 and 29, 1962. Entered into force November 29, 1962. TIAS 5326. 3 pp. 5¢.

Weather Stations—Cooperative Meteorological Program. Agreement with Mexico, extending the agreement of August 23 and 29, 1957, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at México March 15, 1963. Entered into force March 15, 1963. TIAS 5327. 3 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Gabon. Exchange of notes—Signed at Libreville April 10, 1963. Entered into force April 10, 1963. TIAS 5328. 5 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Tunisia, relating to the agreement of March 17 and 18, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tunis January 22 and March 6, 1963. Entered into force March 6, 1963. TIAS 5329. 3 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Colombia. Signed at Washington April 9, 1962. Entered into force March 29, 1963. TIAS 5330. 9 pp. 10¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 30–October 6

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to September 30 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 487 of September 24 and 490 of September 26.

No.	Date	Subject
*494	9/30	U.S. participation in international conferences.
496	9/30	Vice President to visit Belgium, Luxembourg, and Netherlands.
†497	9/30	Louchheim: World Affairs Conference, Albany, N.Y.
†498	10/1	Rostow: "How To Make a National Market."
*499	10/1	Itinerary for visit of Emperor Haile Selassie.
500	10/2	Ball: annual meeting of IMF and IBRD.
501	10/2	Foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters.
*502	10/2	Porter sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Administration (biographic details).
503	10/2	U.S.-Jamaica cotton textile arrangement.
*504	10/2	Cultural exchange (U.S.S.R.).
*505	10/3	Petterssen sworn in as scientific attaché, Stockholm (biographic details).
†506	10/3	Chayes: "United States Trade Policies and Programs: Tools for Negotiation."
*507	10/3	Martin appointed education adviser, Bureau of African Affairs (biographic details).
*508	10/4	Visit of Prime Minister Lemass of Ireland.
†509	10/4	Machrowitz. Szymczak, and Marrow appointed consultants to Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (rewrite).
†510	10/4	<i>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. I, General.</i>

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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New Opportunities in the Search for Peace

An address made by President Kennedy before the 18th session of the United Nations General Assembly at New York, N.Y., on September 20, 1963, is contained in this 20-page booklet.

PUBLICATION 7595 15 CENTS

Human Rights—Some Next Steps

This 22-page pamphlet contains an address made by Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, before the Rotary Club of Ypsilanti, Michigan, on August 5, 1963.

Also included are texts of the United Nations conventions on abolition of slavery, abolition of forced labor, and political rights of women, and President Kennedy's letter of July 22, 1963, transmitting the three conventions to the Senate "with a view to receiving advice and consent to ratification."

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1270



October 28, 1963

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For index see inside back cover

The Age of the Rights of Man

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

I am most grateful for the honor you have conferred on me.² I am proud to be associated with this great center of Jewish learning and ideas—a center where Christian scholars also are welcome and many have come to study under your Graduate Interfaith Fellowship Program. It is important for us as individuals—made pygmies by the problems of the modern world—to determine what we can hold on to. In the tempestuous complexities and dangers of today, we would be lost without a firm grip on fundamentals.

What are the basic guidelines by which we chart our course? I would suggest that some of the most reliable and worthwhile are the simple but profound ideas lying at the root of the American political tradition: that men are born equal and have certain “unalienable” rights; that law can free rather than enslave; that the

individual—his dignity, his freedom—is the beginning of political arrangements; that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.

These ideas are both political and moral. They descend from the Jewish and Christian religions and the ancient Greek philosophers. They may be found also, at least in rudimentary form, in other great religions and philosophies.

From the dawn of history, government at the village level in much of the world has given some recognition to the consent of the governed. Councils of elders, selected or emerging from family units, or sometimes elected, were common in much of Asia and Africa. The power of tribal chieftains was often circumscribed by local custom and religious rules.

The ancient sacred books of the Hindus contain coronation oaths which show that in Vedic times the king usually was elected and bound in compact with the people. By the time of Buddha, two and one-half millennia ago, there were many little republics in Aryan India. The

¹ Made at the Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio, on Oct. 12 (press release 524 dated Oct. 11).

² Secretary Rusk received the honorary degree of Doctor of Humane Letters.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1270 PUBLICATION 7611 OCTOBER 28, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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original rules for the government of the Buddhist monastic order are said to have been adopted from the practices of these republics. The first rule required full and frequent assemblies.

In ancient China, likewise, the notions of equality of rights and of consent of the governed were set forth by philosophers and, in elementary form, recognized in practice. In a book on political thought in old China, Chou Tsiang-Khan notes that: "In China, except for the Emperor, everyone in the state is equal in the sight of law with equal personal and public rights. Even the authority of the Emperor is not a divine right, but is conditioned by the wish and consent of the people"

Mencius, the great disciple of Confucius, said 50 years ago: "The people are the most important element in a state. . . ." He advanced the view that both the ministers and the people have a right to depose a wicked king.

Another ancient Chinese philosopher, Han Tzu, wrote: "A state under an enlightened sovereign . . . promulgates a code of laws for the guidance of the people."

And Lao Tzu, some 2,500 years ago, emphasized a theme which might well be pondered today, especially by the rulers of the Communist states. He wrote: "The more restrictions and prohibitions there are in the world, the poorer the people will become."

Basic Ideas of Human Rights

Over the centuries, those simple ideas about human rights and consent of the governed have matured and developed. They have long since ceased to be distant dreams. Increasingly, they have won acceptance as attainable goals and have set the pattern for political institutions and behavior. One thinks of an observation by the great English mathematician and philosopher, Professor Alfred North Whitehead:

The history of ideas is a history of mistakes. But through all mistakes it is also the history of the gradual purification of conduct.

These ideas took a great leap forward in the age of the Enlightenment. They found eloquent expression in our own Declaration of Independence and in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. The great

principles set forth in these declarations were presented not as novel doctrine nor as the special rights of Frenchmen or of the inhabitants of British North America; they were presented as universal truths valid for all time and all men.

These great ideas impelled the development of the democracies of Western Europe and of the British Commonwealth and inspired the liberators of Latin America. They have led to the creation of nearly 50 new nations since the Second World War.

They are proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. Among the purposes set forth in its preamble are: "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. . . ." And article 55 speaks of "self-determination of peoples" and requires the members to promote, among other objectives, "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

These basic ideas have been articulated by many others and in many languages.

We in the United States have fought to defend them in the past. We are devoting great effort to defending them today. They are the central issues in the world struggle, as we see it. They are ideas in which the American people genuinely believe. They guide our relations with the rest of the world. They are why we react instinctively to a colonial situation, why we are deeply concerned about the future of Eastern Europe, why we are much more comfortable in dealing with democracies than with dictatorships, and why we are disturbed by our failures here at home to fulfill our own commitments to each other.

Principle of Self-Determination

We as a nation are instinctively anticolonial. We won self-determination for ourselves and have favored it for others.

Nearly 50 years ago, President Wilson proclaimed the principle of self-determination of peoples for the fashioning of the World War I peace settlements. At that time, his idea achieved only partial fulfillment. But under

the mandates system, colonial territories of the defeated Central Powers were to be held as a "sacred trust" and to be developed in the interest of their inhabitants. The mandates system set irrevocably the direction to be taken by the dependent territories of Asia and Africa after World War II.

In 1945 the United Nations had 51 members. Today it has 111. More than three-fourths of the new members are former dependent territories.

The peoples of South and East Asia, of the Southwest Pacific, of the Middle East, and of most of the continent of Africa have attained national independence. Relatively few dependent territories remain, and in most of those self-government is being developed and self-determination is assured.

We in America have understood and supported the drive to national independence. We put ourselves in the vanguard of the independence movement by proclaiming the independence of the Philippines and by providing for self-determination by Puerto Rico. And we have rejoiced in the rise of former colonial peoples to "the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them"

However, the attainment of national independence does not guarantee the liberty of the individual. There may be no more arrests by the colonial police for subversive nationalist activity. But this does not necessarily mean political freedom for the citizenry to express their views, organize their political parties, and vote for their chosen candidates in free and fair elections. It does not necessarily mean freedom from arbitrary punishment. In many of the new nations, the early national government has tolerated no opposition, suppressed groups and views other than its own, and conducted a one-party rule of virtual dictatorship.

Nor does the attainment of national independence automatically improve the economic well-being of a people.

It took the older nations of the Atlantic community centuries of experience and struggle to build the institutions and create the fabric which make possible a free society. The older nations

have much to contribute to the newer ones in education, and in economic and political organizations. That is the central purpose of our programs of technical and development assistance. With systematic help from the developed countries, both directly and through the United Nations family of organizations and other international agencies, it should be possible for the new nations to advance—economically, socially, and politically—with relative rapidity. But they will not advance without wise leadership.

Trends in Eastern Europe

While former colonial areas were on the way to independence, countries in Eastern Europe with long national histories were being subjected to foreign rule and ideology. That was the unhappy experience of Poland, Czechoslovakia, of Hungary, and of other Eastern European peoples.

The darkest night of Stalinist terror and oppression is past. Historic forces of national liberation are visibly at work. Gradually the small Communist nations of Eastern Europe seem to be finding for themselves a little more autonomy. They are taking steps to increase their trade and other contacts with the West—first, with countries of Western Europe, but also with the United States. And persistent pressures for more individual freedom are also evident, only in the smaller Soviet bloc countries within the Soviet Union itself.

We would like to do what we can to encourage these trends within the Communist world. We favor freer movements of information and people between the bloc countries and the United States. On the whole, we think the trend toward nationalism and individual freedom is more likely to be furthered by a somewhat relaxed atmosphere than by an atmosphere of crisis or severe cold war.

But there can be no genuine *détente* without settlement of some of the critical political issues between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. One of the most important and dangerous of these arises from the division of Germany and Berlin. We do not believe that any part of the world can achieve a reliable peace

until the German people are permitted to exercise the right of self-determination.

Likewise, the other countries of Eastern Europe have an unalienable right to national independence under governments freely chosen by the people. We look forward to the day when they will have recovered this right. And we will try, by peaceful means, to help them move toward that goal. The world cannot rest while the wartime promises of the Allies and the goals of the United Nations remain unfulfilled in this great region of Europe.

Opposition to All Dictatorships

We are opposed not only to Communist dictatorships but, in principle, to all dictatorships. We have been saddened by the breakdown of democracy in some of the new countries and by the failure of some others even to give democratic institutions a chance. We are confident that these setbacks and misfires are temporary because we believe that peoples everywhere aspire to govern themselves.

We recognize also that there are many possible forms of democratic institutions and that those that are best for a particular country may differ considerably from our own and from various parliamentary forms of Western Europe. But we feel deeply about the difference between democracy and dictatorship, between constitutional government and rule by raw force.

In recent days our attention has been required by two reverses for the cause of freedom in the Caribbean area. There have been, of course, many military coups in Latin American history. But in the last few years, a number of military dictatorships have been thrown out or have yielded to constitutional regimes.

The setbacks in the Dominican Republic and Honduras³ demand that we and other democracies in the hemisphere use all appropriate measures to preserve, restore, and enhance freedom in the Americas. Because the United States has provided other American Republics with material and resources, it has a special responsibility to see that its participation in

the affairs of the hemisphere works toward the ends of freedom.

U.S. Goal of Full Equality

I come now to a fourth area of the struggle for the rights of man. Even in a country where national independence is secure and free institutions have become firmly established, it does not necessarily follow that full freedom is enjoyed by all citizens.

Despite having a Constitution and Bill of Rights for 175 years, despite the Emancipation Proclamation, and despite the adoption of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, we are still struggling to insure rights for all, regardless of race or color.

This is a struggle in which the national government is now heavily committed. What is at stake is the right to vote, freely and without fear; the right to equal treatment, without discrimination; in short, the right of every human being to dignity.

The rest of the world is watching this struggle and judging us by our progress, or lack of it, toward the goal of full equality. Our failures to live up to the pledges of the Declaration of Independence and our Constitution embarrass our friends and hearten our enemies. They are actively exploited and usually exaggerated by Communist propaganda.

These are matters of concern to the Secretary of State. But they are not the primary reasons why we must put things right. The main reasons we must put them right lie in our commitments to ourselves, in the character of our society, in the goals we set for ourselves—and all humanity—long ago. We cannot fulfill our historic role unless we fulfill our pledges to our own people.

The Power of Ideas

We are the most powerful nation the world has ever seen. Our military strength staggers the mind of man. Our economic productivity would have been considered, a generation or two ago, beyond human reach. But our greatest strength lies in these ideas about the consent of the governed and the rights of man. They are the most potent force in the world today.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 21, 1963, p. 4.

They are the heart of the humane creed which we share with many other peoples. They are the notions which give us allies, declared and undeclared, throughout the world, including behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. If we don't quit this world struggle, if we persevere in our efforts, history could come to know the 20th century as the Age of the Rights of Man.

Limited Test Ban Treaty Ratified, Enters Into Force

RATIFICATION

White House Announcement, October 4

White House press release dated October 4

At a ceremony in the White House on Monday, October 7, 1963, the President will ratify the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water signed at Moscow August 5, 1963.¹ The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty on September 24.² The treaty has been signed in Washington by 99 countries, making a total of 102 signatures on the original of the treaty for which the United States is depositary.

Arrangements are being made for the simultaneous deposit of instruments of ratification of the treaty by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in Washington, London, and Moscow.

The treaty will enter into force upon the deposit of ratifications by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.

Remarks by President Kennedy, October 7

White House press release dated October 7

Ladies and gentlemen: In its first two decades the Age of Nuclear Energy has been full of fear, yet never empty of hope. Today the fear is a little less and the hope a little greater. For the first time we have been able to reach an agreement which can limit the dangers of this age.

¹ For background and text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1963, p. 631.

The agreement itself is limited, but its message of hope has been heard and understood not only by the peoples of the three originating nations but by the peoples and governments of the hundred other countries that have signed. This treaty is the first fruit of labors in which multitudes have shared: citizens, legislators, statesmen, diplomats, and soldiers, too.

Soberly and unremittingly this nation—never this nation alone—has sought the doorway to effective disarmament into a world where peace is secure. Today we have a beginning, and it is right for us to acknowledge whose work across the years has helped make this beginning possible.

What the future will bring, no one of us can know. This first fruit of hope may or may not be followed by larger harvests. Even this limited treaty, great as it is with promise, can survive only if it has from others the determined support in letter and in spirit which I hereby pledge in behalf of the United States.

If this treaty fails, it will not be our doing and even if it fails, we shall not regret that we have made this clear and honorable national commitment to the cause of man's survival. For, under this treaty, we can and must still keep our vigil in defense of freedom.

But this treaty need not fail. This small step toward safety can be followed by other longer and less limited, if also harder in taking. With our courage and understanding enlarged by this achievement, let us press onward in quest of man's essential desire for peace.

As President of the United States and with the advice and consent of the Senate, I now sign the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

Joint Communique, October 10

Press release 519 dated October 10

On October 10, 1963, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article III of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water, the Original Parties to the Treaty—the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—deposited

their instruments of ratification of this Treaty with the Depositary Governments, with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Moscow, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in London, and the Government of the United States of America in Washington, respectively.

In accordance with its terms, the Treaty entered into force on the day of deposit of instruments of ratification by the Original Parties, that is on October 10, 1963.

Under the Treaty, instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Depositary Governments.

The Treaty provides that any State which did not sign the Treaty before its entry into force may accede to it at any time.

The Treaty also provides that for States whose instruments of ratification or accession were deposited subsequent to the entry into force of the Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of such deposit.

Text of Proclamation, October 10

White House press release dated October 10

WHEREAS the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963 by the respective plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and as thereafter opened to other States for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow;

WHEREAS the text of the Treaty, in the English and Russian languages, as certified by the Department of State of the United States of America, is word for word as follows:

Here followed the text of the treaty in the English and Russian text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239) and in Russian languages.]

WHEREAS the Senate of the United States of America passed their resolution of September 24, 1963, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, did advise the President of the United States of America that they had given their advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty;

WHEREAS the Treaty was duly ratified by the President of the United States of America on October 7, 1963, in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate;

WHEREAS on October 10, 1963, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics duly deposited instruments of ratification with the aforesaid Governments,


designated by Article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty as the Depositary Governments;

AND WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Article III, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the Treaty entered into force on October 10, 1963;

NOW, THEREFORE, be it known that I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim and make public the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith, on and after October 10, 1963, by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have caused the Seal of the United States of America to be hereunto affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this tenth day of October in the year of our Lord one thousand [SEAL] nine hundred sixty-three and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred eighty-eighth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

Three Added to U.S. Delegation to Cultural Conference With Japan

The Department of State announced on October 10 (press release 521) that Frank Stanton, president of the Columbia Broadcasting System, and Peter Mennin, composer and president of the Juilliard School of Music, have accepted appointments to the American delegation to the Second U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange, to be held at Washington October 16-22.¹

The Department also announced that W. Kenneth Bunce, Assistant Director for Far Eastern Affairs of the U.S. Information Agency, would represent the Agency on the American delegation, replacing Director Edward R. Murrow. The keynote address on educational television, originally scheduled to be given by Mr. Murrow, will be delivered by Mr. Stanton.

¹ For the names of the members of the U.S. and Japanese delegations, see BULLETIN of Oct. 14, 1963, p. 582.

U.S. Grain Dealers To Be Allowed To Sell Wheat to Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY¹

The Soviet Union and various Eastern European countries have expressed a willingness to buy from our private grain dealers at the regular world price several million tons of surplus American wheat or wheat flour for shipment during the next several months. They may also wish to purchase from us surplus feed grains and other agricultural commodities.

After consultation with the National Security Council and informing the appropriate leaders of the Congress, I have concluded that such sales by private dealers for American dollars or gold, either cash on delivery or normal commercial terms, should not be prohibited by the Government. The Commodity Credit Corporation in the Department of Agriculture will sell to our private grain traders the amount necessary to replace the grain used to fulfill these requirements, and the Department of Commerce will grant export licenses for their sale with the commitment that these commodities are for delivery to and use in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe only.

An added feature is the provision that the wheat we sell to the Soviet Union will be carried in available American ships, supplemented by ships of other countries as required. Arrangements will also be made by the Department of Commerce to prevent any single American dealer from receiving an excessive share of these sales.

No action by the Congress is required, but a

¹ Made at the beginning of the President's regular news conference on Oct. 9.

² H. Doc. 163, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

special report² on the matter will be sent to both Houses tomorrow.

Basically, the Soviet Union will be treated like any other cash customer in the world market who is willing and able to strike a bargain with private American merchants. While this wheat, like all wheat sold abroad, will be sold at the world price, which is the only way it can be sold, there is in such transactions no subsidy to the foreign purchaser; only a savings to the American taxpayer on wheat the Government has already purchased and stored at the higher domestic price which is maintained to assist our farmers.

This transaction has obvious benefit for the United States. The sale of 4 million metric tons of wheat, for example, for an estimated \$250 million, and additional sums from the use of American shipping, will benefit our balance of payments and gold reserves by that amount and substantially strengthen the economic outlook for those employed in producing, transporting, handling, and loading farm products.

Wheat, moreover, is our number-one farm surplus today, to the extent of about 1 billion unsold bushels. The sale of around 150 million bushels of wheat would be worth over \$200 million to the American taxpayer in reduced budget expenditures.

Our country has always responded to requests for food from governments of people who needed it, so long as we were certain that the people would actually get it and know where it came from. The Russian people will know they are receiving American wheat.

The United States has never had a policy against selling consumer goods, including agricultural commodities, to the Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe. On the contrary, we have been doing exactly that for a number of years; and to the extent that their limited supplies of gold, dollars, and foreign exchange must be used for food, they cannot be used to purchase military or other equipment.

Our allies have long been engaged in extensive sales of wheat and other farm products to the Communist bloc, and, in fact, it would be foolish to halt the sales of our wheat when other countries can buy wheat from us today and then sell this flour to the Communists. In recent weeks Australia and NATO allies have agreed to sell 10 million to 15 million tons of wheat and wheat flour to the Communist bloc.

This transaction advertises to the world as nothing else could the success of free American agriculture. It demonstrates our willingness to relieve food shortages, to reduce tensions, and to improve relations with all countries, and it shows that peaceful agreements with the United States which serve the interests of both sides are a far more worthwhile course than a course of isolation and hostility.

For this Government to tell our grain traders that they cannot accept these offers, on the other hand, would accomplish little or nothing. The Soviets would continue to buy wheat and flour elsewhere, including wheat flour, from those nations which buy our wheat. Moreover, having for many years sold them farm products which are not in surplus, it would make no sense to refuse to sell those products on which we must otherwise pay the cost of storage. In short, this particular decision with respect to sales to the Soviet Union, which is not inconsistent with many smaller transactions over a long period of time, does not represent a new Soviet-American trade policy. That must await the settlement of many matters. But it does represent one more hopeful sign that a more peaceful world is both possible and beneficial to us all.

¹ Not printed here.

² 18 U.S.C. 955 provides:

"Whoever, within the United States, purchases or sells the bonds, securities, or other obligations of any foreign government or political subdivision thereof or any organization or association acting for or on behalf of a foreign government or political subdivision thereof, issued after April 13, 1934, or makes any loan to such foreign government, political subdivision, or

LETTER FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL

Press release 520 dated October 10

Following is the text of a letter from the Attorney General to the Secretary of State concerning legal questions raised by the proposed wheat sales to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.

OCTOBER 9, 1963.

The Honorable,
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is in response to Under Secretary Ball's letter of September 23, 1963,³ requesting my opinion concerning the application of certain federal statutes to sales of United States wheat and other agricultural products to the Soviet Union and Eastern European bloc countries. I understand that the precise form which these sales might take has not been determined but that in any case they would be made for U.S. dollars, gold, or convertible currencies at not less than world market prices, and would not involve extensions of credit except within the range of those commonly encountered in connection with other commercial sales for export of the commodities involved. I have reviewed the relevant statutes and have concluded that they present no legal obstacle to such sales.

I.

The Johnson Act

The Johnson Act, 18 U.S.C. 955, prohibits certain financial transactions by private persons in the United States involving foreign governments which are in default in the payment of their obligations to the United States. The prohibited transactions include the making of "loans" to, and the purchase or sale of "bonds, securities, or other obligations" of, a foreign government which is within the statutory category.⁴ The Under Secretary's letter

organization or association, except a renewal or adjustment of existing indebtedness, while such government, political subdivision, organization or association, is in default in the payment of its obligations, or any part thereof, to the United States, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

"This section is applicable to individuals, partnerships, corporations, or associations other than public

(Continued on p. 662.)

states that the Soviet Union is a government in default for the purposes of the Act.

It is, of course, apparent that if the proposed sales of agricultural products to the Soviet Union should be made entirely for cash, no question under the Johnson Act would be presented. Moreover, since the Act is expressly made inapplicable to federal corporations, it would not apply to sales that might be made by the Commodity Credit Corporation. The latter is a corporation created by act of Congress (62 Stat. 1070, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 714), empowered to procure agricultural commodities for sale to foreign governments and to export or cause such commodities to be exported (62 Stat. 1072, 15 U.S.C. 714c). It should also be noted that, as provided by section 11 of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 529, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 635h), the Johnson Act does not apply to persons acting for or participating with the Export-Import Bank in any transaction engaged in by the Bank. The Bank itself, as a corporation created by act of Congress (12 U.S.C. 635), is exempted from the operation of the Johnson Act. Accordingly, the Act would not interfere with export sales in which the Bank participated by issuing a guarantee of payment of the purchase price or otherwise. Nor would it apply to private insurance companies, acting through the Foreign Credit Insurance Association, which might participate with the Bank in the issuance of such guarantees. The Under Secretary informs me that such guarantees are a common feature of similar export transactions with other foreign governments and their agencies.

There remains for consideration the propri-

(Continued from p. 661.)

corporations created by or pursuant to special authorizations of Congress, or corporations in which the United States has or exercises a controlling interest through stock ownership or otherwise. While any foreign government is a member both of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, this section shall not apply to the sale or purchase of bonds, securities, or other obligations of such government or any political subdivision thereof or of any organization or association acting for or on behalf of such government or political subdivision, or to making of any loan to such government, political subdivision, organization, or association." [Footnote in original.]

ety under the Johnson Act of possible sales by private American firms on a deferred-payment basis. It is my opinion that such sales would not involve the making of "loans" within the meaning of the Act. This view is consistent with the position taken by this Department under Attorney General Cummings (37 Ops. Att. Gen. 505 (1934)), and more recently in Assistant Attorney General Katzenbach's letter of January 19, 1962, to the General Counsel of the Department of Agriculture. The term "loan" in ordinary commercial usage denotes a contract by which one delivers a sum of money to another, and the latter agrees to return at a future time a sum equal to that borrowed, with or without interest. See, e.g., *In re Granite Union Co.*, 219 Fed. 353 (C.A. 2, 1915); *National Bank of Paulding v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.*, 131 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Ohio 1954). The right to defer payment for goods sold is not a loan but credit. See, e.g., *Dunn v. Midland Loan Finance Corp.*, 206 Minn. 550, 289 N.W. 411 (1939); *Bernhardt v. Atlantic Finance Co.*, 311 Mass. 183, 40 N.E. 2d 713 (1942); Whitney, *Modern Commercial Practices* § 12 (1958). And the payment of consideration by a third party for an assignment of the buyer's obligation does not constitute a loan to either the buyer or the seller. See *Oil City Motor Co. v. C.I.T. Corp.*, 76 F. 2d 589 (C.A. 10, 1935); *G.M.A.C. v. Mid-West Chevrolet Co.*, 66 F. 2d 1 (C.A. 10, 1933); *Dunn v. Midland Loan Finance Corp.*, *supra*; 6A Corbin, *Contracts* § 1500 (Rev. ed. 1962). Accordingly, neither sales transactions by American exporters on a deferred-payment basis, nor payments made to such exporters by third parties in return for an assignment of the right to payment in connection with such sales, are "loans" to the purchaser of the exported goods in the ordinary sense of that term in legal and commercial usage.

Nor would the forms of credit transactions in which private exporters commonly engage in connection with export sales on credit, involving the assignment or negotiation of contract rights or commercial paper, violate the Johnson Act's prohibition against the purchase or sale of the "bonds, securities, or other obligations" of the governments to which the Act refers. Since

the right to receive payment in connection with export sales is not normally received by the seller in the form of bonds or securities, the issue presented by such transactions is whether they would involve the purchase or sale of "other obligations" within the meaning of the statute.

Although the assignment or negotiation of a contract right or commercial document resulting from the sale of goods on credit can be broadly termed a "sale" of the buyer's "obligation," it is not, in my opinion, proscribed by the Johnson Act. The Act is a criminal statute, and therefore must be construed strictly, "lest those be brought within its reach who are not clearly included." *United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess*, 317 U.S. 537, 542 (1943); *United States v. Resnick*, 299 U.S. 207 (1936); *Kraus & Bros. v. United States*, 327 U.S. 614, 621-622 (1946). For that reason and the reasons indicated hereafter, it is my view that the Act must be interpreted in accordance with the rule of *ejusdem generis*, to relate only to sales of bonds and securities and "other obligations" of like nature. The distinction here made is essentially that made in connection with both Federal and State enactments in the field of securities regulation: between obligations which are covered because they are, or are likely to be, widely distributed among members of the public, and obligations which are not covered because they are issued in the ordinary course of trade and normally move exclusively within the relatively restricted channels of banking and commercial credit. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3(a)(3), (1), discussed in H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 14 (exemption for "short-term paper . . . of a type which rarely is bought by private investors"), and 1 Loss, *Securities Regulation* (2d ed.) 566 *et seq.*, 653 *et seq.* (exemptions for short-term paper and non-public offerings); Cal. Corp. Code § 25102(b)(c) (exemptions for "Bills of exchange, trade acceptances, promissory notes and any guarantee hereof, and other commercial paper issued, given, or acquired in a bona fide way in the ordinary course of legitimate business, trade, or commerce," and for promissory notes "not offered to the public or . . . sold to an underwriter for the purpose of resale").

The foregoing interpretation of the Johnson Act is the necessary result of application of the reasoning employed by Attorney General Cummings in construing the Act shortly after it became law in 1934. 37 Ops. Atty. Gen. 505, *supra*. That opinion, rendered at the request of the Secretary of State, reads in part as follows (*id.* at 512):

The Committee Reports (S. Rept. 20 and House Rept. 974, 73d Cong.) recite that the bill was introduced following an investigation by the Senate Committee on Finance and the revelation therein that "billions of dollars of securities . . . offered for sale to the American people" were overdue and unpaid; that some of these "foreign bonds and obligations . . . were sold by the American financiers to make outrageously high profits"; and stated a purpose "to prevent a recurrence of the practices which were shown by the investigation to be little less than a fraud upon the American people . . . to curb the rapacity of those engaged in the sale of foreign obligations . . ."

This, I think, is indicative of a purpose to deal with such "bonds" and "securities" and with "other obligations" of like nature, observing the rule of *ejusdem generis*—that is, obligations such as those which had been sold to the American public to raise money for the use of the foreign governments issuing them—not contemplating foreign currency, postal money orders, drafts, checks and other ordinary aids to banking and commercial transactions, which are "obligations" in a broad sense but not in the sense intended. It was obviously not the purpose of the Congress to discontinue all commercial relations with the defaulting countries.

Direct recourse to the legislative history of the Act confirms that both distinctions here made—that between loans and commercial credit, and between securities and commercial paper—reflect accurately the intention of Congress and the policy it sought to implement. As noted by Attorney General Cummings, it was obviously not the purpose of the Congress to interfere with the ordinary incidents of trade relations with the defaulting nations as distinguished from participation by them in the capital markets of the United States. Moreover, the debates provide numerous indications of Congress' familiarity with the distinction between traffic in "bonds [and] securities" and commercial dealings. A parallel was drawn with the recently-enacted Securities Acts in terms of the need to protect unsophisticated investors. 78 Cong. Rec. 6048, 6052. Reference was also made to

Section 5 of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, 47 Stat. 7 (1932), which expressly prohibited the making by the RFC of "advances . . . upon foreign securities or foreign acceptances," or drafts and bills of exchange secured by goods in transit to Europe. See 78 Cong. Rec. 6051. The contrast in the language of the two Acts, together with the context in which the Johnson Act was passed, makes it clear that the Johnson Act does not apply to the assignment or negotiation by an American seller, in the ordinary course of business, of contract rights or commercial paper resulting from sales of goods on normal commercial terms.

It should be understood that the types of transactions discussed above would violate the Act, regardless of their purely formal characteristics, if used as a subterfuge to evade it. Thus, for example, extensions of credit for an inordinately long period might be used as a device to circumvent the prohibition against loans. This question need not be considered in detail here since you inform me that any extensions of credit that may be involved will be within the range of those commonly encountered in commercial sales of a comparable character. Subject to that qualification I conclude that none of the transactions outlined in your letter would be prohibited by the Johnson Act.

II.

Section 2(c) of the Agricultural Act of 1961

Section 2 of the Agricultural Act of 1961 (75 Stat. 294, 7 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 1282 note), declares it to be—

. . . the policy of Congress to—

(c) expand foreign trade in agricultural commodities with friendly nations, as defined in section 107 of Public Law 480, 83rd Congress, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1707), and in no manner either subsidize the export, sell, or make available any subsidized agricultural commodity to any nations other than such friendly nations and thus make full use of our agricultural abundance. . . .

The adoption of this declaration of policy followed the announcement by the Department of Commerce in June 1961 of a change in existing export licensing policy to permit the sale of subsidized surplus agricultural commodities to the Eastern European Soviet bloc. The an-

nouncement indicated that consideration would be given to approval of export licenses for shipment of such commodities, including commodities acquired directly or indirectly from Commodity Credit Corporation stocks, to the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries provided the commodities were sold for convertible currencies. *Hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate and Study the Administration, Operation, and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949, and Related Acts* (87th Cong., 1st Sess.), p. 109.

Section 107 of P.L. 480 (Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 457, 7 U.S.C. 1707), referred to in the declaration of policy, defines the term "friendly nation" to mean "any country other than (1) the U.S.S.R., or (2) any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign nation controlling the world Communist movement." Public Law 480 authorized, *inter alia*, export sales for soft currencies and for long-term credits. See 7 U.S.C. 1701, 1731. Sales of this character are authorized only with respect to "friendly nations," as defined in the Act, but no restriction is imposed on commercial sales for cash or short-term credits.

During consideration by the House of the bill which became the Agricultural Act of 1961 Representative Latta, referring to the change of policy announced by the Department of Commerce, proposed adding to the declaration of policy already contained in section 2(c) the language: "and in no manner either subsidize the export, sell, or make available any subsidized agricultural commodity to any nations other than such friendly nations." He objected to selling subsidized agricultural commodities to the Soviet bloc—even sales not involving any element of assistance under P.L. 480—because sales at the world market price would, in his view, give bloc countries the benefit of subsidies paid by the Commodity Credit Corporation to American producers and exporters.⁵ H

⁵ Under section 407 of the Agricultural Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 1055, as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1427), the Commodity Credit Corporation is authorized to sell subsidized agricultural commodities owned or controlled by it for export at less than the domestic price. Representative Latta stated that under the Department of Commerce proposal "the American taxpayer will now

urged that this was objectionable "in view of the world situation." After some debate as to the meaning and desirability of the amendment, it was adopted. 107 Cong. Rec. 13746-13748. The Conference Committee accepted the amendment. H.R. Rep. No. 839, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 28.

It is clear that the policy declaration contained in section 2(c) does not have the legal effect of prohibiting commercial sales of subsidized agricultural commodities to bloc countries at world market prices for U.S. dollars, gold, or convertible currencies. Declarations of policy in legislation, like preambles and other introductory material, do not alter specific operative provisions of law. *Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson*, 370 U.S. 195, 202 (1962); *Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co.*, 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938); *Price v. Forrest*, 173 U.S. 410, 427 (1899); *Yazoo R. Co. v. Thomas*, 132 U.S. 174, 178 (1889); Sutherland, *Statutory Construction* (3d ed.) § 4820. This rule is particularly relevant where, as here, the declaration of policy was not contemporaneous with the enactment or amendment of any of the basic pertinent statutes: the Export Control Act, the Agricultural Act of 1949, and the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act.⁶

I have examined the history of the declaration with care and find no indication that Congress itself viewed the amendment as more than an expression of its policy, to be given consideration by the Executive in making decisions within the framework of authorizations and prohibitions established by prior law. Representative Latta, who sponsored the declaration, himself stated that its purpose was to

[be] picking up the difference between the world price and the domestic price. . . . The exporter would charge this difference to the taxpayer." 107 Cong. Rec. 13746-13748. In fact, as noted by Chairman Cooley of the House Agricultural Committee in debate on the floor of the House, since the commodities in question are surplus, the American taxpayer in each case has already "picked up" not merely the difference between the world price and the domestic price, but the entire amount of the domestic price. Export transactions can be said to involve a "subsidy" only because the losses incurred in maintaining the domestic price support program are not deemed realized until a sale occurs. The net result of export transactions therefore is to reduce the loss to the taxpayer by the amount of the world market price. *Id.* at 13747. [Footnote in original.]

have the Department of Commerce know "what the sense of this Congress is" with respect to the transactions in question. 107 Cong. Rec. 13746. And Representative Hoeven, one of its supporters, pointed out that the amendment "pertains only to the policy section of this bill." *Id.* at 13747. At no point in the legislative consideration of the declaration was any effort made to revise or to repeal the statutes that would have to be deemed amended if the policy were to be given binding legal effect.

The Congress could, of course, have embodied its policy in a provision of positive law to which the Executive Branch would have been bound to adhere. That it did not choose to do so is significant, not only in establishing that section 2(c) is without legal effect but in determining its proper interpretation and application as policy. Congress evidently contemplated that situations might thereafter arise in which the considerations of policy to which it was directing attention should not be decisive; that it would be necessary for the Executive to consider and appraise the policy thus declared and to determine whether its application would serve the national interest in particular situations. Both Congress and the courts have traditionally sought to avoid restricting the Executive unduly in matters affecting foreign relations because of the need for flexibility in this area and the fact that the Constitution entrusts the external affairs of the Nation primarily to the Executive. *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304, 319-321 (1936); *Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp.*, 333 U.S. 103, 111-114 (1948). If, therefore, the Executive Branch should determine that permitting the sales in question would serve the national interest at

⁶ Export Control Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 7, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. 2021 *et seq.* (authorizing the President to regulate exports, including their financing, transportation, and other servicing); Agricultural Act of 1949, section 407, *supra* (CCC authorized to sell agricultural commodities for export at less than support prices); Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, section 5, *supra* (CCC empowered to procure agricultural commodities for sale to foreign governments, and to export such commodities, or cause them to be exported, and to aid in the development of foreign markets for these commodities). [Footnote in original.]

this time, its action would not only be lawful but consistent with the intention of Congress as to the manner in which section 2(c) was to be interpreted and applied.

III.

The Battle Act

I agree with the Under Secretary that the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 644, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 1611 *et seq.*) (the Battle Act) presents no legal obstacle to sales of agricultural commodities to Eastern European bloc countries. The Battle Act was designed to supplement the Export Control Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 7, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. 2022-32), which authorizes the President to "prohibit or curtail the exportation from the United States . . . of any articles, materials or supplies . . . except under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe." Pursuant to the Export Control Act, a comprehensive system of export licensing was set up to control the shipment of commodities from the United States to foreign countries. See H.R. Rep. 318, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The Battle Act added to this system of regulation a mechanism for inducing other countries to embargo the shipment to the Soviet bloc of "arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items of primary strategic significance used in [their] production." See S. Rep. No. 698, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The Act provides (section 103, 22 U.S.C. 1611b(b)) for the termination of all military, economic, or financial assistance to any nation upon the recommendation of the Administrator of the program, subject to review by the President in certain instances, if it "knowingly permits the shipment to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination," of any of the embargoed materials. The Act contains a further declaration of policy regarding the export, by countries receiving assistance, of other commodities "which in the judgment of the Administrator should be controlled." Section 201, 22 U.S.C. 1612. If a country receiving assistance

from the United States does not effectively cooperate in controlling exports of such commodities, all military, economic, or financial assistance is to be terminated upon a determination by the President of non-cooperation. Section 203, 22 U.S.C. 1612b.

As indicated by the above summary of its provisions, the Battle Act did not purport to regulate private United States shipments to Soviet bloc countries, which were already subject to regulation under the Export Control Act. The Battle Act relates, rather, to trade with the Soviet bloc by countries receiving aid or assistance from the United States. Moreover, the transactions to which this opinion relates would be purely commercial in nature from the standpoint of the purchasing countries, and would therefore not involve "economic or financial assistance" within the meaning of the Battle Act. The Commodity Credit Corporation assists exports of agricultural products through the payment to United States exporters of subsidies designed to eliminate the impact on such exporters of the domestic price support program and thereby enable them to compete on an equal basis with foreign exporters. However, as the Under Secretary's letter states, the only "assistance" involved in the payment of such subsidies redounds to the benefit exclusively of United States producers and exporters.⁷

As to both points, the following colloquy between Senator Sparkman, the floor manager of the Battle Act in the Senate, and Senator Kem,

⁷ This view is supported by my recent opinion to the Secretary of Agriculture of August 29, 1963, regarding the applicability of the Cargo Preference Act to export sales on long-term credit negotiated by the Secretary of Agriculture with domestic exporters under Title IV of Public Law 480. While the opinion concludes that the Cargo Preference Act applied because the purpose of the Title IV long-term credit program was in substantial part "to assist" the foreign economy, it was stated that if the Department of Agriculture should sell surplus agricultural commodities to a domestic exporter for export purposes under a program designed to dispose of the goods on the best possible terms and conditions, "the resulting export is a purely commercial transaction . . . and, hence, not subject to the Cargo Preference Act even if the United States advances credit to the exporter and the ultimate purchaser is a foreign government." [Footnote in original.]

who advocated a more stringent bill, is instructive (97 Cong. Rec. 10675):

MR. SPARKMAN: I should like to say that it does not make any difference what the United States is receiving [from the U.S.S.R.]. That is not the question. The question relates to trade between Soviet countries and countries to which the United States intends to extend help.

MR. KEM: Exactly.

MR. SPARKMAN: Either economic or military. It has nothing to do with trade between the United States and Russia or any other country.

MR. KEM: I did not intend to imply anything else.

Accordingly, it is clear that the Act has no application to the contemplated transactions.

IV.

The Export Control Act

The Under Secretary's letter properly states

that in any event the export of agricultural products to the Soviet Union and to bloc countries would require the issuance of licenses in accordance with the export control regulations promulgated pursuant to the Export Control Act of 1949, *supra*.

I am not aware of any other federal statutes relevant to the problems involved. Accordingly, it is my opinion that the transactions described in your letter could be accomplished in conformity with the laws of the United States.

Sincerely,

ROBERT F. KENNEDY
Attorney General

How To Make a National Market

by W. W. Rostow

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council¹

Some months ago, when I agreed to join you on this occasion, I suggested that the title of my talk should be: "Our Major Tasks on the World Scene." Between then and now I have been working on a particular problem, among others, which, I suspect, may prove the critical problem of the decade in many of the developing nations of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Since that problem touches your professional interests—it is deeply interwoven with the future of agriculture—I decided to devote the whole of my talk to it.

My subject tonight is: "How To Make a National Market."

As you will see, behind this title is a judgment that the central task faced in a great

many of the developing countries is to move from their present position, where modern life is mainly confined to a few cities, to make their rural areas simultaneously a more efficient source of agricultural produce and an enlarged market for their industrial output. That, in any case, is my theme; and, before I am through, I shall try to talk about it in a practical way.

Process of Industrialization

But first I shall try to place these developing nations in an historical perspective.

If you look back you can see that individual nations of the contemporary world entered the process of industrialization at different points in time.

What I would call the takeoff into sustained growth occurred first, of course, in Great

¹Address made before the Farm Equipment Institute at New Orleans, La., on Oct. 1 (press release 498).

Britain, beginning at the close of the 18th century with the revolution in cotton textile manufacture, backed by Watt's efficient steam engine. Then, between 1830 and 1850, the United States and Western Europe entered the new industrial game in a serious and sustained way. After a pause, Sweden, Japan, Russia, and Canada were seized with the industrialization process in the period, roughly, between 1870 and 1914.

At the beginning of the First World War, then, the whole northern half of the planet—from Great Britain around through Japan to North America—had begun systematically to absorb and apply the fruits of then modern science and technology, with the exception of parts of Eastern Europe and China.

Starting in the late 1930's and proceeding through the Second World War and beyond, those who were left out in the first century or so of industrialization are now moving into the same process. And one way to describe the world in which we live—certainly not the only way, but one way—is to say that the whole southern half of the planet, plus China and Eastern Europe, is now moving into industrialization. They are bringing to bear on their societies a different range of technology than that which was available to the pre-1914 early comers of the north; but many of the problems they confront are wholly recognizable from the earlier experience.

Now, of course, these developing nations are at quite different points in the application of modern science and technology to their lives. There are parts of Africa, Asia, and even some places in Latin America which are still quite primitive. Before they can begin a systematic industrialization, they must pass through a period where the primary tasks are education, the building of administrative skills, the laying out of transport, the exploitation of sources of power, and so on. But countries containing perhaps 70 percent of the population of the developing nations in the southern half of the world have already had a considerable preliminary experience of economic development. They have laid out their transport systems, acquired substantial administrative experience, built educational institutions, and learned many

of the most fundamental techniques of industrial manufacture. As you travel from their jet airports to their ultramodern hotels, they present, at first glance, a picture of advanced modernization.

But in this first phase of industrialization they have proceeded in a somewhat unbalanced way; and I should like to describe the typical distortions from which they now suffer. Before doing so, however, I should like to observe that the growth of nations, like the development of our children, is rarely well balanced. It is wholly natural, given the nature of economic development and the historical experience of others, that they should find themselves now facing a series of structural distortions.

Characteristics of Developing Countries

What, then, does a typical nation among the more advanced of these developing societies now look like?

First, there is some industrial capacity, usually developed to substitute for the import of certain kinds of consumers' goods. The easiest way to begin industrialization is to set high tariffs or otherwise to prevent the import of automobiles, radios, and other luxury goods which the upper middle class in these countries can afford to buy, and begin to produce them at home. This both saves foreign exchange and permits industrialization to begin, and it is no great trick to market for a rich urban middle class. In addition, most of them begin to manufacture textiles—often, again, with protection for the home market.

The second characteristic of these countries is that, leaving the textiles aside, the market for these manufactured goods is small; and there is a tendency for industrialization to slow down, once the substitution for imports has mainly taken place. If the initial market for TV sets is, say, 100,000, and a steep tariff is laid down, TV output in the protected market can expand rapidly up to 100,000. But then it will only expand at the rate that those rich enough to buy a TV set increase—a much slower rate. Under these circumstances, some industrial plant is usually idle or inefficiently used and industrial profits are not plowed back into in-

dustrial expansion. Profits move off into commerce, real estate, office buildings, and sometimes, despite the tremendous requirement of capital, they leak abroad.

A third characteristic of such countries is that, although some agricultural development is taking place, the gap between rural and urban life is widening. In their first phase they have concentrated on the development of a few major cities which have within them many of the trappings of modern urban life. But neither sufficient capital nor sufficient human and technical talent has been invested in the countryside. As a result of this imbalance, a number of these developing nations have become dependent on the import of food for their cities; they have not developed the possibilities of agriculture for the supply of industrial raw materials or exports; and the agricultural population is not an effective market for industrial products.

Finally, as a result of this imbalance, men and women flock from the countryside to the bright lights of the cities. And, because there is not sufficient industrial momentum, they do not find full employment, but, nevertheless, they lay a heavy claim on government budgets for housing, education, and so on, even though they live in urban slums.

Looked at in this way, the central problem of development on the world scene is not the gap between rich nations and poor nations: It is the gap between the rich and poor parts of the developing nations themselves. The developing nations are pressing upon the more developed parts of the free world the proposition that they have suffered because industrial prices have tended to rise in recent years while the prices of their raw materials and foodstuffs have tended to fall. This is a real enough phenomenon, and there are things we ought to do about it; but their critical problem may lie not in the terms of trade in world commerce but in the terms of trade between their own industrial and rural areas. The prices paid in the countryside for manufactured goods in these developing nations are too high, while the prices paid by the cities for the output of rural areas and the total resources allocated from the cities for rural development are too low.

Breaking Down Structural Distortions

My central proposition tonight is, then, that the operational task of development in many parts of the world over the next decade or so may be to break down these structural distortions, to produce a self-reinforcing agricultural and industrial expansion, and to create truly national markets within these countries.

In concrete terms, the problem I am talking about can be visualized from a recent survey made in one such developing nation. It was found that 90 percent of the durable and non-durable goods sold to consumers were sold to the 39 percent of the population living in towns of over 10,000 people, whereas the 61 percent of the population living in rural areas bought only 10 percent of such goods.

Before turning to prescription for this problem, I might add that we have seen it before in other countries. For example, within the memory of all of us here we have seen this kind of problem in substantial parts of the American South. It is only since the 1930's that the TVA area has been brought fully into the national economy of the United States, by exactly the kind of self-reinforcing industrial and agricultural process that I shall try later to describe. In Canada it is only in this generation that Quebec has moved into what I would call the takeoff into self-sustained growth; and the same is true for southern Italy and perhaps even for large parts of southern France. It is, as I say, quite natural to have distortions within a national development process, with an initial concentration on urban development and urban markets, with the rural areas brought fully into modernization only with the passage of time.

Four Major Jobs To Be Done

Now, how do you do it? How do you make a national market, starting from the kind of distorted situation that can be observed in the world around us?

I suggest that there are four major jobs that must be done, and they should be done simultaneously as part of a conscious national strategy, shared by the public and private authorities. The four elements are these: a buildup

of agricultural productivity, a revolution in the marketing of agricultural products in the cities, a shift of industry to the production of simple agricultural equipment and consumers' goods for the mass market, and a revolution in marketing methods for such cheap manufactured goods, especially in rural areas.

If I am correct, what is involved are two distinct revolutions in marketing and distribution—one urban, the other rural—plus a shift in public and private resources to agriculture, plus a shift in the direction of industrial output. Let me say a word about each, in turn.

Buildup of Agricultural Productivity

First, the matter of agricultural productivity. If one looks at agriculture in most of these developing nations, the first thing that strikes you is how uneven that development has been. In most countries there are a few bright spots, at least. Near the cities one can see the beginnings of modern market gardening or even some dairy farming or modern chicken raising. One can see in a few areas, at least, the relatively efficient production of industrial crops, such as cotton, or export crops, such as tea and rubber. There are, however, vast areas of mainly subsistence agriculture, usually carried on by traditional methods of low productivity. Little surplus is produced from such areas for the cities, and little is bought of the cities' products, except perhaps the inevitable soft drinks and coarse but often quite expensive manufactured textiles.

A good deal of assistance to agriculture takes the form of building of roads and communications into the countryside and perhaps the beginnings of basic rural education. Roads and schools are, of course, a necessary condition for the modernization of the countryside, but they are not a sufficient condition. Roads and schools in themselves do not automatically bring about a productivity revolution. What the countryside in developing nations generally needs, in addition, are three things: more technical advice, including advice about markets and marketing, more credit resources so that they can act on that technical advice, and an increased incentive to shift over to new methods of agricultural production or to new crops.

In the United States our great and continu-

ing agricultural revolution has been based on the county agent, the mail-order catalog, and reasonable prices for agricultural output, as well as on cheap agricultural credit.

How exactly agriculture in a particular developing country should be transformed requires that one decide in each region what sort of new crops can be efficiently produced and are likely to find markets. Here general prescriptions are to be avoided, although in many parts of Latin America it is clear that there is a potential market in the cities not merely for basic grain but also for higher grade protein foods—dairy products, meat, poultry, et cetera. Just as agriculture in the American South has moved in this direction in the past generation, I suspect we shall see this trend also in many of the more advanced developing areas.

Revolution in Marketing

But this kind of agricultural revolution can only be effective if there is a parallel revolution in marketing; and this brings me to the second required element in the making of a national market.

Recent studies of the food distribution system in some Latin American cities indicate that with the application of modern marketing methods, food prices could be lowered by at least 10 percent. To understand the meaning of this in a developing country, it must be recalled that more than half of the income is spent on food by most of the population. In bringing about a revolution in food distribution, we are talking about big and immediate margins of increase in human welfare.

But, even more than that, one cannot begin to organize with conviction modern dairy and chicken farms, for example, unless one is confident that the products can be efficiently handled and distributed in the cities. The higher grade foods have traditionally been sold by inefficient methods to a very small segment of the urban population.

It is, therefore, a requirement of a successful agricultural revolution that not only the producers of food but the distributors begin to think in terms of a mass market with small unit profits, compensated for by a larger turnover and, therefore, a satisfactory return on capital.

If one looks closely at the cities in the developing areas, one can begin to see the foundations on which to build. Experiments in supermarkets, for example, are taking place in a number of countries, as is the development of consumers' cooperatives. But, in most cases, they now supply a very small part of the market. Most marketing involves too many middlemen, with excessive markups, ending up in small shops with low turnover and excessive unit profits. Building on the initiatives which have already been taken and the practical experiences which have been gained, it is necessary that all of us concerned with the development business give much greater attention and resources to the cheap and efficient marketing of the products of agriculture in urban areas.

Expansion of Production for Rural Areas

The third requirement in making a national market is that manufacturers expand their production to embrace not merely the goods which the small, wealthy middle class can buy but things which have real potentials for mass marketing. I have in mind simple agricultural equipment, cheap textiles, canvas shoes, flashlights, household equipment, transistor radios, and the classic first-phase durable consumers' goods—bicycles and sewing machines.

Having seen villages in developing nations, I am convinced that, even at present levels of income, there is more cash in those villages than we often think. Those who have taken the trouble to produce and sell in the villages have usually done well. What is required now is a purposeful effort to bring the industrial capacity of the developing nations into the service of a much wider range of the population than has been true in the past. They must begin to look at the, say, 60 percent of the population now out of the game as a potential market. One cannot develop industrial efficiency if plants are underemployed. And the owner of an underemployed plant is not likely to plow his profits back into industrial expansion. The manufacturer must, therefore, take rural marketing and agricultural development very seriously indeed.

In this connection I would call your attention to a recent speech—of September 12—made by Señor Raúl Salinas Lozano, Secretary of In-

dustry and Commerce in the Government of Mexico, speaking to a group of Mexican industrial leaders. He urged them to take new capital to the countryside where they can obtain promising results, because only by means of the just distribution of riches will Mexico be able to resolve its longstanding social, cultural, and economic problems. It is better to create a better understanding of the national benefits which result from a proper orientation of new industrial investments. He pointed out two fields of investment that merit attention and vigor: the production of products for the countryside and the production of consumers' goods for the great mass of the underprivileged population. At the same time, and in the name of the Government, he urged the business community that it fulfill its social duty so that Mexicans in the low-income brackets receive the products of industry at the lowest possible price.

Improvement of Marketing Techniques

But, as you all are aware as practical men of business, there is no point in producing goods of this kind unless there are also developed new and efficient ways of getting them out to the rural markets. It is possible in some areas that the technique of the mail-order catalog, which was so powerful an instrument in the development of American rural areas, could be applied. But in many countries the rate of literacy is not sufficiently high and the postal service not sufficiently reliable to use this method. In the first instance what may be required are mobile trucks which would go at regular intervals into the villages with a stock of consumers' goods and agricultural equipment—as did the old-fashioned rural peddler with a pack on his back. Some interesting and promising experiments of this sort have already been undertaken.

What is required is a purposeful organization of this kind of production and marketing, with financing which would permit a protracted period in which the rural population begins to react, in terms of its own efforts to increase incomes, in order to acquire an increased volume of these goods. I am told by an American firm which had experience in the early days of the development of the Tennessee Valley area that it took about 3 years before big profits were

earned in this kind of operation. But, from the very beginning, the availability of such goods at reasonable prices would yield for the developing nation a higher amount of industrial employment for the expenditure of a given amount of income in the villages.

Let me emphasize again a point which I made earlier in this talk. It has been the experience of the United States, confirmed by the experience in certain areas within the modern developing nations, that the availability of such cheap but attractive consumers' goods has been a major factor leading the farmer to change his methods in such a way as to increase his productivity and his income.

Industrial development requires higher productivity methods and higher incomes in the countryside; but the availability of cheap manufactured goods and farm equipment can be a powerful stimulus to higher agricultural productivity. Efforts to achieve both results should proceed simultaneously.

This, then, is a four-point program for making a national market and thus solving the typical structural distortions of many contemporary developing nations. If successful, this program would expand industrial production, increase industrial efficiency, and make the plowback of profits into industrial expansion economically attractive. It would increase productivity in agriculture and raise the level of income in the cities by providing cheap, higher grade foodstuffs. By making agricultural life more attractive and bringing to it some of the fruits that modern industrial methods can offer, it would damp down the abnormal flow from the countryside to the urban slums.

Challenge to Private Business Sector

This kind of program also offers a way in which the private sector within a developing country can make a massive contribution to the economic development process as a whole. It is one thing for private enterprise to assemble or produce automobiles, television sets, and other durable consumers' goods for a small, rich, isolated middle class. It is quite a different matter for it to put its skills of manufacturing and marketing at the service of the urban and rural populations as a whole. I can think of no better

way for private enterprise to demonstrate its legitimacy and to insure its status in a developing society than by playing its part in some such program for breaking down the barrier between the city and the countryside and making a national market.

And it is within such a strategy that private enterprise from abroad could find a major constructive mission in the developing nations. The genius of our own private capitalism in the United States—and this is also true of Canada and increasingly true of Western Europe and Japan—has been that it served all of the people, urban and rural, bringing to them cheaply and efficiently the best fruits of modern science and technology. Working with the private enterprise sectors within developing nations and in collaboration with governments which, in the first instance, must accept this strategy and play an important role within it, I believe that foreign private enterprise could fulfill a constructive mission in the economic development process.

Applied, for example, to the Alliance for Progress, this strategy could give the whole enterprise a new cast, a new dynamism. It would not alter the need for improved methods of tax collection, for land reform in certain areas, for increased investment in education, housing, and health. But it would supply an operational objective in which private enterprise would have scope for real initiative and creativeness, a real basis for collaboration with governments, and a way of demonstrating to all the people its inherent virtues.

What greater reality could the Alliance for Progress have than if it began to yield a sharp drop in food costs to the urban consumer, a shift in rural production to new, higher quality and higher productivity agricultural products, full utilization and rapid expansion in industrial plant, and a flow of cheap farm equipment and cheap industrial products in the villages? Other things matter in economic development above all, health, education, and housing. But it is in the four elements embraced within this market strategy that an economy pays off or fails to pay off; and it is out of the interaction between industrial momentum and rising agricultural productivity that a nation develops the resources necessary for ample welfare programs.

If this is the right strategy, how does one begin? I would suggest that the place to begin is within the private business sector of the developing nation. Business leaders might counsel together and take stock of the untapped market possibilities, get the necessary market surveys made, examine the possibilities and costs of improved marketing arrangements for agricultural products in the cities, for manufactured products in the countryside. On certain projects they could begin on their own; for others, they might require the understanding of the government or its active collaboration—for example, in building rural roads in a key area or granting agricultural credit to expand output of newly marketable crops. It is possible that private and public authorities might decide to work together intensively, on an experimental basis, in a particular region. The aid resources available to the Alliance for Progress might be woven into the scheme where such special financing was required.

But there are two basic points about setting this kind of show on the road: The first initiative must come from within the country itself—the local private and public authorities must, out of their own insights and responsibilities, recognize their problem in some such terms as I have described it tonight and decide to do something about it; second, there must be some minimum concerting of thought and enterprise by leaders in the private business community and between them and the governmental authorities. I am not talking about rigid planning, but of the minimum programming of the effort required to make the four elements in the strategy mutually reinforcing.

Once under way, I am confident that the aid authorities in the United States Government and elsewhere would be prepared to see how, in particular circumstances, they might be helpful.

After examining this problem with some care, in many parts of the world over the past 2 years, I am convinced that the basic raw materials exist for a great surge forward over the next decade in Latin America and elsewhere in the more advanced developing nations. The industrial skills and organization are there; a considerable initial experience in rural develop-

ment programs has been acquired; the first successful small experiments in supermarkets and cooperatives in the cities and in efficient rural marketing have taken place. The challenge now is to marry these up and get going; and the challenge falls substantially on the private enterprise sector—the business leaders within these countries and the foreign firms that operate there.

For those like ourselves who believe in private enterprise, I can think of no more satisfying task than to help pioneer in these new settings the application of the lessons we have learned in our own nations in creating national markets which have, at the same time, made available the fruits of an industrial society to all our people and provided the foundation for regular economic growth.

Four Named To Be Consultants on Cultural Affairs

The Department of State announced on October 4 (press release 509) that Thaddeus M. Machrowicz, U.S. District Judge of the Eastern District of Michigan; Matt S. Szymczak, a consultant and lecturer in business administration and banking at Georgetown University and a former member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Alfred J. Marrow, a management specialist and chairman of the board of the Harwood Manufacturing Corp., New York, N.Y., have been appointed to be consultants to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Their appointments were effective October 4, and they will serve the Department of State without compensation.

The Department announced on October 11 (press release 525) that Mrs. H. Alwyn Inness-Brown was sworn in as a special consultant on that day by Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs.

The founder and president of the Greater New York Chapter of the American National Theatre and Academy (ANTA), Mrs. Inness-Brown will advise the Department in the field of cultural affairs, primarily the performing arts.

Emperor of Ethiopia Visits United States

Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia made a state visit to the United States September 30–October 7. His Imperial Majesty arrived at Philadelphia on September 30 and was in Washington October 1–3, where he met with President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk, and other Government officials. The Emperor and his party were in New York October 3–7 and left from there for Ottawa, Canada. Following are texts of an exchange of toasts between President Kennedy and the Emperor at a state dinner at the White House on October 1 and a joint communique released on October 2 at the conclusion of discussions held by the President and His Imperial Majesty October 1 and 2.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated October 1

President Kennedy

Ladies and gentlemen, I know I speak on behalf of all of us in expressing our great satisfaction and our appreciation of the honor which has been done to us by the visit of our distinguished guest. There is really no comparable figure in the world today who held high responsibilities in the thirties, who occupied and held the attention and the imagination of really almost all free countries in the midthirties, and still could in the summer of 1963 in his own Capital dominate the affairs of his continent. This is an unprecedented experience in the 20th century, and I know of only a few experiences in recent history which are in any way similar.

So I think that the welcome today in Washington, which is really, I think, almost unprecedented—the number of people who came, the warmth of their greeting to His Imperial Majesty, even though Ethiopia is a long way from the United States—shows that the country and its leader have occupied a position of importance in the life of our own country.

Fate and geography and time and necessity have made the United States and Ethiopia very closely associated in the years since the end of the Second World War. We value that associa-

tion. We value the position of responsibility and leadership which His Majesty occupies.

I hope he comes here on this occasion, 10 years after his first visit, and realizes how warm are the sentiments and how genuine is the feeling.

Speaking personally, Your Majesty, having grown up in a sense, as a good many others here in your shadow, having seen the photograph when you spoke to the League, having read your speech some years ago, and now having you here tonight is an historic occasion for us all.

So, in asking my fellow Americans to join in toasting to the prosperity of the people of Ethiopia, I know in a very real sense all of the American people join in toasting to the health of His Imperial Majesty.

Emperor Haile Selassie I¹

Mr. President, I came to the United States in full confidence that the traditional friendship which has always marked the relations between our two nations would be further reinforced and strengthened, and that American and Ethiopian people would as a result of my stay here come even closer to one another in understanding and spirit. My confidence has not been misplaced. The warm words which have been addressed to me and to the Ethiopian Government and people, the letters of friendship and comprehension which have been addressed to me from every corner of the land have only served to reinforce in my firm conviction that the spirit of amity and cooperation which have characterized the relations between Ethiopia and the United States in the past decades will continue to shape and direct the course of our dealings in the future.

As I stand here tonight, I recall with most poignant emotion the moral support which Ethiopia received from the United States in the dark hour when my country was ravished by fascism 27 years ago and the steadfast refusal of the American Government to recognize the occupation of Ethiopia.

It is surely to be regretted not merely by Ethiopia but by the entire world that the United States of America was not represented

¹ As translated from the Amharic language.

in the League of Nations to which I addressed my futile appeal in 1936.

I remember also my meetings with past great leaders of this nation, with President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the Suez Conference in 1945, and with President Dwight D. Eisenhower here in Washington in 1954. Having now met and exchanged views with you, Mr. President, I can tonight express my calm certainty that the United States will continue to fulfill the destiny which has fallen to its lot in the modern world.

My country is old in history. Our culture extends far back into most ancient times, but we are young in modernity. If Ethiopia does not yet enjoy all the blessings of the modern world, if we have further to go to achieve the level of economic and social development which this country has achieved, it is because we have been a landlocked country, and, although never colonized, we have been engaged in a never-ending struggle to maintain our freedom and independence against foreign encroachments. But this is the goal that we have set for ourselves, and in our efforts to obtain it, we have benefited greatly from the assistance which the United States of America has made available to us.

It is only fitting that I express my nation's and my gratitude for this generosity.

Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to propose a toast to the friendship which has for so long endured between our two nations, to the twin ideals of peace and liberty to which we are both equally dedicated, to the prosperity and happiness of the great American people and to your personal health and well-being.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated October 2

During the course of the State Visit of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, October 1 and 2, 1963, the Emperor and President John F. Kennedy discussed important aspects of world peace and economic progress, as well as African problems and aspirations in these vital areas. The two leaders expressed their satisfaction at the friendship

which has for so long existed between Ethiopia and the United States, and reaffirmed their desire to continue closer cooperation and collaboration in fields of mutual interest.

Against the backdrop of the emergence of 28 new nations in Africa since the visit of the Emperor to the United States in 1954, the two leaders discussed current problems of the Continent. They reiterated their belief in the right of the still dependent territories to freedom and independence, and expressed the fervent hope that the final steps in the transition to freedom in Africa can be taken and implemented within the framework provided by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

Noting the historical dedication of the Emperor to the principle of collective security, the President expressed particular appreciation of the significant contribution of Ethiopia to the establishment of unity and peace in the Congo. The Emperor and the President reaffirmed their faith in the United Nations, and deplored any action which would tend to weaken the Organization or the principles embodied in the Charter. The Emperor and the President also endorsed the principle of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity which called for "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence."

The President assured the Emperor of the continuance of the interest of the United States in Ethiopia's economic development and security. In separate discussions, officials of the two governments discussed various aspects of Ethiopia's Five Year Plan and considered possible methods of financing the accomplishments of its programs. The United States agreed to examine Ethiopian requests for United States assistance for economic development projects and to give careful consideration to assistance in the financing of agreed projects by means of long-term loans.

The Emperor extended an invitation to the President to visit Ethiopia. The President indicated his appreciation and expressed his desire to arrange such a visit as soon as his schedule permitted.

Health for Peace and Vice Versa

by Harlan Cleveland

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

I suppose that, like other people attending conferences on matters in which they are genuinely interested, you, who are the Who's Who for WHO, have devoted the last 3 days to working too hard, staying up too late, indulging too heavily, and otherwise violating the standards of good health which you crave for the rest of mankind. Perhaps it is just as well that this meeting is coming to a close; otherwise, to supplement our National Citizens Committee for the World Health Organization, we might have to set up a local health organization for the National Citizens Committee.

I speak to you today as a professional administrator, bringing with me a certain sense of guilt about the state of my art.

We administrators simply have just not kept up with the scientists and engineers and technicians who insist on creating new problems for us. Every time science chalks up another success, a new demand is created—and I stress the word “demand”—for an institutional response. Some new piece of organizational machinery is needed to tame or exploit the new accomplishment, to prepare or adapt society to cope with it.

The example in the front of our minds is, of course, the weaponry of fission and fusion.

The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom—joined now by nearly a hundred other nations—have now confirmed by formal agreement that they have a common in-

terest in not polluting the common atmosphere with radioactive waste, and a common interest in putting a brake on the nuclear arms race. They have agreed that this common interest required agreement despite irreconcilable ideologies, incompatible values, and antithetic ways of organizing political power.

So what is new and hopeful is the dawning realization that national rivals can remain rivals and still agree on what is in the interest of both. Mutual suspicion and mistrust are certainly not dispelled, but they can be bypassed sometimes by the mutual perception of common advantage. The only agreements not threatened by bad faith are those that are built on mutual interest in keeping to the agreed rules.

Hopefully, we are learning that national rivals do not have to kiss and make up before they agree not to annihilate each other. International politics is not what the war gamblers call a “zero-sum game”: A foot gained by one does not necessarily mean a foot lost by the other.

Hopefully, the world is beginning to fumble its way toward a pragmatic approach to the dream of peace, toward a manageable, workable system of order based, as President Kennedy said at American University,² “not on sudden revolution in human nature but on gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned.”

¹ Address made before the Third National Conference on World Health at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 27 (press release 495).

² See p. 658.

³ BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

A "gradual evolution in human institutions" means, of course, improving and expanding and strengthening and using the international machinery of peace, which is the only substitute for the institutions of war.

Down through the ages the institution of war has been nourished by the talents of researchers, scientists, engineers, planners, administrators, and others from outside the ranks of professional soldiers—not to mention the vast sums of money that have been lavished on creating the most efficient possible instruments of war. If now, as President Eisenhower once said, there is no alternative to peace, then the institutions of peace need more professional attention at the practical level, more social engineers designing and tinkering with machinery for peacemaking, more sophisticated techniques for managing peaceful change. Those who care about an attainable peace will study the record and learn the lessons of U.N. peacekeeping; they will become expert in the techniques of peaceful change; they will work at the coldly practical tasks of devising machinery for factfinding, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, and conciliation.

Those of us who work at this trade are all too conscious of the paucity of our knowledge, the poverty of our experience, the crudeness of our present peacekeeping machinery. We have not devised adequate institutional responses to the proud and fearful triumph of a physical science which has given us the capacity to go on accumulating destructive power even beyond the point where further accretions of explosive power have any military value at all.

But at long last it has been agreed that there is, in fact, a common interest in putting a governor on the thermonuclear arms race; that there is, in fact, a common interest in not polluting the atmosphere; that there is, in fact, a common interest in having at hand a "hot line" between Moscow and Washington as a measure against miscalculation of the intentions of men controlling the use of atomic weapons.

So there is reason for cautious hope that the next area of common interest—and then the

next—will be identified; that the next agreement—and the next—can be reached; that the next step—and the next—can be taken toward arms control, disarmament, and a system of world order secured by international institutions.

Mastering the Human Environment

But it is not only newborn weapons that must be quickly wrapped in the swaddling clothes of social constraint and political responsibility. Whenever the scientists achieve a breakthrough in what can be done by man for man, it suddenly seems outrageous not to be channeling the new power that new knowledge confers on us.

Before we knew that mosquitoes carried malaria, before we knew how to commit mass murder among the mosquitoes, nobody thought about eradicating malaria from the face of the earth, because it couldn't be done. Now that we know it can be done, we are well on our way toward the doing of it—even if the task is somewhat longer, and the mosquitoes somewhat more resistant to our attempts to poison them, than the scientists thought when they proudly swept every anopheles mosquito from the island of Sardinia just after the Second World War.

Before there was radio, we did not need to have large international conferences to divide up the frequency spectrum; but the International Telecommunication Union now exists to do just that. And starting next week, a large crowd of technicians and administrators will gather in Geneva to do the job over again, to make sure that there is room in the spectrum for the restless scientists to experiment with communication in outer space.

Before there were airplanes flying across frontiers and oceans, we did not need an International Civil Aviation Organization. Today we have international agreements on aerial navigation because the alternative would be mayhem compounded.

The examples could be multiplied, but the point is clear: To extend the mastery of our environment—as well as mastery of our weaponry—is in the common interest.

It is not exactly a new thought.

We know that all ideologies are equally op-

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

posed to such common enemies as rinderpest, the tsetse fly, and winter wheat rust.

We have noted before that men of science can often communicate meaningfully, even if they need interpreters. Their vocabulary of science has its own peculiarities, its own myopias, its own oversimplifications. But when scientists talk across national frontiers, their conversation is mercifully free of the semantic distortions imposed by political ideology, economic dogma, and the conventional wisdom of crusty cultures.

It has long been clear that everybody gains and nobody loses if enough nations agree to stop polluting the seas with oil, if they investigate together the tropic mysteries of the Indian Ocean and the icebound conundrums of Antarctica, or if they pool their purses and their personnel to stamp out malaria and smallpox and typhus and yellow fever and the yaws.

But it is not yet a platitude to insist that common interest in mastering the human environment is a fact of great potential importance from a *political* point of view.

If we are, as the President has put it, to "make the world safe for diversity"⁵—if science and technology force us and beckon us to cooperate in mastery of the environment—is it too optimistic to project an Alliance for Man beyond ideology, beyond the poor quarrels of sovereign states? Is this not the challenge laid down to the administrators, the builders of human institutions, by what Robert Oppenheimer calls the "thundering impact of discovery upon society?"

We are much farther down this road already than most people realize—in our own international aid programs and in the United Nations Decade of Development. But clearly our institutional arrangements are much too primitive to cope with the inventions of scientists and the innovations of engineers—to cope with what we already know about medical care and health administration, about the production and marketing of food, about the baleful effects of industrial civilization, or about other things, including the investigation of outer space. Our problem, starting today and every day, is to identify the next steps, to negotiate the next agreement based on common interest, to build

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

the next institution to go with the latest discovery.

U.S.—U.S.S.R. Cooperative Projects in Space

In fact we spend quite a lot of our time doing just that—and not entirely without result.

It was less than 2 years ago that President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev first broached the potentially exciting subject of cooperation in outer space.⁶ There was receptivity on both sides. Technical negotiators were appointed. Practical, limited suggestions for cooperation were put on the table. A tentative agreement was reached and then made formal. Details were added by working parties. In August some cooperative projects with the Soviet Union were announced.⁷

We will coordinate launches of weather satellites and open a new full-time "hot line" to exchange meteorological data which will be available to all the weather services of the world. We will exchange data to develop the first map of the earth's magnetic field. We will conduct a joint experiment with a passive U.S. communication satellite.

You have to start somewhere; maybe it does not matter so much where you start. The negotiations so far have left the road open for next steps. Now President Kennedy has held out to the Soviet Union the prospect of sending the first visitor from our planet to the moon, not an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the "socialist camp" or the "capitalist camp" but as the first envoy of the human race.⁸

Sometimes, in my unscientific dreams, I wonder what the envoy of humanity would say if he met a being from another planet. Suppose the Martian or Venusian said, "Tell me, in a few words, what is the essence of what you on Earth have learned from your brief half-millennium years of living experience." Would our man try to explain to Mars and Venus the issues of the cold war? Or would he talk about how v

⁶ For an exchange of messages of Feb. 21, 1962, see *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1962, p. 411.

⁷ For background and text of a memorandum of understanding, see *ibid.*, Sept. 9, 1963, p. 404.

⁸ For an address by President Kennedy before the 18th General Assembly on Sept. 20, 1963, see *ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

have learned somehow to cooperate with each other in our diversity?

The main drama in the agreements which already have been reached is that they are agreements between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. But our joint experiment in collecting weather data is into the World Weather Watch projected by the World Meteorological Organization and will conform to standards established by agreement there. Our joint venture in satellite communications will, we hope, help make the case for the single global satellite telecommunications system wisely projected as American policy by Act of Congress last year. Our cooperation in mapping the magnetic field is part and parcel of an internationally sponsored World Magnetic Survey.

We cannot be sure what the next steps will be in outer space or whether they will be strides or half-steps. The essential thing is to maintain the momentum—and to opt always for the wider, not the narrower, forms of cooperation.

World Food Program

Meanwhile, people have to eat here on earth. We have, as you know, taken quite a lot of steps to do something about that. The first big ones were the establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organization 20 years ago and the launching of the Point 4 idea 6 years later. The latest step is a 3-year experiment by the FAO and the United Nations called the World Food Program, through which we are trying to learn how to use surplus food as an asset in the development process.⁹ We think it will work; if it does, we may be able to expand it.

But this is an area of immense paradox.

Worldwide food production has increased substantially over the past decade, but the average diet is worse because population has increased faster.

In most of the world, population seems to be pressing hard upon land resources, yet the most densely populated land in the world is a net exporter of food.

While the agricultural revolution, which permitted this nation to be the first to worry about overproduction, spreads through Europe, one-

⁹For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 150; Oct. 8, 1962, p. 534; and July 8, 1963, p. 58.

third of humanity remains undernourished.

And if we peer ahead for a decade or so we can perceive a nightmarish vision: half the world wondering what to do with food it cannot eat and the other half wondering how to get enough to do a day's work. We can see the present paradox of want in the midst of plenty becoming an intolerable absurdity.

But it does not help to complain about the irony of supply and demand. Our task is to probe for next steps. Can we do more about the nutritional gap for children between infancy and the school age? Can we do more to raise the world's catch of fish—which could be quadrupled or quintupled by full application of known techniques? Can't we do more about other food from the seas? Can we somehow speed up the adaptation of modern farm technology to other climates, other cultures? The search goes on for practical next steps.

Conserving Our Resources

To master the environment we need to do more than extract resources from it; we need to conserve them as well. What can the world's newly developing areas—those that are just discovering the merits and demerits of industrial growth—learn from the experience of yesterday's industrial revolutions? I suppose we Americans have been the most efficient plunderers of our planet. With a whole continent to work on, and an underpopulated one at that, we must have done a great many things right, but in the process there is surely nothing we have not done wrong—starved and eroded and cutover land in every part of the country bears witness. We have great experience with the more sordid byproducts of industrialization, not only slums and transport snarls and delinquency of all ages but the pollution of our air and the contamination of our water. And we have concocted in our laboratories lethal doses of poison which we still sell and spread and spray with the abandon of abundance.

Because we have so much experience in violating the principles of conservation, we ought to know more about what not to do than anybody else on earth. We are at least beginning to study these problems as matters of social science and not just questions of engineering.

We have managed, in a few fruitful areas of research, to find applications beyond epidemics for the analytical skills and administrative techniques of epidemiology.

Now that we have agreed not to blast radioactive dust into the atmosphere that belongs to us all, maybe we can also tackle the problems of pollution and contamination that are no farther away than the nearest stream, the blackest smokestack, and the exhaust pipe on your automobile and mine.

Since pollution is a problem that knows no national frontiers, perhaps we should develop in the United Nations system a comprehensive review of man's capacity to contaminate the only planet he has to live on. Building on the scattered work in every specialized agency, perhaps we can then develop an international program wide enough and large enough to contain the destructive potential of that two-edged sword called modern industry.

Opening Channels for Health Communications

Some of the greatest opportunities to be grasped—by those who would fashion practical institutions to use for man the wisdom of the sciences—lie in your own field. Medical men and health administrators have long been the earliest to translate scientific discovery into curative drugs and medical practice. In international health it is all too clear that we already possess far more knowledge than we are applying. Once again, the institution builders and the administrators had better hurry up.

I am aware that there is considerable discussion and debate among experts these days about how best to organize medical research. The no doubt efficient jargon of the medical sciences twists my tongue and dizzies my mind to the point where I would not dare to pass comment on the details of this debate. But what does come through to the layman's mind sounds awfully exciting—and suggests that international cooperation is going to be more and more necessary.

Take this matter of health communications which the President referred to in his U.N. address last week. I can understand the urgent need to get research knowledge out of the lab-

oratories and off the library shelves into the hands and minds and habits of those who need it and can use it. I am sure we are going to have some things to say on this subject at the next World Health Assembly, especially from the angle of putting research to work in the less developed parts of the world.

And I can understand the need to build on WHO's present system of epidemic alerts and to build up an "early warning system" to tell the world know when doctors in one country or laboratory find that a drug cripples more than it cures. I am sure we will be working to improve WHO's international reporting and information programs—already great achievements in international cooperation.

But what of health communications beyond these programs of the here and now? Reading the WHO literature on the subject, even the layman senses excitement, even if he falls short of understanding. It is clear that in medical science, as in other branches, the translation of problems into the language of mathematics—which is indeed an exercise in communications—promises to yield even more discoveries of importance in the future. The computer is an indispensable research tool into problems of population genetics and human reproduction—WHO's most recent research subject—mental health, environmental health, mutagens, and toxic agents. The layman comes to realize that "epidemiology" now means the mathematical study of problems which are much more than simply medical, which are indeed basic social problems of our times. Already we speak—at least in New York State—of an "epidemiological study of traffic accidents." Heaven knows we have them in epidemic proportions.

Only specialists can chart the best and most promising channels of international cooperation in this new and exciting frontier of health communications. But we can be sure that there will be new channels opened up, and of course we will look to WHO to lead the way.

Where the experts do agree is on the fact that medical science grew up very largely in the temperate zones and its development and application in the tropical and frigid zones has lagged behind. There is an institutional fallout from this agreement in the form of regional

research institutes like the Nutritional Institute of Central America and Panama in Guatemala City; the Pan American Aftosa Center in Rio de Janeiro; the Zoonoses Center in Buenos Aires; and the Cholera Research Laboratory in Dacca. Next year we will be talking with WHO about the need for additional institutions to work on other regional problems—like malaria in Central America, onchocerciasis (river blindness) in West Africa, and bilharziasis in the Middle East. These regional centers, in addition to research, could train researchers, physicians, and public-health workers, provide technical assistance, and conduct operational programs.

This is the day-to-day business of U.S. foreign policy these days: searching for next steps toward agreements based on common interest,

moving from the tentative to the firm engagement, widening the areas of agreement step by step, working at the gradual evolution of human institutions the better to manage the peace, the better to master the environment. This is why we who must come up with institutional responses to the technological imperatives of modern science are concerned about the state of our art—and why we are thoroughly fascinated with what it promises.

The growth of international institutions is one of the great phenomena of postwar history. But I suspect that we are just on the threshold of international agreement. I do not want to arouse the Daughters of Runnymede, but I have a sneaking suspicion that we are in grave danger of learning the habit of international cooperation.

The Citizen and Foreign Policy

by Mrs. Katie Louchheim

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹

It is good to escape from Washington. It is also good to discover how many of you are interested in foreign affairs.

We who operate on the "leading edge of events," as Secretary Rusk describes our predicament, must leave to the historians the writing of the answers. Meanwhile, we are writing the history from which the answers will be drawn, and with your help today, in your exchanges with our speakers, we should be able to develop the questions upon which these historical answers will have to be written.

We are enormously grateful to the World Affairs Council of Albany for their interest and for this gratifying turnout.

Working in Washington, where nearly everyone considers himself a Government VIP, except the media, who consider themselves VIP-makers, one develops a real hankering for an opportunity to talk to citizen VIP's like yourselves—"very informed persons." We know or are told what Washington is saying and thinking, and we are even plugged in on what the "grass roots" thinks and feels about the top issues of our time. But, with all due respect to the science of pulse-taking and prognostication, we have found there is no substitute for the direct personal confrontation.

We are here today as part of a public dialog that is underway between the American people and the American Government. This dialog has deep roots. The American Constitution provides that government derives its authority

¹ Address made at a World Affairs Conference at Albany, N.Y., on Sept. 30 (press release 497).

from "We the People." And in the 20th century we have learned, as a basic fact of political life, that the health of a democracy depends on the informed participation of its citizens.

We are very proud of the saying that goes, "A sound foreign policy depends upon an informed citizenry." We produce this maxim with appropriate chauvinistic gestures for the visitor from abroad. "This saying," we avow, "is not a cliché but a fact, a truth we live by."

Perhaps here the semanticist might interrupt to argue that this is more of a truth than a fact—a truth being what we believe in and preach, and a fact, what we practice. If I may, I should like to examine with you the case for and against the verisimilitude of this proposition that a sound foreign policy rests upon an informed citizenry, weighing this truth against the facts of the informed and the uninformed.

Let us examine the facts as they relate to the informed electorate and decide whether or not we are, each of us—we, the Government, and you, the informed citizen—doing all we can to bring about the desired objective; namely, a well-informed public.

Though sharply limited by availability of funds, we in the Department of State, for our part, do make an enthusiastic effort to expand its contacts with all citizens.

Last year our News Office put the Department on record in 282 daily news conferences and in answering an average 110 telephoned or personal inquiries a day from United States and foreign correspondents. Secretary Rusk and his principal associates took time to participate in 160 radio and television programs about our foreign affairs. Our Public Correspondence Division answered some 200,000 letters and telegrams from the general public. Thousands of community leaders, organization heads, editors and broadcasters, and other media representatives attended our three national foreign policy conferences in Washington and four regional conferences in different parts of the country. And these were only a few of our efforts to maintain contact with our fellow citizens outside the Federal Government.

Concurrently, a staggering volume of words, sounds, and pictures makes its way daily toward the American people. Some 1,700 news-

papers are published each day, another 8,000 each week. In addition, another 8,000 magazines and periodicals appear regularly. The number of radio stations on the air now stands at over 4,500. Over 600 television channels are currently broadcasting—and there are some 10 million television sets in the United States, substantially more than the number of bathtubs. To be immune to the effects of this vast outpouring an individual would have to be not only blind and deaf but determinedly antisocial.

The penetration by the several means of mass communication into what can be loosely described as the "public consciousness" is unprecedented. With public opinion survey techniques, it provides the technological underpinning for a modern rebirth of the ideal government described by Aristotle and Rousseau some 2,000 years apart. The best state, according to the two great thinkers, is that in which every citizen is both participant and spectator. On the basis of their own experiences, the one of the Greek polis, the other of the 18th-century Swiss citizen state, both philosophers believed that this ideal could only be achieved in quite small communities. It is the challenge of the mass media and mass communications that they can vastly extend the community in which individuals can observe and participate.

This is particularly true where foreign affairs and foreign policy are concerned, because in these areas it is the media rather than our own experience and hearsay which provide most of us with most or all of our information. In this connection, our problem is quite different from the one that challenged the Hollywood moguls conferring on the publicity buildup for a new movie of painfully little merit. One of them said: "I've placed full-page ads in all the dailies." Another chimed in: "We've got radio and TV spots lined up in every major market. A third said: "Billboards and movie theater are all covered." He paused, looked around at his associates, and said: "Now all we have to do is stop the word-of-mouth reaction."

At the Department of State, we are very much interested in encouraging word-of-mouth reaction—or, in other words, informed public discussion of our international problems. For when the people speak, the Government listens. Writing in 1922, the sagacious Walter Lipp-

mann referred to the "mystical force called public opinion" that takes up the slack in public institutions." In recent years "the mystical force of public opinion" has become less mystical and ever more forceful. When events occur thousands of miles away, when the policies that state our positions toward those events are as complex as they are remote, then the process of keeping the "informed electorate" informed becomes so stupendous and staggering that we must count on you, our interested and well-organized and well-informed friends, to share with us some of the responsibility for carrying this message.

Edward R. Murrow, Director of the United States Information Agency, observed not long ago that by far the greater proportion of information about America flowing to overseas audiences goes through private channels, of which one of the most important is the American tourist abroad. The USIA, Voice of America, Department of State, AID program, Defense Department, and other Government agencies together have a considerably smaller impact than the sum total of private actions.

We have seen this with special clarity in the case of civil rights. At our recent meeting in Boston, a representative of the NAACP inquired of a State Department speaker what the Government was going to do to change the image of the American Negro overseas. His answer was, "The image of the American Negro overseas can only be changed by the actions of the American people." What was perhaps not asked, but implied, was, how can we demonstrate that we are moving in the right direction despite the bombings in Birmingham? We can talk about the dignity of the great peaceful march on Washington, and we can know that this unforgettable event also made headlines around the world, especially in those new countries of Africa where the African Negro identifies with the American Negro.

We don't have to go to meetings to know that discrimination in the United States works against us abroad. When we talk with our ambassadors and their wives on home leave, we hear the NAACP question put somewhat differently: "How would you like to have to explain the disdain for law and order of those in

authority in some American communities to a West African—or an East African—or an Asian resisting the sophistry of his Communist neighbor?" In one instance recently we produced an answer of our own: A headline in an African paper had proclaimed that South African *apartheid* and American segregation were synonymous. Our ambassador started out to protest this libel when one of his senior officers, a Negro, insisted that he be the one to go to the newspaper to set the record straight.

What I am saying does not mean that discrimination is primarily a foreign policy problem; far from it. It is perhaps the number-one domestic problem facing us as a nation today. It would confront us with urgent decisions and calls to action even if our society were enclosed in a tight box impregnable to probing eye or eavesdrop. As the Secretary of State said in his testimony on the administration's civil rights bill:²

We must try to eliminate discrimination due to race, color, religion, not to make others think better of us but because it is incompatible with the great ideals to which our democratic society is dedicated. If the realities at home are all they should be, we shan't have to worry about our image abroad.

In short, we are committed to seeking equal opportunity for all Americans because—in the President's words—"it is right."³ As it happens, what is "right" is also right as far as the great majority of the world's peoples are concerned.

It is perhaps commonplace to suggest that the voice of the "aginer" is often the voice heard loudest in the land, just as it is bad news which makes headlines in our newspapers. Around the country the radical extremists are good copy, and yet I suspect their numbers are statistically insignificant. Our experience at the State Department is no different from that of any other public body in this respect: Most of the letters we receive are against something.

We would not silence the "aginer." Indeed, we point him out to our foreign visitors as a sign of our freedom to disagree. It is our goal instead to contribute all we can to the store of

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 29, 1963, p. 154.

³ Message from the President to the Congress relative to civil rights, Feb. 28, 1963, H. Doc. 75, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

public knowledge and understanding of our foreign affairs. For the better we Americans all understand our purposes as a nation, the less difficult our great tasks of building peace and progress will be.

Howard University To Conduct Foreign Affairs Scholars Program

The Ford Foundation announced on October 9 a grant of \$600,000 to Howard University in support of a program to prepare minority-group candidates for a career in foreign affairs. Following is the text of a statement by Secretary Rusk released by the Department of State on October 9 (press release 517).

I welcome the Ford Foundation's decision to support a new scholarship program designed to prepare minority-group students, especially those in Negro colleges, for careers in foreign affairs.

In the past 2 years the Department of State has made a determined effort to encourage Negroes and other minority-group citizens to apply for entry into the Foreign Service. We have done this because we consider it essential that opportunity be open to all Americans to participate in shaping and administering foreign policy. In addition, this largely untapped source of talent will help us to broaden the base of our representation.

Because of our concern about the small number of minority candidates entering the Foreign Service, officials of the Department have conducted a series of meetings over the past year with a group of leading Negro educators. The members of the group are: Professor Kenneth Clark, City College of New York; Presidents Rufus E. Clement, Atlanta University; Albert W. Dent, Dillard University; Jerome Holland, Hampton Institute; Martin Jenkins, Morgan State College; Benjamin Mays, Morehouse College; James M. Nabrit, Jr., Howard University; S. Milton Nabrit, Texas Southern University; Marvin Wachman, Lincoln University; Charles Wesley, Central State College [Ohio]; Stephen Wright, Fisk University; and Luther Foster, Tuskegee Institute.

Out of these discussions came the proposal for which the Ford Foundation has now granted funds. We are delighted at this decision, for which we thank President Heald and the trustees of the Foundation. We look forward to working with Howard University which has been selected to administer the Foreign Affairs Scholars Program.

In the years to come we hope that many young men and women who will benefit from this program will embark on careers in the State Department, USIA, AID, and other foreign affairs agencies. They will be welcome.

Advisory Commission To Survey Hawaii's East-West Center

The Department of State announced on October 9 (press release 515) that the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs has agreed to undertake a survey of the East-West Center established at the University of Hawaii in 1949 to strengthen mutual understanding among the peoples of Asia, the Pacific area, and the United States.

The nine-member Commission,¹ appointed by the President to evaluate and advise on the Government's educational and cultural programs, headed by John W. Gardner, president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The study will be conducted for the Commission by its vice chairman, Roy E. Larsen, chairman of the executive committee of Time, Inc., and chairman of the board of the Fund for the Advancement of Education of the Ford Foundation, assisted by James M. Davis, director of the International Center of the University of Michigan.

The East-West Center was established by Congress and receives Federal funds administered by the Department of State. Known formally as the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West, it is now in its third year of operation. Its three principal activities, engaging more than 500 students and scholars from the United States and 2

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 617.

ther countries, are: a student scholarship program, providing 2 years of study and travel, mainly for graduate students; a program of high-level research and writing for advanced scholars; and a program of on-the-job technical courses lasting from 1 week to 2 years.

Tariff Schedule on Importation of Butter Oil Amended

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS Proclamation No. 3178 of April 15, 1957,² issued pursuant to Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), established quota for imports of butter substitutes, including butter oil, containing 45 per centum or more of butterfat and classifiable under paragraph 709 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended;

WHEREAS at the time of the issuance of that proclamation butter oil was in fact being classified for purposes of tariff duty by the Bureau of Customs under paragraph 709;

WHEREAS, subsequent to the issuance of that proclamation, the United States Customs Court, in litigation involving the rate of duty applicable to butter oil and not involving the construction of that proclamation, held that butter oil was not properly classifiable for purposes of customs duty under paragraph 709 *Maehndrich et al. v. United States*, decided July 3, 1962, C.D. 2351, 97 Treas. Decs. (No. 28) 8);

WHEREAS the decision in that case has the effect of barring the importation of butter oil under the quota established by Proclamation No. 3178, and is contrary to the intent and purpose of that proclamation and Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act; and

WHEREAS the quota prescribed by Proclamation No. 3178 has been superseded by the quota prescribed in item No. 950.06, Part 3, Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and Statutes of the United States, particularly Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby proclaim that the article description for Item No. 950.06, Part 3, Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (published in Part II of the *Federal Register* of August 17, 1963, and promulgated by paragraph numbered 3 of Proclamation No. 3178 of August 21, 1963³) is hereby amended to read as follows:

¹ No. 3558; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 10853.


² For text, see *BULLETIN* of May 20, 1957, p. 817.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1963, p. 478.

"Butter substitutes containing over 45 percent of butterfat provided for in item 116.30, part 4B, schedule 1, and butter oil however provided for elsewhere in these schedules."

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fifth day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

Supplementary Items Added to Agenda of General Assembly

The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, has included the following items in the agenda of its 18th session:¹

83. Measures in connexion with the earthquake at Skoplje, Yugoslavia.²
84. Actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighbourly relations among European States having different social and political systems.³

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, effective September 29. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 486 dated September 23.)

¹ For the agenda adopted on Sept. 20, see *BULLETIN* of Oct. 7, 1963, p. 556.

² Adopted on Sept. 24 (U.N. doc A/5550/Add. 1).

³ Adopted on Oct. 2 (U.N. doc. A/5550/Add. 2).

United States and Spain Renew Defense Agreement

Press release 492 (revised) dated September 26

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Spanish Government and the United States Government have recently agreed to review relations between the two Governments and to reaffirm the spirit of friendship and cooperation that has characterized their relations over the past decade.

The Foreign Minister of Spain, Fernando María Castiella y Maiz, and the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, on behalf of their respective Governments, have agreed that the occasion of the renewal of the Defense Agreement¹ between the two Governments is a suitable time to issue a joint declaration regarding cooperation between Spain and the United States.

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State have also agreed to an exchange of notes establishing a bilateral Consultative Committee on Defense Matters, and have exchanged letters regarding future United States military assistance to Spain. The Secretary of State has separately indicated the intentions of the United States Government regarding loans to Spain through the Export-Import Bank.

The texts of the above documents, all signed and dated today [September 26], follow:

TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS

Joint Declaration

The Governments of Spain and of the United States of America have engaged in discussions regarding their mutual security interests and their future relations in political, military and

economic matters of common concern. In affirming the importance of their bilateral Defense Agreement, which will be applied in the new five year period of its validity in the spirit of this Declaration, they consider it to be necessary and appropriate that the Agreement form a part of the security arrangements for the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas.

The United States Government reaffirms its recognition of the importance of Spain to the security, well-being and development of the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. The two governments recognize that the security and integrity of both Spain and the United States are necessary for the common security. A threat to either country, and to the joint facilities that each provides for the common defense, would be a matter of common concern to both countries, and each country would take such action as it may consider appropriate within the framework of its constitutional processes.

The two governments, on behalf of the peoples of Spain and of the United States, have reaffirmed their friendship and mutual trust and their determination to establish a close cooperation in order to strengthen the common defense, and to continue regular consultations on all political, military and economic matters of common interest. The two governments have similarly affirmed their desire to encourage economic growth and the expansion of trade and other economic relations among nations. They have reaffirmed their recognition of the common dangers, and their determination to maintain a close working relationship on all matters affecting their common interests and security.

In order to assure continuing joint consultations on certain special matters of interest to

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 5, 1953, p. 436.

hem, the two governments have agreed upon the arrangements set forth in an exchange of notes of this date.

DEAN RUSK
*Secretary of State
of the United States
of America*

FERNANDO MARÍA CASTIELLA
*Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Spain*

Exchange of Notes on Consultative Committee

Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister Castiella

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to discussions which have recently taken place concerning the mutual desire of the Government of Spain and the Government of the United States of America to develop arrangements, within the limits of their respective constitutional processes, which would enable the two governments, through liaison and consultation on defense matters of mutual concern and in accordance with the spirit of the Joint Declaration of this date to carry out more effectively the specified purposes and objectives of the Defense Agreement of September 26, 1953, and its attendant technical and procedural agreements, and thereby improve and enhance their common defense; and to confirm the understandings reached as a result of these discussions, as follows:

1. There is hereby established a joint Spanish-United States Consultative Committee on Defense matters with headquarters in Madrid.

2. The Committee for the sessions cited in numbered paragraph 4 shall be composed of:

(a) For Spain:

- (1) Co-chairman of the Committee: (the designee of the Spanish Government)
- (2) Members: (the designees of the Spanish Government)

(b) For the United States:

- (1) Co-chairman of the Committee: the Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Group.
- (2) Members: The Commanding General 16th Air Force, the Commander U.S. Naval Activities in Spain, the Commander 65th Air Division, and the Deputy Chief, United States Military Assistance Advisory Group.

3. The Committee and members thereof shall be assisted by such staff, military or civilian, as they consider appropriate.

4. The Committee shall in principle meet at monthly intervals, to consider military matters of mutual concern, so as to develop and improve through continuing military cooperation the security and effectiveness of jointly utilized facilities in Spain. The United States

Ambassador to Spain, or his designee, may participate in its deliberations.

5. At the request of either Government special meetings of the Committee may be held from time to time in Madrid or in Washington which may be attended by Foreign or other Ministers, or other high officials, of either Government.

6. The Committee by agreement between the Co-chairmen shall decide on matters within its competence as defined in paragraph 4 above and, when necessary, will recommend to the respective Governments how best to resolve in the mutual interest of the two countries such problems as may arise in connection with the operation of the facilities in Spain provided under the terms of agreements between the two Governments, matters arising from the operation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, and such other matters as either Government may direct the Committee to consider.

7. All Committee deliberations shall be held in closed session and release of any public information shall be as mutually agreed by the Co-chairmen.

8. The Spanish Government shall provide suitable offices for the Committee. The Co-chairmen shall decide upon the necessary clerical and administrative support, the keeping of permanent records of the Committee, and the functioning of a joint military secretariat.

If the foregoing is acceptable to Your Excellency's Government, I have the honor to propose that this note and Your Excellency's reply indicating concurrence shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments on this matter.

Foreign Minister Castiella to Secretary Rusk

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of today's date which states:

[Text of preceding note from Secretary Rusk on a joint Spanish-United States Consultative Committee on Defense Matters.]

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the agreement of the Spanish Government with the above text.

I seize this opportunity, Mr. Secretary, to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration and personal friendship.

Exchange of Letters on Military Assistance

Foreign Minister Castiella to Secretary Rusk

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The importance of the renewal for five years of the Defense Agreement of September 26, 1953 between the Governments of the United States and Spain has been reaffirmed by the Joint Declaration of today's date. The Government of Spain wishes to express its satisfaction for the spirit of friendship and cooperation that has prevailed during the past ten years in the relationship between the armed forces of Spain and those of the United States

and trusts this same spirit will continue throughout the new period of validity of the Agreement.

The Spanish Government understands that the United States Government, subject to Congressional action, will provide support to Spanish defense efforts, at an appropriate level, by making available military assistance to the Spanish armed forces.

The Spanish Government trusts that the continuation of a close technical and scientific relationship between both countries would contribute to the achievement of a rapid and efficient modernization of the Spanish armed forces and military industries, all within the framework of Spain's economic and financial capabilities.

Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister Castiella

DEAR MR. MINISTER: The United States Government is pleased to acknowledge receipt of your letter of this date concerning the spirit of friendship and cooperation that has prevailed during the past ten years in the relationship between the armed forces of Spain and the United States. The United States Government appreciates the sentiments set forth in your letter and wishes to report, on its part, its complete satisfaction with the relationship.

In connection with the renewal for five years of the Defense Agreement of September 26, 1953, the United States Government confirms the understanding of the Spanish Government that, subject to Congressional action, the United States Government will provide support to the Spanish defense efforts, at an appropriate level, by making available military assistance to the Spanish armed forces. The United States Government also looks forward to the continuation, within the framework of this military assistance program, of a close technical and scientific relationship between both countries which would contribute to the achievement of a rapid and efficient modernization of the Spanish armed forces and military industries.

Letter Regarding Eximbank Loans

Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister Castiella

DEAR MR. MINISTER: I am informed by Mr. [Harold F.] Linder, the President of the Export-Import Bank, that he and his associates have from time to time held discussions with representatives of the Spanish Government regarding the economic development of Spain and its requirements for external capital resources in connection with its further development. As you know, over the past ten years more than \$200 million of loans have been authorized by the Bank to finance capital equipment, goods, and services which have contributed to Spanish economic growth.

In the course of these discussions the Bank indicated to Spanish representatives that its facilities will continue to be open to Spain, and that in addition to loan applications currently under active consideration it would be willing to receive new requests for loans to

finance equipment and services for projects in Spain. The Bank estimates that, based upon present applications before it and the new requests it would anticipate in due course, financing related to Spain will exceed \$100 million during the period of the next several years. Approval of all such loans would, of course, be subject to the normal procedures and requirements of the Bank.

Protocol Amending North Pacific Fur Seals Convention Signed

Press release 514 dated October 8

A protocol amending the 1957 Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals¹ was signed on October 8 at Washington by representatives of the four governments that are parties to the convention. Signing for the Government of the United States of America was U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Signing for the Governments of Canada, Japan, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were their ambassadors in Washington, Ambassador Charles S. A. Ritchie, Ryuji Takeuchi, and Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, respectively. By its terms the protocol will enter into force upon deposit of instruments of ratification by the four signatory governments.

The interim convention has been in force since October 14, 1957. Like the convention the protocol is designed to insure the maximum sustainable productivity of the fur seal resources of the North Pacific Ocean. The provisions of the protocol reflect the recommendations adopted by the North Pacific Fur Seal Commission on November 30, 1962.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Adopted at an air law conference convened by the International Civil Aviation Organization in Tokyo August 20 to September 16, 1963. Enters into force when 12 signatory states deposit their instruments of ratification.

Signatures: China, Congo (Brazzaville), Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Holy See, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Panama, Philippines, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, and Yugoslavia, September 14, 1963.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3948

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1963.
Ratifications deposited: Cuba, August 21, 1963; Federal Republic of Germany, August 13, 1963.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.

Signatures and acceptances: Algeria, September 26, 1963; Burundi and Congo (Léopoldville), September 28, 1963; Malagasy Republic, September 25, 1963; Mali, September 27, 1963; Rwanda, September 30, 1963; Uganda, September 27, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.

Signatures and acceptances: Malagasy Republic and Uganda, September 27, 1963.

Fur Seals

Protocol amending the interim convention of February 9, 1957 (TIAS 3948), on conservation of North Pacific fur seals. Done at Washington October 8, 1963. Enters into force on October 14, 1963, if the fourth instrument of ratification is deposited on or before that date; if the fourth instrument of ratification is deposited after October 14, 1963, on the date of its deposit.

Signatures: Canada, Japan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States, October 8, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.

Ratified by the President: October 7, 1963.

Signatures affixed at Washington: Haiti and Portugal, October 9, 1963.

Ratifications of original parties deposited: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 10, 1963, at Washington, London, and Moscow.

Entered into force: October 10, 1963.

Proclaimed by the President: October 10, 1963.

Ratification deposited: New Zealand, October 10, 1963.

Accession deposited: South Africa, October 10, 1963.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.

Accessions deposited: Jamaica, August 20, 1963; Trinidad and Tobago, February 21, 1963.

Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes and schedules and protocol of provisional application. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700.

Admitted as contracting parties (with rights and obligations dating from independence): Malagasy Republic, September 27, 1963; Mauritania, September 26, 1963; Senegal, September 24, 1963.

Declaration on provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960; for the United States April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.

Signature: Spain, August 29, 1963.

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration on provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, *supra*. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

Signatures: Cyprus, August 6, 1963; Kuwait, September 9, 1963; Spain, August 29, 1963.

Procès-verbal extending declaration of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498), on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 9, 1961. Entered into force for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4958.

Signatures: Chile, August 21, 1963; Cyprus, August 6, 1963; Tanganyika, July 30, 1963.

Procès-verbal extending period of validity of declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 18, 1960 (TIAS 5184). Done at Geneva November 7, 1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963. TIAS 5266.

Signatures: Cyprus, August 6, 1963; Israel, August 23, 1963; Japan, September 3, 1963; New Zealand, September 4, 1963; Peru, September 16, 1963; Rhodesia and Nyasaland, September 9, 1963; Tanganyika, July 30, 1963.

Declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force January 9, 1963; for the United States May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309.

Signatures: Chile, August 21, 1963; Cyprus, August 6, 1963; Greece, August 29, 1963; Haiti, September 11, 1963; Kuwait, September 9, 1963; Sweden and Tanganyika, September 2, 1963.

Protocol for accession of Spain to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 30, 1963.

Signatures: Belgium, September 9, 1963; France, September 4, 1963; India, September 13, 1963; Netherlands (ad referendum), September 4, 1963; South Africa and Uruguay, August 30, 1963.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement amending agreement relating to the establishment of a joint U.S.-Canadian committee on trade and economic affairs of November 12, 1953 (TIAS 2922), as amended, to include the Minister of Industry in the Canadian membership. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 17, 1963. Entered into force September 17, 1963.

Iceland

Agreement replacing Schedule II annexed to the reciprocal trade agreement of August 27, 1943 (57 Stat. 1075), with a Schedule II reflecting the nomenclature of the revised tariff schedules of the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik July 12 and 15, 1963. Entered into force July 15, 1963.

Jamaica

Agreement covering trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston October 1, 1963. Entered into force October 1, 1963.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 8, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5179). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 7, 1963. Entered into force October 7, 1963.

PUBLICATIONS

Department Publishes Foreign Relations Volume for 1943

Press release 510 dated October 4, for release October 12

The Department of State released on October 12 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume I, General*. This is the first volume to be issued in the regular *Foreign Relations* series for 1943, but a special volume has been published on the conferences at Cairo and Tehran¹ and another on relations with China in 1943.² Five other regular *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1943 are in preparation, as well as special volumes giving documentation on the conferences in 1943 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, at Casablanca, Washington, and Quebec.

In the present volume there is documentation on a considerable number of multilateral subjects relating to the war. The longest and perhaps the most important chapter is that dealing with the tripartite conference of foreign ministers in Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943, pp. 513–781. Among other topics treated are questions relating to trade, prisoners of war, refugees, war crimes, relief and rehabilitation, and planning for postwar organization and economic policies.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume I, General* (vi, 1,189 pp.; Department of State publication 7585) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$4.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Greece, relating to the agreements of July 2, 1948, as amended, and April 21 and 23, 1952. Exchange of notes—Signed at Athens April 19, 1963. Entered into force April 19, 1963. TIAS 5331. 3 pp. 5¢.

Technical Cooperation. Agreements with the Somali Republic, extending the agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961. Effected by exchange of letters—Signed at Mogadiscio December 28 and 31, 1962. Entered into force December 31, 1962. Exchange of letters—Signed at Mogadiscio June 15 and 17, 1962. Entered into force June 17, 1962. Exchange of letters—

¹ Department of State publication 7187.

² Department of State publication 6459.

Signed at Mogadiscio March 22 and 26, 1962. Entered into force March 26, 1962. TIAS 5332. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Brazil amending the agreement of March 15, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro October 4, 1962. Entered into force October 4, 1962. With minutes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro October 4, 1962. And minutes to the agreement of March 15, 1962—Signed at Brasilia March 15, 1962. TIAS 5333. 9 pp. 10¢.

Defense—Communications Facilities. Agreement with Belgium. Signed at Brussels April 19, 1963. Entered into force April 19, 1963. TIAS 5334. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Trade. Agreement with El Salvador. Signed at Washington May 7, 1963. Entered into force May 7, 1963. TIAS 5335. 4 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 7–13

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to October 7 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 492 of September 26; 495 of September 27; 497 of September 30; 498 of October 1; and 509 and 510 of October 4.

No.	Date	Subject
*511	10/7	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*512	10/8	Davis sworn in as Ambassador to Switzerland (biographic details).
†513	10/8	Duke: Publicity Club of Chicago (as-delivered text).
514	10/8	Signing of protocol amending North Pacific fur seals convention.
515	10/9	Survey of Hawaii East-West Center (rewrite).
*516	10/9	Death of Andrew B. Foster.
517	10/9	Rusk: Ford Foundation grant for Foreign Affairs Scholars Program at Howard University.
*518	10/9	Itinerary for visit of Irish Prime Minister.
519	10/10	Entry into force of limited test ban treaty.
520	10/10	Attorney General's letter to Secretary Rusk on wheat sales to U.S.S.R.
521	10/10	Amendment to delegation to U.S.-Japan cultural conference (rewrite).
*522	10/11	Cieplinski: Polish American Congress.
*523	10/11	Itinerary for visit of Yugoslav President.
524	10/11	Rusk: Hebrew Union College.
525	10/11	Mrs. Inness-Brown sworn in as special consultant, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (rewrite).
†526	10/12	Mrs. Louchheim: "The Citizen in a Changing World."

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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New Opportunities in the Search for Peace

An address made by President Kennedy before the 18th session of the United Nations General Assembly at New York, N.Y., on September 20, 1963, is contained in this 20-page booklet.

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Human Rights—Some Next Steps

This 22-page pamphlet contains an address made by Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, before the Rotary Club of Ypsilanti, Michigan, on August 5, 1963.

Also included are texts of the United Nations conventions on abolition of slavery, abolition of forced labor, and political rights of women, and President Kennedy's letter of July 22, 1963, transmitting the three conventions to the Senate "with a view to receiving advice and consent to ratification."

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1271



November 4, 1963

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Strength for Peace and Strength for War

Address by President Kennedy¹

In the year 1715 King George I of England donated a very valuable library to Cambridge University and, at very nearly the same time, had occasion to dispatch a regiment to Oxford. The King, remarked one famous wit, had judiciously observed the condition of both universities—one was a learned body in need of loyalty and the other was a loyal body in need of learning.

Today some observers may feel that very little has changed in two centuries. We are asking the Congress for funds to assist our college libraries including those in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and it was regrettably necessary on one occasion to send troops to Oxford, Mississippi, and more generally speaking, critiques of our modern universities have often accused them of producing either too little loyalty or too little learning. But I cannot agree with either

charge. I am convinced that our universities are an invaluable national asset which must be observed, conserved, and expanded.

I am deeply honored by the degree which you have awarded me today—and I think it is appropriate to speak at this university, noted for both loyalty and learning, on the need for a more exact understanding of the true correlation of force in the conduct of foreign affairs.

One year ago this coming week the United States and the world were gripped with the sober prospect of a military confrontation between the two great nuclear powers. The American people have good reason to recall with pride their conduct throughout that harrowing week. For they neither dissolved in panic nor rushed headlong into reckless belligerence. We were aware of the risks of resistance, they nevertheless refused to tolerate the Soviets' attempt to place nuclear weapons in this hemisphere but we recognized at the same time that our preparations for the use of force necessarily required a simultaneous search for fair and peaceful solutions.

¹ Made at the University of Maine, Orono, Maine, on Oct. 19 (White House press release; as-delivered text). President Kennedy was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1271 PUBLICATION 7614 NOVEMBER 4, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Different Interpretations of History

The extraordinary events of that week and the weeks that followed are now history—a story which is differently interpreted, differently recounted, and differently labeled among various observers and nations. Some call it as the West's greatest victory, others as a bitter defeat. Some mark it as a turning point in the cold war, others as proof of its permanence. Some attribute the Soviet withdrawal of missiles to our military actions alone, while some credit solely our use of negotiations. Some view the entire episode as an example of communist duplicity, while some others abroad have accepted the assertion that it indicated the Soviets' peaceful intentions.

While only the passage of time and events can reveal in full the true perspective of last October's drama, it is already clear that no single, simple view of this kind can be wholly accurate in this case. While both caution and common sense proscribe our boasting of it in the traditional terms of unconditional military victory, only the most zealous partisan can attempt to call it a defeat. While it is too late to say that nothing has changed in Soviet-American relations, it is too early to assume that the change is permanent. There are new rays of hope on the horizon, but we still live in the shadows of war.

Let us examine the events of 12 months ago, therefore—and the events of the past 12 months—and the events of the next 12 months—in the context of calm and caution. It is clear there will be further disagreement between ourselves and the Soviets as well as further commitments. There will be setbacks in our nation's endeavors on behalf of freedom as well as successes. For a pause in the cold war is not a lasting peace, and a *détente* does not equal disarmament. The United States must continue to seek a relaxation of tensions, but we have no cause to relax our vigilance.

A year ago it would have been easy to assume that all-out war was inevitable, that any agreement with the Soviets was impossible, and that an unlimited arms race was unavoidable. Today it is equally easy for some to assume that the cold war is over, that all outstanding issues between the Soviets and ourselves can be quickly and satisfactorily settled, and that we shall now

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have, in the words of the psalmist, an "abundance of peace so long as the moon endureth."

Slight Progress on a Long Journey

The fact of the matter is, of course, that neither view is correct. We have, it is true, made some progress on a long journey. We have achieved new opportunities which we cannot afford to waste. We have concluded with the Soviets a few limited, enforceable agreements or arrangements of mutual benefit to both sides and to the world.

But a change in the atmosphere and in emphasis is not a reversal of purpose. Mr. Khrushchev himself has said that there can be no coexistence in the field of ideology. In addition, there are still major areas of tension and conflict, from Berlin to Cuba to Southeast Asia. The United States and the Soviet Union still have wholly different concepts of the world, its freedom, its future. We still have wholly different views on the so-called wars of liberation and the use of subversion. And so long as these basic differences continue, they cannot and should not be concealed; they set limits to the possibilities of agreement; and they will give rise to further crises, large and small, in the months and years ahead, both in the areas of direct confrontation—Germany and the Caribbean—and in areas where events beyond our control could involve us both—areas such as Africa and Asia and the Middle East.

In times such as these, therefore, there is nothing inconsistent with signing an atmospheric nuclear test ban, on the one hand, and testing underground on the other; about being willing to sell to the Soviets our surplus wheat while refusing to sell strategic items; about probing their interest in a joint lunar landing while making a major effort to master this new environment; or about exploring the possibilities of disarmament while maintaining our stockpile of arms. For all of these moves, and all of these elements of American policy and Allied policy toward the Soviet Union, are directed at a single, comprehensive goal—namely, convincing the Soviet leaders that it is dangerous for them to engage in direct or indirect aggression, futile for them to attempt to impose their will and their system on other unwilling

people, and beneficial to them, as well as to the world, to join in the achievement of a genuine and enforceable peace.

Every Responsible Effort To Improve Relations

While the road to that peace is long and hard and full of traps and pitfalls, that is no reason not to take each step that we can safely take. It is in our national self-interest to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere so that all of our citizens can breathe more easily. It is in our national interest to sell surplus wheat in storage to feed Russians and Eastern Europeans who are willing to divert large portions of their limited foreign exchange reserves away from the implements of war. It is in our national self-interest to keep weapons of mass destruction out of outer space, to maintain an emergency communications link with Moscow, and to substitute joint and peaceful exploration in the Antarctic and outer space for cold-war exploitation.

No one of these small advances, nor all of them taken together, can be interpreted as meaning that the Soviets are abandoning their basic aims and ambitions. Nor should any future, less friendly Soviet action—whether it is a stoppage on the autobahn, or a veto in the U.N., or a spy in our midst, or new trouble elsewhere—cause us to regret the steps we have taken. Even if those steps themselves should be undone—by the violation or renunciation of the test ban treaty, for example, or by a decision to decline American wheat—there would still be no reason to regret the fact that this nation has made every responsible effort to improve relations.

For without our making such an effort, we could not maintain the leadership and respect of the free world. Without our making such an effort, we could not convince our adversaries that war was not in their interest. And without our making such an effort, we could never, in case of war, satisfy our own hearts and minds that we had done all that could be done to avoid the holocaust of endless death and destruction.

Historians report that in 1914, with most of the world already plunged in war, Prince Bülow, the former German Chancellor, said to the then Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg: "How did it all happen?" And Bethmann-Hollweg

replied: "Ah, if only one knew." My Americans, if this planet is ever ravaged by nuclear war, if 300 million Americans, Russians, and Europeans are wiped out by a 60-minute nuclear exchange, if the pitiable survivors of that devastation can then endure the elements of fire, poison, chaos, and catastrophe, I do want one of those survivors to ask me, "How did it all happen?" and to receive the credible reply, "Ah, if only one knew."

Readiness for Peace as Well as War

Therefore, while maintaining our readiness for war, let us exhaust every avenue for peace. Let us always make clear both our willingness to talk, if talk will help, and our readiness to fight, if fight we must. Let us resolve to be the masters, not the victims, of our history, not treading our own destiny without giving voice to our blind suspicion and emotion. Let us distinguish between our hopes and our illusions, and let us hope for steady progress toward peace, not critically dangerous relations with the Soviets but never laboring under any illusions of Communist methods or Communist goals.

Let us recognize both the gains we have made down the road to peace and the great distance yet to be covered. Let us not waste the present pause by either a needless renewal of tension or a needless relaxation of vigilance. And let us recognize that we have made these gains only by achieving this pause by the firmness we displayed a year ago as well as our restraint in our efforts for defense as well as our effort for peace.

In short, when we think of peace in our country, let us think of both our capacity to deter aggression and our goal of true disarmament. Let us think of both the strength of our Western alliances and the areas of East-West cooperation.

For the American eagle on the Presidential seal holds in his talons both the olive branch of peace and the arrows of military might. On the ceiling in the Presidential office, constructed many years ago, that eagle is facing the altar of war on its left. But on the newer carpet on the floor, reflecting a change initiated by President Roosevelt and implemented by President Truman immediately after the war, that

now facing the olive branch of peace. And it is in that spirit—the spirit of both preparedness and peace—that this nation is stronger than ever before—strengthened by both the increased power of our defenses and our increased efforts for peace, strengthened by both our resolve to resist coercion and our constant search for solutions. And it is in this spirit that I assure you that the American eagle still faces toward the olive branch of peace. In the months and years ahead, we intend to build both kinds of strength—during times of *détente* as well as tension, during periods of conflict as well as cooperation—until the world we pass on to our children is truly safe for diversity and freedom and the rule of law covers all.

President and Secretary Rusk Pay Tribute to Chancellor Adenauer

Following are the texts of letters from President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk to Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release dated October 14

OCTOBER 10, 1963.

DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR: On the occasion of your retirement from the Chancellorship after many years of extraordinary service, I want to take this opportunity to salute once again your contribution to Germany and the cause of freedom.

You assumed the burdens of office at a most difficult and painful moment in the history of the German people—after long, hard years of dictatorship and devastating war. And to your people you have given, by your wise and responsible leadership, a sense of national identity, purpose and pride.

Western Europe, prior to your service as Chancellor, was still obsessed by bitter and traditional rivalries, hatreds and fears. Today movement toward Western European unity and Atlantic Partnership, to which you have

been a prime contributor, has replaced disorder and dissension with cooperation and reconciliation, and has banished for the first time in history the threat of another war between any of the Atlantic allies. The relations between my country and yours have never been closer—and the bonds which you have so greatly helped to forge will endure.

Germany today is respected by all free nations as a champion of peace and freedom—for you have created in your own land a stable, free and democratic society which stands in sharp contrast to the repression still enforced on so many of your countrymen. To them you have given both help and hope, rightly refusing to accept as permanent the unnatural division of your nation, capital and people.

For these reasons and many more, Mr. Chancellor, your place in history is assured and your mark on history is indelible. The peaceful and democratic transfer of power over which you now preside is symbolic of the changes you have inspired; and I know I speak on behalf of all Americans in paying tribute to your magnificent record of achievements in the past and in wishing you every happiness and success in the future.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

LETTER FROM SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 533 dated October 16

OCTOBER 15, 1963.

DEAR CHANCELLOR ADENAUER: My colleagues in the Department of State join me in sending you our best wishes on your retirement. Your courage, integrity and leadership have placed you among the great leaders of the free world. You have led your nation to new and higher paths. Having come to your great responsibilities at a unique time in history, you have met the great test which confronted you.

Whenever the honored name of the Federal Republic of Germany is seen with those of the partners of the Atlantic alliance and the world's leading free and democratic nations, we will also think of Konrad Adenauer.

Sincerely,

DEAN RUSK

U.S. Policy Regarding Military Governments in Latin America

by Edwin M. Martin

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

By tradition and conviction as well as a matter of policy, the United States opposes the overthrow of constitutional and popular democratic governments anywhere.

This is especially true in Latin America, with whose people we have such close historical ties and whose aspirations for political and economic freedom we support wholeheartedly. Moreover, under the Charter of Punta del Este the people of the Western Hemisphere have bound themselves in a joint effort for political and socio-economic development—the Alliance for Progress—within a framework of free and democratic institutions.

The deviations from these principles which we have observed in the two years since Punta del Este have caused some to question the validity of the principles of the charter and some impatient cynics to ignore the progress which has been made.

Both the impatient idealists and the defeatist cynics ignore the realities of rising nationalism; the anxieties caused by social revolution; the challenge posed by the Alliance for Progress to old value systems; the threat to the established order brought on by the new; and finally the strain which rapid social and economic change places on fragile political institutions.

In short, there is a temptation to measure current events not against historical reality and substantive progress, but against somewhat theoretical notions of the manner in which men should and do operate in a complex world.

¹ Statement written by Mr. Martin especially for the New York Herald Tribune and published in the Herald Tribune of Oct. 6.

We all have respect for motherhood and abhor sin. We may observe, however, that where motherhood has prospered, so has sin. In an increasingly nationalistic world of sovereign states, a U.S. frown doesn't deter others from committing what we consider to be political sin. And as we are pretty nationalistic ourselves and rightfully proud of our great successes, we sometimes find this fact frustrating.

Our task has only begun when we have stated our position. The real issue is how, under the conditions of the present-day world, we can assist the peoples of other sovereign nations to develop stable political institutions and help them strengthen their beliefs in these institutions so as to make them effective against brute force.

In Latin America there are very few who would argue as a matter of principle for violent overthrow of constitutional regimes. Most of those who support or accept coups d'état would simply maintain that their particular case was surrounded by unique circumstances. This is the "yes, but" argument.

Genuine concern with an overturn of the established order, fear of left-wing extremism, frustration with incompetence in an era of great and rising expectations, and a sheer desire for power are all formidable obstacles to stable, constitutional government—especially in countries where the traditional method of transferring political power has been by revolution or coup d'état. In most of Latin America there is so little experience with the benefits of political legitimacy that there is an insufficient body of opinion, civil or military, which has any reason to know its value and hence defend it.

No two countries are alike, but in general we feel that in order to enlarge their experience of legitimacy, and thus their respect for it, we must strengthen in each society the power of the educated middle class with a stake in the country, and hence in peace and order and democracy for all the people. This is in fact what the Alliance for Progress is all about—it is as much socio-political revolution as it is an economic one.

The Role of the Military and the Civilian

As societies come to have more respect for constitutional civilian governments with wide popular support, these governments will no longer be easy targets for military coups. But to tip the balance even more in favor of established civilian governments, we also must assist the military to assume the more constructive peacetime role of maintaining internal security and working on civic action programs. The latter are especially valuable in identifying them with the problems and goals of the civilian population.

Even in the United States we argue about the areas of national policy in which the military have a rightful voice. In Latin America we cannot aim to reduce them to impotence in the national life—rather it is a problem of acceptance of a mission in support of legitimate governments against subversion from extremists of both right and left, whose threat of force must be met by force. There must be military participation in the formulation of some national policies; they cannot be excluded altogether.

I should not wish this emphasis on the need for the military to acquire a new and somewhat more limited role in political life to be read as a downgrading of the real contribution they have made to political freedom and stability in many countries. Peron in Argentina, Perez Cardenas in Venezuela, and Rojas Pinilla in Colombia were all military dictators who were brought down with the help of their own military in the 1950's. And the two worst dictators today in Latin America, it should be noted, are not military men and were able to consolidate their power only by reducing the regular military forces to impotence.

Nor are the military universal supporters of those who oppose change as represented by the programs of the Alliance. Governments controlled by the military have overseen the election to power this year in Argentina and Peru of two of the most progressive regimes either country has ever had. This year in Ecuador and Guatemala military regimes have announced reform programs of substantial importance.

Nevertheless, the fundamental facts remain—military coups thwart the will of the people, destroy political stability and the growth of the tradition of respect for democratic constitutions, and nurture Communist opposition to their tyranny. Moreover, the military often show little capacity for effective government, which is a political rather than military job.

What the United States Can Do

Apart from our and the Alliance's vigorous long-term efforts to eliminate the political vacuums on the civilian side which invite military action, as well as our efforts to train the military in their most valuable role, what can the United States do in the case of specific threats or coups which nevertheless come?

Unless there is intervention from outside the hemisphere by the international Communist conspiracy, the use of military force involving the probability of U.S. soldiers killing the citizens of another country is not to be ordered lightly.

Nor can we, as a practical matter, create effective democracy by keeping a man in office through use of economic pressure or even military force when his own people are not willing to fight to defend him. A democracy dependent on outside physical support of this kind is a hollow shell which has no future. The people had better start over again. Moreover, once outside military support is used it may prove hard to withdraw. We have seen in this century—in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua—how politically unproductive military occupations are, even when carried out with the best of intentions.

We must use our leverage to keep these new regimes as liberal and considerate of the welfare of the people as possible. In addition, we

must support and strengthen the civilian components against military influences and press for new elections as soon as possible so that these countries once again may experience the benefits of democratic legitimacy. Depending upon the circumstances, our leverage is sometimes great, sometimes small.

One should not underestimate what has been accomplished by the U.S. and Alliance policies I have described. They are accomplishments that have truly enhanced the long-term prospects of the Alliance.

In Argentina the military walked up the hill a number of times to look at the green pastures of full military control and the power and perquisites that would go with it. Each time a combination of wiser heads in the military, along with more and more confident civilian leaders who were strongly buttressed by U.S. diplomatic support and aid programs, turned them back. The elections were held on schedule.

In Peru the 1-year rule of the junta was about the most respectful of civil liberties, most progressive in its policies, and quickest to give up its power peacefully in the history of Latin American military regimes. Here again the strong stand taken by the United States prior to recognition helped to secure public commitments, and followthrough, from the junta to pursue liberal policies—liberal, of course, only for a military dictatorship.

A similar story can be told of the Ecuadoran junta, which is governing through an able and representative civilian cabinet and generally without repression of civil liberties.

In every case mentioned there has been a novel and notable absence of reprisals against the leaders of the ousted regimes. The firing squads or prison guards, so characteristic of earlier political upheavals in Latin America, have been eschewed. This restraint can be credited to the progress Latin America has been making under the Alliance and to U.S. influences, brought to bear through all the means open to us, to produce moderation and a prompt return to constitutional and democratic regimes.

I fear there are some who will accuse me of having written an apologia for coups. I have not. They are to be fought with all the means

we have available. Rather I would protest that I am urging the rejection of the thesis of the French philosophers that democracy can be legislated—established by constitutional fiat.

I am insisting on the Anglo-Saxon notion that democracy is a living thing which must have time and soil and sunlight in which to grow. We must do all we can to create these favorable conditions, and we can do and have done much.

But we cannot simply create the plant and give it to them; it must spring from seed planted in indigenous soil.

Protocol and the Conduct of Foreign Affairs

*by Angier Biddle Duke
Chief of Protocol*¹

For the past 33 months I have been planning, programming, and managing the meetings between the President of the United States and nearly 80 world leaders: emperors, presidents, kings, and prime ministers. Sitting in on these meetings and the association with the participants has probably been the most illuminating experience of my life. It has given me an unequaled vista on the conduct of foreign affairs at the highest level.

As my office thinks through the objectives of each such visit months in advance, as we guide chiefs of state through their press relations, as we arrange every facet of their movements in this country, as we coordinate the silent but remarkable problems of security, what a blow it is to find in the papers here and around the country that the Chief of Protocol is the State Department's version of Emily Post!

By way of underlining just how unique these experiences can be, let me point out that on several occasions in the past 3 years the only other person present during the talks between

¹ Address made before the Publicity Club of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., on Oct. 9 (press release 513 dated Oct. 8; as-delivered text).

the President and the visiting decisionmaker has been the protocol chief. Relationships with the President's guest are also often unique. They are always rewarding or at least revealing in one way or another, and they are, by the nature of the assignment, close.

Let me illustrate. Last week I had the responsibility of picking up the Emperor of Ethiopia in Addis Ababa and bringing him and his delegation to Washington.² On the way, he asked me to land our Air Force plane in Khartoum so that he could meet briefly with the President of the Sudan. Emperor Haile Selassie descended the steps at the airport where he was met by President Abboud, who turned on seeing me and exclaimed: "Why, it's Ambassador Duke. If I had known you were coming I would have brought you a present!" My sole relationship with the Sudanese Chief of State had been during his official visit to Washington over 2 full years ago. I must add that he sent on board the plane as we left two small elephants carved in wood. That little episode did not hurt my standing with Haile Selassie at the outset of his visit, I can assure you.

But let me go back to my point concerning value, the benefits, to the American people of these visits to our shores of official guests. As a "traffic manager" for this kind of diplomacy, I have been able to observe suspicions dissolve, fears dispelled, friends reassured, opponents disarmed or even persuaded. This policy of top-level confrontation is a success. I wish it could be a specifically demonstrable one, but I know that history will so record it. All of us know the value, the worth, of personal communication in our own lives. You who deal with the communication of ideas understand that at least as important as the idea is the man expressing it.

In this world of many revolutions the revolution of rising mobility, as Secretary [of Commerce Luther H.] Hodges calls it, has enabled many men to confer with one another at key moments. The prestige of the United States and its Government has had the effect of polar-

izing the leadership of well over half the nations of the world in the form of visits to Washington in less than 3 years. In fact it has been half seriously observed that to prove true sovereignty a new nation's leader must run up the new flag, take the oath of office, and visit with President Kennedy.

Conversely, let's look at the opposition. Chairman Khrushchev obviously understands the usefulness of making as well as receiving visits, as evidenced by the many visits he has made and the many chiefs of state he has invited to Moscow. Apropos of his Russian trip, the King of Afghanistan told me of one curious aftereffect of a visit to his own country. He was out shooting with Khrushchev in the Crimea and successfully felled a deer at very long range. The Communist leader admiringly asked to see the King's gun, and there on the wooden stock was emblazoned the gold Presidential seal and a dated plaque marking the gift as a memento of the visit to Afghanistan of President Eisenhower.

Traditional Form of State Visits

I have studied the form of state visits to the Soviet Union, and I know the care, the courtesy, and the thought devoted to them. The Russians have one important variation which may be worth noting. The state guest is met in Moscow, where he remains a day or two for the negotiating sessions, and then usually takes a tour of a week or so around the U.S.S.R. Before departure he returns to the capital for a final session, and he returns home with the words of Khrushchev's farewell as his last memory of the Soviet Union.

Here the Washington portion of the visit and the meetings with the President come first, and the swing around the country is climaxed by a stay in New York and an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations when in session.

We have given some thought to reversing that order, but it takes a long time to make changes. Part of the difficulty is that each head of state, as represented by his ambassador here, virtually insists on the same level and type of treatment as his predecessors. I will give you an exam-

²BULLETIN of Oct. 28, 1963, p. 674.

ple. For over a year my office had been working on the elimination of the need for airport arrival ceremonies. The air traffic noises and the wasteful time consumed going back and forth impelled us to the idea of a helicopter arrival on the White House lawn. Such a ceremony would be more beautiful and impressive and most convenient for the President.

We worked out the details, received final approval, but no guest was willing to accept the new plan. I thought I had a customer in the President of one small but most friendly land, and I carefully outlined to his ambassador the advantages of having the visit long remembered for inaugurating a new tradition. "No, my friend," he replied, "I must refuse to permit my country to go down in history as the first to be downgraded in not having your President come to the airport."

No amount of explaining that the airport was in Maryland and that this would be the initial point of arrival in Washington could move him, and I never succeeded in changing until a curious event occurred. A new nation suddenly became independent, and its head was invited to Washington for a 1-day visit. There had not yet been time to appoint an ambassador here; therefore, I made the arrangements unilaterally. It was a beautiful fall day on the south lawn; the magnificent honor guard of troops in dress uniform, the flags of the 50 States, the red carpet stretching across the grass to a raised platform, all fused in a setting fit to shake the resolve of the most hardened traditionalist. The watchful diplomatic corps observed for the first time a successful, splendid ceremony. From that moment on we have never looked back, and President Kennedy never returned to the airport.

Not everything has been so successful. After a year or so in office a widely circulated weekly magazine did a cover story on my views of the 10 most recommended places in the United States for Presidential guests. I had cooperated most enthusiastically, naming, as I recall, Williamsburg, Los Angeles, TVA, Seattle, Colorado Springs, Boston, Charleston, West Point, Washington, and Detroit. It was a disaster. The magazine claimed a circulation of 26 million, and it seemed to me that virtually

a million angry letters, telegrams, and messages poured in on the State Department for months. I had to explain to the Mayor of Chicago that his great city needed no recommendation from me; guests insisted on coming here at their own request. I was threatened by Congressmen; at least one Governor complained directly to the White House, and I don't think enough water has flowed under the bridge to make it safe for me to go back to New Orleans.

Governors' Advisory Committees

But out of this calamity came the idea of establishing a nationwide network of Governor advisory committees, which would be in a position to advise traveling diplomats and state men through the office of the Chief of Protocol of the assets available in each of their States. The plan had the additional virtue of putting us in direct contact with almost every Governor's office, and this has been most useful in many cases involving distinguished guests in unpleasant but very real incidents of racial discrimination.

Traditionally protocol has been the apology making agency of the State Department in such matters, but since 1961 we have made it a policy to plan trips around the country so as to avoid incidents if at all possible. The Governors' offices have cooperated to such an extent that with proper preparation, a diplomat can now travel without fear in all but a few States. The day may someday come when leaders from any part of the world can travel in safety anywhere in this country. Just about half of our Washington diplomatic corps, from 110 nations come from Africa and Asia, and you can well understand the effect on them and their policies toward us of living under the menace of insulting incidents. Even in our nation's Capital today it is not safe for some diplomats to go out and look for an apartment without first requesting the assistance of my office.

I should point out as well that the face of the State Department is so often the one presented by the Protocol Office, and that face must be representative. Consequently we have among our top officers members of many racial and religious groups from all over the country. Simi-

arly, on White House and State Department guest lists for which we are responsible, every element of the American community is constantly and methodically sought out.

The President's Guest House

We are responsible as well for the administration and maintenance of Blair House, the President's guest house. My wife has taken a working interest in this historic home, which is undergoing a physical underpinning and a gradual restoration.

Located on Pennsylvania Avenue, diagonally across from the White House, this distinguished residence dates back to 1824. It was built for the Surgeon General of the Army and subsequently sold to Dr. Blair, who was a journalist. It was here that Robert E. Lee was offered command of the Union forces at the outbreak of the Civil War. President Truman lived and worked in Blair House for over 4 years during the reconstruction of the White House, and from an upstairs window he looked down on the shooting of White House guard Leslie Coffelt, who died protecting his chief from Puerto Rican nationalists bent on entering the house to assassinate him. The residence was closed down this summer to install air conditioning, fireproof wiring system, new kitchen, additional bathrooms, and structural strengthening. From that point on a newly formed Blair House Fine Arts Committee under the honorary chairmanship of Mrs. Kennedy takes over to supervise the furnishing of the interior in a manner worthy of its past. Their mission is to solicit contributions of specific objects such as Georgian paneled dining room donated by Congressman [Peter] Frelinghuysen of New Jersey and his family. Cabinet wives have become interested, and each one has a project in the house. One of the most interesting to me is Mrs. [Stewart L.] Udall's work in the library. She is collecting works of United States authors in multiple copies, with the idea of encouraging visiting world leaders to take the books back home with them—spreading the word, so to speak.

Another way of telling the American story is through films. The Protocol Office cooperates

with USIA [U.S. Information Agency] in its task of making films for overseas in such specific ways as including program suggestions which would provide important visual background. During President Tito's visit, at Ed Murrow's suggestion, we plan to include a housing development on his itinerary so that Yugoslavs will later be able to see the American style in such things through the eyes of the visitor. A film, usually in color, is made on every state visit, and they have a guaranteed distribution in the guest's country. In Khartoum I was told that the Arabic version of President Abboud's visit 2 years ago was still being shown from time to time in the Sudan.

I won't bore you with all our other activities, but just let me mention that we are responsible for the accreditation of all ambassadors and consuls in the United States, for the exercise of their privileges and immunities, particularly regarding such legal matters as entry through customs, tax exemptions, and the like. We are also deeply interested and concerned with the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral consular conventions, some of which are presently before the Senate for ratification. When international conventions are held on any of the above-mentioned matters, such as the 1961 Conference on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Congress on Consular Relations, both held in Vienna, we are there at work.

It might interest you to know that for the first time I have a permanent public affairs officer attached to my staff. David Waters' primary job is to work with the foreign and American correspondents traveling with the President's guests to assure them of adequate coverage and facilities. Next week, here in Chicago, Dave and I will be back again with the Prime Minister of Ireland [Sean F. Lemass], who is repaying the Irish visit of President Kennedy last June.

I don't know whether all this is the kind of thing State Department protocol is associated with in your mind. I hope it is, but I doubt it.

When I first reported for indoctrination after Christmas in 1960, my predecessor told me that the two least valued posts in Government were his and the Vice Presidency, and I would be inclined to consider his observation still valid.

But in my mind the worst thing about the post is its name. Can it ever convey a sense of usefulness, of efficiency, of a purposeful, democratic attitude? We have tried to think up new titles for the job, but I can report resignation on that front as well. This post will probably just have to speak for itself in the future as it does today. If the compensations do not lie in public estimation, then I can assure you that they do in the content of the assignment and the day-to-day work in and around the very core of this country's power structure.

It has often been said of late that we are changing protocol faster than at any other previous time. That is in many ways a grati-

fying comment and essentially true, but at the same time we are pledged to retaining the enduring values of the great traditions of a democratic society.

It might interest you in this respect to hear a letter written to President George Washington on January 24, 1790, by Gouverneur Morris of New York. The passage reads: "I think of very great importance to fix the taste of the country properly, and I think your example will go far in that respect. It is therefore my wish that everything about you should be substantially good and majestically plain; made to endure." In this spirit and on these foundations we make our changes.

The Citizen in a Changing World

by Mrs. Katie Louchheim

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

My subject, which is the changing world in which we live, seems especially appropriate today. On this day 471 years ago, I need hardly remind you, an Italian navigator, with Spanish ships and a Spanish crew, landed on an island in the Western Hemisphere. If it had not been for Columbus' persistence and daring, we might not be here. And I like to remember that if it had not been for the faith and support of a woman—Spain's Queen Isabella—Columbus might never have left Spain.

Columbus' voyage changed the world of his day. It began the great era of discovery. It opened islands and continents previously unknown, or hardly known, to colonization by Europeans. Now we are witnessing the dawn of a new age of national independence for the former colonial peoples.

There are few colonies left today, and those

few will inevitably achieve their independence in a matter of years. Since 1943, fifty new nations have come into being. The United Nations at its birth in 1945 had 51 members. Now there are 111. Before the end of 1963, a 112th, Kenya in East Africa, will join the ranks. The map of our world has been changing so fast that last month's atlas is out of date.

But changes are taking place which are even more fundamental. Side by side with this political revolution, an economic and social revolution is under way—what is often called "revolution of rising expectations." Along with freedom from foreign control, the impoverished masses of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, too, are beginning to demand freedom from want, hunger, and disease—those freedoms for which we fought the great war of the 1940's. People long landless, ill-housed, ill-clothed, and uneducated are demanding a share in the better life which a new technology makes possible. People silent for centuries are making their

¹ Address made before the Catholic Daughters of America at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 12 (press release 526).

lives heard. The immediate effect of their awakening is upheaval—sometimes violent upheaval, as the old social and economic order resists the new.

Change is not confined to the newly developing nations. It is global. In the 18 years since the end of World War II we have seen the world's population increase by 50 percent and our own country's population by more than a third. We are living through a scientific and technological revolution with staggering implications. We have built machines that can outcalculate mathematicians and machines that can run a factory without human hands. With no regions left to explore on this planet, we are exploring the great empty spaces around it and expect soon to explore the moon.

If we have trouble adjusting to the accelerated pace of the past few years, think how difficult it must be for a pastoral society like the ancient empire of Ethiopia, whose gallant 72-year-old monarch visited Washington last week.² Emperor Haile Selassie presides over a proud, remote, mountainous realm which, outside of its capital city, has scarcely changed since the days of the fabled Prester John. To catch up with the modern world, it will have to leap over five or six centuries. This may be an extreme example, for fiercely independent Ethiopia was tactically cut off from the tides of Western history until Mussolini conquered it in 1936. But other nations of Africa and Asia will have to make changes nearly as radical if their people are to share in the fruits of development, and their leaders are determined to make the giant leap. Their determination was illustrated last week by Emperor Haile Selassie's lively and serious-minded granddaughter, Princess Ruth, who spent her time in Washington exploring adult education and literacy-teaching methods to apply in the mass program she directs at home.

Princesses may be a diminishing breed, but those who are left are adapting themselves to the demands of a new world. Another example is Princess Ashraf, sister of the Shah of Iran, an ardent supporter of women's rights and an untiring worker for their emancipation. A striking change, among those taking place

in our time, is thus the changing status of women. This century has been called by many names—for example, "the century of the common man"—but it could as well be called the century of the woman, common or uncommon. The emergence of women to play an important part in professional, public, and political life has occurred within the past 60 years.

It is true that there have been outstanding women in every century and in many lands. But in most countries they were exceptions to the general rule, even in nations which claimed to be socially advanced. It is also true that in many countries women exercised a powerful influence behind the scenes, or even behind the throne, and that in parts of Asia and Africa they have long controlled important sectors of the economy. Nonetheless, the emergence of women into the public light of day in the past two or three generations has been impressive.

Sometimes we in the West have to remind ourselves how recent this change is. In the United States, for instance, we now take for granted higher education for all our girls who want it and are qualified; but our grandmothers, and especially our grandfathers, did not take it for granted. As recently as 1880, American men were protesting that higher education would have an adverse effect on the health of the frail sex. The first undertaking of the American Association of University Women was a survey which proved that women were not invalidated by exposure to the germs of higher learning.

There are few countries now where new, or larger, educational opportunities are not opening to women. With the relaxation of traditional bans against work outside the home, many women have taken employment and have acquired economic rights and a degree of personal independence previously denied them. They are making a place for themselves in the professions—in law, education, nursing, social welfare, and government service.

In the field of political rights, the changed status of women has been phenomenal. Of the 111 members of the United Nations, only 9 do not yet allow women to vote—and 2 of them do not allow men to vote either. New Zealand gave women the vote 70 years ago; American women won it just over 40 years ago. But in

²BULLETIN of Oct. 28, 1963, p. 674.

most countries this advance has been achieved since 1945. In many cases it came as due recognition of women's part in national struggles for independence.

The most recent nation to give women the vote is Iran, where they first voted in March of this year, in a local election, by last-minute imperial fiat. The whole idea was so new to most of them that sound trucks were used to urge the unaccustomed feminine voters to the polls, and police were on hand to explain the complexities of marking ballots. Last month Iranian women not only voted in a national election; they elected six women deputies to the parliament. The implications of this granting of the franchise are tremendous, and full of hope for the future.

Changes in the status of women are taking place over a vast area, in many continents and countries. The rate of change varies from one country to another, and within countries, depending on history, religion, tradition, local attitudes; on whether the area is urban or rural; isolated or open and susceptible to influences from outside. But even in the most conservative Moslem nations, perhaps the most closed of societies, the winds of change are blowing.

There was an interesting illustration of this in Yemen a short while back, before the Republic was established. When the United States opened a legation in Yemen about 5 years ago, the only schools were Koranic schools, open only to boys. The wife of our chargé d'affaires organized a few classes in her house for her own children and other children of the diplomatic corps. Within 3 months a Yemeni Government official came to her and begged her to take his three daughters into her school. These three were followed by more Yemeni children, both boys and girls. The first Yemeni father's explanation for entering his daughters was illuminating. He said: "Unless our children, especially our girls, can be assured a modern education, our country has no future. We know that the Middle Eastern countries which have progressed in the last 50 years are those where schools have been established and where eventually women have been allowed to learn as well as men."

The reasons for the changing status of women are many and complex. One is the reason given

by the Yemeni official. The leaders of many of the developing countries realize that a modern nation cannot exist with a backward female population. If they are to develop their resources, they need all their man- and woman-power, and they need it *trained*. Recently the President of one of the African nations made the point in forceful terms: ". . . Africa's progress will be impossible and unattainable so long as the African woman is not emancipated," he declared. "The emancipation of the woman is imperative, an essential condition and the decisive basis for the transformation of the living conditions of a people."

There is also an element of national pride. Officials from the newly independent nations of Africa, for example, who have visited more developed countries are impressed with the capability of the women. They are quick to grasp that a capable, "evolved" female population is characteristic of development; therefore they want it at home. There is, too, a more personal and private source of pressure for the emergence of women—or at least for their education—that is the boredom of the younger educated men with uneducated wives.

The major pressures for the emergence of women come from the women themselves—from their own awareness that a better life is possible for them, from their own need to fulfill their own potential. Women are part of the "revolution of rising expectations." They are coming to realize that they don't have to starve, or lose their babies, or be illiterate. They have discovered that other women—in Europe, or the United States—have more education, more status and independence, more voice in the community and in the nation. They are tired, as an East African woman put it, "of being led like mules by our men."

They are beginning to cast off their social inferiority and to take part in civic and social activity. They are forming organizations for self-improvement and self-education. Recently we received a newspaper report on one of these organizations, the Council of Women of Uganda. The reporter summed up its significance in these sentences:

A quiet revolution is being fought in Uganda. And without firing a shot, the revolutionaries are winning

he battle hands down. For they are the women of Uganda, and their battle is being fought against hundreds of years of male dominance.

They are determined to have their say in the governing of independent Uganda, and they are equipping themselves by learning all they can. They know that citizenship takes time, energy, and knowledge.

One measure of their success is the inclusion of women in 13 of the 32 African delegations to this fall's U.N. General Assembly. The women of Africa are beginning to make themselves heard.

Many of the newly independent countries have nationwide women's organizations. Pakistan, for example, has its All-Pakistan Women's Association, which was founded in 1947 to cope with the staggering problems of 6 million refugees and drew many previously sheltered upper class women out of purdah to help. Tunisia has its National Union of Tunisian Women, responsible for many of the country's social services. Kenya, due for independence in December, already has a federation of clubs, appropriately called "Progress of Women."

These emerging women have discovered that the women's club is a force for progress, an instrument of adult education, a training ground for leadership. When the daughters of Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia quietly organized a women's club in Riyadh early this year, with their father's approval, one of the last bastions of total male autocracy began to crumble—as the Crown Prince and the princesses were undoubtedly aware.

I suspect it may be an open secret that the wife of an American businessman lent a friendly hand in organizing that club, sharing with her Saudi Arabian friends her experience in clubs back home. Americans, these days, are living and working all over the world. And an American woman who is transplanted from Boston to Bogotá or Detroit to Dar-es-Salaam puts the skills she acquired at home at the service of her new community. Whether she is a businessman's wife or a diplomat's wife, like a good guest, she helps unobtrusively with the host country's housework. She may assist in a clinic or hospital. She may teach English in a local school. She may show a group of volunteers how to work together more effectively, simply by doing these things herself.

She learned these volunteer skills, of course, by belonging to an American women's organization—like yours. You are part of a great American institution. In my long years of working with organized women in the United States, I have acquired a solid respect and admiration for them. What they can accomplish, and have accomplished, makes me wonder how civilization could have gotten beyond the Stone Age without a band of leopard-skin-clad ladies marching the populace out of the caves to a Cave Dwellers' Community Cleanup Council.

It is a fact that American women through their organizations have changed the faces of their communities. They have seen needs and they have done something about the needs. They have wangled money for hospitals and schools out of hornyhanded businessmen, and they have paid part of the price out of their own pocketbooks. They have given themselves in volunteer service to those hospitals, to homes for the aged, to institutions for the mentally ill. You know this because you do all these things, and more, yourselves. The services which American women give voluntarily would cost millions of dollars if they had to be paid for, or might not be available at all.

This kind of citizen effort is an old American tradition. You may realize that it has not been a tradition in many other countries. Our American zeal for joining a multiplicity of organizations, especially women's organizations, has long astounded foreigners and even amused them. But this is a new era. Just as leaders of developing countries have noticed a relationship between national development and capable women, so they see a connection, at least in the United States, between capable women and women's organizations.

The result is that the American women's voluntary organization has become as much an object of earnest study by visitors from abroad as a Detroit assembly line, the National Institutes of Health, supermarkets, or the public school system. A meeting with a major American women's group is an indispensable part of a well-balanced program for a visiting leader from a new nation, along with Niagara Falls, the Grand Canyon, or Disneyland. Some women leaders from Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer-

ica come to the United States expressly to find out how our women deal with school problems through the PTA, or float a bond issue, or raise money for a clinic, or help get out the vote. They want to see how we recruit, train, and organize volunteers for community service.

The American women's groups have responded warmly to the visitor's quest for information. They have opened their doors and their meetings; they have explained and demonstrated their techniques. A number of American women's organizations have added to their domestic programs the raising of money to bring women leaders from the developing countries to the United States for study and training in organizational techniques.

For many of our women's groups, foreign aid is a new frontier. They have realized that they have exportable talents. The League of Women Voters is helping to develop civic education in some countries of Latin America. The General Federation of Women's Clubs has donated scholarships to prepare Latin American girls for teaching. Two new organizations, the Women's Africa Committee and the Committee of Correspondence, conduct leadership-training seminars for African and Middle Eastern women. The National Council of Catholic Women is now taking a special interest in Latin America, and young women of The Grail are working in community development programs in Africa.

These are only a few of the ways in which American women's organizations are reaching out to their sisters on other continents. They are some of the ways by which the citizen can contribute to our changing world.

Since this District of Columbia Court of the Catholic Daughters of America was founded 50 years ago, not only has the world changed, and the United States itself, but the role of the United States in the world has greatly changed. In those 50 years we have grown from a young nation, absorbed in its own concerns and holding itself aloof, to a mature power deeply involved in the rest of the world. The responsibilities we have assumed are vast and infinitely complex, and some are far beyond the scope of the individual citizen.

Yet the individual citizen can play a part,

and an important one. Women, in particular, can play an important part. They have already proved it. The power of women who cooperate is limitless. But women as individuals can create a climate in which progress can take place.

A contemporary philosopher, Scott L. MacDonald, has eloquently stated my point: "Each human individual is responsible for injury anywhere in the universe." To set the universe as the limits of our personal responsibility seem unreasonable. But if we were to ask each individual to assume responsibility for dealing with injustice in his own community, that would surely be acceptance of our proposition.

Here in the United States we are going through our own social revolution. It is a revolution which aims to carry out at last the 13th and 15th Amendments to our Constitution. It is a revolution based on that ringing declaration of 1776, that "all men are created equal . . . [and] endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . ." As mothers, neighbors, as educators, business women, political leaders, or citizens, we can be responsible for insuring justice at our own doorstep.

We cannot alter, perhaps, what is going on at the other side of the globe. But in our world today, events in our own community affect not only all of us but all of humanity, even those at the far ends of the earth.

President Kennedy, speaking last June in Frankfurt, Germany,³ of a better life for ourselves and our children, said:

To realize this vision, we must seek, above all, a world of peace—a world in which peoples dwell together in mutual respect . . . not a mere interlude between wars but an incentive to the creative energy of humanity.

Surely women possess the creative human resources of which President Kennedy spoke. We are the mothers and teachers, the healers and tenders, and the heart-healers. We are the guardians of our democratic heritage. For each of us is a responsible, involved, participating citizen, and the community is not only her village or her city but the community is her world—her universe.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, July 22, 1963, p. 118.

North Pacific Fishery Conference Adjourns at Tokyo

STATEMENT BY BENJAMIN A. SMITH II
CHAIRMAN, U.S. DELEGATION¹

We have just concluded 3 weeks of intensive discussions with delegations of Canada and Japan on the future of fisheries treaty arrangements in the North Pacific. The three nations did not reach complete agreement in these talks. In view of the wide differences which remained at the end of the first round of discussions at Washington in June,² it would perhaps have been unrealistic to have expected complete agreement at this time.

Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made in narrowing the differences of view. The delegations are recommending to their respective Governments that a further conference be held next spring, probably at Ottawa. I personally look forward with considerable hope to a resumption of these talks and to the prospect of an eventual reconciliation of views among the three nations.

As President Kennedy stated on September 3 shortly before my departure for Japan, the United States believes that the abstention principle is sound and reasonable and that without constraints of this nature the nations of the world could run serious risks of depleting fisheries. This was our position at the meeting in Tokyo. At the same time we recognized that certain difficulties had arisen with respect to the present formulation of the principle and to the language of the present treaty.⁴ For example, the Japanese people have come to interpret the treaty as an unfair arrangement imposed upon them during the period of military occupation. With this in mind, we submitted at the Tokyo conference a new draft treaty. This new draft involves no compromise of the principles on which we stand but does, in my view, constitute a major effort toward enabling the Japanese to accept our position.

¹Released at Anchorage, Alaska, on Oct. 7.

²BULLETIN of June 10, 1963, p. 914.

³For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1963, p. 519.

⁴Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2786.

The United States proposal was not completely acceptable to Japan. However, Japan was willing to recognize the special interest of the United States in the salmon and halibut stocks of the eastern North Pacific and on the basis of this recognition was prepared to continue to accept substantial restrictions on its fishing in this area. This constituted a major departure from the rigid position which Japan took at the Washington talks.

I believe that the discussions have lessened the prospects of a break in the existing relationships in the field of fisheries and that, with further patient consideration of the requirements of each country, the three nations will ultimately reach agreement.

FINAL CONFERENCE PRESS RELEASE

The second Meeting of the Parties to the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean which began on September 16, 1963, came to a close today [October 7].

The delegations from Canada, Japan and the United States, giving due consideration to each other's position and problems clarified at the first Meeting held at Washington, D.C. last June, continued their deliberations in a very frank and friendly manner with a view to working out a mutually satisfactory solution.

During the course of the Meeting the U.S. delegation submitted a new draft Convention incorporating various modifications to the Japanese draft Convention presented at the Washington Meeting. The U.S. draft Convention offered a new stimulus to discussions at the Meeting.

The Japanese delegation proposed modifications to the U.S. draft, pointing out that the draft amounts in effect to the maintenance of the situation prevailing under the present Convention. The Canadian delegation also submitted some modifications to the U.S. draft with special reference to certain salmon and herring stocks and the need for cooperation in the broad field of fisheries research.

All three delegations fully discussed and examined these proposals and views, and exerted

constructive and conciliatory efforts throughout the Meeting to find mutually acceptable means of resolving the problems. The present Meeting thus served a great deal to reduce the differences which existed between the views of the three delegations at the conclusion of the Washington Meeting.

However, the three delegations deemed it difficult at this Meeting to come to complete agreement and concluded that it would be desirable to give further study to means of resolving the remaining differences in the views of the three

countries in the light of the work of the present Meeting.

The three delegations, being encouraged by the results of this Meeting and the hopes for the future, decided to adjourn and recommend to their respective Governments that a third Meeting be convened some time in the spring when further efforts would be made to reach agreement. In this connection the Canadian delegation took note of the hope expressed by the Canadian delegation that the next Meeting would be held in Ottawa.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Scheduled November Through January 1964

U.N. ECE Senior Economic Advisers	Geneva	Nov. 2
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 7th Session	Geneva	Nov. 4
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Growth).	Paris	Nov. 4
U.N./FAO Intergovernmental Committee on the World Food Program: 4th Session.	Rome	Nov. 4
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.	Geneva	Nov. 4
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee: Subcommittee on Nontariff Barriers.	Geneva	Nov. 4
ILO Governing Body: 157th Session (and its committees)	Geneva	Nov. 4
UNESCO Executive Committee for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments.	Cairo	Nov. 5
OECD Economic Policy Committee	Paris	Nov. 6
ITU CCITT Working Party of Study Groups V and XV.	Geneva	Nov. 6
OECD Energy Committee	Paris	Nov. 7
FAO Council: 41st Session	Rome	Nov. 1
GATT Cereals Group	Geneva	Nov. 1
ITU CCITT Study Group V (Protection)	Geneva	Nov. 1
IA-ECOSOC: 2d Regular Annual Meeting at the Ministerial Level	São Paulo	Nov. 1

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Oct. 17, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique téléphonique; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

GATT Committee on Agriculture	Geneva	Nov. 11-
TU CCITT Working Party of Study Group XV (Transmission Systems).	Geneva	Nov. 11-
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 12-
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel	Paris	Nov. 12-
N. ECE Inland Water Transport Subcommittee	Geneva	Nov. 13-
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 14-
FAO Conference: 12th Session	Rome	Nov. 16-
GATT Subcommittee on Tariff Negotiating Plan	Geneva	Nov. 18-
ICO Working Group on Tonnage Measurement	London	Nov. 18-
BIRPI Committee of Experts on Copyright Matters	Geneva	Nov. 18-
CAO Panel of Teletypewriter Specialists: 5th Meeting	Montreal	Nov. 18-
WHO FAO/IAEA Seminar on the Protection of the Public in the Event of Radiation Accidents.	Geneva	Nov. 18-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 10th Meeting	Vancouver	Nov. 18-
N. ECAFE Conference on Development of Fertilizer Industry	Bombay	Nov. 18-
NATO Medical Committee	Paris	Nov. 19-
OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 19-
TU CCITT Working Parties of Study Groups V and VI	Geneva	Nov. 20-
N. ECA Standing Committee on Trade: 2d Session	Niamey, Niger	Nov. 20-
GATT Committee on Legal and Institutional Framework	Geneva	Nov. 25-
GATT Working Group on Preferences	Geneva	Nov. 25-
GATT Meat Group	Geneva	Nov. 25-
IO Meeting of Experts on Conditions of Work of Public Servants	Geneva	Nov. 25-
TU CCIR/CCITT Plan Committee for the Development of the International Network.	Rome	Nov. 25-
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 26-
N. ECE Gas Committee: 10th Session	Geneva	Nov. 27-
N. ECAFE Committee on Inland Transport and Communications: 12th Session.	Bangkok	Nov. 27-
CAFE/WMO Regional Seminar on Hydrology	Bangkok	Nov. 27-
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee	Geneva	Nov. 28-
N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	New York	November
9th Pan American Child Congress	Buenos Aires	Dec. 1-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Dec. 2-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 7th Session	New Delhi	Dec. 2-
Permanent Committee of the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Union): 11th Session.	New Delhi	Dec. 2-
Western European Fisheries Conference	London	Dec. 3-
AO Council: 42d Session	Rome	Dec. 6-
AO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Food Products and Drink Industries.	Geneva	Dec. 9-
GATT Action Committee	Geneva	Dec. 10-
N. ECAFE Asian Population Conference	Manila	Dec. 10-
N. ECE Working Party on Combined Transport Equipment	Geneva	Dec. 11-
GATT Contracting Parties: 21st Session	Geneva	Dec. 16-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	London	Dec. 16-
NATO Ministerial Council	Paris	Dec. 16-
N. Economic and Social Council: 36th Session (resumed)	New York	December
N. Special Fund: 11th Session of Governing Council	New York	Jan. 13-
NICEF Executive Board	Bangkok	Jan. 13-
N. Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Jan. 13-
HO Executive Board: 33d Session	Geneva	Jan. 14-
N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: 23d Session	Geneva	Jan. 20-
International Agricultural Film Competition 1964	Berlin	Jan. 20-
U African LF/MF Broadcasting Conference: Preparatory Meeting of Experts.	Geneva	Jan. 20-
AO Meteorology/Operation Division	Paris	Jan. 21-
N. ECOSOC Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning	New York	Jan. 22-
ICO Working Group on Tonnage Measurement: 5th Session	London	Jan. 27-
N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 7th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 27-
NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport	Paris	Jan. 29-
AO Desert Locust Control Technical Advisory Committee: 12th Session.	Rome	January
NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee	Paris	January

Problems of Economic Development

*Statement by Jonathan B. Bingham
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

I deem it a privilege and an honor to join the ranks of the Second Committee for this 18th session of the General Assembly. It is much on my mind that a number of distinguished Americans have occupied this chair before me, including such men as Mr. Paul Hoffman, Senator Mike Mansfield, Mr. George Meany, and Mr. Henry Ford II. As for the outstanding statesmen from other nations who have rendered signal contributions to the work of the Second Committee over the years, it would take too long even to begin to list their names.

Perhaps some day a great scholar will write a book about the work of the Second Committee since the organization of the United Nations. Among the most important trends that such a scholar would surely note would be the committee's steadily increasing preoccupation over the first 18 years of its existence with our common aim of speeding the development of the less developed areas of the world.

As the report of the Economic and Social Council² which is before us shows, the same trend has prevailed at ECOSOC. So far as the economic portions of the ECOSOC report are concerned, they are almost exclusively concentrated on the problems of economic development. There is thus a considerable overlap between several of the items on our agenda, such as item 12 and item 33, and it was for that reason that we welcomed your proposal, Mr. Chairman, that we engage in one general debate covering all the items on our agenda.

¹ Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Oct. 3 (U.S. delegation press release 4250).

² U.N. doc. A/5503.

ECOSOC Report

First of all, I should like to make some comments on the work of the Economic and Social Council, as reflected in the report before us. In our view the Council's 36th session, held in Geneva during the month of July,³ was a most fruitful session, conducted in an atmosphere singularly free from political polemics and productive of a number of useful decisions and resolutions.

One of the most important decisions of the Council was to recommend that this General Assembly take steps looking toward an appropriate increase in the size of the Council itself in order that it might "remain the effective and representative organ envisaged in Chapters 9 and 10 of the Charter." Such a step, which was supported by a vote of 15 to 2 in the Council, is long overdue, and we hope that this Assembly will take action based on the Council's resolution. Since this is not, however, a matter before the Second Committee, I will say no more on that subject.

Another important step taken by the Council was to provide for an effective means of following up on the work so impressively commenced by the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, of which I had the honor to be a vice president. The Council's decision, which reflected the overwhelming sentiment in the meeting with the officers of the conference called in April by the Secretary-General and which essentially

³ For a statement made before the Council on July 10 by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 265.

ollowed the recommendations of the Secretary-General himself, was to establish a committee of 15 experts to be appointed by the Council on the nomination of the Secretary-General after consultation with governments. The appointments were to be made on the basis of "personal qualifications, knowledge or experience in the field, with due regard to equitable geographical representation." We are confident that outstanding individuals will be appointed to this committee and that they will be of great assistance to the Economic and Social Council and to the U.N. family of agencies generally in indicating ways in which the overall and highly complex task of improving the application of science and technology for the benefit of the less developed areas can be pursued more effectively.

We would hope that this advisory committee would work closely with the Subcommittee on Science and Technology set up by the Administrative Committee on Coordination and that, as a result of the work of both of these committees, far more will be done in these areas by all the agencies in the United Nations family and by their member governments than in the past.

The problem, of course, is not simply one of transferring scientific and technical information to the savants of a developing country. Even more important is the dissemination of this information through the country to those who need it and can use it, in adaptation to local conditions. This is a job which essentially must be done by the developing countries themselves, although many governments and private institutions, including those of my own country, stand prepared to help.

Another and quite separate aspect of the problem is the pursuit of scientific advances that may be of particular importance for the developing countries, such as an economical method of desalinization of water, more efficient small atomic power reactors, and improved methods of drawing food from the sea. Many institutions and enterprises in our own country and elsewhere are at work on such problems, and they should be encouraged wherever possible.

Scientists from developing countries have repeatedly stressed the need for national and re-

gional research and training institutions in the field of science and technology. This is an endeavor which my Government has supported wholeheartedly, and we continue to do so. The Special Fund is, of course, peculiarly well adapted to assisting governments with this type of project, and we hope that it will undertake an increasingly important role in this area in the future.

Several of the important decisions taken by the Economic and Social Council in July were made without dissent. This was the case with the adoption of a resolution on the economic and social consequences of disarmament, which, following extensive talks, was sponsored by Colombia, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Noting a number of previous resolutions on the subject, and particularly Resolution 1837 of the 17th session, and recognizing "the importance which general and complete disarmament would have for the expansion and acceleration of economic and social progress in the world," the resolution expressed the hope that governments would intensify their efforts to achieve an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and also expressed the hope that member states, particularly those with significant defense expenditures, would continue to pursue studies and activities relating to the economic and social consequences of disarmament. In response to a report submitted by the Secretary-General, the Council in this resolution also took account of the problems that might arise from disarmament in relation to the demand for primary commodities exported by developing countries and asked the Secretary-General to consider the possibilities of undertaking an international study in this area.

Last week the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union suggested that the General Assembly might well endorse the resolution adopted by ECOSOC, and we fully agree with his suggestions.

There is no need for me here to reiterate the intensity of the desire of the Government and people of the United States to achieve effective disarmament. I will only say that we are encouraged to intensify our efforts in this respect by the recent historic test ban agreement.

As so many delegates have stated, here and in the plenary, we meet this year in an atmosphere of hope and optimism which is in happy contrast to the tension and gloom of the past two sessions.

Yet another constructive action of ECOSOC was its decision to approve the plan proposed by the Secretary-General for the establishment of a United Nations Training and Research Institute. Delegates will recall that last year the Assembly, upon the recommendation of this committee, requested the Secretary-General to study the desirability and feasibility of establishing such an institute to carry on research into ways of making our international organizations more effective, and to provide special training of personnel, particularly from the developing states, for administrative and operational assignments with the United Nations and specialized agencies, as well as for national service. The Council endorsed the broad lines of the Secretary-General's plan and asked him to explore possible sources, both governmental and nongovernmental, of financial assistance to the institute, a task upon which the Secretary-General is currently engaged. It is our hope that such organizations as foundations and trade unions, both here and in other countries, will see in the proposed institute an opportunity greatly to contribute to the strengthening of the international organizations, upon which the world's future so greatly depends.

The Council also recommended a resolution for consideration by the General Assembly requesting the Secretary-General to proceed with his plans for the institute, and we hope that this resolution will be adopted unanimously.

In the field of trade, the Council, acting on the recommendations of the second meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,⁴ took several decisions making final arrangements for the time and place of the conference. These decisions were not controversial and were adopted without dissent. The overriding importance of the subject of trade and development was recognized by all, and no subject was touched upon more frequently in the course of

⁴ For a statement by Isaiah Frank, see *ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 173.

the Council's debates dealing with economic subjects.

As various delegations have already pointed out, it is not up to this General Assembly to make any changes in the arrangements for the 1964 conference or to take decisions with respect to it. Nevertheless, in view of the importance of the subject, I should like to outline our views on some of the questions involved and to try to clear up some misconceptions which are prevalent.

Trade and Development

In recent years there has been an increasing realization of the vital importance of increasing export earnings for the developing countries, if these countries are to succeed in their development efforts. 1964 promises to be a year of unprecedented activity in the search for ways to increase these export earnings. We are confident that the two major meetings to take place next year—the trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development—will give an important impetus to this search. The GATT negotiations, scheduled to start in May 1964, can result in a substantial widening of the markets in the developed countries for the foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactures of the developing nations. These negotiations are being planned to provide for across-the-board reductions in tariffs, with only minimum exceptions, and the developing countries will, of course, benefit from these concessions. Because these negotiations offer the prospect of substantial benefits to all countries, my Government believes that the developing countries will want to follow closely and participate, as appropriate, in the planning for the trade negotiations and in the negotiations themselves.

At the same time, as U.N. members we are all looking forward to the Conference on Trade and Development, which will focus on the full range of problems of the developing countries in the trade field. Much useful work looking toward a highly constructive conference has already been done by the Preparatory Committee of 35 nations, thanks in considerable part to the extensive and generally excellent documentation

prepared by the secretariat under the leadership of the distinguished and highly respected Secretary General of the conference, Dr. Raúl Prebisch. In its resolution on the trade conference, the Economic and Social Council invited those states which would participate in a conference "to give earnest consideration, before the beginning of the conference, to proposals for concrete and practical international action and to explore all practical means for their implementation"—in other words, and in phrase, to do their homework in advance. My Government is actively engaged in doing just that and is reviewing its positions on the important substantive issues on the agenda. We assume that other governments are engaged in a similar review, and we hope that they will study the issues critically, imaginatively, and realistically, in the light of their own particular problems.

My Government is approaching the conference with an earnest desire to move forward toward the solution of the various trade problems which hamper the progress of the developing countries. We fully support the desires of the developing countries for assurance of growing markets and improved and stable prices for their exports of primary products. We are prepared to review existing programs for dealing with these problems and to explore suggestions for strengthening work in this field. We recognize also the need of the developing countries to expand their exports of manufactured goods and are prepared to consider most carefully proposals for constructive approaches to this problem. We believe that the conference should also consider ways and means of promoting greater regional integration among developing countries, so as to foster the development of industries capable of utilizing economies of scale and hence better able to compete effectively in export markets.

We hold great hope that substantial progress will be made at the U.N. conference in reaching a better understanding of the problems faced by the developing countries and the methods of dealing with them. We are looking forward to constructive results from the conference and believe it will lead to a continuing role for the United Nations in the productive consideration of these problems.

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I should like to mention certain illusions which are current in some quarters in respect to the attitude of our Government and the governments of other developed countries toward the forthcoming Trade and Development Conference, and to dispel these illusions if I can.

First, there is an illusion that we, the developed countries, want the developing countries to remain, as the saying goes, "hewers of wood and drawers of water"—that while we are willing to assist the developing countries with certain aspects of their economic development, we are not interested in helping them to increase their production and export of manufactured goods. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our interest is to encourage the growth of vigorous and prosperous economies, and we know that industrial development must be a part of this process, both for the purpose of well-balanced internal development and for the purpose of increasing the exports that are needed if the imports essential for development are to be paid for. We not only regard such vigorous and prosperous countries as an assurance of continued peace in the world, but also as potential customers for ourselves. We know from experience that trade grows fastest among countries with diversified and growing economies, and by far the largest proportion of our exports today go to highly industrialized countries.

A second illusion is that the developing countries must fight for a new principle by which they would not have to grant full reciprocity in trade negotiations with developed countries. In practice full reciprocity, as a principle, has not been applied for more than a decade. Any lingering doubts should have been finally dispelled at the ministerial meetings of GATT in 1961⁵ and 1963.⁶ At the latter, for example, the ministers included in the negotiating principles for the 1964 tariff negotiations a specific directive to reduce barriers to exports of the developing countries without reciprocity from them.

A third illusion is that GATT is not concerned with the trade problems of the develop-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, June 24, 1963, p. 990.

ing countries. In fact, the last two ministerial meetings of GATT have given very particular attention to these problems and have resulted in declarations which have much in common with the ideas expressed in the important joint statement of developing countries submitted to the second session of the Preparatory Committee on the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development.

GATT is now engaged in an action program worked out at its last ministerial meeting in May. Its Action Committee of 32 members includes many of the developing countries, including Brazil, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. While I do not wish to take the time to describe the work of this action program in detail, it might be useful to simply list its elements: (1) removal of quantitative restrictions; (2) no new tariff or nontariff barriers on items of interest to the developing countries; (3) duty-free entry for tropical products; (4) elimination of tariffs on primary products; (5) reduction and elimination of tariff barriers to exports of semiprocessed and processed products from less developed countries; (6) progressive reduction of internal fiscal charges and revenue duties; (7) other positive measures to assist the development and expansion of trade of less developed countries. It is further significant that GATT is not concerned merely with the enunciation of principles but with concrete actions by governments on which they report to periodic meetings.

In connection with some of the above points in the GATT action program, I should like briefly to refer to my Government's position, particularly with respect to tropical products. We have, of course, ratified the International Coffee Agreement and are active participants in the cocoa agreement negotiations now going on in Geneva. The United States levies no duties or nontariff barriers on raw cocoa and would be prepared to implement provisions of an agreement which would call for the removal or reduction of duties on semiprocessed cocoa. In addition to participation in such formal agreements, we are also members of virtually every consultative or study group concerned

with improving markets for primary commodities.

The United States already admits most of tropical products duty-free or at low rates of duty. Currently we are preparing to utilize to the fullest possible extent the provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to negotiate with other members of GATT agreements whereby increasing numbers of tropical commodities will be granted duty-free entry. We ourselves do not levy internal taxes on tropical products and we support measures to reduce these taxes as rapidly as feasible. We also would welcome steps by state-trading countries to increase the imports of tropical products.

To sum up, it is our view that these past efforts in 1964—in the GATT and the U.N. Conference—offer promise of a real breakthrough in increasing the resources available to the developing countries through trade. The progress which is made in this direction will, in turn, give a substantial boost to the efforts of all to make the Decade of Development a sounding and historic achievement.

Special Fund and Other Assistance Programs

As I turn to a consideration of the operational programs under agenda items 36 and 37, I should like to pass on to the committee some personal impressions. During the past months I have been fortunate enough to be able to talk, in the countries in which they serve, with a number of United Nations resident representatives, who also serve as Special Fund program directors, and with various United Nations system experts, and also to visit projects under both the Special Fund and Expanded Technical Assistance Programs. Not only was I impressed with the projects themselves, but I was struck by the extremely high quality of the persons working in the United Nations family of programs—quality in terms of ability, technical competence, dedication, and sensitiveness to the customs and culture of the peoples with whom they were working. Having had some firsthand contact with United Nations system operational programs a decade ago, I can fairly say that there has been a notable improvement in the quality, scope, and vigor

programs and, therefore, in the degree to which they are furthering the developing programs of the host countries.

So far as the Special Fund is concerned, it is satisfying to note the degree to which operations have accelerated. A considerable number of projects have been completed, and the Managing Director has predicted that 70 more will be completed next year and about 140 in 1963. Perhaps most impressive of all is the Managing Director's estimate that 5 of the projects completed so far, at a total cost of under \$3 million, have resulted in \$400 million of capital investment. This is the measure of the importance of the Special Fund's preinvestment activity, and we hope that this encouraging follow-up to Special Fund activity will continue in the future.

A further source of satisfaction is the fact that the most recent program trends indicate a marked increase in the industrial activities of the Special Fund. In the program approved at the last session, the volume of industrial projects exceeded for the first time those approved in the agricultural field. Thirteen industrial projects were approved amounting to \$11,727,700, compared to 7 projects for agriculture, forestry, primary, and fisheries activities with earmarkings of \$4,370,800.

We hope that this favorable trend will continue and that there will no longer be any shortage of project requests in the industrial development field, such as Mr. Paul Hoffman had occasion to complain of in the past. At this end we believe it would be helpful, as originally suggested at the third session of the Committee on Industrial Development by the delegation of the Philippines, and subsequently discussed at the Governing Council, that, where the recipient government so requests, the cost of feasibility studies and surveys be shared with private entrepreneurs, with the Special Fund to be fully reimbursed if the enterprise proceeds. We also would like to see more active use of preparatory allocations so as to provide needed assistance to governments in preparing proposals in the industrial field.

In general we fully concur with the statements of the Secretary-General in the introduction to his Annual Report, in which he com-

mented favorably on the work of the Special Fund and of the United Nations and the specialized agencies which serve as its executing agencies. We also agree with the Secretary-General's expression of keen disappointment at the shortfall in governmental pledges for the support of the Special Fund's activities. Notwithstanding the General Assembly's special plea last year that such contributions should reach \$100 million as soon as possible, contributions fell short of that target by approximately 30 percent as of August 31 of this year. It is our most earnest hope that the appeals of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hoffman, and the General Assembly will be heeded and that the target of \$100 million will be reached at the pledging conference to be held on the 15th of this month.⁷

We also hope that the General Assembly will unanimously adopt the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council, which we were pleased to support, for an increase of 6 members in the size of the Governing Council of the Special Fund.

Along with the Special Fund and the regular technical assistance activities of the U.N. and the specialized agencies, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance plays an important part in the U.N. Development Decade. As the Secretary-General recently noted (A/5501/Add. 1), the improved financial situation of the Expanded Program has been an encouraging sign. The resources for the current biennium for the first time exceed \$100 million. Also as pointed out by the Secretary-General, the efficiency of the program has been steadily improving. This is due to the work of the headquarters and field staff of the Technical Assistance Board, the participating organizations, and, of great importance, the more careful selection by governments of projects, more and more related to national economic development plans.

An important change in EPTA regulations was recommended last June by the Technical Assistance Committee and subsequently by

⁷ At the pledging conference on Oct. 15 pledges in the amount of \$80.5 million were made for the Special Fund. Five countries stated their intention to announce their pledges at a later date.

ECOSOC: to wit, the use of Expanded Program funds for the provision of operational personnel if—but of course only if—the governments concerned so request. Some governments among the developing countries are not in favor of, and make no use of, these OPEX programs, but other governments find that such programs meet an acute need and are enthusiastically in favor of their expansion. In our view, if these governments believe that programs of this type can measurably advance their own development efforts and if the programs are set up so as to provide training for those who will eventually take over the jobs, we believe the EPTA program can properly provide some of the resources needed. We, therefore, hope that the General Assembly will approve the recommendations of the Technical Assistance Committee and the Economic and Social Council in this regard.

We hope, too, that the recommendations of the Technical Assistance Committee and of ECOSOC with regard to the continuation of the United Nations regular technical assistance program at a level of \$6.4 million, as proposed by the Secretary-General for the year 1964, will be approved. In our view, these programs are among the most vital of the activities of the U.N. and are worthy of our full support. The flexibility for transfers of funds within the regular program, as provided in the recommended resolution, will make the program even more responsive to the needs of the developing countries.

With respect to the character of the contributions that are made to the various operational programs, my delegation would like to call the attention of member states to the importance of having contributions to these programs made in convertible currencies. All net donor countries should be able to make their contributions on this basis, and we have so urged, before the Technical Assistance Committee, the Governing Council, and the Economic and Social Council. Not only are convertible currencies needed to pay administrative and various operational services costs, but, perhaps even more important, they are needed to pay for experts, equipment, and supplies from the developing countries and in order to place fellows and hold

seminars in developing countries. All delegations are in agreement as to the importance of increasing the active share of the developing countries in the programs in these ways, yet this cannot be done from contributions in non-convertible currencies. In a statement before the Technical Assistance Committee, Mr. D. Owen, executive chairman of the Technical Assistance Board, already explained the various needs for convertible currencies, and the Technical Assistance Committee agreed to his appeal to the attention of governments when considering their contributions for 1964.

It is our earnest hope that all net donor countries will at least make sufficient of their contributions to the voluntary programs for convertible currencies so as to carry their share of the administrative costs and to make possible the increased use of experts and equipment for the developing countries. We also hope that the Soviet Union will reconsider its recent decision to contribute to the regular United Nations technical assistance program only in non-convertible currency, a decision which represents a complete departure from past practice and long-established regulations with regard to the United Nations regular budget.

Before concluding on this topic, I should like to commend Mr. Victor Hoo [Commissioner for Technical Assistance], Mr. Owen, and Mr. Hoffman for the informative and encouraging statements they made to us on Tuesday afternoon. While we must all seek ways to improve and strengthen the various international organizations on which they reported to us, I am sure it is the consensus of this committee that these gentlemen and their staffs are to be congratulated for the fine work they are doing.

Development of Underdeveloped Countries

I should like now to make a few comments under item 33 on our agenda, although the scope of this item is so broad that it covers practically all the work done in this committee.

First, a general observation. Two years ago, under this item the Assembly adopted Resolution 1710 proclaiming the United Nations Development Decade. Since that time notable steps, including some that I have already mentioned, have been taken within the international

community and by individual countries in pursuit of the objectives of the Development Decade, and a number of countries, including some of the largest among the developing countries, have already demonstrated a growth rate in excess of the 5 percent Development Decade target. Nevertheless, I must frankly state that the United States is far from satisfied with the results to date, and our task here at this session is to consider further constructive action to make this decade a memorable one in man's struggle for a better life. It is in that spirit that I comment on some of the questions before me under item 33.

Let us consider first the matter of accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance to the developing countries. The fact that we are not satisfied with what has been done should not, in our view, lead us to conclude, as some delegations appear to suggest, that little or nothing has so far been accomplished. Having been involved myself in what was then generally called Point 4 in the early 1950's, I can testify from my own experience that there has been tremendous progress, both in terms of the flow of capital and technical assistance to the developing countries and in terms of the initiation of a whole series of new approaches to the problems of development, including an increased emphasis on the use of international institutions.

As the Secretary-General's last report on this subject (Document A/5195) pointed out, the flow of public and private capital to the developing countries has more than doubled in the past decade, reaching a total of over \$7 billion in 1961. It is a matter of pride of my delegation that, with respect to the capital flowing into 35 developing countries for which data were available to the Secretary-General, the United States accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total. This massive assistance was extended despite balance-of-payments problems which have been giving us serious concern for some years.

International institutions have been playing an increasingly important part in the process of capital flow to the developing areas. In 1951 loans from the World Bank to the less developed countries were relatively minor. A decade later, the World Bank and its affiliate, the International Development Association, were lending almost

\$1 billion a year to the developing countries. We are confident that the Board of Governors of the IDA will this week approve the addition of \$750 million to IDA's resources, so that IDA can continue to provide credits on the most liberal terms and at a more rapid rate than during the last 5 years.

It is also worthy of note that the membership of the World Bank has been constantly growing. Twenty new members joined during the past year, bringing the total to 97.

Another development of importance in the last few years has been the growth of regional cooperation. ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East] and ECLA [Economic Commission for Latin America], and more recently the Economic Commission for Africa, have been playing an increasingly useful role in their respective areas, and, with Special Fund assistance, institutes for development have been established or are in process of establishment in these three areas. On August 4 representatives of 22 African countries signed an agreement establishing an African Development Bank, its capital of \$250 million to be provided by the African countries which will make up its membership. My Government welcomes this event and is prepared to consider upon request the provision of technical assistance to help in the establishment and operation of the bank, and also to consider the extension of loans, preferably in the form of participation in specific projects, when the bank is established and operating.

In the region closest to us, Latin America, we are involved in a major cooperative effort. The program of the Alliance for Progress is noteworthy not only because of the resources being devoted to it—which are substantial—but even more for the fundamental economic and social change which is its goal. What is sought by the nations of the Americas is nothing less than a revolution by peaceful means. According to one of the individuals most concerned, more progress has been made in the enactment of basic reforms in the 2 years since the Charter of Punta del Este^{*} was signed than in the preceding half century. One of the types of reform which was considered by the parties at

^{*} For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

Punta del Este to be basic was with respect to the ownership of land. The participating countries in the *Alianza* recognize that land reform is a complex and difficult problem, involving far more than simple land redistribution if it is to be effective.

One of the most noteworthy aspects of the Alliance for Progress program is its essentially international character. A notable contribution is being made to its success by the Inter-American Development Bank established in 1960, both through its regular capital of almost \$1 billion and a social progress trust fund of almost \$400 million which was provided by the United States Government for administration by the bank. In order to assist participating governments in the preparation of sound development plans within the scope of the program, a committee of "nine wise men" from different countries has been established, and in addition, tripartite teams, representing the Inter-American Development Bank, the Organization of American States, and ECLA, have been hard at work in a number of countries. One measure of the success of the *Alianza* has been that, although growth rates are uneven among the participating countries, the national income in the Latin American countries increased last year by more than 5 percent, the figure which was established as the goal for the U.N. Development Decade.

Continuing with the general subject of economic development, I should like to mention two new forms of assistance which have emerged in the last decade. One has been the use of food as a weapon not only in the battle against hunger but in the battle against poverty, disease, and economic stagnation. For example, under our own Food for Peace program during the year ending last June 30, some \$1½ billion worth of American farm commodities were shipped overseas. These food reserves were used not only to feed the hungry but also to contribute in a very substantial way to economic development by providing sources of badly needed local currency. As members know, in most developmental programs the capital needed in terms of local currency is far larger than the capital needed in terms of foreign exchange.

We are pleased that a similar program has

been launched on an international basis at the instance of the General Assembly, and we are glad to have been one of the initiators of the World Food Program experiment. As you will note from the report of ECOSOC, the 6th year of the World Food Program was reviewed by the Council in July and considerable satisfaction was expressed with the progress made, although it was noted with regret that the program had not yet reached its target in contributions, particularly the necessary supplementary contributions in terms of cash. The Council recommended that the General Assembly defer a general review of the program until the 20th session, when it would have more definitive information before it.

Without dwelling on the subject, I should like also to mention another new form of activity in the work of economic and social development, namely the Peace Corps. I imagine that most members of the committee are familiar with the types of work which these dedicated young men and women volunteers are doing in some 47 countries. That their activities have been welcome is indicated by the heartening flow of requests for further volunteers.

Industrial Development

At several points in these remarks I have mentioned the importance which we attach to industrial development. I had originally planned at this stage to outline in some detail our views as to the components of a well-balanced industrial development program and to analyze the degree to which the United Nations system of agencies is contributing in a practical, common, down-to-earth way toward progress in the various aspects, such as planning and programming, project preparation, vocational education, managerial training, credit and market analysis, productivity improvements, financing, et cetera. However, I have imposed upon the patience of this committee long enough, and I shall defer these remarks until a later stage in the session when we shall be discussing industrial development specifically.

At this time I should merely like to call the attention of the delegates to the very significant address made on Monday [September 30]

Mr. George D. Woods, the President of the World Bank and its affiliated agencies, before the meeting of the Bank's Board of Governors. Mr. Woods' remarks on industrial development were of particular interest. He stressed that the Bank should make its assistance to industry more versatile and suggested the possibility of financing for industries new to a particular country and also the possibility of bank loans to finance imports of individual pieces of equipment, components, and spare parts.

Of course, other aspects of economic development are important to industrial development. Lagging agriculture or shortages of trained manpower may choke industrial growth, as some countries have found to their cost. Recognizing these relationships, Mr. Woods suggested that the Bank should use some of its resources to provide new kinds of assistance in the areas of agriculture and education. In a felicitous way he indicated his belief that these ventures could provide "new opportunities for collaborating with other members of the U.N. family." Hand in hand with industrialization must go an awareness of the need to conserve mankind's common heritage of resources in the land, sea, and air. We hope that the developing countries in their drive for rapid industrial growth will learn from the past mistakes of others and build sound conservation practices to their own development programs.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for having taken much of the committee's time. My only excuse is that the questions we are attempting to cover in one general debate are of such vital importance, not only to the developing countries but to the world as a whole.

The noted historian Arnold Toynbee has said that this age will be remembered most of all because mankind dared to believe for the first time that the benefits of civilization could be extended to all human beings everywhere. It is to the realization of this inspiring and revolutionary goal that we are committed. In this vast and complex task the organizations of our international community have an essential and increasingly important role to play. The past dozen years have seen much progress, but the road remains long, difficult, and hazardous. It

is our fervent hope that the nations assembled here will effectively combine together their efforts, their resources, and their intelligence in an intensified endeavor to make the months and years ahead ever more fruitful.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Jamaica (with reservation and declarations), August 9, 1963.

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, September 4, 1963.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1963.

Accessions deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, August 6, 1963.

Notifications received of undertaking to seek ratification or acceptance: Chile, August 15, 1963; Ethiopia, August 17, 1963; Togo, August 6, 1963.

Narcotics

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5273.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Madagascar, July 31, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia, October 17, 1963; India, October 18, 1963; Poland, October 14, 1963.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

Acceptance deposited: Panama, September 25, 1963.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.

Accession deposited: Argentina, September 30, 1963.

Trade

Protocol for accession of Cambodia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962.¹

Ratification deposited: Austria, September 9, 1963.

Protocol for accession of Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962. TIAS 5249.

Ratification deposited: Austria, September 9, 1963.

Protocol for accession of Portugal to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force May 6, 1962; for the United States July 1, 1962. TIAS 5248.

Ratification deposited: Austria, October 1, 1963.

Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of United Kingdom: Uganda, August 19, 1963, with respect to the following:

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to annexes and texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 7, 1955. Entered into force January 23, 1959. TIAS 4186.

Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation. Opened for acceptance at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Protocol of rectification to French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956. TIAS 3677.

Process-verbal of rectification concerning protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol amending preamble and parts II and III, and protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955. Section B entered into force October 7, 1957.

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.¹

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.¹

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.¹

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.¹

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.¹

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Women—Political Rights

Convention on political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.²

BILATERAL

Guatemala

Agreement providing for cooperation in the construction of the Inter-American Highway in Guatemala. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala September 25 and October 3, 1963. Entered into force October 3, 1963.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 8, 1962 (TIAS 5179). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 15, 1963. Entered into force June 15, 1963.

United Kingdom

Agreement for the establishment in the Bahama Islands of an Atlantic undersea test and evaluation center, with agreed minutes. Signed at Washington October 11, 1963. Entered into force October 11, 1963.

Uruguay

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Uruguay. Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo March 19 and July 31, 1963. Entered into force July 31, 1963.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Agricultural Trade. Agreement with India. Signed at Washington May 9, 1963. Entered into force May 9, 1963. TIAS 5336. 2 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Equipment for Use by the Institute of Biophysics of the University of Brazil. Agreement with Brazil. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro October 10, 1962 and March 29, 1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963. With United States memorandum—Dated at Rio de Janeiro January 28, 1963. TIAS 5337. 5 pp. 5¢.

Aviation—Transport Services. Agreement with Colombia. Signed at Bogotá October 24, 1956. Entered into force provisionally January 1, 1957. With exchanges of notes. TIAS 5338. 25 pp. 15¢.

Indian Ocean Expedition—Meteorological Research. Agreement with India, relating to the agreement of September 28 and October 5 and 9, 1962. Exchange of notes—Dated at New Delhi February 15 and April 22 and 23, 1963. Entered into force April 23, 1963. TIAS 5339. 5 pp. 5¢.

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Releases issued prior to October 14 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 513 of October 8 and 526 of October 12.

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*527	10/14	Itinerary for visit of President of Ireland.
*528	10/14	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*529	10/14	"Showcase of American Women Around the World" exhibit.
†530	10/15	Kuwait credentials (rewrite).
*531	10/15	U.S.-Japan conference on cultural and educational interchange.
*532	10/15	Rusk: death of Admiral Kirk.
533	10/16	Rusk: letter to Chancellor Adenauer.
*534	10/16	Itinerary for visit of President of Yugoslavia.
*535	10/17	Cultural exchange (U.S.S.R.).
†536	10/18	Schaetzel: "The Atlantic Partnership as Viewed From the U.S.A."
*537	10/17	Mrs. Louchheim: "Women in a Changing World" (excerpts).
*538	10/18	Itinerary for visit of President of Bolivia.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Foreign Relations of the United States 1943, Volume I, General

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume I, General*.

In this volume there is documentation on a considerable number of multilateral subjects relating to the war. The longest and perhaps the most important chapter is that dealing with the tripartite conference of foreign ministers in Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943. Among other topics treated are questions relating to trade, prisoners of war, refugees, war crimes, relief and rehabilitation, and planning for postwar organization and economic policies.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
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November 11, 1963

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Toward a New Dimension in the Atlantic Partnership

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

It is a great privilege for me to be here, Mr. Chancellor [Ludwig Erhard], to express to you and to the German people the gratitude of every American for the honor which you are paying today to George Catlett Marshall. I am especially happy that Mrs. Marshall is with us. It is of special significance that some of our most distinguished Senators and Representatives are with us—men who themselves were General Marshall's strong collaborators and who represent here the fact that the great partnership between you and us known as the Marshall Plan engaged the commitment and dedication of every American citizen who took part in it. This great undertaking could not have been possible without the understanding and practical support of our citizens who are with us in spirit today.

To those of us who served with him, General

¹ Made on Oct. 27 (press release 557) at St. Paul's Church, Frankfurt, Federal Republic of Germany, on the occasion of the dedication of a memorial to Gen. George C. Marshall.

Marshall was an Olympian figure. He led us through our greatest war but won the Nobel Prize for peace. He was a warm human being but a man of stern discipline with regard to the duties of public service. He had the profoundest respect for the constitutional processes of a democratic people. Simple and uncomplicated in mind and spirit, he gave lessons to most sophisticated colleagues in clarity and perception of fundamentals. I can hear him now saying to his colleagues: "Gentlemen, don't discuss our problems so much as though they were military problems—to do so makes military problems out of them."

General Marshall had two essential attributes of greatness in a statesman. He had the ability to form large concepts—those goals which, as Lord Acton said, captivate the imagination by their splendor and the reason by their simplicity. And he had the will to persevere in these concepts until they became reality.

When General Marshall came back from the failure of the Moscow conference in 1947, the

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as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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concept of a large plan to unite and restore Europe was forming in his mind. By early summer he had made his decision. On June 5, 1947, he spoke at Harvard,² indicating that if the European countries would come together to form a joint plan for economic recovery the United States would be prepared to join them in carrying that plan forward.

Of course, many men and many minds had offered him advice and help. But the responsibility was one that he could not share. Only he, carrying the responsibilities that he did, could advise the President—at a time of domestic economic difficulty and in the face of an approaching election—to go to the people and ask for \$16 billion on what could, at best, be called a reasoned and necessary gamble. But he had the concept clearly in mind. He was convinced that it was right, and he did not hesitate.

And so here we come to the second element of his greatness: his ability, having developed a concept, to press ahead in its execution with steadiness and courage.

And it is due to that courage—his refusal to be intimidated by the uncertainties and difficulties he faced as he moved ahead in the summer of 1947—that we owe the fruitful economic partnership between Europe and the United States whose effects are increasingly evident today.

Economic Partnership

That partnership has prospered far beyond the dreams of 1947, but it has not departed from the two basic concepts which General Marshall set forth.

First: that Europe should play its part in the partnership as a collective entity.

Second: that the United States should rise to the opportunities for cooperation which Europe's unity created.

The first of these concepts has been reflected in the creation of three great institutions—the Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM, and the Common Market.

In these institutions the vision of a truly united Europe was first given effect: a Europe

which could act as an entity not by reason of the hegemony of one state or the endless negotiations of many but because the European states had agreed to treat certain issues as matters of common concern, to be addressed by common agencies, on behalf of a single community.

And each time that Europe took an effective step toward greater economic unity, the United States responded to the need and the opportunity for closer partnership which that step created.

Our original loan to the Coal and Steel Community, our atomic cooperation with EURATOM, and the passage of our Trade Expansion Act—all have given tangible evidence that the American goal was a united Europe able to stand on its own feet and able to deal with the United States as an equal and self-respecting partner and able to resume its historic role in world affairs.

There is much unfinished business for both Europe and the United States in the economic field. It is a full agenda: trade, development, and the balance-of-payments problem—a problem which arises from the economic and security functions the United States performs within the free world, and a problem which we believe can be met effectively by common measures in the OECD and elsewhere. As I reflect upon my own public service I find that I have spent half of it worrying about having too much gold and the other half about having too little. I wish we could discover what amount is just right.

The progress of the last 15 years gives us good grounds for believing that this economic agenda of partnership can be successfully dealt with, if we hold to basic concepts of which General Marshall spoke at Harvard.

Our economic partnership carries with it a deep commitment to reducing the barriers of trade among us—a course well understood and ably advocated by Chancellor Erhard. Liberal trade practices are essential to the economic well-being of our peoples and of the free world as a whole. They are no less vital to the achievement of our common political and security purposes, which require economic strength for their fulfillment. Yet in all our countries there are voices, often politically persuasive and sometimes strident, urging us to take measures

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.

which look in the other direction—back toward higher tariffs, narrow markets, and economic isolationism. It would be dangerous to heed these counsels of yesterday. For the economic fragmentation of the free world could result in tearing down all that we have successfully built together in the last 15 years.

Political Partnership

President Kennedy spoke in this great city in June³ of the need for closer partnership between the United States and a uniting Europe not only in economic matters but in political action and defense. I turn first to political cooperation. This question takes on special importance in the current phase of East-West relations.

Here I would register two warnings. First, the Soviet leaders have not abandoned their goal of world domination or their determination to push toward that goal by every means safe for them. Secondly, the limited agreements we recently have reached with the Soviet Union do not constitute a *détente*. The "hot wire" for emergency use between Moscow and Washington,⁴ the ban on atomic tests in the atmosphere and in outer space and under water,⁵ the declaration against placing in orbit weapons of mass destruction⁶—these are useful but small steps toward peace. There can be no genuine *détente* without progress toward settling such critical political issues as Berlin and the division of Germany, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cuba, and there can be little progress toward disarmament until inspection and verification are accepted. So we of the free world are not justified in relaxing our guard.

However, there are interesting developments within the Communist world. There are the Sino-Soviet dialog and tensions in their state relations. There are growing signs of national awareness among the Communist states of Eastern Europe. There is an evident sobriety about the perils of a nuclear exchange. There are problems in the allocation of their economic re-

sources among the competing demands of armaments, industrialization, consumer satisfaction and the promotion of world revolution. And there are signs of growing interest in more personal freedom.

Processes of change are clearly evident behind the Iron Curtain. It would be a mistake to expect these changes to come rapidly. But it would be a mistake to underestimate the power of the ideas of freedom—ideas which historically have demonstrated their vitality and their roots in the very nature of man.

Our basic goal, as President Kennedy said at the Free University of Berlin,⁷ is to reconstitute Europe—not the artificially divided Europe which has existed since 1945 but a Europe in which every people will enjoy self-determination and freedom.

Such a Europe is now blocked by the policy of the Soviet Union, and events since 1945 suggest that this obstacle will not readily yield to oratory or persuasion. It can only be removed by force or by peaceful change. These are not matters to be decided by force, which would itself destroy the goals we have before us. Increased trade and contacts with Communist nations may help. We should seek, as part of this effort to hasten constructive change, agreement on steps which point toward the removal of the present division of Germany. We must keep steadfastly before us our objective of the reunification of the German people in freedom. That goal is important not only for reasons of justice and humanity but because there can be no secure and lasting peace until the tensions inherent in the involuntary separation of the German people have been removed. No satisfactory political settlement is possible which ignores that goal. It follows from this that we must do nothing in negotiations with the Communist nations which would appear to put the stamp of approval on the *status quo* of the German people. It also follows that we must not allow such negotiations to place in jeopardy the growing strength and unity of the West.

These are not matters which can or will be decided unilaterally by the United States or any other country. That is why the question of political consultation takes on special im-

³ *Ibid.*, July 22, 1963, p. 118.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

⁶ See p. 753.

⁷ BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 125.

portance. No agreement affecting our allies will be concluded by my country without such consultation.

Effective procedures for consultation exist, in the North Atlantic Council and through normal diplomacy. We have made good use of these procedures in the last 2 years. But we must move now toward an even more intimate partnership on these vital matters.

All our countries should take greater advantage of the opportunities which discussions in the North Atlantic Council offer to this end. The United States has greatly intensified its own initiatives to consult in the Council and hopes that other members will do the same.

I also hope that key policymaking officials from interested countries can come together more often, under the aegis of the Council, in *ad hoc* NATO groups. In this way the men who are making decisions on these issues in the home capitals will come to have a better understanding of each other's views. There is a useful precedent for this in the Atlantic Planning Advisory Group, which brings together NATO policy planners from the several capitals at periodic intervals.

We are all aware of certain problems in the transatlantic relationship. My own impression is that these are not truly transatlantic in character but stem from the lack of an answer to the question: What is Europe and who speaks for it? Since the basic commitments of the members of the great Atlantic community are identical, I have no reservation about the vitality of transatlantic partnership between the United States and a strong, vigorous, and united Europe. But the answers here must come—as they had to come in 1947—from the European nations themselves.

Defense Partnership

I turn now to the second field in which President Kennedy indicated that the principle of European unity and Atlantic partnership can be given new meaning—that of defense.

We need substantial and diversified Western power to protect the Atlantic area. This power must include both nuclear and nonnuclear components.

The NATO military authorities have ap-

proved force goals whose attainment would help to give us a balanced force structure. It is important that these goals be attained. Then no one anywhere could conclude that the West is lax or indifferent to the defense of its vital interests.

I hope that the alliance as a whole can meet its goals. In a genuine partnership burdens must be equitably borne; all countries must contribute their fair share to the total strength of the alliance. The United States is making, and will continue to make, its full contribution to this partnership. It is a source of pride that the United States has generally met or exceeded its goals, and a source of regret that certain others in the alliance have not. It is our strong conviction that the alliance as a whole should meet its commitments, and we earnestly hope it will do so.

Since you of the Federal Republic and we of the United States are carrying the heaviest burden of NATO, let me speak to you very frankly. You and we are working in the closest partnership in NATO. We consult each other intimately. When we say that your defense is our defense, we mean it. We have proved it in the past. We will continue to demonstrate it in the future.

We have six divisions in Germany. We intend to maintain these divisions here as long as there is need for them—and under present circumstances there is no doubt that they will continue to be needed. Our forces in Germany are supported by the world's largest logistical system, which maintains these forces in the highest state of readiness with the most modern and powerful equipment. And they are backed by nuclear forces of almost unimaginable power.

And let me remind you that the central NATO front is not the only frontier of freedom on which the forces of the United States stand guard. We have more than 2,700,000 men under arms. Of these we maintain nearly 1 million outside the continental United States, ashore or afloat.

As a nation with more than 40 allies and with worldwide defensive commitments, we are naturally very much interested in the mobility of our forces.

In this connection let me say a word about the airlift of a United States armored division to

Germany for maneuvers. This exercise was an experiment and demonstration arising directly from the airlift capability we committed ourselves to create in 1961, in the context of the Berlin crisis. Its fundamental objective was to permit the swift deployment of reinforcements in the face of a major crisis. It was thus the testing of a new and important additional capability which strengthens the military partnership between the United States and Europe.

Does the airlift of an armored division mean the withdrawal of American troops from Germany? The answer is no—the opposite is the case. Because of this airlift we have at the moment a seventh division temporarily in Europe. Moreover, equipment is in position for still another division. Thus, the airlift capability developed by the United States at such great expense provides a major source of added strength to the alliance.

The partnership among the North Atlantic allies must extend to nuclear defense. The occasion to do so arises, as in the case of political consultation, from the need to meet a specific problem. That problem is posed by a growing Soviet nuclear power, reflected in hundreds of Soviet missiles aimed both at Western Europe and at the United States.

It has seemed to two successive United States administrations that the most effective way to meet this threat was by a combination of United States missiles and of MRBM's [medium-range ballistic missiles] deployed to Allied forces under multilateral manning, control, and ownership.

Such a multilateral missile fleet would be militarily effective. Its accurate and well-protected missiles would be counted toward the total needs of Western deterrence.

It would strengthen Atlantic partnership by binding the United States and Europe in an inextricable nuclear tie. The missiles and warheads would be jointly owned and controlled; they could not be unilaterally withdrawn.

And it would strengthen European cohesion by providing the presently nonnuclear powers an opportunity to share in ownership, manning, and control of a powerful nuclear force on the same basis as other members of that force.

It would thus be an effective means of giving

effect to the principles of which General Marshall spoke within the present political framework of Europe.

As that framework progresses there must, of course, be room for evolution in this field, as in the field of political consultation. The President spoke clearly of this possibility in relation to the missile fleet when he said here last July that as Europe moves toward unity it can and should assume greater responsibility in this field.

The European Response and Germany's Role

The Atlantic partnership owed its beginnings, in the economic field, both to the indication of United States willingness to proceed and to the European response. As General Marshall said in his speech: "The initiative . . . must come from Europe."

Sixteen years ago Germany could play only a limited role in framing the European answer. But the ensuing years have seen the Federal Republic achieve a sound political system, remarkable economic advance, and an eminent place in European, Atlantic, and world affairs. You have achieved an historic reconciliation with France. In these efforts it was Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who provided the leadership and played an imperishable part in German and European history. His achievement was powerfully supported by Dr. Ludwig Erhard's "economic miracle."

As a result of these great labors Germany is able to play its vital role in developing European unity and partnership between Europe and North America. The opportunities which are now before you are at least as exciting as those which European countries faced 16 years ago.

A little more than a week ago Chancellor Erhard stressed the need for such an effort when he outlined the program of his government. It is a German program, based on what the Chancellor believes to be the best interests of Germany. But it is also a European program, an Atlantic program, and a free-world program.

Let me say parenthetically, in the light of Mayor [Willy] Brandt's constructive speech last Tuesday, that we Americans who strive

for bipartisanship on our principal foreign policies are heartened to find the leaders of all of your principal parties in general agreement on the basic arrangement of your foreign policy.

We expect to move forward with Chancellor Erhard and his able colleagues toward European unity and Atlantic partnership.

In this effort the steadfastness of both our countries, and of other countries which share our goals, will be tested to the full. For we will have to face obstacles as we move ahead.

There will be difficulties in further progress toward European integration and Atlantic partnership; these are to be expected in a movement of such historic dimensions. We must

be prepared for temporary delays and disappointments. But we are moving with the flood of history, and there can be no other outcome. If freedom is to prevail we must move with deepest conviction and resolution.

I have come here today to make clear, once again, my country's readiness to give new dimension to our partnership. It is for you, and others who share the goals of European unity and Atlantic partnership, to determine whether that effort shall go forward. By going forward we will be honoring in the way which he would most appreciate the statesman who first gave voice and meaning to these concepts, General George C. Marshall.

The Atlantic Partnership as Viewed From the U.S.A.

by J. Robert Schaetzel

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs¹

Napoleon, asked by an admiring countess to explain his amazing military successes, replied that he had succeeded because he had had no allies. Any member of any alliance can appreciate perhaps the crumb of cynical truth in this remark, but it must also be recalled that it was an alliance that in time defeated the general and destroyed his empire. Indeed, history is rather more on the side of alliances than conventional wisdom might suggest. What was Stalin's cry for a second front other than a demand for allies?

The nations of the North Atlantic face today the question, however, of whether Napoleon's cynicism was right or wrong. Do the Atlantic nations that have together worked such miracles

over the last 20 years possess the vision and the sense of purpose required to strengthen our relatively new, common institutions in a changing international environment, where an atmosphere of *détente* ebbs and flows?

European Integration Movement

The European integration movement sheds light on this question. It originated not from European preoccupation with external threats but from positive instincts. Sick of a disastrous train of civil wars, acutely aware of the deficiencies of national governments working independently of one another and unable to provide either security or well-being, impressed by the need for the economy of scale that only a united Europe could offer, excited by the prospect of a great adventure in the organization of man's affairs—these were the emotions and reactions that led to Schuman's proposal on May 9,

¹ Address made at Berlin, Germany, on Oct. 21 (press release 536 dated Oct. 18) at a conference sponsored by the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation on the European Economic Community within the Atlantic framework.

1950, when a new era in European history began. Were the European Coal and Steel initiative and the great further steps forward in 1955—EURATOM and the Common Market—aberrations in the political process of states and not to be repeated? Must Europe and North America revert to a 19th-century environment where nations behave rationally only in the irrational atmosphere of pervasive fear? As Dr. Johnson said, are our minds clarified only by the sight of the gallows?

The excitement set loose in the world by the European Community arose not merely because it promised to settle Franco-German rivalry, or because it would create a great new common market, but because the integration movement was a major innovation in the great tradition of Western political development. National states, by peaceful, democratic means, had embarked upon an admittedly imperfect but nonetheless evident federal process. This process, a revolution to be brought about by peaceful evolution, gave encouragement as well of a different sort: It demonstrated that free men had not lost that precious ability to influence and change their political environment and institutions. The disappointment today over European affairs—in Europe and the United States—stems as much from the dashing of these high hopes as from discouragement over the stalemate which hinders solution of many economic issues of immediate concern.

The Elements of Political Change

What is the chemistry that induces political innovation? Leadership is certainly a crucial factor. Europe, in the critical postwar period, was blessed by the quality of its leaders. A new generation is challenged to build on the achievement of such great men as Schuman, De Gasperi, Spaak, Bevin, and Adenauer.

Another element in the chemistry must be a general sense of public impatience with the established order of things, a feeling that new institutions are needed to deal with old problems.

It is argued that basic political change and the intimate association of national states require a sense of common danger. Is not the

continuing oppressive threat of nuclear war such a danger? If political change results from pressures too great to ignore, contain, or resist, are not the social, political, and economic problems of the Southern Hemisphere such pressures? How can the countries of the North Atlantic square their common Christian ethic with a world situation in which the disparity of living conditions between the advanced countries and the less developed nations has not decreased but increased? These are issues and pressures that suggest innovation—and collective action.

America and Europe

Now to reduce these generalities to the hard substance of Atlantic policy. First, let me call your attention to the breadth and depth of the American commitment. Recall the steady support that the United States has given European unity, to NATO and to the OECD. Despite the current frustrations and difficulties, the broad line of policy has not been brought under serious question, nor is there any substantial pressure in America building up for alternative policies. The reasons for this are easily found. Our national security—as does yours—rests on collective defense. Our economic well-being—and yours—can be assured only if we expand and improve our present transatlantic collaboration. Together we can help to meet the vast and growing needs of the impoverished people of the world. If this task must be handled alone, there can be no assurance that any of us has the strength or the will to meet the challenge.

These truths are widely believed and felt in America. Somewhat paradoxically the United States seems to appreciate more clearly, or at least more actively, than Europe the need for common action. While we recognize our great strength—and feel our burdens—Americans perceive a web of interrelationships that restrict our freedom of action.

The constructive purpose of this meeting in Berlin demands no less than American candor. Thus it must be said: We are watching for the European response to these crucial issues of our times. We are aware of the difficulties that en-

snare Europe for the moment. But America too has its problems. Realistically, what is there to be done to move the Atlantic nations ahead now?

What Does Europe Want?

I suggest that both here and in North America we need to know more clearly what kind of united Europe the *Europeans* want. Some of the words and concepts of 1950 and 1955 have lost their meaning. While large steps ahead toward unity may not be possible now, in troubled and confused times goals serve vital purposes. What are the goals that the Europeans set for themselves today? What does a European in 1963 envisage as the structure of the new, democratic Europe begun so bravely in 1950?

The system of political development adopted by the Six countries has been pragmatic. Through a process of economic integration it has been designed to create conditions that would, in time, lead to political unity. Do Europeans still accept this concept of political evolution? Americans are pragmatic people and have seen the merit in the theory. As political innovators, political philosophy attracts us. The intangible goal of a United States of Europe pulls at the American imagination. An important part of the fabric of American life, and a source of our national strength, are the goals set forth in the American Constitution. Yet 180 years after its acceptance by the Thirteen Colonies, some of the assured individual rights and national objectives that are an integral part of this document still remain to be fully realized.

The fact that goals cannot be immediately realized neither destroys their validity nor their utility. But they must be goals that people deeply want. And there must be effort and progress toward achievement of these goals.

I suggest that there are four important steps ahead which we can take, in the present situation—if Europe has the will. They are: the trade negotiations,² the multilateral nuclear force, an Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly, and strengthening NATO and the OECD.

² See p. 745.

The Trade Negotiations

First, the trade negotiations. We are embarked on what has the potentiality of being the greatest assault on trade barriers in modern history. These negotiations inevitably will be seen in the world as a test of Europe and America. But these negotiations will continue to be subject to the risk of perversion into the narrowest and meanest form of tariff bargaining. What, in fact, should be the basic purpose of this endeavor—and if we forget this purpose, what do we both stand to lose?

The Common Market has led the way in demonstrating to the world that the removal of trade barriers and restrictions results not in economic difficulty but in prosperity. In fact, the European Free Trade Association was a response to the pacemaking of the six Common Market nations. EFTA too has reaped the rewards of freer trade. And finally, the wisdom and the benefits of the European experience were not lost on the United States. We welcomed the prospect of negotiations that would lead to reductions of trade barriers between the Common Market, America, and other nations. Indeed, it was the success of your own European technique for reducing tariffs that led us to make a major change in our approach to tariff negotiations—we would bargain not item by item but in broad, across-the-board reductions. The European example and anticipation of mutually beneficial negotiations stimulated a renaissance in American attitude toward commercial policy. The 1962 Trade Expansion Act embodies these changes.

Some months ago a distinguished member of the Common Market Commission remarked in Washington that in coming negotiations the nation, or nations, that reduced trade barriers the most stood to benefit the most. (I should add that he graciously suggested that the EEC would be prepared to defer this benefit to the United States.) Behind this wry observation lies truth. Our common purpose should be maximum reductions for maximum common benefit. This would redound to the political advantage of both sides of the Atlantic. We would in turn benefit the less developed countries through opening further the great North

Atlantic market. Most assuredly there will be neither economic nor political rewards to Europe, or to the United States, if these negotiations deteriorate into niggling bargaining in a ruthless search for immediate national advantage.

The Multilateral Nuclear Force

The second item on the agenda is the multilateral nuclear force. Seven members of NATO are now at work on this project in Paris and in Washington. The MLF is a serious effort to deal with a major problem. The problem is to improve and broaden the participation in the nuclear defense of the alliance. The MLF is a means of dealing with legitimate interests of the nonnuclear powers without further proliferation of national nuclear forces. We are persuaded that if the participating nations succeed in their efforts and bring the MLF into being the force will make a significant and needed contribution to the defense of Europe.

Furthermore, the beneficial byproducts of this effort within the alliance may not be fully appreciated. The work of developing together the MLF, the designing of a corporate body to build the force, to maintain and control it—these are tasks which tie the alliance more closely together.

The European Communities, NATO, and the OECD all came into being because the Atlantic nations realized that new approaches were needed to solve intractable problems. The nuclear issue is such a problem. The system of European and Atlantic collaboration that we have devised and tested, beginning with the Marshall Plan, is one of common action to deal with common problems. The nuclear problem is an issue of basic common concern; it is being approached today on a basis of collective action. I would further suggest that the mere process of seeking a solution through collective action has special political and psychological timeliness today.

An Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly

A third area where action is possible is in the development of an Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly. This proposal has come from sev-

eral quarters, including our own Senator Fulbright. The Declaration of Paris, issued January 1962, contained a similar suggestion. At difficult times like this, when nations are uncertain as to what the future holds, or, in fact, how to deal with the present, the parliamentary process can be of special importance. To some extent our difficulties today are due to the fact that the elected representatives of the people have lost touch with their colleagues across national boundaries. Although parliamentarians show keen appreciation of their own domestic political difficulties, there is a growing sense of the need to appreciate the "domestic" difficulties of the Atlantic community as a whole. This is only to remind us all that the heart of the democratic process is the compromise of immediate sectional interest for the general good.

The first step is to improve the system for contact and consultation among responsible Atlantic parliamentarians. Our legislators, a number of whom will shortly meet in Paris and in the course of their sessions will consider this matter, envisage a consultative body with a mandate to inquire into the entire range of Atlantic activities—political, economic, and security. It should be possible to devise arrangements which would meet the sensitivities of the neutrals—as we have done in the OECD—while at the same time avoiding a further and self-defeating proliferation of international institutions.

NATO and the OECD

Fourth, we are led naturally to the need to strengthen the two major Atlantic institutions, NATO and the OECD. Perhaps of greatest value in the coming period—in fact an indispensable step—is to improve the techniques for intergovernmental consultation. Sensible gov-

³ The Declaration of Paris was adopted at the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations held at Paris, January 8-20, by citizen delegates selected by their respective parliaments. It proposed, among other things, that the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference be developed into a consultative Atlantic Assembly, which would review the work of all Atlantic institutions and make recommendations on questions of concern to the Atlantic community. For text, see H. Doc. 433, 87th Cong., 2d sess.

ernmental action for the individual good of the nations and for their collective advancement depends on the degree of consensus developed. If through continuing consultation we come to understand more clearly the political, security, and economic problems that must be resolved within the alliance, we have taken a major step forward. While detailed and specific agreement may be hard to come by, the mere fact of the consensus, the thought and discussion that have preceded this consensus, will inevitably mean more harmonious subsequent national actions than would otherwise have been the case.

The inexorable internal changes and movement in the Eastern bloc will place new demands on the Atlantic nations and require the closest coordination within NATO. The clear and simple threat of the past has been replaced by a far more complex range of problems. To advance both the interests of the West and the prospects for peace requires substantial improvement in our consultative procedures.

Berlin in the Atlantic Framework

I have noted the postwar phenomena of European developments, the agenda before us against the problems and doubts of which we are all aware. Berlin has a special relevance to this analysis and should give us renewed confidence with which to face the future.

Berlin symbolizes the unsolved problems and dangers of the world; it exemplifies the chasm between the East and the West. But more importantly it reminds the world of what free people can do. No visitor has come away from Berlin without admiration for the spirit of the people of this city. Free Berlin gives needed encouragement as the great example of the capability of the Western nations, European and American, to collaborate closely, tenaciously, and effectively in maintaining the freedom and vitality of this city. Each day this cooperation is demonstrated in the manner in which Frenchmen, Germans, Englishmen, and Americans work together on matters related to Berlin—and together toward a common goal which each nation agrees is of vital political importance.

The inspiration to us all of the people of Berlin, the atmosphere of support and cooperation offered by other allied nations, can be seen

in the extent to which Berlin is fast becoming a cultural center whose reputation transcends European boundaries and extends to all quarters of the world. The controversy regarding its symphony orchestra is whether it is first, second, or third among the orchestras of the world. What better example is there of this cultural rebirth than the *Festwochen*? Artists from many nations have come to Berlin to demonstrate their talents and to develop their ideas in the atmosphere of freedom and challenge which is the hallmark of this city.

When gloom is a currency which circulates all too freely, is this not the time and certainly the place to recover confidence and hope? What more proof do the Atlantic nations need that optimism is a working hypothesis than the daily lesson of this city? Berlin prospers in the face of danger and adversity. It has brought allies together in solid purpose and to achieve common goals. It is also one more example of the depth and permanent commitment of the United States to the freedom of this city and our constant dedication to the goal of a reunified Germany.

Conclusion

In less than a week a ceremony will take place in Germany commemorating George Marshall.⁴ In 1947 at Harvard University he outlined, not a plan, but an idea. Had it not been for the imagination of European leaders and their response, the miraculous economic, political, and spiritual recovery of Europe would not have taken place. The process of European unity grew out of the process of European recovery. I have emphasized the hold that European unity has on America and the support we have given it.

We are still too much in the middle of these extraordinary affairs to comprehend fully the sweeping changes that have taken place in Europe since 1947. These have not been changes resisted by the United States—in fact they have been welcomed and encouraged. If we had wanted weak and docile satellites we would not have lent our support to European unity. Therefore, it was in the pattern and logic of postwar American policy toward Europe that

⁴ See p. 726.

President Kennedy on July 4, 1962,⁵ should invite a uniting Europe to join with the United States in an Atlantic partnership.

Pessimists may argue, perhaps, that partnership is an illusory and impractical notion. It can be charged, for instance, that there is no European partner, nor likely to be one, but rather a number of national states in wide disagreement. The skeptic may further note that while the European economy is three-fifths that of the United States, and growing at a more rapid pace, Europe still lacks the capacity and perhaps the will to carry a proportionate share of the burden of our common defense. But as I have suggested before, the test of the validity of a goal is not whether it is immediately attainable. The test is whether the goal of partnership is the one desired by Europeans.

Our dictionaries define "partner" as one who has a part in anything with another—a partaker; an associate; a sharer; participant; colleague. These are important words. They convey the direction, the substance, and the atmosphere of what we wish for. There is no passive connotation in these words, but the sense of getting about the business to be done. The nations of the North Atlantic face a great challenge. I have no doubt that we shall rise to meet this test together.

Secretary Rusk Sends Good Wishes to New British Cabinet Officers

Following are texts of messages from Secretary Rusk to Lord Home on his appointment as Prime Minister of Great Britain and to R. A. Butler on his appointment as Foreign Secretary.

Message to Lord Home

Press release 540 dated October 21

OCTOBER 19, 1963.

My sincere congratulations and best wishes to you on your appointment as Prime Minister of Great Britain. We have worked together closely during the recent years when you were

⁵ BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 131.

Foreign Secretary and I have come to know and to value greatly your wisdom and courage. I look forward with confidence to continued collaboration with the British Government and people under your leadership.

Message to Mr. Butler

Press release 541 dated October 21

OCTOBER 20, 1963.

My warm congratulations and best wishes as you assume the duties of Foreign Secretary.

I look forward to seeing you at the NATO ministerial meeting in December and to our close association in the days ahead.

U.S. Revises Aid to Viet-Nam's Special Forces

*Department Statement*¹

The U.S. Government has informed the Government of Viet-Nam that U.S. support will no longer be provided to those elements of the special forces which are not committed to field operations or engaged in related training programs. This action is in line with President Kennedy's statement on September 12 that "What helps to win the war we support. What interferes with the war effort we oppose."²

Letters of Credence

Kuwait

The newly appointed Ambassador of the State of Kuwait, Talat al-Ghoussein, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on October 15. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 530 dated October 15.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Oct. 22 by Robert J. McCloskey, Department press officer.

² The President's statement was in reply to a news correspondent's question put to him at his regular news conference.

Prime Minister of Ireland Visits the United States

The Prime Minister of Ireland, Sean F. Lemass, and Mrs. Lemass visited the United States from October 11 to 20. They were in Washington October 15-17. Following is the exchange of greetings on the south lawn of the White House and the text of a communique released at the close of discussions between the President and the Prime Minister.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, OCTOBER 15

White House press release dated October 15

President Kennedy

Prime Minister, this is a great day for the Americans. It is with the greatest pride and satisfaction that I welcome you to the United States. You follow a long and distinguished list of Irish leaders who have come here in other days—Parnell, De Valera, and the others. They came to enlist the sympathy and support of Americans in their struggle for independence, and it is a source of pride to us all that that support and sympathy was forthcoming.

But now you come as the leader of a sovereign country and a country which I can attest from personal experience bears the United States the greatest good will and which bears us the strongest and most fraternal bonds of friendship.

We are proud to welcome you, Prime Minister, not only because of the long past, not only because you will see in the United States in your short visit more Irish men and women who were either born in Ireland or bear Irish blood than you would see in several years in Ireland, but also because you are building a vigorous new country which looks to the past with pride and the future with hope.

The 3 days, Prime Minister, which we spent in Ireland this summer¹ are among the warmest memories of our lives, and it is, therefore, a great pleasure to have a small chance to show in welcoming you our great appreciation to the Irish people for what they are doing now not

only in their own country but in all parts of the world.

And, therefore, Prime Minister, *céad míle fáilte*, which, for those of you who did not come to Ireland this summer, means "a hundred thousand welcomes."

Prime Minister Lemass

Mr. President, I thank you for your kindly words of welcome. I thank you for the honor which you have done me in inviting me and my wife to visit these United States of America as your guests.

Your historic visit to Ireland, Mr. President, in June last is still vivid in our memory. You came to the land of your ancestors as the President of the United States, and this was a great occasion for us.

The spontaneous demonstrations of affection and esteem which you experienced wherever you went in Ireland, in Dublin, in Wexford—particularly in Wexford—in Cork and Galway, and in Limerick, reflect the feelings of the Irish people and mark also the high regard which your great nation has amongst all our people.

Mr. President, this is a very proud day for me to come here to the Capital of your great country representing the people of Ireland, people who are now a government of their own, who are now dedicated to and free to pursue the ideals of this great democracy which has chosen you to be its leader, an Ireland which is endeavoring to provide for its own peoples the opportunities for well-being and happiness which your people have already secured.

In these aims of ours, we find encouragement and hope in the great efforts of your people, in their achievements, in the manner in which they are now through their energy and their optimism and their confidence building the future of America on its great past.

The friendship between our two countries began long ago in history. It was formed in the common struggle for independence. It was fostered by our common dedication to the ideals of freedom and justice and democracy, and it is fortified by ties of blood and kinship; a friendship thus supported cannot but endure, and it is our aim to develop in every possible way the cooperation between our peoples in

¹ BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 128.

industry and commerce and cultural activities, and to help you, sir, in your great aims of maintaining peace in the world and helping men everywhere to obtain freedom from oppression and freedom from want.

Mr. President, I bring you the greetings of the Irish people. They realize that in extending this invitation to me it was your desire to do honor to them, and they are deeply thankful to you.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE, OCTOBER 17

White House press release dated October 17

During the course of the official visit of His Excellency Sean Lemass, Prime Minister of Ireland, the Prime Minister and President Kennedy discussed a number of issues of common interest and concern to Ireland and the United States. The two leaders expressed their satisfaction at the longstanding friendship between Ireland and the United States, and reaffirmed their intention to maintain their close cooperation and collaboration in areas of common interest.

The President again thanked the Prime Minister for the hospitality extended by the Irish Government to the President and his party during the President's visit to Ireland in June of this year.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the current state of affairs in Western Europe with particular reference to Ireland's efforts to improve its economic links with the continental European countries. The Prime Minister expressed his country's hope that the amount of private investment on the part of American industry in Ireland could be expanded. The President suggested that the steadily improving economic condition of Ireland should attract the interest of a number of American firms.

The President also noted that, on its part, the United States hopes to supply more goods to the Irish market.

Noting the important role Ireland is playing in the United Nations, the President stated that he appreciated the substantial contribution made by Ireland to the establishment of peace and stability in the Congo.

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their mutual desire to strengthen the cultural links between the two countries.

The President assured the Prime Minister of the continuing interest on the part of the United States in Ireland's economic progress.

President Tito of Yugoslavia Visits the United States

Josip Broz Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Mrs. Broz, visited the United States from October 16 to 25. They were in Washington on October 17. Following is the exchange of greetings on the south lawn of the White House and the text of the communique released following conversation between President Kennedy and President Tito.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated October 17

President Kennedy

Mr. President, I take great pleasure in welcoming you to the United States. I hope during this visit we can reciprocate some of the hospitality that you have shown to members of the United States Government, both members of the Cabinet and, most recently, Members of the Congress, in your own country.

This is a difficult and dangerous world in which we live. I think it is most important that we have across the distance of water and across perhaps a difference in political philosophy—that we have an understanding of the basic policies and objectives of the countries through the globe so that danger may be lessened.

We are very glad to have you here, Mr. President, so that you can see something of the United States. I am glad you are going to the South and then to the West.¹ This is a vigorous and progressive people that you will

¹ President Tito canceled his visit to the West because of illness.

see. Nature has been very generous to us, and I think that your visit here, where I am sure you will be warmly and hospitably treated and welcomed, will give you a greater understanding of the policies and objectives and meaning of the United States of America.

So this visit is very welcome. We are very glad to have you here at the White House, and I hope as a result of your visit that the relations between our two peoples will become stronger and that our commitments to national independence will be strengthened.

So, Mr. President, we are very glad to welcome you and your distinguished wife, the members of your Government, here to the White House.

President Tito

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, for this friendly reception and for the kind invitation please accept our sincere thanks.

It is with pleasure that I take this opportunity to have with you, Mr. President, frank exchanges of views on current world developments and on questions of concern to both our countries.

We are glad that we shall be able on this occasion to see at least a part of your great and beautiful country and to acquaint ourselves more directly with some of the great achievements of the hard-working American people.

In various periods of their history, the peoples of Yugoslavia and the United States of America had been linked together with common aspirations, particularly during the two World Wars, when they were struggling side by side to make a reality those ideals which were formulated in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945.

It has always been the desire of the Government of Yugoslavia to maintain good and friendly relations with the United States of America. I am pleased, Mr. President, that you share this conviction. I believe that our exchanges will contribute to both the stability of our good relations and our mutually beneficial cooperation and will also reflect our common interest in the preservation and strengthening of peace in the world.

I take this opportunity to convey the friendly greetings of the people of Yugoslavia to the people of the United States of America.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated October 17

The President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy and the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito held conversations in Washington on October 17 in which Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Harriman, and Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Tyler also participated for the United States and Vice President of the Federal Assembly Todorovic, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Koca Popovic, and Ambassador Micunovic for Yugoslavia.

The meeting provided a timely opportunity for a useful exchange of views on a number of important matters both in regard to the international situation and to United States-Yugoslav relations. The talks took place in a cordial and friendly atmosphere, and were characterized by frank discussion.

President Kennedy and President Tito agreed that the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was a significant initial step in lessening international tension. They concluded that, with determined effort and support from all nations willing to make their contribution, further progress could be made in reducing the danger of war and in ensuring a basis for world peace. Both Presidents reaffirmed their strong support for the United Nations and declared their wish that all countries would endeavor by their activities to increase its effectiveness.

President Kennedy and President Tito reviewed the evolution of the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia. President Tito conveyed the thanks of the peoples and the Government of Yugoslavia for the American assistance of earlier years and expressed particular appreciation for the help recently extended to the victims of the Skopje earthquake. The two Presidents expressed the hope that relations between the two countries, now that direct assistance is no longer needed, could

be further developed in all other fields, particularly in the expansion of normal trade, of economic contacts, and of cultural, scientific and other exchanges.

Yung Lo Encyclopedia Presented to Library of Congress

Press release 546 dated October 23

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

A set of a recent reprinting of the celebrated Ming Dynasty *Yung Lo* Encyclopedia was presented on October 23 by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, on behalf of the Department of State, to the Library of Congress. Rutherford D. Rogers, Acting Librarian, represented the Library of Congress at the presentation ceremony in the office of the Librarian. This reprinting, a gift to the Department of State by the noted Chinese scholar, Professor Yang Chia-lo, was presented to the Library of Congress in order that it be readily available to scholars in Chinese literature and history in the United States.

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS

Assistant Secretary Hilsman

It gives me much pleasure to represent the Department of State at this presentation of a set of the reprinted *Yung Lo* Encyclopedia to the Library of Congress.

The *Yung Lo* Encyclopedia is one of the most celebrated works in Chinese literature. It was compiled during the reign of the Ming Dynasty Emperor Cheng Tsu (1403-1424 A.D.) and contained virtually all learning possessed by the Chinese up to that time. Some 3,000 scholars participated in the prodigious task of research and writing involved in its preparation. The Encyclopedia in its original form contained a total of 22,937 titles, bound in 11,095 volumes. Because of its size, only one copy was made. Some 100 years later a duplicate was painstakingly copied out by over 100 scribes.

Fire destroyed the original in the closing years of the Ming Dynasty, around 1640. In ensuing years, further destruction of the duplicate copy through fire and war reduced the number of remaining volumes to something over 800. Many of these have been scattered among private book collectors and libraries in the United States, Japan, Great Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Viet-Nam.

Some 30 years ago the renowned Chinese scholar, Dr. Yang Chia-lo, became concerned at the unfortunate fate of this treasure of Chinese literature. Since then he has worked untiringly to locate the remnants of the Encyclopedia throughout the world and to obtain photostatic copies. Now 803 volumes of the original have been reprinted under the direction of Professor Yang by the World Book Company of Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, and thus made available to students of Chinese civilization. I understand also that Dr. Yuan Tung-li of the Chinese section of the Library of Congress and formerly Director of the National Library of Peiping compiled in 1939 a census of the volumes of the Encyclopedia existing in Europe, in this manner contributing to the happy result which we see here today.

The academic world is indebted to the dedication, energy, and learning which Professor Yang Chia-lo has given to this important work over the greater part of his lifetime, and to the tradition of free scholarship being nurtured on Taiwan by the Government of the Republic of China. Professor Yang is presently head of the graduate institute of Chinese literature at the Taiwan Provincial Normal University in Taipei.

The Department of State is honored to have been the recipient of this handsome gift and extends on behalf of the American people sincere appreciation to Professor Yang and to all others who helped to make this reprinting possible.

Mr. Rogers

The Library of Congress is both honored and enriched by this notable contribution to scholarship, which will be a treasured acquisition for our Chinese collections. Since this Encyclopedia reproduces many texts which would other-

wise never have come to light, its value to Sinology will be immeasurable. Research scholars in this country will be grateful to Professor Yang Chia-lo for generations to come as they profit from his efforts.

The Library of Congress is grateful to him for this gift to the American people, and to the Department of State for its good offices in placing these volumes in the national library.

U.S. Sympathizes With Cuban People in Aftermath of Hurricane Flora

*Department Statement*¹

We distinguish between the suffering caused by Hurricane Flora and the hardships encountered by the Cuban people as a result of the practices and policies followed by the Communist regime of Fidel Castro. On both counts, however, we sympathize with the Cuban people. The immediate offer of disaster relief by the American Red Cross—which, as you all know, is the principal humanitarian organization of the American people—was in our best humanitarian tradition. Castro chose to reject this offer by the Red Cross as hypocritical and to extend the rejection to any aid from the United States.

The unprecedented attitude of the regime stands in contrast to the request for assistance by other countries hit by the hurricane and to which the United States has gladly responded. We have on various occasions expressed our sympathy for the Cuban people as a whole over deprivations of their personal freedom and material well-being resulting from the fact that Castro has clamped a Communist political and economic system on the country. The resulting hardships have been further compounded by gross mismanagement and incompetence,

which the Cuban regime itself admits. The damage caused by Flora should not be allowed to hide these essential facts.

Our policies toward the Castro regime have been determined by its Communist character, its hostility toward the United States, and its efforts to overthrow other governments in the hemisphere by violence, terror, and subversion. As long as the Cuban government chooses to follow this aggressive course, it leaves us no choice but to maintain our present economic controls, though it should be recalled that for humanitarian reasons these controls have never restricted exports of nonsubsidized foodstuffs and medicines.

U.S. and Iran Sign Agreement Extending Educational Exchanges

Press release 552 dated October 25

The Governments of Iran and the United States on October 24 signed at Tehran an agreement extending the program of educational exchanges between the two countries, begun in 1949 under the Fulbright Act.¹

The new agreement is authorized by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (the Fulbright-Hays Act). It was signed by Abbas Aram, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, and American Ambassador Julius C. Holmes.

Through the last academic year a total of 442 academic exchanges have taken place under the program; 351 Iranian students, professors, teachers, and research scholars have come to the United States, and 91 Americans in comparable capacities have gone to Iran. In addition to those under the agreement a number of leaders and specialists have been exchanged between the two countries.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Oct. 23 by Robert McCloskey, Department press officer.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1973, 3956, and 4824.

International Educational and Cultural Exchanges: A Look Back and a Look Ahead

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

It is more than a ceremonial occasion when a new structure dedicated to the pursuit of a peaceful world rises on the rock of Manhattan. It is an occasion for deep satisfaction, on the part not only of all who have labored to build the Institute of International Education but of the many millions in many lands who are the beneficiaries, direct or indirect, of its work. It is an event which invites a look back and a look ahead.

Nineteen-nineteen, the birth year of the Institute of International Education, was the year in which man first flew across the Atlantic. Women had not yet won the right to vote in the United States. Radio was just beginning to emerge from the laboratories. Atomic energy was locked up in a mathematical equation which had passed most of us by. Trips to the moon were still the private property of Jules Verne. And the United States, after a bright and prophetic brief appearance on the world stage, was turning back to isolation and "normalcy"—a tragic retreat from reality for which we and much of the rest of the world paid dearly a short generation later.

There were countercurrents, set in motion by men who realized that the American people could not thrive or in the long run survive in isolation from the rest of the world. Among them were the small group who founded the Institute of International Education. The de-

cision to set it up has been ascribed to a meeting of three men before a log fire at the Columbia University Club here in New York City in the late fall of 1918. They were Elihu Root, Nicholas Murray Butler, and Stephen P. Duggan, whose mind the idea of such an institute had been taking shape for some time.

The three agreed that there should be established a clearinghouse of information which would, at the same time, serve to stimulate greater interest in the study of international relations on American campuses and more exchanges of students, teachers, specialists, and trainees between the United States and other countries.

The original announcement, in April 1919, noted that "even intelligent Americans were comparatively unfamiliar with international affairs" and that "it is impossible to understand other peoples and to appreciate properly the worth without correct information concerning their life, institutions, and culture." It noted also that the need for a central clearinghouse of information in the field of international education had become manifest during the war through inquiries of all kinds from the Allied countries—about our universities and the availability of scholarships and fellowships.

There were very few international scholarships and fellowships in those days. There were the Rhodes Scholarships to Oxford, which were then 15 years old, and the Boxer Indemnity Fund Scholarships for Chinese students to the United States, which had begun in 1908. These and all other international scholarships

¹ Made at symbolic cornerstone-laying ceremonies for the Institute of International Education's new headquarters building at United Nations Plaza, New York, on Oct. 24 (press release 551).

ellowships, and professorships to and from the United States probably did not total more than several hundred.

Compare those beginnings with the college year 1962-3! According to the annual survey of the I.I.E.—one of your unique and very valuable services—nearly 78,000 foreign citizens were in the United States on educational assignment. More than 64,000 were students. Almost 6,000 were teachers, researchers, and other scholars. And more than 7,000 were interns and residents affiliated with United States hospitals. These students and teachers and doctors came from 152 countries and territories. Seventeen of these countries sent more than 1,000 persons each.

Many of these visitors came at their own expense. But many received financial support from private institutions or governments, including our own.

On the outgoing side your report showed nearly 19,000 Americans abroad on educational assignment—approximately 16,000 students and 3,000 faculty members and administrative staff. Note your warning that, since some institutions overseas did not respond to your inquiry, these figures are on the low side.

Educational and cultural exchanges have become a very important aspect of this country's relations with almost every part of the world. As you know, many exchanges are financed by the United States Government, as an expression of the good will of the American people, their faith in education, their belief in free inquiry, and their unflagging determination to build a world in which all men will live together in peace. The Fulbright Act and the Smith-Mundt Act shortly after World War II set in motion a great international migration of students and scholars and artists. The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 broadened and strengthened this stimulating movement.

That legislation also created a U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs and specifically required it to make a special study of whether the program had been effective. That Commission, composed of distinguished private citizens under the chairmanship of John W. Gardner, president of the

Carnegie Corporation, completed its worldwide survey² early this year.

In summary, it said:

Testimony is overwhelming from all sources that the program as a whole is effective. The Commission was frankly surprised, though gratified, at the wealth, variety and convincing character of the evidence.

It concluded that the exchange program had:

- increased mutual understanding;
- succeeded in helping dispel among foreign visitors many misconceptions and ugly stereotypes about the American people;
- been outstandingly successful in providing a valuable educational experience to foreign grantees;
- benefited his (the grantee's) home country;
- effectively established channels of communication between the people in other countries and the United States; and
- effectively supported one of the Nation's most basic international objectives—of helping support strong free societies able to work together, in mutual trust and understanding, on the grave issues of our time.

The Commission's main conclusions would apply as well to exchanges financed by sources other than the United States Government. Indeed, as you know well, even the exchange program of the Department of State relies heavily on private participation. Private agencies and volunteer groups do most of the work of screening the grantees, placing them in universities, planning the tours of foreign visitors, and arranging hospitality. This is a people's program, in which Americans as individuals help to create better international understanding and build the peace. The American undergraduate who is friendly to a foreign student, and the American family which invites a foreign visitor into its home, contribute significantly to the success of the program.

These exchanges have also enabled many thousands of American students and teachers to go

² A limited number of copies of the Commission's report, entitled *A Beacon of Hope: The Exchange-of-Persons Program*, are available upon request from the office of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Room 4513, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

abroad—with immense benefit not only to themselves but to their country.

The Advisory Commission called its report *A Beacon of Hope*. If educational and cultural exchange is “a beacon of hope,” the Institute of International Education is one of the great lighthouses from which this bright signal shines forth to the world.

Over the years I.I.E. has been blessed with a notable roster of trustees. No commemorative plaque could hold them all, or even some of the most widely known—names such as Bunche, Butler, Carman, Dulles, Jessup, Lamont, Moore, Morrow, Murrow, Root, Seligman, and many others.

I.I.E. has been the clearinghouse its founders intended it to be. It has been the storehouse too—of statistics on exchanges, of evaluations, of whys and wherefores.

One of the Institute’s greatest services has been to enlist more and more citizens and private organizations in support of exchanges. Through its wide-ranging regional activities, it mobilizes the talents and energy of many thousands of Americans. It has demonstrated superbly a great strength of this Republic—the voluntary activities of private citizens in responsible support of broad public purposes.

Now, what may we see as we look ahead?

Certainly we may expect a further expansion of educational and cultural exchanges. And it is altogether appropriate, I think, that this building should be just across the street from the headquarters of the United Nations and that it should be dedicated on United Nations Day. For exchanges are one of the hopeful means of moving peoples and nations toward the world of peace and justice and fraternal friendship envisaged by the United Nations Charter.

Undoubtedly we will be called upon to help meet the educational needs of more foreign students in the years ahead. We must, therefore, keep on trying to improve the procedures of selection, orientation, language instruction, and placement.

It is better to have fewer students who can fully realize their opportunities than a larger number including some who are inadequately prepared or are not placed in the right institu-

tions or courses for their particular needs. I as has been forecast, 120,000 foreign students will be here in 1970, we shall want to be sure that they are in fact fully qualified and that we are able to match their talents and interests to the opportunities available in this country. We can, I know, count on I.I.E. and other private agencies to work diligently and intelligently on these problems. The State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and other agencies of the Government are, of course, prepared to cooperate.

I would hope also for a larger outflow of American students to other countries, especially to those with which we have not had extensive contacts in the past. We now have exchange of various kinds with some 130 countries and territories. But there are still many college and universities in other countries in which American students are not enrolled. I would hope that governments not now providing scholarships to American students would make an effort to do so.

Already we are negotiating with other governments for the joint financing of new exchange agreements which the Fulbright-Hays Act makes possible. We have concluded such agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and Sweden. Nothing could better express the mutuality of benefit under international exchange programs than increasing mutuality of support.

But this is not a day to linger over problems and unfinished business. This is a day to honor those who had the imagination and foresight to establish the Institute of International Education, and those whose work and support have made it the invaluable instrument it has become. This is a day to say “well done” to the galaxies of foundations, colleges, and universities, corporations, individual citizens, and other parts of the private sector, which support international educational and cultural exchanges. This is a day to rejoice in the growth of the international communities of mind and spirit.

I hope that the I.I.E. will receive the expanding private support it needs to grow in service in the future. You have my warmest best wishes.

Public Hearings Announced for 1964 GATT Trade Negotiations

ANNOUNCEMENT OF PUBLIC HEARINGS¹

Preparations for next year's trade negotiations moved into the public phase on October 21 as the White House issued a public list of products to be considered for possible reductions in rates of duty and the scheduling of public hearings was announced by the Tariff Commission and the Trade Information Committee. All imported articles but those excepted from negotiation by the Trade Expansion Act have been listed for consideration.

The issuance of the public list is one of the steps required before the President may use his authority to lower duties. The next step will be the public hearings. Both the Tariff Commission and the Trade Information Committee hearings are scheduled to begin December 2. November 20 has been set as the deadline for interested parties to submit requests to appear at either hearing.

The Tariff Commission will hold hearings at which interested parties may testify about the economic effects of possible tariff reductions on American industry. The hearings will be an important part of a Tariff Commission investigation of the articles on the list. Results of the investigation will be reported to the President in 6 months.

The Trade Information Committee, an inter-agency committee chaired by a member of the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, will hear testimony relevant to any aspect of the negotiations but will devote particular attention to four subjects:

(1) Reductions in rates of duty which the United States should seek to obtain from other nations.

¹ Released on Oct. 21 by the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

Pamphlet Available at GPO

A pamphlet entitled *Negotiations Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962* and containing the announcement of public hearings (with background on the public list and hearing procedures); the notice of proposed trade agreement negotiations and articles to be considered for negotiation; and the notice of public hearings is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (price 20 cents).

(2) Nontariff barriers imposed by other nations which the United States should seek to have removed or modified.

(3) Articles upon which elimination, reduction, or continuance of present United States duties should be offered.

(4) Other United States import restrictions which should be offered for modification or continuance.

Stressing the importance of testimony before the Trade Information Committee, Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, said:

We need the marketplace knowledge of American producers. We cannot promise that our negotiating teams will come home with every reduction or every concession that we will seek, but the more we know of their needs the more our farmers, workers, and businessmen will benefit from our efforts.

The final list of articles on which the United States will negotiate will not be completed until the testimony presented at these hearings, along with other available information, has been thoroughly reviewed and analyzed and the President has received the views of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the

Tariff Commission, and other Government agencies whose advice may be requested.

Reductions in duties as a result of the GATT negotiations will not occur until other nations have agreed to reductions on articles of interest to United States producers. Once agreement is reached the act requires that, generally, reductions be spaced over a period of at least 4 years.

The public list is made up of several separate lists of commodities. Each list includes those articles whose duty may be reduced under a particular provision of the Trade Expansion Act.

The basic negotiating authority in the act permits the President to lower duties by as much as 50 percent of the July 1962 rate. The list of articles eligible under this authority includes all imported products but those excepted by the act.

Another list itemizes articles on which the duty was 5 percent or less on July 1, 1962. The President is authorized to negotiate reductions to zero in these duties.

There is a list of tropical agricultural and forestry products not produced in significant quantity in the United States on which rates may be reduced or eliminated if the European Economic Community will take comparable action.

Another list of products (referred to in the Department of Agriculture's Handbook 143) is included on which tariffs may also be reduced to zero in agreement with the European Economic Community if the President finds that such action would help maintain or expand United States exports of like articles.

The published lists are as inclusive as the law permits. Some products on the lists, however, may not be offered for negotiation as a result of determinations following the public hearings. It is also expected that very few of the Handbook 143 products on which duties may be reduced to zero through special agreements with the European Economic Community will, in fact, prove suitable for such treatment.

It is anticipated that a supplement to the public list will be issued to identify those products eligible for tariff elimination because the United States and the European Economic Community account for more than 80 percent of free-world

exports in the article. Other supplements may be issued when appropriate to announce additional subjects to be considered for negotiation.

NOTICE OF PROPOSED TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND ARTICLES TO BE CONSIDERED FOR NEGOTIATION²

In conformity with section 221 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 874, 19 U.S.C. 1841, and as President of the United States, I hereby direct publication in the *Federal Register* of this notice of proposed trade agreement negotiations, including the list of articles to be considered for trade agreement concessions under Title II of the Trade Expansion Act.

I. Proposed negotiations.

It is intended that the trade agreements authority conferred by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will be employed primarily in multilateral trade agreement negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). That authority may also be employed to conclude other trade agreements including but not limited to, agreements for the purpose of obtaining mutually advantageous tariff or other trade concessions, consolidating trade agreement concessions, or compensating other nations for modifications or withdrawals of United States trade agreement concessions such as those required to compensate for increases in United States rates of duty incidental to the promulgation of the Tariff Schedules of the United States.

II. List of articles to be considered for trade agreement concessions.

(A) Every article provided for in the Tariff Schedules of the United States (28 F.R. 8599, as corrected 28 F.R. 9131)³ will be considered for modification or continuance of the existing duty to the extent permitted by sections 201(b) and 254 of the Trade Expansion Act (19 U.S.C. 1821, 1884), continuance of duty-free or excise treatment, continuance or modification of any other import restriction applicable thereto, or imposition of any additional import restriction, pursuant to authority vested in me by section 201 of the Trade Expansion Act (19 U.S.C. 1821); *Provided that*,

(1) The articles identified in part 2 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States, which I hereby determine to be articles presently meeting the criteria of section 225(a) of the Trade Expansion Act

² 28 *Fed. Reg.* 11251.

³ "Tariff Schedules of the United States" or "Tariff Schedules of the United States Annotated (1963)", Division of Public Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, available for inspection at any field office of the Bureau of Customs or the Department of Commerce. [Footnote in original.]

(19 U.S.C. 1845), will not be considered for reduction of any duty or other import restriction, or elimination of any duty;

(2) The articles consisting of crude petroleum and certain products thereof and subject to import quotas under Presidential Proclamation 3279, as modified by Presidential Proclamations 3290, 3328, 3386, 3389, 3509, 3531, and 3541, which I determine to be articles presently meeting the criteria of section 225(a) of the Trade Expansion Act, will not be considered for reduction of any duty or other import restriction, or elimination of any duty;

(3) Pursuant to section 257(h) of the Trade Expansion Act (19 U.S.C. 1887), the articles identified in part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States will not be considered for modification of any import restriction imposed under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (64 Stat. 261, as amended, 7 U.S.C. 624).

(B) All articles dutiable under the Tariff Schedules of the United States item numbers or designated parts thereof contained in the following lists will also be considered for reduction of duty to a rate below fifty percent of the rate existing on July 1, 1962, including elimination of duty:

(1) The following articles, as to which I hereby determine that the rate of duty which existed on July 1, 1962, was not more than 5 percent ad valorem (or ad valorem equivalent, as determined by the Tariff Commission in accordance with section 256(7) of the Trade Expansion Act (19 U.S.C. 1886(7)) and pursuant to authority delegated by section 5(a) of Executive Order 11075, as amended), will be considered for reduction or elimination of duty pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 201 and section 202 of the Trade Expansion Act (19 U.S.C. 1821, 1822):

100.07	111.56	126.39	145.26
100.09	111.64	126.41	145.30
100.81	111.68	126.51	145.42
105.30	111.72	126.57	145.44
105.82	111.76	126.65	145.52
106.40	111.80	126.73	145.53
106.50	112.10	126.81	146.10
106.60	113.08	126.85	146.12
106.85	113.40	126.87	146.52
107.15	113.56	126.95	146.54
107.30	113.58	127.01	146.56
107.35	119.50	130.15	146.58
107.80	120.11	130.20	146.60
110.15	120.13	130.30	146.62
110.20	125.01	130.40	146.90
110.25	125.05	130.45	147.29
110.30	125.10	130.65	147.60
110.33	125.15	131.15	147.62
110.35	125.20	131.35	148.72
110.40	125.40	131.72	149.20
110.47	125.60	131.75	149.22
110.57	126.05	135.20	149.24
110.60	126.09	136.10	155.40
111.10	126.11	137.66	155.50
111.15	126.15	140.35	155.55
111.18	126.17	140.38	156.20
111.22	126.19	145.04	156.25
111.28	126.21	145.07	156.47
111.32	126.25	145.14	156.55
111.40	126.37	145.24	160.20

160.65	204.25	445.20	608.05
161.29	222.25	452.14	608.06
161.49	245.90	452.48	608.10
161.94	251.05	452.58	608.30
165.15	251.35	452.68	608.70
165.55	251.40	452.80	609.42
166.10	251.51	461.20	609.80
166.20	252.05	470.23	609.96
166.30	252.45	470.65	610.20
166.40	252.55	472.40	610.25
167.15	252.63	472.42	610.32
175.06	253.25	472.46	610.39
175.15	254.05	473.04	610.65
175.36	256.13	473.32	620.02
175.45	270.35	473.36	620.32
176.42	270.45	474.20	622.04
177.04	273.15	474.26	632.10
177.32	273.50	474.60	632.14
177.34	273.75	485.10	632.64
182.30	273.80	493.04	642.35
182.55	274.15	493.20	642.93
182.58	274.65	493.56	642.96
184.10	274.80	494.22	646.06
184.20	274.85	494.60	646.15
184.25	300.20	495.15	646.20
184.30	300.45	511.11	646.25
184.35	301.01	511.14	646.26
184.40	301.02	511.21	646.28
184.45	304.10	512.11	646.40
184.47	304.12	512.14	646.54
184.61	304.16	512.24	646.56
184.70	304.22	513.11	646.58
186.30	306.50	513.71	646.70
186.40	306.51	514.51	651.23
188.18	306.52	515.21	651.25
188.20	309.41	515.51	651.45
188.24	309.66	516.11	652.06
188.36	335.40	516.41	652.27
188.50	356.50	517.11	652.30
190.57	361.52	517.31	652.33
190.90	380.48	518.44	652.40
191.15	390.12	519.37	652.93
192.50	390.50	519.95	653.07
192.55	415.15	520.38	653.10
192.60	416.30	520.39	657.09
193.15	417.50	521.17	660.50
200.45	418.60	521.41	661.80
200.55	418.62	521.54	674.51
200.90	418.76	521.61	690.30
202.03	419.22	521.81	692.24
202.06	420.18	521.84	696.05
202.09	420.86	522.31	700.20
202.12	420.96	522.71	700.27
202.15	421.08	523.31	703.80
202.18	421.16	523.35	730.73
202.21	421.18	523.51	741.05
202.24	421.44	531.27	741.06
202.27	421.46	532.11	741.15
202.30	421.54	533.11	755.10
202.36	425.88	534.31	755.40
202.39	426.28	540.14	760.32
202.41	428.36	543.61	760.54
202.43	428.38	543.63	771.15
202.45	435.10	601.06	793.00
202.48	435.40	603.10	
202.50	437.22	607.11	
202.52	437.30	607.15	
202.53	437.58	607.31	
202.57	437.84	607.50	
202.63	439.30	608.02	

(2) The following articles, which I hereby determine to be articles referred to in Agricultural Handbook No. 143, United States Department of Agriculture, as issued in September 1959, will be considered subject

to the further requirements of section 212 of the Trade Expansion Act (19 U.S.C. 1832) for reduction or elimination of duty pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 201 and section 212 of the Trade Expansion Act:

100.07	115.60	126.51	135.90	144.10	147.48	153.32	165.55
100.09	116.00	126.53	135.92	144.12	147.50	154.05	165.65
100.20	116.05	126.55	135.94	144.20	147.52	154.10	165.70
100.35	116.10	126.57	136.00	145.02	147.54	154.15	166.20
100.40	116.15	126.59	136.10	145.04	147.60	154.20	166.30
100.43	116.20	126.61	136.20	145.07	147.62	154.25	166.40
100.45	116.25	126.63	136.22	145.08	147.64	154.30	167.05
100.50	116.30	126.65	136.30	145.09	147.66	154.35	167.10
100.53	117.00	126.67	136.40	145.12	147.68	154.40	167.15
100.55	117.05	126.71	136.50	145.14	147.70	154.45	167.20
100.60	117.10	126.73	136.60	145.16	147.72	154.55	167.25
100.63	117.15	126.77	136.61	145.18	147.75	154.60	167.30
100.65	117.20	126.79	136.70	145.20	147.77	155.10	167.32
100.73	117.25	126.81	136.80	145.22	147.80	155.12	167.34
100.75	117.30	126.83	136.90	145.24	147.85	155.15	167.35
100.77	117.35	126.85	136.91	145.26	147.90	155.20	167.37
100.79	117.40	126.87	137.00	145.28	148.10	155.30	167.40
100.81	117.45	126.89	137.01	145.30	148.15	155.35	167.42
100.85	117.50	126.91	137.10	145.40	148.20	155.40	167.50
100.95	117.55	126.93	137.20	145.41	148.25	155.50	170.01
105.10	117.60	126.95	137.21	145.42	148.30	155.55	170.05
105.20	117.65	127.01	137.25	145.44	148.35	155.60	170.10
105.30	117.67	127.10	137.28	145.46	148.40	155.65	170.15
105.40	117.70	130.10	137.40	145.48	148.42	155.70	170.20
105.50	117.75	130.15	137.50	145.50	148.44	155.75	170.25
105.55	117.80	130.20	137.60	145.52	148.46	155.80	170.30
105.60	118.10	130.30	137.62	145.53	148.48	156.25	170.35
105.70	118.15	130.35	137.63	145.54	148.50	156.30	170.40
105.82	118.25	130.40	137.66	145.55	148.52	156.35	170.45
105.84	118.30	130.45	137.70	145.58	148.54	156.40	170.60
106.10	119.50	130.50	138.00	145.60	148.56	156.45	175.03
106.20	119.55	130.55	140.09	145.90	148.60	156.47	175.06
106.30	119.65	130.60	140.10	146.10	148.70	160.20	175.09
106.40	119.70	130.65	140.11	146.12	148.72	160.30	175.10
106.50	120.11	130.70	140.14	146.14	148.74	160.35	175.12
106.55	120.13	131.10	140.16	146.20	148.76	160.40	175.15
106.60	125.01	131.12	140.20	146.22	148.80	160.65	175.18
106.70	125.05	131.15	140.21	146.24	148.82	161.05	175.21
106.75	125.10	131.20	140.25	146.30	148.86	161.07	175.24
106.80	125.15	131.25	140.30	146.42	148.90	161.15	175.27
106.85	125.20	131.27	140.35	146.44	148.93	161.19	175.30
107.10	125.25	131.30	140.38	146.50	148.96	161.23	175.33
107.15	125.30	131.33	140.40	146.52	148.98	161.29	175.36
107.20	125.40	131.35	140.45	146.54	149.15	161.31	175.39
107.25	125.50	131.38	140.46	146.56	149.20	161.37	175.45
107.30	125.60	131.40	140.50	146.58	149.22	161.41	175.48
107.35	125.65	131.45	140.55	146.60	149.24	161.43	175.49
107.40	125.70	131.85	140.60	146.62	149.26	161.45	175.51
107.45	125.80	132.15	140.65	146.64	149.28	161.49	176.02
107.50	126.01	132.20	140.70	146.66	149.50	161.53	176.03
107.55	126.05	132.25	140.75	146.68	149.60	161.57	176.04
107.60	126.07	132.30	141.05	146.70	150.00	161.59	176.07
107.65	126.09	132.50	141.10	146.72	150.50	161.61	176.10
107.70	126.11	132.55	141.15	146.80	152.00	161.65	176.11
107.75	126.15	135.10	141.20	146.88	152.05	161.69	176.18
107.80	126.17	135.12	141.25	146.90	152.14	161.71	176.22
115.00	126.19	135.14	141.30	146.91	152.18	161.75	176.24
115.05	126.21	135.16	141.35	146.93	152.22	161.79	176.26
115.10	126.23	135.20	141.40	146.96	152.26	161.81	176.29
115.15	126.25	135.30	141.45	146.98	152.30	161.84	176.30
115.20	126.27	135.40	141.50	147.02	152.34	161.88	176.32
115.25	126.29	135.50	141.55	147.10	152.38	161.92	176.33
115.30	126.31	135.51	141.60	147.13	152.42	161.94	176.36
115.35	126.33	135.60	141.65	147.16	152.46	161.96	176.38
115.40	126.35	135.61	141.66	147.20	152.50	162.03	176.40
115.45	126.37	135.70	141.70	147.22	152.54	162.07	176.42
115.50	126.39	135.75	141.75	147.26	152.58	162.11	176.45
115.55	126.41	135.80	141.80	147.29	152.62	162.15	176.46
				147.31	152.70	165.25	176.47
				147.33	153.00	165.30	176.49
				147.36	153.04	165.35	176.50
				147.40	153.08	165.40	176.52
				147.42	153.16	165.44	176.54
				147.44	153.24	165.46	176.55
				147.46	153.28	165.50	176.70

177.04	184.50	306.33	452.22
177.12	184.52	306.34	452.24
177.16	184.61	306.40	452.28
177.20	184.65	306.41	452.34
177.22	184.70	306.42	452.44
177.24	184.75	306.43	452.48
177.26	186.10	306.44	452.52
177.30	186.15	306.50	452.54
177.32	186.30	306.51	452.58
177.34	190.10	306.52	452.64
177.36	191.15	306.53	452.68
177.40	192.15	306.54	452.80
177.50	192.20	306.60	455.04
177.52	192.25	306.61	455.16
177.56	192.30	306.62	455.18
177.58	192.35	306.63	455.20
177.62	192.45	306.64	455.22
177.70	192.55	306.70	455.24
177.72	192.60	306.71	455.30
178.05	192.75	306.72	455.32
178.10	192.90	306.73	455.34
178.25	193.10	306.74	455.40
178.30	193.15	306.80	455.42
182.10	222.25	306.81	465.25
182.11	300.15	306.82	465.30
182.15	300.20	306.83	465.35
182.20	304.08	306.84	465.40
182.30	304.10	425.30	465.45
182.35	304.14	426.12	465.50
182.36	304.16	435.10	490.05
182.40	304.22	435.40	490.10
182.45	304.24	435.45	490.12
182.46	306.10	435.70	490.30
182.52	306.11	437.22	490.32
182.55	306.12	437.30	490.44
182.58	306.13	437.47	490.46
182.91	306.14	437.58	490.48
184.10	306.20	437.84	490.50
184.20	306.21	439.30	493.04
184.25	306.22	450.20	493.42
184.30	306.23	450.30	493.56
184.35	306.24	450.40	493.65
184.40	306.30	450.50	493.66
184.45	306.31	452.14	748.25
184.47	306.32	452.20	

(3) The following articles, which I hereby determine after receipt and consideration of findings by the Tariff Commission made pursuant to section 213 (c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1833 (c)) to be tropical agricultural or forestry commodities of a kind not produced in significant quantities in the United States, will be considered subject to the further requirements of section 213 of the Trade Expansion Act for reduction or elimination of duty pursuant to authority vested in me by section 201 and section 213 of the Trade Expansion Act:

136.00	147.85	175.27	202.36
145.08	148.60	175.30	222.15
145.14	148.65	176.36	435.40
145.16	175.09	188.18	452.20
145.42	175.10	188.22	452.22
145.44	175.11	188.36	452.52
146.80	175.12	193.10	452.64
147.80	175.24	193.15	452.68

(C) (1) Listing of an article for negotiation anywhere in this paragraph does not preclude the possibility of negotiation pursuant to notice given elsewhere herein.

(2) The term "rate existing on July 1, 1962" is used in this paragraph as defined by section 256(4) of the

Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1886(4)), and section 203 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 (76 Stat. 75, as amended, 76 Stat. 882).

III. Supplemental notices.

From time to time as may be appropriate, other notices may be published for the purpose of giving notice of proposed actions under the Trade Expansion Act not announced in this notice.

IV. Public hearings of the Trade Information Committee.⁴

I have designated the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations to perform the functions prescribed by the second sentence of section 223 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (section 3(g) of Executive Order No. 11075 of January 15, 1963, as amended). Accordingly, the Trade Information Committee of the Office of the Special Representative will hold public hearings for the purpose of affording an opportunity for any interested person to present views concerning any article on the list published in paragraph II of this notice, any article which should be so listed, any tariff or other trade concession which should be sought by the United States, or any other matter relevant to the trade agreements proposed in Part I of this notice.

V. Public hearings of the Tariff Commission.⁵

In accordance with section 221(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, I have furnished the Tariff Commission with the list⁶ of articles published in paragraph II of this notice, for the purpose of securing from the Tariff Commission its judgment as to the probable economic effect of modifications of duties or other import restrictions on United States industries producing like or directly competitive articles.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 21, 1963.

NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARINGS

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS

TRADE INFORMATION COMMITTEE

Docket No. 63-2

Notice of Public Hearing Relating to Articles to be
Considered for Trade Agreement Negotiation

⁴ See F.R. Doc. 63-11183, in Notices section, *infra*.
[Footnote in original.]

⁵ See F.R. Doc. 63-11132, in Notices section, *infra*.
[Footnote in original.]

⁶ Copies of Public Notice of Investigation and Hearings Under Section 221 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 may be obtained from the United States Tariff Commission, Washington, D.C.

TIMETABLE

1. Requests to present oral testimony must be received by Wednesday, November 20, 1963.
2. For due dates for written briefs, see section 5 of this notice.
3. Hearings begin December 2, 1963.

1. Notice of public hearing.

Pursuant to section 223 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (76 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C. 1843), section 3(g) of Executive Order No. 11075 of January 15, 1963, as amended (28 F.R. 473), section 202.3 of Directive No. 1 of the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (48 C.F.R., Part 201, 28 F.R. 3974), and § 211.2(a) of its Regulations (48 C.F.R., Part 211, 28 F.R. 7947), the Trade Information Committee in the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations has ordered public hearings to be held concerning the notice of proposed trade agreement negotiations and articles to be considered for negotiation published this day by the President in the *Federal Register*.

2. Subject matter of public hearings.

The subject matter of the public hearing will include any matter pertaining to the proposed trade agreements announced in the notice of proposed trade agreement negotiations required to be heard by section 223 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. That section provides, in pertinent part, that any interested person may present his views "concerning any article on a list published pursuant to section 221, any article which should be so listed, any concession which should be sought by the United States, or any other matter relevant to such proposed trade agreement".

In view of the fact that briefs and testimony presented to the Tariff Commission concerning the subject matter set forth in section 221 of the Act will be made available to the Trade Information Committee, the same material need not be submitted to the Committee. It is suggested that persons appearing before the Committee devote particular attention to the following subjects comprised within section 223 of the Act:

- (1) Reductions in rates of duty which the United States should seek to obtain from other nations.
- (2) Restrictions and barriers to trade other than rates of duty imposed by other nations which the United States should seek to have removed or modified.
- (3) Articles upon which elimination, reduction, or continuance of the United States rate of duty should be offered.
- (4) Other United States import restrictions which should be offered for modification or continuance under the authority of section 201(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

3. Time and place of public hearing.

The public hearing will commence on Monday, December 2, 1963. Hearings held before January 1, 1964, will be held in Room 105, 722 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. Hearings held after January 1, 1964, will be held in Conference Room B of the Interdepart-

mental Auditorium, Labor Department Building, Constitution Avenue and 14th Street, N.W., Washington D.C.

The sequence of the hearings will follow Schedules 1 through 8 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS). Each Schedule will be treated as a unit for the purpose of conducting the hearing. Matters not specifically related to any commodity will be scheduled as the Committee deems appropriate.

Hearings on Schedules 1 and 2 will commence on December 2, 1963. The opening date for hearings concerning Schedules 3 through 8 and any other matters will be announced in the *Federal Register* on Tuesday December 10, 1963.

4. Requests to present oral testimony.

All requests to present oral testimony, regardless of subject matter, must be received by the Executive Secretary of the Trade Information Committee not later than Wednesday, November 20, 1963. The entire schedule for the proposed hearing will be formulated on the basis of requests to appear received as of that date.

Requests to present oral testimony must conform with the regulations of the Committee, 48 C.F.R., Part 211, 28 F.R. 7947. Requests shall be submitted in an original and three copies. Requests must include the following information:

- (a) The name, address, and telephone number of the party submitting the request;
- (b) The name, address, telephone number, and official position of the person submitting the request;
- (c) The description and TSUS item number (to the extent practicable) of the commodity or commodities in which the party has an interest;
- (d) The subject or subjects to be dealt with in the proposed testimony, listed individually and, in the case of import restrictions other than duties, with sufficient particularity to identify the restriction to be discussed;
- (e) A brief indication of the position to be taken by the party;
- (f) The name, address, and telephone number of the person (or persons) who will present oral testimony; and
- (g) The amount of time requested for the presentation of oral testimony, and if more than 15 minutes is requested, the reasons therefor.

Each party submitting a request will be notified of the Committee's disposition thereof. Each person whose request is granted will also be notified of the date on which he is scheduled to appear and the amount of time allotted for his presentation. The Committee reserves the right to restrict the time allotted for oral presentation. Any person whose request is denied will be notified of the reasons therefor.

5. Submission of written briefs.

Any interested party may submit a written brief to the Committee concerning the subject matter of this hearing. Each party presenting oral testimony must

file a brief. All briefs must be filed within the time specified in the following paragraph.

Written briefs concerning commodities contained in Schedule 1 of the TSUS must be received by the Executive Secretary by November 25, 1963, and briefs concerning commodities contained in Schedule 2 must be received by December 2, 1963. Written briefs concerning commodities contained in other Schedules of the TSUS must be filed fifteen calendar days before the date on which hearings concerning that Schedule are to begin. Hearing dates for subsequent Schedules will be announced in the *Federal Register* on December 10, 1963.

Briefs must conform to the Committee's Regulations, 48 C.F.R., Part 211, 28 F.R. 7927. Briefs must be submitted in twenty (20) copies, one of which must be made under oath or affirmation. In addition, each brief shall clearly designate on the first page the name and address of the party submitting the brief, the description and TSUS item number of the commodities to which the brief pertains, and the subject matter of the brief.

Suggestions for the preparation of written briefs will be sent to all parties requesting to present oral testimony, and will otherwise be furnished upon request to the Executive Secretary.

In order to aid preparation for the hearings, statistics of United States imports on a world-wide basis, according to TSUS item numbers, will be available shortly from the Government Printing Office in a Census Bureau publication entitled "United States Imports of Merchandise for Consumption: TSUS Schedule by Part by Item, 1961". A breakdown of United States imports by country will be published later in the year.

6. *Rebuttal briefs.*

In order to assure each party equal opportunity to contest the information provided by other interested parties, the Committee will entertain rebuttal briefs filed by any party within one week after the close of hearings on a particular schedule. Rebuttal briefs shall conform, in form and number, to the Regulations of the Committee and the provisions of this notice applicable to written briefs. Rebuttal briefs should be strictly limited to demonstrating errors of fact or analysis not pointed out in the briefs or hearing, and should be as concise as possible.

7. *Information exempt from public inspection.*

Parties are referred to §§ 211.7 and 211.8 of the Committee's Regulations, 48 C.F.R., Part 211, 28 F.R. 7947, for the regulations concerning information exempt from public inspection. In addition, the following should be noted: 1) Requests to present oral testimony should contain no confidential information, and any requests marked "For Official Use Only" will not be accepted. 2) Every written brief must present in nonconfidential form, on separate pages, a statement of the party's position and supporting arguments sufficient to inform any other party of the arguments he must meet in order to oppose the position taken in the brief.

8. *Public inspection of written materials.*

Subject to the regulations of the Committee, and in particular §§ 211.7 and 211.8, all written materials filed with the Committee in connection with this hearing will be open to public inspection, by appointment, at the office of the Executive Secretary, Executive Office Building, 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506. Transcripts of the hearing will also be available for inspection, but not for reproduction. Transcripts may be purchased from the official reporter.

9. *Communications.*

All communications with regard to these hearings should be addressed to: Executive Secretary, Trade Information Committee, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Executive Office Building, 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506.

SIDNEY PICKER, JR.
Executive Secretary

GATT Asked for Advisory Opinion on U.S.-EEC Poultry Dispute

Following is the text of a letter from Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, to Eric Wyndham White, Executive Secretary of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

OCTOBER 16, 1963.

DEAR MR. WYNDHAM WHITE: As you know, a dispute exists between the US and the European Economic Community concerning poultry.¹ Desiring to do what they reasonably can to minimize the differences between them, and without prejudice to the juridical position of either party, the Government of the United States and the European Economic Community believe that much would be gained by obtaining an impartial opinion on the question set forth below.

Accordingly, on behalf of my government, I hereby request that appropriate steps be taken to convene, as promptly as possible, a meeting of the Council of Representatives of the GATT, for the purpose of establishing a panel to render an advisory opinion to the two parties concerned in order to determine:

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1963, p. 996, and Oct. 14, 1963, p. 605.

"On the basis of the definition of poultry provided in paragraph number 02.02 of the Common Customs Tariff of the European Economic Community, and on the basis of the rules of and practices under the GATT, the value (expressed in United States dollars) to be ascribed, as of September 1, 1960, in the context of the unbindings concerning this product, to United States exports of poultry to the Federal Republic of Germany".

With respect to the composition of the panel, the Government of the United States and the European Economic Community believe it would be appropriate to have it consist of three members, including yourself as chairman, and that the other two members not be nationals of any country involved in the present dispute with respect to poultry.

Sincerely yours,

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
*Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations*

Promotion of Foreign Investment in U.S. Companies To Be Studied

White House press release dated October 2

President Kennedy on October 2 named a 13-man task force to study ways of promoting increased foreign investment in the securities of U.S. private companies and to survey the availability of foreign financing to U.S. private companies operating abroad. These questions bear importantly upon the future of the U.S. balance of payments. The task force includes both government officials and private members of the financial community.

Government officials on the task force are:

- Henry H. Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury, who will serve as chairman of the task force, representing the Treasury Department
- Robert M. McKinney, retiring U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland, who will serve as executive officer of the task force, representing the Department of State
- Ralph A. Young, adviser to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, who will represent the Board
- Charles A. Coombs, vice president for foreign operations of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who will represent the Bank

Private members of the task force include:

- Frederick M. Eaton, partner in the New York law firm of Shearman and Sterling
- G. Keith Funston, president, New York Stock Exchange
- George F. James, senior vice president for planning and finance, Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc., New York
- George J. Leness, president, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce Fenner and Smith, New York
- Andre Meyer, senior partner, Lazard Freres & Company, New York
- Dorsey Richardson, president, Investment Company Institute, New York
- Arthur K. Watson, president, IBM World Trade Corporation, New York
- Walter B. Wriston, executive vice president, First National City Bank of New York
- John M. Young, partner, Morgan Stanley and Company, New York

The creation of this task force is in line with section 6 of President Kennedy's special message on the balance of payments, July 18.¹ The purpose and background of the task force study is outlined in more detail in section 6 of the President's message and in a separate Treasury Department release² based on an organization plan and working program worked out by the Treasury Department in consultation with the State Department.

At the conclusion of its work the task force will make a report to the President.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Part 8, April 12-May 6, 1963; 382 pp.; Part 9, May 23, 1963, 213 pp.; Part 10, July 10, 1963, 93 pp.; Part 11, March 8, 1963, 175 pp.; Part 12, August 1, 1963, 87 pp.

Government Information Plans and Policies (Part 4—Vietnam News Coverage). Hearing before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. May 24, 1963. 34 pp.

Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting a report for the period January 1, to June 30, 1962, pursuant to the Bretton Woods Agreements Act. H. Doc. 130. June 25, 1963. 51 pp.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 250.

² Not printed here.

U.N. Calls on States to Refrain From Orbiting Weapons

Following is a statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, made in Committee I (Political and Security) on October 16, together with the text of a resolution adopted in plenary session on October 17.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

U.S. delegation press release 4265

May I first echo the words of welcome of our Chairman to the two Soviet astronauts¹ who are visiting the General Assembly this morning and express the welcome of my Government and its respect and admiration for their extraordinary achievement in pioneering the exploration of outer space.

Mr. Chairman, it is my agreeable duty to speak to the draft resolution² introduced in his committee yesterday by the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Padilla Nervo, who has spent so many years of devoted effort in the field that probably preoccupies the attention of all of us with a greater universality than anything else, and that is the field of disarmament.

This resolution represents another decisive advance in the disarmament process, one which we believe will prevent the orbiting or the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. We warmly welcome the cooperation of the Soviet Union in this endeavor. We are par-

ticularly pleased that this draft resolution is cosponsored by all of the participants in the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

While attempting to realize our ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament, we have sought continuously to implement less ambitious measures which could help to lessen international tensions and to facilitate our larger task. By the adoption of this resolution, members of the United Nations will be taking a positive step toward the goal of disarmament. Hopefully this step could lead us to further measures.

The resolution, as you know, is a simple one. It does not require the cessation by governments of any present activity. To the best of our knowledge no weapon of mass destruction has ever been placed in orbit around the earth. Rather, this resolution calls for abstention. It would represent international recognition that the arms race in outer space must not be extended into this new environment, that while we are seeking ways of limiting and reducing existing armaments, we undertake to refrain from developing a new potential in the armaments field. Certainly, it would seem easier not to arm an environment that has never been armed than to agree to disarm areas which have been armed.

The draft resolution on the table sets forth a policy which has already been adopted by the United States. On September 5, 1962, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. [Roswell L.] Gilpatric, made the following statement of United States intentions respecting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction:

¹ Lt. Col. Yuri A. Gagarin and Jr. Lt. Valentina Tereshkova.

² U.N. doc. A/C.1/L. 324.

Today there is no doubt that either the United States or the Soviet Union could place thermo-nuclear weapons in orbit, but such an action is just not a rational military strategy for either side for the foreseeable future.

We have no program to place any weapons of mass destruction into orbit. An arms race in space will not contribute to our security. I can think of no greater stimulus for a Soviet thermo-nuclear arms effort in space than a United States commitment to such a program. This we will not do.

At the same time we are pursuing cooperative scientific efforts in space through the United Nations and otherwise, we will of course take such steps as are necessary to defend ourselves and our allies, if the Soviet Union forces us to do so. This is in accordance with the inalienable right of self-defense confirmed in the United Nations Charter.

Our policy in this regard was made clear to the United Nations by Senator [Albert] Gore as United States representative to the First Committee on December 3, 1962.³ On September 20, 1963, President Kennedy reaffirmed our intention to keep weapons of mass destruction out of orbit.⁴

Since that time we have met with the representatives of the Soviet Union on this problem. We are glad that the intentions of the Soviet Union in this regard are the same as our own, and I am happy to report that the resolution which is before the Assembly has the support of both Governments.

Speaking on behalf of my Government, let me say what has been said many times before: The United States has no intention of placing in orbit around the earth any weapons of mass destruction, of installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or of stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The United States intends to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the conduct of the foregoing activities by others.

The United States fully intends to pursue this policy.

We recognize that it is not possible to foresee today all events which may at a future time occur in the newly emerging field of space technology and in the exploration and the use of outer space. Nor can we foresee fully the out-

come of continuing efforts to achieve disarmament. Naturally, if events as yet unforeseen suggest the need for a further look at this matter, we would acquaint the United Nations with such events.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have set forth my Government's policy of refraining from orbiting weapons of mass destruction in outer space and have reiterated our firm endorsement of this resolution. I am certain that the members of this committee are fully aware of the value of this resolution, and I would, on behalf of my Government, strongly recommend it to all of the members of the committee.

My Government is gratified at this important step that we are about to take. We believe it should help reduce international tension. The United States hopes that there will be unanimous agreement to this resolution. We believe that by faithfully following the policy expressed in it we will help make the world a safer place in which to live. By avoiding a nuclear arms race in space, we will have taken one further step on the road to disarmament.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION⁵

The General Assembly,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) which expressed the belief that the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind,

Determined to take steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space,

1. *Welcomes* the expressions by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of their intention not to station any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space;

2. *Solemnly calls upon* all States:

(A) *To refrain* from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner;

(B) *To refrain* from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the conduct of the foregoing activities.

³ BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 21.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.324 (A/RES/1884 (XVIII)); adopted by acclamation on Oct. 17.

Albanian Proposal to Change U.N. Representation of China Rejected

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

Nothing has happened in the world in the past year to justify the General Assembly seriously redebating the item which we now have before us; indeed quite the opposite is the case. For many years this issue has been dealt with in decisive fashion by the United Nations; in 1961 proposals to seat the Communist Chinese and expel the representatives of the Republic of China were defeated by a vote of 36 to 48; last year they were defeated by 42 to 56. In 1961 also the Assembly decided by a vote of 61 to 34 that any proposals to change the representation of China would come under the provisions of article 18 (3) of the charter, and this requires a two-thirds vote. Since then the leaders of Communist China have further demonstrated both in word and deed that they do not accept the most basic principles of the charter. The Albanian proposal² is consequently totally inappropriate and should be decisively rejected. Given the behavior of the Communist Chinese in the past year, it is even more unfortunate that the constructive mood of this 18th session of the General Assembly, a mood in which all, or almost all, of us have taken such satisfaction, should be interrupted in the strident and discordant rhetoric of the cold war. As President Kennedy said in his address³ at the outset of this session, the whole world is now looking to the United Nations to see if the current "pause in the cold war" can be stretched into a period of cooperation during which both sides can gain "new confidence and experience in concrete collaborations for peace." The Albanian proposal to expel one of our founding members and to replace its representatives with those of the world's most warlike regime is in essence a proposal to install the chilliest advocate of both cold and hot wars in our halls.

¹ Made in plenary session on Oct. 16 (U.S. delegation press release 4267).

² U.N. doc. A/L. 427 and Add. 1.

³ BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

Two years ago on the eve of our debate on this subject Communist China had subjected Tibet to its domination. Last year it was engaged in aggressive warfare against India and by its own admission was using its influence during the crisis over Soviet missiles in Cuba to try to prevent the solution which the rest of the world welcomed. And now this year we find Communist China not only embroiled in both old and new disputes, on all of its peripheries, but also being the unique and aggressive advocate, alone in the councils of the world, of the inevitability and desirability of war as a means of solving international disputes.

Mr. President, in the past 2 years 19 plenary meetings have been devoted to substantive debate on the representation of China. Nearly all members have expressed their views. In both 1961 and 1962, proposals to expel the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and to admit Chinese Communist representatives were decisively rejected, not by "less and less support," as claimed by the representative of Albania in his statement of September 27, but by a no vote of 48 in 1961 and by an absolute majority of 56 in 1962. One of the preceding speakers, furthermore, has based his case in part on the erroneous assumption that a majority of member states recognize Communist China. The fact is, of course, that an absolute majority of member states—namely 59—recognize the Government of the Republic of China.

Government at Peiping Not Peaceloving

The Albanian request that this Assembly reverse itself, that we throw out a loyal charter member and make room here for representatives of a regime which is not a "peaceloving" state, will not bear scrutiny.

In contrast to the Albanian delegate's protestations about the "peaceloving" nature of the Peiping leaders and their dedication to "peaceful coexistence," the Chinese Communists have demonstrated repeatedly that they will not meet the qualifications of article 4 of the charter. The government in Peiping is not peaceloving; it does not concur in the obligations which the charter imposes; and it is clearly neither able nor willing to carry them out.

A recent example is Communist China's reaction to one of the most significant international developments since our last debate on Chinese representation. I refer of course to the test ban treaty, the first successful step in 17 years of effort to limit the nuclear arms race. What has the Chinese Communist regime said about this agreement? Unlike the virtually unanimous majority of United Nations member states represented here, which have adhered to the treaty, the Peiping regime rejected it out of hand as a "fraud," a "trap," a "deceit." "It is rotten to the core" is their specific reaction to this first momentous step on the path to peace and security by arms control.

The Chinese Communists' rejection of the test ban treaty, while disappointing, cannot be said to come as a surprise in view of their known attitude toward other efforts to diminish international tension and the danger of war.

Their objection to the strenuous efforts of the United Nations to bring about disarmament has also been repeated within the last 60 days. "Universal and complete disarmament can be realized only after imperialism, capitalism, and all systems of exploitation have been eliminated," they say. "To make propaganda about the possibility of realizing 'a world without weapons, without armed forces, and without wars' through universal and complete disarmament while imperialism still exists is to deceive the people of the world and is detrimental to the struggle for world peace."

Just ponder this for a moment. As we know, "imperialism" has long been a Communist synonym for the democracies of the West. Peiping is saying that only when these free, peaceful, economic and political systems have been eliminated can we talk of general disarmament. In other words they are opposed to the work of the 18-member committee in Geneva; they are opposed to actions such as the resolution we have just adopted in Committee I forbidding the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit;⁴ and they are prepared to talk about disarmament only when those who don't accept their ideology have been erased.

Such an attitude hardly is a recommendation for admission to the United Nations. But it

⁴ See p. 753.

is also hardly new. Long ago Mao Tse-tung expressed the iron maxim of Chinese communism in the words: "All political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Only recently he was confirmed by one of his spokesmen as having said in 1957: "If the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become Socialist (i.e. Communist)." We must conclude that they accept nuclear war because the death of half of the human race would improve the prospects for Chinese communism in the remaining half of the world.

In spite of all this evidence of the dangerous mood of Communist China, there may be delegations here who are still essentially unmoved—people who see Communist China's attitude as only one more aspect of the cold war; who regard this as a remote dispute, even if important, between big powers but with little real relevance and importance to them; who may even secretly take some comfort in the attitude of Communist China on the assumption that it to some degree assists them in the struggle against colonialism. To those who are so inclined I urge that the real objective and aims of the Chinese Communists be studied more carefully. For their true objective is not the objective of African or Asian democratic nationalism; their true objective is to use this nationalism as a way station to world domination.

The efforts of peoples still under colonial rule to achieve freedom are to be supported, but the Communist Party in those countries is enjoined to work "independently among the masses" and to "guide the revolution onto the road of socialism," by which, of course, they mean communism. And lest there be any misunderstanding of what this means to the social fabric and leadership of those states, the leaders of Communist China add that "all forms of struggle, including armed struggle" are to be mastered and that "the transition from capitalism to socialism (that is, communism) in any country can only be brought about through the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country." These words speak *for* themselves, and they should speak *to* all of us.

No, Mr. President, while the Communist Chinese continue by word and deed to reject the obligations of the United Nations Charter, while they treat the organization with contempt and arrogance, they block their own admission to it. They—who have been branded as an “aggressor” by the United Nations—charge that the “United Nations flag has been imprinted with the ignominious hallmark of aggression against Korea.” And they persist in asserting the right to use force if necessary to eliminate the Government of the Republic of China and take the island of Taiwan.

The Chinese Communists, according to Albania, consider “the liberation of Taiwan and the other Chinese islands . . . a legitimate right of this People’s Republic of China,” an objective made more specific in a report of a political work conference of the Chinese Communist People’s Liberation Army issued on March 6, 1963, which says: “We will speed the revolutionary and modernizing buildup of our army . . . to liberate Taiwan. . . .” For many years the United States has sought without success to persuade the Chinese Communists to abandon the use of force as a method of pursuing their policies in the straits. It is no wonder, in the light of such an attitude, that we participate in a mutual assistance treaty with the Republic of China.

Principles of Charter Should Be Universal

The standards of this organization were established after serious deliberation. Every member that has joined this organization is pledged to accept those standards. The Chinese Communists cannot amend or contradict them in the way they do and still expect the members of the organization to consider them seriously committed to obey them and undertake the responsibilities and obligations of membership.

The recurrent theme of “universality” running through the arguments of those in favor of the admission of Red China surely cannot be considered in isolation from such facts. We agree that universality represents a goal toward which the United Nations must strive. But the people of China are already properly and legitimately represented in the United Nations by the

Government of the Republic of China. The United Nations must not weaken its dedication to the principles on which it was founded and which have been spelled out in its charter. It is these principles that should be universal. If we were to admit those who deny their validity, we would be creating an illusion of universality, which in time would probably turn out to be no more than a universal delusion.

Nor are the “realists” who maintain that the composition of the United Nations should simply reflect the world as it is realistic if they disregard these principles of international conduct. The argument that it is “unrealistic” to exclude the representatives of a regime that for 14 years has controlled hundreds of millions of people on the mainland of China brushes aside realities that have a direct bearing upon the issue before us. These realities include the unrepresentative and aggressive nature of the Chinese Communist regime; the fact that China is already represented in the United Nations by a Government which is both able and willing to carry out its obligations under the charter; the fact that the Charter of the United Nations sets forth explicitly the requirements for membership; and finally the monstrous reality of the Albanian proposal to expel a member that has always supported the charter in order to make room for a regime whose creed and actions are diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of the charter.

This argument of “realism” also overlooks still another reality, namely that what keeps the people of mainland China from participating in the work of this organization is an unscrupulous regime that has interposed itself between the people of China and the rest of the world. The people of the United States have always been close friends of the people of China, and we are much concerned with their well-being and that they take their proper place in the modern world. But we believe we could do the Chinese people no greater disservice than to give them the impression that we are siding with their oppressors.

It has also been suggested that the Chinese Communists can best be “tamed” by admitting them into the United Nations. Although I still feel, as I said in 1961, that “this is a most tempting thought which all of us would like to share,”

unfortunately the weight of the evidence points the other way. In their bilateral relations they have been aggressive, expansionist, and unfriendly to their neighbors. On the rare occasion when Chinese Communists have spoken in international meetings they have fostered disharmony and conflict. Even in the recently completed Centenary Congress of the International Red Cross the Chinese Communist delegate, Peng Yen, refused to support a resolution which "welcomed the efforts being made by the Governments to dispel the menace of armed conflict by the reduction of armaments, the banning of nuclear tests and weapons and the resort to peaceful methods of negotiation."

We have another concrete illustration of Chinese Communist behavior after they were brought into the international conference arrangement on Laos. Whenever the ICC [International Control Commission] has taken action to forestall the possibility of a resumption of full-scale hostilities on Laos, it has been subjected to attack by the Chinese Communists. Despite their protestations of peaceful intent the Chinese Communists have refused to cooperate and have, through their proxies in North Viet-Nam, sought to defeat the purpose of the international agreement to which they have become a signatory, thereby keeping this unhappy neighbor country in a constant state of turmoil.

Nor need we look beyond the speech of the Foreign Minister of Albania, the spokesman of Communist China in this Assembly. His two speeches to this Assembly have constituted a brutal reversion to the most extreme demagoguery of the cold war and have given the Assembly a vivid example of what would happen in our incessant struggle for mutual understanding and accommodation in the halls of the United Nations if Communist China should become a member.

In conclusion, Mr. President, the fact of the matter is that the General Assembly has ruled and ruled again on this matter.

In 1961 the General Assembly after a long, full, and a fair debate decided that it was not prepared to throw out one loyal member of this organization and to replace it by a regime which defies the charter and the organization itself and which has the temerity to demand a license to permit armed aggression as the price of its

admission to an organization dedicated to peace. That decision was reaffirmed with even greater conviction in 1962. Nothing has happened the interim to cause us to reconsider that carefully considered decision. On the contrary everything that has happened confirms the wisdom of that decision. The evidence mounts from month to month that Communist China does not believe in world peace and collective security nor the charter of this organization.

U.N. Condemns Repression of Opponents to Apartheid

Following is a statement made on October 18, 1962, in the plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Francis T. Plimpton, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PLIMPTON

U.S. delegation press release 4259

I should first like to express the appreciation of my delegation for the courtesy of our fellow delegates in being willing to agree to the 20-minute adjournment to permit the consultation which we wished to have.

I am glad to say, Mr. President, that we have now received instructions to the United States delegation to vote for the resolution as a whole.

I would like, Mr. President, to ask for a separate vote on paragraph 2, and I would like to say that we will abstain as to that paragraph. And I hope that I may be permitted to explain why.

I should first say that I think the whole world knows that the United States is uncompromisingly and irrevocably opposed to *apartheid*, opposed to racial discrimination anywhere, and opposed to injustice anywhere. Furthermore, the United States is uncompromisingly and irrevocably opposed to legislation such as the legislation under which these defendants are being

⁵ The General Assembly rejected the Albanian draft resolution on Oct. 21 by a vote of 41 to 57, with 1 abstentions. One member was absent.

tried, which permits incarceration without hearing and without trial—and extended incarceration—and which puts on the defendant the burden of proving himself innocent.

There remains, Mr. President, the fact that any country does have the right and the duty to defend itself, its citizens, its women and its children against criminal violence as such, provided the defense is under proper legislative safeguards for the accused. We question whether any member state here represented would feel that it was appropriate for any other state or for any international organization to interfere with its own sovereignty to conduct, under proper legislative safeguards for the prisoners, its defense against criminal violence that will hurt all its citizens.

It is in this area, Mr. President, that the United States questions the wording of paragraph 2 and reserves its views on account of that wording, although we would very cheerfully vote for paragraph 2 in the language which was adopted by the Security Council, which was to the effect that all political prisoners should be released immediately.

I repeat, Mr. President, that the United States will vote for the resolution as a whole.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 1761 (XVII) of 6 November 1962,

Recalling the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963,² which called upon the Government of South Africa "to liberate all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of apartheid",

Taking note of the reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa,³ which stress the fact that the harsh repressive measures instituted by the Government of South Africa frustrate the possibilities

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/1881 (XVIII) ; adopted on Oct. 11 by a vote of 106 to 1 (South Africa), with no abstentions. In a separate vote on paragraph 2, the vote was 102 to 1 (South Africa), with 4 abstentions (Australia, France, U.K., U.S.). In both cases Honduras, Paraguay, Portugal, and Spain were absent.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1963, p. 338.

³ U.N. doc. A/5497 and Add. 1.

for peaceful settlement, increase hostility among the racial groups and precipitate violent conflict,

Considering reports to the effect that the Government of the Republic of South Africa is arranging the trial of a large number of political prisoners under arbitrary laws prescribing the death sentence,

Considering that such a trial will inevitably lead to a further deterioration in the already explosive situation in South Africa, thereby further disturbing international peace and security,

1. *Condemns* the Government of the Republic of South Africa for its failure to comply with the repeated resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council calling for an end to the repression of persons opposing *apartheid*;

2. *Requests* the Government of the Republic of South Africa to abandon the arbitrary trial now in progress and forthwith to grant unconditional release to all political prisoners and to all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of *apartheid*;

3. *Requests* all Member States to make all necessary efforts to induce the Government of the Republic of South Africa to ensure that the provisions of paragraph 2 above are put into effect immediately;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council, as soon as possible during the eighteenth session, on the implementation of the present resolution.

U.N. Calls on Member States To Aid in Skopje Reconstruction

Statement by Charles W. Yost

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

My Government considers it an honor to be numbered among the sponsors of this resolution² which expresses the united feeling of the sympathy of this Assembly to the people of Skopje and to the Government of Yugoslavia. The large number of these sponsors, indeed, testify how widespread among the member nations of the United Nations is the feeling of sympathy for a fellow member and her people in the face of the great disaster which struck them last July. The list of the sponsors has cut across lines of political, economic, and sociological difference to combine together widely

¹ Made in plenary session on Oct. 14 (U.S. delegation press release 4260).

² U.N. doc. A/RES/1882 (XVIII) ; adopted unanimously on Oct. 14.

diverse nations into a common group in support of a fellow member in distress.

We know the Secretary-General and the heads of the appropriate United Nations bodies will respond both quickly and generously to the operative paragraph of this resolution which calls on them to help in meeting the immediate and the long-term needs of the Yugoslav Government arising from the earthquake.

As soon as the news of this tragic event was received on July 26, President Kennedy sent the following message to the Yugoslav Government's President Tito:

I have learned with sorrow and concern of the earthquake disaster in the city of Skopje and the tragic loss of life that has occurred. The sympathies of the American people go out to those who have suffered this catastrophe. I have, accordingly, instructed our ambassador to establish close communication with the Yugoslav authorities in order that every appropriate means of assistance from this country may be utilized to alleviate the suffering and hardship in Skopje. I have also asked the Secretary of Defense to notify our military authorities in Europe to offer whatever assistance is possible and practicable.

Immediately thereafter the United States Government units furnished aid and assistance to the victims of the disaster. A major contribution was the prompt dispatch of a fully equipped military field hospital. Simultaneously, United States private, voluntary organizations, including CARE, Lutheran World Relief, and Church World Service in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy immediately diverted to the Skopje area foodstuffs normally used in other programs supported by the United States Food for Peace program. At the same time, private relief and charitable organizations of the United States also responded generously and promptly with assistance.

In addition to this aid United States business firms provided air transportation, medical supplies, and other gifts in kind, and both business and private United States citizens contributed several tens of thousands of dollars for the relief of the earthquake victims.

Finally, Mr. President, we are actively cooperating with the Yugoslav Government in the task of rebuilding and renewing the city of Skopje.

Mr. President, the United States was but one of the many nations that responded to the needs

of the people of Skopje. In the spirit of the resolution we give our wholehearted support to the continuing assistance the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies can make to the victims of this truly national disaster.

May I also take this opportunity to express our profound sympathy, as have so many other speakers, for those stricken peoples who have suffered such heavy loss in the recent disaster in the Caribbean and in Italy.

TREATY INFORMATION

Supplementary Tax Convention Signed With Sweden

Press release 542 dated October 22

A supplementary convention between the United States and Sweden relating to income taxes was signed on October 22 at Stockholm. Ambassador J. Graham Parsons signed for the United States and Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson for Sweden.

The provisions of the new convention modify and supplement in certain respects the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the establishment of rules of reciprocal administrative assistance in the case of income and other taxes, signed at Washington on March 23, 1939.¹ They serve to bring the latter convention into closer general conformity with more recent tax conventions entered into by the United States. The principal purpose of such conventions is to remove an undesirable impediment to international trade and economic intercourse generally by doing away as far as possible with double taxation on the same income.

Among the modifications made by the new convention are (a) the introduction of a reciprocal exemption provision with respect to interest flowing from one state to residents or corporations of the other, (b) the establishment of a 15-percent rate, as in other United States

¹ 52 Stat. 1490.

realties, applicable generally to dividends received in one state from sources in the other, and a 5-percent rate applicable to dividends received by a parent company from a subsidiary, and (c) an undertaking by Sweden to allow full credit against its taxes for income taxes imposed by the United States. An expansion of the present exemption of certain income of students and business apprentices to embrace teachers, professors, and research workers is included. Changes are also made in the definitions of certain technical terms.

The convention will be submitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, September 4, 1963.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. *Acceptance deposited:* Jamaica, October 18, 1963. Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1945. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

Ratifications deposited: Panama, September 24, 1963; Tanganyika, April 10, 1963.

Protocol amending article 50(a) of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to increase membership of the council from 21 to 27. Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.

Ratifications deposited: Italy, May 17, 1963; Tanganyika, April 10, 1963.

Protocol relating to amendment to convention on international civil aviation (to increase number of parties which may request holding an extraordinary meeting of Assembly). Adopted by Assembly at Rome September 15, 1962.¹ Enters into force upon deposit of 66th instrument of ratification by contracting parties to convention.

Ratification advised by the Senate: October 22, 1963.

Ratifications deposited: Australia, August 1, 1963; Finland, February 4, 1963; Ireland, February 14, 1963; Ivory Coast, January 14, 1963; Niger, December 17, 1962; Norway, February 26, 1963; Portugal, May 23, 1963; South Africa, September 17,

1963; Sweden, May 10, 1963; Tanganyika, April 10, 1963; Thailand, February 28, 1963; United Kingdom, September 18, 1963; Upper Volta, July 12, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratification deposited: Hungary, October 22, 1963.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London April 11, 1962.¹

Acceptance deposited: United Arab Republic, October 3, 1963.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, for the protection of industrial property, as modified by the additional act signed at Brussels December 14, 1900, and final protocol. Signed at Washington June 2, 1911. Entered into force May 1, 1913. 38 Stat. 1645.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Ivory Coast, August 9, 1963.

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection of industrial property. Dated at The Hague November 6, 1925. Entered into force June 1, 1928; for the United States March 6, 1931. 47 Stat. 1789.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Ivory Coast, August 9, 1963.

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, for the protection of industrial property revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, and at London June 2, 1934. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Ivory Coast, August 9, 1963.

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon, October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, September 23, 1963.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, October 1, 1963.

Sugar

Protocol for the prolongation of the International Sugar Agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389). Open for signature at London August 1 to September 30, 1963.¹

Signatures: Argentina,² Australia, Belgium,² Brazil,² Canada, China,³ Colombia,² Costa Rica, Cuba,^{2,4}

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to ratification.

³ With a declaration.

⁴ With a statement.

Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,² El Salvador, France, Federal Republic of Germany,² Ghana, Guatemala,⁴ Haiti, Hungary,⁵ India,^{2,5} Indonesia,² Ireland,² Italy,² Jamaica, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands,² New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,² Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,⁵ United Kingdom,^{3,4} United States.²

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratifications deposited: Albania, August 27, 1963;⁶ Indonesia, September 13, 1963.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

Notifications of approval: Nepal, August 13, 1963; Sudan, August 19, 1963.

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.

Notification of approval: Nepal, August 13, 1963.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Additional protocol to the treaty of extradition of January 13, 1961. Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 18, 1962.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: October 22, 1963.

European Atomic Energy Community

Amendment to the additional agreement of June 11, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4650, 5104), for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy. Signed at Brussels and at Washington August 22 and 27, 1963.

Entered into force: October 15, 1963.

Israel

Convention relating to extradition between the United States and Israel. Signed at Washington December 10, 1962.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: October 22, 1963.

Japan

Consular convention. Signed at Tokyo March 22, 1963.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: October 22, 1963.

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to ratification.

³ With a declaration.

⁴ With a statement.

⁵ With reservations.

⁶ With reservations and declaration contained in final protocol.

Korea

Consular convention. Signed at Seoul January 8, 1963.
Ratification advised by the Senate: October 22, 1963.

Morocco

Agreement supplementing the agreement of March 1961, so as to provide for additional investment guarantees authorized by new United States legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Rabat October 1963. Entered into force October 2, 1963.

Sweden

Convention on extradition, with protocol. Signed Washington October 24, 1961.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: October 22, 1963.

Uruguay

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Per Corps program in Uruguay. Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo March 19 and July 31, 1963. Entered into force July 31, 1963.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 21-27

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to October 21 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 530 of October 15 and 536 of October 18.

No.	Date	Subject
*539	10/21	U.S. participation in international conferences.
540	10/21	Rusk: message of congratulations to Lord Home.
541	10/21	Rusk: message of congratulations to R. A. Butler.
542	10/22	Supplementary tax convention with Sweden.
†543	10/22	Delegation to IA-ECOSOC meeting (rewrite).
†544	10/22	Textile arrangement with China.
*545	10/23	Cultural exchange (U.S.S.R.).
546	10/23	<i>Yung Lo</i> encyclopedia presented to Library of Congress.
†547	10/23	Fredericks: "Nations in the Making in Africa."
*548	10/23	Program for visit of President of Bolivia.
†549	10/25	Sisco: "Our Stake in the U.N."
†550	10/24	Ecuador credentials (rewrite).
551	10/24	Rusk: Institute of International Education.
552	10/25	Educational exchange agreement with Iran.
*553	10/25	Harriman: 24th American Assembly, Arden House (excerpts).
*554	10/25	Harriman: American Jewish Congress (excerpts).
*555	10/25	Harriman: Brigham Young University (excerpts).
557	10/26	Rusk: St. Paul's Church, Frankfurt.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Foreign Relations of the United States 1943, Volume I, General

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume I, General*.

In this volume there is documentation on a considerable number of multilateral subjects relating to the war. The longest and perhaps the most important chapter is that dealing with the tripartite conference of foreign ministers in Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943. Among other topics treated are questions relating to trade, prisoners of war, refugees, war crimes, relief and rehabilitation, and planning for postwar organization and economic policies.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume I, General*, may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$4 each.

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THE
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Vol. XLIX, No. 1273



November 18, 1963

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The United Nations: Hope for the Future

by Adlai E. Stevenson

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

As I speak to you today, on this, the 18th anniversary of the United Nations Charter, it is cheering to note that all the predictions of an early demise for the U.N. have so far failed to come true. For this millions of us—all of us—have reason to be thankful. Still, there are some who continue to criticize.

Constructive criticism is justified, for we have not yet developed a perfect instrument for peace with justice. But as William Penn said: "They have a right to censure that have a heart to help." The critics I refer to have no heart to help. Worse, perhaps, they fear to hope. And, if anything, this 18th anniversary of the United Nations is an occasion that offers hope.

I don't mean to imply that we are suddenly threatened in the United Nations—and the world—with harmony or that the light of sweet

reason is about to shine forth everlastingly. I would say such prospects are remote. But I would say, too, that more and more nations are less and less flouting the general consensus of what most nations and men believe to be the law of the charter.

Nonetheless, if we are to believe our ears on some occasions—when the small vocal opposition to the U.N. is at its shrillest—we might think some threat to our independence accompanies our participation in this worldwide alliance of sovereign nations pledged to preserve the peace. I understand that some of these fearful groups are trying to establish a U.S. Day in competition with U.N. Day. This is the first time I have heard that the United States and the United Nations are rivals!

At the House of Burgesses in Williamsburg, Virginia, a quaintly costumed guide shows visitors a draft prepared there in 1775 for the new nation's constitutional convention. She tells visitors proudly that the draft was incorporated

¹Address made at the Memorial Theater, Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 24 in observance of United Nations Day (U.S./U.N. press release 4276 dated Oct. 23, for release Oct. 24).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1273 PUBLICATION 7619 NOVEMBER 18, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$8.50; foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 1, 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

into the United States Constitution and that its principles, in turn, were incorporated into the United Nations Charter. How can we fear our own invention, born in the original Colonies, nurtured in our City of Brotherly Love, and adopted by the world at our Golden Gate? We would hold our principles less dear if we wanted to keep them exclusively for ourselves.

In celebrating the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations, we are paying homage to this universal adoption of the fundamental principles of the United States. Moreover, the truth is that our membership in the United Nations is overwhelmingly in the national interest—if peace in the world is in our national interest—and I know of no higher national interest of the United States than peace and security.

It becomes increasingly difficult, therefore, to understand the logic of those superpatriots who decry the United Nations, who talk of peace but who object to our only institution for peaceful settlement, who decry every attempt at negotiation and conciliation and offer no alternative save weapons that will destroy friend and foe alike.

Well, we can't afford to prove them wrong. When I consider the possibility my mind goes back to an old Gaelic toast: "Here's to us and those like us, of which there are few and they are all dead."

Or when I consider some of the suicidal fallacies that have been advanced over the years in the name of patriotism, I think about the man who rushed in to see Oscar Hammerstein, the producer, and wanted \$50,000 for the greatest act on earth. "What do you do?" asked Mr. Hammerstein. "I stand on stage and blow my brains out," was the answer. "Marvelous," said Mr. Hammerstein, "but what do you do for an encore?"

In a nuclear production, my friends, there won't be any encores. Those of us who hold public office and are involved in life-and-death responsibilities cannot afford either reckless language or deeds. We have the sobering job of trying to make appraisals which will lead to intelligent, effective policy. And it is in this sensitive area of appraisal that we differ so much with the proponents of the illusion of so-called "instant victory."

I stress this today because victory will not be won in an instant—only mutual annihilation can be attained that fast in our age. And we must not only possess the common sense to recognize this fact—we must also have the courage, the persistence, and the patience to forge ahead even if the progress is slow and frustrative and the goal is far away.

But if we do, perhaps we shall in our time disprove Plato's dire prediction that "only the dead have seen the last of war."

And this is no mere shrinking from annihilation. It springs from something much deeper—a growing sense of our solidarity as a human species. For that cry of John Donne, "Send not to ask for whom the bell tolls," echoes round the world today, reaching, I believe, deeper and deeper levels of consciousness.

Responsibilities Assigned to U.N.

In the 18 years since the United Nations became a viable, vibrant organization, that sense of solidarity has grown, it seems to me, as never before in the history of man. But what responsibilities to assign to an 18-year-old stripling!

As Mr. Dooley said, however, speaking of the youngest man ever to be President, Theodore Roosevelt, "A man is old enough to vote when he can vote, he's old enough to work when he can work. And he's old enough to be President when he becomes President. If he ain't, it will age him."

The United Nations *has* aged quickly, in part because the youngest nations in it are maturing quickly. Peoples long divided by race and political subjugations, with all the lingering resentments that flow from that condition, now meet in a community of equals, and they are learning respect for law and order and parliamentary procedure. For they are citizens of our planet, and, with few exceptions, they belong to no bloc. Certainly there is no such thing as an Afro-Asian bloc—save on colonial issues—and the sense of community, of interdependence, of common peril and hope they feel, weighs heavily on the scales of peace in this dangerous world. Meantime the older nations are also learning, even as the newer ones, that the most rewarding task of civilized man today

is that of reconciling different points of view. And perhaps that is the most valuable lesson of all.

Reasonable men, of course, will question whether we are learning fast enough, whether the pace being set by the U.N. is too slow. But the great challenge of our time, the challenge the United Nations is meeting day in and out, is in striking the proper balance in promoting changes for the better in the condition of mankind. This is the purpose and the meaning of the whole system of world order we have been trying to construct for the past 18 years.

And in these 18 years the United Nations has been tougher and more resilient than faint hearts predicted and cynical hearts hoped. It has survived all manner of assaults and misfortunes—like the Korean war, 101 Soviet vetoes, the three-headed monster theory of executive management called the troika, Dag Hammarskjöld's sudden death, imminent bankruptcy, and the gloomy prediction of the Cassandras in our midst who began prophesying its doom even before the ink was dry on the charter.

Meanwhile it has performed some prodigious feats in peacekeeping and nation building—in Iran, Palestine, Kashmir, Tunisia, Suez, the Congo, West New Guinea, Yemen, Malaysia.

The United Nations' record in the peacekeeping field speaks for itself—a phenomenon all the more remarkable because it still has no armed forces of its own or available at its call. Its accomplishments have been made possible only by reason of the willingness of its members—many from the smaller, newly independent countries—to contribute the forces needed. And if we were to analyze how the United Nations has done its job in each instance, we would discover some little known and less understood facts.

First of all, when one mentions peacekeeping, one thinks immediately of the major confrontations that were averted: Cuba, the Congo, the Middle East, to name only a few. Those of you who are familiar with the history of the First World War know just how senseless and needless that conflict was, beginning as it did with a small incident in the Balkans. We now realize how it could probably have been averted

had there been an institution like the United Nations where steam could have been let off, national face saved, mediation instituted, and so on. One remarkable factor is the flexibility the United Nations has developed in dealing differently with different kinds of crises. In some cases it has used troops; in others it has used surveying and observing teams; in others it has turned to mediators; in still others to fact finders. But regardless of the method the prevailing principle is that the United Nations seeks no victories for itself, only a victory for the rule of law.

And what does all this cost the American taxpayer? Without going into any involved accounting, in the 18 years that the United States has been a member of the United Nations it has cost us slightly over \$100 million a year, or one fourth the cost of the aircraft carrier *Enterprise*. Or to be even more Scotch about it, the cost of the entire operation has been approximately 7½ cents a year per man, woman, and child. Compare that with our \$50-billion-a-year defense budget, and one sees how much cheaper it is to prepare for peace than to prepare for war.

Range and Variety of Work

The range and variety of the United Nations work is, of course, a reflection of the real world of the second half of the 20th century—a world of multiple revolutions, of vast ferment, of pervasive change, of political turmoil. It is a reflection of the fact that, with the discovery of the secret of the atom, the whole purpose of the armed struggle is becoming meaningless and the conventional wisdom about national security which has instructed the leaders of all states in all times past has suddenly become obsolete.

Within the very recent past, too, scientific discoveries have so extended the average span of life that the population expansion threatens to cancel out our best efforts to improve living standards.

Within the very recent past nearly half a hundred new nations have gained independence—and with it the risks and perils of self-government.

Within the very recent past we have become grimly aware of the intolerable contradiction of want in the midst of plenty—of surplus food

in the midst of hunger, of burgeoning knowledge in the midst of ignorance. And we have become aware, too, only very recently, of the complex ways in which our nations are interdependent. Science, transport, communications, economics, and politics have become international concerns and have made the world one.

For many our age is one of contradiction, paradox, and crisis, and there are good reasons for all the ferment and turbulence of our times, for all the complexity and danger of our affairs, and therefore for all the variety and scope of the work and labors of this parliament of man. Reflecting the realities of this world as it does, the U.N. for the most part is a symbol of the aspirations of 111 nations working, talking together, arguing, agreeing and disagreeing together in the search for peace, for decency, for human dignity. The agenda² at the General Assembly which is now in session in New York numbers nearly 100 items, ranging from atomic energy to Zanzibar. Take 100 items, multiply by 111 nations, and you wind up with a figure of 12,000 decisions to be made, 12,000 decisions each affecting the future of the world!

Now I would not wish to give the impression that the United States will be in accord with each one of these decisions—or that it has been in accord with all past decisions. It will not and it has not. And there will be many more to come. After all, we can seldom agree among ourselves in Congress! The United Nations is not a wing of the State Department, and we can't control everything it does. I doubt if we would want to even if we could. But I am saying that, overall, we have every reason to think that our views will continue to be the majority view as they have been in the past on issues of substance.

Just the other day, as one example, the Assembly voted again not to admit Communist China on its terms, and the vote for our position was even larger than last year's.³ I do not cite this instance because I take any particular pleasure in barring any country from membership. The United Nations, after all, is for all the people in the world. But the admission of

the Communist Chinese and the expulsion of the Republic of China, a founding member, would, in my view, have installed in the United Nations the world's most warlike regime—a regime not representative of the people—and would have given at least implicit approval of war as an instrument of national policy.

We have reason to be pleased, too, with the action taken by the United Nations on extending the United Nations Operation in the Congo for the first 6 months of 1964.⁴ The formula that was adopted reduces the United States' share of the financing by about 10 percent below what we paid in past years and distributes the burden more widely.

The peacekeeping operation in the Congo has, of course, been one of the U.N.'s greatest undertakings. Unfortunately, it has also been one of its most costly. Actually there would have been no such financial peril for the organization had all the members paid their fair share of the costs. Some, I am glad to report, are now meeting their peacekeeping obligations. The Congo has taught us all the lesson that, if the organization is to meet its full potential as peacekeeper, the financial responsibility of the membership is essential. It has also revealed the difficulty of launching and sustaining peacekeeping operations which some countries feel are against their national interests.

The Congo, though, was just one step, albeit a big one, in the rapid progress of decolonization. The remnants of colonialism will continue as one of the most perplexing and emotional issues before the United Nations. While the pace of national freedom for the former colonies has been swifter than anyone foresaw when the charter was drafted, it does not satisfy people who are not yet free.

The emphatic and indignant position of the African nations with regard to the repugnant policy of *apartheid* in South Africa is, however, not without growing realization of the difficulties of the racial situation there. And their insistence on self-determination for the African population of the Portuguese territories has also been confined within temperate limits. One can even hope that the talks now taking place between the Portuguese Foreign Minister

² For text of the agenda adopted on Sept. 20 and two supplemental items, see BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1963, p. 556, and Oct. 28, 1963, p. 685.

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 755.

⁴ U.N. doc. A/RES/1885(XVIII).

and the African representatives in New York may be the first step toward a peaceful solution of that stubborn situation.

There are other serious problems confronting the United Nations. For one, there is the disturbing situation in Yemen, where progress toward disengagement and peaceful settlement has been slow. And now we have Indonesia's threatening gestures toward the newly formed Federation of Malaysia and the conflict between Algeria and Morocco. And I haven't begun to exhaust the list of reasons why there is never a dull day in the United Nations—or night, for that matter.

Seizing Every Opportunity for Peace

I haven't mentioned disarmament or all the other items before the General Assembly. Some we may solve this year; those we don't will be back on the agenda next year—part of the continuing, never-ending search for peace. In this search it is not enough for nations merely to look at each other. They must look in the same direction. So the big question we face today, of course, is whether the Communist bloc will ever look in the same direction as we do. The answer may be a long time coming. But the recently concluded nuclear test ban treaty,⁵ now signed by more than 100 countries, is the most important single step taken since the war in the field of arms control and disarmament. Perhaps even more important than the treaty—which the Russians emphatically rejected when I proposed it in the General Assembly just a year ago⁶—is the clear demonstration that, when the nuclear powers have a common interest and act upon it, when they look in the same direction, they can make progress.

As for the test ban treaty, in the future the air we breathe will be cleaner and our children will have a better chance of growing up to contribute to the well-being of mankind rather than to its destruction. And, being human, I must add that it was a great personal satisfaction and gratification to me because, as some of you may recall, I urged such a treaty during the presidential campaign in 1956—and probably lost a few million votes in the process. Now, 7

⁵ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 635.

years later, the overwhelming approval of the Senate⁷ is a reflection of the strong support the treaty has in the United States, and with it we have moved a little closer to safety and sanity in the world.

The unanimous resolution of the General Assembly, proposed by the United States and the Soviet Union, not to orbit or station weapons of mass destruction in outer space is another hopeful sign.⁸ It adds to our hope for further progress in disarmament rather than the resumption of old cold-war rhetoric that has been the chief ingredient of all the meetings in Geneva up to now. Much remains to be done in these talks; the surface has just been scratched, and now it is time for second steps. If Premier Khrushchev is as interested as we are in peace and disarmament—and I think he is—then we share a great common cause and progress should be possible.

It in no way detracts from the significance of recent agreements, however, to remember that the basic conflicts and differences in ideology still remain.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan put it well some days ago in the General Assembly: "The world," he said, "is asking itself the question: Will the test ban treaty be a turning point in history? We cannot see past the veil which obscures the future. Dangerous questions are still outstanding. There has been no change as yet in the position of the East and the West on Viet-Nam, Laos, Germany, Berlin, and Cuba—even though their frozen positions have somewhat melted." This list, I could add, is far from complete.

In tempering our optimism, too, we must bear in mind that differences between the East and the West are not the only ones that threaten the world. I have mentioned the last stubborn racial and colonial problem in Africa. We cannot ignore the growing pressure of the Chinese Communists and what some darkly hint is the attempt to divide the world between the whites and the nonwhites. And in Latin America in recent weeks we have witnessed some

⁷ *Ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1963, p. 631.

⁸ For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson on Oct. 16 and text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 753.

serious blows to democratic government, while in Asia—in Laos and Viet-Nam, to mention only the obvious—the long struggle for peace and progress still goes on.

Our imagination, our courage, our will, therefore, face remorseless tests everywhere we look. How we meet them may determine the future course of world history. There is, for example, much dissatisfaction about our foreign aid programs. But we must not lose sight of the fact that in the long run equal chance and equal dignity for the emerging masses—the guiding philosophy of our aid program—may have more to do with peace and security in the future than the outcome of the ideological conflict between East and West that has held our attention for so long.

I was reminded of this recently when reading about the death of Edith Piaf and how she always helped lesser known artists. When you reach the top yourself, she said, "You have to send the elevator back down so that others can also get to the top."

As I have said so many times, for so many years, we dare not neglect any opening that will help us advance our belief in a peaceful and equal future for *all* men. To seize every opportunity to break through to the reason and conscience of others is, indeed, nothing less—or more—than enlightened self-interest.

Gigantic Tasks Ahead

Understanding, therefore, that very real dangers and conflicts still grip our world today, the fact remains that the United Nations observes its 18th anniversary in a moment of relative calm. And it is in this calm that we must see and put into perspective the gigantic tasks that are still before us.

In our own land, for one, we cannot rest until the last vestiges of indignity or discrimination are abolished forever—until every man in America can look his neighbor in the face and see a friend—not a color. For the very essence of freedom, after all, is nothing less than dignity.

I recently told a committee of the United Nations, during a debate on racial discrimination, that we in this country are now living through our third revolution in the name of

freedom.⁹ It has been essentially peaceful, and nearly all Americans, Negro as well as white, are determined to keep it that way. But today, even as in our first revolution in 1776, we are in anguish and our anguish is evident to all. We make no effort to hide or disguise it, which is more than many can say. And the fact is that what troubles we have today are the result of progress made yesterday. We are moving through a period of social change in the direction of equal rights for all in the last corner of our land. That much still remains to be done is self-evident. But our greatness as a nation demands that the shadow be dispelled and our international commitment to freedom and justice for all be redeemed.

And if some among you question why I refer to a national dilemma when speaking about the United Nations, it is because, as one who loves America, I wish to see her as a model for all mankind. For it is in America, I believe, that the fervor and will to create a more just and more coherent international order should and can be at its most enlightened and sustained.

And the attainment of equality for all in America will give the twin causes of freedom and human rights a great impetus throughout the globe. For the rights of man—the quality of life on earth in our time—is, after all, the key to peace.

It has been precisely that quality of life on earth with which the United Nations has been concerned since 1946. Looking back, most of us remember with what hopes and dreams the United Nations was launched. For many Americans the adoption of the charter was a kind of expiation of our earlier rejection of the League of Nations, and those who believed this noble experiment might have worked if the United States had participated in it pinned extravagant expectations on this new experiment.

There was desperation in our hope then, considering the alternative—a chaotic world, war and total destruction. And there was still the question: Could the nations of the world unite to keep the peace? Many orators answered

⁹ For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson in Committee III on Oct. 1, see U.S. delegation press release 4249.

with an emphatic yes; but few could forget that the previous answer had been no!

Building the Institutions of Peace

Today our hope is based on 18 years of experience, of building the United Nations into a going concern. It has survived repeated threats to its existence and its effectiveness. It helped create a climate that has contributed some progress in disarmament, *détente*, and hope for the future. And in urging the great powers to take the next step, it is helping us decide today whether the family of man shall live as in the past—in anarchy and violence—or build a new, decent world community with freedom as its political habit and peace as its goal. Has mankind ever made a more fateful decision?

We have been victims of the past. We don't intend to be victims of the future. For we Americans are deeply committed to living in a free and peaceful world. In this convulsive atomic age the only way to live is to live in peace. And because the Charter of the United Nations is both the vision of this new world and the roadmap, we are resolved by necessity and desire to make the United Nations system work.

As I look back on these 18 years—and I was one of the jubilant midwives present at the birth—this anniversary, therefore, seems to me to be the brightest one of all. At first, as I said, we had only hopes. Now our hopes are firmer and more confident. True, when we look back it is to 18 years of tumult and danger. But we are confident now that we are building an effective organization which can deal with crises—because it has done so again and again. And each success, each humble effort at pacification accomplished at any level, brings peace that much closer.

The journey of a thousand leagues, we say, begins with a single step. So we must never neglect any work of peace that is within our reach, however small. We have constantly to carry on, or re-begin, the work of building the institutions and practices of a nonviolent world, keeping always in mind, beyond the setbacks and disappointments, that a free people should ever be seeking their greatest adventure in the works of peace, that even in the midst of con-

flict they must never surrender the creative and compassionate attitudes proper to a peace community.

Let me emphasize again, no one claims that we have developed a perfect instrument in the United Nations. Certainly it is no magic lantern. It is not the whole answer to lasting peace. It never was from the day the world divided at the war. And it is not a world government. But world society has to achieve the minimum institutions of order, and the only embryo of such an order is the United Nations system which represents the will of most governments to recognize more than national interests.

Above all, perhaps, the consensus of the members represents a moral force that cannot lightly ignored, one that day by day attempts to conciliate, mediate, discuss, compromise, if need be, simply delay the conflicts which play, like earthquake tremors, across the political crust of our society.

I have ranged widely in these remarks, such is the complexity of a world in which one thing always leads to another; and the business before the General Assembly this autumn ranges more widely still.

Our task is to build the organization to help us master our physical environment, foster peaceful change, and promote human rights. Our task is to use the organization—its facilities, its resources, its talents, its procedures—to work at the problems that lie right before us plain to view.

Vast opportunities may have been opened by modern science, by the fluid state of international relations just now, and by the rising impatience everywhere about the achievement of full personal freedom and equality. History and our own peoples enjoin us to probe every opening, to explore every international device to take every step that reflects our common interest in progress and in peace.

Our efforts will be erratic, and the world will remain a dangerous place to live in. But we have our wits and our resources; we have the United Nations in which to pool them for peacekeeping and nation building; we have the beginnings of a habit of cooperation on a great many kinds of problems. And we have a simple conviction: that it is not beyond man's capacity to act human!

On this United Nations Day, therefore, let us renew our hope that, finally, men will learn to live as brothers, to respect each other's differ-

ences, heal each other's wounds, promote each other's progress, and benefit from each other's knowledge.

Our Stake in the United Nations

by Joseph J. Sisco

Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs¹

Today the United Nations is 18 years old. Its age is already equal to the complete lifespan of the League of Nations. It has been buried and sanctified more often than any other international organization in history. And through the tumultuous postwar years the United Nations has proved itself both relevant and necessary to the world.

The United Nations is many things to many people.

It is the symbol of human aspirations for a decent world.

It is an institution of 111 members practicing the new art of parliamentary diplomacy.

It is a multilateral organization performing such varied activities as stopping a war, combating malaria in some small village, or drafting a convention on human rights.

Arriving at a balanced assessment of the U.N. these days is not easy. Some overestimate its utility. Others see in each new crisis the cataclysmic end of the organization.

Forces Shaping the United Nations

But a real understanding of the United Nations, reflecting both its limits and capacities, requires an awareness of the fundamental forces

of the postwar period which have shaped and reshaped the organization. There are at least five such forces.

First is the cold war—the collision between East and West manifested in the nuclear arms race. Two sets of ideas about the value of human dignity have clashed that cannot be bridged philosophically but must be bridged politically if either is to survive. The United Nations mirrors both aspects of this so-called East-West confrontation.

The revolutionary wave of national independence is the second force which has buffeted the United Nations. Political independence has come to nearly 1 billion people, leaving less than 2 percent of the former colonial peoples in dependent status. The United Nations has itself administered a number of these changes from dependent to independent status with surprisingly little violence and bloodshed. Today the United Nations is involved with the difficult and emotional final stages of liquidating the old colonial system and the race problems embedded in it. Just a short trip to the U.N. will impress upon each of you the heavy preoccupation of the organization with the questions of achieving majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, self-determination for the Portuguese territories, and the elimination of *apartheid*² from South Africa.

¹Address made on United Nations Day, Oct. 24, before the Buffalo Council on World Affairs and the Rotary Club of Buffalo at Buffalo, N.Y., and before the Bridgeport Association for the United Nations at Bridgeport, Conn. (press release 549 dated Oct. 25). On Nov. 10 Mr. Sisco became Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.

²For a statement made in the plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly by Francis T. P. Plimpton on Oct. 11, see BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1963, p. 758.

The third factor is the so-called "revolution of rising expectations." It highlights the glaring gap between the material conditions of the advanced and less developed nations. The United Nations system is heavily occupied with the first systematic effort at international cooperation in the field of economic and social affairs. More than three-quarters of its staff devotes full time to these fields. Certainly this is one of the greatest phenomena of contemporary times.

Fourth is the quick pace of discovery and invention, which outstrips political and social developments and which makes a decent standard of life a practical proposition for all. The United Nations is concerned increasingly with the complex problems of how to put science and technology to maximum use in different societies.

Fifth is the emergence of the open society of nation-states—a society of enormous diversity of cultures, races, and political, economic, and social systems. The United Nations is, of course, the institutional center of this open international society. An interdependent world has been thrown into more intimate association. This interdependence—in which we are literally living in each other's backyards, in which oceans no longer divide—makes international organization not a luxury but a necessity.

Because the United Nations has been coping with these forces, it is relevant. And being relevant, it is in a position to be effective and useful.

Promoting the National Interests of the U.S.

The real measure of effectiveness to an American is: How has our membership in the United Nations served the foreign policy interests of the United States? The other 110 members of the U.N. also view this organization in similar terms.

How relevant and how useful can the U.N. be in advancing the purposes of U.S. foreign policy—in helping us to grapple with the cold war, with the burgeoning changes in the southern part of the world, with the impact of the new science and the new technology, and with the emergence of the vast new open society which I have just touched on?

The test, of course, is whether it is adaptable enough to whatever kind of a world history has in store for us. We talk about a relaxation of tensions, about a new environment in which Soviet policy is showing flexibility and an apparent—and I stress "apparent"—willingness to begin to behave like a more responsible citizen of the world.

Some modest advances have been made.

We have had Soviet agreement to the partial test ban.

The Washington-Moscow "hot line" to help prevent war by miscalculation is operational.

The Soviets have finally agreed to have international experts inspect the larger nuclear reactors that the International Atomic Energy Agency is helping install in underdeveloped areas.

Just last week the Soviets joined in an Assembly resolution declaring that no nation will station or orbit weapons of mass destruction in outer space.³

And today they are talking more realistically about the kind of law that should govern activities in outer space.

We do not yet know the full significance of these moves. As President Kennedy said at the University of Maine last Saturday,⁴ we do not know whether we have reached a turning point in the cold war but we are not lowering our guard. The areas of tension remain—in Cuba, in Laos, Viet-Nam, and Berlin. While continuing our effort to relax world tensions, we have no cause to relax national vigilance. It is easy—and deceiving—to assume that we are the Soviets can quickly and satisfactorily resolve our deep differences. But Khrushchev is unbending in the ideological struggle, and we still see the world differently. Though there may be a change in atmosphere and emphasis, there has been no reversal of purpose.

By what deeds can we test Soviet intentions? Certainly one indication would be the payment by the Soviet Union of its outstanding debt to the United Nations for past peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East. Another would be their abandonment of subver-

³ For a statement made in the plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly by Adlai E. Stevenson on Oct. 16, see *ibid.*, p. 753.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1963, p. 694.

sion and indirect aggression, their agreement to put the United Nations into the breach to extinguish brush-fire wars.

But regardless of whether the Soviets are willing to recognize the benefits of joining with us and other countries in a genuine and enforceable peace, the U.N. has already proved to be an effective instrumentality for promoting the kind of world we want. As Secretary Rusk said recently: "Let us realize, then, that as the United Nations succeeds, as the words and ideals of the Charter become the everyday practice of nations, the world of free choice—our kind of world—has a better chance to survive and prosper."

In the future, whether it is a future of cold war or of relaxed relationships, the U.N. has to substitute as an instrument to promote our national interests and the cause of peace.

As a Place for Mobilizing World Opinion

Some say that there is no such thing as world opinion; others tend either to overstate or down-trade its effect. But 18 years of experience in the United Nations seems to demonstrate that the flow of words, to which we contribute at least our share, has been on the whole beneficial.

It gives us a chance to make our case before the world audience as we did last year in the Cuba crisis.⁶ Ambassador Stevenson's "answers or no" challenge to Soviet representative Valerian A. J. Zorin, who had just denied the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and the dramatic presentation of hard photographic evidence helped us to mobilize political support over the world. There is no need to claim, as do some overzealous supporters of the U.N., that this was the key factor. It was American power, and the determination to use it if necessary, which caused Mr. Khrushchev to blink. But surely it is not too much to claim that the overwhelming political pressure mustered in the U.N. contributed to Mr. Khrushchev's decision to pull out the missiles quickly.

Let's take another case. The United Nations is now heavily engaged in questions of human rights and racial discrimination. Just a few

days ago the United States took the initiative—an unprecedented step—to bring to the General Assembly a full account of the monumental efforts being made by the United States to root out racial discrimination from our own national life. Ambassador Stevenson outlined eloquently the efforts being made to assure the American Negro the exercise of his unfettered right of franchise, to bring about fair employment practices, and to end segregation in housing, in schools, and elsewhere. Ambassador Stevenson pulled no punches. He cited the record, as yet uncompleted. He reiterated our determination to bring an end to injustices against the American Negro.⁷

It is not insignificant that just a few days later Emperor Haile Selassie, speaking before the entire membership of 111, paid tribute to the efforts being made by President Kennedy to this end. It will interest you to know that the mature reaction of world opinion to developments on the racial question in our country shows that the great majority of the members of the United Nations and their people around the world recognize the difference between a country which is having racial trouble because it is unwilling to make progress and a country which is having racial trouble because it is making progress. The Assembly provided us with a unique opportunity and platform to present this message to the world.

As a Place for Switchboard Diplomacy

The current 18th General Assembly illustrates, perhaps more clearly than any other in the past, the role which the United Nations plays in the sphere of private diplomacy. The U.N. has become a key diplomatic center—a switchboard for bilateral and multilateral talks. There is much more quiet diplomacy going on at the U.N. than most people realize. Every fall a large number of the most influential leaders of government and foreign ministers from all over the globe assemble in New York. This event—and I find it very significant that it has now become routine—offers unparalleled opportunities for East and West to meet, for

⁶ Message for U.N. Day to employees of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 723.

⁷ For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson in Committee III on Oct. 1, see U.S. delegation press release 4249.

small and large powers to influence each other. During his 2-week visit to the General Assembly, Secretary of State Rusk was able to meet personally with more than 75 foreign ministers.

It is this quiet switchboard operation which is perhaps least well understood and appreciated.

In recent days at the Assembly, the interested parties discussed without fanfare the differences arising over the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. Yemen, too, has been the subject of quiet talks, stressing the need for prompt implementation of the disengagement agreement between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia.

The United Nations is more heavily involved in the Middle East than in any other area in the world. The Palestine refugee agency continues to clothe and feed a million refugees. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization continues to take the sting out of nasty local incidents which could mushroom into broader and more serious hostilities. The United Nations Emergency Force continues to police the armistice demarcation lines and is a significant element of stability at Sinai and Gaza. A 200-man U.N. mission is observing the disengagement agreement in Yemen.

So it is not surprising that the United Nations, bulwarked by the quiet efforts of the Secretary-General, continues its unflagging efforts to bring about and maintain stability in the Middle East.

Just a few days ago the Secretary-General announced the beginning of talks between the Portuguese and a number of African leaders regarding the Portuguese territories. This contact, which the U.N. has facilitated, is important because it is to the interests of the Portuguese, the Africans, and the world generally that the Portuguese territories problem be solved peacefully.

As a Third Force

The United Nations has also played a key role as a third force. In many disputes it helped to remove the seeds of war. The U.N. played a decisive role in avoiding a direct big-power confrontation in the Congo. And the Assem-

bly just the other day decided to continue the U.N. Force for another 6 months to give the Congolese more time to develop their own capacity to maintain law and order.

During this past year, the states of Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines requested the Secretary-General to send a team to North Borneo and Sarawak to determine whether the inhabitants wanted to be incorporated into the new Federation of Malaysia.

The United Nations Temporary Executive Authority provided a crucial third-party role in easing the turnover of West Irian from the Netherlands to Indonesia. On May 1 Indonesia assumed full administrative control.

This vital third-party role alone would justify the existence of the United Nations.

Conclusion

Those of us who must help the Secretary of State and the President make the hard choices of foreign policy are often criticized because we do not opt for a more dynamic, all-American policy of victory-every-time—instead of the half-loaf compromises we must sometimes settle for.

Two illusory options are held out to us—two courses that have historically attracted the hopefuls and the cynics alike.

One school of thought wants us to get out of the United Nations if we can't have our way at the time—to pick up our marbles and go home whenever there is a disappointment. The other theory is that the United States should use its power and money unilaterally to impose our preferred solutions on the world. The school of thought would deny on the international level the methods and principles of persuasion and cooperation that we swear by at the national and local levels.

Both of these courses are unrealistic and impractical. There are no such magical solutions, panaceas, and easy answers.

I am reminded of the answer given by the French marshal to Lord Cardigan, the general who directed the tragic charge of the Light Brigade. As the cavalymen, riding in the face of the Russian guns, fell like heroes (and flies), Cardigan asked the French marshal: "Is this

not a magnificent sight?" "Milord," replied the Frenchman, "it is truly magnificent, but it isn't war."

What our critics offer is truly magnificent, but it isn't peace.

If we follow their counsel and get out of the United Nations unless we control its every decision, we will be abandoning the organization and all it has done and can do to advance the purposes of our foreign policy—*most of the time*. We will be turning over this great instrumentality to our adversaries.

In the real world of the hard day-to-day decisions of foreign policy there is no single magical road to conducting our foreign relations, and there are going to be inevitable setbacks and compromises. If we are going to talk sense to the American people, as Ambassador Stevenson is fond of saying, we must tell them that foreign policy must be conducted through all the instrumentalities at our disposal—through military power, through foreign aid, through alliances, through bilateral diplomacy, through regional arrangements, and through the 73 international organizations that make up the U.N. system. Skillful foreign policy combines and orchestrates these instruments.

I have tried to point out that the U.N. system is a remarkably varied and adaptable instrument, whether in an atmosphere of cold war or of relaxed tensions. The U.N. can help as a forum for pleading our cause, as a way to spotlight Communist subversion, as a third force to settle quarrels of smaller countries without engaging the awesome force of the big powers, and as a suitable mechanism for building for our children a world of freedom, diversity, and creativity compatible with our own. The world envisioned by the U.N. Charter, after all, is patterned on our values and our instruments and our institutions. In short, the United Nations is working for us.

Letters of Credence

Ambassador

The newly appointed Ambassador of Ecuador, José Antonio Correa Escobar, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on October

ber 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 550 dated October 24.

Norway

The newly appointed Ambassador of Norway, Hans Kristian Engen, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on November 1. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 562 dated November 1.

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at Indianapolis

The Department of State announced on October 31 (press release 564) that it will hold its next regional foreign policy conference at Indianapolis on November 19, with the cooperation of the Indianapolis World Affairs Council. Representatives of the press, radio, television, and nongovernmental organizations concerned with foreign policy, and community and business leaders from Indiana, northern Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin will participate.

The purpose of these regional meetings is to provide an opportunity for senior Government officials who carry responsibility for foreign policy to meet with community leaders, media representatives, and other interested persons to explore in depth and exchange views on matters of current import in world affairs.

Officials of the Government participating in the conference will be U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Ward P. Allen, Interim U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States and Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State; Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; Mose L. Harvey, Member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State; Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; Mrs. Katie Louchheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; and William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Science and International Cooperation

*Remarks by President Kennedy*¹

I am happy to accept the invitation to address the National Academy of Sciences, and I am very happy to come here with our distinguished visitor from Bolivia, the President of Bolivia [Dr. Victor Paz Estenssoro],² although a distinguished scholar and educator in his own right, and in exile, has led his country through one of the most profound revolutions in the last decade that this hemisphere has witnessed. Therefore, I am proud that he is with me on this very important occasion to my own country.

It is impressive to reflect that 100 years ago, in the midst of a savage fraternal war, the United States Congress established a body devoted to the advancement of scientific research. The recognition then of the value of abstract science ran against the grain of our traditional preoccupation with technology and engineering.

You will remember De Tocqueville's famous chapter on why the Americans are more addicted to practical than to theoretical science. De Tocqueville concluded that the more democratic a society, "the more will discoveries immediately applicable to productive industry confer gain, fame, and even power on their authors."

But if I were to name a single thing which points up the difference this century has made in the American attitude toward science, it would certainly be the wholehearted understanding today of the importance of pure science. We realize now that progress in technology depends on progress in theory, that the

most abstract investigations can lead to the most concrete results, and that the vitality of a scientific community springs from its passion to answer science's most fundamental questions. We therefore greet this body with particular pleasure, for the range and depth of scientific achievement represented in this room constitute the seedbed of our nation's future.

Science and Public Policy

The last hundred years have seen a second great change—the change in the relationship between science and public policy. To this new relationship your own academy has made a decisive contribution. For a century the National Academy of Sciences has exemplified the partnership between scientists who accept the responsibilities that accompany freedom and Government which encourages the increase of knowledge for the welfare of mankind. As a result in large part of the recommendations of this academy, the Federal Government enlarged its scientific activities through such agencies as the Geological Survey, the Weather Bureau, the Bureau of Standards, the Forest Service, and many others; but it took the First World War to bring science into central contact with governmental policy, and it took the Second World War to make scientific counsel an indispensable function of government. The relationship between science and public policy is bound to be complex.

As the country had reason to note in recent weeks, during the debate on the test ban treaty, scientists do not always unite themselves to their recommendations to the makers of policy. This is only partly because of scientific disagree-

¹ Made at the 100th anniversary convocation of the National Academy of Sciences at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 22 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

² See p. 787.

ments. It is even more because the big issues so often go beyond the possibilities of exact scientific determination.

I know few significant questions of public policy which can safely be confided to computers. In the end the hard decisions inescapably involve imponderables of intuition, prudence, and judgment.

In the last hundred years science has thus emerged from a peripheral concern of government to an active partner. The instrumentalities devised in recent times have given this partnership continuity and force. The question in all our minds today is how science can best continue its service to the Nation, to the people, to the world, in the years to come.

I would suggest that science is already moving to enlarge its influence in three general ways: in the interdisciplinary area, in the international area, and in the intercultural area. For science is the most powerful means we have for the unification of knowledge, and a main obligation of its future must be to deal with problems which cut across boundaries, whether boundaries between the sciences, boundaries between nations, or boundaries between man's scientific and his humane concerns.

As science, of necessity, becomes more involved with itself, so also, of necessity, it becomes more international. I am impressed to know of the 670 members of this academy, 163 were born in other lands. The great scientific challenges transcend national frontiers and national prejudices. In a sense this has always been true, for the language of science has always been universal and perhaps scientists have been the most international of all professions in their outlook. But the contemporary revolution in transport and communications has dramatically contributed to the internationalization of science, and one consequence has been the increase in organized international cooperation.

Every time you scientists make a major invention, we politicians have to invent a new institution to cope with it, and almost invariably these days, and happily, it must be an international institution. I am not just thinking of the fact that when you gentlemen figure out how to build a global satellite communica-

tions system we have to figure out a global organization to manage it. I am thinking as well that scientific advantage provided the rationale for the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization; that splitting the atom leads not only to a nuclear arms race but to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency; that the need for scientific exploration of Antarctica leads to an international treaty providing free access to the area without regard to territorial claims; that the scientific possibility of a World Weather Watch requires the attention of the World Meteorological Organization; that the exploration of oceans leads to the establishment of an Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission.

Recent scientific advances have not only made international cooperation desirable but they have made it essential. The ocean, the atmosphere, outer space, belong not to one nation or one ideology but to all mankind, and as science carries out its tasks in the years ahead, it must enlist all its own disciplines, all nations prepared for the scientific quest, and all men capable of sympathizing with the scientific impulse.

Scientists alone can establish the objectives of their research, but society, in extending support to science, must take account of its own needs. As a layman, I can suggest only with diffidence what some of the major tasks might be on your scientific agenda, but I venture to mention certain areas which, from the viewpoint of the maker of policy, might deserve your special concern.

Conservation of Natural Resources

First, I would suggest the question of the conservation and development of our natural resources. In a recent speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations,³ I proposed a worldwide program to protect land and water, forests and wildlife, to combat exhaustion and erosion, to stop the contamination of water and air by industrial as well as nuclear pollution, and to provide for the steady renewal and expansion of the natural bases of life.

Malthus argued a century and a half ago that

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

man, by using up all of his available resources, would forever press on the limits of subsistence, thus condemning humanity to an indefinite future of misery and poverty. We can now begin to hope and, I believe, know that Malthus was expressing not a law of nature but merely the limitation then of scientific and social wisdom. The truth or falsity of his prediction will depend now, with the tools we have, on our own actions, now and in the years to come.

The earth can be an abundant mother to all of the people that will be born in the coming years if we learn to use her with skill and wisdom, to heal her wounds, replenish her vitality, and utilize her potentialities. And the necessity is now urgent and worldwide, for few nations embarked on the adventure of development have the resources to sustain an ever-growing population and a rising standard of living. The United Nations has designated this the Decade of Development. We all stand committed to make this agreeable hope a reality. This seems to me the greatest challenge to science in our times—to use the world's resources, to expand life and hope for the world's inhabitants. While these are essentially applied problems, they require guidance and support from basic science.

I solicit your help, and I particularly solicit your help in meeting a problem of universal concern—the supply of food to the multiplying mouths of a multiplying world. Abundance depends now on the application of sound biological analysis to the problems of agriculture. If all the knowledge that we now have were systematically applied to all the countries of the world, the world could greatly improve its performance in the low-yield areas; but this would not be enough and the long-term answer to inadequate food production, which brings misery with it, must lie in new research and new experimentation, and the successful use of new knowledge will require close cooperation with other nations.

Already a beginning has been made. I think of the work in other countries, of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and the creation by the OAS [Organization of American States] of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences in Costa Rica. I look forward eventually to the establishment of a series of international agricultural research institutes on a regional

basis throughout the developing world. I can imagine nothing more unwise than to hoard knowledge and not disseminate it and develop the means of disseminating it throughout the globe.

Using the Resources of the Sea

Second, I would call your attention to a related problem; that is, the understanding and use of the resources of the sea. I recently submitted to Congress a plan for a national attack on the oceans of the world, calling for the expenditure of more than \$2 billion over the next 10 years. This plan is the culmination of 3 years' effort of the Interagency Committee on Oceanography and it results from recommendations made by the National Academy.

Our goal is to investigate the world ocean, its boundaries, its properties, its processes. To our surprising extent, the sea has remained a mystery. Ten thousand fleets still sweep over its surface in vain. We know less of the oceans at our feet, where we came from, than we do of the sky above our heads. It is time to change this, to use to the full our powerful new instruments of ocean exploration, to drive back the frontiers of the unknown in the waters which encircle the globe.

I can imagine no field more exciting to us than this great effort which our country and others will carry on in the years to come. We need this knowledge for its own sake. We want to know what is under the sea, and we need it to consider its bearings on our security and on the world's social and economic needs. It has been estimated, for example, that the yield of food from the seas could be increased five or ten times through better knowledge of marine biology, and some day we will seed and weed and harvest the ocean. Here again, the job can best be done by the nations of the world working together in international institutions.

As all men breathe the same air, so a storm along Cape Cod may well begin off the shore

**Oceanography—The Ten Years Ahead: A Long Range National Oceanographic Plan, 1963-1972. Interagency Committee on Oceanography, pamphlet No. 10. June 1963. Single copies are available upon request from the Interagency Committee on Oceanography, Office of Naval Research, Building T, Room 1714, Washington, D.C., 20301.*

of Japan. The world ocean is also indivisible, and events in one part of the great sea have astonishing effects in remote places.

International scientific cooperation is indispensable if human knowledge of the ocean is to keep pace with human needs.

Study of the Atmosphere

Third, there is the atmosphere itself, the atmosphere in which we live and breathe and which makes life on this planet possible. Scientists have studied the atmosphere for many decades, but its problems continue to defy us. The reasons for our limited progress are obvious. Weather cannot be easily reproduced and observed in the laboratory. It must, therefore, be studied in all of its violence wherever it has its way. Here, as in oceanography, new scientific tools have become available. With modern computers, rockets, and satellites, the time is ripe to harness a variety of disciplines for a concerted attack. And even more than oceanography, the atmospheric sciences require worldwide observation and, hence, international cooperation.

Some of our most successful international efforts have involved the study of the atmosphere. We all know that the World Meteorological Organization has been effective in this field. It is now developing a worldwide weather system to which nations the world over can make their contributions. Such cooperative undertakings can challenge the world's best efforts for decades to come.

Controlling the Effects of Experimentation

Fourth, I would mention a problem which I know has greatly concerned many of you. That is our responsibility to control the effects of our own scientific experiments, for as science investigates the natural environment, it also modifies it, and that modification may have incalculable consequences for evil as well as for good.

In the past the problem of conservation has been mainly the problem of human waste of natural resources, of their destruction, but science has the power for the first time in history now to undertake experiments with premeditation which can irreversibly alter our biologi-

cal and physical environment on a global scale. The problem is difficult, because it is hard to know in advance whether the cumulative effects of a particular experiment will help or harm mankind. In the case of nuclear testing the world is satisfied that radioactive contamination involves unnecessary risks, and we are all heartened that more than 100 nations have joined to outlaw testing in environments where the effects most directly threaten mankind.

In other fields we may be less sure. We must, for example, balance the gains of weather modification against the hazards of protracted drought or storm.

The Government has the clear responsibility to weigh the importance of large-scale experiments to the advance of knowledge or to national security against the possibility of adverse and destructive effects. The scientific community must assist the Government in arriving at rational judgments and interpreting these issues to the public. To deal with this problem, we have worked out formal procedures within the Government to assure expert review before potentially risky experiments are undertaken, and we will make every effort to publish the data needed to permit open examination and discussion of proposed experiments by the scientific community before they are authorized.

Need for Public Support

If science is to press ahead in the four fields that I have mentioned, if it is to continue to grow in effectiveness and productivity, our society must provide scientific inquiry the necessary means of sustenance. We must, in short, support it. Military and space needs, for example, offer little justification for much work in what Joseph Henry called abstract science. Though such fundamental inquiry is essential to the future technological vitality of industry and Government alike, it is usually more difficult to comprehend than applied activity and, as a consequence, often seems harder to justify to the Congress, to the executive branch, and to the people.

But if basic research is to be properly regarded, it must be better understood. I ask you to reflect on this problem and on the means

by which, in the years to come, our society can assure continuing backing to fundamental research in the life sciences, the physical sciences, the social sciences, our natural resources, on agriculture, on protection against pollution and erosion. Together, the scientific community, the Government, industry, and education must work out the way to nourish American science in all its power and vitality. Even this year we have already seen in the first actions of the House of Representatives some failure of support for important areas of research which must depend on the National Government. I am hopeful that the Senate of the United States will restore these funds. Of course, what it needs is a wider understanding by the country as a whole of the value of this work which has been so sustained by so many of you.

I would not close, however, on a gloomy note, for ours is a century of scientific conquest and scientific triumph. If scientific discovery has not been an unalloyed blessing, if it has conferred on mankind the power not only to create but also to annihilate, it has at the same time provided humanity with a supreme challenge and a supreme testing. If the challenge and the testing are too much for humanity, then we are all doomed, but I believe that the future can be bright and I believe it can be certain. Man is still the master of his own fate, and I believe that the power of science and the responsibility of science have offered mankind a new opportunity not only for intellectual growth but for moral discipline, not only for the acquisition of knowledge but for the strengthening of our nerve and our will.

We are bound to grope for a time as we grapple with problems without precedent in human history, but wisdom is the child of experience. In the years since man unlocked the power stored within the atom, the world has made progress, halting but effective, toward bringing that power under human control. The challenge, in short, may be our salvation. As we begin to master the potentialities of modern science we move toward a new era in which science can fulfill its creative promise and help

bring into existence the happiest society the world has ever known.

I express my appreciation to all of you for what you have done in your respective disciplines in the field of science, and the contribution which those disciplines have made to the welfare of our country and, in the great sense, to the welfare of all mankind.

I can imagine no period in the long history of the world where it would be more exciting and rewarding than in the field today of scientific exploration. I recognize with each door that we unlock we see perhaps ten doors that we never knew existed, and therefore we have to keep working forward. But with all of the tools now at our command, with all the areas of knowledge which are waiting to be opened up, I think that never in the short history of the academy or in the far longer history of science has the time been brighter, the need been greater for the cooperation between those of us who work in Government and those of you who work in far distant laboratories on subjects almost wholly unrelated to the problems we now face in 1963. I hope that that cooperation will remain intimate and that it will remain beneficial to both science and to the people as a whole.

Science has made all of our lives so much easier and happier in the last 30 years. I hope that the people of the United States will continue to sustain all of you in your work and make it possible for us to encourage other gifted young men and women to move into these high fields which require so much from them and which have so much to give to all of our people. So the need is very great. Even though some of your experiments may not bring fruition right away, I hope that they will be carried out immediately.

It reminds us of what the great French Marshal Lyautey once said to his gardener: "Plant a tree tomorrow." And the gardener said, "It won't bear fruit for a hundred years." "In that case," Lyautey said to the gardener, "plant it this afternoon." That is how I feel about your work.

Nations in the Making in Africa

by J. Wayne Fredericks

Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs¹

Much like Athena, springing from the head of Zeus, the new nations of Africa have leaped onto the world stage in independence. Unlike Athena, however, these nations are mortal rather than mythical. While they are fully sovereign, they have some way to go to attain their full political, economic, and social development.

The recent history of Africa can be characterized by those moving words from President Kennedy's inaugural address:² "... a celebration of freedom—symbolizing an end as well as a beginning—signifying renewal as well as change." On the African Continent today we are witnessing the end of colonialism and the beginning of a new day for the peoples of Africa. We are seeing a renewal of faith by Africans in the values of their ancient cultures side by side with a driving determination to produce change that will bring them rapidly into the modern world.

Today I will talk about both the end and the beginning that Africa is experiencing.

The End of Colonialism

By an interesting coincidence the end of colonialism and the beginning of Africa's march to freedom began in a Moslem country on the eve of a Christian holiday under the auspices of a secular organization. This was, of course, the creation of the independent nation of Libya by the United Nations on December 24, 1951.

¹ Address made at the seventh annual Foreign Policy Institute at Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., on Oct. 23 (press release 547).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

Since that date 28 other African states have attained independence, and 4 additional countries—Zanzibar, Kenya, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia—are scheduled to become independent within the next several months.

This unprecedented spectacle of so many nations gaining freedom in a dozen years is the more remarkable for its relative absence of violence. Almost all of the new African nations achieved independence through their own inspired leadership and the wise cooperation of former colonial rulers. Indeed, by and large, relations between the new nations and the metropolises have continued to be cordial and mutually beneficial.

Algeria's independence followed 7½ years of fighting. But even in that instance most of the wounds of battle have been healed, and despite some friction in recent developments surprisingly good relations exist today between Algeria and France.

In the rich Republic of the Congo violence flared after the transition to independence had taken place. There divisive forces were set in motion almost at once in three of the country's original six provinces, with Katanga posing the most serious threat to the Congo's national existence. Thanks to a combination of determination by the Congolese Government to keep the country intact and the support of the United Nations, the Katangan secession movement collapsed early this year. The United States strongly supported Congolese and United Nations actions to prevent a complete breakdown of peace and order in the heart of Africa. We are confident those actions were correct and necessary to protect Congolese sovereign integrity

and to head off Communist penetration into this part of Africa. While the Congo is by no means free of troubles today, it is independent and sovereign within its borders, and it is moving ahead with confidence to the enormous tasks of nation building that remain before it.

In these four countries that have timetables for their independence, things are moving ahead reasonably well. Zanzibar is scheduled to become independent at midnight on December 9, Kenya's long-awaited *Uhuru* has been set for December 12, and Nyasaland will attain its independence from England on July 6, 1964. No independence date has yet been set for Northern Rhodesia, which is expected to achieve full internal self-government in January.

The outlook is less promising in the white-dominated southern regions of the continent, however—in Southern Rhodesia, in the Portuguese territories, and in South Africa, which is independent but where the majority of its people are not yet able to enjoy fully rights which have been accepted by the United States and others as fundamental to all of their citizens.

Southern Rhodesia is an area where the building of a truly multiracial society was well begun but where difficulties have arisen. We can understand and sympathize with Southern Rhodesia's problems, but there may be less time left for dialog than the program of the Government of Southern Rhodesia would indicate. We certainly hope that the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesians, white and black, can speedily work out a mutually acceptable solution.

The United States also is greatly interested in developments in the Portuguese territories in Africa. We would hope that the Portuguese, in view of their experience in Africa, could continue to play—like their European colleagues—an important role on that continent. We have no desire to see the Portuguese forced out of Africa, but events in Africa are moving too fast for them or anyone to maintain the *status quo*. We hope that the transition can take place on a mutually acceptable basis.

Only in the past few days representatives of Portugal and a number of independent African nations have been meeting at the United Nations to discuss this situation. The fact that such

discussions have begun is encouraging. I hope they will bring the Portuguese and indigenous Africans closer together and develop new ideas on how to resolve some of the more pressing questions concerning Portugal's African territories.

The Republic of South Africa is a world unto itself. That country has set itself against the major trends in Africa and the world. Its present Government has been in power since 1948 and in the last decade and a half has enacted an intricate complex of laws designed to entrench white supremacy in the country.

At a time when the rest of the world is moving toward greater racial, religious, and social equality among peoples, South Africa is trying to keep its peoples separated through its doctrine of *apartheid*. By virtue of its complete and tight control over the entire country, the Government is attempting to build a society in which the whites can maintain 19th-century privileges while the majority of the population is denied the normal rights of general citizenship. This system not only is objectionable to the equal dignity of men but encourages violent reaction and perhaps interventions.

The United States is firmly and irrevocably opposed to *apartheid* in all its aspects. We have stated this often, and our position is clear. We believe *apartheid* can lead only to tragedy in South Africa—to an eventual eruption that will have serious consequences for all its people, including an invitation to Communist penetration. Because of this belief we take every opportunity to encourage South Africa to grant dignity and self-determination to its people and to avoid the possibility of a cold war or racial Armageddon.³

Problems Facing New African Nations

Turning now from the end to the beginning, what are the problems facing new nations moving from colonial status to independence, and how are they being met by Africa's young governments?

Obviously, wherever it happens, the picking up of the reins of government by new hands

³ For a statement made by Francis T. P. Plimpton at the plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly Oct. 11, see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 758.

creates many dislocations. This is particularly true for people who had their past policies set in distant European capitals. African leaders have a whole new range of problems to face—budgetary responsibilities, defense requirements, relations with other countries, internal administration, economic growth, and a host of other questions.

The new leaders are being pressed by their people for rapid economic and social advances, and they must show progress in the face of such sobering facts as these: an average per capita income throughout the continent of only \$130 a year; a 15-percent literacy rate; a low life expectancy—one out of every five Africans dies before reaching puberty; a low agricultural productivity rate—the world's second largest landmass accounts for only 5 percent of the world's agricultural products; massive problems of malnutrition and disease; inadequate transportation and communications facilities. There is a shortage of investment capital; a lack of trained technicians and administrators; far too few businessmen, small and large; and a serious shortage of industrial production upon which to build.

In addition to all of this there are the same social problems attendant upon rapid urbanization in Africa that there are in the United States. In Africa, however, these problems tend to be more acute because of the breakdown of tribal mores and the difficulty of creating new values.

Despite these considerable handicaps Africa's new nations are making genuine progress in meeting their enormous social and economic needs. They are doing this both through their own hard work and through assistance provided by the free world. As a result of these greater efforts and the use of modern technological methods, African production and exports are rising. In fact, Africa's exports in recent years have risen faster than those of any other of the less developed regions of the world. In terms of total exports Africa (excluding Egypt) showed an increase from \$5,560 million in 1959 to \$6,452 million in 1962.

Because the new African countries are starting from such a low base, however, it is apparent that self-help measures are not sufficient

for rapid progress. Much assistance is needed from abroad.

By far the largest part of the needed help is coming from European sources. France, for example, has been contributing more than \$600 million annually to independent African countries. The United Kingdom's total of grants and loans has amounted to some \$150 million annually. By the end of 1962 West Germany had either provided or planned for development programs amounting to almost \$250 million in 30 African countries and technical assistance programs of nearly \$70 million. And the Common Market development fund, which provided some \$580 million in assistance in the last 5 years, plans to make available about \$800 million in the next 5 years.

Compared with these figures U.S. aid is considerably smaller. Nevertheless, we feel we can play an important supplementary role in many countries and a major role in a few. Our total AID program for Africa, excluding Egypt, amounted to some \$260 million in fiscal year 1963. In addition our Food for Peace program came to about \$230 million and Export-Import Bank development loans to \$20 million.

Private Enterprise in Africa

The Communist bloc also is actively attempting to get into the African aid picture. During the past 5 years the bloc has extended some \$800 million in loans and credits to Africa, but a large part of that total has not been used by the African nations.

Africans have some evidence that Communist offers are not always matched by Communist deeds. Guinea, for example, achieved its independence in 1958 and began its national life under severe handicaps. Failing to get an adequate response to its call for help from the West, it accepted credits of more than \$115 million from the Communist bloc. The excessive costs and low quality of materials supplied by the bloc, together with highhanded Communist interference in Guinea's internal affairs, soon convinced President Ahmed Sékou Touré that his country's national interests were being subverted, and he swiftly cut back on his dealings with the Communists. The extent of Guinea's disappointment with Communist per-

formance is evidenced by the fact that a national economic conference was held in Conakry earlier this month to stress the expansion of the private sector. And beginning next week all Guinean marketing will be placed under private control.

Although we hear much about African socialism, there is a flourishing concept and practice of private enterprise in Africa. There is little relation between the militant Marxism of Communist countries and the concepts of socialism in Africa. In fact, private enterprise accounts for the largest part of all African economic activity.

Agriculture, which plays the major role in most African economies, is overwhelmingly private. Vigorous new private industries and commercial establishments are being set up throughout the continent. There are also many new development banks being organized in various countries, and a major purpose of these banks is to make loans to individual private businessmen. The U.S. Agency for International Development has lent money to these banks to encourage private enterprise. In addition all African countries seek private foreign investment, including investment from the United States, and a number of American firms have sizable commitments in Africa.

An example of a country in which private enterprise is playing a major role is Nigeria. There a 6-year, \$3 billion development plan has been developed, of which \$1.2 billion will be allocated to the private sector. Nigeria expects to provide 50 percent of total investment from internal Nigerian resources and hopes to finance the remaining 50 percent from public foreign aid and private foreign investment.

Nigeria's economic efficiency and its provision of opportunities and incentives have helped the country's gross national product to rise at an average annual rate of 3.8 percent since 1950. Nigeria also has demonstrated a high capacity to absorb capital usefully.

Understandably, much outside help is needed to fulfill this ambitious plan. The United States has been much impressed with Nigeria's efforts to help itself, and we are committed to a long-range loan program over the next 6 years.

On an Africa-wide basis the new nations are demonstrating remarkable political maturity. The principal vehicle of political cooperation is the Organization of African Unity, which was formed at the historic African heads-of-state conference at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May of this year. Thirty-one independent African nations have signed the OAU Charter, and the heads of state, who will convene annually, will meet again in May 1964 at Tunis. The United States has always supported constructive efforts toward unity in Africa, and we view the OAU as a major African development. We believe it represents an impressive and realistic approach to African cooperation.

There is much more that could be said about the problems and progress being made in Africa's newly independent nations, but I think these remarks illustrate the fact that healthful growth is under way in Africa. Let me emphasize that all the problems are not resolved far from it. Every political leader's tenure in office is limited by his ability to secure economic progress against the odds I have cited. There are other specific and limited kinds of problems as well, one example of which might be the border dispute between Morocco and Algeria.

While the United States is happy to be playing a role in this growth—and intends to continue to do so vigorously—we are pleased with the strong and cordial relations that exist throughout much of Africa between the new independent nations and former colonial powers. The continuation of traditional African-European relations—as well as African-American relations—is a healthy indication that Africa's progress will move ahead in an atmosphere conducive to the growth of a world of free choice.

Obviously, Africa has a long way to go to achieve all the aspirations of its people, but the goals are worth the great efforts being put forth by African, European, and American alike. All of us want to see a strong and free Africa develop in peace and freedom, in justice and prosperity. If we can help bring about such a development at this time when one era ends and another begins in Africa, our hope for a world of peace and security for future generations to enjoy will be substantially strengthened.

U.S. Welcomes Algeria-Morocco Cease-Fire Agreement

President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria and King Hassan II of Morocco, meeting at Bamako, Mali, signed a cease-fire agreement on October 30 designed to end the border conflict between their two countries. Following is the text of a Department statement read to news correspondents on November 1 by Richard Phillips, Director of the Office of News.

The Department welcomes with hope and satisfaction the agreement reached by Africans within an African framework announced at the Bamako conference. We view it as an encouraging first step which we hope will lead to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. We think it represents a significant effort on the part of both participants to restore peace to Northern Africa and feel that a high degree of statesmanship was shown by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and President Modibo Keita of Mali as well, in bringing the disputants together. All who have been working and hoping for a peaceful solution of the dispute will be watching to see if the cease-fire goes into effect at 7:00 p.m. eastern standard time, as scheduled.

President Paz of Bolivia Visits United States

The President of the Republic of Bolivia, Victor Paz Estenssoro, visited the United States from October 21 to 28. He was in Washington from October 22-24. Following is the text of a communique between President Kennedy and President Paz released on October 23.

White House press release dated October 23

For two days, we have been engaged in a frank exchange of our points of view on a number of important topics referring to the development of relations between our two countries and our responsibility for international action at both the inter-American and the world level. Our conversations have been extremely useful

and have reaffirmed the traditional friendship between Bolivia and the United States.

We agreed that the limited nuclear test ban treaty is a first step toward reducing the threat of total disaster for all nations and that the proposal by the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico for a Latin American de-nuclearized zone is a concrete indication of the sponsoring nations' deep interest in problems of arms control, a matter in which the United States is also deeply interested.

We reaffirmed our adherence to the United Nations and our firm decision to continue collaborating with the efforts of that organization to maintain peace and promote understanding among the peoples of the world.

We expressed our grave concern at setbacks to democratic government in Latin America and we have agreed upon the need to contribute to the preservation and strengthening of democratic institutions.

The hope was expressed that territorial problems in Latin America might be resolved within the framework of international solidarity which should inspire all the nations of the hemisphere with the same spirit of harmony which inspired the Chamizal agreement¹ between the Presidents of the United States and Mexico.

In our talks, we have examined the Alliance for Progress, the vast multilateral effort in which all of the free American nations have joined since the meeting at Punta del Este in August 1961.² At the end of this second year of the Alliance, we have noted on the one hand the significant and tangible progress which has been achieved, but we have also observed that we must still travel great distances to reach our objectives.

We have agreed that Bolivia—in common with many countries which are seeking to develop a more diverse and stronger economy—does not possess sufficient resources to proceed immediately with all the desired and necessary tasks. The available foreign public capital is limited. There is, thus, both the need to set priorities for the use of scarce resources and to seek to augment the available supply of external

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 23, 1963, p. 480.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

capital by offering inducements which will attract additional private capital.

We have noted with satisfaction that the problem of scarce resources is being attacked in Bolivia through efforts to make more efficient use of available resources. We agree that it is necessary to sustain the responsible effort which the Government of Bolivia is now making—through the COMIBOL—to restore more efficient production of Bolivia's principal export, tin. We are also agreed on the need of continuing the steps which are being taken toward diversification of the Bolivian economy through the reform and expansion of agricultural production, as well as of selected industrial development.

We renewed our determination to strengthen relations between Bolivia and the United States on the basis of the democratic ideals of freedom and social justice which our nations share and which have inspired their domestic and international conduct as sovereign nations. We noted the responsibility we have to determine that conduct independently in keeping with the reality and special circumstances of each of our nations.

The President of the United States reiterated his admiration for the efforts of the Bolivian people to make profound changes in their national life in conformity with the ideals and needs of the people themselves through the peaceful and democratic means contemplated in the Charter of the Alliance for Progress.

The President of Bolivia reiterated his appreciation for the cooperation rendered to Bolivia by the United States within the general Alliance effort.

We agreed that Bolivian prosperity depends in great part on a stable market for Bolivian minerals and, therefore, on the need to assure their export on the best possible terms. In this regard, we agreed upon the importance of research on improved methods of treating Bolivian ores, in which we are now cooperating, to provide a basis for determining the feasibility of operating in Bolivia a smelter designed for Bolivian ores.

The United States and Bolivia are playing a key role at this time in the history of the Americas. We shall not cease in our efforts until hunger, poverty, ignorance, social injustice and the threat to our free institutions have been eradicated. We consider that programs based on the will of the people are the best means of bringing prosperity and well-being to our peoples. Our complete understanding of the occasion of this meeting has confirmed our faith and will to work together for the good of the Americas and the free world in the future.

President Greet Turkish People on Anniversary of Republic

Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to Gen. Cemal Gürsel, President of the Republic of Turkey, on the 40th anniversary of Turkish independence.

White House press release dated October 29

OCTOBER 29, 1963

I send warm greetings to you and the Turkish people on this fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Republic.

The United States is proud of its association with Turkey in an alliance that rests on common aspirations and mutual interests. The American people admire the resolute spirit and manifest courage of the Turkish people in facing the trials of the postwar years and in their forthright attack on the problems of economic and social development which will determine Turkey's future. To this end, we welcome Turkey's new five-year development program, and wish it the fullest success.

In the sixteen years since the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, we have actively supported the steadfast efforts of Turkey to develop its military and economic strength. We will continue to hold firmly to this policy of cooperation, which has so greatly advanced common interests and added so much to the defensive strength of the free world.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

U.S. and Republic of China Conclude Textile Arrangement

Press release 544 dated October 22

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States Government announced on October 22 the conclusion of a bilateral agreement with the Republic of China concerning trade in cotton textiles between the Republic of China and the United States during the period October 1, 1963, to September 30, 1967. The agreement was concluded by an exchange of notes between Ambassador Jerauld Wright and the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shen Chang-huan, in Taipei on October 19, 1963.

The agreement will insure the orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between the Republic of China and the United States. It is the result of bilateral discussions between a United States technical panel and representatives of the Chinese Government in Taipei during the week of October 7, which led to a complete understanding on the future pattern of cotton textile trade between the Republic of China and the United States.

Principal features of the bilateral arrangement are as follows:

1. The agreement covers all 64 categories of cotton textiles.
2. During the 12-month period commencing October 1, 1963, total exports of cotton textiles from the Republic of China to the United States will be limited to 53 million square yards equivalent.
3. Within this aggregate limit, the Republic of China will be able to export the equivalent of 19.7 million square yards of apparel and 33.3 million square yards of yarns, fabrics, and made-up goods. Within these group limits, the agreement also provides for specific export ceilings on particular categories of cotton textiles.
4. The Republic of China also agrees to limit

its export of certain apparel items made of corduroy to 4 million square yards equivalent during the first 12-month period of the agreement.

5. The aggregate limit, the group ceilings, the limits on specific categories, and the ceiling on corduroy will be increased by 5 percent for the 12-month period commencing October 1, 1964, and by 5 percent for each subsequent 12-month period.

6. In the event that the Republic of China desires to export in excess of 350,000 square yards equivalent in any category for which no specific ceiling is provided, the Republic of China agrees first to consult with the United States.

7. The two Governments agree on procedures which would be applied in the event that an excessive concentration of imports in apparel items made from particular types of cotton fabrics should cause or threaten to cause disruption of the United States market.

8. The two Governments will exchange such statistical data on cotton textiles as are required for the effective implementation of the agreement. A set of conversion factors is specified in the annex to the agreement to express various categories of cotton textiles in terms of a square yard equivalent.

9. The agreement also provides for reductions in shipments to the United States below the agreed ceilings as compensation for shipments in excess of the restraint levels in effect during the first year of the long-term cotton textile arrangement.

10. The two Governments also agreed to consult on any problem that may arise concerning the implementation of the agreement.

The export levels established by the bilateral agreement supersede the restraint actions taken

by the United States Government over the past year against textile exports from the Republic of China to the United States pursuant to articles 3 and 6(c) of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962.¹

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

Note of Republic of China

OCTOBER 19, 1963.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of today's date proposing a bilateral arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles between the Republic of China and the United States, which reads as follows:

[Text of U.S. note.]

I have the honor to confirm on behalf of the Government of the Republic of China that this bilateral arrangement is acceptable and that your Excellency's note and this note in reply shall constitute an agreement between our Governments.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

U.S. Note

TAIPEI, October 19, 1963.

No. 36

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to recent discussions in Taipei between representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of China concerning exports of cotton textiles from the Republic of China to the United States.

As a result of these discussions, I have the honor to propose the following agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles between the Republic of China and the United States:

(1) The Government of the Republic of China shall limit its exports to the United States in all categories of cotton textiles for the twelve-month period beginning October 1, 1963 to an aggregate limit of 53 million square yards equivalent.

(2) Within this overall ceiling, the following group ceilings shall apply:

- | | |
|--|--------------------|
| (a) Apparel categories
(Categories 39-63) | 19.7 million syds. |
| (b) All other categories
(Categories 1-38 and 64) | 33.3 million syds. |

(3) Within the group ceiling for apparel categories, the following specific ceilings shall apply:

(a) Categories 41-42	77,700 d
(b) Category 43	10,500 d
(c) Category 44	15,000 d
(d) Category 45	9,000 d
(e) Category 46	225,000 d
(f) Category 47	25,000 d
(g) Category 49	3,150 d
(h) Category 50	122,000 d
(i) Category 51	196,000 d
(j) Category 52	125,000 d
(k) Category 53	10,000 d
(l) Category 54	21,000 d
(m) Category 55	3,150 d
(n) Category 57	25,000 d
(o) Category 59	25,000 d
(p) Category 60	18,900 d
(q) Category 62	15,750 d
(r) Category 63	125,000 d

(4) Within the group ceiling on all other categories the following specific ceilings shall apply:

(a) Category 1	500,000 l
(b) Category 2	78,750 l
(c) Category 5	902,050 sy
(d) Category 6	367,500 sy
(e) Category 9	17,000,000 sy
(f) Category 15	500,000 sy
(g) Category 18	725,000 sy
(h) Category 19	212,500 sy
(i) Category 22	825,000 sy
(j) Category 23	600,000 sy
(k) Category 26	3,060,000 sy
(l) Category 28	850,000 p
(m) Category 30	1,500,000 p

(5) Within the group ceilings for each group 1 square yard equivalent of any shortfalls occurring exports in the categories given specific ceilings may be used in any category not given a specific ceiling. In the event the Government of the Republic of China desires to export in a twelve-month period more than 350,000 square yards equivalent in any category 1 given a specific ceiling, it shall request consultation with the Government of the United States on the question. The United States Government shall agree to enter into such consultations and, during the course thereof, shall provide the Government of the Republic of China with information on the condition of the United States market in the category in question. Until an agreement is reached, the Government of the Republic of China shall limit its exports in the category in question at an annual level not in excess of 350,000 square yards equivalent.

(6) The limitations on exports established in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 of this agreement shall be increased by five percent for the twelve-month period beginning October 1, 1964; and for each subsequent twelve-month period these limitations shall be increased by a further five percent over the levels of immediately preceding twelve-month period.

(7) Annual exports from the Republic of China in categories 9, 22 and 26 shall be spaced on a cumulative quarterly percentage basis of 33-66-93-100. Annual exports from the Republic of China in categories 50, 51 and 52 shall be spaced on a cumulative quarterly percentage basis of 50-80-100-100. Annual exports

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

other categories subject to specific ceilings shall be spaced as evenly as practicable, taking into account seasonal factors.

(8) The Government of the Republic of China shall limit its exports of items made of corduroy in categories 46, 50 and 51 at an annual ceiling of no more than 4 million square yards. In the event concentration in exports from the Republic of China to the United States of items of apparel made up of cotton fabrics causes or threatens to cause market disruption in the United States, the Government of the United States may call for consultations with the Government of the Republic of China in order to reach a mutually satisfactory solution to the problem. The Government of the Republic of China shall agree to enter into such consultations and, during the course thereof, the Government of the Republic of China shall limit its exports of the items in question at an annual level of 105 percent of its exports during the twelve-month period immediately preceding the month in which consultations are requested.

(9) Each Government agrees to supply promptly any available statistical data requested by the other Government. In particular, the Governments agree to exchange monthly data on exports and imports of cotton textiles from the Republic of China to the United States. In the implementation of this agreement, the system of categories and the factors for conversion into square yard equivalents set forth in the annex to this agreement shall apply.

(10) During the life of this agreement, the United States Government shall not invoke the procedures of Articles 6(c) and 3 of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962 to limit importation of cotton textiles from the Republic of China into the United States.

(11) The Governments agree to consult on any question arising in the implementation of this agreement. In particular, in the event that because of a return to normalcy of market conditions in the United States, the Government of the United States relaxes measures it has taken under the Long-Term Arrangement for any of the categories, consultation may be requested by the Government of the Republic of China to remove or modify ceilings established for such categories by this agreement.

(12) This agreement shall continue in force through September 30, 1967; provided that either Government may propose revisions in the terms of the agreement no later than 90 days prior to the beginning of a new twelve-month period; and provided further that either Government may terminate this agreement effective at the beginning of a new twelve-month period by written notice to the other Government given at least 90 days prior to the beginning of such new twelve-month period.

(13) The Governments recognize that the agreement reached by letters of August 8, 14, 28 and September 10, 1963² between officials of the two Governments con-

cerning the entry into the United States of certain cotton textiles exported from the Republic of China requires that deductions be made from certain specific ceilings applicable during the term of this agreement. Accordingly, the following annual deductions shall be made from the ceilings applicable to the listed categories.

	<i>First Year</i>	<i>Second Year</i>	<i>Third Year</i>	<i>Fourth Year</i>
Category 5 (syds)	169,400	127,100	84,700	42,400
Category 19 (syds)	58,100	43,500	29,000	14,500
Category 41-42 (doz)	5,600	4,200	2,800	1,300
Category 43 (doz)	2,800	2,100	1,400	700
Category 45 (doz)	700	500	300	200
Category 46 (doz)	4,700	3,500	2,300	1,200
Category 50 (doz)	2,100	1,600	1,100	500
Category 51 (doz)	300	200	200	100
Category 60 (doz)	7,100	5,300	3,500	1,800
Category 62 (lbs)	7,800	5,900	3,900	2,900
Category 63 (lbs)	23,800	17,900	11,900	5,900
Category 64 (syds)*	182,600	137,000	91,300	45,700

*To be deducted from group ceiling for "all other categories".

(14) In order that the effective dates of prior restraint actions terminating, pursuant to this agreement, on October 1, 1963 may be modified to coincide with the annual periods applicable in this agreement, the following additional deductions shall be made for the first year of the agreement from the specific ceilings listed in paragraphs 3 and 4:

Category 5	120,166 syds.
Category 6	3,515 syds.
Category 18	407,056 syds.
Category 19	25,000 syds.
Category 41	10,666 doz.
Category 42	1,666 doz.
Category 43	1,666 doz.
Category 45	1,666 doz.
Category 49	3,034 doz.
Category 54	3,600 doz.
Category 55	500 doz.
Category 60	3,000 doz.
Category 64*	15,333 syds.

*To be deducted from group ceilings for "all other categories".

If these proposals are acceptable to the Government of the Republic of China, this note and Your Excellency's note of acceptance on behalf of the Government of the Republic of China shall constitute an agreement between our Governments.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

² Not printed here.

ANNEX
SQUARE YARD EQUIVALENT CONVERSION FACTORS BY
CATEGORY

Category	Description	Unit	Conversion Factor
1	Yarn, Carded, Singles	Lb.	4.6
2	Yarn, Carded, Plied	Lb.	4.6
3	Yarn, Combed, Singles	Lb.	4.6
4	Yarn, Combed, Plied	Lb.	4.6
5	Ginghams, Carded	Syd.	1.0
6	Ginghams, Combed	Syd.	1.0
7	Velveteens	Syd.	1.0
8	Corduroy	Syd.	1.0
9	Sheeting, Carded	Syd.	1.0
10	Sheeting, Combed	Syd.	1.0
11	Lawns, Carded Yarn	Syd.	1.0
12	Lawns, Combed Yarn	Syd.	1.0
13	Voiles, Carded Yarn	Syd.	1.0
14	Voiles, Combed Yarn	Syd.	1.0
15	Poplin and Broadcloth, Carded	Syd.	1.0
16	Poplin and Broadcloth, Combed	Syd.	1.0
17	Typewriter Ribbon Cloth	Syd.	1.0
18	Print Cloth Shirting, 80 x 80 Carded	Syd.	1.0
19	Print Cloth Shirting, Other, Carded	Syd.	1.0
20	Shirting, Carded	Syd.	1.0
21	Shirting, Combed	Syd.	1.0
22	Twill and Sateen, Carded	Syd.	1.0
23	Twill and Sateen, Combed	Syd.	1.0
24	Yarn-Dyed Fab., Exc. Ginghams, Carded	Syd.	1.0
25	Yarn-Dyed Fab., Exc. Ginghams, Combed	Syd.	1.0
26	Fabrics, N.E.S. Carded	Syd.	1.0
27	Fabrics, N.E.S. Combed	Syd.	1.0
28	Pillowcases, Plain, Carded	No.	1.084
29	Pillowcases, Plain, Combed	No.	1.084
30	Dish Towels	No.	.348
31	Other Towels	No.	.348
32	Handkerchiefs	Doz.	1.66
33	Table Damasks and Mfrs.	Lb.	3.17
34	Sheets, Carded	No.	6.2
35	Sheets, Combed	No.	6.2
36	Bedspreads and Quilts	No.	6.9
37	Braided and Woven Elastics	Lb.	4.6
38	Fishing Nets	Lb.	4.6
39	Gloves and Mittens	Doz. Prs.	3.527
40	Hose and Half Hose	Doz. Prs.	4.6
41	M and B White T-Shirts	Doz.	7.234
42	Other T-Shirts	Doz.	7.234
43	Knitshirts Exc. T and Sweat-shirts	Doz.	7.234
44	Sweaters and Cardigans	Doz.	36.8
45	M and B Shirts, Dress, Not Knit	Doz.	22.186
46	M and B Shirts, Sport, Not Knit	Doz.	24.457
47	M and B Shirts, Work, Not Knit	Doz.	22.186
48	Raincoats, ¾ Length or Over	Doz.	50.0
49	Other Coats	Doz.	32.5
50	M and B Trousers, Slacks and Shorts (Outer)	Doz.	17.797
51	W and Ch. Trousers, Slacks and Shorts (Outer)	Doz.	17.797
52	Blouses, Whether or Not in Sets	Doz.	14.53
53	W, Ch & Inf. Dresses (Inc. Uniforms) Not Knit	Doz.	45.3
54	Playsuits, Washsuits, Sun-suits etc.	Doz.	25.0
55	Dressing Gowns, etc. Not Knit	Doz.	51.0

Category	Description	Unit	Conversion Factor
56	M and B Undershirts, Exc. T	Doz.	9.2
57	M and B Briefs and Undershorts	Doz.	11.2
58	Drawers, Shorts and Briefs, Exc. M and B, Knit	Doz.	5.0
59	Other Underwear, Not Knit or Crocheted	Doz.	16.0
60	Nightwear and Pyjamas	Doz.	51.9
61	Brassieres and Other Body Supporting Garments	Doz.	4.0
62	Other Knit or Crocheted Clothing	Lb.	4.0
63	Other Clothing, Not Knit or Crocheted	Lb.	4.0
64	All Other Cotton Textile Items	Lb.	4.0

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

- Lead-Zinc. Hearings before the Subcommittee Mines and Mining of the House Interior and Insu Affairs Committee on conditions in the domestic le zinc mining industries. June 13-July 8, 1963. 2 pp.
- The United States Balance of Payments. Hearin before the Joint Economic Committee pursuant Sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304 (79th Congress). P 1. Current Problems and Policies. July 8-9, 19 218 pp.
- Russian Trawler Traffic in U.S. Territorial Wate Hearings before the Subcommittee for Special Inv tigation of the House Armed Services Committ July 9-10, 1963. 126 pp.
- International Banks. Hearing before the House Bar ing and Currency Committee on H.R. 7405, a bill amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to a thorize the U.S. Governor of the International Ba for Reconstruction and Development to vote for increase in the Bank's authorized capital stock, a H.R. 7406, a bill to provide for increased partici tion by the United States in the Inter-American I velopment Bank, and for other purposes. July 1963. 237 pp.
- A Special Report on American Studies Abroad: Pr ess and Difficulties in Selected Countries. P pared by Walter Johnson, member of the Uni States Advisory Commission on International E cational and Cultural Affairs. H. Doc. 138, July 1963. 48 pp.
- Large Dams of the U.S.S.R. A translation prepar by the National Science Foundation together w explanatory remarks of Senator Frank E. Moss Utah. S. Doc. 27. July 11, 1963. 323 pp.
- Recent Changes in Monetary Policy and Balance- Payments Problems. Hearings before the Hou Committee on Banking and Currency. July 22- 1963. 412 pp.
- Semiannual Report of the National Advisory Cour on International Monetary and Financial Proble July 1-December 31, 1962. H. Doc. 144. July 1963. 57 pp.
- Excluding Cargo Which Is Lumber From Certain Tar Filing Requirements. Report to accompany H 1157. H. Rept. 630. August 1, 1963. 7 pp.
- Invitations To Hold the 1968 Olympic Games in t United States. Report to accompany S.J. Res. and S.J. Res. 67. S. Rept. 386. August 2, 19 4 pp.

A Balanced Approach to Disarmament

Statement by Charles C. Stelle

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

Yesterday this committee began consideration of the most important item on its agenda—the question of disarmament. It is a question which has been considered no less than 17 times in as many previous years by this Assembly—considered ever more earnestly, considered ever more thoughtfully, and considered ever more hopefully.

There was, of course, progress—progress in studies, in understanding, in growing realization of the urgent need to achieve sound and balanced agreements based on common interests shared by all mankind. But we still, for those years, were engaged merely in laying foundation stones. It was a period of the gradual emergence of more adequate machinery for considering disarmament issues within governments, and of more widely representative instrumentalities for negotiation between governments.

In the year since this Assembly last discussed this topic, disarmament has, however belatedly, however hesitantly, and on however small a scale, reached a new phase of development. Areas of actual agreement have finally begun to crystallize and to emerge.

Let us view briefly some of the more important events that have occurred in this field during the past year.

A series of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev during the first few

months after our most recent disarmament discussion here gave clear indication of a serious common desire for a test ban.² Though no agreement was reached, the negotiations which finally brought a limited treaty were revived and intensified in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee as a result of these exchanges.

On June 10 President Kennedy, in an address at American University,³ called for a reexamination of attitudes toward the cold war and toward peace itself. He announced the decision to engage in the talks in Moscow that eventually led to the test ban agreement.⁴

You are all familiar with the results of these negotiations. Following Senate advice and consent by an overwhelming and bipartisan vote of 80-19,⁵ the treaty was formally ratified by President Kennedy on October 7 and, after exchange of instruments of ratification by the three original parties, came into force on October 10.⁶

On June 20 the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement for the establishment of a direct communications link—the so-called “hot line”—between Washington and Moscow.⁷ This communication link became operational 2 months ago.

The United States had long sought to avoid

² BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 198.

³ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1963, p. 631.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1963, p. 658.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Oct. 29 (U.S. delegation press release 4280).

the extension of the arms race into outer space. President Eisenhower, in an address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 22, 1960,⁸ spoke eloquently of the need for avoiding such an arms race. Deputy Secretary of Defense [Roswell L.] Gilpatric stated on September 5, 1962, that the United States did not intend to be the first to place weapons of mass destruction in orbit. It was with satisfaction, then, that the United States joined with the Soviet Union and with all the participants in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in sponsoring the resolution which embodies this policy and which was adopted by the General Assembly by acclamation.⁹

These steps, all achieved since our deliberations here a year ago, are far from general and complete disarmament. But they can contribute to it. The glacial disarmament problem has begun at last to melt a bit and to move.

There are, I think, two landmarks which have guided us toward the more realistic discussions of disarmament in the recent past.

One of these is the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union on September 20, 1961,¹⁰ and endorsed by the General Assembly as the basis for negotiations. It provided for the first time a basis for longer range consistent effort in a clear and agreed direction. In the interest of progress we will not be content to rest indefinitely on the limited area of agreement there defined; but as we move ahead we are determined to expand the area of agreement recorded in that instrument rather than to depart or detract from it.

The second landmark which has set us on the path to the intensification and greater realism of the disarmament effort has been the establishment of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee and the useful work it has done. The members of that Committee who had not participated in previous disarmament negotiations should be particularly commended for their

contributions to its work. Each of the areas in which agreed policy has now been recorded, the antecedents in the work, the proposals, and the common objectives hammered out through discussions in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee.

But let us not look to the past. Let us look to the road ahead.

The United States will return to the negotiating table of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva to seek to define areas of agreement on three important levels.

General and Complete Disarmament

A first level of agreement to which we address our efforts will be that of general and complete disarmament. We recall in the preamble of the Joint Statement that:

The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer a legitimate instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

In connection with our prospective discussions of this topic, we have taken note of the latest suggestion by Foreign Minister Gromyko put forward in the Assembly on September 12, 1962. He proposed that limited contingents of nuclear, continental, antimissile, and antiaircraft weapons and their nuclear warheads should be retained until the end of the third stage.

We shall want to explore the implications of this proposal. It may prove to represent another move toward realism in the Soviet approach to the basic disarmament problem. We do not know, but we want to give every consideration to its implications. And we want to say that, upon our return to Geneva, the Soviet Union will be equally willing to give every consideration to the United States approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament.

On August 14 the United States tabled in the ENDC draft treaty language covering the various nuclear disarmament measures proposed by the United States for stage I. It elaborates four major measures proposed in the U

⁸ *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1960, p. 551.

⁹ For a statement made by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson in plenary session on Oct. 16 and text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 753.

¹⁰ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

tates treaty outline¹¹ which relate to nuclear disarmament in stage I.

First, the race in nuclear weapons production would be halted through a cutoff in the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

Second, states would undertake obligations with respect to the nontransfer of nuclear weapons.

Third, nuclear weapons technology would be frozen with a comprehensive test ban which we hope would be agreed upon and put into effect even before stage I of a general and complete disarmament program is initiated.

Fourth, in addition to and in association with placing a ceiling on the nuclear weapons capabilities of nuclear powers by a cutoff of production, the U.S. proposals also call for a cutback in these capabilities by means of transfer to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons of significant quantities of weapons grade U-235 already produced. Such action would serve not only to reduce the destructive potential of present nuclear stockpiles but would be simple to implement and to verify. Its verification would involve only verification of the quantity and quality and assurances against possible diversion to weapon uses of the materials transferred. This measure circumvents one of the major difficulties inherent in nuclear disarmament, namely, the revelation of highly sensitive information concerning nuclear weapon design. The United States treaty outline tabled on April 18, 1962, provides that the United States and the Soviet Union would each transfer to nonweapon uses 50,000 kgs. of weapons-grade U-235. At the same time, in our statements we have repeatedly indicated that if that amount for some reason unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union we would be prepared to consider, within reason, appropriate adjustments. In its efforts to find a mutually acceptable arrangement in this field, the United States delegation approached the Soviet delegation in April of this year and indicated that if the Soviet Union's

objection to the United States proposal was based on a feeling that the 50,000 kgs. amount proposed by the United States was not sufficiently large the United States would be prepared to consider, within reason, an amount larger than 50,000 kgs. In addition, the U.S. delegation stated that if the Soviet Union felt that transfer of equal amounts by both the United States and the U.S.S.R. would for some reason entail certain inequities for the Soviet Union, the United States would be prepared to consider a reasonable arrangement in this respect too. The U.S. delegation told the Soviet delegation that transfer by the United States of 60,000 kgs. and by the U.S.S.R. of 40,000 kgs. could be an example of such an arrangement. We also indicated to the Soviet delegation that the United States continued to be prepared to explore the possibility of an arrangement under which the cutoff and the transfer, as a combined step, would not need necessarily to await agreement on, or the initiation of, the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

We are hopeful that in the discussions in Geneva, with the aid of our colleagues there, agreement may be brought closer on an approach such as I have outlined.

With respect to the question of reduction of armaments, the United States believes that armaments, including nuclear delivery vehicles, should be reduced gradually rather than abruptly. Through progressive reduction of the whole range of armaments, stability would be maintained as the reductions were made. Disarmament would be balanced, and security for all would be maintained as provided for in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. Specifically, we have proposed that in stage I there should be a 30-percent reduction of armaments, including nuclear delivery vehicles; in stage II half of the remaining inventory would be eliminated; and final reductions would be made in stage III. Production of the armaments to be reduced would be limited to agreed allowances during stage I, and such limited production would be only for the purpose of maintenance and one-for-one replacement of armaments within the agreed levels. By the beginning of stage II, production would be halted, except for production within agreed

¹¹ For text of an outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world submitted by the United States on April 18, 1962, to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, see *ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 747.

limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments. We believe that the gradual approach which we urge is sound and one which would not disturb military balance and thus jeopardize the security of states.

In its plan for general and complete disarmament the United States recognizes the essential need for adequate verification to insure that the provisions are properly carried out and to provide international confidence. Such verification should also provide assurance that activities limited or prohibited under the treaty are not conducted clandestinely and that the armaments retained do not exceed agreed levels. Yet we have made clear we would not ask for more verification than necessary for the amount of disarmament and of the risk involved. In the past we have illustrated by example that we do not ask for unnecessary verification. We have also asked the Soviet Union for its ideas as to possible modes of verification which would be effective. We have not yet heard any suggestions from the Soviet Union, which continues to concern itself with arms destroyed but not arms retained. We would welcome suggestions from them on how verification might best be made effective and not misused.

In addition the United States believes that in our negotiations on general and complete disarmament appropriate attention must be paid to the principle that disarmament should be accompanied by the establishment of reliable peacekeeping procedures and institutions. This principle is clearly endorsed in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. In recognition of its importance the United States outline of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world contains specific recommendations on measures to be taken in each stage of disarmament to strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace.

President Kennedy clearly reiterated United States support for the development of U.N. peacekeeping machinery in his address to the Assembly on September 20.¹² "The conventions of peace," he said, "must pull abreast and then ahead of the inventions of war. The United Nations, building on its successes and

¹² *Ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

learning from its failures, must be developed into a genuine world security system."

Indeed there is no rational alternative to a sound system of peacekeeping under the aegis of the United Nations. This is in the interest of the smaller powers, which depend upon an effective United Nations for their protection. The interests of the major powers as well would be served by a stronger United Nations which could help promote great-power disengagement from dangerous confrontations and prevent brush-fire conflicts from becoming big ones.

Since this committee last discussed disarmament, the United Nations has made significant progress in developing its peacekeeping capacity. This year the fourth special session of the General Assembly passed seven resolutions on the financing of peacekeeping operations, including one which endorsed the principle that such financing is the collective responsibility of all United Nations members.¹³ Another significant development has been the announcement of plans by several member states to earmark units of their armed forces for emergency United Nations service. As President Kennedy said on September 20, we hope these initiatives will encourage similar action by other states and the United States remains ready to provide logistic and other material support.

The Secretary-General has stated that he sees "no acceptable alternative method of keeping peace in the world to the steady and sound development of the peacekeeping functions of the United Nations," and that he is also "a firm believer in the organic development of institutions." The United States shares this view and will continue to support sound measures designed to develop the United Nations as an effective peacekeeping institution. Progress in this direction is a necessary concomitant of progress toward general and complete disarmament.

Many more topics directly relating to general and complete disarmament on our agenda at Geneva require equally thoughtful consideration. Among these are such problems as armaments, forces, bases, military expenditures, and the

¹³ For background and texts of resolutions, see *ibid.* July 29, 1963, p. 178.

establishment, organization, and functioning of the IDO [International Disarmament Organization]. There is much work which must be done, both within and between governments, before agreement can be concluded. That work must be continued, imaginatively and persistently, even when final agreement seems distant. The most important problems are not frequently the most difficult.

Collateral Measures

A second level on which agreement must be sought is on a series of measures which in our negotiations we have come to call collateral measures. These are initial measures of disarmament which could, if put into effect without delay, materially improve international security and prospects for further disarmament progress. The United States will continue its efforts to identify and seek agreement on such measures.

President Kennedy in his address before the General Assembly on September 20 put special emphasis on collateral measures. Referring to several recent agreements he said:

I believe, therefore, that the Soviet Union and the United States, together with their allies, can achieve further agreements—agreements which spring from our mutual interest in avoiding mutual destruction. There can be no doubt about the agenda of further steps. We must continue to seek agreements on measures which prevent war by accident or miscalculation. We must continue to seek agreement on safeguards against surprise attack, including observation posts at key points. We must continue to seek agreement on further measures to curb the nuclear arms race, by controlling the transfer of nuclear weapons, converting fissionable materials to peaceful purposes, and banning underground testing, with adequate inspection and enforcement. . . .

The agenda is a full one, the opportunities are varied and challenging.

I will not attempt in the time available here to deal separately with the possibilities suggested either by the United States, by the Soviet Union, or by other states represented in the Disarmament Committee.

I should like, however, to call attention, in particular, to a significant paper submitted by the United States to the conference which has not yet been fully discussed in all its aspects.

It is a working paper on reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication—ENDC 7, transmitted in a report to this Assembly as Document No. A/5408.¹⁴

It is this paper, tabled last December, which contains the suggestion for a direct communications link, which has now been agreed. It is this paper which sets forth certain proposals on observation posts, a subject in which the Soviet Union in recent months has seemed to indicate a renewed interest. There are other possibilities thus far not fully explored in the program of action set forth. We hope these ideas will receive thoughtful consideration within governments, within this Assembly, and in the disarmament negotiations forum in Geneva.

And, of course, it is in the area of separable measures that one finds the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty—a topic that has already received separate consideration as an agenda item of this committee. The United States has already pledged its continued and constructive efforts to seek an agreement on an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty which will put an end to all nuclear weapon tests in all environments.

Nuclear-free zones also come under the heading of collateral measures. The United States feels that as an aid in halting further proliferation of nuclear weapons, such zones under appropriate circumstances would be a most useful approach.

For a measure in the field of disarmament and arms control to have a beneficial rather than an unsettling and dangerous effect, it must be balanced so that no state or group of states gains military advantage. Where the establishment of nuclear-free zones would upset this balance, a measure aimed only at nuclear weapons would be unrealistic and dangerous. In such areas broader approaches to arms control are necessary.

Obviously any effective nuclear-free zone would have to include adequate provision for verification if the nations participating in the zone, as well as those respecting it, are to have sufficient assurance that the zone is not being

¹⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1962, p. 1019.

abused or misused. Ideally such a zone would include all states in the area concerned but particularly any whose failure to participate might render the agreement ineffective.

In addition it is the feeling of the United States that if a nuclear-free zone is to be effective, it should be initiated by the states in the area concerned and be freely acceptable to them. Such an arrangement cannot be forced upon a group of nations if it is generally felt to be inimical to their best interest. In this regard, until there is general support from within an area where such an arrangement has been proposed it would be premature to attempt to secure outside endorsement for it from the United Nations or other external bodies. On the other hand, where there is prior broad agreement among the states involved, a united request for outside endorsement and recognition of a zonal arrangement would doubtlessly receive wide support.

Of course, each zone must be considered on its merits. Some of the proposals which have been made are serious attempts to find a way to alleviate to some degree the frightening threat of nuclear war that hangs over the heads of all of us. Others would alter the balance of power in a way which would be detrimental to world peace. In this latter connection I refer specifically to proposals calling for nuclear-free zones in Europe and also in Asia and the Pacific. The creation of zones in these areas, where nuclear weapons form part of existing security arrangements, would upset the military balance. In these areas measures directed only at nuclear weapons are not only inadequate but are likely instead to increase tensions and promote instability. Moreover, in Asia and the Pacific there is also the factor of the aggressive policies of the Chinese Communists, who have not been willing to join in endorsing the partial test ban treaty and whose policies pose serious hazards for their neighbors.

I have dealt with general and complete disarmament and with several collateral measures. I turn now to a third and intermediate level of agreement, thus far perhaps too little in the forefront of our attention. It is an objective made clear in paragraph 8 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. That paragraph is of such importance as to bear quotation:

States participating in the negotiations should to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon a total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures will facilitate and form part of that programme.

President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan referred to this as one of three objectives to be sought in negotiations in their joint letter of February 7, 1962, to Premier Khrushchev. In addition to a program of general and complete disarmament and initial measures, the President wrote, "our negotiators should attempt to attain the widest measure of disarmament which would be implemented at the earliest possible time while still continuing their maximum efforts to achieve agreement on those other subjects which present more difficulty." This is not a new proposal or objective. It is, however, at this point in negotiations, a new way of thinking about the various possibilities that have been put before the conference. It is a concept which may help us find new groupings of measures which may emerge as being ripe for agreement.

Let us not be content with small initial steps of the kind we are beginning to achieve. Neither let us feel impelled to wait until a full program of general and complete disarmament has been agreed to take substantial steps of actual physical disarmament. Let us search for a middle ground in accordance with the essential principle of balance. As we return to Geneva let us seek more actively than in the past to consolidate the widest possible area of agreement.

Mr. Wallner Nominated to Post at NATO Defense College

The Department of State announced on October 30 (press release 561) that the United States has nominated Woodruff Wallner to Civil Deputy to the NATO Defense College at Paris. Mr. Wallner is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

¹⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1962, p. 355.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Adjourned During October 1963

Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.	Tokyo	Sept. 16-Oct. 7
IAO Limited Southeast Asia Rules-of-the-Air and Communications Meeting.	Bangkok	Sept. 17-Oct. 4
ITU CCITT Special Study Group A (Data Transmission)	Geneva	Sept. 23-Oct. 4
IAEA General Conference: 7th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 24-Oct. 4
N. Cocoa Conference	Geneva	Sept. 25-Oct. 24
NESCO Executive Board: 66th Session	Paris	Sept. 25-Oct. 29
N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 22d Session (and Working Party on Rural Electrification).	Geneva	Sept. 30-Oct. 4
OECD Committee for Agriculture: Working Party I (Agricultural Policies).	Paris	Sept. 30-Oct. 4
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meeting of Boards of Governors.	Washington	Sept. 30-Oct. 4
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 51st Statutory Meeting.	Madrid	Sept. 30-Oct. 5
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's Program for Refugees: 10th Session.	Geneva	Sept. 30-Oct. 7
N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 9th Session . . .	Bangkok	Sept. 30-Oct. 7
ATO Technical Conference on Employment Policy	Geneva	Sept. 30-Oct. 18
ATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee	Paris	Oct. 3-4
OECD Energy Committee: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Drafting Group	Paris	Oct. 3-4
OECD Ministerial Meeting on Science	Paris	Oct. 3-4
OECD Meeting of Experts on Trade Questions of Less Developed Countries.	Paris	Oct. 4 (1 day)
CEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 9th Session	Geneva	Oct. 7 (1 day)
ATT Working Group on Preferences	Geneva	Oct. 7-11
N. ECE Timber Committee: 21st Session	Geneva	Oct. 7-11
NESCO: Executive Committee on Preservation of the Nubian Monuments.	Paris	Oct. 7-11
ATO Civil Defense Committee	Paris	Oct. 8-9
CEM Executive Committee: 22d Session	Geneva	Oct. 8-12
South Pacific Commission: 25th Session	Nouméa	Oct. 10-24
ATT Committee on Legal and Institutional Framework	Geneva	Oct. 14-18
N. ECA Meeting of Experts on Iron and Steel in West Africa .	Monrovia	Oct. 14-18
N. ECE Working Party on Simplification and Standardization of Export Documents: 3d Session.	Geneva	Oct. 14-18
CEM Council: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 14-19
N. Special Fund and Expanded Technical Assistance Program Pledging Conference.	New York	Oct. 15 (1 day)
IMCO Assembly: 3d Session	London	Oct. 16-25
ATO Industrial Planning Committee	Paris	Oct. 17 (1 day)
OECD Trade Committee: Meeting of Experts on Trade Questions of Less Developed Countries.	Paris	Oct. 17-18
14th Pan American Railway Congress	México, D.F.	Oct. 18-31
OECD Agriculture and Trade Committees: Joint Working Party on Apples and Pears.	Paris	Oct. 21 (1 day)
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices: Bureau and Working Party I.	Paris	Oct. 21-22
IRPI Committee of Experts on Problems of Less Developed Countries in the Field of Industrial Property.	Geneva	Oct. 21-23
N. ECE Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles	Geneva	Oct. 21-25
N. ECE Committee on the Development of Trade: 12th Session.	Geneva	Oct. 21-29
N. ECA Conference on African Electric Power Problems	Addis Ababa	Oct. 21-31
IA-ECOSOC Sugar Study Group	Washington	Oct. 22-24
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices . .	Paris	Oct. 23-25

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Nov. 1, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: IRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-COSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Adjourned During October 1963—Continued

OECD Industry Committee: Special Committee for Nonferrous Metals and Statistical Working Party.	Paris	Oct. 23-25
OECD Pulp and Paper Committee: Statistical Working Party . .	Paris	Oct. 24-25
GATT Action Committee: Subcommittee I	Geneva	Oct. 24-29
IMCO Council: 10th Session	London	Oct. 25 (1 day)
FAO Working Party for Rational Utilization of Tuna Resources in the Atlantic Ocean.	Rome	Oct. 25-30
NATO Science Committee	Paris	Oct. 28-29
U.N. <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Tungsten	Geneva	Oct. 28-29
UNESCO Board of Consultants for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments.	Paris	Oct. 28-29
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Bureau and Consultative Committee.	Paris	Oct. 28-31
OECD Committee for Scientific Research	Paris	Oct. 29-31
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Cooperative Study of the Kuroshio System.	Tokyo	Oct. 29-31

In Session as of October 31

U.N. General Assembly: 18th Session	New York	Sept. 17-
ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference	Geneva	Oct. 7-
GATT Negotiations on United States Tariff Reclassification . .	Geneva	Oct. 15-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 3d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 28-
Inter-American Economic and Social Council: 2d Annual Meeting at the Expert Level.	São Paulo	Oct. 29-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 15th Meeting.	Bangkok	Oct. 30-
International Sugar Council: 16th Session	London	Oct. 31-

In Recess as of October 31

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed August 29, 1963).	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1964
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United States Delegations to International Conferences

Inter-American Economic and Social Council

The Department of State announced on October 22 (press release 543) that President Kennedy had on that day designated Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman as chairman of the U.S. delegation to the meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at the ministerial level beginning at São Paulo, Brazil, on November 11. Ambassador Teodoro Moscoso, U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress and permanent U.S. delegate to the IA-ECOSOC, was named vice chairman of the delegation.

Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Bullitt are alternate U.S. representatives to the conference. Legislators representing both political parties and both Houses of Con-

gress will be advisers to the U.S. delegation.

The São Paulo conference, which brings together high-level officials from the 20 Alliance for Progress member nations, will conduct second annual review of the alliance, analyze the performance of each member country during the past year and making recommendations for action in the year ahead. Problems of Latin America in the trade and commodity fields are also high on the agenda. The week-long conference at the ministerial level will be preceded by 10 days of meetings of experts in such fields as health, housing, community development, land reform, tax reform, and incentives in the private sector.

Meetings at the expert level will begin on October 29. The U.S. delegation to these meetings will be headed by William D. Rogers, Deputy U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Jack N. Behrman and Assistant Secretary

labor Daniel P. Moynihan will be part of that delegation and also will remain in São Paulo to join the delegation to the ministerial sessions as alternate representatives.

an American Congress of Architects to Meet at Washington in 1965

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated October 12

I have been most pleased to learn that the XI Pan American Congress of Architects will for the first time assemble in this country and in our Capital City in 1965. As President, I wish to extend to all the members of the Pan American Federation of Architectural Associations our country's welcome and appreciation for meeting in Washington, D.C.

Architecture and new approaches to urban planning are common themes in the life of all the countries of this hemisphere. It is a segment of human thought and creativity in which all citizens of the Americas may share and deepen their understanding and appreciation of one another.

The Festival of the Cities of the New World, which will take place from May 1 to September 1, 1965, responds to a common interest in city life and city design which exists throughout the Americas. It is our belief that Washington, D.C., with its buildings, its parks, its monuments, its people, and its plans serves as a notable reflection both of our own historic experience in city building and of our aspirations in city life. This city provides as well a setting for the exhibition of the achievements and plans of our sister republics.

The Organization of American States has offered its full cooperation, and I am asking the agencies of the Federal Government and the District of Columbia to offer their full support and participation. I invite the people of all countries in this hemisphere to share with the people of the United States in the celebration of this festival and in the exhibitions which we are confident will give form, content, and direction to urban life throughout the Americas.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1963. Ratification deposited: Argentina, October 10, 1963.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892. Accession deposited: Guatemala, October 17, 1963.

Trade

Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of United Kingdom: Uganda, August 19, 1963, with respect to the following:

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force for the United States June 30, 1956. TIAS 3591.

Declaration on provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960; for the United States April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration on provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, *supra*. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

Protocol relating to negotiations for establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.¹

Declaration on relations between contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Government of the Polish People's Republic. Done at Tokyo November 9, 1959. Entered into force November 16, 1960. TIAS 4649.

Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May 21, 1960; for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4498.

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, *supra*. Done at Geneva December 9, 1961. Entered into force January 8, 1962. TIAS 4958.

Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184.

Declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960. Entered into force November 14, 1962. TIAS 5227.

¹ Not in force.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement amending the agreement of February 26, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4435 and 5291), providing for the joint establishment and operation in Australia of certain space vehicle tracking and communication facilities. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra October 22, 1963. Entered into force October 22, 1963.

China

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei October 19, 1963. Entered into force October 19, 1963.

Dominican Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 30, 1962 (TIAS 5261). Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo September 14, 1963. Entered into force September 14, 1963.

India

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 8, 1963.

Entered into force: October 25, 1963.

Norway

Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo September 20 and October 16, 1963. Entered into force October 16, 1963.

Panama

Agreement for withholding of Panamanian income tax from compensation paid to Panamanians employed within Canal Zone by the canal, railroad, or auxiliary works. Effected by exchange of notes at Panamá August 12 and 30, 1963. Entered into force August 30, 1963.

Sweden

Convention supplementing convention and protocol for avoidance of double taxation and establishment of rules of reciprocal administrative assistance in income and other taxes of March 23, 1939 (54 Stat. 1759). Signed at Stockholm October 22, 1963. Enters into force upon exchange of ratifications.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

William B. Buffum to be Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs, effective November 10.

Joseph J. Sisco to be Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Organization Affairs, effective November 10. (For biographic details, see Department State press release 561 dated October 30.)

Order Amended on Allowances to Certain Personnel Abroad

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 10853, RELATING TO VARIOUS ALLOWANCES TO CERTAIN GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL ON FOREIGN DUTY

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 235(a) of title 38 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 10853² of November 27, 1959, headed "Delegating the authority of the President with respect to various allowances to certain Government personnel on foreign duty," as amended is hereby amended by substituting for Section 2 thereof the following:


"(c) The authority vested in the President by Section 235(a) of title 38 of the United States Code to prescribe rules and regulations, to the extent that such authority is in respect of the following:

"(1) Section 235(a)(5) of title 38, except as that section pertains to allowance similar to that provided for in Section 911(9) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1136(9)),

"(2) Section 235(a)(6) of title 38, and

"(3) Section 235(a)(8) of that title."

SEC. 2. The rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 2(c) of said Executive Order No. 10853, or pursuant to the said Executive Order as amended, shall be effective from such date or dates as he shall determine, but not in any case earlier than October 15, 1962, in respect of Europe (38 U.S.C. 230(c)) or earlier than January 9, 1961, in respect of the territory of the Republic of the Philippines (38 U.S.C. 230(b)).



THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 18, 1963.

¹ No. 11123; 28 Fed. Reg. 11249.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 28, 1959, p. 940.

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Algeria. U.S. Welcomes Algeria-Morocco Cease-Fire Agreement (text of Department statement)	787
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*556	10/29	Harriman: Washington Convention of Hadassah (excerpts).
*558	10/28	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*559	10/29	Visit of Vice President Johnson to Benelux countries.
†560	10/30	Office of Community Advisory Services established (rewrite).
561	10/30	Wallner nomination to NATO Defense College; Sisco designation as Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs; Buffum designation as Director, Office of U.N. Political Affairs (rewrite).
562	11/1	Norway credentials (rewrite).
†563	11/2	Vice President Johnson: arrival statement, Luxembourg.
564	10/31	Regional foreign policy conference, Indianapolis (rewrite).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Department of State 1963

The Department of State recently released a 152-page illustrated report, *Department of State*, which describes its activities at home and abroad during the past year.

The report opens with a brief discussion of the objectives of U.S. foreign policy and then re in some detail the different means by which the Department of State has been working for the ach ment of those objectives.

In a foreword, President Kennedy expresses the view that "the men and women to whom we en this critical task" of promoting our foreign relations, "and the work they accomplish are too little kn by the American people whose interests they serve." The President adds, "If it [this publication] h to convey to you something of the same sense of admiration for these dedicated men and women w I share with many of my predecessors, it will truly serve our national purpose."

The book deals with the activities not only of the geographic and functional bureaus of the Dep ment of State but also Department offices less well-known to the general public, such as the Execu Secretariat, the Policy Planning Council, the Offices of Security and Protocol, and the Foreign Ser Institute. It also includes sections on the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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EDUCATION AND SOCIAL
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1274



November 25, 1963

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DEC 11 1963

Our Obligation to the Family of Man

*Remarks by President Kennedy*¹

I am gratified to receive this award from the council, and I am impressed by what you are doing here in the city, and I think that the words of Reverend [Dan M.] Potter bear very careful reflection by us all. The United States is not in the position which England was when Benjamin Disraeli described it as two nations divided, the rich and the poor. This is a generally prosperous country, but there is a stream of poverty that runs across the United States which is not exposed to the lives of a good many of us, and therefore we are relatively unaware of it except statistically. It is concentrated to a large measure in the large cities to which he said so many people are moving out. It is concentrated in some of our rural areas.

The New York Times 2 weeks ago, I think,

¹ Made before the Protestant Council of the City of New York on Nov. 8 (White House press release (New York, N.Y.) ; as-delivered text). The council conferred upon the President its first annual "Family of Man" citation for his support of human rights.

had an article by Mr. [Homer] Bigart on desperate poverty in several rural counties of eastern Kentucky—schools which were without windows, sometimes with occasional teachers in counties without resources to distribute the surplus food we make available. And what is true in some of the older coal mining areas of the United States is very true in our cities, and we see it in some of our statistics, where we have a mental retardation rate of three times that of Sweden, where we have an infant mortality rate behind half the countries of Europe, plus we have about 8 million boys and girls in the decade who will drop out of school, and a good many of them out of work, and this council, and the religious leaders of the Jewish and Catholic faith, have a great responsibility not only for the moral life of the community but also for the well-being of those who have been left behind.

We are attempting, in cooperation with the State and the city, as Reverend Potter describes, to carry out a pilot program here in the city

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1274 PUBLICATION 7626 NOVEMBER 25, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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New York, but it is only a beginning, and there are hundreds of thousands without resources, and we have a responsibility to all of them. We have it in Washington. Schools were integrated a few years ago. About half of the population of Washington is Negro. Today about 5 percent of the children in the schools of Washington are Negro. Other whites who are more prosperous generally moved away. So I commend this council for its concern for the Society of Man in the city of New York, and I hope its efforts will be matched in other cities across the country and that we will remember in this very rich, constantly increasing prosperity that there are some for whom we have responsibility.

I want to speak tonight very briefly, however, about the family of man beyond the United States. Just as the family of man is not limited to a single race or religion, neither can it be limited to a single city or country. The family of man is more than 3 billion strong. It lives in more than 100 nations. Most of its members are not white. Most of them are not Christians. Most of them know nothing about free enterprise or due process of law or the Australian ballot.

If our society is to promote the family of man, let us realize the magnitude of our task. This is a sobering assignment, for the family of man in the world of today is not faring well.

The members of a family should be at peace with one another, but they are not; and the hostilities are not confined to the great powers of the East and the West. On the contrary the United States and the Soviet Union, each fully aware of their mutually destructive powers and their worldwide responsibilities and obligations, have on occasion sought to introduce a greater note of caution in their approach to areas of conflict.

Yet lasting peace between East and West could not bring peace to the family of man. Within the last month—the last 4 weeks—the world has witnessed active or threatened hostilities in a dozen or more disputes independent of the struggle between communism and the free world—disputes between Africans and Europeans in Angola, between North African

neighbors in the Maghreb, between two Arab states over Yemen, between India and Pakistan, between Indonesia and Malaysia, Cambodia and Viet-Nam, Ethiopia and Somalia, and a long list of others.

In each of these cases of conflict neither party can afford to divert to these needless hostilities the precious resources that their people require. In almost every case the parties to these disputes have more in common ethnically and ideologically than do the Soviet Union and the United States, yet they often seem less able and less willing to get together and negotiate. In almost every case their continuing conflict invites outside intervention and threatens worldwide escalation, yet the major powers are hard put to limit events in these areas.

As I said recently at the United Nations,² even little wars are dangerous in this nuclear world. The long labor of peace is an undertaking for every nation, large and small, for every member of the family of man. "In this effort none of us can remain unaligned. To this goal none can be uncommitted." If the family of man cannot achieve greater unity and harmony, the very planet which serves as its home may find its future in peril.

Growing Gulf Between Rich and Poor

But there are other troubles besetting the human family. Many of its members live in poverty and misery and despair. More than one out of three, according to the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], suffers from malnutrition or undernutrition or both, while more than one in ten live below the breadline. Two out of every five adults on this planet are, according to UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], illiterate. One out of eight suffers from trachoma or lives in an area where malaria is still a clear and present danger. Ten million—nearly as many men, women, and children as inhabit this city and Los Angeles combined—still suffer from leprosy; and countless others suffer from yaws or tuberculosis or intestinal parasites.

For the blessings of life have not been dis-

² BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

tributed evenly to the family of man. Life expectancy in this most fortunate of nations has reached the Biblical three score years and ten; but in the less developed nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America the overwhelming majority of infants cannot expect to live even two score years and five. In those vast continents more than half the children of primary school age are not in school. More than half the families live in substandard dwellings. More than half the people live on less than \$100 a year. Two out of every three adults are illiterate.

The family of man can survive differences of race and religion. Contrary to the assertions of Mr. Khrushchev, it can accept differences of ideology, politics, and economics. But it cannot survive, in the form in which we know it, a nuclear war—and neither can it long endure the growing gulf between the rich and the poor.

The rich must help the poor. The industrialized nations must help the developing nations. And the United States, along with its allies, must do better—not worse—by its foreign aid program, which is now being subjected to such intensive debate in the Senate of the United States.

The Foreign Aid Program

Too often we advance the need of foreign aid only in terms of our economic self-interest. To be sure, foreign aid is in our economic self-interest. It provides more than a half million jobs for workers in every State. It finances a rising share of our exports and builds new and growing export markets. It generates the purchase of military and civilian equipment by other governments in this country. It makes possible the stationing of 3½ million troops along the Communist periphery at a price one-tenth the cost of maintaining a comparable number of American soldiers. And it helps to stave off the kind of chaos or Communist takeover or Communist attack that would surely demand our critical and costly attention.

The Korean conflict alone, forgetting for a moment the thousands of Americans who lost their lives, cost four times as much as our total worldwide aid budget for the current year. But

foreign aid is not advanced only out of American economic self-interest. The gulf between rich and poor which divides the family of man is an invitation to agitators, subversives, and aggressors. It encourages the ambitions of those whose desire to dominate the world threatens the peace and freedom of us all.

"Never has there been any question in my mind," President Eisenhower said recently, "as to the necessity of a program of economic and military aid to keep the free nations of the world from being overrun by the Communists. It is that simple."

This is not a partisan matter. For 17 years through three administrations, this program has been supported by Presidents and leaders of both parties. It is being supported today by the Congress by those in leadership on both sides of the aisle who recognize the urgency of this program in the achievement of peace and freedom. Yet there are still those who are unable or unwilling to accept these simple facts: that who find it politically convenient to denounce foreign aid on the one hand and in the same sentence to denounce the Communist menace on the other.

I do not say that there have been no mistakes in AID [Agency for International Development] administration. I do not say it has been purchased for us lasting popularity or served our satellites. I do say it is one essential instrument in the creation of a better, more peaceful world. I do say that it has substituted strength for weakness all over the globe, encouraging nations struggling to be free to stand on their own feet. And I do not say that, merely because others may not bear their share of the burden, it is any excuse for the United States not to meet its responsibility. To those who say that there has been a failure, how can we measure success? by the economic viability of 14 nations in Western Europe, Japan, Spain, Lebanon, where our economic aid, after having completed its task, has ended; by the refusal of a single one of the more than 50 new members—a single one of the more than 50 new members of the United Nations—to go the Communist route; by the reduction of malaria in India, for example, from 75 million cases to 2,000; by the 18,000 classrooms and 4 million textbooks bringing learning to Latin America under the infant Alliance for Progress?

Human Dignity and U.S. Security

Nearly 2 years ago my wife and I visited Bogotá, Colombia, where a vast new Alliance for Progress housing project was just getting under way.³ Earlier this year I received a letter from the first resident of this 1,200 new home development. "Now," he wrote, "we have dignity and liberty."

Dignity and liberty—these words are the foundation, as they have been since 1947, of the mutual security program. For the dignity and liberty of all free men, of a world of diversity, where the balance of power is clearly on the side of free nations, is essential to the security of the United States. And to weaken and water down the pending program, to confuse and confine its flexibility with rigid restrictions and rejections, will not only harm our economy; it will hamper our security. It will waste our present investment, and it will, above all, forfeit our obligation to our fellow man, obligations that stem from our wealth and strength, from our devotion to freedom, and from our membership in the family of man.

I think we can meet those obligations. I think we can afford to fulfill these commitments around the world, when 90 percent of them are used to purchase goods and services here in the United States, including, for example, one-third of this nation's total fertilizer exports, one-fourth of our iron and steel exports around the world, one-third of our locomotive exports. A total of \$1 billion in our total foreign aid program may save \$100 million in our balance of payments, but it costs us \$900 million in exports.

I think the American people are willing to shoulder this burden. Contrary to repeated warnings, prophecies, and expressions of hope, after the 17 years since the Marshall Plan began, I know of no single officeholder who was ever defeated because he supported this program, and the burden is less today than ever before. Despite the fact that this year's AID request is about \$1 billion less than the average request of the last 15 years, many Members of Congress today complain that 4 percent of our budget is too much to devote to foreign aid; yet in 1951 that program amounted to nearly 20 percent

of our budget—20 percent in 1951, and 4 percent today. They refuse today to vote more than \$4 billion to this effort, yet in 1951, when this country was not nearly as well off, the Congress voted \$8 billion to the same cause. They are fearful today of the effects of sending to other people seven-tenths of 1 percent of our gross national product, but in 1951 we devoted nearly four times that proportion to this purpose and concentrated in a very limited area, unlike today, when our obligations stretch around the globe.

This Congress has already reduced this year's aid budget \$600 million below the amount recommended by the Clay committee.⁴ Is this nation stating it cannot afford to spend an additional \$600 million to help the developing nations of the world become strong and free and independent—an amount less than this country's annual outlay for lipstick, face cream, and chewing gum? Are we saying that we cannot help 19 needy neighbors in Latin America and do as much for the 19 as the Communist bloc is doing for the island of Cuba alone?

Some say that they are tiring of this task—we are tired of world problems and their complexities, we are tired of hearing those who receive our aid disagree with us. But are we tired of living in a free world? Do we expect that world overnight to be like the United States? Are we going to stop now merely because we have not produced complete success?

I do not believe our adversaries are tired, and I cannot believe that the United States of America in 1963 is fatigued.

Surely the Americans of the 1960's can do half as well as the Americans of the 1950's. Surely we are not going to throw away our hopes and means for peaceful progress in an outburst of irritation and frustration. I do not want it said of us what T. S. Eliot said of others some years ago: "These were a decent people. Their only monument: the asphalt road and a thousand lost golf balls."

I think we can do better than that.

My fellow Americans, I hope we will be guided by our interests. I hope we will recognize that the struggle is by no means over, that it is essential that we not only maintain our ef-

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 91.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 15, 1963, p. 574.

fort but that we persevere, that we not only endure, in Mr. Faulkner's words, but also prevail. It is essential, in short, that the word go forth from the United States to all who are concerned about the future of the family of

man, that we are not weary in well-doing. And we shall, I am confident, if we maintain the peace, we shall in due season reap the kind of world we deserve and deserve the kind of world we will have.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 8

Press release 572 dated November 8

Secretary Rusk: I know you have many matters on your minds this morning; so I won't take your time with opening statements. I am ready for your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the secrecy around the wheat negotiations with the Russians¹ is greater than usual. Your aides here in the Department, whose job has been to inform us, claim that they know nothing because they are not briefed. Now, this has been going on for weeks, and we believe we have a legitimate interest. Can you tell us how it stands?

A. Well, we are in a period in which the wheat problem is being discussed with the Soviet Union. There is a certain amount of bargaining going on. Obviously it is not in our interest to disclose the details of a bargaining situation. I wouldn't mind telling you gentlemen what the situation is if you would promise not to tell the Soviet Union the process of this bargaining.

But, as Mr. Khrushchev indicated yesterday, some progress has been made, but we don't know yet what the outcome will be. The President indicated in his last press conference that these matters ought to be left to the negotiators, and I would be content to leave it there for the time being. They are meeting this morning, and there may be other meetings, I don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your appraisal of the situation now in Viet-Nam, since we have recognized it,² and what do you

see ahead in the future as to the impact U.S. policy in Southeast Asia?

A. Well, I think the great question which has been in front of us all along has been how to get on with the main job of assuring that South Viet-Nam is secure and able to work out its own future under its own leadership and without any interference from the outside.

Now, we were very much concerned when in 1959 the Viet Cong, with public support from Hanoi, moved to interfere in South Viet-Nam and indeed threatened to take it over, and there has been steady growth in assistance and help by the United States and others to South Viet-Nam in that struggle.

We were also concerned in May and June and July of this year when developments in South Viet-Nam indicated that there was a growing gap between the government and the people of that country, and there was some danger that the solidarity of the country itself in meeting this threat would be undermined by differences within the country.

Now it is our hope that the political and military leadership that has now formed a new government there in Viet-Nam will be able to rally the country, consolidate the effort, go on with the job, so that that country can be independent and free and secure.

As far as the United States is concerned, we do not have and have never had any special United States interest in terms of military base or anything of that sort. Our primary concern with Viet-Nam is that it be secure and independent, as it is entitled to be, and we are hopeful now that there will be a consolidation of effort and that the central problem there will

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 28, 1963, p. 660.

² See p. 818.

be dealt with with expedition, and we will do what we can to assist, and we have every reason to believe that the present leadership will do everything they can on their own side.

The "Neutralization" Aspect in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you comment on the suggestion of a columnist this week that the administration might possibly find some benefit in attempting to develop a political settlement or a truce with the North Vietnamese? Is that conceivable?

A. I don't see quite what is involved there. So far as we can tell from what has been said in Hanoi, what they have in mind is that the regime at Hanoi would remain exactly as it is—the Communist regime, a member of the Communist bloc—and that they would then press for far-reaching changes, something that they call neutralization, in South Viet-Nam.

Well, we have run into that before, where they say, "On our side of the line nothing is to be changed, but on your side of the line something must be changed."

Now, let's look at this neutralization aspect for a moment. Up until about 1958 or 1959 there was no difficulty anywhere about the general attitude of South Viet-Nam. They weren't committing aggression against anybody. They weren't a military base for anybody. They weren't an ally in any formal sense with anyone. They were simply a country trying to be independent.

Now, the American military presence there at the present time was a direct consequence of the efforts of the Viet Cong at Hanoi, the Communist world, to take over South Viet-Nam. If everyone else would leave South Viet-Nam alone, there is no problem. But to negotiate on far-reaching changes in South Viet-Nam without far-reaching changes in North Viet-Nam seems to be not in the cards.

The other side was fully committed—fully committed—in the original Geneva settlement of 1954 to the arrangements which provided for South Viet-Nam as an independent entity, and we see no reason to modify those in the direction of a larger influence of North Viet-Nam, or Hanoi, in South Viet-Nam.

Now, this is not—there is no problem about South Viet-Nam if others would leave it alone.

The same thing is true of Laos. Let these people work out their future in their own way without outside interference.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. May I ask a question on a different subject?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you give us your thoughts on the moves in the Senate to restrict aid to Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Indonesia?

Foreign Aid

A. Well, I must say that I am very much concerned about the tendency in the Congress to legislate foreign policy as it might apply to specific situations or specific countries. The legislative cycle moves a year at a time. The world moves very fast. It is not possible for the Congress to anticipate in advance what the circumstances are going to be in any given situation. So I am very much concerned about the tendency to try to build into law attitudes in the use of our aid program, for example, with regard to particular countries.

These are responsibilities carried by the President of the United States. They are very heavy responsibilities. The President is the one whom the country will hold responsible if things go badly in a particular situation. Those who might propose amendments are not going to stand up and say, "Yes, I did that with my amendment," if things go wrong. So I am very much concerned about the loss of flexibility, the loss of any ability to move to protect and forward the interests of the United States wherever they might be engaged anywhere in the world. So I would hope very much that the Congress would withhold its hand and not try to legislate in detail about the application of an aid program to a particular country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the larger view of the foreign aid situation, the Congress is in the process of tearing it to shreds; and this is only the authorization. The news is going to be a lot

worse when you get to appropriations; this is quite clear.

Now, how do you respond to this? You are getting a message, at least they say on the Hill, which tells you, the administration, the Congress is fed up with foreign aid, as it is now being operated. What do you propose to do about it?

A. Well, we are in daily, sometimes hourly, contact with the Congress about this matter. I must say that I don't understand the tendency to cut back on our foreign aid program as deeply as is now being discussed in the Congress. The large and dangerous questions are still in front of us, whether it is Berlin, or Cuba, or Laos, or Viet-Nam, or whatever it may be.

There is no *détente* in the sense that there is a general easing of relations between the free world and the Communist world. There have been some limited and specific agreements. Some of them have been important, such as the nuclear test ban treaty. There have been explorations of the possibilities of agreements on other subjects.

But this is no time to quit. There is too much unfinished business ahead of us. The United States has almost a million men outside of the continental limits of the United States, ashore and afloat. We must support those men. They are out to do a job for the free world, and I think they are entitled to have us support them by trying to get the job done without committing them to combat, if possible.

Now, we spend gladly—we spend gladly—about \$50 billion a year in our defense budget. I don't see why we can't spend 10 percent of that, if necessary, to get the job done without war, if possible. So I am very much concerned about the general attitude that somehow we can relax, we can cut back on our foreign aid, we can become indifferent to what is happening in other parts of the world. The world is not in that shape at the present time, and effort is still crucial to getting the great job done on behalf of freedom.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you give us your assessment of how

the latest Berlin difficulty² has affected Moscow-Washington relations in the larger sense?

Access to Berlin

A. Well, I think that one would have to say that these three interruptions on the autobahn in the last several weeks have raised some very serious questions. I can't pretend to know what is in the minds of the people on the other side on this matter. But they surely do understand and must understand, that access to West Berlin is utterly fundamental from the point of view of the Western Powers and from the point of view of the United States.

Now, in detail, sometimes these incidents rather futile, look rather artificial, as though it were some sort of elaborate minuet about procedures of one sort or another. But that is not really the issue.

The point is not whether a particular tail is lowered. The point is freedom of access to West Berlin. Chief Justice John Marshall once said that "the power to tax is the power to destroy." Well, in a rough analogy, the power asserted by the other side to insist upon its own initiative—to insist upon particular procedures or regulations, could be converted into a power to interrupt access to West Berlin. That we can't have, because our position in West Berlin is of vital interest to the United States and to the West, and we must insist upon free access to that city.

So these incidents are serious, and I think Khrushchev's remarks the other day indicate that he recognizes that they are serious. So we must insist, and we have insisted, that existing procedures be fully complied with.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your remarks on neutralization in Viet-Nam may be subject to misinterpretation. Just to sum it up here: do you reject neutralization as a solution to the problem in Viet-Nam?

A. Well, I don't know—my point is I don't know what Hanoi talks about when they talk about neutralization. South Viet-Nam was never allied with anyone; it was not a military base for anyone. It was subjected to attack from the outside through penetration, infiltration

² For background, see p. 818.

arms supplies, subversive activities, matters of that sort.

There can be peace in Southeast Asia if others would leave South Viet-Nam and Laos alone and let the peoples of those countries work out their own future.

My point is I don't know what they mean by neutralization, except that I suspect that it means that they are trying to find some formula by which they can bring South Viet-Nam within the Communist world.

The Question of Military Coups

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Since the military coup in South Viet-Nam, there has been a good deal of discussion about our general attitude toward the military coup. Could you tell us what we are telling our Latin American neighbors on this point today?

A. Well, I think it is difficult to make a general statement that would apply in theoretical exactitude to 112 different countries. I think that the developments in South Viet-Nam promise to move rapidly toward constitutional government and a sense on the part of the people that they have a stake in their future.

Now, it is true that in certain other areas, when questions of recognition arise, we give a good deal of attention to the attitude of the governments who are neighbors and who are very much involved in the same problem. In this hemisphere, for example, we have very far-reaching commitments to support constitutional and democratic governments, and there is a hemispheric commitment to this problem. And the possibilities that military coups in this hemisphere could become—could start—chain reactions of such events are matters of great concern to the governments of this hemisphere.

So we are in very close consultation in the hemisphere about how these questions should be handled here. Similarly, there have been one or two occasions in Africa where our own attitude had to take into account the attitudes of other African states who had an immediate and direct interest in that situation.

But I think it would be difficult to draw a broad conclusion that would be applicable in

detail to all of the 111 or 112 countries with whom we do business.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. You have expressed serious concern about the interruptions on the autobahn. And it has been indicated, both from Moscow and from here, that the chances are that there are likely to be more such incidents in the future. Is there any alternative, in your judgment, to simply waiting until these incidents occur; or is there some initiative that might be taken from the Western side to actually, as the last protest note said, put an end once and for all to these harassments?

A. Well, the West has made over the years a series of suggestions about far-reaching and fundamental solutions of the German-Berlin question. We have had discussions, in the last 21½ years since I have been in my present office, about Berlin.

It would be possible to work out better arrangements if the other side would, in a spirit of genuine reciprocity, recognize the vital interests of the West in these matters. But those discussions have not been particularly fruitful thus far because there has not been adequate recognition of the Western vital interests in the situation.

Whether the situation will change, we cannot say. But the West has repeatedly made proposals, far-reaching proposals, for a permanent settlement of the German and Berlin questions on the basis of the needs and the wishes of the German people themselves. There is no objective reason, there is no reason in logic, why these questions cannot be settled in a way that meets the vital interests of both sides. But thus far it has not been possible to do so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in Latin America, sir, will the United States back the Venezuelan and Costa Rican proposal before the OAS [Organization of American States] for a foreign ministers meeting in order to discuss the defense of democracy in the face of a coup?

A. I have already indicated that, as far as I am concerned, I would be glad to meet with the inter-American foreign ministers, if this is

the consensus of the foreign ministers themselves, to talk about further steps we can take in the hemisphere to strengthen the constitutional processes in the hemisphere. But this is a matter of consultation in the OAS and elsewhere, so that I don't think that I have heard yet whether that consensus has been reached. But as far as we are concerned, we are prepared to engage in such conversations, and I think it would be quite important.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with Mr. Harriman's trip yesterday to South America,⁴ could you discuss two phases? One, his meeting today or tomorrow with President [Arturo] Illia of Argentina, and if you hope—if you think that something can develop to conciliate the oil problem, the problem of the oil contract; and, two, what your hopes are in connection with the Inter-American Economic and Social Council ministerial meeting in São Paulo.

A. Well, Governor Harriman will be making calls in Buenos Aires and I believe also in Brazil, in addition to his visit with the Inter-American ECOSOC. The principal purpose of his journey is, of course, the ECOSOC meeting, where there will be an opportunity to review broadly the progress of the Alliance for Progress and measures which might be taken to strengthen it.

I think that it might be said that we ought to anticipate that the Alliance for Progress program will encounter many difficulties and, indeed, will be associated with tension in one country or another.

Quite apart from anything that the United States might do in this respect, Latin America is in the process of revolutionary changes, far-reaching changes, in their economic and social structures. Now, these changes would be going on in any event. We have felt for some time that it was important for the United States to assist those countries in taking hold of those necessary changes and moving them along through democratic processes, and through constitutional processes, in ways that make sense.

Now, it isn't easy to bring about important

changes through democratic methods. And the result is going to be that there will be tension inside of a number of countries as these changes occur, and undoubtedly there will be some tensions between some of these countries and the United States because they will feel that we need to do more than we can do and that perhaps we are too exigent in asking that changes occur on their side before we come in with substantial amounts of aid.

So there is a certain amount of tension built into these changes. But we have been encouraged by the steady progress that has been made in country after country. We think they are headed in the right direction. We think that those changes can occur by peaceful means rather than by revolutionary means and that the United States ought to play a very important part in assisting them in finding the external resources which those changes will require.

Prosecuting the War in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, in South Viet-Nam, do you think that the new regime can prosecute the war more effectively than Diem did? If so, why?

A. I think, actually, the principal problem that developed with respect to the previous regime was the alienation of apparently very large sections of the population. We believe that the present regime has moved promptly to consolidate public effort, that they will be able to resolve some of the internal difficulties that grew up, and that there will be a possibility that the people of that country will move to greater unity on behalf of the total effort.

We are encouraged about the possibilities. But there is a good deal of unfinished business and some real problems ahead. But the reception, the support of the people themselves, will be vital in this type of guerrilla warfare. The attitude of the peoples becomes absolutely crucial. As I think it was Mao Tse-tung said, "If guerrillas are operating within a friendly population, every bush is an ally." Well, in the last period we feel that as far as the villages are concerned and the countryside is concerned, they become more and more the allies of the effort to eradicate the Viet Cong aggression.

⁴ BULLETIN of Nov. 18, 1963, p. 800.

And we believe this will get an impetus from recent events and they can go ahead now with more confidence.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have twice referred to Hanoi's idea of neutralization in Viet-Nam. What is your understanding of the French point of view and their mention of a truce?

A. I think that was perhaps a comment from a very long-range point of view. It had very little to do with what happens tomorrow or the next day, perhaps commenting on the basis of what was anticipated at the time of the 1954 Geneva Accords. But we see no—we see no development specifically along that line from Paris or any ideas about any particular moves that ought to be taken at this time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to Berlin, some of the Russians here have been telling us that we were using salami tactics against them, and specifically in connection with the note that we sent them which they say has changed the procedures in Berlin. Do you think there is any justification to that charge?

A. No. I don't understand that assertion. We have been following the practices that we have been following for years on the autobahn. We have not changed those practices in either direction. Our convoy conducted itself in exact accordance with established procedures and moved ahead on the basis of established procedures. I don't know any element of change, as far as we are concerned, in our own practices. And, of course, we can't accept changes called for by the other side. There has been no discussion of that and no change in practice.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you please give us the benefit of your insight as to why the Russians at this time chose to make an issue over Western access rights to Berlin?

A. No, quite frankly, I can't. I would mislead you if I thought that I understood just what's in their minds on these three incidents because it seems to cut across and interrupt good many other things that they have been trying and efforts that have been made in small as well as some of the larger problems to find a few points of agreement after the test ban treaty.

But when you try to cross the gap of language and philosophy and understanding that exists between East and West on these matters, it's very hard to know what's in the mind of the other side. I would just have to say I don't understand it.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes?

Q. Sir, would you tell us, please, what are your views about any officials of your Department who would go before a congressional committee and deliberately say, under oath, what is untrue and what they know to be untrue?

A. Well, I think the answer to that is self-explanatory, that our policy is that when people testify before congressional committees they should tell the truth. (Laughter.)

Soviet Purchases of Wheat

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask a couple of questions about the wheat deal, which I don't believe will compromise your bargaining position. First, why wasn't the shipping arrangement with American ships worked out prior to the President's granting an export license—determination to grant an export license on October 9? Second, how do you respond to the critics of the deal who say that by selling wheat to the Russians at this time we are letting them off the hook at a time when they are economically pressed? And, third, do you see any expansion of U.S.-Communist trade in the future?

A. Well, in the first place, the question of substantial Soviet purchases of wheat came with very little advance notice from the other side. And it did require looking into a good many elements that needed review, if such transactions were to go forward.

But I would suppose that the reason for the wheat arrangement is that it would be in our interest to make it. This is not a gesture of philanthropy. If there is a basis for an exchange of wheat for convertible currency or gold that would be in our interest to make, that is one thing. This is not something that is done for any other purpose than our own self-interest. But these are matters which have to be discussed in detail.

There was no preliminary discussion with the Soviets before the question came up. These were matters that were taken up first by them with some of the private traders, and the private traders then needed to know whether in fact licenses could be issued and what the circumstances might be. But I think I would not add anything to what I have just said on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Senator [Thomas J.] Dodd, on the floor of the Senate, has said that he has proof that Mr. Otepka's phone was tapped in the Department here. What is your policy on wire-tapping?

A. Well, this question has come up in a case which is now pending in the Department of State. Since I myself will play a personal role in this case at a later stage, if there are hearings and if the procedures go through their normal track, and it will be for me, the Secretary of State, to review this in all its aspects at a later stage, I think it would be peculiarly inappropriate for me to comment at this stage.

Q. Then aren't you participating at all in the transmittal of letters of dismissal for Mr. Otepka? Did somebody else make the—

A. The procedures on that are established under longstanding regulations, and the letters have gone from other offices of the Department. Under existing practice, if Mr. Otepka uses the machinery that is available to him, then in due course it would come to me for complete review. And therefore I think it's important for me to reserve my own position on the matter until I have it before me officially.

Q. Mr. Secretary, many Congressmen and also, I believe, the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has called for a drastic revision of the foreign aid program in the future. The fiscal 1965 program is now being put together in the Department. Are new concepts and fresh organizational structures being built into this program, and if so, in response to these demands—and if so, could you tell us something about them?

A. I think the suggestions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are being given the most serious and fullest consideration. We are studying those at the present time. And our proposals for next year will take those views much into account. Exactly in what way remains to be seen.

But I think the underlying point is that the foreign aid effort is a postwar effort which requires us to keep our backs in it year after year, if we are to get this job done. I think we should not suppose that changes in details or changes in administrative arrangements will necessarily prove the key that unlocks the necessary effort.

I think we have got to have a general national understanding that it is in our vital interest to go ahead with a substantial aid program for the next years ahead and to be ready to do this in the most effective way possible. And I think it's this broader need for the foreign aid program that we need fully to understand.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I think it's useful to take every few months to take a pulse on the Atlantic nuclear navy. Over the past year we have ranged from tolerance—that is, if the Europeans want it, we will listen to their ideas—to various forms of enthusiasm. In the light of the Italian difficulties at the moment, the British pre-election period, the German changeover, how do you gauge the odds, our enthusiasm, and the future of this whole project?

A. Well, now that we know that a number of our allies are very much interested in it, we are prepared to go ahead with it—we'd like to go ahead with it. At exactly what pace depends upon the circumstances of the other governments more than upon us.

But we think this is a good idea, both from a military and from a political point of view, and we'd like to proceed with it. And those discussions will go forward.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Is the United States making any progress with its allies in working out uniform energy policies toward the Soviet?

A. No, that is a matter which will be discussed. These are matters that are regularly discussed in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. Credit policies have been a matter of general coordination, not only as far as the Soviet bloc is concerned but also with regard to the free world. And I would suppose these matters would be discussed further. But I have nothing specific on that to say this morning.

Report of Soviet Arms to Algeria

Q. Mr. Secretary, it was reported that Soviet arms have been reaching Algeria from Cuba and from Egypt. Do you think that the Soviets are engaged here in a new gambit, or do you think it's an initiative of the Cuban and Egyptian Governments in supplying these weapons to Algeria?

A. The recent Algerian-Moroccan affair⁵ has underlined to us the importance of other countries, other powers, staying out of it. These two great Arab people, two Maghrebian people, ought to be able to resolve their problems between themselves and within an African framework. Now, any intrusion from the outside simply makes that more difficult and raises the possibility that still others might then come in and create a type of confrontation there which would be in the adverse interest of both peoples concerned.

I don't, myself, necessarily connect the Cuban ship with the particular incident that arose at the borders, because the timing of the departure of these supplies from Cuba apparently was such that it preceded the actual outburst of the fighting. It might have been related to other problems there of some other sort.

But I think it is very important that others keep out of that situation, so that these two countries can settle this affair between themselves and within the framework of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] arrangements that are now in progress. As you know, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the OAU will be meeting on this matter. The Emperor of

Ethiopia and the President of Mali have played a very constructive role in it, and we hope very much that these two neighbors can get together and work out this situation.

Situation in Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please assess the internal situation in Cuba and particularly the presence or removal of the Russian troops there?

A. I think there is nothing much to add to what the President said on that at his last press conference. There have been substantial withdrawals of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. I would not get into a numbers game again about the precise numbers, but we do know that there have been significant withdrawals.

We also know that the situation inside of Cuba is very tight, from the economic point of view; they are having considerable difficulties.

One of the things that worries us most about Cuba, about which we are concerned, is the continued effort of Mr. Castro to interfere in the affairs of other countries in this hemisphere, and the other countries and we are working very closely to meet this and to deal with it as it arises.

I am thinking, for example, of such things as that raid on the British island to recapture some refugees, whose only offense was they tried to escape the prison Mr. Castro has made out of Cuba.

I am thinking of the training of young men from other Latin American countries in terrorist and guerrilla tactics, with the idea that they would go back and engage in terrorist activities in their own countries.

I am thinking of such things as financial subsidies to terrorists in other countries.

These are things that are disturbing the peace of the Caribbean and the inter-American system, and that is one of the focal points of our attitude toward Cuba. It just will not be permitted to happen, and we are taking many different measures to interrupt this kind of interference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you.

A. Thank you.

⁵ For text of a Department statement of Nov. 1, see *ibid.*, p. 787.

United States Recognizes New Government of Viet-Nam

Department Statement

Press release 570 dated November 7

On Friday morning, November 8, Saigon time, the United States Ambassador to Viet-Nam [Henry Cabot Lodge] will deliver to the Vietnamese Foreign Office a note¹ replying to a Vietnamese note¹ dated November 5 which had called attention to the expressed desire of the new Vietnamese Government to maintain and strengthen the friendly relations already existing between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States. In its note the Government of the United States states that it shares with the provisional government of the Republic of Viet-Nam the strong hope that the cordial relations between our two countries will continue as in the past and develop further to our mutual benefit in the future.

The note delivered by the Ambassador is an expression of recognition of the present Government of Viet-Nam by the United States Government.

U.S. Protests Soviet Interference With Convoys to Berlin

Following is the text of a U.S. note to the Soviet Union protesting stoppage of an American convoy on the autobahn to Berlin delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Moscow on November 6. The United Kingdom and France also delivered identical notes.

Press release 566 dated November 6

The Government of the United States most emphatically protests the continued interference by the Soviet military authorities with the movement of Allied convoys between West Berlin and West Germany on the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn.

An eastbound United States Army convoy which reached the Marienborn checkpoint at

¹ Not printed.

0901 Greenwich mean time on November 4, was held up by the Soviet military authorities. They first of all insisted that the personnel of the convoy dismount. When this was not accepted, they demanded that the tailgates of some vehicles be lowered. When this too was refused, they prevented the convoy from proceeding.

These demands seem to indicate a deliberate intent to interfere with the free movement of Allied convoys on the autobahn to Berlin. They are totally without justification and are in contradiction with the established procedures followed up to the present time by the Allied Powers. The pertinent procedures currently in effect were communicated by the three governments to the Soviet military authorities last October 29. As part of their rights relating to Berlin, the French, American and British Governments possess the right of unrestricted access to Berlin, which right has been confirmed by quadripartite agreements. They exercise this right of access in accordance with procedures which have been followed as a means of insuring an orderly flow of traffic on the autobahn. It is not for the Soviet authorities to impose restrictions upon the exercise by the Allied Powers of their rights in this domain.

The United States Government wishes to make very clearly to the Soviet Government that it considers the action taken against the American convoy at the Marienborn checkpoint as an inadmissible attempt to prejudice the Allied right of free access to Berlin.

The arbitrary nature of this unjustified Soviet action is emphasized by the very different treatment accorded on November 5 to closely similar British and French convoys despite the fact that the procedures followed by these convoys were identical to the procedures followed by the American convoy.

The United States Government requests the Soviet Government immediately to instruct its military representatives in Germany to bring to an end, once and for all, these hindrances. The United States Government will hold the Soviet Government responsible for all consequences of the failure to comply with this request.

An American Looks at Berlin

by George C. McGhee

*Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany*¹

It is a pleasure for me to participate in the Berlin Week at the Amerika Haus here in Nürnberg. My theme for this evening is American policy with respect to Berlin. This is a subject about which much has been spoken and written. Yet, it seems to me, the issues involved do not lose timeliness. While I will speak about Berlin primarily, I will also point up the importance of the Berlin problem as an aspect of the larger question of German unity.

It might be helpful in placing my remarks in perspective if I review with you some of the historical facts of the Berlin question.

We might begin with the situation at the end of the war. Certain agreements were arrived at in 1944 between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the European Advisory Commission, which provided for the establishment of zones of occupation in Germany and for the administration of Greater Berlin. There were subsequent agreements signed in June and July of 1945 on the same general subjects, which also provided for participation by the Provisional Government of the French Republic. These instruments determined, in essence, the legal status of Greater Berlin.

As a result of these agreements, Greater Berlin was divided into four sectors. A point of capital importance, however, is that the city came under the joint administration of the Four Powers. The Allied Kommandatura, composed of four commandants appointed by

their respective zone commanders, was created for this purpose. The four commandants were aided by technical staffs. Set above the Kommandatura was the Allied Control Council, composed of the four zone commanders. The Control Council held supreme power in Germany, where matters concerning Germany as a whole were concerned.

The Allied Kommandatura met for the first time on July 11, 1945. It functioned until June 16, 1948, when the Soviet representative took his well-known "walk." The Kommandatura suspended its work from that date until December 21, 1948, when the commandants of the Western sectors issued the following statement:

The refusal of the Soviet Authorities to attend meetings of the Allied Kommandatura cannot any longer be allowed to obstruct the proper administration of Berlin, according to the law. The Allied Kommandatura will therefore resume its work forthwith. If the Soviet Authorities, either now or at a future date, decide to abide by the agreements to which the Four Powers are committed, the quadripartite administration of Berlin could be resumed. During their abstentions the three Western Allies will exercise the powers of the Allied Kommandatura although it is realized that owing to Soviet obstruction it will only be possible for them to carry out their decisions in the Western Sectors for the present.

It is quite clear, from a study of the various pertinent documents, that it was agreed by the Western Powers and the Soviet Union that Greater Berlin was to be treated as an area separate and distinct from the four zones of occupation. It was not included as part of any of the four zones of occupation.

The Western allies, therefore, are in Berlin

¹ Address made at the Amerika Haus at Nürnberg, Germany, on Oct. 9.

by right of victory. We are not there at the tolerance of one of the other occupying powers. We are in Berlin, and we will stay there—until we are no longer needed to preserve the liberties of its people. In this connection President Kennedy clearly stated our position in July of 1961 in his report to the Nation,² when he said:

We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force. For the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is essential to the morale and security of Western Germany, to the unity of Western Europe, and to the faith of the entire free world. Soviet strategy has long been aimed not merely at Berlin but at dividing and neutralizing all of Europe, forcing us back to our own shores. We must meet our oft-stated pledge to the free peoples of West Berlin—and maintain our rights and their safety, even in the face of force—in order to maintain the confidence of other free peoples in our word and our resolve. The strength of the alliance on which our security depends is dependent in turn on our willingness to meet our commitments to them.

This is a clear and unequivocal explanation of our determination to stay in Berlin. It should leave no question in anyone's mind about our resolve to sustain and defend the opportunity for more than 2 million people to live in freedom.

This determination also extends to the maintenance of the right of access to Berlin. The right of free and unlimited access is plainly inherent in the right of the Allies to be in Berlin. It was, in addition, confirmed by arrangements made among the wartime Allies in 1945 and reaffirmed in 1949. These Western rights of access clearly encompass the right to transport food and other supplies for the populace of the city. Moreover, the right of the Berliners themselves to receive goods from, and export goods to, Western Germany and beyond was also plainly inherent in the special status accorded Berlin.

The Berlin Airlift

I do not have to recall for this audience the details of our response to the first serious attempt to make untenable our position in Berlin. The airlift mounted in 1948 led to the failure of the Communist bid to force the Allies out

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

of Berlin and to starve the people of the city into a surrender to communism by denial of surface access. Over a period of some 11 months more than 2¼ million tons of food and supplies were brought to West Berlin in over a quarter million flights by French, British and American airmen. At the peak of the airlift, as you may remember, planes were landing in West Berlin at the rate of one every 45 seconds.

The airlift is an indelible chapter in the history of the defense of freedom. So is the fortitude of the people of Berlin during the blockade. They subsisted on a slim diet. The Communists offered them food if they would register in East Berlin, but all but a few thousand spurned the offer. During the winter, as fuel was scarce they were usually miserably cold. For months electric current was on only 3 hours in 24. The Berliners won for themselves the admiration of all free peoples. Their courage and endurance helped greatly in reestablishing the name of the German people in the eyes of the world.

The experience of the blockade, moreover, forged a lasting bond of friendship among Berliners, Americans, and our French and British allies. Every noon the ringing of the Freedom Bell from the tower of the West Berlin City Hall serves as a reminder of our common cause.

Other Threats Against West Berlin

There have been other threats against the freedom of West Berlin, some of which have been coupled with Communist ultimatums, some of which have not. We can recall the protracted period of heavy diplomatic pressure against Berlin which began in November 1958. A recent memory was the Soviet challenge of February–March 1962 in the air corridors,³ one of the vital links of free Berlin to the outside world. This challenge, as in 1948, was met calmly but with firm determination by the Allied authorities and the civilian airlines, whose pilots never faltered in maintaining normal air service to and from Berlin.

During it all, the courage and steadfastness

³ For text of a U.S. memorandum delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Feb. 15, 1962, see *ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1962, p. 370.

of the Berliners themselves did not wane. Even after the building of the brutal wall, the morale of the Berliners remains high. Despite threats and harassments, the free Berliners have energetically rebuilt their city and revived their industries. Berlin, once again, is the greatest metropolis between Paris and Moscow. Ruins and rubble have given way to new office buildings, apartment houses, hotels, and stores. Hundreds of thousands of new jobs have been created. All the usual indices demonstrate clearly the steady growth of the city's economy.

Not only is free Berlin thriving in a material way, but it has also experienced a cultural revival. The arts, music, and the theater are once again joining to give Berlin its traditional reputation as a great European center of culture. Berlin has been restored to its place among the foremost cities of the world.

Unity of Purpose of Western Allies

What has been achieved in Berlin over the past 15 years has been the result of a most successful Western cooperative effort. In the early days following the blockade, almost \$1 billion of direct and indirect Marshall Plan funds were channeled into the city to help in its revival. As they began to overcome the ravages of the war in their own countries, the other Western allies participated. As the Federal Republic began to rebuild its own strong economy, it, too, contributed increasingly to the point where it now assumes the major responsibility. Cooperation has also been strong in the political field. There are no basic differences among the three powers which have basic responsibility in Berlin—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—with respect to Berlin policy.

This unity of purpose of the Western allies is shared, not just with the citizens of free Berlin but with the people of Germany as a whole. There is a common determination to be not just Berlin, but Germany, reunified in peace and freedom. We must never lose sight of the fact that the continued prosperity and viability of free Berlin, and the maintenance of its close ties to the Federal Republic, are essential to the ultimate reunification of Germany.

U.S. Position on Reunification

Last month, in his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the President of the United States made the United States position on Berlin and German reunification crystal clear. In speaking of the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, he said:⁴

Our conflicts, to be sure, are real. Our concepts of the world are different. No service is performed by failing to make clear our disagreements. A central difference is the belief of the American people in self-determination for all people.

We believe that the people of Germany and Berlin must be free to reunite their capital and their country.

We cannot accept the idea that the basic requirements of human justice can be selectively applied. The moral considerations which make self-determination right for the peoples of Africa are equally applicable to the case of Germany and Berlin. Speaking as an American, I can say that my country will continue steadfastly to hold as its objective a united, free, and democratic Berlin, occupying its rightful place as the great capital of a free and united Germany.

I am aware that there are impatient voices calling out for reunification now. I am frank to say, however, that I do not at the same time hear concrete proposals as to how this can be achieved without force, which we of the West have renounced as a means to this end. We must not be misled by semantics or slogans, nor should we deceive ourselves. We must deal with the realities of the world of today. Those who guard the ramparts of Berlin, who engage in the daily feint and counterfeint of maneuver with the Communists, know these realities. Gains do not come easily in Berlin.

But this does not mean a lessening of our determination. We do not need to be refortified in our resolution by the stimulus of conflict and tension. We recognize the simple truth that freedom is the wave of the future and that the evolutionary processes which work for freedom have an internal momentum of their own. These processes will have a better chance in the absence of tension, which serves to freeze the

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 531.

status quo and to make peaceful adjustments politically impossible.

We can look to developments in the East as the harbinger of the future. The harsh doctrine of Stalinism, which brought misery and death for millions of people in the past, has been officially declared a heresy in Eastern Europe. There are stirrings of dissent—questionings of doctrines which were regarded as immutable. There is unmistakable evidence of the natural human desire for liberty. Similar forces, although still more muted and closely controlled, are also present in the East Zone of Germany. I cite these factors to emphasize my belief that the division of Germany is against the tide of history.

We must, nevertheless, recognize that, while history may be in our favor, reunification of Berlin and Germany will not be quick and easy. We must recognize that the times call for patience, calmness, and understanding blended with determination. We must, however, also recognize that history favors those who are willing to make exertions in support of their ideals. There are a number of things we of the West must and can do.

We ourselves are fully aware of the many advantages of freedom as it has developed in the West. We must, however, demonstrate clearly to the world that Western values are universal and respond to the aspiration of all people. We must work hard to continue to demonstrate the dynamism of our system—to make apparent to the world the manifold advantages of freedom of choice.

Marxist dialecticians attack a caricature of Western capitalism as Marx viewed it in the mid-19th century. We can show the world not only that the Western system of a free society is the best way to satisfy men's intellectual and spiritual needs but that a free economy is the most effective means of supplying human wants.

Economic Contrasts in East and West

The difficulties which Eastern Europe faces in the economic field have been characterized by a group of German experts, the Research Council for Questions of Reunification, as a result of the "profound chasm between ideological loyalty and the demands of practical eco-

nomics." The press has recently described problems which beset the economic planners of the Soviet bloc in COMECON [Communist economic council]. The opposition of the Rumanian authorities to the plans made for that country, which would have put a halt to industrial growth, is well known.

Contrast this situation with that which we see in Western Europe—with the dynamic economic growth of the Common Market. Here, in Germany, moreover, where you have benefited from a free-market economy, you also enjoy the benefits of an advanced social welfare policy. It is quite clear that there is infinitely more social justice in the free Western economies than there is in Eastern Europe.

In specific terms we can be assured that workers in the Eastern Zone are well aware of their colleagues in the Federal Republic have a greater share of the good things of life under this system than are available under the system prevalent there. Despite the restrictions in the East on exchange of ideas with the West, the obvious benefits of the Western system are known and are being increasingly talked about by the people of Eastern Europe. The West is becoming an increasingly powerful center of attraction for the East—an attraction which will inevitably result in a reorientation in the East which will make possible a new relationship between East and West.

As President Kennedy said in speaking to students of the Free University in Berlin:

... above all whether they [the people of the East] see much or little of the West, what they must be so bright as to contradict the daily drum of distortion from the East.

In talking of the time when possibilities of reconciliation between East and West appear, the President continued by saying:

There will be wounds to heal and suspicions to be eased on both sides. The difference in living standards will have to be reduced by leveling up, not down. Fair and effective agreements to end the arms race must be reached. These changes will not come tomorrow. But our efforts . . . must continue undiminished.

A parallel need is to maintain vigilantly

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 22, 1963, p. 125.

Western unity which has made it possible for our system to work on a grand scale. This unity has been amply demonstrated in times of crisis. I need only cite again the Western reaction to the Berlin blockade and, in more recent times, the solidarity of the West at the time of the Cuban crisis of last year. We should, however, and I believe we can, be as united in times of relative tranquillity as we are in times of crisis. If we are to succeed in making our common system attractive to the Eastern world, we must pool our ideas and resources.

Maintaining Integrity of Allied Position

Let me now speak specifically with respect to Berlin.

The American commitment to West Berlin was reaffirmed as recently as last June by President Kennedy during his visit to Berlin. I do not believe that I need repeat here what he said eloquently on that occasion. Let no one doubt the strength of the American and Allied resolution in this regard.

We understand and appreciate the desire of the Berlin authorities and the city's people to have more normal relations with their compatriots in the Federal Republic. There is ample evidence of our sympathy with this natural desire. Procedures have been in effect for years to extend to Berlin a great measure of the laws and treaties of the Federal Republic. Representatives of the 2½ million free Berliners play an active and influential role in the parliament of the Federal Republic.

At the same time, however, we have insisted on the maintenance of Berlin's special status. If we are to defend Berlin and insure the continuing freedom and prosperity of its citizens, we must have a strong base from which to operate. Do not misunderstand me; I do not use the word "base" exclusively in its military sense. We believe it essential for us to preserve a strong legal position in the city in the interest of Berlin as well as in our own interest. A lack of clarity in the Allied position could eventually weaken the sense of responsibility we have for the city and would impair our ability to fulfill that responsibility.

In recent years the Soviet leadership has become more sensitive and responsive to world

opinion. It is vitally important to Berlin and to the Allies for the world to have a sympathetic understanding of the issues involved in the Berlin question. The strength of our case in the court of world opinion depends in large part upon the integrity of our position. We ask that the considerations I have mentioned be seriously taken into account in the deliberations of the German authorities until the just and peaceful reunification of Germany, which we seek as ardently as the Germans, can be attained.

We must strive to maintain the hopes of the people who have been shut off from contact with their brother Germans by the brutal wall through the heart of Berlin. We must at the same time make fresh efforts, consistent with our general policies, to ameliorate the human and physical hardships to the East Germans caused by the construction of the wall.

Both of these objectives can be accomplished within the framework of peaceful competition. We have heard many brave and confident utterances from the Communist leadership about the superiority of communism. This has inevitably been accompanied by doleful descriptions of the inadequacies of our Western system. Berlin challenges them to support their words by deeds. It challenges them to the competition of the marketplace of ideas.

We have heard their defense of the wall. They plead a need to defend their "gains" from attack by the West. We all know that this is false, that they really fear the magnetic appeal which freedom, as found in West Berlin, has. We are entitled to say to them: "If you are so confident of the virtue of your ideas, let the people make a free choice between the two systems. Allow free Berliners to enter East Berlin, and allow East Germans to come to the West."

We are also entitled to ask: "Why must people of the Soviet Zone still fear to express dissent? Why is an area which was known for its productivity and industry unable to meet the basic needs of its people? Why is the productivity of the German worker or farmer in the East (who is not different in character from his West German counterpart) so much less than that in the West?"

We challenge the Soviet leadership, which has ultimate responsibility for East Germany,

to allow an improvement of the conditions of the people there. Let the Communists stop their untruthful propaganda barrage and allow their people to see and judge the situation in the West for themselves.

Further, why must there be an endless round of petty harassments affecting access to Berlin,⁶ as well as life in the city itself? If the Communist leaders are so confident of their ultimate, peaceful victory, why do they continue their efforts to isolate and weaken Berlin? Is this a sign of confidence, or are they really fearful that they cannot compete?

In exploring these questions we should not be provocative, for this would be self-defeating.

⁶ For text of a U.S. note to the U.S.S.R. dated Nov. 6 protesting the stopping of an American convoy on the autobahn, see p. 818.

What is needed is a cooperative effort in the West to exert an ever-increasing influence and attraction in the East. We must make it clear that we are not hostile to any system under which the people are free to choose their own destiny. I am convinced that if the people of the East are free to choose, the attraction of our system in the West is such that the ultimate victory will be ours.

As President Kennedy said in Berlin,

There is no easy course to the reunification of Germany, the reconstitution of Europe. But life is never easy. There is work to be done, and obligations to be met, obligations to truth, to justice, and to liberty.

In this sense, I ask that all of us combine our efforts, our abilities, and our resources to the end that Berlin and Germany may ultimately be reunited in peace and freedom.

National Strategy, Security, and Arms Control

by William C. Foster

*Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*¹

It happens that I have long been involved in the national defense program of the United States. From 1951 to 1953 I served as Deputy Secretary of Defense. With this background, some of my friends think it a little strange that I am now so thoroughly involved in the arms control and disarmament program. But I am not the only public official that has made this type of transition. In fact a significant portion of the personnel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, scientists and military personnel, have come to us from previous positions in the Department of Defense.

Within the last 6 to 8 years the problems of

arms control and disarmament have come to be broadly recognized in the defense community as an integral part of our overall national security program. Thus at the present time our arms control program is a serious policy concern that merits and receives substantial personal attention from both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, as well as the President of the United States.

Today I would like to consider the greatly increased importance of arms control planning in our national security program. To explain the importance and the role of our arms control and disarmament program, it is necessary to review the changes which technology has imposed on our national defense strategy. While I am sure that most of you are aware of these basic technological developments—the

¹ Address made on Oct. 31 before the Southwest Conference on Arms Control convened by the Human Relations Center, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.

ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile], the thermonuclear bomb, and the jet aircraft—I suspect that comparatively few are aware of the effect that these developments have had on the strategy of diplomacy and of warfare down to the foot soldier.

Dilemma of Defense in a Thermonuclear World

The problem of maintaining military security for our free society at the present time centers around the dilemma of defense in a thermonuclear environment. The basic difficulty is that nuclear weapons have become so powerful and the means of delivering them have become so effective that development of an adequate defense at present does not appear feasible. There are, of course, designs for ballistic-missile defense systems, and the technical analysis shows that these systems should operate effectively against small numbers of unsophisticated ICBM warheads. But the essential point is this: Every such defense system that has been studied has been very expensive, and none has been designed that could offer an adequate overall defense against a massive, coordinated missile attack using penetration aids that are within the present state of the art. Even providing a theoretically effective defense against an intelligent opponent is essentially prohibitive. Best estimates indicate the cost to the defense runs anywhere from 10 to 100 times what it would cost the offense to override the defense system.

As you know, much money and technical effort have gone into the development of anti-missile defenses. But still the basic difficulty remains: At present there is no effective defense against these weapons. Moreover, in the foreseeable future technology offers no great hope that an effective overall defense can be devised. Of course, research will and must continue. And it is possible that presently unforeseen developments may ultimately provide a practical defense. However, we cannot rest the long-term security of the free world today on such hope. The basic task of the diplomat and the strategist, therefore, is to face up to the facts now in hand and to provide for the security of the free world in the absence of a classic defense situation.

We are already well embarked on such a course. The present technical infeasibility of a real defense has led us to rely on a strategy of deterrence. Thus for the first time in our history we are not relying on the oceans to serve as an effective defense barrier. And for the first time in our history the vast power of the U.S. military establishment is not in a position to provide an entirely effective physical defense. Rather, with a strategy of deterrence our security is assured by the threat of retaliation. Thus in the last analysis (so long as we must rely on deterrence) the security of this nation will depend in large measure on the restraint, the moderation, and the rationality exercised by our potential opponents.

Two Parallel Roads

This central fact of the present military environment colors the entire spectrum of international relations. It constitutes the basic strategic dilemma of our time. In coping with this dilemma the United States is following two parallel and complementary roads.

The first is an effort to make deterrence work. In traveling this road our attention must be given to a strong and flexible defense posture and to such appropriate adjustments in the spectrum of military and political affairs as will foster greater international stability in an inherently unstable world.

The second is the effort to reduce our dependence on force for the settlement of international disputes. This road is almost unused. But since deterrence or the balance of terror does not provide a satisfactory long-term solution, we must work toward the development of international machinery which gradually but ultimately can replace national military forces as guarantors of security.

There is no conflict here. The steps now under way to improve our defense establishment—to help make deterrence work—should help rather than hinder our progress toward a more effective world order. The efforts we are undertaking to strengthen the world order should help to make deterrence work. Arms control and disarmament measures play a role in both parts of the strategy.

In the first, while deterrence requires the

maintenance of a strong military posture, limited arms control measures can promote stability by reducing suspicions and the dangers of stumbling into a nuclear exchange through accident or misunderstanding, or even the tensions that could develop out of an uncontrolled arms race.

In the second, disarmament through major limitations or reductions of national arsenals can curb the warmaking potentials of states and permit the development of peacekeeping machinery which would insure that as arsenals are scaled down international peace and security can be fully and fairly protected.

At the present time, of course, our major effort is concentrated on arms control measures rather than disarmament. Disarmament is a long-term goal. It will require major modifications not only in world institutions but in the conventions and traditions or relations between nations. There is no easy way or any shortcut to this objective.

The United States has introduced an outline plan for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.² The discussion of this plan at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva has clearly illustrated the variety and extent of the difficulties involved in such an undertaking. We expect to continue to negotiate in earnest on an approach to disarmament. But in the meantime, recognizing the practicalities of the world in which we live, it seems that for the immediate future progress is more likely to take the form of more limited arms control steps.

Complexity of Deterrence

While the broad outlines of the defense problem can be summarized in rather simple terms, the actual problem is enormously complex. When we consider the ambitions of the Soviets and the Chinese around the world and the separate interests and concerns of our allies and the uncommitted nations, and when we think of the separate ways in which military threats can develop—ranging all the way from local insurrection or guerrilla activity to general

nuclear war—we have a problem of enormous complexity.

The public image of the problem of deterrence is often limited to the problem of strategic nuclear war. However, as seen from the decision levels of the Government in Washington, the problem of deterrence includes also the deterrence of nonnuclear aggression and subversion at all levels of violence.

If a war of any type were to begin between major powers, there would always be the possibility that the intensity of the conflict would increase. A limited guerrilla activity could expand into an open nonnuclear conflict, a nonnuclear conflict could escalate with the tactical application of nuclear weapons, or a tactical nuclear conflict could well explode into a general thermonuclear exchange. The key to the control of such escalation from the lowest to the highest level is mutual restraint—political restraint in time of peace to avoid a conflict and military restraint in time of war to keep any conflict limited. Just as the risk of nuclear war serves to deter nonnuclear aggression, so the risk of a large nonnuclear war can serve to deter indirect nuclear aggression or guerrilla-type war.

Since the deterrent strategy operates in the entire spectrum of limited war as well as at the strategic level, the concept of restraint in arms control must also operate at these levels. Conventions of restraint are needed and must be developed for all potential levels of violence. Overall, the nuclear environment tends to pose a partial military stalemate throughout the spectrum of conflict. This stalemate, however, is not an entirely stable one. It could be upset by irrational behavior of the political leadership or by miscalculation, or by accident or failure of command and control.

The price that humanity would have to pay for any such failure would be fantastic. Consequently we have an obligation to improve the present security system by every means at our command, unilateral or negotiated, to make it work that so long as we have to rely on deterrence it will work.

Our national program toward this objective includes a strong national defense program that deal with those aspects of the problem which we have full national control. It also

² For text, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1962, p. 747.

udes a program of bilateral and international agreements on separate arms control measures designed to minimize those risks which we cannot unilaterally control. These two aspects of our program work as partners in the effort to make deterrence work.

Our basic military strategy is to deal with all situations using the minimum force required for the situation: that is, to avoid any conflict unless it is essential for the preservation of our national interests, and if a conflict does start, we will endeavor to keep it as limited as possible. The foundation stone for success in this strategy is a strong national defense posture. Our defense forces must be so designed that a potential aggressor would never be given a rational motivation either to initiate a conflict or to raise an existing conflict to a higher level of violence. To achieve this our military forces must be sufficiently strong at each potential level of violence that a prospective opponent could see no advantage in such a conflict.

In addition to being strong our forces must not be vulnerable to surprise attack. Vulnerable forces invite attack, and, perhaps just as serious, a nation with vulnerable forces may feel forced to initiate even an unprofitable war to avoid being the second to strike. Thus survivable military forces take the advantage out of surprise attack. This explains the great effort which has been expended in recent years to make our strategic forces as invulnerable as possible. The air- and ground-alert program for our bomber forces, the hardening and dispersal program for our land-based missiles, and the Polaris system with its mobility and concealment, all represent forces to take the advantage out of surprise attack.

However, even if we strongly desire to avoid the escalation of a limited conflict and even if our forces at the next level are strong and well protected, it is nevertheless possible that such escalation may occur contrary to the desires of those concerned. This might happen as a consequence of a series of small misunderstandings, unless the dividing line between the two levels of conflict is clear, unambiguous, and well understood by both sides.

Here we have a new and important aspect of military strategy in the nuclear age that is

just beginning to be recognized. The Defense Department now takes this dividing line into consideration when evaluating the advantages of new weapon systems or changes in deployment which might either sharpen or obscure the lines between potential levels of conflict.

In the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency we have recently undertaken a series of studies addressed to this problem. From our point of view we are looking for areas where international negotiations might contribute either by defining more clearly the conventions of restraint for various types of limited war or by multilateral modification of military deployments to make such restraint more feasible. This is a complex area which will require much more study before specific approaches can be advanced with confidence. But it is an area in which we may anticipate future contributions of the arms control program toward our national security.

Risk of Stumbling Into War

In addition to the foregoing we must also face the risk of war or escalation of war as a consequence of accident, miscalculation, or irrational behavior. Our national security program is designed to deal with these risks in many different ways. The efforts of the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are all involved.

Let me first consider the risk of accidents in which either by mechanical or human failure armaments might be used contrary to official authorization. This has been a source of continuous concern to the Department of Defense. The precautions to avoid accidents through human and mechanical failure have been extremely rigorous ever since nuclear weapons were introduced.

On the other hand, certain types of weapons which could be developed in the future might be extremely difficult to make comparably safe. I am thinking in particular of weapons of mass destruction which might be stationed in outer space. Present analysis indicates that such weapons would be both more expensive and less effective than conventional ICBM delivery sys-

tems. Moreover, once placed in space such weapons would constitute a permanent risk. There would always be a possibility that normal mechanical failure, collision with a meteorite, or interaction with unforeseen solar radiations might trigger it by accident.

In our agency we have long believed that it would be desirable if we could reach an understanding that such weapons would not be placed in space. Without such an understanding we believe there would be a greater risk that an arms race in space might develop simply for prestige reasons rather than because of any real military utility. After full coordination with other agencies we entered into negotiations with the Soviet Union. These resulted in recent agreement on the text of a United Nations resolution³ which subsequently was endorsed by acclamation by the General Assembly. The resolution, which constitutes a recommendation on the part of the Assembly, calls upon all states to refrain from placing in orbit or stationing in space vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction.

There are as well the related risks of miscalculation, misunderstanding, or less than completely rational behavior. Our basic military posture is, of course, designed as a partial answer to these risks. Our ability to provide for a controlled and graduated response at every level of conflict allows us to make our determination known at limited levels of violence with lesser risk of triggering a holocaust. In addition the ability to fight effectively at a variety of levels—guerrilla warfare, nonnuclear warfare, or even tactical nuclear warfare—provides a multiplicity of possible stopping places where a miscalculation might be corrected without triggering general nuclear war.

During our negotiations at Geneva the United States has placed on the table a substantial list of measures designed to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.⁴ The first of these proposals to interest the Soviet Union was our proposal for a "hot line" between the two heads of government. This line has

now been installed and is in operation.⁵ "hot line" obviously reflects the mutual interest of the United States and the Soviet Union in avoiding war through miscalculation or failure of communications.

Some of the other measures that the United States has proposed on which we have not had favorable response from the Soviet Union include: an exchange of military missions, advance notification of military maneuvers, establishment of a commission to examine possibilities in budget control. We believe an exchange of military missions would result in improved communication and understanding between our two military systems. It might provide a better tool for mutual reassurance in crisis situations. In addition informal contacts between our military officers could result in some practical new suggestions for reducing some of the risks imposed by the new technology.

We believe that advance notification of military maneuvers could also contribute to better understanding and reduce the risk that they would be misinterpreted. We also believe a requirement to announce maneuvers might also serve to discourage maneuvers which could reasonably be interpreted as hostile.

Restricting Expansion of Arms Race

No discussion of our arms control program would be complete without at least a mention of our efforts to restrict the geographic and political expansion of the arms race. While the present problems of maintaining national security in what is essentially a bipolar world are extremely complex, they are nothing compared to the problems we would face in a world where large nuclear arsenals were available to all major powers. To visualize the problems we might face, simply try to imagine a world in which nuclear weapons were available: to the Chinese Communists, to India and Pakistan, to the major powers in Latin America, or to the major powers in the Middle East. The limitation of the spread of these weapons, in our

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.

⁴ For text of a working paper presented on Dec. 12, 1962, see *ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1962, p. 1019.

⁵ For text of the agreement establishing a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

give us time to solve our problems before they become even more complex, is thus a major arms control objective.

We hope that the limited nuclear test ban,⁶ which has now been signed by 107 nations and joined to by 1 other, will prove to be a useful step toward this objective. Of course, in and of itself the test ban will not stop the spread of nuclear weapons—although it is a strong inhibitor. But we hope it will produce a climate in which more effective measures will be possible and where the United States and the U.S.S.R. will be able to effectively exert their influence toward this end.

In a sense the initial U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. agreement should be viewed something like a no-smoking pledge between parents. If both parents smoke, they will find it very difficult to influence their children to abstain. While the treaty is valuable for the major powers—we are certainly better off without the ever-increasing contamination of fallout—there is no real significance in the treaty for the smaller nations.

Disarmament Under a World Rule of Law

When I began this talk, I called your attention to the two aspects of our national security program. Thus far I have talked only about the first, or the arms control side of our arms control and disarmament mission, and how it can complement the military system and assist in the development of the machinery and conventions of restraint that are needed to make deterrence work. I will now talk briefly about the second or longer range side of our program—the problems of disarmament and peacekeeping under a world rule of law.

As we observed earlier, one of the major effects of nuclear weapons is to induce a partial military stalemate throughout the spectrum of conflict. Thus it may become possible, in passage of time, to achieve some reduction in the economic burden of armaments through mutually acceptable agreements. As long as we are unable to obtain the participation of Communist China or other major powers in a disarmament

program, there will be severe limits on how far we can go. Clearly we must limit ourselves to those types of agreement which would not seriously upset the balance of power vis-à-vis nonparticipating states. We are currently conducting research to determine how such agreements might be designed in order to improve military stability as well as reduce the economic burden.

Of course, any agreement which places significant limits on military forces would require effective inspection and verification procedures. The problem of inspection and verification has received heavy attention in our research program ever since the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established. Research in this area accounts for well over half of our research expenditure. This research involves more than just paper studies. In order to obtain practical experience with specific inspection techniques we have initiated an inspection field test program as a joint venture with the Department of Defense. As a consequence of this research program, we hope to be prepared with tested inspection procedures which can be used in connection with specific disarmament proposals.

Even limited arms control agreements may require some limited form of inspection and may also call for some limited form of international machinery. As the significance of the agreements becomes greater, we should gradually increase our experience and our ability to utilize international peacekeeping techniques. Over the long run we hope that the development of international inspection and peacekeeping machinery will contribute toward the development of an international climate in which the rule of law could gradually displace the rule of force. We do not expect such a change to take place quickly. The achievement of such a goal will require a major change in the traditions of diplomacy and in the minds of men. But over the long run it is the only real hope of avoiding disaster. It is a goal toward which we must work.

We must not be misled into accepting the balance of terror as a satisfactory substitute for the rule of law.

⁶For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

The Impact of Foreign Aid on the American Economy

by David E. Bell

*Administrator, Agency for International Development*¹

It is not yet as widely understood as it should be that since late 1959 a drastic change in procurement policy has taken place regarding the expenditure of our foreign aid funds. With few—and diminishing—exceptions, we now limit the use of our foreign aid appropriations to the procurement of United States goods and services. This change was made to minimize the impact of the foreign assistance program on the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit.

The resulting figures speak for themselves. Of the \$2.4 billion of economic aid committed in fiscal year 1963, \$1.9 billion, 80 percent of the total, will be spent directly in the United States for U.S. goods and services.

With respect to individual commodities the effect of the changed policy is very plain. For example, in 1960, before the new policy took effect, only 11 percent of the iron and steel products financed by foreign aid appropriations came from American steel mills; for the first 9 months of 1963, 87 percent was purchased from U.S. producers. In 1960, 11 percent of the nonferrous metals financed under foreign aid came from the United States; for the first 9 months of 1963, 92 percent were purchased in the U.S. For fertilizer the percentage rose from 17 percent to 97 percent. And similar figures could be given for many other products.

Furthermore, the restriction of foreign aid spending to U.S. goods and services means that a substantial share of U.S. exports in some lines is now financed by our foreign aid program.

¹ Address made at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., on Oct. 23.

For example, in calendar year 1962, one-third of U.S. exports of locomotives, one-third of exports of fertilizer, and 21 percent of exports of iron and steel products were among the commodities purchased under the foreign aid program to assist the economic development of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Under these new policies the foreign aid program today accounts for a relatively small declining element in the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit. The outflow of dollars under foreign aid next year is estimated at about a billion dollars—far smaller than the \$2.4 billion spent abroad each year by U.S. tourists, the nearly \$3 billion invested abroad each year by U.S. business.

I do not believe these facts are as well understood in the Congress as they need to be. Members of the House of Representatives voted several weeks ago for a substantial cut in this year's foreign aid bill apparently due to the mistaken belief that the cut would reduce the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit by an equivalent amount. In fact, the major appropriations items that were cut by the House—Progress lending, development assistance elsewhere in the world, and military assistance—are tied virtually 100 percent to procurement. The main direct effect of the House cut therefore would be to reduce U.S. exports, not to reduce the balance-of-payments deficit.

The facts I have cited thus far demonstrate that the U.S. foreign assistance program has a major effect in financing U.S. exports of goods and services, and a relatively small

declining effect on the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit.

Foreign aid today in overwhelming degree takes the form of U.S. goods and services—not U.S. dollars—going out to help the underdeveloped countries. And in the process, according to a private planning group's estimate, American assistance to the developing countries is responsible for at least several hundred thousand American jobs.

Encouraging Private Investment and Trade

Impressive as these statistics are, they tell only part of the story of the impact on the American economy.

Our foreign aid programs include a series of measures designed to encourage and assist U.S. private investment in the underdeveloped countries. We strongly believe that U.S. private capital and know-how can make a major contribution to economic development, not only in Latin America but in Africa and Asia as well. Over and above the immediate impact on U.S. exports and foreign investment, the aid program, in the process of helping in the economic development of peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, is acquainting them with U.S. products, opening up markets for U.S. businesses, and establishing favorable conditions for U.S. private investment abroad.

Our biggest present export customers are the developed countries of Western Europe and Japan, whom we assisted in the 1940's and early 1950's and where aid financing is no longer necessary. In the period from 1950 to 1962, our exports to Europe doubled. Our exports to Japan have tripled in the past decade.

In the developing countries, AID-administered economic assistance programs are now playing a major role in introducing U.S. products and paving the way for an economic growth that will surely lead to expanded markets for U.S. exports. There are already signs that in the developing countries trade is beginning to follow aid, as it did in Europe. As examples, over the past 5 years there were increases in U.S. commercial exports (not aid-financed) of 10 percent to Taiwan, 28 percent to Colombia, and 76 percent to Israel.

I cite these figures not as a justification for

foreign aid. Its justification rests on broader grounds. But I bring them to your attention to show that the cost of foreign aid is not the drain on American gold supply, economy, or taxpayers that it is sometimes pictured to be. The President requested for fiscal year 1964 a program costing \$4.5 billion.² This is a large sum of money, but it should be kept in perspective. It represents seven-tenths of 1 percent of our gross national product and 4 percent of the Federal budget. Our economy has been operating in recent years with \$35-\$40 billion of unused capacity; total mutual defense and assistance expenditures are only about 10 percent of that unused capacity. It surely cannot be argued that this amount constitutes a serious strain on our national resources, nor can it be argued that it is an excessive burden for the wealthiest nation in the world.

Fundamental Objectives of Aid Program

But the United States has not carried out a foreign aid program since 1947 because of its benefits to the American economy, nor has that program been without cost to us.

The fundamental reason why the United States Government provides economic and military assistance to less developed countries is to help them establish themselves as independent, self-supporting nations, able to make economic and social progress through free institutions. This is in the interest of the countries we help. But it is also in our own vital interest, for only in a world community of free, self-sustaining nations can our own nation progress and prosper.

The importance of these objectives has been recognized and pursued by the administrations of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. And the Congress, each year since 1947, has appropriated substantial sums for foreign aid despite the apparent lack of domestic political appeal of such a program and the many frustrations inherent in it.

Incidentally, to emphasize the importance to U.S. national security of the objectives of our foreign aid program is not to deny that other

² For text of the President's foreign aid message of Apr. 2, 1963, see BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.

interests will also be served by the economic, political, and social progress of less developed countries. We certainly have a profound humanitarian concern for reducing the hardship and improving the living standard of the world's people who are hungry, poor, illiterate, and sick.

Our economic interest, as distinct from our security and humanitarian concern, is also served not only by the gains to be anticipated from larger international trade and investment but by increasing the rate of scientific and technical innovation and by enlarging the scope for the creative vigor of the free economic system. But, I repeat, the fundamental reason for our foreign assistance programs is that it is in the national interest of the United States to help the less developed countries achieve economic development, political stability, and social progress under free institutions.

I continue to see comments and questions in the newspapers to the effect that our aid programs have accomplished little. This surprises me very much because it seems to me there is ample evidence of very substantial progress in many places. Not only are Europe and Japan strong and independent as a result of U.S. aid, but a half dozen more countries—Greece, Taiwan, Israel, Mexico, Venezuela, the Philippines—are all achieving substantial economic progress and rapidly approaching the end of the need for economic assistance. Indeed, some of these countries, such as Israel and Taiwan, are themselves beginning to offer technical assistance to other less developed countries.

Moreover, our foreign aid is heavily concentrated on those countries where there is effective leadership and action toward economic growth. These countries—for example, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Nigeria—are making solid progress in mobilizing their own resources, setting priorities for their use, following sound economic and fiscal policies, and building the basic institutions needed in a developing society.

Certainly there are plenty of places in the world where things are not going as we would like to have them. Obviously the risks are high, the dangers are great, and the outcome is uncertain in a number of countries, particularly in Southeast Asia and in Latin America.

But these are reasons for conducting our-

selves sensibly, for running the most astute prudent program we can devise; they are reasons for quitting in the middle of the game for abandoning the struggle for peace and freedom. No matter how difficult the circumstances, we could not excuse ourselves if we gave up the field to the Communist movement. The President put it well recently when he said that we must be guided by our interests rather than indignation.³

Improving Effectiveness of Aid Activities

I fully accept the necessity for drawing on the best of our past experience and continually improving the effectiveness of our assistance programs. I believe we are making headway in this direction. We are, for example, stressing more and more heavily the importance of self-help on the part of the countries we are aiding. This concept lies at the heart of the Alliance for Progress. In spite of obvious setbacks, the first 2 years of the alliance have indeed brought in a substantial number of Latin American countries strong advances in self-help—and correspondingly a strong basis for our help to be effective.

Another improvement we are making in our foreign aid program is to do a better job of mobilizing the resources and talents of the American society to contribute to the developing countries. The role of the Agency for International Development has become increasingly one of catalyst to organize the expertise—the skills—necessary to help create capital plant—organize human and material resources, and provide administrative knowledge for a modern economy. Private resources in the American economy that exist in our industries, farms, labor unions, banking institutions, cooperatives, business concerns, savings and loan associations, professional groups, State and local governments are being drawn upon to help other countries achieve economic development. The University of Pittsburgh's affiliation with the Central University of Quito under the Alliance for Progress is the program for improving the curriculum and instruction in the schools of engineering

³ For an address made by President Kennedy at Lake City, Utah, on Sept. 26, see *ibid.*, Oct. 21, p. 631.

...ile, the university assistance program in
...igeria are examples.

We are also making considerable progress in
...ieving a broader sharing of the costs of eco-
...omic assistance among the advanced countries.
...1962 the flow of aid from Europe and Japan
...the less developed countries was just about as
...rge, in relation to their national incomes, as
...rs was. Some individual countries in our
...inion can and should provide more and we
...ink a number of other countries ought to lib-
...alize the terms on which their aid should be
...ade available, but it is clear that the provision
...economic assistance is today a matter of many
...tions, not just one.

We should not exaggerate the speed or magni-
...de of the progress that is possible. In India
...Pakistan, for example, present per capita
...come is around \$70 per year. Suppose that,
...rough their own efforts plus substantial out-
...le help, India and Pakistan were able to raise
...eir per capita income at a rate of 3 percent
...r year—a rate somewhat higher than the
...ited States has achieved over the last 50
...ars. In 25 years, at such a rate, per capita
...come would double. In absolute terms the
...ults may seem discouraging. Per capita in-
...es in India and Pakistan would have risen
...om \$70 to \$140—after 25 years of steady ef-
...t! (During the same period, incidentally,
...e U.S. income per capita is expected to rise
...om about \$2,500 per capita to more than \$4,000
...r capita. Even allowing for the well-known
...difficulties of such intercountry comparisons, the
...ferences are obviously enormous.)

If we translate the absolute figures into real
...ms, however, we can get a more accurate im-
...pression of their significance. Doubling the per
...ita income of India and Pakistan would
...an that, instead of half the children of pri-
...ry school age being in school, all could be. It
...uld mean that diseases like malaria, typhoid,
...allpox, and cholera could be virtually elimi-
...ed. And it would mean that what economists
...d the process of self-sustaining growth could
...ve been achieved—the process under which
...untry through its own institutions generates
...aving and investment, the skilled people and
...technological advances, the incentives and
...tudes which will yield year after year an in-
...ase in per capita production and income.

This, it seems to me, is the heart of the matter.
It is this process of self-sustaining growth,
rather than the level of per capita income, that
makes a country truly independent. And the
process of self-supporting growth depends
principally on building the skills and institu-
tions which permit people to understand and
to solve their own problems. This is why we
stress so strongly the self-help measures that
the underdeveloped countries must take. Only
if they take strong self-help measures can out-
side assistance contribute to solid progress.

I do not minimize the difficulties. Rapid
population growth, Communist subversion,
repressive military dictatorships, poverty, and
ignorance are formidable difficulties. To suc-
ceed, we must be strong, tenacious, enduring.
We will continually be advised to give up the
struggle as too costly, too exhausting, too
risky.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee re-
jected such despairing advice last week in re-
porting out a foreign aid authorization this
year of \$4.2 billion. The full Senate will have a
similar opportunity to do so this coming week,
when the aid bill reaches the Senate floor.

All our interests and all our instincts as
Americans tell us not to give up. We are
striving for all that is best in our own heritage—
giving help to those who will help themselves,
spreading education and health to more and
more people, preserving our own freedom and
expanding free institutions around the world.
With these values at stake, I believe we must
and will continue to accept the challenge.

U.S. and Japanese Cabinet Officers To Hold Third Economic Meeting

Press release 569 dated November 7

The third meeting of the Joint United States-
Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Af-
fairs will be held at Tokyo from November 25
through November 27. This Committee was
established by an exchange of notes signed June
22, 1961, as a result of the talks held by Prime
Minister Ikeda with President Kennedy on his
visit to Washington.¹ The first and second

¹ BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 57.

meetings of the Committee were held respectively at Hakone, Japan, in November 1961² and at Washington in December 1962.³

The United States will be represented by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, and Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers Walter W. Heller. Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer and Ambassador Ryuji Takeuchi will also attend.

Japan will be represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira, Minister of Finance Kakuei Tanaka, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Munenori Akagi, Minister of International Trade and Industry Hajime Fukuda, Minister of Labor Takeo Ohashi, Minister of Transportation Kentaro Ayabe, Director of the Economic Planning Agency Kiichi Miyazawa, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasumi Kurogane.

The agenda of the meeting will be as follows:

1. The economic situation in Japan and in the United States.
2. Financial, monetary, and balance-of-payments situation.
3. Developments in trade and economic relations between the United States and Japan.
4. Developments in international trade and economic relations.
5. Cooperation in the economic development of the less developed countries.
6. *Ad hoc* matters.

The U.S. Cabinet Secretaries, accompanied by their wives, are expected to arrive by a special plane at Haneda Airport on November 23 and will be formally welcomed by the Japanese Cabinet Ministers. They will proceed to Kyoto by special plane at the invitation of the Japanese Government and visit several places in that district over the weekend. Meetings will be held both in the morning and in the afternoon

² *Ibid.*, Nov. 27, 1961, p. 891.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 959.

from November 25 through 27 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. Prime Minister Ikeda will entertain the U.S. Cabinet Secretaries at luncheon on the 25th, and on the 26th individual Japanese Cabinet Ministers will entertain respective U.S. Cabinet Secretaries at luncheon. On the afternoon of November 27 Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress of Japan will hold a tea party for the U.S. Cabinet Secretaries and their wives at the Imperial Palace.

Senior advisers to the U.S. Cabinet Secretaries will be:

State: Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs G. Griffith Johnson
Treasury: Assistant Secretary John C. B. Fair
Interior: Assistant to the Secretary Joseph J. Joseph, Jr.
Agriculture: Administrator for Foreign Agricultural Service Raymond A. Ioanes
Commerce: Assistant Secretary for International Business Affairs Jack N. Belton
Council of Economic Advisers: Robert Solov

Other members of the U.S. delegation will be:

The White House: Pierre Salinger, Press Secretary
 President
 Myer Feldman, Deputy Special Representative
State: Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Robert J. Manning
 Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Economic Affairs Robert V. Rothenberg
 (coordinator)
 Special Assistant to the Director of Asian Affairs Thelma E. Vetter
 (coordinator)
 Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Edward S. Little

Deputy Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Takio Oda, Vice Minister of Finance Takao Ishino, Vice Minister of International Trade and Industry Zenei Imai, Director of International Economic Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Makoto Matsuo, Minister of Labor Hideo Hori, Vice Minister of Transportation Satoru Okamoto, Director of Economic Planning Agency Masamichi Matsumura will also attend the meeting. Senior advisers to the respective Ministries will attend on the Japanese side.

U.S. Delegate Reports on Space Radio Communication Conference

An Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference on Space Communications, under the auspices of the International Telecommunication Union, met at Geneva October 7-November 8. Following is the text of a statement made by the chairman of the U.S. delegation, Joseph McConnell, on the closing day of the conference and transmitted from Geneva by the communication satellite SynCom.

It is most fitting that a communication satellite is being used to transmit this report on the result of the space radio communication conference in Geneva.

The final acts will be signed in a few minutes. Orderly development and operation of the space programs of the United States and other nations will depend in large measure on the agreements reached by this conference. Adequate communications, protected from harmful interference, are essential to continued progress.

I will now report to you on the decisions reached by the conference.

The conference dealt with:

- Communication Satellites
- Space Research
- Meteorological Satellites
- Navigational Satellites
- Radio Astronomy
- Space Activities of the Amateurs, and
- Aeronautical Space Services

In addition, the conference established regulations and notification procedures for utilizing allocations as well as technical criteria for frequency sharing. Details of the specific frequency bands allocated for each of the services are available in Washington for those of you who wish to have complete technical data. Taking up the subjects in order—

Communication Satellites. The proposal of the United States for allocations for the communication satellite service was for 2725 MC/S. The U.K., France, and other countries made proposals similar to ours. The proposal of the U.S.S.R. was for approximately 1600 MC/S, but in frequency bands different from those proposed by us. Only 800 MC/S were common in the two proposals. The conference has agreed to an allocation of 2800 MC/S, of which 2000 (consisting of four 500 MC/S bands) were included in our original proposal. Our engineers and scientists believe that this allocation should be sufficient to accommodate anticipated traffic growth until the period 1975-80.

Space Research. The conference has recognized that space research has a vital need for protected frequencies. Although we were not able to obtain agreement in all cases on worldwide exclusive allocations for space research, a reasonably satisfactory compromise, which varies in details from band to band, has been achieved, including bands used for the mini-track network and deep space research. We believe that the programs of all nations, including both manned and unmanned space research programs, can proceed satisfactorily insofar as their frequency needs are concerned.

Meteorological Satellites. The conference has made allocations for the meteorological satellite service, which promises to be of benefit to the entire world. The various programs in this field, both national and international, such as the Worldwide Weather Watch program of the WMO [World Meteorological Organization], can move forward.

Navigational Satellites. Exclusive allocations have been made, along the line of our proposals, for a new navigational satellite service which should prove to be of substantial assistance to the navigators of all nations.

Radio Astronomy. As you know, the worldwide scientific community was most anxious

that this conference adequately protect radio astronomy. The decisions made in this field are of great significance, in particular the agreement reached to clear the 1400-1427 MC/S band for exclusive worldwide use in radio astronomy. This is the famous hydrogen line band through which the astronomers obtain such valuable information about the universe. The band had been allocated to radio astronomy at the 1959 Geneva radio conference, subject, however, to reservations by a number of Soviet bloc countries. They have now agreed that radio astronomy should have worldwide exclusivity in the band.

As you know, the FCC recently decided that, in the United States, TV Channel 37 (608-614 MC/S) should be reserved exclusively for radio astronomy for a 10-year period. I am happy to report that the FCC decision assisted the conference in making significant progress on a broad international basis with respect to this channel.

The Western Hemisphere countries, with the simple exception of Cuba, have agreed that for 10 years this band should be used for radio astronomy. To reach agreement it was necessary for many countries to make concessions.

In addition, the status of several of the bands allocated to radio astronomy by footnote at the 1959 conference was considerably improved, varying in detail from band to band.

Space Activities of the Amateurs. Satellite experimentation by radio amateurs, as typified in the Oscar 1 and Oscar 2 programs, has received recognition by the conference through the allocation of the band 144-146 MC/S. Although the International Amateur Radio Union would have preferred similar privileges in other bands as well, the value of the amateur experimental work and the widespread interest it has created has been recognized by the conference.

Aeronautical Space Services. I am pleased to say that satisfactory provisions were made for aeronautical space services.

Regulations and Notification Procedures for Utilizing the Allocations Made by the Conference. A particularly difficult issue arose in connection with the matter of regulations governing the use of the allocated frequencies. Several countries proposed that the use of frequencies allocated at this conference should be considered

as provisional pending a future planning conference. In our judgment the regulations had to be sufficiently definitive to permit the long-range planning and major investment involved in many of our space programs, in particular the communications satellite program.

I wish to report that in the opinion of the delegation the issue was satisfactorily resolved. The allocation of frequency bands and the regulation of their use were effectively established. They are always subject to modification by subsequent future conferences as might be called by the ITU. No new element of impermanency has been added.

Technical Criteria. The key to satisfactory space service allocations, particularly the communication satellite program, was the technical feasibility of space services sharing some of the bands presently allocated to terrestrial communications. The conference has agreed on technical standards and criteria permitting the sharing. This will permit orderly, simultaneous development of all kinds of communication services without causing harmful interference.

Although, as you know, this was a technical conference and the agenda was limited to frequency allocations and related technical matters, it does have great significance for our commercial communication satellite program. The policy of the United States, established by the President and reflected in the Communications Satellite Act of 1962,¹ is that a commercial communication satellite service should be organized as a single global system with nondiscriminatory access to all nations. During the conference members of the delegation explained informally to many delegates of other nations the United States policy in this field. Fears have been expressed by a number of the smaller countries that the major space powers of the world would somehow preempt the frequencies allocated by the conference and thus prevent small-nation participation in a global system. Efforts were made to allay these fears by explaining that the allocations for communication satellites are properly viewed as having been made for the benefit of all nations.

¹ For remarks by President Kennedy on Aug. 1, 1962, upon the signing of H.R. 11040, see BULLETIN Sept. 24, 1962, p. 467.

My comments would not be complete if I did not express publicly the recognition due to all members of the delegation, including Ambassador [Jacob D.] Beam, Commander [T. A. M.] Caven, Mr. [E. William] Henry (Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission), and Dr. [Joseph] Charyk (president of the Communication Satellite Corporation).

We also are greatly indebted to those Members of Congress on our delegation, including Mr. [Oren] Harris (chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives), Senators [Vance] Hartke and [Morris] Cotton, and Representatives [Abner] Sibal and [William L.] Springer, whose support meant so much to the delegates.

All of us will agree, however, that the persons who made the greatest contribution to our efforts were the Government and industry advisers on the delegation. They are the technical experts and scientists whose work began 2 years before the conference and who continued their dedicated devotion through the long and tedious hours of this 5-week conference. Finally, all delegations are most grateful for the fine leadership shown by the chairman of the conference, Mr. Gunnar Pedersen of Denmark. Thank you.

Current U.N. Documents: Selected Bibliography

Photographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

General Assembly

Report on the Mental Health of Refugees in the Special Cases Category in Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey. Submitted to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees by Dr. Peter Berner, Mental Health Adviser. A/AC.96/206. July 24, 1963. 28 pp.

Documents received from governments and international organizations and institutions regarding technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law. A/5455/Add.1, August 12, 1963, 38 pp.; Add.2, September 17, 1963, 11 pp.; Add.3, September 17, 1963, 35 pp.

Joint Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriages and Registration of Mar-

riages. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. A/5483. August 27, 1963. 11 pp.

Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. A/5488. September 5, 1963. 108 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Letter dated September 3, 1963, from the representative of the United States to the Secretary-General furnishing information on U.S. space launches as of June 30, 1963. A/AC.105/Inf.44. September 6, 1963. 6 pp.

Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Report of the Secretary-General. A/5491. September 10, 1963. 23 pp.

United Nations Emergency Force. Report of the Secretary-General. A/5494. September 12, 1963. 20 pp.

Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Letter dated September 10, 1963, from the representative of the United Kingdom to the chairman of the special committee, summarizing developments in non-self-governing territories under British administration, September 1962-August 1963. A/AC.109/54. September 16, 1963. 4 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Report of the Commission on the Status of Women. E/3810. July 11, 1963. 14 pp.

Tourism as a Factor in Economic Development. Study prepared by Professor K. Krapf, a U.N. consultant. E/CONF.47/15. July 12, 1963. 57 pp.

United Nations Children's Fund. Countries and projects assisted by UNICEF. E/ICEF/470. August 20, 1963. 41 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol to amend Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase number of parties which may request holding an extraordinary meeting of Assembly. Adopted by Assembly at Rome September 15, 1962.¹

Ratified by the President: October 28, 1963.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.¹

Ratification deposited: Ghana, October 4, 1963.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹

Ratifications deposited: Argentina, October 10, 1963; Cuba (with a reservation), September 26, 1963; Guatemala, October 1, 1963.

¹ Not in force.

Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning acquisition of nationality. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹
Ratification deposited: Argentina, October 10, 1963.

Red Sea Lights

International agreement regarding the maintenance of certain lights in the Red Sea. Done at London February 20, 1963.²
Acceptance deposited: United Arab Republic, October 3, 1963.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Notification of approval: Ireland, September 19, 1963.

Women—Political Rights

Convention on political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.²
Ratification deposited: Brazil, August 13, 1963.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement correcting discrepancies in the annex of the agreement of November 27, 1959 (TIAS 4383), concerning American military cemeteries. Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels January 8, 1962, and October 24, 1963. Entered into force October 24, 1963.

Iran

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Tehran October 24, 1963. Entered into force October 24, 1963.

Agreement for the use of funds received by the Government of the United States from the sale of surplus property in Iran. Signed at Tehran September 1, 1949. Entered into force September 1, 1949. TIAS 1973.

Terminated: October 24, 1963 (superseded by agreement of October 24, 1963, *supra*).

Agreement amending the agreement of September 1, 1949, for financing educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran November 25, 1957. Entered into force November 25, 1957. TIAS 3956.

Terminated: October 24, 1963 (superseded by agreement of October 24, 1963, *supra*).

Agreement amending the agreement of September 1, 1949, as amended (TIAS 1973 and 3956), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran June 20, 1961. TIAS 4824.

Terminated: October 24, 1963 (superseded by agreement of October 24, 1963, *supra*).

Jamaica

General agreement for economic, technical and related assistance. Signed at Kingston October 24, 1963. Entered into force October 24, 1963.

Philippines

Agreement providing Philippine Social Security Sys-

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

tem coverage for Filipino employees of the United States armed forces in the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila April 23, 1962, and August 30, 1963. Entered into force August 30, 1963.
Agreement providing Philippine Social Security System coverage for Filipino employees of the United States Employees Association, JUSMAG Officers Club, JASMAG NCO Club, and the AID Employment Recreation Association in the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila August 30 and October 8, 1963. Entered into force October 8, 1963.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Mrs. Louchheim To Direct Office of Community Advisory Services

The Department of State announced on October 30 (press release 560) that it has established an Office of Community Advisory Services under the direction of Deputy Assistant Secretary Katie Louchheim. The newly created office organizationally will be under the supervision of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

The Office of Community Advisory Services will be responsible for the development and implementation of a program designed to increase contacts between United States communities and the Foreign Service. The office will also assist in planning programs for Foreign Service officers and their families to exchange ideas and familiarize themselves with prevailing views on major subjects of public interest in the United States.

Among its other activities the office will serve as a focal point in the Department on matters concerned with the increasing role of women and women's organizations in international activities in the United States and abroad, and the planning of programs under private and Government auspices in this field.

Confirmations

The Senate on November 6 confirmed Douglas Henderson to be Ambassador to Bolivia. (For biographical details, see Department of State press release dated November 19.)

Algeria. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 8 810

American Republics. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 8 810

Bolivia. Henderson confirmed as Ambassador 838

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 4-10

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to November 4 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 560 of October 30.

No.	Date	Subject
†565	11/6	Report on educational exchange program sent to Congress (rewrite).
566	11/6	U.S. note to U.S.S.R. on autobahn stoppage.
*567	11/4	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*568	11/7	Williams: Assumption College, Worcester, Mass. (excerpts).
569	11/7	Third meeting of Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.
570	11/7	Recognition of Government of Viet-Nam.
*571	11/8	Cultural exchange (Europe and Near East).
572	11/8	Rusk: news conference.
*573	11/8	Delegation to IA-ECOSOC ministerial meeting.
574	11/8	McConnell: Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference on Space Communications.
†575	11/9	Rusk: message to Vice President Johnson.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Department of State 1963

The Department of State recently released a 152-page illustrated report, *Department of State* which describes its activities at home and abroad during the past year.

The report opens with a brief discussion of the objectives of U.S. foreign policy and then in some detail the different means by which the Department of State has been working for the achievement of those objectives.

In a foreword, President Kennedy expresses the view that "the men and women to whom we entrust this critical task" of promoting our foreign relations, "and the work they accomplish are too little known by the American people whose interests they serve." The President adds, "If it [this publication] is to convey to you something of the same sense of admiration for these dedicated men and women which I share with many of my predecessors, it will truly serve our national purpose."

The book deals with the activities not only of the geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State but also Department offices less well-known to the general public, such as the Executive Secretariat, the Policy Planning Council, the Offices of Security and Protocol, and the Foreign Service Institute. It also includes sections on the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1275



December 2, 1963

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD

DEC 17 1963

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Gettysburg Address and Our Commitment to Freedom

Remarks by Secretary Rusk¹

One hundred years ago there came to this community a most remarkable man whose memory is revered by all of us who are the heirs of those who fought here—both in blue and in gray. He spoke here about ancient verities, not as a sophisticated philosopher but as a man who felt deeply about the hopes which lie in the heart of man. It was a speech of only 10 sentences, around 270 words. It disappointed many who heard it, and the man who gave it thought it was a failure. But it has become the most widely read speech ever made by an American and perhaps by anyone in the English tongue. It has been translated into every written language and is cherished around the world.

In accepting the Latin version for deposit in the Vatican Library in 1959, the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, His Excellency Egidio Vagnozzi, called the Gettysburg Address not

¹ Made at ceremonies commemorating the 100th anniversary of President Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, at Gettysburg, Pa., on Nov. 17 (press release 585 dated Nov. 16).

only "a great American document" but also great Christian document—"one of the greatest documents ever issued by man."

What is there about those words which make them memorable? In the original tongue they have beauty and cadence—"the vibrations of deathless music." They express tender sentiments. But these qualities are inadequate to account for their indelible imprint. What makes the Gettysburg Address great and enduring is the simple eloquence with which it states the ideas to which this nation is dedicated: "Liberty . . . the proposition that all men are created equal . . . government of the people, by the people, for the people."

What Lincoln Believed

Lincoln believed, with the authors of the Declaration of Independence, that the large principles it set forth were universal truths. As he saw the meaning of the American Revolution, "It was not the mere matter of separation of the colonies from the motherland—but some-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1275 PUBLICATION 7627 DECEMBER 2, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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thing in that Declaration giving liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world for all future time."

Lincoln believed, with the authors of our Constitution, that they were founding a "new order of the ages."

He believed, with Washington, that "the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered, perhaps, as *deeply*, as *finally*, staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people."

He believed that this experiment was the "last best hope of earth."

He believed that the central issue in the struggle in which this nation was engaged a century ago was whether this or any nation "conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal" could "long endure." And let us not forget that his reaffirmation of the American commitment to the "proposition that all men are created equal" had been preceded by the Emancipation Proclamation.

The advocates of democracy in many other lands saw the central issue as Lincoln saw it. From England, John Bright wrote: "... there is no other political constitution now in existence, in the preservation of which the human race is so deeply interested." From France, liberal republicans spoke out—Edouard Laboulaye said: "... the cause of America is the cause of liberty" and "... should liberty become eclipsed in the new World, it would become night in Europe." From Italy, Garibaldi and his friends hailed Lincoln as the "pilot of liberty." Carl Schurz and other German democrats, many of whom had come to this country after the failure of their own revolution of 1848, saw the struggle in the same light.

After Lincoln's death a noted French liberal, Lucien Anatole Prevost-Paradol, wrote: "... he has not lived for his country alone, since he leaves to everyone in the world to whom liberty and justice are dear, a great remembrance and a pure example."

As our own Booker T. Washington put it: "By the same token that Lincoln made America free, he pushed back the boundaries of freedom everywhere, gave the spirit of liberty a wider

influence throughout the world, and reestablished the dignity of man as man."

Worldwide Symbol of Freedom and Democracy

Over the years, admiration for Lincoln has spread over the earth. Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Chinese liberal revolution, drew his three principles of government from the Gettysburg Address. The Lincoln Memorial is a mecca for millions of visitors to Washington every year, including tens of thousands from abroad. Prime Minister Nehru has kept on a study table a brass mold of Lincoln's right hand. A few years ago high school students in Tokyo ranked him as one of the most respected of all world figures. And Tolstoi said that "of all the great national statesmen of history, Lincoln is the only giant" and predicted that his name would live thousands of years.

Thus Lincoln is a worldwide symbol of freedom and democracy. And the Gettysburg Address is the utterance through which his dedication—and ours as a people—to freedom and democracy is most widely known. Indeed, the central commitments of the American experiment are probably known to more people in other lands through the words of the Gettysburg Address than through those of the Declaration of Independence.

People all around the world not only know of these central commitments but share them. Liberty, equality, the dignity of the individual, "government of the people, by the people, for the people"—these are aspirations rising out of the nature of man.

Freedom and Foreign Policy

Since the Second World War nearly 50 new nations have emerged. Nearly all are republics or democracies, at least in name. Unhappily, some are in reality dictatorships. In some, the early national governments have tolerated no opposition. In others, democratic governments collapsed or were overthrown. But the yearnings for genuine political freedom have not been eradicated. They are manifest in every nation, including those behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

Our commitments to freedom are the source

of our foreign policy. They explain our attitude toward colonial questions, our concern about the future of Eastern Europe, and why we are more comfortable in dealing with democracies than with dictatorships. They explain also our concern about our failures here at home to live up fully to our own great commitments.

The independence we won for ourselves we have favored for others. We have welcomed the rise of the former colonial peoples to "the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them." We want to see these new nations make solid progress—economically, socially, and politically.

Within the free world, old empires have been largely replaced by new partnerships between the less developed and the advanced countries—partnerships based on political equality.

But new empires have appeared, clothing their lust for domination with ideology which plunders the noble concepts of freedom to subvert freedom itself. There are large and dangerous questions which call for final solution, and there is no more enduring basis for settlement than the simple notion of self-determination: Let the people themselves decide.

For almost two centuries we have been opposed to dictatorship. We remain so today—and will be opposed tomorrow. We recognize that there are many possible forms of democratic institutions. But we believe deeply in political democracy, individual dignity, and the rule of law. We do not like it when democratic institutions are suppressed. We believe that the setbacks which democracy has suffered in many of the new nations, and a few old ones, will be temporary. For we know that ordinary men and women throughout the world respond to Lincoln's phrase "government of the people, by the people, for the people."

Likewise, we will not be at ease until every one of our own citizens enjoys in full the rights pledged by the Declaration of Independence and our Constitution. The National Government is heavily committed to insuring these rights for all.

The rest of the world is watching closely the struggle for full equality in this country. Our failures distress our friends and hearten our enemies. But this is not the main reason why we must complete this task. We must complete it as a duty to ourselves. It is past time to complete the task which Lincoln began with the Emancipation Proclamation.

We are a powerful nation, with almost incomprehensible power. Our farms and factories are ever more bountiful. We enjoy levels of well-being almost beyond the dreams of men a generation or two ago. But our greatest strength lies in the ideas about freedom and human dignity which gave birth to our nation and to which Lincoln renewed our dedication in the Gettysburg Address. These ideas, these aspirations, are shared today by a great majority of mankind. They bind us with others throughout the world. They are the mightiest force in the world today. They are the enduring memorials to the apostles of liberty for all men, of whom none has been greater than Abraham Lincoln.

Letters of Credence

Czechoslovakia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Karel Duda, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on November 13. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 581 dated November 13.

Uruguay

The newly appointed Ambassador of Uruguay, Juan Felipe Yriart, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on November 12. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 576 dated November 12.

The Agony of Success

by Harlan Cleveland

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

I am especially pleased to be here because we are all, by choice or necessity, in the same business: We all make U.S. foreign policy, and we all help sustain it.

In our country foreign policy is formed and carried out not just by the President and the State Department but by our whole people.

Some people think that the resulting babel of voices in our foreign policy is proof positive of the weakness of our democratic system. The American "image," they say, should be crystal clear and forever consistent; America, they say, should speak with a single voice—the way the Communists do, or at least are supposed to do.

Of course there are rare moments when it is imperative for a single voice to speak for the whole nation. When nuclear powers seemed to be on a collision course in the Caribbean a year ago last October, for example, the President's voice had to come through loud and clear around the world—with no static.

But most of the time what the rest of the world sees is the great diversity of our society—a jumble of business firms and farm organizations and universities and churches and foundations and, last but not largest by far, the American labor movement. That's the way it should be. That's the kind of society we are; and this diversity is the ultimate source of our past success, our current strength, and our future durability. The sounds you hear—of many voices talking at once—are the needful noises of democracy.

To you, of all people, I don't have to sell the

idea that broad participation by private organizations in foreign policy is not only satisfying to the democratic impulse but absolutely essential if we are to do what history commands us to do—which is to help other people build free institutions within their societies and then work with them to build a workable system of world peace. No private organization in the country has understood this more clearly than the American labor movement. No segment of our society has done more to translate that understanding into action abroad. This is not flattery but fact.

You not only supported but helped to staff and run the Marshall Plan. I was there, and I can testify that the participation of men drawn from the ranks of organized labor helped make the Marshall Plan a vehicle for social change as well as a program for economic reconstruction.

You have understood that in times of rapid political change diplomacy is not just the act of getting along with the current powers—that be in each country; modern diplomacy is the art of getting along with the next government as well. The labor attachés, first appointed to American embassies only 20 years ago, can use the bond of union membership to establish effective relations with those new leaders, trained for politics in the labor movement, who are coming into political power in many parts of the world. Many a foreign door has been opened in recent years by a union card in the hand of an American trade unionist.

You have helped to build free trade unions in many countries and conducted, as well, an impressive variety of international exchange and

¹ Address made at the AFL-CIO convention at New York, N.Y., on Nov. 14 (press release 587 dated Nov. 3).

visitor programs. At this very convention, I understand, you have over 300 labor leaders as invited guests from overseas.

In sum, you have brought to bear on our foreign policy that extraordinary talent for educating people while organizing them, which is the hallmark of the American labor movement, and you have fortified this foresight with a full measure of your rich resources of time and talent and money.

It was your heads-up vision and massive support that made the International Labor Organization the standard setter for labor conditions throughout the free world—and your sense of history that turned the ILO, after the Second World War, toward the tasks of manpower training in the world's newly developing societies.

Meanwhile you have made your influence felt at home in support of the most positive and progressive aspects of U.S. foreign policy.

Your support from the outset helped build a solid domestic political base for the United Nations in this country. And when the controversial U.N. loan bill came up last year, you helped justify—and helped produce—a convincing two-to-one approval in the House of Representatives and an overwhelming three-to-one approval in the Senate.

Your support from the outset helped put through the so-called foreign aid program; and you have repeatedly helped to save it from well-intentioned tinkers; and your leaders have persisted in the refreshing notion that instead of nibbling the foreign aid program to death, we should turn our talents to improving it—on the beautifully simple proposition that this would serve the basic interests of the United States of America. In the atmosphere of the moment, that attitude is not only refreshing but positively breathtaking.

Politics of Foreign Policy

Because you have understood so well the interaction of American politics with international politics, I am emboldened to offer this afternoon some thoughts about the politics of American foreign policy. For once again the electoral fit is upon us, and once again it is open season on foreign policy.

Candidates for the dubious privilege of running against President Kennedy will busy themselves by fanning our frustrations with tidy, black-and-white solutions to messy and colorful problems.

Special interests will take advantage of the campaign climate to complain ahead of time about next year's tariff talks.

Small but noisy groups will demand that the U.N. stop making peace for a moment so they can get off—presumably because they would rather make war than make peace with foreigners.

People who feed on fear and frustration will ride their frantic circuits hawking the dubious doctrine that only by abandoning our freedoms can we save them from communism.

As the election campaign begins to warm up, the snipers are testing their range, the sound of crossfire is heard in the land, and the nonsense level is on the rise.

Yet of all the dangers we face in a hazardous world at a riskful time, this is one danger that we ought to be able to avoid: We could—if we wanted to—stop talking nonsense among ourselves.

Success Makes Life More Complicated

Even under the best of conditions the operation of U.S. foreign policy generates a chronic low-grade fever in the body politic—induced by acute frustration. The most notable symptoms are anxiety reactions, expressed in a fearful, angry, or indignant tone of voice.

And some of this is inescapable—because the frustrations are not apparent but real. They are caused by the simple fact that we are the greatest power on earth and we therefore have to be the most responsible power on earth. To hold great power under restraint is the most trying test of how tough—which is to say, how mature—a nation is.

There is no cure for this in national strength and national success. The more powerful we get, the more success we achieve, the more we get involved in other people's troubles and the more we have to make them our own.

For there's a funny thing about success: It makes life more complicated.

I wouldn't know from personal experience

what happens when a man succeeds in amassing a million dollars, but I have the impression that it increases both his personal problems and his social complications.

Certainly when a man succeeds in reaching a higher position in an organization or profession, he is promptly rewarded with harder work, greater controversy, and tougher decisions than he had before. When a candidate for public office succeeds at the polls he wins, in return for his trouble, a bigger bucket of more complex trouble.

And any man who has won an affirmative answer to a marriage proposal knows what complexity flows from *that* success.

But somehow some people think that world affairs ought to be different. The solution of any problem, they feel, should reduce by one the number of problems remaining to be solved. They assume that success in achieving some aim of foreign policy today should make international life that much easier and simpler tomorrow.

Yet the plain fact is that in international politics the success of past and present policies can make life tomorrow quite a bit more frustrating than it was yesterday.

Success of Postwar Policy in Europe

Take the success of Woodrow Wilson's notion—it was Jefferson's too—that our national policy is to promote the self-determination of peoples. We were the original anticolonial people, and in half a century we have helped half a hundred peoples to achieve their national independence.

But this success hardly made things simpler for us. We wanted the leaders of those nations to be independent, and we wanted them as members of the United Nations. But they are certainly less comfortable to live with now, precisely because they are, by the dozens, members of the United Nations, precisely because they are independent—even of us.

Take, as another example, what is generally accepted as one of the most brilliant foreign policy successes of all times: the Marshall Plan. Our aim was to help Europe return to health, and we succeeded.

A few years ago one of the weekly news mag-

azines, which had opposed the Marshall Plan hammer and tongs, advertised on its front cover an article entitled "The World's Greatest Success Story—Now It Can Be Told." The world's greatest success story turned out to be the story of the Marshall Plan. But the main burden of the article was to complain rather bitterly that the Marshall Plan was such a success that Europe had become *too* healthy. The Europeans, the article protested, already were competing too aggressively for export markets and forcing American industry to get up early in the morning to stay in the game.

Of course that is not even half the price we are paying for the success of our postwar policy in Europe. Europe now stands on its own feet, looks us straight in the eye, and bargains with us hard on tariff rates and money matters. Europe even feels strong enough to want a larger voice in the military defense of Europe. Of course this is what we really wanted all along, because self-reliant nations were the realistic alternative to a Communist takeover. But the success of our policy certainly has made life in the Atlantic community more complicated—and, for the time being, more frustrating.

Success in Strengthening the U.N.

As a third example of frustration induced by our own efforts, let's look at the troubles we have brought upon ourselves by promoting—successfully—a United Nations with the capacity to act.

In its short and turbulent life the United Nations has acquired considerable know-how in its primary job of peacekeeping—not by following theoretical or legal blueprints for keeping the peace but by working at it the hard way.

In the past 18 years the United Nations has been called upon to help get Soviet troops out of Iran; to stop two wars between Indonesia and the Netherlands and two more growing out of Arab-Israeli rivalry in the Middle East; to help put down a civil war in Greece; to police an armistice in the Vale of Kashmir; to defend Korea against Communist invasion; to prevent civil war and outside intervention in the Congo; and to help put out quite a number of other fires around the world. In all of these crises the

U.S. did its share, and sometimes we carried the lion's share—because we are the lion.

The U.N. has emerged from each of these crises, as Ulysses did from the trials that beset him, stronger than it was before. Each time the organization learned another lesson in the practical business of keeping the peace. It has, then, been quite successful in its appointed task as peacekeeper; and the world is a safer place for that.

But does this mean that every time the United Nations puts out a fire some place, the world is less flammable and our responsibilities are fewer? Not at all.

In 1948 the United Nations succeeded in stopping a war between the Arab states and Israel. And for each of the 15 years that followed the United Nations has been caring for a million Arab refugees—one of the most thankless, heartbreaking, and unyielding problems of our times. Nobody else will do the job; so the United Nations does it, and we pay for most of it, and there is no end in sight.

In 1956 the United Nations succeeded in obtaining a cease-fire and a withdrawal of warring forces at Suez. And for the next 7 years it has had to supervise that truce. At this very moment some 6,000 men make up the Emergency Force in the Middle East which patrols—by foot, jeep, and aircraft—the armistice lines in the Gaza Strip, in the Sinai Desert, and at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba. They have been doing it night and day since 1957. Every year we have to go to the Congress and ask for funds to help keep the lid on in the Middle East for another 12 months.

In 1962 the United Nations finally succeeded in its agonizing assignment of restoring peace and order and independence to the Congo. So now it faces the consequence: the stupendous task of helping the Congo retain that order and independence by learning to manage its own affairs, run its own institutions, and stand on its own feet economically.

Thus does every success in strengthening the U.N. lead to more U.S. involvement in more opportunities to build more peacekeeping machinery to resolve more dangerous conflicts. The work isn't easy, but it's hardly the moment to stop trying. And it is a curious time to

propose, as some few Americans are proposing, that the U.N. be cut back to a debating society that cannot actually *do* anything. That's the Soviet ambition for the U.N.'s future: a platform for loud speeches and guaranteed inaction. Let us not help them attain it.

Success of Foreign Aid Program

Consider one final example of success leading to feelings of frustration. Starting with the famous fourth point in President Truman's 1949 inaugural address, we undertook a worldwide effort to modernize the poorer countries—some of them ancient nations and some of them brand new, by sending them technical aid and investment loans.

Aid can, of course, be used for many purposes just as water coming from a hose can be used to put out leaf fires, to wash the car, to cool the children in summer, to break up a dog fight or even to water the garden. To ask, "Is the water successful?" you first have to know what it is being used for.

Our aid has been used, over the years, to build up the armed forces of weak nations on the periphery of the Communist world; to shore up their economies to permit them to carry an oversized defense load; to maintain political stability by tiding friendly nations over economic crises; and to water the garden of economic and social development. Since 1950 our aid has been focused increasingly on this last purpose, especially to help grow trained people, which takes longer than growing anything else—people who can learn to manage the public and agricultural extension services, the banks and factories and transportation networks, and institutions of land reform and tax reform, the schools and post offices, budget bureaus, and foreign ministries, and all the rest of what it takes to run a modern society.

By and large this unprecedented program has been paid off. The weak nations on the periphery of the Communist world are still there—a little stronger. Not one of the new nations created since the end of the Second World War has chosen communism as a way of life and government; and if some of them have not chosen democracy as we know it either, none is a hope-

less case. The 14 nations of Western Europe and Japan used our aid so well that they were phased out long ago. Since then Spain and Lebanon have joined this group, and 6 other nations are in the process of being terminated over the next few years—if we don't dump them overboard in midstream.

We have been doing all this as part of what George Meany has called the long-term cost of frustrating those who would bury democracy and of "reinforcing our own strength by supporting around us a community of resolute, prospering, free world societies."

And who in his right mind would expect this job to be finished in a decade or two? What man in touch with reality would expect this gigantic operation to be carried out with no errors and with no waste anywhere? By what rational process is anyone led to expect that this complex, experimental, and sometimes mysterious task would move forward smoothly everywhere in the world with no delays and no disappointments?

Yet the debate on the foreign aid bill this year is full of the sounds of weariness, impatience, anxiety, and depression—of frustration because the job has not been finished or has been tarnished with error, delay, or disappointment here and there from time to time.

This is a time when the so-called "burden" of foreign aid is getting lighter—not heavier. A decade ago we were spending 2 percent of the gross national product to help other people help themselves; this year we propose to spend less than 1 percent for that purpose.

This is a time when the preponderant part—80 percent—of the nonmilitary aid program takes the form of repayable loans instead of the free grants that made up 90 percent of the program in Marshall Plan days.

This is a time when 90 cents out of every aid dollar are spent in the United States and account for well over half a million direct jobs for American workers—not counting the much greater indirect employment.

This is a time when the evidence shows that we Americans have greater talents and more success—and are much more welcome—at this business than our principal rivals. The Soviets certainly have not retired as competitors—wit-

ness the aid extended to Somalia this week—but they have chalked up an impressive collection of costly aid failures.

This is a time when the worst thing that can be said about the foreign aid program is that it operates under a musclebound law stuffed with restrictions designed to prevent all past mistakes, to preclude quick or flexible action, and to legislate changes inside foreign countries which can only be the product of their domestic politics, not ours.

Let us admit it, at least to ourselves: Even though we know better we are still tackling 20-year problems with 5-year plans based on 2-year personnel working with 1-year appropriations. That wasn't good enough even in the 1950's. It is not nearly good enough for the sixties.

The Tasks of Leadership

We are privileged, you and I, to live in a time when the frustrations of American foreign policy are often the agony of success, while the frustrations of Soviet foreign policy are typically the agony of failure.

They failed to subvert the nationalist revolutions and spark the chain of Communist revolts that Lenin dreamed of. They failed to make a political killing with aid and trade; they failed to scare people with nuclear terror; they failed to destroy the U.N.; they failed to keep their once-monolithic bloc glued together. They failed, by and large, because of Western countermeasures under American leadership—witness the Marshall Plan and development aid—and because of United Nations actions we supported—witness the Congo.

At a time like this I do not for one instant believe we are going to lose the vision, tire of the race, and throw in the towel—as some would have us do.

One reason for staying the course—though not the best reason—is that quitting is just what the Communists would like us to do.

Another reason for sticking determinedly at it is simply that these counsels of frustration and despair are not the stuff of leadership. Let those who are tired of the tasks of leadership ask themselves whether they are ready to live

in the kind of world community that others will build if we decide the task is too much for us.

But the first and best reason why we are not going to stop building free institutions abroad and building international organizations to

keep the peace is simply that we are not making that way. A great Republican President said it half a century ago, "God Almighty hates quitter." The verb seems out of character for the Almighty, but the sentiment is strictly American.

Vice President Johnson Visits Benelux Countries

Vice President and Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson made an official visit to the Benelux countries November 4-9. They were in Luxembourg November 4, the Netherlands November 5-7, and Belgium November 7-9. During his visit Vice President Johnson held talks with government leaders and officials of the European Communities. He also opened the U.S. Food and Agriculture Exhibition and Symposium at Amsterdam on November 7. Following are texts of the Vice President's arrival statement at Luxembourg and addresses he made at Amsterdam and Brussels, together with a message sent by Secretary Rusk on November 9 to Vice President Johnson in Brussels.

ARRIVAL AT LUXEMBOURG, NOVEMBER 4

Press release 563 dated November 2, for release November 4

Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister [Pierre Werner], for the warmth of your welcome.

We in the United States were highly honored by the visit of your Grand Duchess earlier this year.¹ Her graciousness and charm won us all. I am especially glad that by her visit to our country—and by this visit to your country—we can in this year of Luxembourg's 1,000th anniversary reaffirm the ties of friendship between our two nations.

Luxembourg's history was eight centuries old when the United States was established. Yet our common concern today lies not in the thou-

¹ For text of a communique, see BULLETIN of May 20, 1963, p. 776.

sand years of history on which you look back so proudly but in the new millennium on which you are embarking.

Luxembourg and your neighbors—Holland, Belgium—are in the vanguard of the new Europe. Your unity in Benelux showed the way for the larger communities which followed: the Coal and Steel Community, European Atomic Energy Community, European Economic Community, and others. We approve, admire, and applaud your responsible efforts and responsible influence in such unity.

In this 20th century the American people have committed their strength, their resources, and their lives to support the abiding conviction that the destiny of freedom throughout the world rests upon the unity and partnership of the interdependent Atlantic nations. Today uniting Europe offers the promise that such partnership can and will be achieved.

In the movement toward unity and partnership, we now face old obstacles as well as new opportunities. But, because of the efforts which have been made, we approach these tasks with new means and new will to master them. We remain realistic—but realism itself permits only optimism toward the future.

It is in the confidence that a new period of creative and constructive progress is near at hand for the Atlantic partnership that I have come on this purposeful mission to your country and your neighbors. With me I bring the warm friendship of the American people and the greetings and personal good wishes of

President of the United States, John F. Kennedy.

ADDRESS AT AMSTERDAM, NOVEMBER 7²

We know, as a matter of history, that all of Europe's roads lead to the Netherlands. That is why we are here today. The United States has chosen the Netherlands as the site for this display of the food and agriculture products of the United States in the hope—and expectation—that here we can reach all of Europe's people.

Of course we were also influenced by other friendly considerations. The ties between the American people and the Dutch people are old and close. New York City had its beginnings as New Amsterdam. In some parts of the United States your language is still the second language. Thousands of American names reflect a Dutch ancestry. In several of our States the farming areas are populated with families of Dutch ancestry, and we have brought as special guests for this exhibition two Dutch-American farmers and their Dutch-American wives from Michigan.

The American people like the Dutch people, and we believe the Dutch people like America somewhat better than in the early days when Dutch settlers in what was known as the New Netherlands petitioned for the establishment of a school so that, as they put it, "The youth, in this wild a country, where there are so many dissolute people, may, first of all, be well instructed and indoctrinated not only in reading and writing, but also in the knowledge and fear of the Lord. . . ."

Since this is a trading exhibition, we feel it is appropriate that it be presented in a country whose own trading abilities Americans particularly respect. Our history books teach us those early Dutch settlers were remarkably good traders, for it was 237 years ago that the Dutch came over to America and from our American Indians bought all of Manhattan Island—on which the great city of New York now stands—for only 30 guilders.

Made at the opening of the U.S. Food and Agriculture Exhibition and Symposium.

The ties between America and the Netherlands are cherished by us. But we also cherish the many common bonds between America and all of Europe. It is the highest objective of American policy and programs today to construct on those common bonds, common values, and common aspirations an effective and functioning support for our Atlantic partnership.

We have no greater opportunity for implementing that partnership than in the realm of agriculture. In a hungry world we of the Atlantic nations are by far the best fed of all peoples. Success in agriculture is—and will continue to be—the cornerstone of the strength of the free world.

Against the success of agriculture in the free world there is today the contrast of failure in agriculture under the Communist system. While the leaders of the Communist bloc like to convey the impression that there is a race between the U.S.S.R. and the United States for agricultural supremacy, it is evident to the world—and even to the people within the Communist nations—that the race is no contest. No Communist agriculture is competitive with the agricultures of the West.

The experience of Communist agricultures is both discrediting the premise of Communist ideology and proving itself a disservice to the people relying upon it for their food.

This failure of agriculture in the Communist world clearly leaves to us of the West, and of the Atlantic partnership, great responsibilities for the future. Today throughout the world four children are born every second—more than 300,000 every day. In the first 60 years of this century, the world population increased by 1.4 billion. In these last 40 years of this century that population will increase 3.4 billion more.

When we reach the year 2000, there will be 6 billion human beings to feed every day, where there are only 3 billion today.

If this great responsibility is to be met—if the world is to be spared the anguish of human hunger more massive than our minds can conceive—we of the Atlantic partnership will, of necessity, have to carry a very large portion of that burden. Hopeful as we may be of ultimate progress in other areas, we can only be sure of

adequate success within the time remaining from the farms and fields of our own region.

Our individual agricultural successes are the result of imaginative and creative effort applied jointly to the obstacles in the path to agricultural plenty and to the task of achieving effective agricultural organization. As this has been the route to our respective successes, it is the only route to our collective success in meeting our collective responsibilities to the future.

We must bring our agricultures into close accord today so that we may meet the tests of tomorrow.

Basic challenges in this regard are facing us now in the decisions regarding a common agricultural policy for the Common Market and in the GATT trade negotiations which begin next year. We of the United States believe that the success of our agricultures will be assured by lowering the barriers to trade in our agricultural products. For ourselves, we are prepared to do just this. If the negotiations involve, as they may, questions of domestic agricultural policy, we are equally prepared to discuss our domestic policies.

In this exhibition you will see a special motion picture. At one point in that film the narration suggests a human principle which is to me unforgettable. Referring to an ancient castle, surrounded by water, with its gates drawn and closed, the narration suggests: "The gate that protects from the world—shuts out the world."

Western Europe has long been the major market for American farm products. America, in turn, has long been a market for Europe's industrial products. This age of progress is an age of trade, for the two are linked and are inseparable. In our trade relations with one another—the Netherlands, all of Western Europe, the United States, and our friends throughout the free world—we must resolve that we will never shut ourselves off from one another.

Now, on behalf of my country, it is my pleasure and privilege to extend to our friends of the Netherlands and the other nations of Europe an invitation to enter this United States Food and Agriculture Exhibition.

ADDRESS AT BRUSSELS, NOVEMBER 8¹

For any American a visit to Belgium stirs many remembrances of common experiences we have shared together through a long span of friendship and alliance in peace and war.

On Christmas Eve in 1814 representatives of the United States met in your country, at the city of Ghent, to sign the treaty ending the first war in which our newly established nation was engaged. One hundred thirty years later, in another cold December, other representatives of the United States were on Belgian soil—this time young Americans under arms. Once again it was on Christmas Eve that the glad tidings came: the tide had been turned in the Battle of the Bulge, and the liberation of Belgium was assured.

On this occasion, so graciously arranged by the Belgian-American Association and the other sponsoring organizations, we do not come to relive or recall the tragedies and hardships of the past. We come, instead, to consider what must be done so that neither we nor those who come after us shall be compelled to relive such experiences.

In this 20th century aggressors have learned that they must reckon with the Atlantic partnership as a single unit. Before an aggressor could reach Brussels he would have to strike at Boston—at Philadelphia before Paris at Los Angeles before London, at Chicago before Cologne. Our peril is indivisible. So also is our prosperity.

We, no less than our adversaries, must reckon with the reality that our partnership is a unit—not merely a defense unit but a unit economically, agriculturally, scientifically, and ideologically.

When the United States was being formed Benjamin Franklin left the hall where the final decisions about the form of union had been reached. A spectator rushed to him and asked, "What do we have?" Doctor Franklin answered, "A Republic—if we can keep it."

We have a partnership—if we can keep it. That is what brings me here. Your country—and my own—are committed beyond question.

¹ Made before the Belgian-American Association.

tion or doubt to supporting, sustaining, and assuring the success of the Atlantic partnership. Together with your neighbors, Belgium and its leaders—especially your great statesman, Foreign Minister [Paul-Henri] Spaak—have led the effort toward European integration from the beginning. That same goal has been the unwavering objective of American policy for 20 years under administrations of both our major parties.

We have a partnership—of heritage, values, achievements, and aspirations. Our challenge now is to keep what has been achieved and resume the momentum toward greater fulfillment.

Until now the works of Atlantic partnership—and especially the works of European integration and unity—have been propelled by the ferment of new concepts directed at new challenges and new opportunities. For 15 years we have plowed new ground. Now we must return to ancient fields where we shall meet the oldest of obstacles to the unity and partnership we seek.

There are no older obstacles to harmony among nations than barriers to trade and commerce, or to the establishment of effective consultations on policies and actions, or to the establishment of unified common defense forces. Yet these three items are next on the Atlantic agenda.

For all these there is a common denominator of partnership. But there is also a common danger of fragmentation. If by our own hand we reduce our multilateral assets to unilateral fractions, we shall split the essential atom of free-world unity and release the energy of an awesome force of self-destruction. We cannot each take away from the forthcoming negotiations individual fractions of economic, political, and military independence and expect to leave standing the security of our mutual interdependence.

On each of the questions now on the Atlantic agenda, the position and purpose of the United States is quite clear.

On trade, we believe all countries can benefit from a general lowering of trade barriers. We have prepared ourselves through the Trade Expansion Act to lower our trade barriers to the maximum extent possible. We believe we must

all go to the conference tables as allies, not adversaries. Our aim must be to trade, not to triumph. Trade has too long and too often been used as a weapon; we must remember we have no targets but ourselves.

On political consultations, we believe that if the momentum of our movement toward Atlantic unity and partnership is to be sustained, we must provide—and use—the means for closer communication, deliberation, and agreement. A partnership can survive face-to-face talk however heated. But a partnership cannot endure side-by-side silence however unintentional.

As a starting point we of the United States believe greater use can be made of existing NATO organs for this purpose, and we are ready to do just that. If the European nations agree on how the voice of a uniting Europe should be heard more effectively in political consultations, we will consider their proposals sympathetically. The possible establishment of new mechanisms for closer consultation may well become possible as Europe's own greater unity permits more effective action.

On defense, we must deal with the unfinished business of our nuclear defense partnership. Once conceived and established, military strategies resist change. But the effectiveness of strategies and the strength of alliances become irrelevant if capabilities do not change as the danger changes.

For the defense of Western Europe the dangers have become more complex. To the threat of massive Soviet ground forces has been added the threat of Soviet missiles. We must be prepared to meet the dangers that are, not the dangers that were. Two American administrations have believed—and have urged—that this threat be met by the combination of American missiles in the United States and of medium-range missiles deployed to an allied fleet in Europe on waters under multilateral control, manning, and ownership.

The movement to Atlantic partnership makes this possible. The movement to European unity makes this desirable—as a first step toward a greater European voice in nuclear matters. Evolution of this missile fleet toward European

control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded.

Our American positions on the Atlantic agenda are well known. Supporting those positions is a resolute American will for success of the Atlantic partnership.

A spirit of unity is the prevailing force of Europe today; the spirit of partnership is the prevailing force of American purpose. Our nation is a member of other partnerships—the Pacific partnership, the partnership of the Americas, and the partnership of our own States, as well. Yet the predicate for successful service to every American interest—and the faithful keeping of every American commitment—rests upon the achievement of success in the Atlantic partnership.

We would find it difficult to meet our commitments anywhere, even partially, if we did not keep our commitments here to the fullest. We ask that our friends of Europe remember that American self-interest is not withdrawal but participation in transatlantic affairs. That is why we want to see maintained the vital institutions of Europe's new unity, so that participation can be feasible and full.

Atlantic partnership is not an end in itself. It is the means by which we defend freedom, assure fulfillment for poorer nations, and maintain the kind of world in which our common values and highest ideals can be secure.

Today the strength of our Atlantic partnership permits us to explore opportunities for promoting constructive trends toward greater freedom on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Increased trade and contacts and negotiations may be helpful and may be fruitful. But such efforts do not alter the fundamentals of our own purpose. East-West relations will succeed only as we are successful in maintaining the strength and unity of the West.

If we fail in the West, relations with the East are sure to go against us. We must not be diverted from our own positive purposes. Our negotiations must not lead us into steps which would either weaken Western strength and unity or confirm the division of Europe.

We in America are sensitive to both hazards. I can assure you the United States will consult closely with its allies about these concerns as negotiations may progress.

We of the United States do not believe that peace can be secure, or that partnership can be effective, until the reconstitution of Europe is achieved. The artificial division of the German people must end. We believe that division will be ended and that the day of unification will be hastened by the influence of a uniting Europe.

So I would conclude by emphasizing one conviction. Whatever opportunities or inducements or enticements may appear, our first work now is—as it has been for 15 years—the work of perfecting European unity and transoceanic partnership on which Atlantic interdependence must stand.

The Atlantic partnership is not a dream, it is not a name—it is a fact. We can serve it—we can fail it. The next steps before us will require us to make that fateful choice. We of America approach that time of choosing with the greatest and unwavering confidence that men who have the future to win will not lose that future serving the past.

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 575 dated November 9

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: I want to tell you how grateful I am for the extremely effective way in which you have promoted United States relations with the three Benelux countries during your trip. All reports indicate that your visit, with Mrs. Johnson, has made a great impact not only in the countries you have been to but in Western Europe as a whole. Both your public statements and discussions with the Chiefs of State and government and European Community leaders concerned, as well as the warm reception accorded you by our three close Benelux allies, have greatly strengthened the concept of the Atlantic Partnership.

With warm regards,

DEAN RUSK

U.S. Revises Areas Closed to Soviet Citizens; Proposes Mutual Abolition or Reduction of Restrictions

Press release 579 dated November 12

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

In a note delivered on November 12 to the Soviet Embassy at Washington the United States informed the Soviet Government of revisions of the system of closed areas restricted to travel by Soviet citizens in the United States. They do not apply to participants in the exchanges program or to Soviet citizen officials of the United Nations Secretariat.

The revisions do not significantly alter the amount of territory in the United States closed nor the general characteristics of the restrictions which have applied heretofore. The revisions do, however, reflect the continuing review of the system of closed areas which takes account of the security requirements of United States defense establishments, as well as restrictions placed on American citizens in connection with travel in the U.S.S.R.

The United States note reiterated the United States desire for complete and mutual abolition of all travel restrictions and renewed the United States proposal that representatives of the two governments meet to discuss the question.

The closed area system was inaugurated in 1955 in response to Soviet restrictions initiated in 1941.

U.S. NOTE OF NOVEMBER 12

The Department of State refers to note No. 8 of January 6, 1961,¹ to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which dealt with restrictions applicable to Soviet citizens traveling in the United States. Reference is also made to the notes from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics of January 3, 1955,² and November 11, 1957,³ which establish regulations concerning travel by Soviet citizens in the United States comparable to those previously imposed by the Soviet Government on the movement of citizens of the United States in the Soviet Union.

The United States Government first instituted a system of closed areas on January 3, 1955, as a result of the absence of any indication that the Soviet Government was willing to relax significantly its long-standing travel restrictions which have been in effect since 1941. The Department's note of that date stated that, if the Soviet Government should liberalize its regulations restricting the travel of the United States citizens in the Soviet Union, the United States Government would be disposed to reconsider its regulations. In the eight years that have passed since that date, the United States has on a number of occasions reiterated its desire for mutual abolition of closed areas. For a short while in 1957, it appeared that the Soviet Government might consider reducing the barriers to travel. In its note of August 28, 1957,⁴ to the American Embassy at Moscow, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that "it is ready to discuss with the Embassy the question of the exclusion from the list of cities and localities in the U.S.S.R. forbidden for visits by foreigners of a number of cities and localities in the U.S.S.R. on the basis of reciprocity." The expectation raised by this note unfortunately was not fulfilled.

In reply to the Ministry's note, the Department on November 11, 1957, reiterated the United States Government's desire for aboli-

² For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1955, p. 193.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1957, p. 934.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 936.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 23, 1961, p. 119.

tion of closed zones and proposed such an abolition. On May 22, 1958, the Department addressed a new note to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which offered concrete proposals for a mutual reduction of closed areas in the absence of an agreement to abolish restricted zones completely.⁵ This proposal went without reply. On August 19, 1958, the Department once more reminded the Embassy that no response had been received to the United States proposals for easing travel restrictions.⁶ No reply was received to this note. On a number of occasions since August 1958 the subject has been raised with Soviet officials by United States representatives. As of the present time, despite its professed willingness to discuss the travel restrictions question, the Soviet Government has still not even acknowledged the proposals of the United States Government.

Not only has the Soviet Government remained unwilling to discuss the abolition or reduction of its impediments to free travel, but the Soviet authorities have regularly applied travel restrictions in such a way as to close areas that are supposedly open. Parts of Central Asia and the Caucasus are regularly closed "temporarily" each year. On the basis of the official notifications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, over 25 percent of the Soviet Union is formally closed to travel by foreigners. In practice, this percentage is considerably higher.

The Government of the United States reiterates its firm preference for the mutual abolition of closed zones.

The regulations contained in the Department's notes of January 3, 1955, November 11, 1957, and January 6, 1961 are hereby superseded. The Soviet Government will note that the areas closed in the United States continue to be reciprocal to those closed in the Soviet Union.

These regulations will continue until further notice to apply to travel in the United States by Soviet citizens possessing valid passports issued by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, other than Soviet citizen officers and employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations while their conduct is a re-

sponsibility of the Secretary General of the United Nations, and other than Soviet citizens who are visiting the United States within the framework of the exchanges program as described in the Department's note of July 6, 1961.

Travel will continue to be permitted throughout the United States except in the border zones described in enclosure No. 1, and in the states and counties listed in enclosure No. 2. Enclosure No. 3 lists open cities and transit routes in otherwise closed areas.

Transit travel by railroad or commercial airlines through closed areas will continue to be permitted when such travel is necessary to reach open areas or open cities in otherwise closed areas. Soviet citizens engaging in such transit travel are not to leave the immediate vicinity of any air or rail terminal located in a closed area except when necessary to make air or rail connection for continuing the travel. The transit through closed areas by automobile or bus will be permitted only on the routes specified in enclosure No. 3. As in the past, all resident Soviet citizens to whom these regulations apply with the exception of those temporarily admitted to the United States for some specific purpose which does not involve temporary residence in Washington, District of Columbia, or New York, New York are required to submit official notification at least forty-eight hours in advance of any travel beyond any point more than twenty-five miles distant from the center of New York or Washington. Such official notification must continue to include the names of all travelers, description of the itinerary, route numbers of all roads traveled by car listed in the order in which the roads are taken, identification of modes of travel, and description of points and approximate duration of all stopovers. Notification will continue to be addressed to the Department of State, the Army, Navy, or Air Force Foreign Liaison Offices, or the United States Mission to the United Nations in New York, New York as appropriate.

Soviet citizens will not be permitted to hire unchauffeured automobiles during the course of a trip; nor are they to use as means of transportation helicopters or charter aircraft.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, June 16, 1958, p. 1007.

⁶ For text of a U.S. note, see *ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 385.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, July 30, 1962, p. 191.

enclosures:

1. Border Zones Closed to Travel by Soviet Citizens Possessing Valid Passports Issued by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
2. States, Counties, and Cities Closed to Travel by Soviet Citizens Possessing Valid Passports Issued by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
3. Cities in Otherwise Closed Areas, and Specific Routes of Automotive Transit through Otherwise Closed Areas, which are Open to Travel by Soviet Citizens Possessing Valid Passports Issued by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 12, 1963.

Enclosure No. 1

**ORDER ZONES CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET CITIZENS
POSSESSING VALID U.S.S.R. PASSPORTS**

USA-Canadian Border

In addition to the shores of the Great Lakes, included within closed areas, the following lake shores are closed by a band fifteen miles wide in the states and counties listed:

- a. *Lake Superior*: Wisconsin—Douglas, Bayfield, Iron; Michigan—Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton, Marquette.
- b. *Lake Huron*: Michigan—Cheboygan, Presque Isle, Alcona, Iosco, Tuscola, Huron, Sanilac.
- c. *Lake Erie*: Michigan—Monroe; Ohio—Lucas, Ottawa, Sandusky, Erie.

USA-Mexican Border

In addition to the border counties included within closed areas, the following counties are partially closed by a band which extends fifteen miles from the border into United States territory.

New Mexico: Hidalgo, Luna.

Texas: Hudspeth, Culberson, Jeff Davis, Presidio, Brewster, Terrell, Val Verde, Kinney, Maverick, Dimmit, Zapata, Starr, Hidalgo, Cameron.

Alaska

A band fifteen miles wide, which runs from Nunavut Peninsula north along the Bering Sea and east along the Arctic Ocean to the border of Canada, is closed.

Enclosure No. 2

**STATES, COUNTIES AND CITIES CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY
SOVIET CITIZENS POSSESSING VALID U.S.S.R. PASS-
PORTS**

Names listed under each State are names of Counties, unless otherwise indicated. In addition, the territorial waters of the United States adjacent to any closed area are closed up to one mile from the edge of the closed area.

Alabama: Baldwin, Barbour, Bullock, Calhoun, Cof-

fee, Colbert, Dale, Etowah, Geneva, Henry, Houston, Jefferson, Lauderdale, Limestone, Macon, Madison, Mobile, Montgomery, Pike, Russell, Shelby, St. Clair, Talladega.

Alaska: Aleutian Islands, Islands in the Bering Sea, Kodiak Island, City of Haines, City of Seward, City of Skagway.

Arizona: Cochise, Graham, Greenlee, Maricopa, Pima, Pinal, Santa Cruz, Yuma.

Arkansas: Cleburne, Conway, Crittenden, Cross, Faulkner, Lee, Lonoke, Monroe, Prairie, St. Francis, White, Woodruff.

California: Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, Humboldt, Imperial, Kern, Kings, Los Angeles,⁸ Marin, Monterey, Napa, Orange, Placer, Riverside, Sacramento, San Bernito, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma, Sutter, Ventura, Yolo, Yuba.

Colorado: Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, Eagle, Elbert, El Paso, Jefferson, Larimer, Logan, Pueblo, Summit, Weld.

Connecticut: Fairfield,⁹ Hartford, Litchfield, Middlesex, New Haven, New London, Tolland, Windham.

Florida: Alachua, Baker, Bay, Bradford, Brevard, Broward, Calhoun, Clay, Columbia, Dade, Duval, Escambia, Flagler, Glades, Highlands, Hillsborough, Holmes, Indian River, Jackson, Manatee, Martin, Monroe, Okaloosa, Okeechobee, Orange, Osceola, Palm Beach, Pinellas, St. Johns, St. Lucie, Santa Rosa, Sarasota, Seminole, Union, Volusia, Walton, Washington.

Georgia: Bryan, Chatham, Chattahoochee, Columbia, Evans, Glynn, Liberty, Lincoln, Long, McIntosh, Muscogee, Richmond, Stewart, Tattnall.

Hawaii: Hawaii, Honolulu, Kauai, Maui.

Idaho: Ada, Bannock, Bingham, Boise, Bonner, Butte, Canyon, Elmore, Gooding, Jefferson, Jerome, Kootenai, Lincoln, Owyhee, Twin Falls.

Illinois: Adams, Boone, Carroll, Champaign, Clark, Coles, Cook, De Kalb, Douglas, Du Page, Edgar, Grundy, Jersey, Jo Daviess, Kane, Kendall, La Salle, Logan, Madison, McHenry, McLean, Ogle, Peoria, Rock Island, St. Clair, Sangamon, Stephenson, Vermilion, Will, Winnebago, Woodford.

Indiana: Allen, Bartholomew, Brown, Clark, Clay, Daviess, Elkhart, Floyd, Greene, Harrison, Hendricks, Huntington, Jackson, Jefferson, Jennings, Johnson, Kosciusko, Lake, La Porte, Marion, Marshall, Martin, Monroe, Morgan, Owen, Parke, Porter, Putnam, Ripley, St. Joseph, Scott, Starke, Sullivan, Vermilion, Vigo, Wabash, Whitley.

Iowa: Benton, Black Hawk, Cedar, Des Moines, Fremont, Harrison, Iowa, Jasper, Johnson, Linn, Mills, Monona, Polk, Pottawattamie, Poweshiek, Scott, Shelby, Tama, Woodbury.

⁸ Except for portions in open city of Los Angeles, as defined in Enclosure No. 3. [Footnote in original.]
⁹ Closed except for portion north of Merritt Parkway. [Footnote in original.]

Kansas: Atchison, Butler, Cherokee, Clay, Cloud, Cowley, Dickinson, Douglas, Ellsworth, Geary, Harvey, Jackson, Jefferson, Johnson, Kingman, Labette, Leavenworth, Lincoln, Marion, McPherson, Osage, Ottawa, Pottawatomie, Reno, Rice, Riley, Saline, Sedgwick, Shawnee, Sumner, Wabaunsee, Wyandotte.

Kentucky: Bullitt, Christian, Hardin, Jefferson, McCracken, Meade, Oldham, Todd, Trigg, Trimble.

Louisiana: Caddo, Caldwell, De Soto, Jefferson, Ouachita, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. Tammany.

Maine: Androscoggin, Aroostook, Cumberland, Hancock, Oxford, Penobscot, Sagadahoc, Waldo, York.

Maryland: Allegheny, Anne Arundel,¹⁰ Baltimore, Calvert, Carroll, Charles, Frederick, Hartford, St. Mary, Talbot, Washington.

Massachusetts: Barnstable, Berkshire, Bristol, Dukes, Essex, Franklin, Hampden, Hampshire, Middlesex,¹¹ Nantucket, Norfolk,¹¹ Plymouth, Suffolk,¹¹ Worcester.

Michigan: Alger, Alpena, Arenac, Bay, Berrien, Calhoun, Charlevoix, Chippewa, Clare, Dickinson, Eaton, Emmet, Gladwin, Ingham, Isabella, Kent, Keweenaw, Luce, Mackinac, Macomb, Marquette, Midland, Muskegon, Oakland, Ottawa, Saginaw, St. Clair, Schoolcraft, Wayne.

Minnesota: Anoka, Cook, Hennepin, Lake, Ramsey, St. Louis.

Mississippi: Hancock, Harrison, Jackson.

Missouri: Barton, Bates, Benton, Boone, Cass, Cedar, Cooper, Henry, Hickory, Howard, Jackson, Jasper, Johnson, Lafayette, Moniteau, Morgan, Pettis, St. Charles, St. Claire, St. Louis, Saline, Vernon.

Montana: Cascade, Chouteau, Fergus, Golden Valley, Hill, Judith Basin, Lewis and Clark, Liberty, Pondera, Teton, Toole, Wheatland, Yellowstone.

Nebraska: Banner, Butler, Cass, Cheyenne, Colfax, Dodge, Douglas, Gage, Hall, Hamilton, Jefferson, Johnson, Kimball, Lancaster, Otoe, Polk, Saline, Sarpy, Saunders, Seward, Washington, York.

Nevada: Churchill, Clark, Douglas, Lincoln, Lyon, Mineral, Nye, Ormsby, Storey, Washoe.

New Hampshire: Chesire, Coos, Grafton, Hillsboro, Rockingham, Strafford.

New Jersey: Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Essex, Gloucester, Hunterdon, Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Ocean, Passaic, Salem, Somerset, Sussex, Union, Warren.

New Mexico: Bernalillo, Chaves, Dona Ana, Lincoln, Los Alamos, Otero, Roosevelt, Sierra, Socorro, Torrance.

New York: Albany, Cayuga, Chautauqua, Chenango, Clinton, Cortland, Erie, Essex, Franklin, Fulton, Hamilton, Herkimer, Jefferson, Lewis, Madison, Monroe, Montgomery, Niagara, Onondaga, Oneida, Orange,

Orleans, Oswego, Otsego, St. Lawrence, Saratoga, Schenectady, Schoharie, Seneca, Suffolk, Wayne.

North Carolina: Beaufort, Bladen, Brunswick, Currituck, Columbus, Craven, Cumberland, Dare, Davidson, Durham, Forsyth, Greene, Harnett, Hoke, Hyde, Johnston, Jones, Lenoir, New Hanover, Onslow, Orange, Pamlico, Pender, Sampson, Wake, Wayne, Wilkes.

North Dakota: Benson, Bottineau, Burke, Cavalier, Eddy, Grand Forks, Griggs, McHenry, McLean, Mercer, Mountrail, Nelson, Pembina, Ramsey, Renville, Rolette, Sheridan, Steele, Towner, Traill, Walsh, Ward.

Ohio: Ashtabula, Butler, Clark, Clinton, Cuyahoga, Franklin, Geauga, Greene, Lake, Licking, Lorain, Mahoning, Medina, Montgomery, Pike, Portage, Stark, Summit, Trumbull.

Oklahoma: Comanche, Greer, Harmon, Jackson, Nowata, Pittsburg, Tillman, Washita.

Oregon: Benton, Clackamas, Coos, Douglas, Clatsop, Lane, Linn, Marion, Morrow, Multnomah, Polk, Washington, Yamhill.

Pennsylvania: Adams, Allegheny, Bedford, Berks, Chester, Cumberland, Dauphin, Franklin, Fulton, Lancaster, Lehigh, Luzerne, Mahoning, Medina, Montgomery, Philadelphia, Pike, York.

Rhode Island: Bristol, Kent, Newport, Providence, Washington.

South Carolina: Aiken, Beaufort, Berkeley, Charleston, Edgefield, Lexington, McCormick, Oconee, Richland, Sumter.

South Dakota: Custer, Fall River, Haakon, Jackson, Meade, Pennington, Ziebach.

Tennessee: Anderson, Montgomery, Roane, Shelby, Stewart, Sullivan.

Texas: Armstrong, Bell, Bowie, Burnet, Callahan, Carson, Cass, Cochran, Collin, Coryell, Dallas, De Witt, El Paso, Grayson, Harrison, Hockley, Jones, Lampasas, Lubbock, Marion, Medina, Nolan, Potter, Randall, Reeves, Shackelford, Tarrant, Taylor, Travis, Wichita, Wilbarger, Williamson.

Utah: Emery, Grand, Juab, Salt Lake, Sanpete, Uintah.

Vermont: Addison, Chittenden, Franklin, Grand Isle, Lamoille.

Virginia: Charles City, Henrico, Isle of Wight, James City, King George, Nansemond, Prince George, Princess Anne, Southampton, Surry, Sussex, York, City of Chesapeake (formerly Norfolk County), City of Alexandria, City of Virginia Beach (formerly Princess Anne County).

Washington: Adams, Benton, Clallam, Clark, Franklin, Garfield, Grant, Grays Harbor, Island, Jefferson, King, Kitsap, Lincoln, Mason, Pend Oreille, Pierce, Skagit, Snohomish, Spokane, Stevens, Thurston, Walla Walla, Whitman.

West Virginia: Mineral, Pendleton.

Wisconsin: Ashland, Clark, Dane, Eau Claire, Fond du Lac, Jefferson, Marathon, Marinette, Outagamie, Portage, Rock, Sauk, Sheboygan, Winnebago, Waukesha, Winnebago.

Wyoming: Goshen, Laramie, Platte.

¹⁰ Closed except for portion south of Route 50 and South River. [Footnote in original.]

¹¹ Except for portions in open city of Boston, as defined in Enclosure No. 3. [Footnote in original.]

Enclosure No. 3

CITIES IN OTHERWISE CLOSED AREAS WHICH ARE OPEN TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET CITIZENS POSSESSING VALID U.S.S.R. PASSPORTS

Anaheim, California	Lincoln, Nebraska
Austin, Texas	Los Angeles, California ¹³
Baltimore, Maryland	Madison, Wisconsin
Bangor, Maine	Miami, Florida
Berkeley, California	Miami Beach, Florida
Bloomington, Indiana	Minneapolis, Minnesota
Boston, Massachusetts ¹²	Newark, New Jersey
Bozeman, Montana	New Brunswick, New Jersey
Buffalo, New York	New Haven, Connecticut
Camden, New Jersey	New Orleans, Louisiana ¹⁴
Champaign, Illinois	Niagara Falls, New York
Chapel Hill, North Carolina	Omaha, Nebraska
Chicago, Illinois	Palo Alto, California
Columbus, Ohio	Passaic, New Jersey
Council Bluffs, Iowa	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Dearborn, Michigan	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Denver, Colorado	Portland, Oregon
Des Moines, Iowa	Princeton, New Jersey
Durham, North Carolina	Providence, Rhode Island
East Chicago, Indiana	Richmond, Virginia
Elizabeth, New Jersey	Sacramento, California
Evansville, Indiana	St. Paul, Minnesota
Hammond, Indiana	San Jose, California
Hanover, New Hampshire	Seattle, Washington
Honolulu, Hawaii	Shreveport, Louisiana
Independence, Missouri	Skokie, Illinois
Kansas City, Kansas	South Bend, Indiana
Kansas City, Missouri	Stockbridge, Massachusetts
Lansing, Michigan	Toledo, Ohio
Lawrence, Kansas	Urbana, Illinois
Lexington, Massachusetts	

SPECIFIED ROUTES OF AUTOMOTIVE TRANSIT THROUGH AREAS CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET CITIZENS POSSESSING VALID U.S.S.R. PASSPORTS

between:

San Francisco and Berkeley, Calif.—via the Bay Bridge
 San Francisco and Palo Alto, Calif.—via Route 101
 Palo Alto and San Jose, Calif.—via Route 101
 Los Angeles and Anaheim, Calif.—via Route 101
 Denver and Boulder, Colo.—via Denver-Boulder Toll Rd.
 Chicago, Ill., and Milwaukee, Wis.—via Route 94
 Chicago, Ill., and Southern Illinois—via Route 57
 through Cook, Will, Champaign, Douglas, Coles counties
 Kansas City and Lawrence, Kan.—via Kansas Turnpike
 Durham and Chapel Hill, N.C.—via Route 15
 Washington, D.C. and Stafford Co., Va.—via Route 1

Washington, D.C. and Maryland Eastern Shore Counties—via Route 50

Washington, D.C. and Baltimore, Md.—via Washington-Baltimore Expressway

Baltimore, Md. and New York, N.Y.—via Route 40 and New Jersey Turnpike

Philadelphia and Somerset County, Pa.—via Pennsylvania Turnpike

Exit 4 of New Jersey Turnpike and Philadelphia, Pa.—via Route 73

Exit 4 of New Jersey Turnpike and Camden, N.J.—via Routes 73 and 38

Exit 8 of New Jersey Turnpike and Princeton, N.J.—via Routes 33 and 539

Exit 9 of New Jersey Turnpike and New Brunswick, N.J.—via Route 18

New York and Sullivan County, N.Y.—via Route 17

Erie County and Buffalo, N.Y.—via N.Y. State Thruway

Buffalo and Niagara Falls, N.Y.—via Route 190

White River Jct., Vt., and Hanover, N.H.—via Route 10

Columbia County, N.Y. and Stockbridge, Mass., and Lenox, Mass.—via Routes 90 and 7

Across:

Northern Indiana—via Indiana Toll Rd.

Northern Ohio—via Ohio Turnpike

Henrico Co., Va.—via Route 1

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania—via Pennsylvania Turnpike

¹² Only the following parts of the following counties in the Boston area are open: The part of Middlesex County east of Route 128. The part of Suffolk County north of the Neponset River. The part of Norfolk County east of Route 128 and north of the Neponset River. [Footnote in original.]

¹³ Only the following portions of the City of Los Angeles and adjacent Los Angeles County are open: Pacific Ocean between Manchester Avenue (Route 10) and Topanga Canyon Road (Route 27); Topanga Canyon Road (Route 27) to Ventura Road (Route 101); Ventura Road (Route 101) to Sherman Oaks, thence Route 134; Route 134 along San Fernando Boulevard and Colorado Boulevard to Verdugo Road (Route 2) to Little Jimmy Spring area in Angeles National Forest, then by a line running south to Crystal Lake Recreation Area in Angeles National Forest on Route 39; Route 39 to San Bernardino Road (Routes 60, 70 and 99); Routes 60, 70, 99 to Rosemead Boulevard (Route 19); Route 19 to Santa Anna Freeway Route 101; Route 101 to Slauson Boulevard; Slauson Boulevard to Sepulveda Boulevard (Route 101A); Route 101A to Manchester Avenue (Route 10); Manchester Avenue (Route 10) to Pacific Ocean. [Footnote in original.]

¹⁴ Open except for port area. [Footnote in original.]

U.S. Establishes Closed Areas for Official Personnel of Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Polish, and Rumanian Missions

Press release 580 dated November 12

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

In separate notes delivered on November 12 to the diplomatic missions in the United States of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania the United States informed these governments that for reasons of national security we have been obliged to declare certain areas of the conterminous United States (that is, the United States excluding Alaska and Hawaii) closed to travel by official personnel of those countries' diplomatic, consular, and United Nations establishments in this country. These Eastern European countries generally maintain zones closed to travel of official American personnel.

The closed zones take into account the security requirements of United States defense establishments vital to the security not only of the United States but of its allies.

The establishment of the closed areas will take effect immediately.

TEXTS OF U.S. NOTES

Bulgaria

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of the Bulgarian People's Republic and has the honor to inform him that the United States Government has been obliged for reasons of national security to declare certain areas of the conterminous United States (that is, the United States excluding Alaska and Hawaii) closed to travel by official personnel of the Bulgarian Legation in Washington and of the Bulgarian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. These closed zones are approxi-

mately proportionate in area to those existing in the Bulgarian People's Republic.

A list of counties of the United States which are closed to further travel by the official Bulgarian personnel designated above is appended. The establishment of the closed zones will take effect immediately.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 12, 1963.

Czechoslovakia

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and informs him that the United States Government has been obliged for reasons of national security to declare certain areas of the conterminous United States (that is, the United States excluding Alaska and Hawaii) closed to travel by official personnel of the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington and of the Czechoslovak Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York.

A list of the counties of the United States which are closed to further travel by official Czechoslovak personnel designated above is appended. The establishment of the closed zones will take effect immediately.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 12, 1963.

Hungary

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Hungarian People's Republic and refers to the note of June 29, 1963,¹ from the Hungarian

¹ Not printed.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs which informed the American Legation in Budapest of the action taken by the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic to terminate the requirement for notification of travel in Hungary by official personnel of the American Legation.

The Government of the United States of America, taking account of the above-mentioned action of the Hungarian Government, has decided to terminate the requirement of notification of travel in the conterminous territory of the United States (that is, the United States excluding Alaska and Hawaii) by official personnel of the Hungarian Legation in Washington and of the Hungarian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. At the same time, the United States Government has been obliged for reasons of national security to declare certain areas of the conterminous United States closed to travel by official personnel of the Hungarian Legation in Washington and of the Hungarian Permanent Mission to the United Nations. These closed zones are approximately proportionate in area to those existing in the Hungarian People's Republic.

A list of counties of the United States which are closed to further travel by the official Hungarian personnel designated above is appended. The removal of the travel notification requirement and the establishment of closed zones will take effect immediately.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 12, 1963.

Land

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic and has the honor to inform him that the United States Government has been obliged for reasons of national security to declare certain areas of the conterminous United States (that is, the United States excluding Alaska and Hawaii) closed to travel by official personnel of the Polish Embassy in Washington, of the Polish Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, and of the Polish Consulate General in Chicago.

A list of counties of the United States which are closed to further travel by the official Polish

personnel designated above is appended. The establishment of closed zones will take effect immediately.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 12, 1963.

Rumania

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of the Rumanian People's Republic and has the honor to refer to the note of May 21, 1963,¹ from the American Legation in Bucharest to the Rumanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the United States desire to terminate the requirement for notification of travel by official personnel of the Rumanian Missions in the United States and the American Legation in Bucharest. On August 6, 1963, the Rumanian Foreign Ministry, in a note to the American Legation in Bucharest,¹ also indicated its desire to terminate the travel notification requirement.

The Government of the United States, taking account of the above-mentioned exchange of communications, has decided reciprocally to terminate the requirement of notification of travel in the conterminous territory of the United States (that is, the United States excluding Alaska and Hawaii) by official personnel of the Rumanian Legation in Washington and of the Rumanian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. At the same time, the United States Government has been obliged for reasons of national security to declare certain areas of the conterminous United States closed to travel by official personnel of the Rumanian Legation in Washington and of the Rumanian Permanent Mission to the United Nations. These closed zones are approximately proportionate in area to those existing in the Rumanian People's Republic.

A list of counties of the United States which are closed to further travel by the official Rumanian personnel designated above is appended. The establishment of closed zones will take effect immediately. The termination of the requirement of notification of travel for the official Rumanian personnel designated above in the United States shall take effect at such time

¹ Not printed.

as the Rumanian Government shall signify its assent to the termination of similar travel notification procedures for official United States Legation personnel in Rumania.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 12, 1963.

LIST OF U.S. COUNTIES CLOSED TO TRAVEL

The following counties of the conterminous United States will be closed to travel other than *transit* travel on scheduled airlines or trains. Authority for location of counties and U.S. Highways will be Rand McNally's "Road Atlas," 1963 edition.

Alabama: Calhoun, Montgomery, Etowah, Houston, Mobile, Madison.

Arizona: Pima, Pinal, Graham, Greenlee, Cochise, Maricopa, Santa Cruz, Yuma.

Arkansas: Lonoke, White, Faulkner, Conway, Cleburne, Woodruff.

California: Imperial, Fresno, Sacramento (except for transit on Route 50), Alameda (except for transit on Route 80), Contra Costa (except for transit on Route 80), Napa (except for transit on Route 80), Orange, San Benito, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano (except for transit on Route 80), Kings, Sonoma, Yuba, Placer, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, Sutter, Ventura, Marin, Humboldt, Monterey, San Diego, Kern, Los Angeles (except for transit on Route 66), San Bernardino (except for transit on Route 66).

Colorado: Boulder, Logan, Larimer, Weld, Adams, Arapahoe, Elbert, El Paso.

Connecticut: New London.

Florida: Escambia, Duval, Monroe, Bay, Okaloosa, Walton, Brevard, Pinellas, Dade, Seminole, Hillsborough, Orange.

Idaho: Bannock, Butte, Twin Falls, Gooding, Jerome, Lincoln, Elmore, Canyon, Boise, Owyhee, Ada, Bingham, Jefferson.

Illinois: Kane, Will (except for transit on Route 66).

Indiana: Jefferson, Vigo, Allen, Marion, Daviess (except for transit on Route 50), Martin (except for transit on Route 50), Greene, St. Joseph (except for transit on Indiana Toll Road), Marshall, Elkhart (except for transit on Indiana Toll Road), Jennings (except for transit on Route 50), Ripley (except for transit on Route 50).

Iowa: Linn, Woodbury, Shelby, Mills, Pottawattamie, Fremont, Harrison, Black Hawk, Des Moines.

Kansas: Pottawatomie, Wabaunsee, Jackson, Jefferson, Douglas, Osage, Shawnee, Cloud, Ottawa, Lincoln, Ellsworth, Saline, Dickinson, Rice, McPherson, Marion (except for transit on Route 50), Kingman, Sumner, Cowley, Butler, Sedgwick.

Kentucky: Bullitt, Hardin, Meade, McCracken.

Louisiana: Caddo, De Soto.

Maine: Hancock, Cumberland, York.

Maryland: Charles, St. Marys, Ann Arundel (except for transit on Baltimore-Washington Parkway, Route 50, and Friendship Airport), Baltimore (except for city of Baltimore and transit on Baltimore-Washington Parkway, and Route 40).

Massachusetts: Barnstable, Middlesex (except for part east of Route 128), Suffolk (except that part north of the Neponset River), Worcester (except for transit on Routes 15 and 90 to Boston), Nantucket, Norfolk (except that part east of Route 128 and north of the Neponset River).

Michigan: Alpena, Bay, Calhoun, Chippewa, Cheboygan, Comb, Marquette.

Minnesota: Ramsey, St. Louis.

Mississippi: Jackson.

Missouri: St. Charles, St. Louis (except for transit on Routes 66 and 50), Cass, Bates, Henry, Vernon, Claiborne, Cedar, Hickory, Moniteau (except for transit on Route 50), Saline, Johnson (except for transit on Route 50), Pettis (except for transit on Route 50), Cooper (except for transit on Route 50), Benton, Morgan (except for transit on Route 50), Jackson (except for transit on Route 50).

Montana: Yellowstone, Pondera, Toole, Hill, Lewis and Clark, Wheatland, Teton, Judith Basin, Cascade, Chouteau, Fergus, Liberty.

Nebraska: Hall, Douglas, Lancaster, Polk, Jefferson, Colfax, Dodge, Banner, Kimball, Cheyenne, Saunders, Washington, Butler, York, Seward, Saline, Gage, Johnson, Otoe, Cass.

Nevada: Washoe, Lincoln, Churchill (except for transit on Route 50), Mineral, Clark, Nye.

New Hampshire: Rockingham, Hillsboro.

New Jersey: Burlington (except for transit on New Jersey Turnpike), Atlantic, Camden (except for transit on the New Jersey Turnpike, Routes 73 and 38/30 from New Jersey Turnpike to Philadelphia), Monmouth, Middlesex (except for transit on the New Jersey Turnpike), Mercer (except for transit on New Jersey Turnpike), Ocean.

New Mexico: Chaves, Lincoln, Bernalillo (except for transit on Route 66), Dona Ana, Los Alamos, Otero, Sierra, Socorro, Torrance (except for transit on Route 66).

New York: Onondaga, Orange, Clinton, Essex, Franklin, Niagara, Schenectady, Suffolk, Madison, Oneida, Herkimer.

North Carolina: Forsyth, Onslow, Dare, New Hanover, Brunswick.

North Dakota: Burke, Mercer, McLean, Sheridan, Benson, Ramsey, Cavalier, Pembina, Eddy, Nelson, Griggs, Steele, Ward, Bottineau, McHenry, Mount Renville, Walsh, Grand Forks.

Ohio: Pike, Summit (except for transit on the Ohio Turnpike), Mahoning (except for transit on the Ohio Turnpike), Clinton, Butler, Licking, Montgomery.

Oklahoma: Pittsburg, Harmon, Greer, Kiowa, Wagoner, Itata (except for transit on Route 66), Comanche, Custer, Logan, Jackson.

Oregon: Benton, Linn, Morrow, Coos, Klamath, Multnomah.

Pennsylvania: Allegheny (except for transit on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, transit to Pittsburgh on Route 19), Dauphin, Cumberland, Philadelphia, York.

Rhode Island: Washington, Kent, Newport, Bristol.

South Carolina: Aiken, Charleston, Berkeley, Beaufort.

South Dakota: Ziebach, Haakon, Jackson, Meade, Minnehaha, Custer.

Tennessee: Anderson, Montgomery, Roane, Shelby, Sullivan.

Texas: Lubbock, Wilbarger, Taylor, Medina, Jones, Jackelford, Callahan, Potter (except for transit on Route 66), Runnels, Nolan, Grayson, Tarrant, Travis, Hill, Coryell, El Paso.

Utah: Grand (except for transit on Route 50), Emery (except for transit on Route 50), Salt Lake.

Vermont: Franklin, Addison.

Virginia: York, Henrico, King George, Prince William, Nansemond, Princess Anne, Norfolk.

Washington: Benton, Jefferson, King, Spokane, Stevens, Lincoln, Whitman, Grant, Adams, Franklin, Kitsap Harbor, Snohomish, Pierce, Walla Walla, Kitsap.

West Virginia: Pendleton, Mineral (except for transit on Route 50).

Wisconsin: Dane, Waukesha.

Wyoming: Goshen, Laramie, Platte.

Travel to Alaska and Hawaii may be permitted upon request.

Cities in Otherwise Closed Areas which are open to travel:

Anaheim, California
Austin, Texas
Baltimore, Maryland
Berkeley, California
Boston, Massachusetts²
Boulder, Colorado
Camden, New Jersey
Council Bluffs, Iowa
Independence, Missouri
Kansas City, Missouri
Lawrence, Kansas
Lincoln, Nebraska
Los Angeles, California³

Boston: Open for travel are: the part of Middlesex County east of Route 128; the part of Suffolk County south of the Neponset River; the part of Norfolk County east of Route 128 and north of the Neponset River. [Footnote in original.]

Los Angeles: Only the following portions of the County of Los Angeles and adjacent Los Angeles County are open: Pacific Ocean between Manchester Avenue (Route 10) and Topanga Canyon Road (Route 27); Topanga Canyon Road (Route 27) to Ventura Road (Route 101); Ventura Road (Route 101 to Sherman Avenue, thence Route 134); Route 134 along San Fer-

Madison, Wisconsin
Miami, Florida
Miami Beach, Florida
New Brunswick, New Jersey
Niagara Falls, New York
Omaha, Nebraska
Palo Alto, California
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Portland, Oregon
Princeton, New Jersey
Richmond, Virginia
Sacramento, California
St. Louis, Missouri
St. Paul, Minnesota
San Jose, California
Seattle, Washington
South Bend, Indiana

SEATO Announces 1963-64 Schedule of Military Defense Exercises

Press release 584 dated November 14

The schedule of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization military defense exercises for the training year 1963-64 was announced on November 14 by the SEATO military planning office.

The program calls for a tactical air exercise in Thailand and an airborne-amphibious exercise in the Philippines. Both are scheduled to be held during the first half of 1964.

SEATO military exercises are an essential part of normal peacetime training for collective defense and are planned well in advance. Accordingly the SEATO military advisers at their last meeting agreed to an outline plan of training exercises for the period 1964-69.

During the past training year three military exercises were conducted by the military forces

of the United States. The exercises were conducted along the Santa Monica Freeway (Route 101) from the intersection of the Santa Monica Freeway and Colorado Boulevard to Verdugo Road (Route 2) to Little Jimmy Spring area in Angeles National Forest, then by a line running south to Crystal Lake Recreation Area in Angeles National Forest on Route 39; Route 39 to San Bernardino Road (Routes 60, 70 and 99); Routes 60, 70 and 99 to Rosemead Boulevard (Route 19); Route 19 to Santa Anna Freeway (Route 101); Route 101 to Slauson Boulevard; Slauson Boulevard to Sepulveda Boulevard (Route 101A); Route 101A to Manchester Avenue (Route 10); Route 10 to Pacific Ocean. [Footnote in original.]

of the SEATO member nations. Seascope, a naval control of shipping command post exercise sponsored by Australia and the United States, was held in October 1962 in the Southwest Pacific and the Indian oceans. Later, in April and May 1963, Sea Serpent, a maritime exercise sponsored by the United Kingdom, was

conducted in the South China Sea toward the end of the training year, from June 11 to June 25. SEATO held its largest ground defense exercise, Dhanarajata, in Thailand, with that country and the United States as cosponsors. All member nations participated in all three military exercises.

An Open Society: Key to an Advancing America

by Lucius D. Battle

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs*¹

This is my first visit to this historic and honored place. I cannot begin these remarks in any other way than to express, with real humility, my appreciation of the honor of your invitation to come here, on this occasion and before this assembly.

At the same time I am aware of a time-honored tradition—coming, I believe, out of the entertainment world—that the “next to closing” act in a sequence of presentations should be a strong one. The conference is now near the end of its sequence of talks and discussions, and I am aware that President Foster has slipped me in uncomfortably near that exacting—and not altogether enviable—position of “next to closing.”

I can think of few people, however, for whom I would be as willing to have a tryout, in such a role, as I am for your president.

For more than a year now I have had the privilege of working closely with Luther Foster. Among his many public service activities, he is a member of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cul-

tural Affairs. The function of this Commission is to advise the President on our programs and activities in the exchange field and to report to the Congress and to the public, at home and abroad, with a view to developing “a better understanding of and support for the program.”

Although it is advisory, this Commission is distinctly a working commission. For example, members have traveled to various parts of the world to study the operations of our exchange programs—on the ground, so to speak. In the summer of 1962 Dr. Foster made a firsthand on-the-spot report for the Commission on the way our Government and private exchange programs are progressing with four West African countries: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Nigeria. Later in the fall, just a year ago, the Department of State commissioned him to visit Southern Rhodesia to take part in the dedication of a new college and to report on educational developments and prospects. He was the principal speaker at the ceremonies marking the founding of Nyatsime College near Salisbury, which the African founders had patterned after Tuskegee Institute. If emulation is the sincerest form of compliment, Tuskegee indeed takes pride in this recognition, as in other things before it, of the program which Booker T. Washington began to build with a starting capital of \$2,000 eighty-two years ago.

¹ Address prepared for delivery before the Tuskegee Conference on Disadvantage, at Tuskegee Institute, Ala., on Oct. 26. Although Mr. Battle was unable to be present at the conference because his plane was grounded at Washington, the text of his address will be included in the full conference proceedings that the institute will publish shortly.

I am sure this is only one of many examples of how far the little candle lighted then at Tuskegee has cast its beam.

The Advisory Commission is engaged in a wide variety of activities, covering the very broad field which we call, for want of a more precise and descriptive phrase, educational and cultural affairs. I will hope to give this phrase some further and more precise content in the course of these remarks because of the growing importance this activity has in our foreign relations and in our open society.

I have chosen to think of my remarks in the framework of our philosophy of the "open society." This is, I believe, our real key to an advancing America. If so, it is our real key to unlocking solutions to the problems of disadvantage, relating particularly to the Negro in America, with which your sessions here this week have been concerned.

I am attracted to the concept of the open society—of "a public order of human dignity," as has so well been called by Professor McDougal of Yale Law School—not alone because of the historic ideals it represents or its direct relevance to the immediate problems of this conference. These are of course the major considerations, and I want to discuss them in detail a little later on. But first I would like to point out a professional or occupational reason—and a very practical one—why, as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, I have a special interest in this concept.

Relation of Open Society to Exchange Program

"Open society" is a phrase we are fond of using to convey the quality of openness of our life in America—and quite commonly in the sense of openness to the eyes of visitors to this country. It is a phrase with a positive value for us. In our Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs alone we supervise programs bringing more than 5,000 foreign visitors to the United States a year.

Let me give you a specific example of what an open society means to this activity. August 28th of this year had long been selected by an exchange group, the Cleveland International Program for Youth Leaders and Social Workers, for its 169 members from 48 countries to be

in Washington. It is their annual custom to conclude their 4 months of study and observation in the United States with a visit to the Capital—to see historic sites and other points of interest and to hold final meetings before returning to their home countries.

August 28 also became the day, you recall, of the civil rights march in Washington.

During that historic day these visitors from abroad had ample time to mingle freely with the crowds of marchers. They went where they wished. They talked with whomever they wished. At the end of the day many of them gave the program director their impressions of what they had seen and heard. There was a clear consensus: "We saw no bitterness, we saw no hate."

I have cited this example because I believe it gives a good picture of how the orderly processes of an open society work for us.

All of the exchange programs of our Government, and of private sponsors as well, have a great stake in the existence of a fully functioning open society in these United States. As the flow and counterflow of peoples across national and cultural boundaries increase—as we can be sure they will—our society is exposed increasingly to direct, personal, on-the-spot observation. Heads of governments are not the only foreign visitors I have in mind. I am thinking of other key officials, though of lesser rank—of writers, professors, judges, research scholars, students, men and women of science and the arts, all of them able to influence the forward course of mankind. We open our society to them, and we are proud to do so.

We must, however, be aware that the mirror of our life shows many imperfections. I need not labor this point; a conference devoted to a consideration of the disadvantaged groups in our society need not, at this concluding stage of its meetings, be reminded of the reality and high visibility of these imperfections.

I would only make the point here that the type of society we have here—the tone and texture of it—is seen and known throughout the world. Those who see it firsthand know best what to believe about us. And of course our own citizens who go abroad, under our ex-

change programs or in other ways, convey a very direct sense of our society by the appearances they make and by the answers they are able to give to inquiring minds in other countries. There is clearly a direct relation between what we do at home and what we seem to be abroad.

Our aims at home and abroad are truly inseparable. The President's Commission on National Goals in 1960 emphasized this by urging that we strive toward "an open and peaceful world" through making democracy more effective and individual life freer and more rewarding.

Since I have dwelt at some length on the way we appear to the rest of the world, let me make one point very clear. I am not suggesting that we seek to eliminate disadvantage from our society only because the effort will make that society look better in the eyes of others. Human dignity and the rights of men transcend all other considerations. Tuskegee holds a conference such as this, and others in their several ways try to build a better society for all our citizens. They do these things not for the sake of appearances but so that men and women of all races, colors, and creeds may come to enjoy the full realities of freedom and opportunity in an open, democratic society. They do these things to hasten the pace of progress in civil rights, to move forward in all fields where disadvantage now cripples our society. Many, if not most, of you in this audience can give concrete and specific meaning to these words.

Unfinished Business of Democracy

It is fortunate, from every point of view, that we have chosen in this country the course of the open society, with its built-in belief that man can improve his lot upon this earth. But we do need to take stock periodically to see how well we are doing on the unfinished business of a democracy and, if we are not doing well, to get on with the job.

This is the general approach of this conference. We know that disadvantage will not be removed from our society by one such conference, nor many like it. There will be slower progress on many fronts than we would like.

But there is nothing so powerful as a good idea. This good idea—this effort to come to grips with a difficult problem in this way—is wisely conceived as a continuing series of conferences. I believe continuing effort can show real results.

Only 2 days ago this kind of faith was visibly fulfilled in New York City by the dedication of the new building of the Institute of International Education, close by the United Nations.² Forty-four years ago IIE came into being in a one-room office—as little more than an idea.

So I would put my faith in the power of ideas, as you are doing. What goes on in men's minds ultimately determines the whole outcome of issues of economic growth, of social progress and of human survival itself.

But I would also put my faith in the power of trained minds and hands, in the power of education to move the world. I would want to see education, as Booker T. Washington once said, "as common as grass, and as free for all as sunshine and rain."

I do not presume to come before you with any detailed prescriptions for progress. But neither do I propose to leave with you a sense of a general and undefined interest on my part.

We in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs naturally have a special interest in our country's educational and cultural health. We have had occasion many times in planning exchanges of professors, teachers, research scholars, students, and others to be aware of the great educational resources available in this country and on which our international activities depend. But if we look at American education in terms of all its levels—primary through postgraduate—and in terms of the mounting requirements upon it, we see serious inadequacies. It is an easy generality to say that we need more educational opportunity, more trained minds and hands. The hard questions are what, precisely, we need, and how, precisely, to attain it.

In a recent address to the American Council on Education, U.S. Commissioner of Education

²For text of an address by Secretary Rusk, see BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1963, p. 742.

Francis Keppel presented striking—and disturbing—facts. One is that one-third of our young people do not complete high school and 25 percent do not even complete eighth grade.

He also provided data on racial differences in educational opportunity and attainment. One is that almost 12 percent of young white adults (age 25–29) completed college, while only 5.4 percent of this age group in the non-white population have done so.

We might well note Commissioner Keppel's concern not merely with education at the college and graduate levels but with "whether our vocational and technical education programs are adequate to the needs of our labor force, for national economic and technological goals, and to the drive of each individual for economic security and fulfillment."

These facts throw into bold relief the reality of disadvantage, both across the board educationally and with special reference to the educational opportunity available to Negroes. One development on the positive side is the recent appointment of President Stahr of Indiana University to head a new Committee on Equality of Educational Opportunity of the American Council on Education. This body will be concerned primarily with the need to expand opportunities for Negroes in colleges and universities, to formulate a nationwide, long-term plan at faculty, student, and administrative levels in all regions of the country.

There is little need to try to add to the abundant evidence you have relating to educational and economic disadvantage, including the recent report of the President's Commission on the Status of Women, the report of the Commission on National Goals, and many others. In the words of the 1962 Carnegie Corporation report, Negro youth is a reservoir of talent that the United States "is wasting on a shocking scale."

Growth of Opportunity

In more positive terms the forward thrust of our society over the last decades has been closely related to the growth of educational and economic opportunity. For example, Tuskegee, a great pioneer in industrial education, along

with our land-grant colleges and other institutions, has contributed materially to creating the broad base of technically trained manpower we are fortunate to have in this country. A comparison with Latin America will help to illuminate what I mean. In the United States we have some 1,100,000 persons who are engineers or technicians—who have some technical training. By the same standards, the total for all Latin America is an estimated 50,000. At the same time we are aware of the limitations on educational and economic opportunity that run through our society, that constitute a serious block to realizing the growth potentials of our economy and the values of self-expression and fulfillment for all our citizens.

Because it relates so directly to my special concerns in educational and cultural affairs, I might refer briefly to access to the arts as a field of economic opportunity and of self-expression. Such access has been increasing for minority citizens in recent years. The rich artistic talents of Negroes are increasingly recognized and presented abroad as among the finest examples of our contemporary culture. It was in 1939, many of us will recall, that Marian Anderson could not perform in Constitution Hall. As a footnote on the passing years let me point out that just last Monday night, in the same hall, a special concert was presented with a talent lineup that included the Howard University Choir of 50 voices and Louis Armstrong and his concert group. They appeared under the auspices of the United States Committee for the United Nations and to salute the 18th anniversary of the United Nations.

There is another reason why I am proud to mention this concert. Both musical groups, and the other performing artists on the program, had gone abroad under the cultural presentations program of the Department of State. They went as representatives of the performing arts of this country and of American life—just as Duke Ellington and orchestra and the Los Angeles Chamber Orchestra under Henry Lewis are among our touring groups today. The Howard University Choir toured Latin America, under the leadership of Warner

Lawson, who is also a member of our Advisory Committee on the Arts; and Louis Armstrong went to Africa and the United Arab Republic, and to Chile.

The concert was an event in the 9-year history of our cultural presentations program, because this was the first time such an honor had been given to those who have represented us so well. The concert also made clear our commitment, which I deeply feel, that the reflection of American life to audiences abroad through the performing arts should include the great talents which artists of our minority groups can contribute. In addition the concert was unusually good entertainment—with, as one reviewer pointed out, Beethoven, ballet, and Satchmo all on one program!

Foreign Affairs Scholars Program

I do not want to leave the subject of educational and economic opportunity without emphasizing a need we feel in the Department of State. It is for men and women of the Negro race who want to make careers in this field of national service and who have had the educational opportunities to equip themselves for it. The present flow of talent to the foreign affairs field from Tuskegee and similar institutions does not meet the opportunities now available, and these opportunities will surely increase in the future. Now is the time for both individual students and institutions to take steps to provide a greater flow of talented Negroes to a field in which they can make special contributions to their country.

In addition to the self-generated effort that must take place, I can report a very concrete step which the Ford Foundation took earlier this month on a proposal developed by the Department in collaboration with a group of leading Negro educators, including Dr. Foster. The foundation made a grant of \$600,000 to Howard University to support a new scholarship program designed to prepare minority-group students, especially those in Negro colleges, for careers in foreign affairs. The step grows out of the effort several of us in the Department have made for more than a decade to do something about the small number of minor-

ity candidates entering the Foreign Service. This farseeing grant by the Ford Foundation will greatly assist in moving this effort forward, enabling us to reach a largely untapped source of talent and giving more Americans an opportunity to participate in shaping and administering foreign policy.

Commenting on the Ford grant, Secretary Rusk said:³

In the years to come we hope that many young men and women who will benefit from this program will embark on careers in the State Department, USIA, AID and other foreign affairs agencies. They will be welcome.

The goal of greater civic participation reminds us that the whole open-society concept depends on the active participation by citizens in civic affairs. In the pattern of New England town meetings this is relatively simple. Pericles could say of his society: "Although only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge it."

Here is the great concept of citizens capable of judging public questions, able to act to prevent assumptions of authority against the general will, able to assure the open and free atmosphere of public discussion. The Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in 1954 emphasized that men can improve their societies if they have the facts and are free to compare things as they are with their vision of things as they ought to be.

Democracy provides for, and protects, the vital process of subjecting the existing order of things to steady examination. A civilization imbued with the democratic idea will not be satisfied with promised fulfillments indefinitely postponed. It will want to see, and should seek, prompt progress toward the realization of its ideals.

The idea of great dialog goes with the democratic state, as the idea of monolog with the monolithic state. This conference is in the tradition of the democratic, open society, in the fullest sense, in seeking to open a public and continuing dialog on these central problems. It seeks to ask questions, to discuss issues, and to find answers. And it seeks to do so, as we have here this week, with the participation of

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1963, p. 684.

people of all backgrounds of race and creed, bound together by the contributions of expert knowledge they bring and by their common commitment to finding roads of real progress. I have noted that we in the State Department frequently to quote either Alice in Wonderland or Alexis de Tocqueville—or each other. I will not break this assumed precedent, because I want to cite De Tocqueville.

At one place he describes a society in which men are seeking the “petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives.” He sees men close to others but not feeling their presence. He sees men existing only in themselves and for themselves.

This is not the state of man which the Tuskegee conference has in view. Here you have been seeking the hopeful, democratic perspective—the view of human possibilities which the democratic idea invites us to take. This is the way of individual effort, and at times of disappointment, and then again of renewed effort. This is not the way of ease. But it is in the line of Tuskegee’s historic commitment to help the advancement of full democracy in America and, as your announcement of this conference eloquently states, to seek the heightening of sensitivity to human issues of this region and of this nation.

Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, and others in your distinguished line of leaders belong not to Tuskegee alone; they are held in the grateful memory of their nation. In the same way this continuing series of conferences can be a force for thoughtful, constructive progress felt throughout our society.

In our common concern with realizing the great ends we all seek, we can perhaps stand being reminded of the ringing words with which Abraham Lincoln closed his first annual message to Congress in 1861: “The struggle of to-day is not altogether for to-day—it is for a better future also. With a reliance on Providence, all the more firm and earnest, let us proceed in the great task which events have devolved upon us.”

My congratulations to all who have made this conference possible and who are continuing in the “great task which events have devolved upon us.”

Board of Foreign Scholarships Reports on Exchange Program

The Department of State announced on November 6 (press release 565) the release of a report on the U.S. educational exchange program entitled *Experiment in International Understanding*.¹ The report, submitted to Congress on November 5 by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, gives American readers their first closeup of the U.S. educational exchange program as it is carried out overseas.

To illustrate in microcosm the Department of State’s worldwide activity in this field, the Board selected the program with Italy. Although the United States has exchange programs with 135 countries and territories, the Italian example commended itself to the Board for its “rich variety and scope,” length of operation, and rank as one of the five largest in the world.

The report covers the period from September 1961, when the Fulbright-Hays Act was passed, to September 1963. It is devoted largely to the program carried out by the American Commission for Cultural Exchange With Italy, a binational body established at Rome 13 years ago.

The Board of Foreign Scholarships, composed of 12 educational and cultural leaders appointed by the President, supervises the selection of students, scholars, teachers, and trainees for exchange grants administered by the Department of State. Under the chairmanship of John M. Stalnaker, president of the National Merit Scholarship Corporation, the Board oversees academic exchanges not only with the countries having binational commissions but also with the 90 other participating countries and territories where no formal agreement or commission exists.

The Board report notes that since 1949 the U.S. educational exchange program has enabled 21,261 Americans to study, teach, or lecture abroad and 39,257 foreign nationals to have similar opportunities in the United States.

¹ Copies are available upon request from the Operations Staff, Board of Foreign Scholarships, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Scheduled December 1963 Through February 1964

12th Pan American Child Congress	Mar del Plata, Argentina . . .	Dec. 1-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions . .	Geneva	Dec. 2-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 7th Session.	New Delhi	Dec. 2-
U.N. Seminar on Status of Women in Family Law	Bogotá	Dec. 3-
FAO Council: 42d Session	Rome	Dec. 6-
ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Food Products and Drink Industries.	Geneva	Dec. 9-
Inter-American Children's Institute: 44th Meeting of Directing Council.	Mar del Plata, Argentina . . .	Dec. 9-
GATT Action Committee	Geneva	Dec. 10-
U.N. ECAFE Asian Population Conference	Manila	Dec. 10-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Combined Transport Equipment.	Geneva	Dec. 11-
GATT Contracting Parties: 21st Session	Geneva	Dec. 16-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	London	Dec. 16-
NATO Ministerial Council	Paris	Dec. 16-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 36th Session (resumed) .	New York	December
U.N. Special Fund: 11th Session of Governing Council . .	New York	Jan. 13-
UNICEF Executive Board	Bangkok	Jan. 13-
U.N. Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Jan. 13-
WHO Executive Board: 33d Session	Geneva	Jan. 14-
OECD Agriculture Committee	Paris	Jan. 20-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: 23d Session . . .	Geneva	Jan. 20-
International Agricultural Film Competition 1964	Berlin	Jan. 20-
ITU African LF/MF Broadcasting Conference: Preparatory Meeting of Experts.	Geneva	Jan. 20-
ICAO Meteorology/Operations Meeting (in association with WMO Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology).	Paris	Jan. 20-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 8th Session	London	Jan. 21-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Coordination for Indian Ocean Expeditions.	Paris	Jan. 22-
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning.	New York	Jan. 22-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on Data Exchange.	Paris	Jan. 27-
IMCO Working Group on Tonnage Measurement: 5th Session.	London	Jan. 27-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 7th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 27-
NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport.	Paris	Jan. 29-
FAO Desert Locust Control Technical Advisory Committee: 12th Session.	Rome	January
NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee	Paris	January
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development: 3d Session of Preparatory Committee.	New York	Feb. 3-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 16th Session.	Bangkok	Feb. 10-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Nov. 14, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECO, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Trade and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; ITC, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; UN, United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference: 1st Session on the Preparation of a Revised Allotment Plan for the Aeronautical Mobile (R) Service.	Geneva	Feb. 10
U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole	Santiago	Feb. 12-
ITU CCIR Study Group XI: Subgroup on Color Television Standards.	London	Feb. 14-
U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space	New York	Feb. 17-
U.N. ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Coordination of Technical Assistance Activities.	New York	Feb. 17-
U.N. ECE Seminar on Urban and Suburban Travel	Geneva	Feb. 24-
OECD Agriculture Committee: Ministerial Meeting.	Paris	Feb. 26-
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 7th Meeting	Moscow	February
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee	Paris	February
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: 6th Session	Algiers	February
FAO Working Party on Rice Soils, Water, and Fertilizer Practices: 9th Session.	Philippines	February or March

Fifth Committee Discusses U.N. Budget Estimates for 1964

*Statement by William S. Mailliard
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*

Mr. Chairman, before setting forth the general comments of my delegation on the budget estimates for 1964, I should like to express—and to emphasize—our gratitude for several things.

First, to the Secretary-General for his personal appearance before this committee, for his most illuminating statement to us,² and for his thoughtful and helpful foreword to the budget estimates for the coming year.³

Second, we are once again grateful to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for a series of important commendations which in general will be supported by the U.S. delegation; and we are especially appreciative of the contributions of the distinguished chairman of that committee, Ambassador [Thanassis] Aghnides, whose service in that capacity since this organization was established has always reflected the independence and integrity of approach that is in the highest tradition of international public service.

Third, to the Comptroller and his Budget Director for the very careful and detailed man-

ner in which the text and tables have been drawn up, particularly with respect to section 3. The net result is better supporting information than we have had in the past and a generally improved presentation of the budget.

Fourth, we are appreciative of the largely anonymous work of all those members of the Secretariat who have served the organization in the letter and spirit of article 100 of the charter—that touchstone of loyalty to the organization without which there could be no effective and disinterested international civil service.

Fifth, we are gratified to find a number of improvements in administrative practices and financial procedures, including the fact that no overall supplementary appropriation is being requested for the current year and that no expansion in permanent staff is contemplated.

All this is evidence of sound policies, careful work, and devoted service, for which we wish to express our gratitude and appreciation to the responsible officials of the United Nations.

Current Financial Plight

As we turn to the budget estimates for 1964, we are struck at once with that stark and inescapable fact which the Secretary-General expressed in these words: “. . . for the immediate future the financial position of the Organization will remain one of extreme difficulty.” The cold figures—an estimated deficit of \$112 million at the end of the current year—make the point that the Secretary-General did not exactly overstate the problem.

¹ Made in Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary) on Oct. 28 (U.S. delegation press release 79 dated Oct. 25).

² U.N. doc. A/C.5/988.

³ U.N. doc. A/5505.

The reason for our current financial plight is known to all of us. The United Nations is not guilty of irresponsible spending: Some of its members are guilty of irresponsible nonpayment of assessments legally assessed and legally due.

It is a simple statement of fact to say that if delinquent members would pay up their arrearages, our house automatically would be put in order, financially speaking. But we all know, of course, that the question of arrearages is much more than a question of money. If matters drift indefinitely, certain members will lose their voting privilege in the General Assembly under the mandatory and automatic application of article 19. We hope that all nations, large and small, will pay their arrears; none of us wishes to see any member bar itself from full participation in the work of the Assembly.

In the meantime, however, the existence of large arrearages and the consequent budget deficit imposes a heavy drag on the entire organization and inhibits the adoption of any new programs and projects regardless of their merit.

We therefore are faced with the sheer necessity of finding economies wherever we can, of eliminating all frills, of cutting any corners we can cut in a commonsense effort to eliminate all unnecessary costs. An excellent example of how to trim costs without damage to operations is the suggestion of the Advisory Committee that nearly a quarter of a million dollars could be saved by limiting reimbursements for travel costs to economy class rather than first-class fares. I might say in passing that my own Government instituted this very practice some time ago. Substantial economies have resulted, and, while not everybody was entirely happy about it, everybody got where he was needed at less cost per head.

Need for "Consolidation and Containment"

Mr. Chairman, the Secretary-General has called for a policy of "consolidation and containment." It is obvious that this is justified—indeed required—on purely financial grounds. But I would suggest that even if the cost of peacekeeping had not been so high in recent years, even if certain members had not created a financial crisis by refusal to pay assessments,

we would be faced with something of the same problem at about this point in our history, the need for consolidation is, in our view, caused by several things other than a shortage of real cash.

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, I do not find it at all surprising that this organization as a whole has arrived at a period of pause, not in current operations but in rate of growth. I suspect that my delegation would find good reason for supporting the idea of a period of consolidation and containment at about this time even if the budget were balanced and the cash outlook were much brighter than it is. We believe that, quite apart from the purely financial point, at least four factors contribute to our present difficulties: to the need for a bit of consolidation and containment.

First, the very complexity and novelty of the organization, plus the complexity and novelty of the problems with which it deals, would necessitate periodic reappraisals of administrative procedures. I think it is important to remind ourselves, every now and again, that the United Nations is an organization without historical precedent and that it is engaged in an extremely diverse range of activities which have never been undertaken before on an international scale. Many of these activities are extraordinarily complex and sophisticated tasks at the frontiers of human experience—tasks for which the social sciences have yet to provide us with very clear guidelines. We are, in short, engaged in a vast range of experimentation and pioneering. Under the circumstances it would be a plain miracle if our organizational structure, our planning, our programming, our priorities, and our procedures did not need a periodic overhauling.

Second, for almost two decades this organization has been in a process of rapid growth. Our membership has doubled, our institutional structure and substructure has proliferated, programs have expanded, and our costs have gone up from each year to the next. The United Nations today is a complex of 23 constituent and affiliated agencies, employing approximately 35,000 people and spending the equivalent of some 550 millions of dollars—an institutional complex with regional commissions in four geographic areas, resident representa-

a 65 countries, and operational activities in 125 countries and territories. In short, the United Nations today is big business.

Most of us have welcomed this growth. My own Government has been a consistent promoter of expanding the most urgent programs of the United Nations. The United States remains an advocate of strengthening the U.N. system as a whole; we are unlikely to break our habit of support for a more effective United Nations.

But the way to a more effective United Nations is through sound growth and periodic pruning. Organizations, like fruit trees, are stronger when weak branches are cut back. Periods of rapid growth in any organization—even those which deal with familiar and routine tasks—must be followed by moments of pause or consolidation if efficiency is to be retained and carried forward.

Third, Mr. Chairman, we apparently face an absolute shortage, on a worldwide basis, of certain skills required to carry out some of our activities. I am not suggesting, of course, that just because there is a shortage of mathematics teachers or development economists we should not fill a post for a fisheries expert if one is needed and available. But it seems to be a fact of life that with so many nations focusing their efforts on economic and social development, with so many national and regional and international programs of assistance now under way, the world is simply running out of people who are both available and qualified by essential skills. I do not have to point out that if we were to drop our standards of qualification for United Nations employment we would retard, not advance, the longrun growth and the current effectiveness of this organization.

Fourth, there is the equally plain fact of life at the United Nations is bursting at the seams. It is literally true that we have no room for more conferences than we are now having; it is a physical fact that there is no space for additional staff to sit down and work. This is not the place to discuss long-range solutions to these roadblocks, but it is the place to note their existence.

So without for a moment downgrading the narrow financial problem—which is, in fact, the most grave—we wish to emphasize before this

committee that these other real problems, stemming from inherent complexity, rapid growth, and shortages of personnel and physical facilities, would be with us regardless of the current cash position of the United Nations treasury.

Areas Requiring Reexamination

We therefore propose, Mr. Chairman, that we turn our attention with some sense of urgency to making a virtue of necessity. We suggest that the current financial stringency can be exploited usefully by engaging in a systematic exercise in self-evaluation, which, in any case, may be overdue. More specifically, we would call the attention of the members to certain areas which we believe are ripe for critical reassessment.

Before going briefly into these points, let us be perfectly clear that when we talk about the United Nations we are, for the most part, talking about ourselves. The Secretariat does not lay down the policies; it carries out the policies laid down by the members. So if we are searching for solutions, we must look not so much in this building as in the capitals of 111 nations around the world and in the headquarters of delegations around New York.

That being said, let us turn to those areas of U.N. activity where we believe careful reexamination might be fruitful. We suggest that there are four principal areas.

Handling of Assessment Resolutions

First, there is the question of the budgeting procedure itself. I am afraid it must be said bluntly that many members are quite casual about budgetary decisions. The attitude seems to be that if an initial estimate turns out to be inadequate, one can always go back and ask for more. The result is that over the years we have tended to have two budgets each year instead of one—first on an estimated set of expenditures and then on a supplemental set of expenditures. We have recognized the efforts that already have been made to establish the discipline of an annual budget, but greater effort must be made in this direction.

The major source of trouble, of course, is that all too frequently the Assembly is asked to authorize expenditures for programs which have not been carefully costed—and which in some

cases could not be because the scope and scale and even the function of the project have not been worked out adequately before it is presented to the Assembly. Clearly there should be more preparatory work before program and budgetary decisions are made and less preparatory work after program and budgetary decisions are made. When one Assembly approves a conference estimated to cost \$1.5 million and the next Assembly finds that in the course of preparatory work the cost has doubled to \$3 million, something is wrong at one end or the other of that process. Certainly this committee cannot be said to be in control of its proper business when such events occur. We shall not cure this disability of recurring supplemental assessments until assessment resolutions establish expenditure ceilings which can only be exceeded in the most exceptional circumstances. We simply must, as far as is practically possible, take the surprises and guess-work out of budget estimates.

Mr. Chairman, we are not losing sight of the fact that by its very nature the United Nations must cope with unforeseeable emergencies requiring unforeseen expenditures. This is, first and foremost, an organization designed to keep the peace of the world and to restore the peace if the peace is breached. This first function has, and must retain, a priority call on our resources; and this inevitably will require unpredictable budgetary arrangements for operations which cannot be carefully planned out or costed in advance.

But this is all the more reason for a firm annual budget covering the more normal operations which can be planned and for which reasonably accurate estimates can be drawn in advance of assessment actions. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, my delegation feels that the time has come to begin projecting budget estimates for a 2-, 3-, or even a 5-year period. This is common practice for modern governments and corporations. Certainly this committee would gain perspective if it could see ahead for more than a 12-month period.

Programing of Conferences

Second, there is that booming business called the international conference—one of the great

growth industries of the postwar world. Since the birth of the United Nations, my Government has participated in five times as many international conferences as during the whole history of the Republic up to that time.

I do not wish to make light of the dramatic growth in the number and scope of international conferences, for this is a heartening measure of the degree of international cooperation which has been achieved with a major stimulus from the United Nations. We would warn, however, that conference going can be habit forming. We would recall that the main criterion for judging the success of a conference is not how long it lasted, or how many delegates attended, or how many papers were presented, but what actions resulted. And we would especially urge that conference agenda be kept within more manageable proportions than some that have been approved in the past.

It seems clear, Mr. Chairman, that we—and here I most certainly mean we member governments of the United Nations—must somehow find the self-discipline to ask ourselves sternly whether this or that proposed conference will really serve a useful purpose, whether it really has to last that long, whether it really needs that many delegates and that many papers and that many translations at that much cost. In our view, if this kind of self-discipline had been applied to the programing of the conferences provided for in this budget, the combined cost of these conferences might have been reduced by nearly \$2 million. Is it not possible that the Conference on Trade and Development might have been carried out for \$2 million, the Third Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy for \$1 million or less, and the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference for, perhaps, \$700 thousand? The United States believes that this would have been possible with better programing.

Scheduling of Regular Meetings

Third, there is the question of the regularly scheduled annual or more frequent meetings of the councils and executive boards of the various U.N. agencies, commissions, and committees. These are what I had in mind when I warned of the narcotic danger of habitual conference go-

ing. As the years wear on, as the annual meeting in the spring or the fall or the summer becomes more and more of an institutionalized fixture, one tends to forget why the particular meeting schedule was established in the first place.

The mere fact that we met last year and the year before and the year before that really is not a valid reason for meeting this year and next. Without being rude about it, we think the time has come to acquire the habit of asking ourselves bluntly: Is this meeting really necessary? Could we get our business done just as well if we only met every other year or if we delegated interim responsibilities to a small standing committee or to the executive?

Sharpening Criteria for Allocation Priorities

Fourth, there is the difficult, qualitative, and sometimes subjective problem of fixing criteria or determining priorities in the allocation of limited resources. The plain fact is that we do not have the resources to do all the things we would like to do. We never have, and we never shall. So, unless we are to operate on a completely random basis, we are forced into a system of priorities. To do that, we have to define criteria for deciding which subjects, which programs, which projects have prior claims on our resources and talents and time. And the tougher these criteria are—the greater our discipline becomes in resisting the inevitable pressures to make exceptions—the more effective our operations will be across the board.

We are aware of how painful these choices are, how many things there are to do, how many problems, indeed, seem to cry for urgent attention. But the choice is forced upon us by physical limitation of resources; and in these circumstances a failure to make tough-minded choices can only be put down as misuse of precious assets.

This is, and will remain, a continuing problem of all of the agencies—particularly the specialized agencies, the Special Fund, and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. We feel that the need to sharpen criteria for priority systems has become an urgent matter.

Mr. Chairman, if this were the most brilliantly planned, richly financed, perfectly organized,

and ruthlessly administered institution in the world, it would still be immensely complex, inherently difficult, and essentially experimental; so it would still need periodic phases of pause for reexamination and self-assessment.

Let us therefore use the pause which is forced upon us by the current financial crisis for a fresh look at some of the procedures which may show the strain of rapid growth, fundamental complexity, and insinuated habit.

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that in addition to the detailed processing of the budget estimates before this committee we might reach a consensus on the need for application of tighter criteria in the allocation of resources, in the programming of conferences and meetings, and in the handling of assessment resolutions—and that this consensus might be reflected in the committee's report to the General Assembly.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I conclude by recalling that it is precisely because of the enormous importance of the work of the United Nations, because of the pioneering character of its programs, because there is so much to do and so little with which to do it, that the responsibility falls upon us to do what we can do superlatively well. This, it seems to me, is but the price we pay for laboring at some of the most important work ever undertaken by mankind.

World Bank Issues Financial Statement for First Quarter

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on November 4 reported a net income of \$22.6 million in the first quarter of the current fiscal year. Loan commissions earned during the quarter ending September 30, 1963, amounted to \$8 million and were credited to the special reserve, increasing that reserve to \$262.9 million. In addition to its net income and the special reserve, the Bank has a supplemental reserve against losses on loans and guarantees amounting to \$558 million.

Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was \$53.3 million. Expenses totaled \$30.7 million and included \$25.7 million for interest on the Bank's funded debt, for bond issuance, and other financial expenses.

During the period the Bank made 12 loans totaling \$341.2 million in China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Malaysia (2 loans), Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, and Venezuela. This brought the total number of loans to 361 in 67 countries and territories and raised the gross total of commitments to \$7,462.7 million. By September 30, as a result of cancellations, exchange adjustments, repayments, and sales of loans, the portions of loans signed still retained by the Bank had been reduced to \$4,933.8 million.

Disbursements on loans were \$131.8 million, making total disbursements \$5,557.3 million on September 30.

The Bank sold or agreed to sell the equivalent of \$93.5 million principal amounts of loans. At September 30 the total amount of such sales was \$1,698.8 million, of which all except \$69 million was without the Bank's guarantee.

Repayments of principal received by the Bank amounted to \$26.1 million. Total principal repayments amounted to \$1,381.1 million on September 30, consisting of \$681.5 million repaid to the Bank and \$699.6 million repaid to the purchasers of borrowers' obligations sold by the Bank.

During the quarter the following 16 countries became members of the Bank: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Report of the special committee on the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. S/5426, September 16, 1963, 154 pp.; Add. 1, September 26, 1963, 169 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General on the question of military disengagement in the Congo. S/5248, September 17, 1963. 17 pp.

Haitian-Dominican dispute:

Letter dated August 22, from the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General. S/5404. August 28, 1963. 15 pp.

Letter dated September 12 from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Haiti addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/5414, September 20, 1963. 20 pp.

Cable dated September 23 from the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General. S/5415, September 24, 1963. 1 p.

Letter dated September 24 from the permanent representative of Haiti addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/5433. September 24, 1963. 2 pp.

Letter dated October 7 from the permanent representative of India addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the boundary dispute with Communist China. S/5435. 3 pp.

Letter dated October 9 from the permanent representative of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning Kashmir. S/5438, October 9, 1963. 2 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General in pursuance of the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1056th meeting on August 7, 1963 (S/5386) concerning the question of race conflict in South Africa. S/5438. October 11, 1963. 31 pp.

General Assembly

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program. Report on the resettlement of refugees. A/AC.96/205, August 6, 1963, 49 pp.; UNHCR program for 1964, A/AC.96/209, August 12, 1963, 34 pp. report on new refugee situations, A/AC.96/207, August 19, 1963, 19 pp.

Requests for the inclusion of additional items in the agenda of the 18th session:

Letter dated September 16 from the Albanian Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to the Secretary-General concerning "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations." A/5498. September 16, 1963. 3 pp.

Letter dated September 16 from the permanent representatives of certain Asian and African countries concerning "Question of the composition of the General Committee of the General Assembly." A/5519. September 17, 1963. 3 pp.

Letter dated September 16 from the permanent representatives of certain Asian and African countries concerning "Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council." A/5520. September 17, 1963. 3 pp.

Explanatory memorandum from Chile concerning "Measures in connection with the hurricane which has just struck the territories of Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago." A/5566/Rev. 1/Add. 1. October 15, 1963. 3 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. A/5518. September 17, 1963. 19 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on special educational and training programs for South West Africa. A/5526. September 18, 1963. 19 pp.

Question of extended participation in general multilateral treaties concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations. A/5528. September 19, 1963. 27 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and additional protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000. *Notification received that it continues to be bound:* Cyprus, April 23, 1963.

Adherence deposited: Uganda, July 24, 1963. Protocol to amend the convention for unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955. Entered into force August 1, 1963.¹ *Signature:* Morocco, May 31, 1963. *Ratifications deposited:* Belgium, August 27, 1963; Portugal, September 16, 1963.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation (to increase number of parties which may request holding an extraordinary meeting of Assembly). Adopted by Assembly at Rome September 15, 1962.² *Ratification deposited:* United States, November 8, 1963.

Fur Seals

Protocol amending the interim convention of February 9, 1957 (TIAS 3948), on conservation of North Pacific fur seals. Done at Washington October 8, 1963.² *Ratification deposited:* Canada, November 12, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433. *Ratifications deposited:* Australia, November 12, 1963; Bulgaria, November 13, 1963; Burma, November 15, 1963.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection of industrial property. Dated at The Hague November 6, 1925. Entered into force June 1, 1928; for the United States March 6, 1931. 47 Stat. 1789. *Accession deposited:* Rumania, October 19, 1963. *Notifications received that they consider themselves bound:* Central African Republic, October 5, 1963; Chad, September 11, 1963; Laos, September 17, 1963; Upper Volta, September 17, 1963.

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, for the protection of industrial property revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, and at London

June 2, 1934. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.

Accession deposited: Rumania, October 19, 1963.

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 30, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon, October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Accessions deposited: Central African Republic, Chad, Laos, Rumania, Upper Volta, October 19, 1963.

Safety of Life at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, October 23, 1963.

Trade

Uganda on August 9, 1963, acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of the United Kingdom with respect to the following:

Protocol of rectification to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force March 24, 1948. TIAS 1761.

Protocol modifying certain provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force April 15, 1948. TIAS 1763.

Special protocol modifying article XIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force April 19, 1948. TIAS 1764.

Special protocol relating to article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force June 7, 1948. TIAS 1765.

Second protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force September 14, 1948. TIAS 1888.

Protocol modifying part I and article XXIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2744.

Protocol modifying part II and article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force December 14, 1948. TIAS 1890.

First protocol of modifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2745.

Third protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1951. TIAS 2393.

Protocol modifying article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force March 28, 1950. TIAS 2300.

Protocol replacing schedule I (Australia) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1951. TIAS 2394.

Protocol replacing schedule VI (Ceylon) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2746.

Annecy protocol of terms of accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy October 10, 1949. Entered into force for the United States October 10, 1949. TIAS 2100.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20401. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.

Education—Exchange Commission and Financing Programs. Agreements with Colombia. Signed at Bogotá January 9, 1957. Entered into force provisionally January 9, 1957. Entered into force definitively January 1, 1959. And amending agreement effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá December 27, 1960. Entered into force December 27, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá May 3 and 11, 1962. Entered into force May 11, 1962. TIAS 5236. 16 pp. 10¢.

Economic Development—Commitment of Funds to the Tunisia Three-Year Plan. Agreement with Tunisia. Exchange of notes—Dated at Tunis September 28 and October 29, 1962. Entered into force October 29, 1962. TIAS 5239. 5 pp. 5¢.

International Trade in Cotton Textiles. Long-term arrangements with Other Governments. Done at Geneva February 9, 1962. Accepted by the United States September 26, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962. TIAS 5240. 26 pp. 15¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Morocco. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rabat September 11, 1962. Entered into force September 11, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5241. 13 pp. 10¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Ceylon. Exchange of notes—Signed at Colombo November 21, 1962. Entered into force November 21, 1962. TIAS 5245. 7 pp. 10¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Guinea. Exchange of notes—Signed at Conakry December 11 and 14, 1962. Entered into force December 14, 1962. TIAS 5246. 6 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Greece, amending the agreement of August 4, 1955, as amended. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Entered into force provisionally August 4, 1962. Entered into force definitively October 25, 1962. TIAS 5251. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreements with Chile, amending the agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended. Exchanges of notes—Signed at Santiago November 29, 1962. Entered into force November 29, 1962. TIAS 5252. 6 pp. 5¢.

Fourth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 3, 1950. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2747.

Fifth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Torquay December 16, 1950. Entered into force June 30, 1953. TIAS 2764.

Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and schedules of tariff concessions annexed thereto. Done at Torquay April 21, 1951. Entered into force June 6, 1951. TIAS 2420.

First protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 27, 1951. Entered into force October 21, 1953. TIAS 2885.

Second protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 8, 1952. Entered into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4250.

Third protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 24, 1953. Entered into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4197.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.
Accessions deposited: Peru, November 4, 1963; Philippines, November 8, 1963.

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Madagascar, October 9, 1963.

BILATERAL

Greece

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with related letter. Signed at Athens October 30, 1963. Entered into force October 30, 1963.

Korea

Consular convention. Signed at Seoul January 8, 1963.

Ratifications exchanged: November 19, 1963.

Enters into force: December 19, 1963.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to November 11 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 563 of November 2, 565 of November 6, and 575 of November 9.

No.	Date	Subject
576	11/12	Uruguay credentials (rewrite).
*577	11/12	Kennedy and Rusk: messages to Japan on mine disaster and railway accident.
*578	11/12	U.S. participation in international conferences.
579	11/12	Note to Soviet Union on travel restrictions.
580	11/12	Notes to Soviet bloc countries on travel restrictions.
581	11/13	Czechoslovak credentials (rewrite).
*582	11/13	Award for <i>Department of State 1963</i> publication.
†583	11/15	U.S.-Hong Kong cotton textile agreement.
584	11/14	SEATO military defense exercises.
585	11/16	Rusk: anniversary of Gettysburg Address.
†586	11/15	<i>Foreign Relations</i> volume for 1943 published.
587	11/13	Cleveland: "The Agony of Success."

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1276



December 9, 1963

We all share the deep sense of shock which has swept over the Nation today because of the grievous loss which all of us have suffered. Those of us who have had the high privilege of serving closely with President Kennedy will always cherish the gallantry and the wisdom and the grace with which he carried his awesome and lonely responsibilities. This is a great nation, with great strength and much unfinished business, and one of our greatest Americans is now President. President Johnson needs and deserves our fullest support as he takes up these high responsibilities on behalf of all Americans.

DEAN RUSK

*Statement made upon arrival at Andrews Air
Force Base, Md., 12:40 a.m., November 23, 1963.*

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BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

To the People of the United States:

John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 35th President of the United States, has been taken from us by an act which outrages decent men everywhere.

He upheld the faith of our fathers, which is freedom for all men. He broadened the frontiers of that faith, and backed it with the energy and the courage which are the mark of the Nation he led.

A man of wisdom, strength, and peace, he moulded and moved the power of our Nation in the service of a world of growing liberty and order. All who love freedom will mourn his death.


As he did not shrink from his responsibilities, but welcomed them, so he would not have us shrink from carrying on his work beyond this hour of national tragedy.

He said it himself: "The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it—and the glow from that fire can truly light the world."

Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, do appoint Monday next, November 25, the day of the funeral service of President Kennedy, to be a national day of mourning throughout the United States. I earnestly recommend the people to assemble on that day in their respective places of divine worship, there to bow down in submission to the will of Almighty God, and to pay their homage of love and reverence to the memory of a great and good man. I invite the people of the world who share our grief to join us in this day of mourning and rededication.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-third day of November in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of [SEAL] America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1276 PUBLICATION 7630 DECEMBER 9, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Statements by U.S. Officials on President's Death

CABINET OFFICERS AT HONOLULU¹

We are deeply shocked by this grievous tragedy which has removed a great and beloved leader of our country and of the world's quest for peace. Our hearts are with Mrs. Kennedy and her family at this time of sorrow. The Nation must find at such a moment its inner strength and a renewed dedication. Our prayers go with President Johnson as he assumes the high responsibilities of the Presidency.

DEAN RUSK	LUTHER HODGES
DOUGLAS DILLON	WILLARD WIRTZ
STEWART UDALL	WALTER HELLER
ORVILLE FREEMAN	

President Kennedy died at about one o'clock, central standard time, at Dallas, Tex., on November 22, shortly after he had been shot by an assassin during a parade through the downtown section of the city.

passionate sense of the meaning of poverty, fear, and injustice and a will to lift them.

In 3 years he set a course, at home and on the world scene, which visibly raised the hopes of men that freedom could triumph without war and that free men could, by their own devices, elevate their lives and those of their children.

He drew for his strength on the deepest traditions of this nation. As in grief we face the future, we draw from the living memory of his dedication to those traditions—and from his unforgettable courage—the will to carry on.

UNDER SECRETARY BALL

Press release 601 dated November 22

A great President is tragically dead.

At a critical moment in history he evoked from his own nation and from men who cherish human freedom and peace everywhere the confidence and the faith to move forward.

In his person there were courage, grace, and an understanding of the responsibility that power carries with it. There was also a com-

AMBASSADOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON

U.S./U.N. press release 4317 dated November 22

The tragedy of this day is beyond instant comprehension. All of us who knew him will bear the grief of his death to the day of ours. And all men everywhere who love peace and justice and freedom will bow their heads.

At such a moment we can only turn to prayer—prayer to comfort our grief, to sustain Mrs. Kennedy and his family, to strengthen President Johnson, and to guide us in time to come. May God help us.

¹ Statement made on Nov. 22. These Cabinet-level officers were on a plane bound for Tokyo to attend a meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs scheduled for Nov. 25-27. When they received the news of the President's death, they returned immediately to Honolulu and thence to Washington.

World Leaders Pay Tribute to President Kennedy

Following are a few of the messages of condolence sent to President Johnson and Mrs. Kennedy at the time of President Kennedy's death. They are a small but representative part of the hundreds of tributes which were received from other countries.

MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

President Ben Bella asks that his profound condolences be expressed to the Government of the United States, to Mrs. Kennedy and to other members of President Kennedy's family. President Ben Bella is deeply moved by the loss of his friend, President Kennedy, a loss which will be felt by the entire world and particularly by Algeria, which remembers President Kennedy's assistance to the Algerian people during the hours of their greatest need.

Sent on behalf of Ahmed Ben Bella, President of Algeria, by U.S. Ambassador William Porter

In the name of the Argentine people and Government and in my own name, I send to the people and Government of the United States of America this expression of our consternation and profound grief at the death of your illustrious President, John F. Kennedy. His struggles for the strengthening of peace and the improvement of the lot of the peoples of the world and his defense of democracy and human rights gave to his person a luster comparable only to that of the greatest heroes of your great nation. Humanity and the United States of America have lost a statesman who was inspired by a profound faith in God and in the destinies of man. Argentina is in mourning and shares

this grief-stricken moment with the great people of the United States.

ARTURO U. ILLIA
President of the Argentine Republic

Deeply distressed over the news of the death of President John F. Kennedy, I wish to express to Your Excellency and through you to our brothers, the people of the United States of America, the sentiments of the deepest sorrow of the people and the Government of Brazil.

JOÃO GOULART
President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil

The Chinese Government and people are greatly shocked and grieved in learning of the tragic death of President John F. Kennedy. The United States of America lost a great President and the free world lost an inspiring leader. His untimely death is a great loss to the cause of the free world. On behalf of the Chinese Government and people I am sending my heartfelt sympathy and condolences to the American Government and people.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK
President of the Republic of China

Deeply grieved by the sad death of your illustrious President Kennedy, I wish to express to Your Excellency and to your country, on behalf of the people and Government of Colombia and in my own name, the feelings of sorrow which this tragic event has brought to us. The memory of this statesman will always be especially and gratefully cherished by Colombians. We recall at this time with great feeling the pleasant moments of his visit to our country, and we appreciate in all their generous magni-

tude his course, programs, and accomplishments in bringing about closer relations between our two peoples and governments. As time goes by, the figure of President Kennedy will grow in the consciousness of men as the most forceful champion of freedom, human rights, understanding and harmony among men and nations, and world peace. His death plunges all mankind into mourning and will always be an irreparable misfortune for the Americas.

I express to Your Excellency my very sincere wishes for the success of the Government over which you now preside and the hope that the high principles of inter-American solidarity that inspired the public life and the governmental work of your illustrious predecessor may be kept alive.

GUILLERMO LEÓN VALENCIA
President of Colombia

We are deeply grieved at the passing of President John F. Kennedy, who so well embodied the principles and ideals to which the American nation is dedicated. His contributions to the securing of world peace have earned him the gratitude of all men and all suffer a common loss at his death. The energy and dedication which characterised his service held out high promise for all who shared these same desires for mankind, and all men of good will must express their sorrow at his passing.

Africans in particular must mourn the passing of this man who devoted so much of his term in the highest office of the United States to securing for Americans of African descent the dignity which is rightfully theirs. He now takes his place with Abraham Lincoln in the ranks of America's and the world's heroes who laid down their lives in pursuit of the brotherhood and equality of man.

The tasks which this great man began now fall to your lot and we pray that you will be granted the wisdom and courage to carry them through to their final and complete fruition. We personally and the Ethiopian people extend to you and the American nation our sympathy at the tragedy which you have sustained.

HAILE SELASSIE I
Emperor of Ethiopia

The death of President Kennedy deeply grieves the French people, who had an exceptionally high regard for this great Chief of State who served the cause of freedom and human dignity so illustriously.

In the face of the misfortune which so deeply afflicts your country and affects all the nations of the world, and at a time when destiny charges you with the highest responsibilities, please be assured, Mr. President, of the more than ever faithful and trusting friendship that France bears toward the United States of America.

GENERAL DE GAULLE
President of the French Republic

I heard with the greatest consternation and most heartfelt sympathy the terrible news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Federal Government and the entire German nation stand, shaken, at your side and at the side of the American people. Only future generations will be able fully to assess the tragic loss that your country and all mankind has suffered. In the same way that, as a young man, he was prepared to give his life for his country and the ideals of freedom, so he did when the trust of the American people called him to the most important post in the free world. The German nation mourns in him a friend and ally who felt our cares as his own and to whom the freedom of all was the highest goal. Germany, which had the honor to give him a heartfelt reception only a few months ago, will never forget John F. Kennedy.

LUDWIG ERHARD
*Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of Germany*

With the American people the Berliners grieve for John F. Kennedy. In their name I wish to express to you the condolence we feel so deeply. Dear President Johnson, in the most terrible hours of our own recent history we came to know you as a good friend. All Berliners want God to bless and protect you while carrying on your heavy task.

WILLY BRANDT
Governing Mayor, West Berlin

I am bewildered and shocked at the tragic news of the assassination of my personal friend and great statesman John F. Kennedy. President Kennedy was a distinguished champion in the great fight for the rights of man. It needed a man of President Kennedy's courage to take the uncompromising stand which characterised his policies for the achievement of racial equality and human dignity. By his notable achievements during his unexpectedly brief term of office President Kennedy left a profound mark on the course of human history. May his supreme sacrifice fortify men of goodwill to redouble their efforts towards the achievement of justice, freedom, equality and the brotherhood of man. Please accept on behalf of myself, the Government and people of Ghana profound condolences on this great loss.

KWAME NKRUMAH
President of the Republic of Ghana

I am shocked and horrified to learn of the tragic death of President Kennedy. On behalf of my peoples, I send my sincere sympathy to the Government, and to the Congress, and to the people of the United States of America.

ELIZABETH R

On behalf of the British Government I extend to you and to the Government of the United States of America our deepest sympathy in the terrible loss that you have sustained by the assassination of President Kennedy. He was greatly admired and loved by us all.

I extend to you our assurance of friendship and support in the heavy burdens which have devolved upon you.

ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME
Prime Minister of Great Britain

I send you my profound sympathy in the loss of your friend and comrade and my heartfelt good wishes for the great office which you have now assumed.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

On the occasion of your elevation to the high office of Chief Executive of the United States of America I hasten to express to you my heartfelt congratulations together with sincere good

wishes for your success in the vital charge you have assumed. The world at large looks upon you at this critical time for the continuation and further strengthening of the noble ideals and lofty goals set by your late lamented illustrious predecessor for the safeguarding of international peace and liberty among nations.

MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI
Shah of Iran

Stunned by sorrow over the heavy blow inflicted to the United States and all mankind, I express on my own behalf and that of our people my deep condolences to the bereaved family, the nation, and world democracy.

ZALMAN SHAZAR
President of Israel

Still deeply shocked by the terrible loss which the death of President Kennedy has inflicted upon the American nation, our friend and ally, and upon the entire world, I would have liked to come personally to Washington to attend his funeral and thus attest once more to the deep and intense feeling of solidarity [with the United States] that is held by the Italian nation.

Unfortunately, I must submit to my physician's advice not to travel, due to a slight troublesome indisposition. I, therefore, appoint Senator Cesare Merzagora, President of the Senate, to represent me on that occasion, as provided by the Constitution.

I take this opportunity to renew to you, Mr. President, the assurances of the cordial friendship I have felt toward you since I had the pleasure of meeting you during your official visit to Rome, and again on the occasion of your private visit last July.

In this difficult hour, Italy feels more than ever the strength of the bonds that unite her with America, and will continue to make common cause with your country in her efforts in behalf of liberty, justice, and peace.

It is with these sentiments that I express to you my very best wishes for success as you face the extremely grave responsibilities that lie ahead, armed with your unusual skill and with the support not only of your own people, but also of all countries which, like Italy, are linked with the United States by indissoluble bonds.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my most sincere and cordial friendship.

ANTONIO SEGNI
President of the Italian Republic

I beg Your Excellency to accept the most sincere condolences of the Government and people of the Ivory Coast on the occasion of the heinous assassination of President John Kennedy. We in Africa realize how fraught with grave consequences is his death, for his courageous life had been for us a pledge of peace and brotherhood in the world. Humanity has lost in him not only one of the greatest Presidents in American history, but also one of the greatest men in the history of mankind. As you assume the supreme office of your country, we wish to express to you, Mr. President, our most cordial good wishes, in the certainty that you will pursue and bring to completion the noble mission of your illustrious predecessor.

FELIX HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY
President of the Republic of Ivory Coast

Our Government and the entire people are shocked at the tragic death of President Kennedy. We mourn the loss of the world's leader and champion of peace and justice in the world.

His courageous and energetic leadership for the freedom of mankind and unity of the free people of the world shall live forever and leave an indelible mark in the pages of modern history of mankind.

Please convey to the loving family members of the deceased Chief of State our humble prayers for the peaceful repose of his body and soul. We are fully aware of the immense responsibilities and tasks before Your Excellency but we are also confident that the new Chief Executive of the United States will carry the burden for the good and welfare for all mankind throughout this universe.

CHUNG HEE PARK
Acting President of the Republic of Korea

It is with the greatest sadness that I learn of the death of President John Kennedy, victim of an inhumanly evil attack. In paying tribute to the glorious memory of President Kennedy, I extend to Your Excellency and to the people of the United States, in my name and in the name

of the Laotian people, my profound expressions of sympathy and friendship. I ask that Your Excellency also convey to Mrs. Kennedy my most heartfelt condolences and the expressions of my great respect.

SRI SAVANG VATTHANA
King of Laos

In the name and on behalf of the Government, the people of Liberia, and myself, I extend profound condolence and regrets to Your Excellency, the Government, and the people of the United States for the tragic and inhumane murder of your predecessor, the late President John F. Kennedy, whose youthful energy, ability, clarity of vision and courage of conviction contributed so much nationally and internationally in the short span of his natural life and incumbency as President of the United States. His death has cast a great pall not only over the United States but also over most countries of the world prominently among which is Liberia. Upon your accession to the Presidency of the great United States of America, I am happy to extend to Your Excellency hearty congratulations in my own name and in the name of the Government and people of Liberia which has always been, and still remains, closely aligned with the United States by ties of friendship. May God grant you wisdom, strength, and courage to continue.

W. V. S. TUBMAN
President of Liberia

Deeply moved by the news of the fatal attack to which His Excellency President Kennedy fell victim this morning, I beg you to accept the expression of the profound sorrow of the Mexican Government and people—to which I add my own—for the death of that illustrious statesman and friend of my country who had tirelessly devoted his efforts to promoting peace among nations and justice among men.

Having also been informed of the shock which this cruel event has caused you, I express the hope that you have already recovered from it and I renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration and personal friendship.

ADOLFO LÓPEZ MATEOS
President of the United Mexican States

The announcement of the dastardly attack on President Kennedy, which resulted in his death, has shocked the Moroccan people, their King, and Government. The United States of America and the free world have lost in President Kennedy a man who devoted all the energy and dynamic action of which he was capable to the cause of peace and peaceful coexistence.

We pay tribute to his memory and express to the American nation, represented by you, to President Kennedy's widow, and to you our most sincere and heartfelt condolences.

HASSAN II
King of Morocco

Deeply moved by the abominable assassination of His Excellency John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, I offer to Your Excellency, in the name of the Panamanian Government and people, in my own name, and through you to the Government and people of the United States, these most sincere expressions of condolence at this irreparable loss, which brought to an end the life of a great man who was the champion of democracy and the defender of human liberties.

ROBERTO F. CHIARI
President of the Republic of Panama

The tragic death of President Kennedy has deeply moved the Peruvian Government and people, who saw in him a world leader whose acts were always inspired by the noblest aims of human solidarity. In this grave and sorrowful hour, please accept my most heartfelt condolences, along with my sincere wishes that your government, animated by the same shining ideals of your illustrious predecessor, may bring back hope to your great nation that is now so afflicted by this irreparable loss. I anticipate for our two countries a continuation of the close and cordial relations that prevailed during his enlightened term of office.

FERNANDO BELAUNDE TERRY
President of Peru

On behalf of the people and Government of the Republic of the Philippines I would like to convey to you my fervent hope that with God's help you may bear with strength and courage

the responsibilities of the office of President of the United States.

As the head of a great nation, you are the leader also of the free world, and free peoples everywhere shall look to you, as they have done until now to your late distinguished and deeply lamented predecessor, for unceasing inspiration and support in the unremitting struggle for freedom, equality and human dignity.

I take this occasion to assure you of the continued cooperation and undying friendship of the Filipino people.

DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL
President of the Philippines

Deeply moved by the shocking news on the murder of the President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy and revolted at this crime, we send you, Mr. President, the American Government and nation expressions of sorrow and heartfelt sympathy on behalf of the Polish people, the Council of State, and the Government of the Polish People's Republic and on our own behalf. President Kennedy's name will go down into the annals of history as that of an outstanding statesman and citizen who devoted his energy and extraordinary abilities to the development of his country and to the cause of peaceful international coexistence and who displayed great understanding for the furtherance of friendly American-Polish relations.

ALEKSANDER ZAWADZKI
Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic
JOZEF CYRANKIEWICZ
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic

I am profoundly shocked to learn of the untimely and tragic death of President John F. Kennedy. On behalf of the Syrian Arab people and Government and on my own behalf I hasten to extend to Your Excellency and to the American people the sincere expression of condolences on the loss of a great President who dedicated his life for the preservation of world peace and tranquillity. The late President Kennedy has rendered humanity the greatest services of our day and has set an example for selflessness and devotion. I express the confidence that you

shall continue the work which your great predecessor has undertaken with courage and vigor for a better world. May the Almighty help you in leading the American people towards the noble goal to which they aspire.

AMIN AL-HAFIZ

President of the Syrian Arab Republic

Tanganyika has been deeply shocked to learn of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The pursuit by true Americans of justice for all men both in the United States and the world outside will be his lasting memorial. He trod faithfully in the footsteps of Lincoln, with whom he is now linked in death. Please accept my personal condolences, and those of the Government and people of Tanganyika.

JULIUS K. NYERERE

President of Tanganyika

I am deeply shocked at the terrible news of the attack that has cost the life of President John Kennedy. This loss is felt with profound sorrow not only by the American nation, but by all peoples, all men, and particularly by those who knew President Kennedy personally and witnessed his noble and intelligent contribution to peace and his ceaseless fight for human dignity, freedom, and justice. His work has already left a deep mark on our era, both in the preservation of peace and in the social and economic advancement of man. I am convinced that the death of President Kennedy, who was struck down just as he was making magnificent progress toward the realization of these objectives, will be recorded in history as an example of a sacrifice courageously made in the service of a cause in which all men feel equally concerned.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of the sincere condolences, which I extend to you personally, to the Kennedy family and the American people, in the name of the Tunisian people and in my own name.

HABIB BOURGUIBA

President of the Republic of Tunisia

Profoundly distressed to hear of the dastardly assassination of President Kennedy, I hasten to convey on behalf of the people of Turkey and on my own behalf our deepest

sympathies and sincere condolences to Your Excellency and through you to the family of the bereaved as well as to the great American nation for this irreplaceable loss which deeply grieves them and all peace and progress loving people of the world. The entire Turkish nation is now sharing the deep sorrow for the loss of this great man who has given all his energies and now his life in upholding the supreme ideals which we all must continue to defend and advance.

CEMAL GÜRSEL

President of the Turkish Republic

I am deeply saddened by the news of the tragic death of the eminent statesman, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, President of the United States of America.

The death of J. F. Kennedy is a heavy blow to all people who value world peace and Soviet-American cooperation.

The dastardly assassination of the President of the United States at a time when, as a result of the efforts of peace-loving peoples, there were noticeable signs of a relaxation of tension and prospects were opening up for an improvement in relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. arouses the indignation of the Soviet people against the perpetrators of this infamous crime. From my personal meetings with J. F. Kennedy I remember him as a statesman of broad views, with a realistic grasp of the situation, striving to find a way to settle by means of negotiation the international problems now dividing the world.

The Soviet Government and the Soviet people share in the sorrow of the American people on the occasion of this great loss, and express the hope that the search for a settlement of the questions at issue, to which President J. F. Kennedy greatly contributed, will be continued in the interest of peace and the good of all mankind.

Accept, Mr. President, the expression of my personal sympathy.

N. KHRUSHCHEV

Chairman, Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

In these difficult circumstances in which you accede to the responsibilities of the Presidency of the United States of America, I address to

you in the name of the people of the United Arab Republic and in my own name all wishes for success. I pray that Almighty God will help you to carry the heavy burden that has been entrusted to you so unexpectedly and in such sad and painful circumstances.

Confident that the American people will respond to your appeal in a difficult hour and give you its full support, we are convinced that the many forces that act for progress and peace and sincerely seek their realization will do all in their power to participate fully with you in facing the consequences of the crisis.

In many circumstances your predecessor gave proof of his courage and of his ability to envisage new horizons of human progress. In offering our most sincere condolences to you for this cruel loss, and in sharing the grief that his departure has caused the American nation, we sincerely wish you success in carrying to newer and broader horizons of progress and peace the standard that has fallen before its time in the midst of the battle.

GAMAL ABD AL-NASSER

President of the United Arab Republic

To Your Excellency and to the beloved American people we offer the expression of our sincerest prayerful condolences on the death in particularly tragic circumstances of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy whom we had known personally and whose intrepid character and high qualities we admired. We pray God to grant Your Excellency as you accede to the Presidency of the nation his choicest graces of guidance and strength.

PAULUS VI

In the name of my Government and the people of Venezuela and in my own name, I express to Your Excellency my most profound and sincere sorrow at the tragic death of His Excellency John F. Kennedy. The death of so great a figure and so noble a friend of Venezuela is especially painful for the nations of Latin America who saw in his policy of the Alliance for Progress a hope for better well-being, justice, and inter-American cooperation.

RÓMULO BETANCOURT

President of the Republic of Venezuela

We have been profoundly moved and embittered by the news of the brutal attack upon the President of the United States of America, John F. Kennedy, and his tragic death. On behalf of the peoples and Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in my own name I wish to express to the American people, to your Government and to you personally our sincere condolences in the great sorrow of the people of the United States over their tragic loss. All of us who recently had occasion to meet and talk with President Kennedy will remember him as a statesman and man who had pledged himself for the improvement of international relations. We are convinced that his dedication to the cause of international understanding and world peace will be of lasting benefit to peace-loving mankind.

JOSIP BROZ TITO

President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

MESSAGES TO MRS. KENNEDY

I am shocked beyond words to hear of the tragedy which has befallen you. On behalf of the people of Canada I send to you, to the other members of your family and to the people of the United States, a message of heartfelt sympathy in this cruel bereavement.

I assure you that my wife and I share your sorrow in a very personal way, remembering as we do the happy hours we spent together at Government House during your visit to Canada. May I say that your husband lives in my memory as a very charming and lovable man. He possessed an unmistakable quality of greatness, tempered by a most engaging simplicity. My prayers accompany him and you in his death.

GEORGES P. VANIER

Governor General of Canada

Both Indira and myself were shocked to hear the sad news of President Kennedy's assassination. This dastardly act has tragically ended, in the prime of life, a distinguished and noble career which meant so much not only to the people of the United States, but to the people of the world.

You and the children have lost a fond hus-

band and devoted father. The people of the United States have lost a great and a noble leader. And the world has lost a distinguished and a high-minded statesman.

In this tragic loss, our hearts and our deepest sympathies go out to you, your children and the American people. The world is a lot poorer by this sudden and tragic end of a great man and a very distinguished statesman.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
Prime Minister of India

I am most shocked and extremely moved to have received the sad news that the President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy has been assassinated. With this sad incident a great American leader has passed away whom I fully honoured and respected. I could say this because I have come to know him personally as a great leader who was fighting for the progress of the United States of America and for the establishment of a proper place for the American people in conformity with the development of the world at present stage. I pray that the American people will be able to cope with the loss of this great son of the United States of America who has also earned great respect in the eyes of the world. To Mrs. John F. Kennedy and the family I express on behalf of the Indonesian people my deepfelt condolences and hope that God Almighty will give to John F. Kennedy a favoured place in Heaven. Amen.

SOEKARNO
President of Indonesia

On hearing the tragic news very early this morning I immediately wrote to Ambassador Baldwin asking him to convey to you and members of your bereaved family my heartfelt sympathy at this time of your deep sorrow. All the world will remember your late husband as a leader who strove valiantly for peace and freedom. His constant courage was an example to free men everywhere.

TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN
Prime Minister of Malaysia

Words are inadequate to describe the pain that gripped my heart when I heard of the sudden and tragic manner in which your husband lost his life and to express to you the profound sorrow that my husband and I feel for you in your profound grief.

Knowing you and your husband personally since we received your warm hospitality in the White House in June 1961, we take the passing of your husband as a great loss to us personally. Also, his departure from the national and international scene at the height of his life, at a time when the whole world was expecting new developments toward a better world under his vigorous, youthful and dedicated leadership, is indeed a profound loss to all peoples who support and share his ideals and purposes.

We do not know how to offer you comfort at this sad hour. But believe us that the great ideals for which your husband stood and the meaningful efforts he was making to realize them will be carried on by all of us who are of the same heart and mind.

We pray that you will take good care of your health, Caroline and John F. Jr., believing that you are not alone in suffering the pain of loss of a great and good man.

With profound sympathy,
Very sincerely,

mitsue ikeda
Wife of the Prime Minister of Japan

My wife and I have been appalled by the great tragedy that has so suddenly struck you and your family.

The people of the United States and the whole world have been deprived of the dedicated services of a leader and statesman of extraordinary courage, vision and energy.

Your illustrious husband's achievements assure for him a place in history.

In this tragic hour of your bereavement, our hearts go out in deepest sympathy and sorrow to you and your children.

We pray that God will give you the strength and fortitude to bear your immeasurable loss.

ayub khan
President of Pakistan

U.N. General Assembly Holds Memorial Meeting

The U.N. General Assembly met in plenary session on November 26 to hear tributes to President Kennedy. Following are texts of statements by Carlos Sosa-Rodriguez, President of the 18th session of the General Assembly, Secretary-General U Thant, and Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative.

DR. SOSA-RODRIGUEZ

John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the 35th President of the United States, is dead. He fell at his post, in the service of his country. The treacherous act of an assassin, inspired by the hatred and fanaticism against which he fought so hard, has struck down in the flower of his age a life full of achievement and full of promise for his country and for humanity.

Not only America but the whole world mourns his passing, for by it the whole world has lost one of those rare humans in whom energy and generosity join to produce glorious and productive activity in the service of the noblest ideals.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy was a leader of peoples in the full sense of the word. His unshakable faith in the need to reaffirm and strengthen the rights inherent in the dignity of mankind and his fight to do away with prejudice, discrimination, and inequality won him the support and the love of millions of people who still suffer those injustices.

His broad vision of world problems, which enabled him to combine defense of the principles and ideals he professed with the tolerance necessary for the maintenance of peace and better understanding among peoples, gained him admiration and respect among all nations.

His simplicity and his kindness as a son, husband, and father permitted him to penetrate

very deeply into the hearts of his countrymen and very deeply, too, beyond his country's frontiers.

The image of President Kennedy, the traces he has left behind him, can never be erased. These traces are also deeply marked in this very General Assembly hall, in which we are gathered today to pay a tribute to his memory.

On the very day of his inauguration as President of the United States, President Kennedy pledged his support to the United Nations in these unforgettable words:¹

To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support—to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective—to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak—and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run.

That pledge was kept.

Scarcely 2 months ago, when no one could suspect the horrible tragedy that would make his address the last he was to make in this forum, President Kennedy told us in words which still ring in our ears:²

The world has not escaped from the darkness. The long shadows of conflict and crisis envelop us still. But we meet today in an atmosphere of rising hope and at a moment of comparative calm. My presence here today is not a sign of crisis, but of confidence. I am not here to report on a new threat to the peace or new signs of war. I have come to salute the United Nations and to show the support of the American people for your daily deliberations.

And in concluding that magnificent address, he said:

Two years ago I told this body that the United States had proposed, and was willing to sign, a limited test ban treaty. Today that treaty has been signed. It will

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

not put an end to war. It will not remove basic conflicts. It will not secure freedom for all. But it can be a lever, and Archimedes, in explaining the principles of the lever, was said to have declared to his friends: "Give me a place where I can stand, and I shall move the world."

My fellow inhabitants of this planet, let us take our stand here in this Assembly of nations. And let us see if we, in our own time, can move the world to a just and lasting peace.

That was the voice which has been stilled forever by the dastardly bullet of an assassin. The loss suffered by the people of the United States is undoubtedly felt by the whole world; it is certainly a grievous loss for the United Nations.

President Kennedy has been snatched away from us at a crucial moment in history, at a moment when the impact of his brave policy for peace and better understanding among peoples was beginning to yield fruit. The best tribute to his memory is to continue to fight for those objectives.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy is no longer with us. His mortal remains are at rest in Arlington Cemetery, next to so many other heroes who have fallen in the service of their great American country. But his noble and generous soul has surely found eternal bliss, and his spirit will live on in the hearts of all who love freedom and respect the dignity of man.

I now invite the General Assembly to stand and observe a minute of silent prayer in memory of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the late President of the United States.

The representatives stood in silence.

SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT

Today we are gathered in this Assembly of 111 member governments to pay solemn tribute to the memory of a martyr. I feel bound to participate in this occasion, not only on my own behalf but also on behalf of the entire Secretariat.

On 20 September 1963, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations. He said, *inter alia*:

... we meet today in an atmosphere of rising hope and at a moment of comparative calm. My presence here today is not a sign of crisis, but of confidence.

... I have come to salute the United Nations and to show the support of the American people for your daily deliberations.

Exactly 9 weeks later President Kennedy fell a victim to an assassin's bullet, and all of us at the United Nations felt that we had lost a friend, not only a friend of the organization, not only a friend of peace, but a friend of man.

I recall with equal vividness a time, some 2 years and 2 months ago, when the United Nations was plunged in gloom because of the sudden death of its Secretary-General. At that time President Kennedy made a special appearance before the General Assembly of the United Nations, and in the course of his address he said:³

So let us here resolve that Dag Hammarskjöld did not live—or die—in vain. Let us call a truce to terror. Let us invoke the blessings of peace. And, as we build an international capacity to keep peace, let us join in dismantling the national capacity to wage war.

Although we all know that man is born under sentence of death with but an indefinite reprieve, death is a tragedy whenever it comes. It is human to feel sorrow at the passing away of anyone dear to us, even when death comes as a merciful release from chronic suffering and pain. But when a young and dynamic leader of a great country, with his brilliant promise only half fulfilled, is felled in the prime of life by an utterly incomprehensible and senseless act, the loss is not only a loss to the bereaved family, whose head he was, nor even the country over whose destiny he presided with rare ability and distinction as Head of State. It is a loss suffered by the entire world, by all humanity, for the late President embodied a rare and quite remarkable combination of intellect and courage, of vigor and compassion, of devotion to the arts and sciences, all focused on serving his basic concern for the well-being of all mankind.

It is a strange irony that President Kennedy, like President Lincoln—and I note that some have already begun to speak of Kennedy as a younger Lincoln, both being dedicated to the paths of peace and reconciliation—should have come to a violent end at the hands of assassins.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

I have the feeling that President Kennedy was sincerely seeking to carry forward to fulfillment the monumental task which began in this country a hundred years ago.

Throughout his public career President Kennedy sought to reduce tension, to uphold the law, and to discourage violence whether in word or deed. On a recent occasion he observed:⁴

And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

President Kennedy was mortal like the rest of us. Not so his place in history, where he will live as a great leader who sought peace at home and abroad and gave his life as a true martyr in the service of his country and of all mankind.

Let us all here and now draw inspiration from his example, and let us resolve that he did not live, or die, in vain. Let us call a truce to terror. Let us invoke the blessings of peace.

AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

U.S. delegation press release 4318

My privilege in this sad hour is to convey to you, Mr. President, to you, Mr. Secretary-General, and to you, the assembled delegates of the world, the profound gratitude of the people of my country for what has been done and for what has been said here today. Our grief is the more bearable because it is so widely and so genuinely shared; and for this we can only say, simply but from the depths of our full hearts, thank you.

President Kennedy was so contemporary a man—so involved in our world, so immersed in our times, so responsive to its challenges, so intense a participant in the great events and great decisions of our day—that he seemed the very symbol of the vitality and the exuberance that is the essence of life itself.

Never once did he lose his way in the maze; never once did he falter in the storm of spears;

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

never once was he intimidated. Like the ancient prophets he loved the people enough to warn them of their errors. And the man who loves his country best will hold it to its highest standards. He made us proud to be Americans.

And so it is that after 4 sorrowful days we still can hardly grasp the macabre reality that the world has been robbed of this vibrant presence by an isolated act conceived in the strange recesses of the human mind.

We shall not soon forget the late President's driving ambition for his own country—his concept of a permanently dynamic society spreading abundance to the last corner of this land and extending justice, tolerance, and dignity to all of its citizens alike.

We shall not soon forget that as the leader of a great nation he met and mastered his responsibility to wield great power with great restraint. "Our national strength matters," he said just a few weeks ago, "but the spirit which informs and controls our strength matters just as much."⁵

We shall not soon forget that he held fast to the vision of a world in which the peace is secure, in which inevitable conflicts are reconciled by pacific means, in which nations devote their energies to the welfare of all their citizens, and in which the vast and colorful diversity of human society can flourish in a restless, competitive search for a better society.

We shall not soon forget that by word and by deed he gave proof of profound confidence in the present value and the future promise of this great organization, the United Nations.

And we shall never forget these ambitions, these visions, these convictions that so inspired this remarkable young man and so quickened the quality and the tempo of our times in these fleeting past 3 years. And our grief is compounded by the bitter irony that he who gave his all to contain violence, lost his all—to violence.

Now he is gone. Today we mourn him. Tomorrow and tomorrow we shall miss him. And so we shall never know how different the world

⁵ For remarks made by President Kennedy at Amherst College on Oct. 26, see White House press release dated Oct. 26.

might have been had fate permitted this blazing talent to live and labor longer at man's unfinished agenda for peace and progress for all.

Yet for the rest of us, life goes on; our agenda remains unfinished. Minutes after his spirit departed, Lyndon B. Johnson took his oath of allegiance to the permanent institutions of this country, institutions which outlast violence and outlive men. These hours of mourning are then but a pause in a process—not a break in purpose or in policy.

President Johnson has directed me to affirm to this Assembly that there will be no Johnson policy toward the United Nations, any more than there was a Kennedy policy. There was—and is—only a United States policy. And that, too, outlasts violence and outlives men.

As long ago as 1948, President Johnson told an American audience that “our long-term and sustained foreign policy must include full support of the United Nations.” And now, on his behalf, I repeat to you that my Government will—as it has over the years—support every practical move to add to the capacity of the United Nations to keep the peace and to aid new nations to reach the stage of self-sustaining growth.

The foreign policy of this Government will continue to be, as to the troubling issues of today and tomorrow, to work for agreement where agreement is possible and to negotiate with patience and persistence until agreement is possible. President Johnson is determined that the better feeling of these past few months shall not be lost, rather that it must be increased. In that spirit we shall not falter on the stony path to peace.

Finally, let me say, as several speakers have reminded us here this afternoon, that John Kennedy never believed that he or any man was indispensable; of Dag Hammarskjöld's death he said: “The problem is not the death of one man; the problem is the life of this Organization.” But he did believe passionately that peace and justice are indispensable. And he believed, as he told this Assembly in 1961, that “in the development of this Organization rests the only true alternative to war. . . .”

So, my friends, we shall honor him in the best way that lies open to us—and the way he would want it to be—by getting on with the everlasting search for peace and justice for which all mankind is praying.

Foreign Dignitaries Attend Funeral of President Kennedy

Following is a list of the foreign dignitaries who attended the funeral services for President Kennedy at St. Matthew's Cathedral, Washington, D.C., on November 25.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

United Nations

U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Ralph J. Bunche, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs

Paul G. Hoffman, Managing Director, United Nations Special Fund

Carlos Sosa-Rodriguez, President of the General Assembly

Sir Patrick Dean, President of the Security Council

European Coal and Steel Community

Albert Coppe, Vice President of the European Coal and Steel Community

Jean Monnet, former President of the European Coal and Steel Community

European Economic Community

Jean Rey, Member of the European Economic Community

European Atomic Energy Community

E. M. J. A. Sassen, Member of the Council, European Atomic Energy Community

Organization of American States

José A. Mora, Secretary General

William Sanders, Assistant Secretary General

Rodolfo A. Weidmann, Representative of Argentina

Ilmar Penna Marinho, Representative of Brazil

Don Manuel Trucco, Representative of Chile

Alfredo Vasquez Carrizosa, Representative of Colombia

José Bonilla Atilas, Representative of the Dominican Republic

Galo Leoro, Alternate Representative of Ecuador

Fern D. Baguidy, Representative of Haiti

Hernán Corrales Padilla, Representative of Honduras

Andrés Fenochio, Alternate Representative of Mexico

Dr. Juan Bautista de Lavalle, Representative of Peru

Ward P. Allen, Alternate Representative of the United States

Emilio N. Oribe, Interim Representative of Uruguay

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Afghanistan

Gen. Assadullah Seraj, Ambassador to France and
Special Representative of the Government of
Afghanistan

Abdul Majid, Ambassador to the United States

Algeria

Haj Ben Alla, President of the National Assembly

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Amar Ouzzegane, Minister of State

Abdelkadir Chanderli, Ambassador to the United
Nations

Cherif Guellal, Ambassador to the United States

Layashi Yaker, Director of Economic Affairs, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs

Argentina

Carlos Humberto Perette, Vice President

Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz, Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Worship

Brig. Ignacio Avalos, Secretary of War

Australia

Sir Alister McMullin, President of the Senate

Sir Howard Beale, Ambassador to the United States

Austria

Alfons Gorbach, Chancellor

Wilfried Platzner, Ambassador to the United States

Belgium

His Majesty Baudouin I

Paul-Henri Spaak, Vice Prime Minister and Minister
of Foreign Affairs

André Schöller, Grand Marshal of the Court

Louis Scheyven, Ambassador to the United States

Bolivia

Enrique Sanchez de Lozada, Ambassador to the United
States

Brazil

Auro Moura Andrade, President of the Senate

João Augusto de Araujo Castro, Minister of Foreign
Affairs

Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Ambassador to the United
States

Bulgaria

Miliko Tarabanov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

Lyubomir Popov, Minister to the United States

Burma

U On Sein, Ambassador to the United States

Burundi

Leon Ndenzako, Ambassador to the United States

Cambodia

His Highness Prince Norodom Kantol, President of the
Council of Ministers

Chan Youran, Director of Political Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Nong Kimny, Ambassador to the United States

Cameroon

Jacques Kuoh, Ambassador to the United States

Canada

Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister

Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

Charles S. A. Ritchie, Ambassador to the United States

Central African Republic

Jean-Pierre Kombet, Ambassador to the United States

Ceylon

M. F. de S. Jayaratne, Ambassador to the United
States

Chad

Adam Malick Sow, Ambassador to the United States

Chile

Sergio Gutierrez-Olivos, Ambassador to the United
States

China

Tingfu F. Tsiang, Ambassador to the United States

Colombia

Alberto Lleras Camargo, former President of Colombia

Germán Zea, Ambassador to the United Nations

Eduardo Uribe Batero, Ambassador to the United
States

Costa Rica

José Figueres, former President of Costa Rica

Gonzalo J. Facio, Ambassador to the United States

Cyprus

Zenon Rossides, Ambassador to the United States

Czechoslovakia

Jiri Hajek, Ambassador to the United Nations

Denmark

His Royal Highness Prince Georg

Jens Otto Krag, Prime Minister

Kjeld Gustav Knuth-Winterfeldt, Ambassador to the
United States

Ecuador

Neftali Ponce Miranda, Minister of Foreign Affairs

José Antonio Correa Escobar, Ambassador to the
United States

El Salvador

Hector Escobar Serrano, Foreign Minister

Francisco R. Lima, Ambassador to the United States

Ethiopia

His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I

His Highness Ras Andargatchew

Finland

Veli Merikoski, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Max Jacobson, Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Richard R. Seppälä, Ambassador to the United States
France

Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Republic

Maurice Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gen. Charles Ailleret, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces

Gabon

Aristide Issembe, Ambassador to the United States

Germany

Heinrich Luebke, President of the Federal Republic
Ludwig Erhard, Chancellor of the Federal Republic
Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kal-Uwe von Hassel, Minister of Defense
Willy Brandt, Governing Mayor of Berlin
Heinrich Knappstein, Ambassador to the United States

Ghana

Kwesi Armah, High Commissioner of Ghana to Great Britain

Miguel Augustus Ribeiro, Ambassador to the United States

Alex Quaison-Sackey, Ambassador to the United Nations

Great Britain

His Royal Highness the Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister

Harold Wilson, Leader of the Labor Party

Jo Grimond, Leader of the Liberal Party

The Duke and Duchess of Devonshire

Sir David Ormsby Gore, Ambassador to the United States

Greece

Her Majesty Frederika, Queen of the Hellenes

Sophocles Venizelos, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

Guatemala

Alberto Herrarte Gonzalez, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Col. José Luis Aguilar de Leon, Personal Secretary to the Chief of Government

Carlos García-Bauer, Ambassador to the United States

Guinea

Karim Bangoura, Ambassador to the United States

Saïfoulaye Diallo, Minister of State

Leon Maka, President of the National Assembly

Allassane Diop, Minister of Communications and Information

Haiti

Carlet R. Auguste, Ambassador to the United Nations

Robert Theard, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Hungary

Peter Medgyessy, First Deputy Foreign Minister

Karoly Csatorday, Ambassador to the United Nations
János Radványi, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Iceland

Gudmundur I. Gudmundsson, Minister of Foreign Affairs

India

Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Chairman of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations

Indonesia

Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, Minister for National Defense and Security and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces

Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, Second Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

Zairin Zain, Ambassador to the United States

Iran

His Royal Highness Shahpur Gholam Reza

Abbas Aram, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Iraq

Ali Haider Sulaiman, Ambassador to the United States

Ireland

Eamon de Valera, President

Frank Aiken, Minister for External Affairs

Maj. Vivion de Valera, T.D.

Dr. Eamon de Valera

Thomas J. Kiernan, Ambassador to the United States

Israel

Zalman Shazar, President

Mrs. Golda Meir, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Avraham Harman, Ambassador to the United States

Italy

Cesare Merzagora, President of the Senate

Attilio Piccioni, Foreign Minister

Sergio Fenoaltea, Ambassador to the United States

Gen. Emiliano Scotti, Military Counselor to President Segni

Guerino Roberti, Assistant Chief of Protocol

Piero Vinci, Chief of Cabinet of the Foreign Minister

Mario D'Antonio, Chief of Cabinet of President Merzagora

Ivory Coast

Philippe Yace, President of the National Assembly

Camille Allialli, Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs

Konan Bédié, Ambassador to the United States

Jamaica

Sir Alexander Bustamante, Prime Minister

Brig. Paul Cook, Chief of Staff, Jamaican Defense Force

Noel Crosswell, Commissioner of Police

Sir Neville Noel Ashenheim, Ambassador to the United States

Japan

Hayato Ikeda, Prime Minister

Masayoshi Ohira, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ryuji Takeuchi, Ambassador to the United States

Jordan

Antone Atallah, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Saad Juma, Ambassador to the United States

Korea

Chung Hee Park, Acting President
Yong Shik Kim, Foreign Minister
Chung Yul Kim, Ambassador to the United States

Kuwait

Talat Al-Ghoussein, Ambassador to the United States

Laos

His Royal Highness Tiao Khampan, Ambassador to
the United States and Representative of the King
Sisouk Na Champassak, Ambassador to India and
Representative of the Royal Lao Government

Lebanon

Ibrahim Hussein El-Ahdab, Ambassador to the United
States
George Hakim, Ambassador to the United Nations

Liberia

S. Edward Peal, Ambassador to the United States
William A. Tolbert, Vice President
J. Rudolph Grimes, Secretary of State

Libya

Wahbi Al-Byuri, Ambassador to the United Nations
Farag Ali Ben Gileil, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Luxembourg

His Royal Highness Prince Jean, Hereditary Grand
Duke
Eugene Schaus, Vice Prime Minister, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Armed Forces
Georges Heisbourg, Ambassador to the United States

Malagasy Republic

Louis Rakotomalala, Ambassador to the United States

Malaysia

Dato Ong Yoke Lin, Ambassador to the United States

Mali

Oumar Sow, Ambassador to the United States
Sory Coulibaly, Ambassador to the United Nations
Boubaca Kasse, Deputy Secretary General, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Mauritania

Mohamed Nassim Kochman, Chargé d'Affaires ad
interim

Mexico

Manuel Tello, Minister of Foreign Relations
Antonio Carrillo Flores, Ambassador to the United
States

Morocco

His Royal Highness Prince Moulay Abdullah
Ahmed Reda Guedira, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Abdelkadar Benjelloun, Minister of Justice

Ali Bengelloun, Ambassador to the United States
Badir Din Senoussi, Director of the Royal Cabinet
Mohammed Ziani, Attaché to the Foreign Ministry
Gen. Mohammed Amezziane, Inspector General of the
Royal Armed Forces

Col. Moulay Hafid, Director General of Royal Protocol
Captain Mediouni, Aide to the Prince

Nepal

Matrika Prasad Koirala, Ambassador to the United
States

Netherlands

His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard
Her Royal Highness Crown Princess Beatrix
Joseph M. A. H. Luns, Minister of Foreign Affairs
J. Herman van Roijen, Ambassador to the United
States

New Zealand

George R. Laking, Ambassador to the United States

Nicaragua

Luis Somoza Debayle, Senator and former President
of the Republic
Alfonso Ortega Urbina, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Nigeria

Julius M. Udochi, Ambassador to the United States

Norway

His Royal Highness Crown Prince Harald
Einar Gerhardsen, Prime Minister
Hans Kristian Engen, Ambassador to the United States

Pakistan

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Minister of External Affairs
Ghulam Ahmed, Ambassador to the United States

Panama

Galileo Solis, Minister of Foreign Relations
Arturo Morgan Morales, Chief of American Section,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Augusto Guillermo Arango, Ambassador to the United
States

Paraguay

Juan Plate, Ambassador to the United States

Peru

Victor Andrés Belaunde, Head of the Peruvian Dele-
gation to the United Nations
Fernando Berckemeyer, Ambassador to the United
States

Philippines

Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Republic
Rufino Hechanova, Executive Secretary to the Presi-
dent
Amelito Mutuc, Ambassador to the United States

Poland

Stanislaw Kulczynski, Deputy Chairman of the Coun-
cil of State
Piotr Jaroszewicz, Deputy Chairman of the Council
of Ministers

Edward Drozniak, Ambassador to the United States

Portugal

Luis Supico Pinto, President of the Corporative Chamber of Portugal

Gen. Jose Ponte Rodrigues, Portuguese Military Representative to NATO

J. de Menezes Rosa, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Rumania

Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers

M. Milita, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Petre Bălănceanu, Ambassador to the United States

Ricanda

Pierre Canisius Cyicarano, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Saudi Arabia

Rashad Pharaoun, Ambassador to France

Abdullah Hababi, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Senegal

Ousmane Socé Diop, Ambassador to the United States

Sierra Leone

Gershon B. O. Collier, Ambassador to the United States

John Karefa-Smart, Minister of External Affairs

Somalia

Mohamed Ali Daar, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs

South Africa

Willem C. Naudé, Ambassador to the United States

Spain

Capt. Gen. Augustin Muñoz Grandes, Vice President of the Spanish State

Adm. Pedro Nieto Antuñez, Minister of Navy

Antonio Garrigues, Ambassador to the United States

Angel Sagaz, Director General, North American Affairs, Spanish Foreign Office

Sudan

Osman El Hadari, Ambassador to the United States

Sweden

His Royal Highness Prince Bertil

Olof Palme, Prime Minister

Olof Palme, Minister Without Portfolio

Ulf Jarring, Ambassador to the United States

Switzerland

Friedrich T. Wahlen, Chief of the Federal Political Department of the Swiss Confederation

Pierre Micheli, Secretary General of the Federal Political Department of the Swiss Confederation

Alfred Zehnder, Ambassador to the United States

Syria

Salah al-Din Tarazi, Ambassador to the United Nations

Walid Maged, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Awdat Mufti, Minister to the United Nations

Tanganyika

Chief Erasto A. M. Mang'enya, Ambassador to the United States

Thailand

Sukich Nimmanheminda, Special Ambassador

Trinidad and Tobago

Sir Ellis E. I. Clarke, Ambassador to the United States

Tunisia

Bahi Ladgham, Secretary of State for the Presidency

Mongi Slim, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Taieb Slim, Ambassador to the United Nations

Ismail Khelil, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Turkey

Ismet Inonu, Prime Minister

Feridun Cemal Erkin, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Uganda

Apollo K. Kironde, Ambassador to the United Nations

John K. Babilha, Minister of Animal Industries, Game and Fisheries

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States

Mikhail Smirnovskiy, Chief of American Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Viktor Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United Arab Republic

Mahmoud Fawzi, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador to the United States

Mahmoud Riad, Ambassador to the United Nations

Uruguay

Juan Felipe Yriart, Ambassador to the United States

Carlos M. Velazquez, Ambassador to the United Nations

The Vatican

The Most Rev. Egidio Vagnozzi, Archbishop of Myra, Personal Representative of Pope Paul

Venezuela

Gen. Antonio Briceño Linares, Minister of Defense

Reinaldo Leandro Mora, Minister of Education

Enrique Tejera-Paris, Ambassador to the United States

Viet-Nam

Tran Chanh Thanh, Ambassador to Tunisia

Yemen

Mohsin A. Alaini, Ambassador to the United States

Yugoslavia

Koca Popovic, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Petar Stambolic, President of the Executive Council

Veljko Micunovic, Ambassador to the United States

The Battle for Progress With Freedom in the Western Hemisphere

*Remarks by President Kennedy*¹

This association and its members carry a very large responsibility for the defense of freedom in the hemisphere. Through the press you create the vital public awareness of our responsibility and appreciation of our dangers. Your work to fulfill this responsibility and the courageous fight of your association for freedom of the press and the liberty of the citizens make me very proud to come to this meeting.

I want to commend the American publishers who are here for their interest in the Inter-American Association, and I want to express a very warm welcome to those of you who have come from our sister republics to visit our country on this important occasion.

I think it is appropriate that this meeting should take place just as the annual review of the Alliance for Progress at São Paulo has ended. That congress and conference has reviewed our progress, examined our defects, on occasion applauded our achievement. It has been a forum for discussion and critical analysis, and if one fact emerges from that meeting it is, despite differences on specific problems, there is a common dedication and a common belief in the fundamental principles of the Charter of Punta del Este, in the soundness, the urgency, and, I believe, the inevitability of the *Alianza para el Progreso*. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, for those principles, the goals and the methods of the alliance, represent the only hope whereby men of good will can obtain progress without despotism, social justice without social terror; and it is on the Alliance for Progress that we base our common hope for the future.

¹ Made before the Inter-American Press Association at Miami Beach, Fla., on Nov. 18 (White House press release (Miami Beach, Fla.); as-delivered text).

That hope is for a hemisphere where every man has enough to eat and a chance to work, where every child can learn and every family can find decent shelter. It is for a hemisphere where every man, from the American Negro to the Indian of the altiplano, can be liberated from the bonds of social injustice, free to pursue his talents as far as they will take him. It is a hope for a hemisphere of nations each confident in the strength of its own independence, devoted to the liberty of its citizens, and joined with all the nations of the West in an association based on national strength and a common dedication to freedom, for we all share in this hemisphere a common heritage and if the idea of Atlantic community is to have full meaning, it must include the nations of Latin America.

The fulfillment of these hopes is not an easy task. It is important that the people of the United States, on whom much responsibility rests, realize how enormous that task is. They can see its dimensions in the fact that Latin America is the fastest growing continent in the world. Its population has increased 10 percent in the past 10 years. Its almost 200 million people will be 400 million people by the 1980's. They can see its dimensions in the fact that tens of millions of their neighbors in the south exist in poverty, with annual incomes of less than \$100, that life expectancy in almost half of the countries in Latin America is less than 50 years, that half of the children have no schools to attend, that almost half of the adults can neither read nor write, that tens of millions of city dwellers live in unbearable slums, that millions more live in rural areas and suffer from easily curable diseases, yet without hope of treatment, that in vast areas men and women are crippled by hunger while we possess in the

United States the scientific tools necessary to grow all the food we need.

Modifying the Traditions of Centuries

These problems, the hard reality of life in much of Latin America, will not be solved simply by complaining about Castro, by blaming all problems on communism, or generals, or nationalism. The harsh facts of poverty and social injustice will not yield easily to promises or good will. The task we have set ourselves in the Alliance for Progress, the development of an entire continent, is a far greater task than any we have ever undertaken in our history. It will require difficult and painful labor over a long period of time.

Despite the enormity of these problems, and our heavy responsibility, the people of the United States have been asked to sacrifice relatively little. Less than 1 percent of our Federal budget is allocated to assist half a hemisphere. It is the people of Latin America who must undergo the agonizing process of reshaping institutions, not the people of the United States. It is the people of Latin America who must draw up development programs and mobilize their total resources to finance those programs, not the people of the United States. It is the people of Latin America whose cities and farms, homes and halls of government, will bear the shock wave of rapid change and progress, not the people of the United States. It is the people of Latin America who will have to modify the traditions of centuries, not the people of the United States.

Certainly we in the United States cannot fail to do so little when so much is at stake for so many. The last 2½ years have been a time of trial and experiment. We have labored to build a structure of cooperation and common effort for years to come. No nation in the Americas can deny that much more must be done to strengthen and speed our efforts, that there have not been setbacks and disappointments.

That is why we intend to support strongly the leadership of the new inter-American committee for the Alliance for Progress and why we are working to clear away unnecessary obstacles to the swift administration of United

States contributions. But necessary concentration on obstacles and improvements should not obscure the fact that the *Alianza para el Progreso* has also made important progress. We have created new machinery for inter-American cooperation. The United States has committed \$2.3 billion to the *Alianza*, and the Latin American nations have committed billions more. In many countries there have been new efforts at land reforms and tax reforms, education, and agriculture.

The basic issues of progress and reform long ignored have become the battleground of the political forces of the hemisphere, and on the economic front last year 10 of the 19 Latin American countries exceeded the per capita growth of 2.5 percent established by the Charter of Punta del Este. Nor can the failure of some to meet the goals of the charter be placed wholly on the shortcomings of the alliance. No amount of external resources, no stabilization of commodity prices, no new inter-American institutions, can bring progress to nations which do not have political stability and determined leadership. No series of hemispheric agreements or elaborate machinery can help those who lack internal discipline, who are unwilling to make sacrifices and renounce privileges. No one who sends his money abroad, who is unwilling to invest in the future of his country, can blame others for the deluge which threatens to overcome and overwhelm him.

For the *Alianza para el Progreso* is not an external aid program. It is more than a cooperative effort to finance development plans. It is a battle for the progress and freedom of all of our nations, and it must be fought on every front of national interest and national need.

Social Justice

First is the front of social justice. It is impossible to have real progress as long as millions are shut out from opportunities and others forgiven obligations. In my own country we have prepared legislation and mobilized the strength of the Federal Government to insure to American Negroes and all other minorities access to the benefits of American society. Others must also do the same, for the landless *campesino*, the underprivileged slum dweller,

the oppressed Indian. Privilege is not easily yielded up, but until the interests of a few yield to the interest of the nation, the promises and modernization of our society will remain a mockery to millions of our citizens.

Economic Welfare

The second front is the front of economic welfare, the principle that every American has the right to a decent life for himself and a better life for his children. This means we must continue to perfect national development plans, to improve financing machinery and institutions. It means that every nation must be willing to make sacrifices and mobilize its own resources for development. It also means that the United States of America must live up to the full to its commitment to provide continuing help. I have pledged the full energies of this Government to insure that commitment will be met, and it is my hope that the Congress of the United States and the people of the United States will recognize not only the obligation that lies upon them but also the opportunity.

In pursuit of economic welfare, the *Alianza* does not dictate to any nation how to organize its economic life. Every nation is free to shape its own economic institutions in accordance with its own national needs and will. However, just as no country can tell another how it must order its economy, no nation should act within its own borders so as to violate the rights of others under accepted principles of international law. Private enterprise also has an important place in the Alliance for Progress.

There is not enough available public capital either in the United States or in Latin America to carry development forward at the pace that is demanded. Yet the net flow of foreign capital alone was almost \$250 million less this year than last, a third as much as the entire request to the United States Congress for assistance funds in this hemisphere. If encouraged, private investment responsive to the needs, the laws, and the interests of the nation can cooperate with public activity to provide the vital margin of success as it did in the development of all the nations of the West and most especially in the development of the United States of America. This country would not have achieved its present growth

rate if it had not been for the development capital—the private development capital—that came to this country, especially in the years prior to World War I, when the United States was an underdeveloped country.

If we are to have the growth essential to the requirements of our people in this hemisphere, then an atmosphere must be developed and maintained that will encourage the flow of capital in response to opportunity. Today that capital is moving into growth here in the United States and into Western Europe. Together we must provide the environment that will encourage its flow to Latin America.

Political Democracy and Stability

And third is the front of political democracy and stability. This is at the core of our hopes for the future. There can be no progress and stability if people do not have hope for a better life tomorrow. That faith is undermined when men seek the reins of power and ignore the restraints of constitutional procedures. They may even do so out of a sincere desire to benefit their own country, but democratic governments demand that those in opposition accept the defects of today and work toward remedying them within the machinery of peaceful change. Otherwise, in return for monetary satisfaction we tear apart the fabric and the hope of lasting democracy.

The Charter of the Organization of American States calls for “the consolidation on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man.” The United States is committed to that proposition. Whatever may be the case in other parts of the world, this is a hemisphere of free men, capable of self-government. It is in accordance with this belief that the United States will continue to support the efforts of those seeking to establish and maintain constitutional democracy.

International Responsibility

And fourth is the front of international responsibility. We must honor our commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, the principle of collective action, and the strengthening

of the inter-American system. We must also continue to invite and urge the participation of other Western nations in development programs, and the United States will continue to urge upon its allies the necessity of expanding the markets for Latin American products.

But just as we have friends abroad, we also have enemies. Communism is struggling to subvert and destroy the process of democratic development, to extend its rule to other nations of this hemisphere. If the alliance is to succeed, we must continue to support measures to halt Communist infiltration and subversion and to assist governments menaced from abroad. The American states must be ready to come to the aid of any government requesting aid to prevent a takeover aligned to the policies of foreign communism rather than to an internal desire for change. My own country is prepared to do this. We in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere, for if there is one principle which has run through the long history of this hemisphere it is our common determination to prevent the rule of foreign systems or nations in the Americas.

We have ultimately won this battle against every great power in the past. We will continue to wage it and win it. And as we gain momentum and strength, the appeal and force of communism will greatly diminish. This has already begun to happen. Castroism, which a few years ago commanded the allegiance of thousands in almost every country, today has far fewer followers scattered across the continent. Experience in China, the Soviet Union, and in Cuba itself has revealed that the promises of abundance under tyranny are false. We ourselves can prove that democratic progress is the surest answer to the promises of the totalitarians.

Self-Inflicted Exile of Cuba

These are the many fronts of the Alliance for Progress. The conduct of those fronts, the steady conquest of the surely yielding enemies of misery and hopelessness, hunger and injustice, is the central task for the Americas in our time. But no sense of confidence, of optimism in the future of the hemisphere as a

whole, can conceal our feelings at the self-inflicted exile of Cuba from the society of American Republics. The genuine Cuban revolution, because it was against the tyranny and corruption of the past, had the support of many whose aims and concepts were democratic. But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed. The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Habana.

It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country and from the other countries of this hemisphere. It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American Republics. This, and this alone, divides us. As long as this is true, nothing is possible. Without it, everything is possible. Once this barrier is removed, we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which a few short years ago stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people throughout the hemisphere.

No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken promises of foreign communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere, for once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic institutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people.

But our pursuit of the goals of the *Alianza para el Progreso* does not wait on that day. In 1961 the American nations signed the Charter of Punta del Este. Today, more than 2 years later, despite dangers and difficulties, I support and believe in the Alliance for Progress more strongly than ever before. With the alliance, the inter-American system—the American nations—can look forward to a decade of growing hope and liberty. Without it, the people of this hemisphere would be left to a life of misery with independence finally gone and freedom a futile dream.

I am well aware that there are some who, fearing the size of the obstacles, the resistance

to progress, the pace of achievement, despair of the alliance. But that same note of despair has been sounded before. In 1948 a distinguished Senator rose on the floor of the American Congress and said of the Marshall Plan, "If I believed there were any good chance of accomplishing these purposes, I should support the bill, but in the light of history, in the light of the history of this very Congress and its predecessors, we cannot say there is a chance of success. All the evidence points to failure."

Despite this, we pressed ahead. The result is modern Europe. I do not discount the difficulties of the Alliance for Progress, difficulties far greater than those confronted by the Marshall Plan. Then we helped rebuild a shattered economy whose human and social foundation remained. Today we are trying to create a basic new foundation, capable of reshaping the centuries-old societies and economies of half a hemisphere. But those who know our hemisphere, like those who knew Europe in 1948, have little doubt that, if we do not lose heart, the gloomy prophecies of today can once again fade in the achievements of tomorrow; for although the problems are huge, the greatest danger is not in our circumstances or in our enemies but in our own doubts and fears.

Robert Frost wrote 50 years ago, "Nothing is true except a man or men adhere to it—to live for it, to spend themselves on it, to die for it." We need this spirit even more than money or institutions or agreements. With it we can make the *Alianza para el Progreso* a reality for generations who are coming in this hemisphere, and ultimately we will hold a continent where more than 20 strong nations live in peace, their people in hope and liberty, and believing strongly in a free future.

Letters of Credence

Sierra Leone

The newly appointed Ambassador of Sierra Leone, Gershon Beresford Onesimus Collier, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on November 20. For texts of the Amba-

sador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 597 dated November 20.

Satellite Communications and International Understanding

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated November 20

I received a report today from Mr. Joseph McConnell, chairman of the U.S. delegation at the recent Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference on Space Communications held in Geneva by the International Telecommunication Union.¹ This conference has been one of the most successful of its kind held in recent times. Mr. McConnell is commended for the outstanding leadership which he gave to the American delegation and for his many contributions to the successful conclusion of the conference.

The conference allocated frequencies for communications satellites and adopted procedures governing their use, thus clearing the way for the establishment of an efficient global communications system. The conference also allocated frequencies for meteorological and navigational satellites, space research, and radio astronomy.

This Government and the United States Communications Satellite Corporation can now take practical steps, in cooperation with other governments and foreign business entities, to develop a single global commercial space communications system. It continues to be the policy of the United States that all countries which wish to participate in the ownership, management, and use of this system will have an opportunity to do so.

Aside from the many political, economic, and social benefits, effective satellite communications can improve international understanding by providing a broad new channel for the flow of information between peoples.

The many delegations which participated in the important work of this conference are to be congratulated on its successful outcome.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 25, 1963, p. 835.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Korea Ratify Consular Convention

Press release 595 dated November 19

Instruments of ratification of the consular convention between the United States and Korea, signed at Seoul on January 8, 1963,¹ were exchanged on November 19. The exchange was made by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Korean Ambassador, Chung Yul Kim, at a brief formal ceremony. This action completes the procedures required for bringing the convention into force. By its terms the convention will enter into force on December 9, 30 days after the exchange of ratifications.

The purposes of the convention are to regulate the consular activities of each country in the territory of the other and to formalize, as far as practicable, the understandings of the two countries in regard to the treatment to be accorded consular officials and employees. The provisions are similar in substance to the provisions of consular conventions concluded with other countries in previous years but are set forth more succinctly than heretofore.

The convention contains provisions regarding the juridical status of consular establishments, the duties and functions of consular officers, and the rights, privileges, and immunities of the consular personnel of each country in the territory of the other. It creates a legal framework within which consular relations between the two countries can continue to develop effectively and to the mutual advantage of both.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956, as amended. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 189.

Acceptance deposited: Ivory Coast, November 19, 1963.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1963. *Ratifications deposited:* Brazil, October 16, 1963; Costa Rica, October 23, 1963; Norway, October 30, 1963; Spain, October 18, 1963.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹ *Ratifications deposited:* Iraq (with reservation), October 15, 1963; Switzerland, October 30, 1963. Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.¹ *Ratification deposited:* Iraq, October 15, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433. *Ratification deposited:* Norway, November 21, 1963.

Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes and schedules and protocol of provisional application. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700. *Admitted as contracting party (with rights and obligations dating from independence):* Jamaica, October 14, 1963.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115. *Accessions deposited:* Costa Rica, November 19, 1963; Tunisia, September 17, 1963.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Amendment to the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3301, 3738, 4317), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. *Entered into force:* November 8, 1963.

Netherlands

Protocol modifying and supplementing extension to the Netherlands Antilles of the convention for avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to income and certain other taxes of

¹ Not in force.

April 29, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1855, 3366, 3367). Signed at The Hague October 23, 1963. Enters into force on the date of exchange of ratifications.

Spain

Commercial agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid October 26 and November 7, 1927. Entered into force November 27, 1927. IV Tren- with 4644.

Terminated: August 29, 1963.

Understanding that provisions of commercial agree- ment, *supra*, do not require extension to Spain of advantages accorded by the United States to the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 4 and July 11, 1946. Entered into force July 11, 1946. TIAS 1572.

Terminated: August 29, 1963.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 21, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5256, 5420). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon November 8, 1963. Entered into force November 8, 1963.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Henri Bader as scientific attaché at Bonn, Germany, effective November 12. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 592 dated November 18.)

Confirmations

The Senate on November 19 confirmed the following nominations:

Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., to be an Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(For biographic details, see White House press relea dated November 8.)

Benson E. L. Timmons III to be Ambassador Haiti. (For biographic details, see Department State press release 606 dated December 5.)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 18-24

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

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†588	11/18	Williams: LaSalle College, Phila- delphia.
*589	11/18	French furnishings for Thomas Jefferson Room.
*590	11/18	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†591	11/18	U.S. observers for Antarctic in- spection (rewrite).
*592	11/18	Bader appointed scientific attaché, Bonn (biographic details).
*593	11/19	Henderson sworn in as Ambassa- dor to Bolivia (biographic de- tails).
†594	11/19	Rostow: "United States Tasks on the World Scene."
595	11/19	Consular convention with Korea.
*596	11/19	Program for visit of German Chancellor.
597	11/20	Sierra Leone credentials (re- write).
†598	11/21	Ball: statement before Senate Banking and Currency Commit- tee.
†599	11/22	Talks between Tin Council and U.S. Government.
*600	11/22	Ball: order on display of flag during period of mourning.
601	11/22	Ball: statement on death of President Kennedy.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1277



December 16, 1963

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An Hour of Sorrow, a Time for Action

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO THE CONGRESS¹

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the House, Members of the Senate, my fellow Americans:

All I have I would have given gladly not to be standing here today.

The greatest leader of our time has been struck down by the foulest deed of our time. Today John Fitzgerald Kennedy lives on in the immortal words and works that he left behind. He lives on in the mind and memories of mankind. He lives on in the hearts of his countrymen.

No words are sad enough to express our sense of loss. No words are strong enough to express our determination to continue the forward thrust of America that he began.

The dream of conquering the vastness of space, the dream of partnership across the Atlantic—and across the Pacific as well—the dream of a Peace Corps in less developed na-

tions, the dream of education for all of our children, the dream of jobs for all who seek them and need them, the dream of care for our elderly, the dream of an all-out attack on mental illness, and above all, the dream of equal rights for all Americans, whatever their race or color—these and other American dreams have been vitalized by his drive and by his dedication.

And now the ideas and ideals which he so nobly represented must and will be translated into effective action.

Under John Kennedy's leadership, this nation has demonstrated that it has the courage to seek peace and it has the fortitude to risk war. We have proved that we are a good and reliable friend to those who seek peace and freedom. We have shown that we can also be a formidable foe to those who reject the path of peace and those who seek to impose upon us or our allies the yoke of tyranny.

This nation will keep its commitments from South Viet-Nam to West Berlin. We will be unceasing in the search for peace; resourceful in our pursuit of areas of agreement, even with

¹Delivered on Nov. 27 (White House press release, as-delivered text; also available as H. Doc. 178, 88th Cong., 1st sess.).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1277 PUBLICATION 7632 DECEMBER 16, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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those with whom we differ; and generous and loyal to those who join with us in common cause.

In this age when there can be no losers in peace and no victors in war, we must recognize the obligation to match national strength with national restraint. We must be prepared at one and the same time for both the confrontation of power and the limitation of power. We must be ready to defend the national interest and to negotiate the common interest. This is the path that we shall continue to pursue. Those who test our courage will find it strong, and those who seek our friendship will find it honorable. We will demonstrate anew that the strong can be just in the use of strength—and the just can be strong in the defense of justice. And let all know we will extend no special privilege and impose no persecution.

We will carry on the fight against poverty and misery, disease and ignorance, in other lands and in our own.

We will serve all of the Nation, not one section or one sector, or one group, but all Americans. These are the United States—a united people with a united purpose.

Our American unity does not depend upon unanimity. We have differences; but now, as in the past, we can derive from those differences strength, not weakness, wisdom, not despair. Both as a people and a Government we can unite upon a program, a program which is wise, just, enlightened, and constructive.

For 32 years Capitol Hill has been my home. I have shared many moments of pride with you—pride in the ability of the Congress of the United States to act, to meet any crisis, to distill from our differences strong programs of national action.

An assassin's bullet has thrust upon me the awesome burden of the Presidency. I am here today to say that I need your help; I cannot bear this burden alone. I need the help of all Americans, and all America. This nation has experienced a profound shock, and in this critical moment it is our duty, yours and mine, as the Government of the United States, to do away with uncertainty and doubt and delay and to show that we are capable of decisive action; that from the brutal loss of our leader we will derive not weakness, but strength; that we can and will act and act now.

From this chamber of representative government, let all the world know and none misunderstand that I rededicate this Government to the unswerving support of the United Nations, to the honorable and determined execution of our commitments to our allies, to the maintenance of military strength second to none, to the defense of the strength and the stability of the dollar, to the expansion of our foreign trade, to the reinforcement of our programs of mutual assistance and cooperation in Asia and Africa, and to our Alliance for Progress in this hemisphere.

On the 20th day of January in 1961 John F. Kennedy told his countrymen that our national work would not be finished "in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of this administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But," he said, "let us begin."

Today, in this moment of new resolve, I would say to all my fellow Americans, let us continue.

This is our challenge—not to hesitate, not to pause, not to turn about and linger over this evil moment but to continue on our course so that we may fulfill the destiny that history has set for us. Our most immediate tasks are here on this Hill.

First, no memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy's memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for which he fought so long. We have talked long enough in this country about equal rights. We have talked for 100 years or more. It is time now to write the next chapter—and to write it in the books of law.

I urge you again, as I did in 1957 and again in 1960, to enact a civil rights law so that we can move forward to eliminate from this nation every trace of discrimination and oppression that is based upon race or color. There could be no greater source of strength to this nation both at home and abroad.

And second, no act of ours could more fittingly continue the work of President Kennedy than the early passage of the tax bill for which he fought all this long year. This is a bill designed to increase our national income and Federal revenues and to provide insurance against recession. That bill, if passed without delay, means more security for those now working,

more jobs for those now without them, and more incentive for our economy.

In short, this is no time for delay. It is a time for action—strong, forward-looking action on the pending education bills to help bring the light of learning to every home and hamlet in America, strong, forward-looking action on youth employment opportunities, strong, forward-looking action on the pending foreign aid bill, making clear that we are not forfeiting our responsibilities to this hemisphere or to the world nor erasing Executive flexibility in the conduct of our foreign affairs—and strong, prompt, and forward-looking action on the remaining appropriations bills.

In this new spirit of action the Congress can expect the full cooperation and support of the executive branch. And in particular I pledge that the expenditures of your Government will be administered with the utmost thrift and frugality. I will insist that the Government get a dollar's value for a dollar spent. The Government will set an example of prudence and economy. This does not mean that we will not meet our unfilled needs or that we will not honor our commitments. We will do both.

As one who has long served in both Houses of the Congress, I firmly believe in the independence and the integrity of the legislative branch. And I promise you that I shall always respect this. It is deep in the marrow of my bones. With equal firmness, I believe in the capacity and I believe in the ability of the Congress, despite the divisions of opinions which characterize our nation, to act—to act wisely, to act vigorously, to act speedily when the need arises. The need is here. The need is now. I ask your help.

We meet in grief, but let us also meet in renewed dedication and renewed vigor. Let us meet in action, in tolerance, and in mutual understanding. John Kennedy's death commands what his life conveyed—that America must move forward. The time has come for Americans of all races and creeds and political beliefs to understand and to respect one another. So let us put an end to the teaching and the preaching of hate and evil and violence. Let us turn away from the fanatics of the far left and the far right, from the apostles of bitterness

and bigotry, from those defiant of law, and the who pour venom into our nation's bloodstream.

I profoundly hope that the tragedy and the torment of these terrible days will bind us together in new fellowship, making us one people in our hour of sorrow. So let us here high resolve that John Fitzgerald Kennedy did live—or die—in vain. And on this Thanksgiving eve, as we gather together to ask the Lord's blessing and give Him our thanks, let us unite in those familiar and cherished words:

“America, America,
God shed His grace on thee,
And crown thy good
With brotherhood
From sea to shining sea.”

President Reaffirms Pledge to Latin America

*Remarks by President Johnson*¹

I have asked you to come here today because this is, in a very special sense, a family gathering. For nothing in President Kennedy's public career meant more to him than the ties which united this country and yours.

A little less than 3 years ago, here in the White House, in this very room, President Kennedy met with you, the representatives of the countries of Latin America. In the first full-scale foreign policy address of his administration, he called for an Alliance for Progress among all the nations of the Americas.²

Today, among you in this same room, I have come to reaffirm that alliance and to pledge all the energies of my Government to our common goals. All I know from personal experience is that the future of this hemisphere, the relations between the United States and Latin America, must be among the highest concerns of my Government.

I have lived my life together with many who proudly claimed descent from Latin America.

¹ Made at the White House on Nov. 26 before a group of Latin American delegates who were in Washington for the funeral of President Kennedy.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

The sound of the Spanish tongue, and the signs of your rich cultural traditions, were among my earliest and my most enduring impressions. I began my government service in Washington under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. And from him I learned that nothing is more important to the country I now lead than its associations with our good neighbors to the south.

In October of 1960, during the political campaign, I reminded my fellow citizens of the United States that "We must support, morally and financially, the struggle of our Latin American friends against political, economic and social injustice—not only to improve their standard of living but to foster the democratic way of life in every country." To me, therefore, as it was to President Kennedy, the Alliance for Progress is part of a long and deeply rooted tradition. That alliance contains the basic principles of the new society which we are building, principles agreed to by all our countries in the Charter of Punta del Este.

The first of these agreed principles is the right of every American nation to govern itself, free from outside dictation or coercion from any quarter. None among us can tell another how to organize its society or how to conduct its affairs.

The second of these agreed principles is the right to human freedom—the right of each person to freely speak his views, worship God in his own way, and participate in the political life of his nation. History and circumstances have created restraints on democracy in some of our nations. But we must never forget that our task will not be complete until every American lives in the dignity of freedom.

The third of these agreed principles is the right to social justice—the right of every citizen to share in the progress of his nation. We have called for land for the landless, education for those denied education, and an end to the unjust privilege of a few at the expense of the needs of the many.

The fourth of these agreed principles is dedication to economic progress. To this end we have embarked upon a cooperative program in which the nations of Latin America have agreed to dedicate their resources, bear fresh sacrifice, and expect hard labor. And the United States

has pledged itself and will carry out its own commitment.

And it is to these principles that we have dedicated ourselves.

So I reaffirm the pledge which President Kennedy made last week³ to improve and to strengthen the role of the United States in the Alliance for Progress. We all know that there have been problems within the Alliance for Progress. But the accomplishments of the past 3 years have proven the soundness of our principles. The accomplishments of the years to come will vindicate our faith in the capacity of free men to meet the new challenges of our new day.

And it was in the spirit of the principles that we have worked out together that President Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress in this very room. Inspired by his memory, and in that same spirit, we will carry on the job.

Let the Alliance for Progress be his living memorial.

U.S. Comments on Venezuelan Discovery of Cuban Arms Cache

*Department Statement*¹

The announcement by the Government of Venezuela [on November 28] that the weapons contained in the arms cache discovered on a beach of the Paraguana Peninsula on November 3 are of Cuban origin is further dramatic confirmation that the Castro regime is pursuing an active policy of indirect aggression in this hemisphere. It gives the lie to Castro's repeated protestations that Cuba exports its Communist revolution only by example.

The evidence presented by the Venezuelan Government demonstrates that the Castro regime is fomenting violence in other American Republics, not only with subversive propaganda, funds, and trained agents but also with weapons and ammunition.

The foreign ministers of the American Re-

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1963, p. 900.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Nov. 29 by Richard I. Phillips, Director, Office of News.

publics at their meeting in Punta del Este in January 1962² issued a clear warning that continental unity and the democratic institutions of the hemisphere were endangered by the subversive offensive of international communism.

The discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, while demonstrating the growing capacity of the hemisphere to detect and frustrate Cuban subversive efforts, also sounds a new alert calling for a redoubling of vigilance by the American Republics.

The foreign ministers also urged the governments "to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or col-

² For background and texts of resolutions, see BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

lective self-defense, and to cooperate . . . to strengthen their capacity to counteract . . . the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers. . . ."

The United States continues to take measures of its own to keep watch over the aggressive intentions and capabilities of the Castro regime and continues to assist other American governments to strengthen their internal security.

With regard to the Venezuelan intention to present the matter to the OAS [Organization of American States], the United States stands ready to work with other governments in this hemisphere in cooperative efforts to increase surveillance against and to thwart further attempts by the Castro regime to export arms and men for subversive purposes.

Major National Security Problems Confronting the United States

by Robert S. McNamara
*Secretary of Defense*¹

Before long this administration will be presenting, once again, the details of a proposed national defense budget for the consideration of the Congress and the public. Given the importance of these matters, their complexities and uncertainties and the existence of real differences of opinion, a degree of controversy is inevitable, and even desirable.

Some controversies, however, reveal underlying differences in perspective that scarcely suggest the participants are living in the same world. Within the past few weeks some critics have suggested that we have literally hundreds of times more strength than we need; others have accused us of risking the whole future of the Nation by engaging in unilateral disarmament. I would like to believe that criti-

cisms bracketing our policy in that fashion prove it to be rational and sound. But a discrepancy of that order cannot be reassuring. Rather, it indicates that we have failed to convey to some part of our audience even the broadest outlines, as we see them, of the problems that our military strategy and force structure are meant to address.

I believe we should be able to move from controversy on that scale toward consensus in military affairs, not always on details or components of our policies but at least on an appreciation of the major national security problems confronting us, on the broad alternative paths to their solution, and on the dominant goals, obstacles, costs, and risks affecting choice. My purpose in speaking to you this evening is to help move in this direction.

As a prelude, then, to the coming season of

¹ Remarks made before the Economic Club of New York at New York, N.Y., on Nov. 18.

debate, I should like to identify and discuss some basic matters on which a considerable degree of consensus seems to me both possible and desirable, although by no means assured.

These include those overall comparative strengths and weaknesses of the opposing military alliances that form the bold relief in the strategic environment. In short, they are the considerations that seem to have relatively long-term significance compared to the annual budget cycle.

Matters of that degree of permanence tend to be stamped on our minds as being unchanging and unchangeable, the unquestioned framework of daily and yearly policymaking. Yet these factors of which I shall speak do change—more swiftly and more profoundly than our picture of them tends to change. Indeed, I believe it is just the fact that over the last decade this topography has changed—while many maps have not—that accounts for some apparently irreconcilable controversies.

The Strategic Landscape of the Fifties

Let me recall the earlier period briefly, for comparison. The strategic landscape at the outset of the fifties was dominated by two outstanding features. One was the practical U.S. monopoly of deliverable strategic nuclear weapons. The other was the Soviet Union and Communist China's virtual monopoly of ground force on the continents of Europe and Asia.

Both of these determinants of Western military policy had changed considerably by the end of the Korean war. The Soviets had produced atomic explosions and had created a sizable nuclear delivery capability against Europe, while NATO ground forces had expanded rapidly and military operations in Korea had greatly tarnished the significance of Chinese Communist superiority in numbers. But the old notions of monopoly persisted as shortcut aids to thinking on policy matters. And they were not so misleading as they came later to be. Soviet armed forces approaching 5 million men still heavily outweighed the NATO forces in Europe; and Soviet delivery capability against the U.S. was dwarfed by that of SAC [Strategic Air Command]. Moreover, tactical nu-

clear weapons were being heralded as a new nuclear monopoly for the West.

Even as these earlier notions of monopolies grew obsolete, ideas about the feasibility of alternative policies continued to reflect them. So did ideas about how wars might be fought. Nuclear operations, both strategic and tactical, by the U.S. in response to Soviet aggression against our allies were considered to be virtually unilateral. Hence it was supposed the problem of credibility of the U.S. response would scarcely arise, even in the case of relatively limited Soviet aggressions. Western reliance upon nuclear weapons, in particular strategic systems, both to deter and to oppose nonnuclear attack of any size seemed not only adequate but also unique in its adequacy.

That sort of situation is convenient for policymakers. It makes policy easy to choose and easy to explain. Perhaps that is why throughout most of the fifties, while the Soviets under various pressures decreased their ground forces and the NATO allies built theirs up, and while the Soviets acquired a massive nuclear threat against Europe and laid the groundwork for a sizable threat against the U.S., the picture underlying most policy debate remained that appropriate to 1949. It was a picture of a Communist Goliath in conventional strength facing a Western David, almost naked of conventional arms but alone possessed of a nuclear sling.

Toward the end of that decade the prospect that the Soviets would acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles at a time when our strategic forces consisted almost entirely of bombers focused our attention and our budget even more sharply than before upon our strategic forces. The urgency of the problem of deterring the most massive of attacks was a new reason for thinking that the West could spare neither resources nor thought to deal more specifically with lesser threats. The most urgent task was to provide for deterrence of massive aggression by assuring the survival under any attack of forces at least adequate, in the calculations of a potential attacker, to destroy his society in retaliation. It was now not the assurance of continued nuclear superiority that preempted the attention of policymakers but, on the contrary, the struggle to maintain it.

But it is time for the maps to change by which policy is charted and justified. The old ones, which assumed a U.S. nuclear monopoly, both strategic and tactical, and a Communist monopoly of ground combat strength, are too far removed from reality to serve as even rough guides. Neither we nor our allies can afford the crudities of maps that tell us that old policies are still forced upon us, when a true picture would show important new avenues of necessity and choice.

What most needs changing is a picture of ourselves and of the Western alliance as essentially at bay, outmanned and outgunned except for nuclear arms no longer exclusively ours. We should not think of ourselves as forced by limitations of resources to rely upon strategies of desperation and threats of vast mutual destruction, compelled to deal only with the most massive and immediate challenges, letting lesser ones go by default. It would be a striking historical phenomenon if that self-image should be justified. We are the largest member of an alliance with a population of almost 450 million people, an aggregate annual product which is fast approaching a trillion dollars, and a modern and diverse technological base without parallel, facing the Soviet Union and its European satellites with their hundred million fewer people and an aggregate output no more than half that of the West.

And quite apart from ignoring the underlying strengths of the West, the outdated picture I have described takes no account of the military capabilities in being that our investments over the last decade, and specifically in the last few years, have bought for us. If new problems put strong claims on our attention and our resources today, it is very largely because we have come a large part of the way that is feasible toward solving some old ones.

Current Status of Strategic Nuclear Forces

Let me summarize the current status of the balance of strategic nuclear forces, that part of the military environment that has preoccupied our attention for so long. In strictly relative numerical terms, the situation is the familiar one. The U.S. force now contains

more than 500 operational long-range ballistic missiles—Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Polaris—and is planned to increase to over 1,700 by 1966. There is no doubt in our minds and none in the minds of the Soviets that these missiles can penetrate to their targets. In addition the U.S. has Strategic Air Command bombers on air alert and over 500 bombers on quick-reaction ground alert. By comparison, the consensus is that today the Soviets could place about half as many bombers over North America on a first strike. The Soviets are estimated to have today only a fraction as many intercontinental missiles as we do. Furthermore, their submarine-launched ballistic missiles are short range and generally are not comparable to our Polaris force. The Soviets pose a very large threat against Europe, including hundreds of intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles. This threat is today and will continue to be covered by the clear superiority of our strategic forces.

The most wishful of Soviet planners would have to calculate as a certainty that the most effective surprise attack they could launch would still leave us with the capability to destroy the attacker's society. What is equally pertinent is that the relative numbers and survivability of U.S. strategic forces would permit us to retaliate against all the urgent Soviet military targets that are subject to attack, thus contributing to the limitation of damage to ourselves and our allies.

Deterrence of deliberate, calculated attack seems as well assured as it can be, and the damage-limiting capability of our numerically superior forces is, I believe, well worth its incremental cost. It is a capability to which the smaller forces of the Soviet Union could not realistically aspire. That is one reason, among others, why I would not trade our strategic posture for that of the Soviets at any point during the coming decade.

But given the kind of force that the Soviets are building, including submarine-launched missiles beyond the reach of our offensive forces, the damage which the Soviets could inflict on us and our allies, no matter what we do to limit it, remains extremely high.

That has been true for our allies ever since the middle and late fifties. Soviet acquisition of a sizable delivery capability against the U.S., and more significantly their acquisition of relatively protected forces, submarine-launched or hardened, has been long and often prematurely heralded. Its arrival at last merely dramatizes the need to recognize that strategic nuclear war would, under all foreseeable circumstances, be bilateral—and highly destructive to both sides.

Larger budgets for U.S. strategic forces would not change that fact. They could have only a decreasing incremental effect in limiting somewhat the damage that the U.S. and its allies could suffer in a general nuclear war. In short, we cannot buy the capability to make a strategic bombing campaign once again a unilateral prospect.

That must, I suggest, be accepted as one of the determinants affecting policy. Another is that the same situation confronts the Soviet leaders, in a way that is even more intensely confining. In fact, enormous increases in Soviet budgets would be required for them to achieve any significant degree of damage-limiting capability. The present Soviet leaders show no tendency to challenge the basis of the U.S. strategic deterrent posture by such expenditures.

In the last 2 years alone we have increased the number of nuclear warheads in the strategic-alert forces by 100 percent. During that period we have more than doubled the megatonnage of the strategic-alert forces. The fact that further increases in strategic-force size will at last encounter rapidly diminishing returns—which is largely an effect of the very large investments the U.S. has made in this area—should be reflected in future budgets. The funding for the initial introduction of missiles into our forces is nearing completion. We can anticipate that the annual expenditure on strategic forces will drop substantially and level off well below the present rate of spending. This is not to rule out the possibility that research now in progress on possible new technological developments, including the possibility of useful ballistic missile defenses, will require major new expenditures. In any event, there will be recurring costs of modernization.

U.S. Superiority in Tactical Nuclear Weapons

In the field of tactical nuclear weapons, the picture is in important respects similar. The U.S. at present has in stockpile, or planned for stockpile, tens of thousands of nuclear explosives for tactical use on the battlefield, in anti-submarine warfare, and against aircraft. They include warheads for artillery, battlefield missiles, demolition munitions, bombs, depth charges, air-to-air missiles, and surface-to-air missiles. The consensus is that the U.S. is presently substantially superior in design, diversity, and numbers in this class of weapons.

This is an indispensable superiority, as we can readily understand if we consider how our problems of strategic choice would be altered if the tables were reversed and it were the Soviet Union which held a commanding lead in this field. Nevertheless, what we have is superiority, not monopoly, and even if tactical nuclear warfare can be limited, below some ill-defined threshold of strategic exchange, the key fact is that if the West initiates such warfare in the future, it must be expected to be bilateral in any theater which engaged the Soviet Union. Again, we cannot buy back a monopoly, or the assurance of unilateral use.

Combat Readiness and Mobility of U.S. Forces

Finally, there is the area of what we call our general-purpose forces. Within the last 2 years we have increased the number of our combat-ready Army divisions by about 45 percent, from 11 to 16. There has been a 30-percent increase in the number of tactical air squadrons, a 75-percent increase in airlift capabilities, and a 100-percent increase in ship construction and conversion to modernize the fleet.

But it is not only force size that matters. The key to the effective utilization of these forces is combat readiness and mobility.

The most recent demonstration of our ability to reinforce our troops presently stationed in Europe occurred last month in Operation Big Lift, the first of a series of planned large-scale, worldwide exercises. For the first time in military history, an entire division was airlifted from one continent to another. That movement could never have been accomplished without a

massive increase in our airlift capability, which is still being expanded. (It will have risen 400 percent between 1961 and 1967.) It required the development of new techniques to preposition combat equipment, of which we have two extra division sets now in Europe. It called for new techniques in military training and administration to make sure that units are really ready to move out on a moment's notice. This exercise, in which some 16,000 airmen and soldiers and more than 350 planes took part, is directly relevant to the needs of Europe, where it brought a seventh division to join the six that are to remain in place. It is also relevant to the ability of the U.S. to fulfill its policy commitments worldwide, swiftly and in effective strength.

But, it might be asked, what is the significance of all this for the realistic security problems of the United States and its allies? To what contingencies are these forces expected to contribute, and how effective might they be, measured against the strength of opposing forces? How meaningful is it to talk of 16 or 20 or 30 divisions in opposing the ground armies of the Soviet Union and Communist China?

Such questions are often meant to be merely rhetorical, in view of the supposed masses of Communist troops. The fact is that they are serious, difficult questions, to which I shall suggest some tentative answers. But it is difficult to encourage realistic discussions of specific contingencies so long as the shadow of the Communist horde hangs unchallenged over the debate. The actual contingencies that seem to be to me most likely and most significant are not those which would involve all, or even a major part, of the Soviet bloc or Chinese Communist armed forces, nor do they all involve Europe. Hence, aggregate figures of armed strength of NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations are not immediately relevant to them. But it is useful to make these overall comparisons precisely because misleading or obsolete notions of these very aggregates often produce an attitude of hopelessness toward any attempt to prepare to meet Communist forces in ground combat, however limited in scope.

The announced total of Soviet armed forces for 1955 was indeed a formidable 5.75 million

men. Today that figure has been cut to about 3.3 million; the Warsaw Pact total, including the Soviets, is only about 4.5 million. Against that, it is today the members of NATO whose active armed forces number over 5 million. The ground forces of NATO nations total 3.2 million, of which 2.2 million men are in Europe, as against the Soviet ground combat forces' total of about 2 million men, and a Warsaw Pact total of about 3 million. Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. forces of course include units stationed in the Far East. In Central Europe, NATO has more men, and more combat troops, on the ground than does the bloc. It has more men on the ground in West Germany than the bloc does in East Germany. It has more and better tactical aircraft, and these planes on the average can carry twice the payload twice as far as the Soviet counterparts.

Estimates of Soviet Ground Forces

These facts are hard to reconcile with the familiar picture of the Russian Army as incomparably massive. The usual index cited to support that picture is numbers of total active divisions, and the specific number familiar from the past is 175 divisions in the Soviet Army.

This total, if true, would indeed present a paradox. The Soviet ground forces are reliably estimated to be very close to 2 million men, compared to about 1 million for the U.S. How is it that the Soviets can muster ten times the number of active, combat-ready, fully manned divisions that the United States has manned, with only twice as many men on active duty? The answer is simply that they do not. Recent intensive investigation has shown that the number of active Soviet divisions that are maintained at manning levels anywhere close to combat readiness is less than half of the 160-175 figure.

What remains is a large number, but even that is misleading. For one thing, U.S. divisions have about twice as many men in the division unit and its immediate combat-supporting units as comparable Soviet divisions. A U.S. mechanized division has far more personnel in maneuvering units, far more in armored cavalry, far more engineers, far more

signals, far more light armored personnel carriers, and far more aircraft available in support than Soviet divisions. In addition to longer staying power, much of the U.S. manpower and equipment margin is muscle that would make itself felt on D-Day. If, on the other hand, we were to reorganize along Soviet lines, we could display far greater numbers of divisions comparable to those of the Soviets.

The Soviet combat-ready force remains a formidable one. Moreover, the Russians do have a powerful mobilization capability; in particular, they have a large number of lightly manned or cadre divisions to be filled out on mobilization. Still, this reality remains strikingly different from our accustomed maps of it.

I do not wish to suggest that such aggregate comparisons are by themselves a valid index to military capabilities. But they are enough to suggest the absurdity, as a picture of the prevailing military strengths on which new efforts might build, of David-and-Goliath notions borrowed from 1949.

None of this is to say that NATO strength on the ground in Europe is adequate to turn back without nuclear weapons an all-out surprise nonnuclear attack.

But that is not in any case the contingency toward which the recent and future improvements in the mobility and capabilities of U.S. general-purpose forces are primarily oriented. Aggression on that scale would mean a war about the future of Europe and, as a consequence, the future of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In the face of threats of that magnitude, our nuclear superiority remains highly relevant to deterrence. The Soviets know that even non-nuclear aggression at that high end of the spectrum of conflict so threatens our most vital interests that we and our allies are prepared to make whatever response may be required to defeat it, no matter how terrible the consequences for our own society.

The probability that the Soviet leaders would choose to invoke that exchange seems to me very low indeed. They know well what even the Chinese Communist leaders must recognize upon further reflection: that a nuclear war would mean destruction of everything they have built up for themselves during the last 50 years.

Spectrum of Possible Cases of Aggression

If we were to consider a spectrum of the possible cases of Communist aggression, then, ranging from harassment, covert aggression, and indirect challenge at one end of the scale to the massive invasion of Western Europe or a full-scale nuclear strike against the West at the other end, it is clear that our nuclear superiority has been and should continue to be an effective deterrent to aggression at the high end of the spectrum. It is equally clear, on the other hand, that at the very low end of the spectrum a nuclear response may not be fully credible and that nuclear power alone cannot be an effective deterrent at this level in the future any more than it has been in the past.

The fact is that at every level of force the alliance in general, and the U.S. Armed Forces in particular, have greater and more effective strength than we are in the habit of thinking we have—and with reasonable continued effort we can have whatever strength we need. I have spoken already of strategic weapons, where the great superiority of the United States is the superiority also of the alliance. In tactical nuclear weapons a parallel superiority exists—and while many of our allies share with us in manning the systems which would use these tactical warheads in the hour of need, it is not unfair to point out that, even more than in the strategic field, the tactical nuclear strength of the alliance is a contribution of the United States. That strength has been increased, on the ground in Europe, by more than 60 percent in the last 2 years. Today the thousands of U.S. warheads deployed on the Continent for the immediate defense of Europe have a combined explosive strength more than 10,000 times the force of the nuclear weapons used to end the Second War. Tactical nuclear strength the alliance has today, and we have provided it.

But neither we nor our allies can find the detonation of such weapons—and their inevitable bilateral exchange—an easy first choice. At the lower end of the spectrum, therefore, we also need strong and ready conventional forces. We have done our part here, and we continue to believe it just—and practicable—for our partners to do theirs.

The most difficult questions arise over the best means for meeting a variety of dangerous intermediate challenges in many parts of the world: those which threaten the possibility of sizable conflict while still not raising the immediate issue of the national survival of ourselves or of any member of our alliances. Conflicts might arise out of Soviet subversion and political aggression backed up by military measures in non-NATO areas in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. There is a range of challenges that could arise from Communist China and its satellites in the Far East and in Southeast Asia. Most dangerously, approaching the upper end of the spectrum, there is the possibility of limited Soviet pressures on NATO territory itself, along the vast front running from Norway to Greece and Turkey. Both the flanks and the center contain potential targets. And always, of course, there are the contingencies that could arise in relation to Berlin.

It is difficult to say just how probable any of these circumstances might be, although they must be regarded as more likely than still larger aggressions. What one can say is that if any of these more likely contingencies should arise, they would be highly dangerous. Inaction, or weak action, could result in a serious setback, missed opportunity, or even disaster. In fact, if either a nuclear exchange or a major Soviet attack should occur, it would most likely arise from a conflict on a lesser scale which Western capabilities had failed to deter and which an inadequate Western response had failed to curb in time.

Since World War II, the expansionist impulse of the Communist bloc is clear, but equally clear is its desire to avoid direct confrontation with the military forces of the free world. In Greece, in Berlin, and in Cuba, Communists have probed for military and political weakness; but when they have encountered resistance, they have held back. Not only Communist doctrine has counseled this caution, but respect for the danger that any sizable, overt conflict would lead to nuclear war. It would follow that no deterrent would be more effective against these lesser and intermediate levels of challenge than the assurance that such moves would certainly meet prompt,

effective military response by the West. That response could confront the Soviets with frustration of their purposes unless they chose themselves to escalate the conflict to a nuclear exchange or to levels that made nuclear war highly probable—a choice they are unlikely to make in the face of our destructive power.

The basis for that particular assurance cannot be systems in development, or weapons in storage depots, or reserves that must be mobilized, trained, and equipped, or troops without transport. We need the right combination of forward deployment and highly mobile combat-ready ground, sea, and air units, capable of prompt and effective commitment to actual combat, in short, the sort of capability we are increasingly building in our forces.

A "Lean and Fit" Military Establishment

This capability requires of us—as of our allies—a military establishment that is, in the President's words, lean and fit. We must stop and ask ourselves, before deciding whether to add a new and complex weapon system to our inventory, whether it is really the most effective way to do the job under the rigorous conditions of combat. We must examine constantly the possibilities for combining functions, particularly in weapons that could be used by two or more services. Given this tough-minded sense of reality about the requirements of combat readiness, it should be possible for the United States not only to maintain but to expand this increased strength without overall increases in our defense budget. As our national productivity and our gross national product expand, the defense budget therefore need not keep pace. Indeed, it appears likely that measured in relative—and perhaps even absolute—terms, the defense budget will level off and perhaps decline a little. At the same time, we are continuing the essential effort to reduce the impact of defense spending on our balance of payments. We have already brought this figure down from \$2.7 billion in fiscal year 1961 to \$1.7 billion for fiscal year 1963, and we shall continue to reduce it, without reducing the combat ground forces deployed in Europe and while strengthening our overall combat effectiveness.

And it must be our policy to continue to strengthen our combat effectiveness. I do not regard the present Communist leaders as wholly reckless in action. But recent experience, in Cuba and, on a lesser scale, in Berlin, has not persuaded me that I can predict with confidence the sorts of challenges that Communist leaders will come to think prudent and profitable. If they were again to miscalculate as dangerously as they did a year ago, it would be essential to confront them, wherever that might be, with the full consequences of their action: the certainty of meeting immediate, appropriate, and fully effective military action.

All of our strengths, including our strategic and tactical nuclear forces, contributed last year, and they would contribute in similar future situations, to the effectiveness of our response, by providing a basis for assurance that the Soviets would not dangerously escalate or shift the locale of the conflict. But above all, in order to fashion that response and to promise

the Soviets local defeat in case of actual ground conflict, we had to use every element of the improvements in combat readiness and mobility that had been building over the preceding year and a half, including combat divisions, air transport, and tactical air. And the last ingredient was also there: the will to use those forces against Soviet troops and equipment.

Let us not delude ourselves with obsolete images into believing that our nuclear strength, great as it is, solves all of our problems of national security, or that we lack the strength to meet those problems that it does not solve. In the contingencies that really threaten—the sort that have occurred and will occur again—we and our allies need no longer choose to live with the sense or the reality of inferiority to the Soviet bloc in relevant, effective force. Let us be fully aware of the wide range of our military resources and the freedom they can give us to pursue the peaceful objectives of the free world without fear of military aggression.

United States Tasks on the World Scene

by W. W. Rostow

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council¹

I should like to consider with you today where we stand in the cold war and what the agenda for Americans is like in dealing with a complex and still highly dangerous situation on the world scene.

It is more than 17 years now since, in a speech of February 1946, Stalin made absolutely clear that the Soviet Union intended in the postwar world not to make peace but to struggle actively for world power. Thus we as a nation have been at the business of cold war for almost a generation.

What has it been like? What shape can we

perceive, looking back from the autumn of 1963, in this tangled story of struggle which has absorbed so much of our resources, talents, and energy and is likely to do so over the foreseeable future?

Stalin's Thrusts in the West and East

Broadly speaking, what we have experienced are two major Communist offensives. The first was Stalin's. Beginning in 1946 he launched major thrusts: first in the West, then in the East.

In the West, Stalin, although set back in Iran, increased Soviet pressure against Turkey by diplomacy and threat during the summer of 1946; in Greece, by supporting substantial

¹ Address made at the University of California at Los Angeles, Calif., on Nov. 20 (press release 594 dated Nov. 19).

guerrilla warfare; and in Italy and France, by vigorous Communist Party efforts to gain parliamentary power. In 1947 he accelerated the movement toward total control in Eastern Europe, symbolized by the creation of the Cominform in September 1947. He succeeded in Prague (in the coup of February 1948) but failed in Belgrade, where Tito's defection was announced in June 1948.

But from early 1947 the Western counter-attack began with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The election in April 1948 saved Italy, and the Communist effort in Greece fell apart in the face of the Greek effort and Communist schisms. France found a group of center parties capable of governing, if uncertainly, and containing the domestic Communist menace.

Germany drifted, from the spring of 1946, toward a split; and the resulting deadlock in the Allied Control Council was dramatized by the Soviet walkout of March 20, 1948, which set the stage for the full blockade on the ground 3 months later. The success of the airlift ended, in effect, Stalin's main thrust to the West. The process set in motion by his offensive, however, yielded not merely the Marshall Plan but the Brussels Pact (September 1948), NATO (March 1949), and the creation (May 1949) of the Federal Republic of Germany, with its close ties to West Berlin.

As this duel in the West proceeded, Stalin launched an offensive in the East which can be roughly dated from the injunction of [Andrei] Zhdanov to the Communist parties in Asia, at the founding meeting of the Cominform in September 1947, to shift from politics to insurrection. Open guerrilla warfare began in Indochina as early as November 1946; in Burma in April 1948; in Malaya in June; and in Indonesia and the Philippines in the autumn. The Indian and Japanese Communist parties, with less scope for guerrilla action, nevertheless sharply increased their militancy in 1948. As the Communist victory was won in China in November 1949, Mao's political-military strategy was openly commended by the Cominform to the Communist parties in those areas where guerrilla operations were under way. The meeting of Stalin and Mao early in 1950 undoubtedly confirmed the ambitious Asian strat-

egy and planned its climax in the form of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, which took place at the end of June 1950.

The American and United Nations response to the invasion of South Korea, the landings at Inchon, the march to the Yalu, the Chinese Communist entrance into the war, and the successful United Nations defense against massive Chinese assault in April-May 1951 at the 38th parallel brought this phase of military and quasi-military Communist effort throughout Asia to a gradual end. Neither Moscow nor Peiping was willing to undertake all-out war or even to accept the cost of a continued Korean offensive. And elsewhere the bright Communist hopes of 1946-47 had dimmed. Nowhere in Asia was Mao's success repeated. Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines largely overcame their guerrillas. At great cost to Britain, the Malayan guerrillas were contained and driven back. Only in Indochina did local conditions favor real Communist momentum; but Ho Chi Minh was finally forced to settle for half a victory (Geneva 1954) in the wake of Stalin's death and in the shadow of possible United States intervention.

Situation in Summer of 1951

Where were we, then, when the truce negotiations on Korea began in the summer of 1951? Stalin had consolidated Eastern Europe; Mao, China. But the global balance of power still lay—even if precariously—with the free world. And the West, led by the United States, had answered three basic questions which underlay the hopes of Communist planners. First, it was demonstrated that the United States commitment to Europe had survived the war. We had not repeated our tragic return to isolation which followed victory in 1918. Second, it was demonstrated that Western Europe had emerged from the Second World War with the capacity to find again its economic, social, and political vigor and, with American aid, to fend off the Communist thrusts against the Eastern Mediterranean, Italy, France, and, climactically, against Berlin. Third, it was demonstrated in Korea that the United States and the free world as a whole had the will and capacity to deal with an ag-

gressive thrust with conventional forces across the truce lines of the cold war.

Post-Sputnik Communist Offensive

After an interval of relative quiet in the cold war—roughly between the summer of 1951 and the launching of Sputnik in October 1957—the second great Communist offensive was launched. This was Khrushchev's bid decisively to shift the balance of world power against the West.

It is worth asking why the negotiations looking toward peace, undertaken in the 1950's, and the mood of *détente* created, for example, by the summit conference of 1955 were broken. In retrospect I think the answer is clear. Two major new factors had emerged on the world scene and Soviet policymakers evidently came to the conclusion that they could be turned to major advantage. It was on these two new factors that Khrushchev's offensive was built.

First there was the emergence in the 1950's of thermonuclear weapons and the possibility of their delivery over long distances by rockets. For the first time the Soviet Union was put in a position of being able to threaten the destruction of Western Europe and the imposition of massive direct damage on the United States. Contemplating these instruments, Moscow evidently judged it possible, in their shadow, to force the West to make limited diplomatic concessions at decisive points. The theme of nuclear blackmail first emerged in Soviet policy in 1956, most notably during the Suez crisis.

The second great new factor on the world scene, which evidently inflamed Soviet hopes, was the marked acceleration in the revolutions of nationalism and modernization in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. There is no doubt that Moscow came to believe that it had deeply rooted advantages in seeking to expand Communist power and influence in these regions, at the expense of the West, by orchestrating flexibly the devices of subversion and guerrilla warfare; trade and aid; appeal to anticolonialism and nationalist sentiments; and by the claim that communism was not merely the fast-closing rival of the United States but the possessor of a method for the more efficient—even if ruthless—modernization of an underdeveloped region. The 1955 arms

deal with Egypt and the agreement to build the Aswan Dam represented the first major efforts along these lines.

But it was only after the launching of Sputnik in October 1957 that the second great Communist offensive of the postwar years was fully launched. It was in 1958 that Moscow laid down its ultimatum on Berlin. It was in 1958 that the Communist Party in Hanoi announced it would undertake a guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam. Soon afterward, the Pathet Lao, with the active help of Communist North Viet-Nam, resumed their effort to take over Laos. It was in these first post-Sputnik years that the Soviets sought to exploit the potentialities for acquiring in the Congo a Communist base for operations in central Africa; it was then they invested a billion dollars in military aid in an effort to induce friction, if not war, between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West New Guinea and also to strengthen Soviet influence and the Communist position in Indonesia. It was also, perhaps fortuitously, at the end of 1958 that Castro took over in Cuba.

At two points the forward momentum of the post-Sputnik Communist thrust was slowed down by major and successful United States actions: in the Lebanon-Jordan and Quemoy-Matsu crises of 1958. But, as of January 1961, Khrushchev's offensive had considerable momentum in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Situations Affecting Future Soviet Policy

The first charge on the Kennedy administration in 1961—somewhat like the challenge faced by the Truman administration early in 1947—was to turn back this Communist offensive by demonstrating that the two hypotheses on which it was built were not viable. Roughly speaking, between May 1961, when a precarious cease-fire in Laos was arranged, and the October 1962 missile crisis in Cuba, the task was substantially accomplished.

The answer to the first question posed by Soviet policy—our possible vulnerability to nuclear blackmail—was given by the whole course of the Berlin affair in 1961-62, including especially the President's July 1961 speech ²

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

and the subsequent military buildup. After the failure of the Soviet effort in February-March 1962³ to crack the unity of the Western alliance by intruding into the Berlin air corridors, Moscow apparently judged the Berlin position of the West too difficult to undermine directly. The Cuban missile gambit was then mounted, and its denouement brought to an end, for the time being at least, the notion that vital interests of the free world would be surrendered under the threat of nuclear war.

The answer to the second question—concerning the ability of the West to avoid Communist takeover in the underdeveloped areas—had to be given at many points by many devices: in Laos, by an evident determination to frustrate a Communist takeover; in Viet-Nam, by the mounting from December 1961 of a massively enlarged counterinsurgency program; in Indonesia, by the successful negotiation over West New Guinea by the Netherlands and Indonesian Governments; in Africa, by the whole cast of our approach to the new African nations, in particular our support for the United Nations effort in the Congo; in Latin America, by the isolation of Communist Cuba, combined with the Alliance for Progress.

By the end of the Cuban missile crisis in the autumn of 1962, the momentum had drained out of Khrushchev's post-Sputnik offensive, despite the unresolved crises in Cuba and Southeast Asia.

In the course of this sequence situations emerged which were bound to affect the future of Soviet policy:

First, Western Europe continued to display an astonishing economic momentum not matched since 1914, and it moved toward great-power status, with a strong likelihood of expansion, in one form or another, of its nuclear role. Moscow cannot count on Western Europe remaining indefinitely a hostage to Soviet MRBM's [medium-range ballistic missiles] without actively participating in the task of deterring those MRBM's.

Second, quite aside from the efforts of the

³ For text of a U.S. memorandum delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Feb. 15, 1962, see *ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1962, p. 370.

United States to deal with the major dimensions of the Communist thrust into underdeveloped areas, those nations and peoples demonstrated a capacity to defend their independence with increasing skill and determination and with an increased understanding of Communist objectives and methods. The overall trend of recent events in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, while still marked by dangerous instability capable of Communist exploitation, made the notion of Moscow control over those areas an increasingly unrealistic prospect, although this difficult conclusion has evidently not been fully absorbed in the policies of Moscow, let alone Peiping, Hanoi, and Habana.

Third, within the Communist bloc the assertion of nationalist impulses—notably in the Sino-Soviet split but elsewhere as well—shattered the intellectual unity and organizational discipline of the international Communist movement. The process also yielded the possibility that the Chinese Communists might emerge with some kind of independent nuclear capability within a time span relevant to current planning.

Fourth, quite aside from the chronic inability of Communist nations to grow food efficiently, a marked industrial deceleration began to take hold in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as the heavy-industry sectors on which postwar momentum was built ran their inevitable course. In 1962 the countries of NATO had an average growth rate of 4.8 percent of GNP; the Communist bloc, leaving wallowing Communist China aside, of 3.6 percent. The effect of this deceleration, which has brought the overall Soviet growth rate down in recent years from something like 7 percent to, perhaps, 4 percent or less, is to reduce the annual increment of Soviet resources available for allocation to military, foreign policy, and domestic purposes, although the declining industrial growth rate is still quite high.

Finally, while Moscow's post-Sputnik offensive was being conducted with great éclat and considerable acceptance of risk, longrun trends operating in Russia and Eastern Europe tended to liberalize somewhat those societies, as well as to strengthen nationalist strands within them and the popular will for peace.

"This Period of Pause"

How then shall we describe the period through which we are now passing?

So far as the *détente* is concerned, Khrushchev has explicitly set narrow limits. He has said that he will not contemplate a German settlement which does not recognize the legitimacy of the Ulbricht government; he has said he will contemplate German unity only under communism; he has said that he will not accept effective international inspection of the Soviet Union, thus narrowly limiting the range of arms control measures; he has said there shall be no ideological coexistence, and Soviet actions on the world scene indicate that this means that he will continue to use Communist parties abroad to exploit every weakness and division in the free world for Soviet and Communist advantage.

In the atmospheric test ban⁴ and in the "hot line" agreement⁵ he has indicated some awareness that he shares with the United States an interest in checking the spread of nuclear weapons and in avoiding a war by accident or miscalculation. Moreover, he has shown interest in expanding trade with the world outside the Communist bloc.

This is, then, at the moment a very narrow terrain of common understanding and common action. In fact, the most fundamental thing to be said about this period of pause is that the ambitious post-Sputnik offensive has been brought—for a time at least—to a halt and that both at home and abroad the Kremlin faces extremely serious problems, as well as the need to devise a fresh strategy.

What implications does this have for the policy of the United States and the West? What should be our objectives in this period of pause which has been earned substantially by the strength, resoluteness, and the unity of the free world?

First, let me put the answer negatively. The greatest danger we face is that we and our allies take the occasion of this pause to let down our strength or dilute our will to grapple with the many dangerous situations we still confront on the world scene. As the men in the Krem-

lin look about them, their best hope must be that the United States and the West may prove incapable of staying the course: that out of a false sense that the cold war is coming to an end, that out of boredom or domestic preoccupations or a desire to get on with purely national objectives on the world scene, we will open up new opportunities for the Communists to advance.

Thus the five basic questions which we as a nation and a community of free men have had to answer in the course of Stalin's and Khrushchev's offensives since 1946 we must be prepared to answer again and again. That is, the United States commitment to the security of the Western World must remain firm; Western Europe must continue to demonstrate its economic, social, and political viability; the whole of the West must be prepared to deal effectively with any Communist thrust across the frontiers of the cold war; we must continue the still incomplete demonstration in the underdeveloped areas that, with our help, these peoples and governments can maintain their independence and move on to build and shape modern societies in conformity with their own traditions, cultures, and ambitions; and, above all, the West must continue so to equip itself and so to behave as to make nuclear blackmail a counterproductive diplomatic or military technique.

Having tested us hard since 1946, in many dimensions, there may be some reluctance in Moscow to return to methods which were not successful; but communism is not a self-containing phenomenon. We can be sure that any perceived weakness within the free world will be exploited if Moscow judges that it commands the capacity to exploit it without excessive cost and risk. We must minimize the number of openings available to the Communists, and we must make sure that the cost and risk of their attempted exploitation remain prohibitively high.

If this view is correct, certain things follow:

First, there must be no letdown in our military capacity to bring force effectively to bear. This is not merely a matter of military budgets but the question of maintaining overseas our own forces and those of our allies required to make the use of force unattractive to the Communists

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

on the spot—whether it be nuclear weapons or slogging infantrymen.

Second, as Khrushchev made clear on the occasion of the 46th anniversary of the Communist revolution on November 7, and as the Communists in Peiping, Hanoi, and Habana make clear every day, the struggle to advance communism by subversion and guerrilla warfare has by no means been abandoned. Although our own capacity to deal with this kind of attack from within has increased and the ability and will of the governments and peoples in the developing nations to defend their independence have been widely demonstrated, the Communists have not wholly lost hope in what they call wars of national liberation. This is ultimately the issue at stake in South Viet-Nam, where a war against South Vietnamese independence is being conducted day by day, directed from North Viet-Nam, with the backing of both Moscow and Peiping.

It is altogether likely that, frustrated in Europe, we shall see a renewed and heightened effort by the Communists in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America over coming months and years, despite some Communist setbacks in recent years.

Importance of Foreign Aid

Third, it follows directly from this fact that we must maintain our own foreign aid program and continue to urge our allies in Western Europe and Japan to expand theirs. I can think of nothing more likely to encourage Communists all over the world than a letdown in the American foreign aid effort. Our foreign aid program is a critically important instrument for helping maintain the independence of the developing nations. In the short run the military aid increases their capacity for defense; in the longer run the buildup of their economies, accompanied by measures that insure social progress, is an essential foundation for the maintenance of their independence.

The struggle to help the developing nations through the historic transition from traditional or colonial ways of life to the attainment of stable, modern societies is a long, difficult struggle. The Communists perceive in this revolutionary transition openings to intrude, upset,

and take over these societies. They have never been more alert or eager to move in than they are right now. They remain the scavengers of the process of modernization—as they have been since Lenin formed the first modern Communist Party in Russia, itself then in the midst of modernization.

Foreign aid, in all its various dimensions, is one of the few effective instruments we have to help see these countries through. I have worked on foreign aid problems inside and outside of government for more than a decade. The justification for foreign aid in the United States interest has never been sounder than it is today. The objective case for a reduction in foreign aid has never been weaker.

I can understand why Members of the Congress might, in one part of their minds, find foreign aid a burden. It is easier not to vote money for expenditure abroad than to vote it—even though foreign aid money, in the end, is spent almost wholly in the United States. I can understand why they should look about for a way to shift or reduce the burden—even though that burden has been declining in terms of our national income and is only a small proportion of what we spend on national defense. I can understand the political difficulty with a program which has no organized constituency behind it in the United States.

But history would neither understand nor forgive us if, at a critical moment in a great and mortal struggle, we deny ourselves one of the few proven weapons available in the battle for the independence of nations and human freedom.

The impulse in the Congress radically to cut foreign aid is as serious and dangerous to the national interest as was the impulse in 1945 and 1946 to bring our troops home and to dismantle our Armed Forces. We disarmed unilaterally and convinced Stalin that even a devastated and war-torn Russia could realistically seek to achieve a decisive shift in the global balance of power and, in time, world domination. To reduce foreign aid at this time is a form of unilateral disarmament.

In one sense the matter is even more serious. Thus far in the cold war the main body of Communist and United States military power has not engaged. Our military strength and

that of our allies have proved an effective deterrent, excepting the attack in South Korea and various Communist adventures in guerrilla warfare. But the nonmilitary struggle for the independence of the developing nations is an active war, going forward every day. Foreign aid is by no means our only instrument in the struggle; and dollars alone cannot win it. But every dollar available for foreign aid is useful and will be brought to bear. For every dollar withdrawn from foreign aid, this nation will pay a disproportionate price in the form of a reduced ability to deal with a world caught up in revolutionary changes which Communists seek to capture.

In laying out our missile programs we properly insure that Communist targets are covered and deterrence will be effective by a safe margin. There are no such safe margins now built into our programs of military or economic aid. A reduction in foreign aid will simply reduce effective United States power and influence on the world scene.

As Secretary Rusk said the other day, ". . . this is no time to quit."⁶ This is a time patiently and stubbornly to stay the course—and to do so with an underlying confidence that, in alining ourselves actively with the cause of national independence and human freedom, we are alined with the forces of history that will prevail. But there is nothing inevitable about history unless it is backed by determined men. And right now there is no substitute in the free world for the resources and commitment to this cause of the American people.

We must persist patiently and stubbornly not merely with our part in the struggle to maintain the independence of the developing nations but also in building in the northern half of the world an effective partnership among the more advanced nations—notably in Western Europe, although Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other nations have an expanded role to play in this partnership.

Having fully recovered from the war and enjoyed a remarkable decade of development, the nations of Western Europe are reassessing what their role should be on the world scene.

⁶ For Secretary Rusk's news conference of Nov. 8, see *ibid.*, Nov. 25, 1963, p. 810.

They feel—and they feel properly—that they should take a greater hand in the life-and-death issues, both of defense and of construction, on which their fate as well as our own depends. What is at stake—as they move from dependence toward a role of increased responsibility—is how Europe should be organized and what their future relations to the United States and to each other shall be.

It is natural that this transition should involve debate and differences of opinion. It is the biggest piece of international architecture ever undertaken at a time of peace. But the underlying fact is that, as these debates go forward—capturing the headlines—the ability and the will of the more advanced nations of the free world to work together is improving in one field after another: in alining concepts of military strategy, in the coordination of foreign aid, in monetary matters, in trade, and in the field of political consultation. There will certainly be difficulties and differences of view. But if we are patient and capable of staying the course—in this field of policy as elsewhere—there is every reason to believe that what will emerge is an effective expression of a profound underlying common interest: In the end we of the Atlantic community are the principal guardians of the great heritage of Western civilization; and in a world of modern weapons and communications, in the face of the phenomenon of communism, in the face of the great revolutionary forces sweeping Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, we can only insure a world in which that heritage can survive and prosper if we work together.

The Prospects for Peace

I have tried to describe the sequence of the cold war in terms of two great offensives: Stalin's of 1946–51 and Khrushchev's of 1957–62. There is, of course, another side to this sequence. In the immediate postwar days, in the mid-1950's, and at present there have been serious and sustained efforts to see whether negotiation could move us toward a more peaceful and stable world. As I said in a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*,⁷ we are engaged in what might

⁷ W. W. Rostow, "The Third Round," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 42, No. 1, October 1963, p. 1.

be called the third round of such negotiation.

The key issues are precisely those to which Khrushchev has referred in setting the limits to the present *détente*: the problems of self-determination and security in Central Europe, the problems of inspection and arms control, and the commitment of the Communists to seek to advance their cause by techniques of subversion and guerrilla warfare, not only in the developing areas but elsewhere as well.

On the basis of statements and policies emerging from Moscow, there is no reason at the moment to believe that we are on the eve of great final settlements of these fundamental issues. If we are to move toward a more peaceful world, it will be, as nearly as we can perceive, by an historical process and not by some clear-cut event. We see no signs that peace will suddenly break out and the cold war come to an end.

What, then, are our prospects in such an historical process? What right have we to hope that, if we can stay the course, history will move toward a peaceful resolution of the dangerous issues which have wracked the planet for a generation and are still outstanding?

The first thing to be said is that communism has moved forward when the U.S. and the West appeared weak or vulnerable; and we have seen relatively stable periods when Communist offensives were frustrated. It was undoubtedly American unilateral demobilization in 1945-46, as well as the economic, social, and political state of Western Europe, which inflamed Stalin's hopes. It was the apparent weakness and vulnerability of Asia which inflamed Stalin's and Mao's hopes in the latter part of the 1940's. It was the believed vulnerability of the West to nuclear blackmail and the apparent vulnerability of the developing nations to Communist intrusion which formed the foundation for Khrushchev's post-Sputnik offensives.

The first lesson of our experience is, therefore, that the prospects for peace are directly related to the strength and unity of the West and the effectiveness of our policies in every quarter of the globe.

But there is something more to be said. The forces at work within the Communist bloc all push in a similar direction. Nationalism is on the rise in Communist China, Eastern Europe, and, indeed, in the Soviet Union itself. One of

the oldest claims of communism—namely, that it is a doctrine and movement which transcends the ancient claims of nationalism—has never looked less persuasive. On the contrary, despite debate and difficulty, the non-Communist world is making real progress in finding ways in which dignified and proud national states can concert for larger common purposes: within Europe, in the Atlantic community; in the expanding relations of Japan, both with the Atlantic community, within Asia, and in other parts of the world; within Latin America and in our hemispheric relations with Latin America; and within Africa. Dangerous clashes of nationalism exist in many parts of the free world and absorb a high proportion of the energies of diplomacy in the search for pacific settlement. But building on the most fundamental of the commitments of free men—namely, to search and find collective solutions in an environment of diffuse authority—we are making real progress.

Second, the claim of Communists that they have found a more efficient, if more ruthless, method for developing an underdeveloped area can no longer be sustained. And there is an inescapable reason for this failure; namely, that the techniques of Communist control are incompatible with the efficiency of agriculture in an underdeveloped area where three-fourths of the people are normally engaged in rural life. This is what Communist China has massively demonstrated to the world in the past 5 years. And its demonstration has been reinforced by the failures in North Viet-Nam and in Castro's Cuba. There are ample problems on our agenda in proving the compatibility of economic progress and human liberty in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. But there is no reason for any of us to believe that communism offers a realistic and effective alternative.

Similarly, in more advanced societies the more we observe of the evolution of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the more clear it is that communism, as a technique for organizing a modern society, has nothing to offer men—either in growth, stability, or social equity—that intelligent, democratic societies cannot do better. We in the more advanced democracies have an ample agenda. But we can approach

that agenda in confidence that events and hard facts, not theoretical debate, are demonstrating that communism is a technically inferior, as well as inhumane, alternative.

In Eastern Europe there is also a solid basis for hope. After almost a generation's monopoly in propaganda and education, the young are not turning to communism for inspiration or guidance. In the social sciences they look to the lively evolution of thought in the West; in culture they reach back to their national traditions, which are closely linked to those of the nations in Western Europe.

In Eastern Germany we see an imposed regime of virtual occupation which every day

appears before the world as an historical anachronism.

None of these historical facts or trends will, in itself, bring us movement toward peace unless we of the West stay the course, maintain our strength, struggle for increased unity, and build an increasingly effective community of free nations. But if we in the West demonstrate a capacity to persist doggedly along the lines of current policy and commitment—lines which have been built up in three postwar administrations and by a generation's effort throughout the West—we have every reason to believe not only that we shall not be buried but that the principles for which we stand shall triumph.

The Communist Bloc Interest in Africa

by G. Mennen Williams

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

The Somali Republic, located on the bulge of the east coast of Africa, recently agreed to accept arms from the Soviet Union. In doing so the Somalis rejected a Western proposal of military assistance.

These facts illustrate two problems: the continuing major interest of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc in Africa, and the difficulty which the United States faces in competing responsibly with the Soviet Union in such a situation.

The Somali Republic, a land of 2 million people, was formed in 1960 by joining former British and Italian Somaliland. Within a democratic framework, its Government has pursued a nonaligned policy in world affairs. It has received economic assistance from both Communist and Western nations. Its guiding

policies have been a desire to build its economy and to reunite Somali people living in nearby Ethiopia and Kenya with their fellow tribesmen in Somalia itself.

As a stable country and a working parliamentary democracy, Somalia has achieved a good record in Africa. The same government has ruled since independence, and the country has scheduled national elections for next March.

Since independence the Somali Republic, as do all sovereign countries, has sought to improve its national security by building an adequate defense establishment. The former metropolitan powers, Italy and the United Kingdom, provided some military aid, but the Somalis felt the equipment was small in quantity and obsolete in quality.

In November of last year the Somali Prime Minister [Abdirasid Ali Scermarche] paid an official visit to Washington,² and the United

¹ Address prepared for delivery at La Salle College, Philadelphia, Pa., on Nov. 18 (press release 588) and read for Mr. Williams by Elbert G. Mathews, Director, Office of Inter-African Affairs.

² For text of a joint communique, see BULLETIN of Dec. 17, 1962, p. 918.

States agreed to study the Somali military aid situation and see where we could help. The Prime Minister obtained a similar indication of willingness to assist from West Germany. Subsequently the United States and West Germany, together with Italy, developed a tripartite Western military aid program for Somalia. British aid ceased when Somalia broke off relations with the British in March 1963 in the dispute over the Northern Frontier District of Kenya.

In offering to assist Somalia militarily the Western countries had several objectives: to provide enough assistance for an adequate defense establishment, to avoid an effort which would sorely tax Somalia's resources in money and manpower, and to assist in such a way that our goals of continued peace and stability in that area of Africa would be served.

Discussions between Western and Somali officials in the spring and summer of 1963 revealed a significant gap between what the Somalis wanted in the way of equipment and what the Western countries felt able to provide. Two other developments complicated the situation: the outbreak in the summer of 1963 of incidents involving the Somali tribesmen who inhabit Ethiopia which had repercussions in Somalia itself, and the breakdown of Somali-British talks over the future of the Somali-inhabited portion of neighboring Kenya.

Because of these developments, and mindful of the coming Somali elections, the Somali Government decided to strengthen its forces substantially and urgently. Thus it turned to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets made a much greater offer and immediately sent aircraft to take Somalis to the Soviet Union for training. At the same time the Somali Government turned down the Western offer. The Western countries—conscious of their common desire to avoid participating in an arms race in Africa, their wish to avoid unduly burdening African economies with military equipment, and their interests in neighboring countries—did not feel they could or should compete with this offer.

The acceptance of Soviet arms assistance does not mean that Somalia is a Communist country, however. The receipt of such mili-

tary assistance will undoubtedly increase Soviet influence in the country. Yet there are strong ties between the Somali Republic and the West, and Western countries plan to continue to assist Somalia economically.

In the meantime the burdens and implications of so large a program of assistance from the Soviet Union may well become clear to responsible people in the Somali Government. If this happens and there is a scaling down of the present program, our decision not to attempt to compete at a level we believed unjustified will have proved wise.

If the Soviets seem determined to enter a situation such as this, it is likely that neither our basic policies nor our available funds will permit us to compete seriously. Nevertheless we can retain and stimulate other close ties with an independent people against the day when they realize the full implications and disadvantages of Soviet aid. This has already happened elsewhere in Africa, and it can happen again.

Yet we cannot underestimate the current threat and thrust of Soviet efforts in Africa. Despite statements by some Soviet experts that the Soviet Union, like the United States, is having second thoughts about foreign aid, recent Soviet offers to African countries are reaching sizable proportions.

From January 1954 to June 1963, the Sino-Soviet bloc expended, as distinct from obligated, a total of \$1.5 billion in economic aid to the less developed countries outside of the bloc itself. Of that amount, approximately 30 percent, or some \$450 million, went to Africa, including the United Arab Republic. (I might point out for comparative purposes that during that same period, only some 6 percent of all U.S. economic aid went to Africa, although today the total has climbed to about 10 percent.) As opposed to the \$450 million expended, total bloc aid earmarked for Africa alone has risen to nearly \$1 billion, when recent offers to Algeria and Somalia are included. However, some countries are showing a disinclination to draw upon these credits offered by the bloc, and there are no indications that the amount actually spent is increasing.

In the field of higher education the Soviet

Union alone had more than 3,000 academic students from Africa during the 1962-63 school year. In the same period the United States had some 5,000 African students. In terms of percentages, however, the African students in the United States constituted only about 7 percent of all foreign students from underdeveloped countries, in comparison with a total of 40 percent in the U.S.S.R.

These two examples give you some idea of the great importance placed upon African penetration by the Communist bloc.

In addition, the Communists in the last few years have established a generally effective diplomatic economic or cultural presence in many independent African states. The U.S.S.R. or its European satellites also have concluded air transport agreements with 10 African countries. Other Communist techniques to undermine Africa's freedom include student training, cultural exchanges, informational programs, and economic ties. Among the principal Communist target groups are African youth, potential leaders of all kinds, labor, and, where possible, military personnel.

At the present time the Communists apparently are not counting principally upon formal local party organizations to further their ends. Rather, they are relying upon what might be called a hit-and-run technique. Their tactics are to try to exploit any favorable situation as quickly as possible, until they are forced to relax their pressures and withdraw because of African reaction to Communist overzealousness. This was the Communist pattern, for instance, in Morocco and Guinea.

In addition to such opportunistic hit-and-run tactics the Communists also employ a technique which might be called subversion by proxy. This involves the use of European Communists in the former colonial powers to condition and hopefully subvert as many as possible of the thousands of impressionable young people who return to their former metropolises for higher education or specialized training.

A high-priority target group for the Communists is labor. African unions are political in nature and are prime targets for the Communists when attempts to infiltrate governments fail. The Soviet African specialist I. I. Potekhin has pointed out:

The position and role of the working class is of exceptionally great importance. . . . In the French colonies (his term, not ours), in Nigeria, in Ghana and in many other countries, every political concession by the colonizers was preceded by a powerful strike movement of the working class.

Recent events in Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, and even in Congo (Léopoldville) would tend to support Potekhin's emphasis on the importance of labor in the African revolutionary scene and give further evidence of the reasons why the Communists are anxious to penetrate labor groups.

Soviet research on African matters is also considered a necessary tool for subversion. The Communists are aware that the dearth of factual materials on Africa hampers their overall policy planning. For that reason they have initiated a whole series of study projects for Soviet scholars and experts to pursue.

Additional evidence of the high priority the Communist nations give to Africa can be seen in their increasing interest in the potentially explosive southern third of Africa. Here white minority governments are resisting the rising demands of black majorities to determine their own futures. In these areas there are abundant opportunities at the present time for Communist elements to move into positions of leadership in the drive for freedom and self-determination. As a matter of fact, the South African Communist Party, even though it is illegal and operates clandestinely, is playing a significant role in organizing opposition to that country's *apartheid* policy.

Yet, in spite of—or perhaps in part because of—international communism's major efforts in Africa, the Communists have to date failed to subvert or capture any African country as a satellite. The very aggressiveness and overt-ness of the Communist power thrust has made many Africans keenly aware of Communist tactics. Open Communist interference in African domestic affairs and overt attempts to sway African nations to support Communist cold-war aims have helped to arouse African suspicions of Communist goals.

The most important factor in precluding Communist successes to this point, however, has been Africa's increasing awareness of the divergence between the aspirations of interna-

tional communism and the aspirations of the African nations. The emerging nations of Africa are determined to remain free and independent at home and nonaligned in international affairs. More and more frequently, troubled African leaders are asking themselves if Communist assistance is worth the headaches it entails—and more and more frequently the answer is no.

Nevertheless we cannot be—and we are not—complacent about the Communist threat to Africa. It is there, it is real, it is dangerous. We must meet it within a framework of policy and financial limitations that does not bind the Communists. But we believe our methods are best for the long-term future, both for the United States and for Africa.

The emergence of modern Africa has posed a great challenge to the United States and the Western World. This new Africa has demanded of us new ideas and new techniques, and it has forced us to abandon much of the stereotyped thinking of the past.

Our African experience of recent years has helped us develop policies and programs that we believe will add materially to Africa's growth and strength, to a truly free and independent Africa, to an Africa able to make increasingly important contributions to the world community. And if we can help Africa attain those goals, we will have taken a memorable and significant step toward assuring peace and security for many generations to come.

Secretary Sends Good Wishes on Latvia's National Day

Following is the text of a letter from Secretary Rusk to Arnolds Spekke, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Legation of Latvia at Washington.

NOVEMBER 15, 1963.

DEAR DR. SPEKKE: On the occasion of Latvia's National Day it is my privilege to extend the sincere good wishes of the Government and people of the United States for the observance of the 45th anniversary of Latvian independence.

Americans firmly believe that no people should be forcibly deprived of their freedom and right to self-determination. For this reason the United States Government refuses to recognize the forcible incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union. Your countrymen's devotion to freedom and their determination to regain it have won the admiration and support of the American people. We are confident that these traits of the Latvian people will serve well the cause of eventual restoration of the rights of the Latvian nation.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

Secretary Appoints Observers for Antarctic Inspection

The Department of State announced on November 18 (press release 591) that Secretary Rusk has appointed nine U.S. Antarctic observers, including two alternates, to carry out inspections by the United States in Antarctica during the 1963-1964 austral summer season (November-March). Each of the 12 signatory powers may undertake inspections under the treaty.¹ The United States decision to conduct inspections under the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force on June 23, 1961, was announced on September 13, 1963.² It was pointed out at that time that inspections are not based on any anticipation that there have been treaty violations.

The names of the persons appointed as observers are as follows: Charles C. Bates, John L. Buckley, John C. Guthrie, Richard H. Hawkins, Jr., Michel Ivy, George W. Rathjens, J. P. Ruina, Victor B. Scheffer, and Frank G. Siscoe.³

In designating each appointee as a U.S. Antarctic observer under article VII of the Antarctic Treaty, Secretary Rusk stated:

"The purpose of the inspection is to promote the objectives and insure the observance of the

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1963, p. 513.

³ For biographic details, see press release 591 dated Nov. 18.

provisions of the Antarctic Treaty. You may expect to have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica. This includes all stations, installations, and equipment and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica.

"While performing inspections, you should bear constantly in mind that all states active in Antarctica have been both friendly and cooperative with the United States in matters relating to the continent, and it is the policy of the United States to preserve and enhance this situation. You should conduct your activities in compliance with this policy."

Harry Most Named to Committee on International Book Programs

The Department of State announced on November 27 (press release 604) that Secretary Rusk had appointed Harry R. Most, president of W. B. Saunders Co., Philadelphia, to serve on the Government Advisory Committee on International Book Programs.

The function of the Committee is to advise the various Government departments and agencies on their overseas book programs and to act as a liaison body for greater cooperation between the Government and the industry in extending the circulation and use of American books abroad. Members of the Committee are drawn from leaders of the industry for varying periods of service.

Other members of the Committee are:

Curtis G. Benjamin, *chairman*, chairman of the board, McGraw-Hill Book Co.

Jerome Hardy, executive vice president, Time, Inc.

John Howe, assistant to the president, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.

William Kelty, assistant general manager, Office of International Editions, Reader's Digest

Igor Kropotkin, president, American Booksellers Association

Freeman Lewis, executive vice president, Pocket Books, Inc.

Andrew McNally III, president, Rand McNally

M. R. Robinson, president, Scholastic Book Services

Craig T. Senft, president, American Textbook Publishers Institute

William Spaulding, president, American Book Publishers Council

Franklin Watts, president, Franklin Watts, Inc.

W. Bradford Wiley, president, John Wiley & Sons

Thomas Wilson, director, Harvard University Press

Government representatives on the Committee are Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State; Dr. Leona Baumgartner, Assistant Administrator for Human Resources and Social Development, Agency for International Development; and Donald M. Wilson, Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency.

U.S. and Hong Kong Conclude Cotton Textile Agreement

Joint Announcement

Press release 583 dated November 15

The Government of Hong Kong and the United States Government have announced details of an agreement affecting exports from Hong Kong to the United States in 35 categories of cotton textiles during the period October 1, 1963, to September 30, 1964.

The purpose of the agreement is to provide for orderly exports from Hong Kong to the United States during the second year of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles,¹ which became effective on October 1, 1962, for a period of five years. The new agreement concludes discussions conducted in Washington and Hong Kong between representatives of the two Governments.

The new agreement continues most of the restraints on Hong Kong cotton textile exports which were requested by the United States Government during the first year of the Geneva Long-Term Arrangements, removes three of these restraints, and provides for one new restraint. The agreement also provides for growth in Hong Kong's trade in cotton textile categories under restraint, and also incorporates a series of highly complex adjustments made to take account of outstanding problems and differences.

With respect to categories not currently un-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

der restraint, the United States Government reserves the right to request restraints if, in its view, the condition of the United States textile market should require the imposition of restraints on Hong Kong exports in these categories. The provisions of the Geneva Long-Term Arrangements would be applicable to these requests.

The details of the agreement are as follows:

(1) The restraint levels in 35 categories of cotton textiles total 248.9 million square yards equivalent for the period October 1, 1963, to September 30, 1964. The annex under this release lists the specific restraint levels by categories agreed between the two Governments.

(2) The Government of Hong Kong agrees to limit, during the period from October 1, 1963, to September 30, 1964, the corduroy fabric content of apparel exports to the United States to a level of no more than 4 million square yards and to insure that the pattern of trade by garment categories established during the first year of the Long-Term Arrangements with respect to corduroy apparel items will be maintained during the second-year period.

(3) The United States Government agrees to lift its requests for restraints in categories 33, 44, and 57.

(4) The United States Government also agrees that the specific restraint levels, by categories and corduroy fabrics content, will be increased by 5%, in accordance with the provisions of the Long-Term Arrangements, to the extent that restraints may be renewed in these categories, for the twelve-month period commencing October 1, 1964.

(5) The Government of Hong Kong has also agreed to continue for another year the arrangements which it had undertaken to space its exports in restrained categories during the first year of the Long-Term Arrangements.

(6) The two Governments will continue to provide each other periodically with such information on exports in restrained and unrestrained categories as may facilitate the implementation of the arrangement.

A list of the specific restraints on 35 categories of cotton textiles is provided in the annex below.

Attachment: Annex—List of Categories and Restraint Levels

ANNEX

Category	Description	Restraint level
1	Cotton yarn, carded, singles---	206,000 lbs.
5	Gingham, carded-----	3,455,358 syds.
6	Gingham, combed-----	721,000 syds.
9	Sheeting, carded-----	48,095,287 syds.
15	Poplin and Broadcloth, carded--	1,545,000 syds.
16	Poplin and Broadcloth, combed--	566,500 syds.
18	Print cloth, shirting type, 80 x 80 type, carded	113,300 syds.
19	Print cloth, shirting type, other than 80 x 80 type, carded	643,750 syds.
22	Twill and Sateen, carded-----	16,683,525 syds.
23	Twill and Sateen, combed-----	669,500 syds.
24	Woven fabric, not elsewhere specified, yarn dyed, carded	242,050 syds.
25	Woven fabric, not elsewhere specified, yarn dyed, combed	236,900 syds.
26	Woven fabric, not elsewhere specified, other, carded	29,600,169 syds.
27	Woven fabric, not elsewhere specified, other, combed*	1,030,000 syds.
28	Pillowcases, carded-----	463,500 nos.
30	Towels, dish-----	808,467 nos.
31	Towels, other-----	9,991,000 nos.
36	Bedspreads and quilts-----	51,500 nos.
39	Gloves and mittens-----	225,750 doz. prs.
41	T-shirts, all white, knit, men's and boys'	126,000 doz.
42	T-shirts, other, knit-----	267,750 doz.
43	Shirts, knit, other than T-shirts and sweatshirts	367,952 doz.
45	Shirts, dress, not knit, men's and boys'	273,000 doz.
46	Shirts, sport, not knit, men's and boys'	786,500 doz.
48	Raincoats, ¾ length or longer, not knit	11,373 doz.
49	Coats, other, not knit-----	43,172 doz.
50	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), not knit, men's and boys'	735,000 doz.
51	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), not knit, women's, girls' and infants'	1,280,858 doz.
52	Blouses, not knit-----	1,065,750 doz.
53	Dresses, including uniforms, not knit	57,750 doz.
54	Playsuits, sunsuits, washsuits, creepers, rompers, etc., not knit, not elsewhere specified	126,000 doz.
60	Pajamas and other nightwear--	472,500 doz.
61	Brassieres and other body-supporting garments	1,475,250 doz.
62	Wearing apparel, knit, not elsewhere specified	299,250 lbs.
64	All other cotton textiles**-----	3,502,000 lbs.

*Parts of T.S.U.S.A. nos. 320.—90, 323.—90, 326.—90, 329.—90, 320.—94, 323.—94, 326.—94, and 329.—94.

**Refers to wiping towels.

Department Opposes Restriction of Credit to Communist Nations

Statement by Acting Secretary Ball¹

I appear this morning to present the views of the Department of State with regard to S. 2310. It is our view that this proposed legislation would not be in the national interest.

The bill as drafted would prohibit the Export-Import Bank or any agency of this Government from guaranteeing the payment of any obligation incurred by a Communist country or from extending credit to any such country in connection with the purchase of any American product.

To understand the consequences of this proposed legislation, one must examine the purposes served by the Export-Import Bank. The Bank has a central objective—to assist United States producers to sell their goods on foreign markets of the world. Selling goods for export is a highly competitive business, and every major Western industrialized country provides some governmental financial mechanism to facilitate such sales.

The Export-Import Bank has two principal methods of operation:

First, it makes loans to foreign purchasers to finance the purchase of United States goods.

Second, it makes it possible for United States exporters to finance commercial sales by guaranteeing the short-term credits normally involved in such transactions. In practice short-term loans are made by commercial banks, and the function of the Export-Import Bank is to insure all or part of the risk taken by the banks in return for an appropriate premium.

Against this background let us consider how the proposed legislation would operate.

One provision of S. 2310 would prohibit the Export-Import Bank or any agency of the United States Government from extending credits directly to a Communist country. At the moment, this problem appears academic. Except for Yugoslavia, the Bank has extended no credits to any Communist country, and no one is presently suggesting that it should do so.

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Nov. 21 (press release 598).

A second provision of the proposed legislation would prohibit the Bank or any agency of the Government from utilizing its guarantee powers in connection with a sale to any Communist country.

In considering this provision, one cannot ignore the broad scope of its language. As drafted, it would—in connection with sales to the Soviet Union or any other Communist country—effectively deny to American producers credit facilities which every major Western nation accords to its own producers. We strongly question the wisdom of imposing such a sweeping and permanent handicap on United States industry and agriculture, particularly at a time when great changes are occurring in the world, when world markets are becoming increasingly competitive, and when the United States is experiencing a persistent and disturbing deficit in its international balance of payments.

It would appear from the history of this proposed legislation that its primary purpose is to serve an immediate and limited objective—to restrict the activities of United States Government credit agencies in connection with the proposed sale of wheat and other agricultural products to the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries.

I know that I need not describe to this committee the steps that have so far been taken in connection with the possible sale of wheat to the Soviet Union.

On October 9 the President reported to the Nation that he had decided to authorize the issuance of export licenses for the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries on certain prescribed conditions, including the condition that the sales be undertaken on normal terms of payment.² The President set forth in detail the reasons for his decision. He also sent to each House of Congress a letter³ explaining the basis for his action.

I shall not burden the committee at this point with the reasons stated in the President's letter, although I shall, of course, be glad to discuss any aspect of the question that the committee may desire.

² For a statement by President Kennedy, see BULLETIN of Oct. 28, 1963, p. 660.

³ H. Doc. 163, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

A reading of S. 2310 leads to the conclusion that it has been drafted on one of two assumptions:

1. That the proposed sale of wheat is undesirable and that this legislation is an appropriate means for preventing that sale.

2. That while the sale of wheat by itself may not be objectionable, it would be against national policy to permit American exporters to avail themselves of normal governmental credit facilities in connection with such a sale.

If one proceeds on the first assumption—that the proposed legislation is intended to prevent the sale of wheat and other products to Communist countries—then, in our view, it is a poor instrument for that purpose.

In the first place, there is no assurance that it would have such an effect. The Canadian wheat sale was arranged on a basis that called for payment of one-fourth the total price in cash, one-fourth in 6 months, one-fourth in 12 months, and the remaining one-fourth in 18 months. As things have worked out, the Soviet Union has not yet seen fit to avail itself of these terms of payment but so far has paid cash.

I do not know whether the passage of this proposed legislation would block the sale of American wheat—or for that matter whether any wheat will be sold even if this legislation is not passed. That depends upon the ability of our grain trade and the Soviet representatives to get together on mutually agreeable terms within the framework of the conditions laid down by the President.

But I would suppose, however, that if the Congress concluded that any wheat sale to the Soviet Union was against the national interest, it would not be content to leave the outcome to such a precarious decision of the marketplace. It would move, instead, directly to restrict the issuance of export licenses for this purpose—as it has ample power to do.

One must assume, therefore, that this proposed legislation was not intended to strike at the sale of wheat as such. Instead, it was apparently drafted in the belief that it would be all right for our grain dealers to sell wheat to Communist countries, provided they could do so

without resort to governmental credit facilities available generally for commercial transactions.

The hard realities faced by the grain dealers who are interested in making this sale are, I think, clear enough. No grain dealer could afford to tie up his capital for the period called for by the normal terms of payment in grain deals of the magnitude in which the Soviet representatives have expressed interest. He would, of necessity, have to resort to short-term bank financing as is customary in the trade. As Secretary [of the Treasury Douglas] Dillon testified to this committee yesterday, the United States commercial banks are not prepared to undertake such financing in the amounts required. This is not because the Soviet Union has the reputation of a bad commercial credit risk but rather because the volume of credit involved is too great.

Under the circumstances, it would seem only reasonable that our financial institutions be given the same kind of reinforcement as that offered the Canadian banks by the comparable Canadian Government institution—the Export Credit Insurance Corporation.

As I understand it, the argument urged against this position is that such a credit guarantee would be an unjustifiable benefit to the Communist countries.

If we were considering the extension of long-term credits, there might be some merit in this argument, since there is evidence that the Soviet Union may be experiencing some credit stringency. But the financing of exporters in order to enable them to make sales under the customary terms of credit prevailing in the world market has never been regarded as a benefit to the purchaser but as a normal facility on which exporters depend in order to compete.

Under these circumstances, the principal effect of S. 2310 could be to deprive our farmers and grain traders of an opportunity to sell their goods. In the longer run, it would also preclude any possibility of an increase in nonstrategic trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe financed on normal commercial credit terms.

In view of these reasons, I feel compelled to recommend strongly against the enactment of S. 2310.

Strengthening the Alliance for Progress

*Statement by Under Secretary Harriman*¹

Let me first express the gratitude of the United States delegation to our hosts on this occasion—to the Government of Brazil, the State and municipal authorities of São Paulo, and the university. It is hard to imagine a more appropriate setting for our deliberations than the developing university campus of this vigorous and thriving metropolis, so powerful a symbol of the human and industrial vitality of Latin America. São Paulo is a dramatic answer to the timid voices who doubt the capacity of this continent to enter fully and rapidly into economic dynamism and advanced technology.

I want also to express my personal pleasure in returning to South America and in renewing contact with a group of leading statesmen of this continent. There is the spiritual refreshment which comes from the warmth of Latin American culture, combining European and American traditions into new and unique creations which are making their own special contributions to world civilization. But it is especially good to return in this time of transition, when dedicated leaders are coming together in common devotion to a hard task—the task of bringing this continent to full life, of realizing its potentialities, of developing its agriculture and its industry, of modernizing its social and economic structure, and of fulfilling the expectations of its growing millions for a better life for themselves and their children.

¹ Made before the second annual meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at the ministerial level at São Paulo, Brazil, on Nov. 13.

This is no easy task, but history gives us every reason to believe that free nations, sharing their common experience and shouldering a common burden, can and will meet the needs of their people for economic betterment and social justice, for dignity and for liberty. In my own half century of business and government experience, I have seen a good deal of economic agony and of social change in many parts of the world.

My political inspiration comes from Franklin D. Roosevelt, under whose direction I first entered government service just 30 years ago. We all remember President Roosevelt as the great proponent of the good neighbor policy—a policy of mutual respect and voluntary partnership among equals in the pursuit of our common inter-American aims—a policy which still inspires us today. For us in the United States he is the unforgettable leader who, when the Nation lay deep in depression, launched that vast program of economic revival and social progress known as the New Deal. I learned from President Roosevelt the values and ideals of progressive democracy, and I learned too that men have within them the power to control their own economic destiny.

Our Alliance for Progress had its start 27 months ago at Punta del Este.² There the free Republics of the Americas formed a great continental partnership—in the words of the charter, a “cooperative effort to accelerate the

² For background and text of the Charter of Punta del Este, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

economic and social development of the participating countries of Latin America, so that they may achieve maximum levels of well-being, with equal opportunities for all, in democratic societies adapted to their own needs and desires."

Joint action is required to achieve these affirmative goals. Joint action is also required to protect our democratic societies against false propaganda, subversion, and violence organized by international communism or by any other movement seeking to destroy the democratic institutions and human values which, as we declared at Punta del Este, are "the foundation of our civilization."

Reviews by Presidents Lleras and Kubitschek

Last year the IA-ECOSOC recognized that Latin American member countries were "faced with a transitional period of varying characteristics."³ The Council saw the first year as one of considerable and promising accomplishments but one also beset by many difficulties. They recommended that a number of specific steps be taken by member governments, and they resolved to request two outstanding Latin American statesmen to review the structure and activities of inter-American organizations and to suggest changes to give the Alliance for Progress the efficiency and dynamic qualities called for by the charter.

In a 10-year program the first 2 years are still a brief span. They are long enough, however, to permit us to reappraise our common objectives, to examine objectively the strengths and weaknesses of the operating machinery, to judge whether we are well launched toward the accomplishment of our goals, and to decide whether those goals should be altered or the ways and means of accomplishing them modified.

Are any of our governments or peoples wholly satisfied with the way the Alliance for Progress is going? Certainly we in the United States are not. We are, to be sure, by no means wholly dissatisfied. The documents before this meeting demonstrate that much more has been done in these first years than is often recognized by the public opinion of our countries. But we are far from having achieved either the necessary

singleness of purpose or the necessary efficiency in methods of cooperation.

In their noteworthy analyses of the Alliance for Progress, both Presidents Alberto Lleras Camargo and Juscelino Kubitschek stated their clear conviction that the objectives of the Charter of Punta del Este were and are sound. What is required, they tell us, is not a revision of the objectives but a new look at the ways and means, both national and international, to secure the timely and effective fulfillment of those objectives. With this conclusion my Government is in full accord. If the charter were to be redrafted today, we believe that all its basic principles would still be recognized as indispensable to our common aims.

What is needed now, however, is a greater multilateralization of effort and strengthened political leadership. This is a matter for all of us acting collectively. We for our part are ready to give the fullest support toward a major new impetus to the Alliance for Progress at this meeting. It is the firm conviction of President Kennedy—and on this point he speaks with the full support of the people and the Congress of the United States—that the success of the Alliance for Progress is of cardinal importance for the peace and prosperity of this hemisphere, for the peace and prosperity of the world, and therefore for the most fundamental objectives of the national policy of my Government.

President Lleras has wisely said that "It is a mistake to believe that policies can be changed through organizations; organization does whatever the governments want it to do." If governments have the will to act, however, the adequacy of the institutional arrangements can make a great difference to the success of their efforts. If I may be forgiven a reference to personal experience, I saw at first hand 15 years ago how the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was developed into a strong intergovernmental institution and thus helped to shape and to give concrete substance to the political will for economic recovery which existed at that time in Europe.

President Kubitschek has rightly identified as essential to the success of the alliance a corresponding political will for economic and social progress. In this alliance the tasks to be accomplished are more complex, more difficult,

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1962, p. 897.

and will take longer than those of European recovery. If anything, therefore, there is an even greater need to stimulate the spirit of close international cooperation and to provide effective institutions to give it direction. The manifest consensus here at this conference demonstrates that the political will to carry forth the objectives of the Alliance for Progress does indeed exist and that we have reached the point in this great enterprise where it is time to give that will more effective institutional form.

For these reasons the United States Government welcomes and will support with enthusiasm the proposal of Presidents Lleras and Kubitschek that there be established an appropriately organized Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP). A strong permanent committee of the IA-ECOSOC, working under the leadership of a distinguished Latin American chairman, can and should give a vigorous new impetus to our common efforts. Working with the alliance coordinating agencies in each member country, it can help give greater effectiveness to the agreed principles for accelerating economic and social progress, for fostering institutional reforms and improvements, for stimulating measures for the more rapid achievement of Latin American economic integration, and for improving trading conditions for the member countries both inside and outside the hemisphere. The CIAP can make a vital contribution to the mobilization and effective application of both internal and external resources.

We are greatly indebted to our expert delegations, ably assisted by the Panel of Nine, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the OAS [Organization of American States] secretariat, for their work in putting into form ready for our consideration this constructive proposal of the two ex-Presidents. We will have proposals for modifying the present draft, and we understand that other delegations also have suggestions for consideration. However, we should not fail at this meeting to come to an agreement on the establishment of this new permanent multilateral organ of the Alliance for Progress. For our part my Government is ready to participate in the CIAP in a truly meaningful manner and is prepared to give great weight to its recommendations.

Complementary Objectives, Not Alternatives

Any rational effort to accelerate development requires a continuous process of decision among alternatives. Hence the emphasis of the Charter of Punta del Este on planning for accelerated development, including the preparation of coherent programs of public investment, guidance for major fields of private investment, and priorities in the application of domestic and supporting external resources. The objectives of the alliance, however, should not be confused by statements of unrealistic alternatives. In one country or another some critics have asserted that Latin America must somehow make a series of choices in applying its energies and resources: that it must concentrate on economic development *or* social progress; that it must emphasize development *or* institutional reform; promote industry *or* agriculture; achieve development *or* stabilization; stimulate the public *or* the private sector; emphasize trade *or* aid. In our view these are not alternatives; they are complementary objectives.

The concept of social and economic progress as joint and mutually reinforcing objectives was consistently argued by Latin American leaders throughout the postwar years, until it won formal recognition in the Act of Bogotá and in the Charter of Punta del Este. And surely they were right. Without economic growth the means will not exist for enlarging social welfare, and as Dr. Mayobre [José Antonio Mayobre, executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America] pointed out so well in his analysis yesterday the declining trend in economic growth must be reversed to meet the minimum goals of the Charter of Punta del Este. But without enlarged social welfare, economic growth cannot be fully realized and certainly will not achieve its fundamental goals of higher living standards and widened opportunities for all. Where illiteracy is widespread and disease debilitating, high economic productivity simply cannot be achieved. Then too, as Thomas Jefferson wrote years ago, he who expects that a people can at the same time be both ignorant and free expects what has never been and never will be. Investment in human resources is the most productive of all investments.

In the last year inter-American meetings of the Ministers of Labor, Health, and Education from all of our governments, and meetings of specialists in the sectors of social investment, have made great headway in devising practical ways and means for applying resources to these ends. This is a new and fruitful dimension in practical inter-American cooperation.

Another unrealistic alternative concerns the relationship of economic development to the so-called basic reforms—land reform, fiscal reform, educational reform, improved public administration, and other institutional improvements. The reports of Presidents Lleras and Kubitshchek mention a widespread notion that the Charter of Punta del Este makes the completion of such reforms a prior condition of the furnishing of outside aid for economic and social development. Both Presidents endorsed the necessity for reforms as an integral part of the development process but rejected the idea that reforms must be finished before development begins.

In fact the charter itself envisages the processes of growth, structural evolution, and social reform as interrelated developments moving hand in hand. True reforms are not merely aspirations set forth in constitutional or statutory formulas. They require the building of institutions and the development of human skills. Agricultural improvement, for example, is not only a matter of more equitable land tenure but also of production incentives, research, education, extension services and credit, organization of the supply of seeds, tools, and fertilizers to the farmer and of storage and marketing arrangements for his products. Similarly industrial modernization is not only a matter of engineering and production technique but also improved methods of administration, labor relations, and elimination of monopolistic bottlenecks impeding the growth of production for mass markets.

It is evident that many of these changes cannot be fully realized except as part of a very substantial process of development. But if development cannot be delayed until the completion of reform, it is equally clear that the starting of reforms cannot be delayed or development itself will be handicapped. We

believe they should be parallel in time and mutually reinforcing.

Nor does the charter ignore the reality that social reforms are bound to involve domestic political controversy and that the responsibility for designing each nation's program must rest with the authorities of that nation. It is the social and economic reforms carried out by representative democracies that have proved truly conducive to social welfare and equality of opportunity, contrasting with the bitter experiences that have followed the violent upheavals of authoritarian regimes, whether pretending to be "dictatorships of the proletariat" or "popular benefactors" in a Fascist mold. Moreover, the political resistance to social change in democratic societies can be greatly reduced if reforms are taking place in an environment of growth. Thus on political as well as technical grounds, development and reform must be regarded as parallel and interlinked processes.

Similarly both the urban and rural sectors, both industry and agriculture, have their indispensable functions in the task of economic progress. Again, it is wrong to suppose that we must choose between them. In fact each supports and stimulates the other. The process of industrialization cannot succeed unless at the same time nations take the necessary steps to enlist their rural sectors as full and active partners in national development. This means making the countryside a more efficient source of agricultural production and thus of working capital and foreign exchange. It also means making the countryside a better market for the industrial output of the cities. The solutions of these two problems—the correction of the chronic imbalance between rural and urban areas—go hand in hand. The answer lies in a systematic campaign to modernize agricultural methods, to modernize marketing methods, and to direct industrial development into channels which will meet the needs of the rural market.

Dr. Hernán Santa Cruz has indicated the need for increased agricultural production to meet the goals of the alliance. It is the free farmer, cultivating his own soil and backed by effective institutions, that has brought about the

miracles of productivity in modern agriculture. It is interesting, in this connection, to note the disastrous failure of agricultural production in the Soviet Union, Red China, and indeed all countries that have attempted to apply Communist theory to the realities of agricultural life.

Still another unrealistic alternative is the alleged conflict between stabilization and development. One of the stated objectives of the charter is the achievement of stable price levels while maintaining adequate economic growth. As we all know, many countries of this continent have had long and painful experience with inflation. Some of the efforts at stabilization have proven unsuccessful or even hampering to development. Once an inflationary spiral is well under way, it evidently cannot be corrected without strenuous effort and a difficult period of adjustment. On the other hand, to permit inflation to go unchecked undermines and distracts development at its base by discouraging savings, diverting investment into unproductive speculative or luxury uses, and encouraging the flight of capital abroad and aggravating balance-of-payment problems. At the same time severe inflation creates social and political tensions which may threaten the entire institutional structure. Reasonable price stability is not an end in itself, but it is a necessary condition of durable economic and social progress.

For these reasons my Government has cooperated in the support of effective stabilization efforts, aiming at as smooth a process of adjustment as can be achieved, an equitable sharing within the national economy of any necessary hardships, and the maintenance of economic growth in real terms.

Stimulating Both Public and Private Sectors

Still another unrealistic alternative is couched in terms of whether a choice must be made between stimulating the public or the private sector. Economic infrastructure and the improvement of human resources require large public investments which complement the expansion of agriculture, industry, and commerce through private investment. The choice between public

and private means is not a matter of theology. It is the pragmatic question of how resources can best be used to hasten national growth. I can only add that the experience of modern history suggests that both freedom and efficiency are most likely to flourish when economic decision, ownership, and power are widely distributed.

Nor can participation of the private sector be limited to business enterprises. Equally important are the other organized associations of modern free societies, such as agricultural cooperatives and trade unions. In our age, indeed, responsible, democratic trade unions have come to be recognized as indispensable partners in a free economy and essential components of a free society. The participation of such trade unions in programs of economic and social development is essential to enlist the energies and initiative of working people in this peaceful American revolution.

During this past year a group of trade union leaders appointed by the OAS secretariat reported, with candor, that free trade unions were not participating adequately in the alliance programs of a number of countries. In response to this report our Ministers of Labor adopted the Declaration of Cundinamarca, a specific program for collaboration of labor ministries and labor unions in the common effort.⁴ Our expert delegations have followed this up with proposals to strengthen free trade union participation, including the establishment in each nation of a trade union advisory group on the alliance. We strongly support these moves.

In sum, economic and social progress under the alliance depends on adequate attention being paid to the private *and* the public sectors, to industry *and* agriculture, to urban *and* rural problems, to reforms and stabilization as well as to the real rate of growth. To be successful in these will also require both timely and effective support from external resources *and* improved trading conditions within and outside the hemisphere. This is the last of the un-

⁴ For text of a message from President Kennedy to the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor at Bogotá, Colombia, May 6-11, 1963, see *ibid.*, June 3, 1963, p. 884.

realistic alternatives: whether to emphasize trade or aid. The fact is that we must move more effectively on both these fronts.

With respect to outside support the inauguration of the Alliance for Progress has brought about a radical change in the pattern of United States foreign economic assistance. In these 27 months the Latin American share of such assistance has almost quadrupled from the average for the previous postwar years. The total commitments of public funds have amounted to \$2.3 billion, one-third in grants and two-thirds in development loans, mostly at very long terms and low rates of interest. Today Latin America receives almost twice as much United States public economic assistance per capita as any other area of the world. Our pledge at Punta del Este was that the United States would "provide a major part of the minimum of 20 billion dollars, principally in public funds, which Latin America will require over the next 10 years from all external sources in order to supplement its own efforts."⁵ So far, we have been sustaining our side of this pledge. Under the new impetus which this meeting can give to the alliance, I am confident that we shall continue to do so.

Criticism of excessive redtape and bureaucratic delay in the application of these funds has been heard in Washington as well as in Latin America. This has been a constant preoccupation of all our responsible officials.

During the past year we have taken many steps in Washington to speed the clearance of loans, the processing of projects, and the flow of assistance. We plan to delegate increasing authority to AID [Agency for International Development] missions in the Latin American countries, and we will work loyally with our partner governments to eliminate unnecessary delays. In all candor, however, we must recognize that the causes of these delays do not all rest on one side. Within Latin America there have also been delays in establishing effective planning machinery, in mobilizing domestic resources, in establishing priorities, and above all in the development of well-conceived and technically sound projects. I know that you too are determined to end these delays on your own side.

⁵For text of the Declaration to the Peoples of America, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462.

The World Bank and the United Nations Special Fund have come increasingly to recognize that preinvestment surveys and technical assistance in project formulation are frequently as important aids to development as capital assistance itself. We in this alliance have shared this experience, and on the United States side we are expanding our capacity to assist in these respects.

The Inter-American Development Bank, which we have all come to think of as the bank of the alliance, has made great strides forward in this last year, establishing itself as a major factor in development financing for Latin America and beginning to draw resources from Europe. President [Felipe] Herrera is to be particularly congratulated on his ceaseless efforts, as indicated in his admirable statement before this assembly, to broaden the scope of the bank's activities in such fields as integration and trade, and the new export financing program now being launched.

The Charter of Punta del Este also looked for a substantial contribution of outside public resources from worldwide international institutions and from governments outside the hemisphere. The World Bank is showing new and welcome concern with such fields as agriculture, education, and housing, which hitherto have played only a small part in its lending operations. Through that bank, and through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Development Assistance Committee, the governments of capital-supplying nations are being encouraged to pay increasing heed to the pressing needs of this continent. While progress has been slower in these first 2 years than any of us would like, we are laying the foundations for an increase and we have solid reasons to expect that a cumulative process will catch hold.

Encouraging Flow of Foreign Investment

The other major potential source of external resources is foreign private investment. External public aid and domestic resources will not meet all of Latin America's need for capital, technical modernization, and management skills. To discuss means of financing industrial development without including foreign private investment is to leave out one of the most dy-

namic elements of growth. To hamper the inflow of private funds is like asking a neighbor to help you build your house but insisting that he do so with one hand tied behind his back.

It is fundamental to the concept of the alliance that the process of development should involve both the public and private sectors, taking, as the charter says, "full advantage of the talents and energies of both." But I would call to your attention that, along with reasons to stimulate the development of commercial, industrial, and financial institutions, the charter calls for the development of labor organizations and cooperatives and similar institutions that make for balance within the private sector, as well as between it and public institutions.

In fact the contribution of foreign private investment will be maximized if the domestic private sector is properly supported by governments. Foreign investment needs to be part of a growing community of like-minded and respected domestic producers. There are a variety of incentives which should be adopted to accelerate private industrial development. More attention, particularly, needs to be given to the stimulation of small and medium-sized enterprises. Steps need to be taken to consult with representatives of the private sector in the development of economic policies and programs.

The alliance charter itself recognizes the need to promote, through appropriate measures, conditions which would encourage the flow of foreign investment. On our part, President Kennedy has already proposed a tax credit to be extended U.S. investors who contribute new funds to industrial enterprises in developing countries.

Latin American industrialization and its system of distribution are on the eve of a new stage which should give private enterprise, both domestic and foreign, an enhanced importance. There has been a substantial beginning in industrial production, as São Paulo bears witness, but concentrated mainly in the replacement of consumer goods imports for urban, middle-class consumption. Latin American industry must now go forward in several dimensions—in the production of industrial equipment and especially in the pro-

duction of consumer goods for the mass markets of the urban working class and the rural agricultural population.

The flow of foreign private investment into a developing economy—as shown by our own experience, as well as that of Canada, Australia, and certain countries of Latin America—accelerates these changes and leads to further domestic private investment. Domestic entrepreneurs may form joint ventures with foreign capital, or may establish enterprises to supply the foreign-owned company with goods or services, or alternatively may distribute the new products. As one sees here in São Paulo, a whole complex of secondary and tertiary establishments arise with the formation of a new industrial activity—extending into the service trades. New opportunities open for domestic capital to move into more productive pursuits and thus encourage capital to remain at home and assist in the expansion of the economy.

Most foreign companies entering Latin America will be highly conscious of their responsibilities to economic growth and will lead the way in plowing back a reasonable share of their earnings into the national economy. In fact sizable contributions to tax revenue, export earnings, and personal income are already made by U.S. manufacturing companies throughout Latin America. In the labor area foreign companies are also often more conscious of the need to raise wages as productivity increases, to provide better working and living conditions, and to recognize the role of responsible and independent trade unions.

There is yet another point, obvious enough but important to state. The private capital of the United States, of Europe, of Japan, has abundant outlets in the free world. It is sought after both at home and abroad, and it has neither the desire nor the necessity to locate where it is not wanted. Foreign private capital can play a critically important and constructive role in the struggle to achieve higher living standards in the Americas as it has in the industrial countries of the free world. Without it there will be gaps in the development process which public funds could not fill even if they could be mustered—technical knowledge and managerial skills which are simply not available in public hands.

These outside resources, and especially those from the private sector, can be utilized much more effectively for both the short and the long runs if Latin American trade also grows. An essential element in the process of development is a change in the structure of foreign trade—a shift from the exporting of unprocessed primary products and total reliance on imports for manufactured goods toward a constantly higher degree of raw-material processing within the country of exportation and a growing interchange of semimanufactured and manufactured goods reflecting the comparative advantage of various industries in the trading countries. But these structural changes require investment, public and private, and they require foreign exchange which itself can be obtained both through increased exports as well as aid.

With both aid and trade, these structural changes can be greatly accelerated. Thus, as I said before, the problem is not one of a false choice between trade or aid but rather their best combination.

Trade Problems of Developing Countries

Among the central criteria for sound development planning is improvement in the balance of payments through the creation of new export industries and the replacement of imports where domestic conditions permit production on an economic basis. Here in São Paulo we can see how domestic efforts, reinforced by foreign aid for economic infrastructure and foreign private investment, have so changed the economic structure in recent years as to open up wholly new possibilities for Brazilian exports of manufactured goods. Certainly aid is no substitute for trade, but it can play a vital part in the structural changes required to bring into being a system of healthy trading relationships.

We meet on the eve of a year of great importance to the future of international trade. Under GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] auspices the so-called Kennedy Round of tariff reductions is to be negotiated starting in mid-1964. And in March of next year there will assemble the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,⁶ whose Secretary General is a distinguished Latin

American, Dr. Raúl Prebisch. Together these two conferences can be of high importance in improving the trade prospects of Latin America.

We share with all the other governments here a deep concern for the trade problems of the developing countries. We recognize that world demand for primary products has grown more slowly than for manufactured goods and that price trends have generally been unfavorable for the last decade—although not over longer periods. Also, many have shown an upward movement in the last 2 years.

For these reasons, in accordance with the policies outlined by President Kennedy, our Government has taken an active part in international negotiations to stabilize and expand primary-product markets and otherwise to improve the trading prospects of the less developed countries. In the past year the world coffee agreement has been put into operation, promising greatly improved stability for this product of vital importance to over half the nations represented at this meeting. In February the International Monetary Fund adopted an arrangement for compensatory financing to offset losses in foreign exchange earnings for reasons beyond the control of an exporting country, and has already authorized drawings for two countries under this new arrangement.

The thrust of trade policy should be twofold: to expand markets in the traditional products and to develop markets for diversified exports. Both the GATT and the U.N. conference should contribute to these twin objectives. There will be special stress on increasingly liberal access for the less developed countries to the markets of the developed countries. So far as the United States is concerned, already more than half of our imports from Latin America enter duty free and the remainder are subject to an average duty of 7 percent—as compared with the 12 percent average for all our imports. We have urged Western Europe to join in a special program to do away with tariffs, quotas, and excise and consumption taxes that discourage the consumption of tropical products. In the 1964 GATT negotiation the major effort will be toward an across-the-board reduction of 50 percent in the tariffs of the industrialized countries. At the same time strict reciprocity will

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 173.

not be sought as between developed and less developed countries.

The importance of the many issues which will be considered in depth by the U.N. conference next spring in Geneva was clearly foreshadowed by the report presented to us yesterday by Dr. Prebisch. My Government expects to play a constructive role at this conference. It is our hope that the conference will examine trade problems objectively, with a view toward concrete and realistic solutions and with a minimum of irrelevant political polemics.

In connection with trade expansion no branch of policy before this meeting is more important to the longrun prospects of development than the movement for Latin American economic integration. We believe, with Dr. Prebisch and Dr. Mayobre, that new and more vigorous initiatives must be undertaken to accelerate progress in economic integration and the realization of the free trade area. The enlargement of market opportunities, the stimulus to industrialization and industrial trade, the competitive stimulus to lower costs and higher productivity, all open up wholly new perspectives if national barriers can be transcended. There can be no doubt that the rapid industrial development of the United States was made possible by the existence of a continent of free trade.

Among the most important functions proposed for the CIAP, in our view, is the acceleration of this movement and the incorporation of the integration objective into the development plans and programs of each of the participating nations. Equally important is the need for Latin American exporters to improve their production, marketing, and promotion techniques. We strongly support the proposal, through intensive efforts at market analysis and export promotion, to expand exports of new types of manufactured products to the growing markets of the developed countries.

Let us then proceed to make the promise of Punta del Este a reality for all the peoples of the Americas. And let us work together to this end without recrimination and resentment and with full confidence in our common destiny. My country has made its share of mistakes. So, I imagine, has every country represented in this

room. The time has come now to learn from the past—and thereby to conquer the future.

The Alliance for Progress was suggested to the governments and peoples of this hemisphere by President Kennedy, but the real roots of this program are Latin American in inspiration and conception. Our role is to help make this conception a reality, fulfilling the proud and passionate desire of the people of Latin America for a decent and spacious future. Franklin Roosevelt inspired us all to be good neighbors. Our family of nations consists of equal members, each free to develop in its own image but bound to the others by unbreakable ties of geography and history. The way of the United States is not necessarily the way of other nations of the hemisphere. National differences will continue to exist. Diversity is the product of freedom, and freedom respects diversity. Every nation can shape its own identity so long as each respects the identity of its neighbors and so long as all resist domination from without. But we share an overwhelming common interest in peace, in freedom, and in a growing abundance and opportunity for all the peoples of the hemisphere. And we share the revolutionary tradition of the Americas. As President Kennedy said in March 1961, when he proposed the Alliance for Progress,⁷ "Let us once again transform the American Continent into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts, a tribute to the power of the creative energies of free men and women, an example to all the world that liberty and progress walk hand in hand."

U.S. and International Tin Council Discuss Surplus Disposal

Joint Announcement

Press release 599 dated November 22

A delegation from the International Tin Council met with representatives of the United States Government in Washington on the 20th and 21st of November, 1963. The delegation from the Council was headed by Mr. Harold W. Allen (Chairman of the Council); it included

⁷ *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

the two Vice Chairmen of the Council (Mr. Y. Coppieters 't Wallant of Belgium and Mr. R. T. Adnan of Indonesia) and representatives of the consuming and producing countries members of the Council. Mr. Henry Brodie (State Department) was in the chair for the United States.

The object of the Council's delegation was to discuss all aspects of U.S. surplus tin disposal in relation to the long-term development of the industry and to obtain effective cooperation from the United States Government in considering the problems arising from such disposals.

The delegation was informed that the United States Government is preparing a long-term tin disposal program and that in the preparation of this program the impact of disposals on the long-term future of the world tin industry and the views expressed by the Council's delegation would be taken into account.

The Chairman of the Council informed the United States representatives of the progress of its inquiry into the long-term aspects of world tin production, consumption, and reserves. The United States representatives accepted an invitation from the Council to cooperate in this inquiry.

U.S. Expresses Continuing Concern for Future of South-West Africa

Statement by Sidney R. Yates

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

By extending the *apartheid* laws to South-West Africa the mandatory power is, in the view of my Government, clearly delinquent in its obligations to the international community and to the population of South-West Africa. These obligations are set forth explicitly in article 2 of the mandate, which states that South Africa "shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory."

Mr. Chairman, my delegation believes not only that there is neither legal nor political basis for the *apartheid* laws in South Africa;

¹ Made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) on Oct. 30 (U.S. delegation press release 4281).

there is also no moral basis for such laws anywhere in the world, let alone in a territory such as South-West Africa, which has a clear international character, which was given to the Government of South Africa as "a sacred trust of civilization."

My delegation believes, further, in the right of the people of South-West Africa to self-determination as promptly as the expression may be freely and responsibly exercised. We would be strongly opposed to any division of the Territory of South-West Africa without the freely expressed consent of its people. We would be strongly opposed to the annexation by any state of all or any part of the territory without such consent.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation is encouraged that there are voices of white people still in South Africa calling for a restoration of reason. In this connection it was refreshing and reassuring to my delegation to read a recent article which appeared in the publication *Forum*, a South African periodical, which urged the application of reason and realism by the people of South Africa to the racial situation. The author of this article reminded the white South Africans that they in fact are the only actors in this looming tragedy who may have some ability to avert the onset of violence. In this South African article the author suggests the following steps by white South Africans:

Primarily they can hold fast to the principles of western civilization. They can denounce at every opportunity the philosophy, the policy and the administrative practices of *apartheid*. They can oppose it and frustrate it by all legal means. They can begin their crusade on behalf of human rights in our country. Theirs is the most worthwhile crusade of all—a crusade against unnecessary dying.

The article is important for two reasons: First, it affirms what we tend to forget too easily: that in the white community of South Africa there are people who are revolted by the Government's policies of *apartheid*, who are not afraid to say so, and who call upon the Government to change its policies. And secondly, the article points up the futility of bloodshed and the need for reason to rule, rather than passion and emotion.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure that every member of this committee has watched with careful in-

terest the progress of the case brought in the International Court of Justice against South Africa by Liberia and Ethiopia. As we all know, shortly after the adjournment of this committee's deliberations last year, the International Court of Justice decided that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute. The Government of South Africa has, quite properly, accepted the Court's decision, inasmuch as it has maintained its participation in the case. This is all to the good.

As we have stated in the past, we believe the General Assembly should take no action which would affect the status of the mandate during the Court's proceedings. My delegation believes that the members of the United Nations should place—and that most members do place—great importance on the rule of law in the conduct of international affairs. It is generally recognized that in this case it is of the highest importance that any action taken by the United Nations rest upon a solid, legal foundation commensurate with the obligations of the world toward the peoples of the mandated territory. Only in this way, we believe, can and should the United Nations hope to mobilize the support needed to carry out its objective.

In this connection I wish to emphasize the importance which the United States attaches to member states of the United Nations respecting the judgments of the International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Article 94 of the charter provides that "Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party." The importance of this concept is further emphasized by subsequent provisions of this article for giving effect to decisions of the Court. We would expect, therefore, compliance with the judgment of the Court.

If the judicial proceedings now in train before the Court are one manifestation of the international community's continuing concern over the problem of South-West Africa, the concern has also been expressed in the request of the General Assembly and of the Committee of 24 to establish a U.N. presence in the territory.

Question of U.N. Presence

My Government attaches particular importance to the recommendation made by the Assembly last year for establishing an effective U.N. presence in the territory.² We are particularly interested not only in the possibility but in the need for a U.N. technical assistance representative in South-West Africa, and I must frankly express our regret and keen disappointment that the Government of South Africa has not as yet given its consent to such a representative.

Mr. Chairman, I believe members should know that during the course of this year my Government pressed this objective with the South African Government. On several occasions we have at a high level outlined the advantages accruing to the peoples of South-West Africa and also to South Africa by such a process, and we have urged the South African Government to accept a U.N. presence. It is our understanding from these representations that the South African Government has not yet reached a final decision on this question, and we hope the South African Government would indicate its willingness to enter into conversations with the Secretary-General on this question.

We have pointed out before the particular advantages that U.N. technical assistance can offer the peoples of South-West Africa and to the Government of South Africa in fulfilling the spirit of the mandate. The Government of South Africa has argued that it is itself in a position to provide the technical assistance programs needed, but, Mr. Chairman, no nation in this day can argue that it is so self-sufficient in knowledge or skill that it cannot benefit from the mobilized resources of the international community. I think the unfortunate condition of the great majority of the population of South-West Africa is urgent testimony of this fact. Once again we strongly urge the Government of South Africa to reconsider its position on this question.

Mr. Chairman, 2 years ago the United Nations established a special training program for South-West Africans. A modest budget was allocated for this program, and member states

² U.N. doc. A/RES/1805 (XVII).

have been supplying scholarships for both secondary and higher education. My Government believes there is no better way to prepare a people for the exercise of self-determination or to give practical expression to concern for their well-being than to raise the level of education. To this end my own Government has been pleased to contribute to this program by the provision of 10 scholarships to South-West Africans, and we are reviewing our contribution to see what additional assistance we can furnish.

Need for Secondary School Training

In reading the second report of the Secretary-General on this subject,³ I would call attention of the members of this committee to the emphasis it places on the need for secondary school training. I think we all might give high priority to this need.

I also note—and with regret—that many of those seeking to take advantage of the scholarships offered have been unable to obtain the necessary travel documents from the South African Government. This lack of cooperation by the South African Government has not prevented my Government from assisting in the educational development of the mandated territory, since we have made our scholarships available to South-West Africans outside the territory as well as those residing there and we shall continue to do so. I urge that Government to reconsider its position on this matter. A change here would be a small matter but one which would be tremendously encouraging to the people of South-West Africa and to all of us who are working for an eventual peaceful solution to the problem.

Mr. Chairman, the international community is and must be urgently concerned with the future of South-West Africa and its peoples. I repeat: The United States believes firmly that the obligations of the mandate assumed by the Government of South Africa should be fulfilled. We believe firmly that the peoples of South-West Africa must have the opportunity freely to exercise their right of self-determination. Neither the United States nor the United Nations can rest until these goals are achieved.

³ U.N. doc. A/5526 and Add. 1.

OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris

Following is the text of a communique issued by the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development at Paris on November 20.

1. The Ministerial Council of the OECD held its annual meeting in Paris on 19th and 20th November, 1963, under the chairmanship of the Honorable Halvard Lange, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, and reviewed the economic prospects for its 20 member countries and their economic relations with the rest of the world.

2. The prospects for economic growth in member countries are on the whole better than last year. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are now progressing at a faster rate. In other member countries expansion continues. In the expectation that this growth will be supported by suitable measures in the United States and other countries, the increase of the gross national product of the OECD area as a whole for the years 1960-64 will probably correspond to the growth target of 50 percent set for the decade of the 1960's by the first Ministerial Council in 1961.¹

The importance has been stressed of internal stability as a condition for balanced long-term economic growth. Costs and prices in a few European countries are rising rather rapidly. A stabilization plan is being put into effect in France. Measures have been taken in Italy; further steps must be envisaged.

3. As regards international payments, measures undertaken by member countries, and the recent trends of trade among them, have begun and should continue progressively to create better equilibrium between the deficit and surplus countries. It is important that measures adopted by all member countries to deal with their internal economic situations should continue to take into account their effects on the general equilibrium of international payments.

4. In member countries in the process of development, economic growth in recent years has generally been somewhat faster than in the OECD area as a whole. However, it can hardly

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1014.

be said that the narrowing of the gap between these and other member countries which is desired has really begun; much remains to be done.

The Ministers considered it desirable, therefore, that the Organization and its more developed members should continue to devote their attention and cooperation to the development problems of the less developed member countries.

Ministers noted with satisfaction that a new Spanish development program will be inaugurated in 1964. The Ministers also reviewed the situation of the consortia for aid to Greece and Turkey and reaffirmed the importance which they attached to the efforts of member countries in support of the development of these two countries, particularly by the provision of long-term development capital on favorable terms.

5. Ministers reviewed the work of the Organization in the fields of agriculture, industry, and manpower, and agreed that this work should increasingly be directed to the problems of adaptation arising from changes in the economies of member countries. They considered in particular that the Organization should pursue its work on an active manpower policy, and on the retraining of manpower as well as on mobility of manpower and industry.

6. Ministers noted with satisfaction the results of the Ministerial Meeting on policies for science and technology on 3rd and 4th October 1963.

7. The Ministers noted that development aid has been maintained at a high level and on improved terms, although the earlier rate of increase has not continued. The needs of the developing countries are, however, increasing, and great problems lie ahead. Past results have depended largely on public support in member countries. The provision of aid to meet the expanding needs of the less developed countries will depend even more on such support in the future and will be related increasingly to measures of self-help in the recipient countries.

The Ministers emphasized the value of the confrontations of national aid programs through the Organization, and asked members further to coordinate their efforts with a view to making aid more effective in response to pri-

ority needs in the less developed countries. They also welcomed the intention expressed by the members of the Development Assistance Committee of relating more nearly the terms of aid to debt-servicing capacities of recipients. Important steps had been taken by some members in this connection during the past year. They noted the decline in private capital movements from the industrialized countries to the less developed countries and asked the Organization to consider further what steps might be taken by industrialized and less developed countries to increase the flow.

The Ministers welcomed the establishment of the OECD Development Center.

8. Since last year's Ministerial Meeting,² the Organization has devoted a great deal of attention to the ways and means to increase the export earnings of less developed countries, member and non-member.

The bulk of the exports of the less developed countries still consists of primary products of which OECD countries are the main importers. Various methods for stabilizing and increasing the export earnings of these commodities are now being studied. Ministers stressed the importance of this work. Member countries should join in efforts to improve the market conditions for primary products.

Increasingly, however, the less developed member and non-member countries need to diversify their economies and encourage the production of manufactured articles for their own markets and for exports. The industrialized countries of the OECD should facilitate this development by providing enlarged access to their markets for these products. The Ministers noted with approval that full reciprocity from less developed countries was not being demanded for the tariff reductions expected from the forthcoming round of GATT tariff negotiations.

Ministers instructed the Organization to continue work and consultations concerning the trade problems of the less developed countries.

They voiced the determination of their governments to prepare for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development³ in a constructive spirit.

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 979.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 173.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1963. *Ratification deposited:* Australia, November 12, 1963.

Health

World Health Organization Regulations No. 1 regarding nomenclature (including the compilation and publication of statistics) with respect to diseases and causes of death. Adopted at Geneva July 24, 1948. Entered into force January 1, 1950. TIAS 3482.

Acceptances deposited: Burundi, November 9, 1963; Congo (Léopoldville), July 9, 1963; Mongolia, Tanganyika, June 19, 1963; Western Samoa, June 28, 1963.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Notifications of approval: Luxembourg, October 8, 1963; Group of Territories represented by the French Overseas Post and Telecommunication Agency, October 10, 1963.

War

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field. Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3362.

Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, May 17, 1963.

Notification given that it considers itself bound: Cameroon, September 16, 1963.

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war;

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3363, and 3365, respectively.

Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, September 24, 1963.

Notification given that it considers itself bound: Cameroon, September 16, 1963.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement establishing a Joint United States-Canada Civil Emergency Planning Committee. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa November 15, 1963. Entered into force November 15, 1963.

Agreement relating to civil defense cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 27, 1951. Entered into force March 27, 1951. TIAS 2227.

Terminated: November 15, 1963 (superseded by agreement of November 15, 1963, *supra*).

Guinea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of May 22, 1963 (TIAS 5394). Effected by exchange of notes at Conakry November 2, 1963. Entered into force November 2, 1963.

Tanganyika

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Dar-es-Salaam November 14, 1963. Entered into force November 14, 1963.

Tunisia

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Tunis November 18, 1963. Entered into force November 18, 1963.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 25-December 1

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to November 25 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 583 of November 15; 588 and 591 of November 18; 594 of November 19; 598 of November 21; and 599 of November 22.

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*603	11/26	Cultural exchange.
604	11/27	Most appointed to Advisory Committee on International Book Programs (rewrite).
†608	11/30	Cleveland: "Great Power and Great Diversity: The Perceptions and Policies of President Kennedy."

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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U.S. Participation in the UN

Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1962

This is the seventeenth annual report covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies for the year 1962.

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation therein are fully described under the following sections: Part I—Maintenance of Peace and Security; Part II—Cooperation in the Economic, Social, Scientific, and Human Rights Fields; Part III—Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories; Part IV—Legal and Constitutional Developments; and Part V—Budgetary, Financial, and Administrative Matters.

The appendixes to the report contain U.N. charts, information on the organizational structure, and availability of publications and documentation of the Organization.

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Vol. XLIX, No. 1278



December 23, 1963

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The United States of America and the Atlantic Partnership

by George C. McGhee

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany¹

It is a privilege to participate in the deliberations of your academy. The general title of these discussions, *Europa und Amerika in der Welt von Morgen*, in itself is an indication of the importance all of us attribute to the relationship between Europe and the United States. You have heard the views of a number of distinguished Europeans. I am honored to be called upon to present an American view. You will, I hope, accord me the additional privilege of speaking in my native language, so that I may express my thoughts with the utmost directness and clarity.

At the close of the Second World War the United States found itself thrust into a position of world leadership. Moreover, this was a role of leadership in a world which had radically changed. I am not sure that everyone, even today, has fully grasped the nature of the im-

plications of these changes. Three salient features marked, however, the postwar environment:

First, world power relationships were dominated by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Second, a Europe composed of relatively less powerful nations was unable to exercise the influence and responsibility it had wielded before the war. Third, with the onset of the nuclear age every concept of strategy had to be thought out anew. The entire character of world relationships had been modified.

As if this were not enough, two new elements soon made themselves felt in international affairs. The policies of the Soviet Union made it plain that other nations must be resolute to defend their freedom if they hoped to retain it. And while liberty was threatened on one side, it was demanded—and granted—on the other. Pressure for the dissolution of colonial ties had existed before the war; now it became

¹Address made at the Evangelische Akademie at Loccum, Germany, on Nov. 21.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1278 PUBLICATION 7634 DECEMBER 23, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

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resistible. Over the past 15 years, consequently, the relationship between former colonial areas and the metropolitan areas has been transformed.

Even now the process of adjusting to all these changes continues. In the immediate postwar period the material resources and energies of Europe naturally were concentrated upon the tremendous problems of reconstruction. Nevertheless, in this period of economic chaos and confused relationships, hopes for a better future began to find a new focus. That focus was the idea of a unified Europe, and history may well record the acceptance of this concept, European political leadership and popular opinion, as one of the most remarkable and significant developments of our century.

I need not point out to this audience the milestones of progress which have marked Europe's path toward unity over the last 15 years. I would, however, like to call attention to the American role in the process of European integration.

The Marshall Plan was not simply an act of American generosity. It was a recognition of the close ties which have always bound Europe and America together; it was a recognition, moreover, of the strategic importance of Europe to the United States; and finally, it was a recognition that in a changing world the broader interests of Europe and America were inextricably joined.

General Marshall, in his Harvard speech,² set the condition upon his proposal for American aid to Europe. It was that Europe organize to help itself and to overcome the traditional rivalries which had been, in two world wars, the cause of so much misfortune not only for Europeans but for Americans.

It is instructive, too, to review the language which in 1949 was written into the legislation authorizing funds for the Marshall Plan. The American Congress, acting on its own initiative, declared:³

It is further declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to encourage the unification of Europe, and to sustain and strengthen principles of

individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence in Europe. . . .

I cite this language in order clearly to demonstrate that American policy toward Europe has followed an unbroken and unchanging line through several administrations, both Republican and Democratic. Despite the remarkable alteration in Europe's economic and political strength over the past decade, this policy declaration is more than ever appropriate today. The act of faith embodied in the Marshall Plan was the germ of Atlantic partnership.

The NATO Alliance

In the years that followed the Marshall Plan the Atlantic nations joined together in the NATO alliance to insure our common defense against the Soviet threat. In an act unprecedented in history the United States has maintained large numbers of its troops in Europe in peacetime, at the invitation of European governments. These troops are a major bulwark of our common defense. They are also an evidence and a pledge of the identity of American interests with America's 14 NATO partners. We have made it unmistakably clear that we will fulfill our commitment—that an act of aggression against any member of NATO will be considered an act of aggression upon the United States itself, and that we would react accordingly.

The forging over the past 14 years of a common NATO defense has created among us mutual confidence and a sense of the real interdependence of Europe and America. Occasionally, however, a voice is heard to suggest that America's commitment to Europe may not be lasting. What President Kennedy said at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt⁴ should leave no doubt in anyone's mind about the strength and depth of our commitment. For those few who, against the evidence, insist on doubting, I have a suggestion: Examine the reverse of the coin.

As the President of the United States has said on a number of occasions, the defense of the United States begins in Europe. The United States too, therefore, must rely for its defense upon its allies. The European contri-

²BULLETIN of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.
³Public Law 47, 81st Cong., 1st sess.

⁴BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 118.

bution to our common defense is vital, and the German contribution in particular is a major one. This means that we must count as heavily on you as you count on us. If our defense is indivisible, so should our mutual confidence be.

The NATO treaty, however, calls for more than a common defense. It also provides quite specifically for political consultation on all matters of mutual interest. These provisions have been increasingly invoked. Regular political consultations in the NATO Council have enabled the member nations to adjust policy differences and develop common views on the broader problems that confront them in the world today. Small wonder, then, that NATO has helped to forge that sense of community which is the distinguishing characteristic of our relationships.

There is, of course, a difference between the consciousness of community expressed in NATO, the OECO [Organization for European Cooperation and Development], and other institutions of an Atlantic character and the consciousness of identity expressed in the various European communities. These separate bases for the development of a community consciousness need not, however, be mutually exclusive. We in the United States have always considered them to be complementary. We ourselves are not, of course, a member of the European Community. We do, however, believe that the development of a unified Europe within the Atlantic framework is essential for the development of the strength and vitality of the Atlantic alliance as a whole.

The recent past already demonstrates that the construction of Europe proceeds most rapidly when NATO is strongest.

Some Misconceptions of U.S. Policy

It has been suggested that United States policy toward Europe has changed in recent years. These suggestions take three forms:

—first, that the United States has lost enthusiasm for the Common Market, because we believe it adverse to our commercial interests, particularly in the field of agriculture;

—second, that in the military field a united Europe would threaten a “nuclear monopoly” the United States wants to keep;

—and finally, that the United States is not prepared to see a “Europe” take up a position of equal responsibility with America in the affairs of the alliance.

I contend that these suggestions are without foundation, that they are based upon misconceptions of American policy. Let us consider them one by one.

When the United States first gave its support to the establishment of the Common Market even before the actual negotiation of the Treaty of Rome, it was on the assumption that the commercial policy of the new entity would be an open and liberal one. This did not represent any attempt on the part of the United States to impose a restriction of its own upon the contemplated Economic Community of Europe. This flows from the fact that international agreements to which we all are parties require that any customs union adopt a level of tariff protection no higher on the whole than the levels previously set for the national economies of its member states.

To date the Common Market has demonstrated, in the industrial field, a commendable liberalism and understanding of the interests of third countries. It has done so not only because of its international commitments but also out of a realization that such a policy is in its own interest. It is principally in the agricultural field that doubts have arisen. There is a discernible danger that thinking in terms of higher protection for agriculture could lead some elements of the community to slide back into the shortsighted prewar kind of autarky which is against the long-range economic interest of Europe as well as the rest of the world.

It is well to recall that neither the drafters of the Rome Treaty nor those third countries which supported the European Economic Community subscribed to the view that agriculture was exempt from the need to respect international obligations and commitments. Agriculture, because of its special problems, is treated differently from industry in all of the advanced countries of the world. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Rome Treaty also provided different rules for agriculture than for industry. But this does not give carte blanche to Europe.

an agriculture. American agriculture does not demand equal treatment with European farmers, as is sometimes asserted. It does react sharply, however, to being excluded from markets which it has built up in the past by virtue of its efficiency.

What the Common Market does is of enormous importance to other trading nations of the world. Consider, for example, the tariff negotiations which took place in Geneva in 1960 and 1961. Then, for the first time, the European Economic Community negotiated as a single unit for its six members, who had before negotiated for themselves. There resulted significant reductions of tariffs. If the result was not all that many hoped for, one reason was that the United States delegation had insufficiently broad authority to negotiate. To remedy this, the United States administration promptly sought, and obtained from Congress, a sweeping authority—of an entirely new character—to reduce tariffs contained in the Trade Expansion Act.

The preliminary discussions that are going on between us now are not, then, the result of a change in United States policy toward the Common Market. On the contrary, they are a practical affirmation of America's firm policy of support. They are a recognition that the Common Market is a potent force in world economic affairs, capable of speaking with one strong voice. The agreements that we hope to reach could have far-reaching consequences—which is precisely why the negotiations stage is so important. We each have important interests which must be thoroughly understood and mutually accommodated.

Let us turn now to the suggestion that the United States is determined to keep a "nuclear monopoly" and to prevent the full development of Europe in the military field. Such a suggestion is not consistent with the strong support the United States gave to the proposal to create a European Defense Community more than a decade ago. There are no illusions about this matter in the United States. If Europe is to unite, the United States understands clearly that the union must ultimately extend to military as well as to economic and political affairs. Europe will not have achieved political unity until it can act in concert and speak in unison,

if not with a single voice. For several years now Europeans have been debating the form and organization which Europe ultimately will take, but there is as yet no consensus. Part of the discussion concerns whether Europe shall be a community of six nations only, or whether a wider, more comprehensive Europe can be constructed. There are other questions too.

Americans can appreciate and understand the debate among Europeans, since a similar debate attended the founding of our own nation 175 years ago. The issues involved are fundamental and can only be decided by the Europeans themselves in the light of their own interests and traditions. So long, however, as there is no established authority which can take responsible decisions for Europe, there is, politically speaking, no Europe. Your policies and ours must take account of that fact.

If one surveys the military field, it becomes clear that there is no present lack of nuclear weapons in the alliance. The NATO nuclear deterrent is largely made up of weapons in the control of the United States. But these weapons consist today largely of manned bombers. The nuclear deterrent of the 1970's must consist, in greater degree, of missile forces. There is a clear understanding in the United States that the construction of these missile forces must take account of Europeans' needs and desires for a greater voice in the responsibility for nuclear affairs in the alliance.

The proposal for a multilateral missile fleet is designed to meet that desire by giving all participants an opportunity to share in the manning, operation, and control of nuclear missiles on a basis of full equality. The accurate and well-protected MRBM's [medium-range ballistic missiles] of this force would contribute to the increased Western missile strength that is required to meet the military needs of NATO deterrence in the decade ahead.

Admittedly, the MLF [multilateral force] is not the definitive solution to the nuclear problems of the alliance. However, in our view it provides the best alternative offered thus far. The proposal is now under close scrutiny by our European allies, and we are prepared to consider their suggestions fully on their merits and to move ahead as rapidly as circumstances permit. As the President indicated at Frankfurt,

we believe that Europe can and should assume greater responsibilities as Europe moves toward unity.

U.S. Support for European Unification

The final suggestion with which I shall deal is that the United States does not really want a united Europe to become a force in world affairs comparable to ourselves.

I wonder how many of you remember the situation 10 years ago, when the term "third force" signified to some the essence of European weakness, a withdrawal into neutralism, a fear of being drawn back into the world power struggle. This was a counsel of despair which has fortunately been stilled by Europe's recovery. If this neutralism, born of weakness, is what is meant by "third force," the United States has never and does not now advocate it.

But if what is meant is the growth of a strong and independent Europe prepared to play a responsible role in world affairs, this is indeed the goal that American policy has sought over the past 15 years. We have supported every broadly based European effort toward unification. Our desire to see the nations of Europe draw together has not rested merely on a sentimental affection for the idea of unity as such. It is founded upon our postwar experience and upon a reasoned view of the self-interest of the United States. We need a united Europe which can join its strength and influence with ours in dealing with world problems.

The United States defense effort is significantly larger than the combined efforts of all other NATO partners. The United States economy produces well over half of the goods produced by all the industrialized countries of the free world combined. Yet the resources of Europe are spread among a number of states, each with its own and often conflicting views and interests.

This means, among other things, that the United States has been faced time and again with the problem of finding a European consensus on major issues. Often no such consensus can be found. Under such circumstances the process of consultation is more difficult and less fruitful than it could otherwise be. Long discussions frequently produce no more than a

negative kind of agreement, upon which it is difficult to act in concert.

This state of affairs is not in Europe's interest, nor is it in ours. Europe has a potential strength and influence far greater than the sum of its parts. However, only the part represented at the conference tables. Europe as such, is absent. Nor is the representation of national interests at the conference tables always tempered by a broad sense of responsibility to Europe as a whole—or to the world. The question that Secretary of State Rusk asked in Frankfurt a few weeks ago⁵ is a serious one. Who speaks for Europe? When this question is answered, we shall be well on the road to fuller partnership.

Progress Toward Both Union and Partnership

The concept of Atlantic partnership presupposes a united Europe. It is not a substitute for it. It is not some shortcut that bypasses the difficult steps toward European unity. In the economic field, where Europe is already partly organized, the United States and the European Economic Community have been working to accomplish a great deal together. The current negotiations, which are now in a preliminary phase, offer the first real political test of mutual willingness to bring to fruition what has been begun in partnership. We in America are prepared to do what is necessary.

Some people do not think it useful to work simultaneously to build a united Europe and a broader Atlantic arrangement. The history of the past decade, however, belies this. It has shown progress toward union and toward partnership to be, not contradictory, but complementary. The destinies of North America and Europe are so obviously and closely bound together that we have no real choice but to operate. Our defense is tightly organized and planned within the NATO framework. Independence is not an empty phrase but a practical reality. And along with the development of increasingly close Atlantic ties in NATO and the OECD, there has been a steady movement toward unity in Europe.

It is also clear that pressing problems of the

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 726.

and capital development elsewhere in the world will not wait while Europe completes the process of its own construction. There are responsibilities toward the developing countries which neither Europe nor America can ignore. In today's world, power and worldwide responsibility go together and the exercise of the one means the acceptance of the other. The world needs both us and Europe.

Jean Monnet, that great Frenchman who has been the inspiration for a united Europe, has always maintained that problems should never be considered obstacles to the achievement of

objectives but should be welcomed as extra incentives to achieving them. The temporary impasse which Europe faces today should serve merely to reinforce our determination to press forward toward our ultimate goal. This goal—a Europe unified and an Atlantic community joined in partnership—lies in the direction in which the irresistible tide of history is flowing, with a momentum of its own. We most certainly have problems before us; but we also have opportunities—if we have the vision and courage to grasp and use them for the attainment of our larger purpose.

The Economic Revolution in Mexico

by Edwin M. Martin

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

You have been discussing for these last 2 days "Mexico Today." You have completed a review of the political, economic, social, and cultural life of Mexico, and tomorrow you will be discussing the international role of Mexico. I am pleased that you will have with you for that discussion my good friend Ambassador Antonio Carrillo Flores, who has contributed so much of himself to the well-being of his country and to the promotion of friendly relations between the United States and Mexico. What I have to say will in a way be a summary of much of what you have discussed, and hopefully I will not steal too much of the Mexican Ambassador's remarks scheduled for tomorrow.

When President Kennedy arrived in Mexico City in 1962 he said in his remarks at the airport that it is our responsibility in the sixties and the responsibilities of others in our sister Republics in this great hemisphere to recognize

that there is also a necessity for an economic revolution if political independence, political equality, and national sovereignties are all to have true significance and true meaning. It is about this revolution in Mexico which I would like to speak, because it seems to me that, as President Kennedy said in the joint communique at the end of his visit to Mexico,² "... the fundamental goal of the Mexican Revolution is the same as that of the Alliance for Progress—social justice and economic progress within the framework of individual freedom and political liberty."

The statistics on Mexico suggest that Mexico began its economic development in earnest in 1930. The upheaval of the Mexican Revolution which began in 1910 did not really subside until about 1930 and permit the country to begin rebuilding. But in the 30 years since that time the statistics show what a country can do that really sets its mind to raising the standards of living of its people. Gross na-

¹ Address made before the 14th annual Conference on the Caribbean at Gainesville, Fla., on Dec. 6 (press release 613).

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 135.

tional product has increased almost five times, per capita income has more than doubled, over 100 million acres of land have been distributed, agricultural production has increased over four times, the literacy rate has been doubled, and the mortality rate has been cut in half. In 1930 Mexico spent three times as much for its military establishment as it did for education. Today education is the largest single item in the budget, more than twice as much as for the military.

There are many reasons for Mexico's success, and there is much that members of the Alliance for Progress can learn from Mexico's experience.

Mexico has set its own national objectives and sought to achieve them with its own resources. Some may regard this as only of passing importance, but I regard the psychological atmosphere in which development takes place a key to the development process. Unless a country knows its objectives and commits itself to them, it will inevitably flounder. Foreign resources have a role to play—certainly they have had a role in the economic development of Mexico as they have in every country's development, including our own. But this role has been a secondary one, as it should be. One of the chief criticisms of the Alliance for Progress is that the Latin Americans have not accepted fully the responsibility for their own economic and social welfare but expect others to provide the resources and create the conditions for development. There is considerable basis for this charge, but I can confidently say it is not applicable to Mexico. On the contrary, Mexico has created such an impression of self-confidence that we tend to forget that there are seven countries in Latin America which have a higher level of income than Mexico and that the annual per capita income of the some 17½ million people who live in the rural areas of Mexico is still among the lowest in the hemisphere.

Mexico has enjoyed political and economic stability since 1930. Certainly the relative political tranquillity of the country has been an important factor in creating a favorable climate for domestic and foreign investors alike.

In discussing stability, we also have to note

the genius of Mexican financial and economic experts, who have consistently sought to avoid inflation and maintain confidence in the Mexican peso. Mexico has had its share of inflation but it has been carefully controlled so that it has not been a source of political instability.

Mexico also seems to have succeeded, whereas some other countries have unfortunately failed in dedicating the efforts of its military establishment to the progress of the country and in devoting proportionally fewer and fewer resources to national defense. Mexico has apparently felt no need for the cruisers and aircraft that have needlessly absorbed the resources of other Latin American countries, and yet I am not aware that Mexico has failed to take care of its essential security interests.

Mexico has made considerable progress in its agrarian reform program. When the Mexican Revolution began in 1910, landholding in Mexico had become highly concentrated. An essentially feudal land system gave the Mexican farmer little stake in the political or economic life of the country. The aspirations of the people for land were not satisfied by peaceful evolutionary methods, and frustration gave way to revolution. The problem was not unlike that in several of the Latin American countries today and one which they must correct with constructive programs if they are to avoid the costly experience of Mexico. Hopefully, as President [Adolfo] López Mateo of Mexico put it, we can deliver to all people the ripe fruit of revolution avoiding the painful stage of fratricidal struggles.

It was not until relative political calm had returned to Mexico in 1930 that Mexico began in earnest to carry out the agrarian reform program provided for in its Constitution. The revolution deprived the small landholding class of much of its political power and facilitated agrarian reform. This land reform had much to do with the political stability after 1930. For with a stake in the land, the Mexican farmer was not easy prey for political agitators. The reform also shifted considerable capital out of agriculture to be used for other, more efficient economic purposes. There is considerable debate about the economic effect of the reform on Mexican agriculture, and that will be

the point of a later comment. But there can be little doubt that the reform achieved its immediate political and social objectives.

The Task Ahead for Mexico

Despite these achievements, however, Mexico realizes that it has a considerable distance to go to achieve the full fruits of its revolution. The task would seem overwhelming to a country less determined than Mexico:

An annual per capita income of only \$330, with approximately half of its people receiving an income of less than \$100 annually;

An annual population growth rate of over 3 percent, which adds over 1 million persons annually to the population and requires the creation of some 350,000 jobs annually;

A rural population which comprises 50 percent of the population yet produces only 20 percent of the national wealth;

A farm population only 15 percent of which has access to bank credit to promote agricultural productivity;

A people who are aware that two out of five of their countrymen cannot read or write.

It may be that the immensity of the task has been the inspiration for the dedication of the Mexican people. We have a theory in the United States, for example, that the best way to inspire a church congregation to work harder is to get a large mortgage on the church.

Let us then consider what the Mexican people are doing, because the resources available to all of Latin America are similar to those available to Mexico.

Mexico is supporting the Alliance for Progress and the concept of self-help which is its primary feature. As the President of Mexico put it, Mexico has moved to support the alliance because it is a movement in which all of the Republics of this hemisphere have a position of responsibility and not simply a unilateral program of aid from the United States. Over 90 percent of the resources for the development of Mexico have been provided by Mexico.

Mexico has made a concerted effort to obtain resources from not only the international lending institutions that are open to it but other

sources both public and private that are available to it in the United States and other countries. Thus it has been able to secure financing of around \$200 million in Europe in the last 2 years. It reentered the U.S. capital market in 1963 with a bond issue of \$40 million. It was successful in attracting \$130 million in new private foreign investment and reinvested profits in 1962 after a renewed effort to create the climate in which private investment felt confident of its future. I doubt that these things would have been possible but for the record of political stability and good financial management, scrupulous attention to its credit standing in the international community, and efforts to promote private initiative.

Improving Programs for Rural Population

In 1962 Mexico turned its attention strongly to the problems of its rural population. As I have noted previously, the agrarian reform program achieved its political objectives, but it has yet to fulfill completely its economic promise. It is true that agricultural output in Mexico has increased remarkably over the past several decades; valued at constant prices, the per capita supply of domestic agricultural commodities increased from 161 pesos in 1932 to 436 in 1959, i.e., at the compound rate of 4 percent per year. These production gains have been obtained primarily by the irrigation of new lands and, to a lesser extent, by the use of new, nonirrigated land and improvement in yields. The new lands placed under cultivation have been in areas of relatively low population density, however; in those areas where the bulk of the rural population resides—chiefly in central and south-central Mexico—production gains have been less spectacular and consequently income remains very low. Mexico is not exempt from the “two economies” problem which plagues most developing countries; in Mexico there is a modern economy, where the latest technology is applied to industry and commercial agriculture, and a subsistence economy, with its problems of primitive farming and poverty.

Mexican leaders are fully conscious that the agrarian reform must move into a new phase.

President López Mateos recently declared:

The obvious conviction, which I have repeated many times, that it is not enough to divide land and water, has caused us to intensify economic and aid programs directed at greater agrarian productivity and the human dignity of the rural population.

As the Mexican President said, a number of programs have been launched during the past 2 years which hold great promise for the future of agrarian reform. A series of projects were inaugurated which are designed to develop the major river basin in central Mexico—the Lerma, Chapala, Santiago basin—in which almost one-fifth of the country's population resides. These projects will rehabilitate existing irrigation systems and build new ones, reclaim land, provide technical assistance to farmers, plan the fertilization and zoning of crops and the use of artificial pastures, and promote the installation of industries based on the processing of local resources.

At the same time the United States joined with Mexico in creating a fund to provide long-term productivity loans for the farmers who do not have access to this type of credit. Loans will actually be made by Mexico's private banks and rediscounted through the central bank. Farm improvement loans cannot be effective, of course, without the spread of the modern techniques of agricultural production, and therefore major improvements are contemplated in Mexico's programs of agricultural education, extension, and research. Also of great importance to incentives are the renewed efforts of the Government to provide titles as provided by Mexican agrarian legislation to all of those who have received land under the agrarian reform program.

Mexico's major task for the remainder of this decade will be to carry forward these measures and initiate new ones to raise the incomes of its rural population. Higher rural incomes are essential for social objectives, but they also have great significance for Mexico's further industrialization, as we shall observe in a moment. But here I want to point out that Mexicans are aware of the challenge presented by the agrarian problem and are moving on a number of fronts to meet it, which is truly the spirit of the Alliance for Progress.

Industrial Development Efforts

Mexico is experiencing some difficulty maintaining the forward momentum in the industrial sector. The overall rate of increase in gross national product was only 4.8 percent in 1962, and many of Mexico's factories were producing at well below capacity. The solution, of course, is a broader market, and Mexico has made a major effort to find new export markets. It has taken a leading role in the Latin American Free Trade Association, and Mexican exports to LAFTA countries rose to \$16.7 million in 1962, the first year in which the concessions were in effect, compared to \$7.9 million in 1961. Mexican imports from LAFTA countries rose to \$6.1 million last year from \$4.1 million in 1961. Mexico has entered into a payments arrangement with the Central American Common Market by which Mexico and each of the five Common Market countries extend reciprocal credits of \$5 million to finance trade.

The largest untapped market for Mexico's industrial products is, of course, Mexico itself. The Mexican Minister of Industry and Commerce recently addressed himself to this problem when he called for a strong effort by private enterprise to develop inexpensive tools and other consumer products which could find a market in the rural areas. Part of the solution to this problem obviously lies in raising the productivity in the rural sector, which I have already discussed. But as the Mexican Minister implied, it also requires commodities produced on a mass basis, at competitive prices, and a distribution system which will get them to the consumer. The United States achieves this objective through the postal system and the mail-order catalog. This may not be the solution in Mexico. Maybe Mexico has already found the solution in the "popular stores" built on 10-ton trailers which daily deliver merchandise to the poorer districts of Mexico City.

Mexico is also making an effort to reduce the serious housing deficit. It is estimated that Mexico has an unsatisfied demand for over 1 million houses, and much of the housing now available is substandard. Mexico needs some 200,000 additional housing units each year, just because of the population explosion of which

have already spoken, but provides less than 50,000 of them. This year Mexico decided to make a major assault on this problem and proposed a cooperative program under the Alliance for Progress. The United States and Mexico, with the cooperation of the Inter-American Bank, are undertaking a program which in a few years should provide Mexico with some 50,000 more new housing units annually. In addition we are supporting housing programs in Mexico, such as the guarantee for the \$10 million project recently undertaken between the AFL-CIO and a Mexican labor union. Hopefully our combined efforts will in a few short years reduce substantially the annual housing deficit in Mexico and possibly even reduce some of the housing backlog.

Relations Between the U.S. and Mexico

A discussion of "Mexico Today" would not be complete if I did not discuss briefly the economic and political relations between the United States and Mexico. I do not doubt that Mexico's proximity to the United States has had an important influence on Mexico's economic evolution. Mexico's principal export is tourism. In 1962 some 800,000 American citizens contributed through tourist expenditures and border transactions some \$790 million to Mexico's foreign exchange receipts. The United States is Mexico's principal customer. Mexico is the fifth largest customer of the United States. Tourism and trade together give Mexico a favorable balance of payments with the United States.

American private enterprise now has investments of some \$850 million in Mexico. American private banks have been a major source of short-term dollar financing for Mexico's imports and have also provided financing for Mexico's export crops. Mexico has consistently been one of the major borrowers from the Export-Import Bank. As President Kennedy said in Mexico City—geography has made us neighbors, tradition has made us friends, economics has made us partners. If there is any problem in the relations between the two

countries now that we seem on the way to settlement of the Chamizal dispute,³ it is the difficulty each country has in raising the level of its exports to the other.

In sum both countries would like to increase the level of economic relations between them. As we have found with Canada, I think we will inevitably find with Mexico: As Mexico develops its economy, the area of economic interest and interchange will increase to the mutual benefit of both countries. Indeed this is one of the reasons why the United States is encouraged by and seeks to encourage the economic development of Mexico.

I know that there is much hand wringing because of events in Latin America, and some are given to despair because the Alliance for Progress has not achieved the new millennium in 2 short years. The example of Mexico gives me confidence that the alliance can achieve its objectives, although I fervently trust without the long years of turmoil which Mexico suffered before it launched itself on its programs of economic and social progress. We will have setbacks in Latin America. But setbacks should not be a cause for despair but for a firmer resolve to get on with the tasks of economic and social development. For, as President Johnson remarked at the Mexican Embassy in May of this year:

"From the unity achieved through the Organization of American States—through the new sense of common purpose arising from the Alliance for Progress—we can believe now that a new day is dawning in the New World. It is a day of unity, a day of cooperation, a day of joint efforts and mutual purpose dedicated to freedom, to social justice, to universal peace.

"In the fulfillment of this new day," the President continued, "we of the United States recognize and believe that the relations between our country and our great next-door neighbor, the Republic of Mexico, will always be vital and decisive to the destiny of the hemisphere and of the world."

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 5, 1963, p. 199, and Sept. 23, 1963, p. 480.

Great Power and Great Diversity: The Perceptions and Policies of President Kennedy

by Harlan Cleveland

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"John Fitzgerald Kennedy lives on in the immortal words and works that he left behind." So said President Johnson to the Congress on Wednesday afternoon.² The words have been quoted and requoted these past 9 days. The most eloquent passages are etched in our hearts. Even without the acid of tragedy, President Kennedy already was competing for honors with Winston Churchill as purveyor of the memorable phrase.

Yet more enduring than the flashes of rhetoric which have quickened our hearts are the flashes of insight which have quickened our minds. President Kennedy worked as hard as any statesman in history to articulate for all of us his perception of the dangerous and exhilarating world we live in.

"I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation," he said.³ But he was anxious that we should all know what people we are and in what generation we live.

The ultimate test of leadership is whether the leader perceives and acts on the realities of the world about him, whether he avoids the cardinal sin of kidding himself and his followers. While we are still limp from the shock and the numbness of last weekend, it may be good for us to codify the perceptions which guided President Kennedy's conduct of U.S. foreign policy

and thus make sure we do not kid ourselves the time of transition, the time of continuing with change, that lies before us now.

From where I have been sitting, President Kennedy seemed to have two important perceptions constantly in mind as he managed our international relations from day to day.

He believed and taught us, first, that our national purpose is to build a world community founded not on uniformity but on diversity.

He believed and taught us, second, that possession of great power—above all, in the nuclear age—lays on us an obligation to act with great responsibility—"to match national strength with national restraint," as President Johnson said last Wednesday.

From these two perceptions President Kennedy derived two enduring policies. We should engage, he thought, in a continuing search for areas of common interest with every other nation, even with our bitterest rivals. And because, as President Eisenhower once expressed it, there is no alternative to peace, President Kennedy thought we should begin now to build the international peacekeeping machinery a diverse and turbulent world would increasingly need.

The United States, a Country of Diversity

To perceive diversity should not be so hard for any American. As we look around our own nation and the world, as we read the daily news, it is hard to believe in anything else.

Yet in this same world there are nations and parties and organizations that passionately believe

¹ Address made before the Institute of World Affairs at Pasadena, Calif., on Dec. 1 (press release 608 dated Nov. 30).

² BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1963, p. 910.

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

believe some single national state, some single political doctrine, some single race of men, can and should dominate the world. The Communists say they think their ideas or their power are ordained by history to win over all comers. Partisans of race or creed often make a similar claim. But mankind is too various, nations are too independent, individual men and women are just too ornery, to give these claims and ambitions a chance in the real world.

Our national purpose is to make the world safe for diversity, not because we have figured it out rationally but because that is the kind of people we are and that is the kind of world it is. Our foreign policy can only be a reflection of our own national experience and of international reality.

The most important thing about our foreign policy is that we live, you and I, in the world's oldest democracy—and its liveliest. Ever since our forefathers got carried away with those ready ideas about human dignity and personal freedom and equal rights for all men, we have been having a lively time trying to make good on their promises.

The racial and ethnic and national groups that came here, and read a sign in the harbor saying, "Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me . . .," have not had an easy time making diversity work. They clove to each other; they huddled together for protection against the other groups that had already come, and against those further waves of strangers that kept rolling in past the Statue of Liberty and populating a continent with a nation of foreigners.

The new Americans and the older Americans learned in time to tolerate each other. As they rubbed up against each other, they discovered not that all men are brothers—that is an earlier, easier lesson—but that all brothers are different, which is a later, harder lesson because it means learning about the value of difference.

Of course, in our earlier days we set a limit to tolerance. If foreigners wanted to be tolerated, there was a fixed requirement: They had to want to be Americans.

Then when we started going to Europe as tourists and traders, we had to make a special effort to remember we were moving among the people whose ancestors did *not* want to come to

America. And now, as Americans by the hundreds of thousands move around in Africa and Asia and Latin America, we have to learn once again that toughest of elementary lessons, the value of difference.

Most of you have probably entertained foreign visitors for a few days or a few weeks, and I'll bet some of your guests find the United States of America more than a little confusing. Some of them come from societies which can describe their goals and define their system with practiced words from ancient texts or modern manifestoes. Perhaps they have asked you for a copy of our manifesto—and have received a blank stare in return.

My own personal solution to the problems of foreigners who want to know about American democracy is to remind them of Plato's wry description of Greek democracy 2,500 years ago: A "charming form of government," he called it, "full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike."

For we do not, of course, have a "system." We have, if anything, a protected plurality of systems. The Englishman Edmund Burke, in his famous speech about how to get along with those wild men across the Atlantic, said in despair that our religion is "the dissidence of dissent." Americans, Burke thought, were "a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the bone of manhood." What makes it so difficult for our own historians to capture and record the American way of life is precisely that our way of life constitutes a living denial of the dogma that any one man's view of society, or any one group's view of society, is the correct, approved version.

The one essential thing about American democracy is this: that no individual or group ever gains the exclusive right to say, with authority, what American democracy is.

A World of Increasing Diversity

As it is with us at home, so it must be as we work abroad in the world. The world about us is more and more diverse—gloriously, irretrievably diverse—diverse in social organization, in economic theories, in political ideas; diverse in attitudes and alliances, in wealth and power; diverse, too, in the stages of economic growth.

In such a world we want above all to be sure that no nation or group of nations ever gains the exclusive right even to define world order, let alone to manage it.

President Kennedy saw with great clarity the rapid postwar mutation of political power. Fifteen years ago there were clearly two poles, two centers of world power, with allies and satellites clustered around them for protection. Now the diffusion of relevant power is already well advanced.

Western Europe is back on its feet—and acting like it.

In the free world many countries and groupings of smaller states are asserting their right to think differently from the great powers, elbowing their way into world politics, insisting that *their* border troubles, *their* terms of trade, *their* sense of racial wrongs and human rights, and *their* votes all be weighed and counted in the computations of current history.

And in that once monolithic bloc of Communist nations, the Yugoslavs have managed to maintain their independence for 15 years, the Eastern European satellites are pulling away from the Moscow sun, and the Chinese and the Russians are talking about each other in almost unbelievably offensive language.

President Kennedy believed that a multipolar world of independent nations, a world of widely diffused military power and political influence, a world of variety and pluralism, would constitute the safest environment for our own pluralistic society. I think this belief must have been partly responsible for the quiet confidence that sustained him even in moments of great crisis and for that contagious optimism which permeated his conduct of the most responsible office on earth.

Awesome Facts of Thermonuclear Power

The other main perception of reality that guided President Kennedy was the result of intimate acquaintance with the awesome facts about thermonuclear power.

We are numbed by repetition of the scale of this power. It is easy to remember that a single warhead now packs more destructive wallop than all the explosives used in the Second World War. It seems harder to remember that such

power in the hands of two nations—and the mutual ability to deliver it to each other's doorstep—is almost bound to produce a nuclear stalemate and focus the eyes of responsible leaders on its limitation rather than its use.

When destructive power grows past the point where it can be used without self-destruction, the remaining questions are not military but political. The conventional wisdom about national security, which has instructed statesmen and generals down through the ages, is suddenly shattered. President Kennedy did his homework on the simultaneous equations of survival and concluded that “in the long run, the only real security in this age of nuclear peril rests not in armament but in disarmament.”⁴

This perception was not shared at first in the Kremlin. When the Soviets in 1961 started nuclear testing again after 3 years of restraint, President Kennedy also resumed nuclear testing. But he also chose this discouraging moment to renew the offer of an inspected test ban and to repeat his own conviction that “Our foremost aim is the control of force, not the pursuit of force, in a world made safe for mankind.”

This conviction never left his mind. At the United Nations, at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, and in direct negotiations with the Russians, he pursued some workable form of agreement with the Soviet Union to put a brake on the nuclear arms race, persisting in what at times looked like a hopeless cause.

It never seemed more hopeless than last June when he delivered his commencement address at American University and told the world that he was going to try once again by sending a top-level representative to negotiate once more. Yet 6 weeks later Averell Harriman successfully concluded these negotiations. Within 10 days Secretary Rusk was in Moscow to sign a limited test ban agreement. Nine weeks later the United States Senate consented to ratification of the treaty.⁷ And today more than 100 nations are committed to its terms.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

⁷ For background and text of the treaty, see *ibid.* Aug. 12, 1963, pp. 234 and 240; Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314; Oct. 21, 1963, p. 631; and Oct. 28, 1963, p. 658.

His realism about nuclear weaponry made Mr. Kennedy acutely, almost painfully, aware of the restraint which responsible control over such power imposed upon the President of the United States. His handling of the crisis brought on by the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba brilliantly documents this sense of restraint. While the President faced up grimly to the possibility of war, he made the minimum use of military power that was required to make his will unmistakable in the Kremlin and opened up every available avenue of diplomatic action—directly and through the United Nations—to persuade the rest of the world that our action was the necessary response of rational men to a mortal threat.

You may recall that, when Chairman Khrushchev started to retreat from this rash adventure, there was no word of exultation from Washington, no whisper of a boast, no claim of victory. Less than a year later President Kennedy wrote the moral of the story: "Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war."⁸

Policies Toward International Organizations

From his grasp of these two big realities—unprecedented power in a world of unprecedented diversity—President Kennedy derived two fundamental policies with regard to international organizations.

One was a conviction that we had better get on with the task of fashioning a workable world peace system by building the practical beginnings of international peacekeeping machinery. Through criticism and crossfire he stuck to the policy, started by President Eisenhower, of supporting to the hilt the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Congo. (The Soviets, who still think their interests are served by U.N. debate but not by U.N. operations, opposed the Congo force for a simple reason: It got in their way; it prevented them from establishing a military presence in central Africa.)

Whenever it seemed that an international agency could do a peacekeeping job—in West

New Guinea, in Yemen, in the continuing task of the United Nations Emergency Force on the border between Israel and Egypt—President Kennedy was ready to support it with practical help: a military airlift, a U.N. loan, or whatever. He knew that in the long run the only substitute for the dread machinery of war is a practical international organization to keep the peace—and that it's never too early to get some practical experience with real international peacekeeping in the real world.

Similarly when it came to disarmament negotiations, he was once again Mr. Pragmatic, anxious to substitute practical negotiations on "next steps" for vague and verbal moralizing.

In his first speech to the United Nations, in the autumn of 1961,⁹ he converted the dream of disarmament into a wakeful reality. A detailed plan was offered, with clear ideas on how to begin and what to do next. And then, in one of the major breakthroughs in the tortured history of that difficult subject, President Kennedy described the other side of the disarmament coin:

To destroy arms, however, is not enough. We must create even as we destroy—creating worldwide law and law enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and weapons. . . . Therefore, the United States recommends that all member nations earmark special peacekeeping units in their armed forces, to be on call of the United Nations, to be especially trained and quickly available, and with advance provision for financial and logistic support. . . . For peace is not solely a matter of military or tactical problems; it is primarily a problem of politics and people. And unless man can match his strides in weaponry and technology with equal strides in social and political development, our great strength, like that of the dinosaur, will become incapable of proper control and, like the dinosaur, vanish from the earth.

Two years later¹⁰ President Kennedy referred to the peacekeeping record of the United Nations as a "proud one" and noted that several members were preparing standby peace forces for U.N. service. "This nation," he said, "remains ready to provide logistic and other material support. . . . The conventions of peace must pull abreast and then ahead of the inventions of war. The United Nations, building on

⁸ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

its successes and learning from its failures, must be developed into a genuine world security system."

Search for Areas of Common National Interest

The other policy that President Kennedy seemed to derive from the dilemma of great power and great diversity was his continuing, unrelenting search for areas of common national interest. If no one nation is going to take charge of world order, the only practical peace will be the product of long and tedious negotiations.

President Kennedy believed, and repeatedly said, that a common national interest was the one workable guarantee that agreements between rivals are safe agreements. He was convinced, as we must for our survival be convinced, that the search for common interests can serve nations with utterly incompatible value systems, with irreconcilable political ideas, with dangerous conflicts outstanding between them. He put it this way:¹¹

In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interest of the Soviet Union as well as ours, and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.

For what makes diversity work, as we have found here at home, is not the ability of men and nations to agree on broad principles, but their ability to agree on procedures, their ability to agree on what to do next and how to do it, while continuing to disagree on everything else.

Some may agree to take the "next step" for gain or greed or glory, that is, because they see their interests served thereby; others may see a mandate for the same "next step" in some ancient religious text or 19th-century economics textbook; still others may go along because they don't want to offend those who are proposing the step be taken. The reasons for common action can be mutually inconsistent; in any large organization I think they often are, and in the United Nations almost always so.

If we had to wait around until two-thirds of

¹¹ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

the delegates who meet in the General Assembly could agree as to *why* they were agreeing, no action resolution would ever be passed and the United Nations would not today be spending more than half a billion dollars a year for peace-keeping and nation building.

What unites our diversity, then, is not so much a paper agreement on philosophy as a practical consensus on procedure, a pragmatic agreement on how decisions will be made and who will carry them into action. It is no accident that the Charter of the United Nations contains 4 pages of philosophy followed by 40 pages of procedure.

The Measure of His Greatness

There is no doubt that the stirring perorations with which President Kennedy so frequently concluded his addresses already have earned their place in English literature. But the perceptions revealed in the substantive middle passages will remain the measure of his greatness. And perhaps the most revealing single statement of all is that single sentence in the American University speech in which he said: "We must deal with the world as it is and not as it might have been had the history of the last 18 years been different."¹²

John F. Kennedy dealt with the "world as it is." In so doing he raised the quality of our national life. Exercising great power with great restraint, he brought honor to the land he loved in his tragically brief service as our President.

A great leader is dead; a great nation must move on. How fast we move, and in what direction, depends on how well we have learned the lessons that our dead teacher was trying to teach us with his thoughtful and elegant prose.

Our new President, who has a comparable grasp of the realities of power and a comparable commitment to the politics of diversity, has picked up where President Kennedy left off. In the opening minutes of his first formal statement of policy, President Lyndon B. Johnson said on Wednesday:

"In this age when there can be no losers in peace and no victors in war, we must recognize

¹² *Ibid.*

the obligation to match national strength with national restraint. We must be prepared at one and the same time for both the confrontation of power and the limitation of power. We must be ready to defend the national interest and to negotiate the common interest. This is the path that we shall continue to pursue."

Transmission From U.S. to Australia Via Commonwealth Cable Opened

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

One hundred and twenty years have passed since Samuel Morse transmitted his famous code message, "What hath God wrought?" He sent his message from Washington, D.C., to a handful of people in Baltimore, Maryland, just 35 miles away. Today my voice is being carried over the Commonwealth Pacific Cable to millions of people on the Australian Continent, 9,000 miles away.

The completion of the Commonwealth Cable is a magnificent technical accomplishment. Perhaps even more significantly it is a practical symbol of the bonds of friendship and common endeavor between the peoples of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These ties of common language and cultural heritage, and of our common efforts on behalf of peace and freedom, can only be strengthened by the direct and instantaneous communication which this cable provides.

The first news transmission on the Commonwealth Cable is vastly different from the first dot-and-dash message by Samuel Morse. But I think Morse would find great satisfaction in the knowledge that the capabilities of cable communication have been developed in this way to serve the cause of international communication and understanding. We in the United States are pleased and honored to join our close friends and allies in saluting the opening of this new facility for free and friendly exchange between our great nations.

¹ Made on opening transmission from the United States to Australia via the Commonwealth Pacific Cable at 6:00 p.m., e.s.t., Dec. 2 (press release 605).

U.S. Raises Duty on Four Articles Imported From EEC Countries

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS the European Economic Community maintains unreasonable import restrictions upon imports of poultry from the United States;

WHEREAS such unreasonable import restrictions directly and substantially burden United States commerce;

WHEREAS products of the European Economic Community receive benefits of trade agreement concessions made by the United States;

WHEREAS it is consistent with the purposes expressed in Section 102 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1801) for the United States to suspend the application of the benefits of certain of those trade agreement concessions;

WHEREAS, having due regard for the international obligations of the United States, particularly paragraph 3 of Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade² requiring any suspension of trade agreement concessions to be made on a most-favored-nation basis, I am taking steps to suspend, on a most-favored-nation basis, certain trade agreement concessions in the United States schedules to that Agreement; and

WHEREAS rates of duty suspended by this proclamation will not be required or appropriate to carry out any trade agreement on and after January 7, 1964:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including Section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882 (c)) and Section 350(a)(6) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1351(a)(6)), and in order to suspend the application of the benefits of certain trade agreement concessions, do hereby proclaim (until such time as the President of the United States of America otherwise proclaims)—

(1) the termination of that part of any prior proclamation which proclaims rates of duty inconsistent with those provided for in the amendment made by paragraph (2) of this proclamation; and

(2) the amendment of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (28 F.R. 8599, as corrected, 28 F.R. 9131) by inserting under the heading "Subpart B" of Part 2 of the Appendix thereto the following:

¹ No. 3564; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 13247.


² That agreement of October 30, 1947, has been proclaimed by Proclamation 2761A of December 16, 1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1103), which proclamation has been supplemented by subsequent proclamations. [Footnote in original.]

Item	Article	Rates of Duty	
		1	2
945. 13	Potato starch (provided for in item 132.50).	2.5¢ per lb.	No change
945. 16	Brandy, valued over \$9.00 per gallon (provided for in items 168.20 and 168.22).	\$5 per gal.	No change
945. 49	Dextrine and soluble or chemically treated starches (provided for in item 493.30).	3¢ per lb.	No change
945. 69	Automobile trucks valued at \$1,000 or more (provided for in item 692.05).	25% ad val.	No change

The rates provided for in the amendment made by paragraph (2) of this proclamation shall be effective as to all articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on and after January 7, 1964.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fourth day of December in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

President Amends Regulations on Imports of Blue-Mold Cheese

A PROCLAMATION¹

PROCLAMATION CORRECTING PART 3 OF THE APPENDIX TO THE TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPORTATION OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

WHEREAS, by Proclamation No. 3019 of June 8, 1953 (3 CFR, 1949-1953 Supp., p. 189)² which was issued pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment

¹ No. 3562; 28 Fed. Reg. 12785.

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 29, 1953, p. 919.

Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), the President imposed import quotas on certain dairy products, subject to allocation and license requirements administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, including an annual aggregate quota of 4,167,000 pounds upon imports of blue-mold cheese (except Stilton) and cheese and substitutes for cheese containing, or processed from, blue-mold cheese (hereinafter referred to collectively as "blue-mold cheese"); and

WHEREAS, after investigation and report to the President by the United States Tariff Commission under subsection (d) of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the President issued Proclamation No. 3460 of March 29, 1962 (3 CFR, 1962 Supp., p. 41)³ which increased the annual quota for blue-mold cheese to an aggregate quantity of 5,016,999 pounds per quota year; and

WHEREAS headnote 1 to part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States, as published in the FEDERAL REGISTER at the direction of the President pursuant to section 101(d) of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 (28 F.R. 8599), states that part 3 covers "the provisions proclaimed by the President pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended . . . imposing quantitative limitations on articles imported into the United States . . ."; and

WHEREAS part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States does not include certain of the provisions of Proclamation No. 3019 under which the Secretary of Agriculture allocates and licenses the quotas which were imposed thereunder; and

WHEREAS item 950.07 in part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States specifies the quota quantity for blue-mold cheese as originally prescribed by Proclamation No. 3019 (4,167,000 pounds) rather than the quota quantity for such cheese as subsequently increased by Proclamation No. 3460 (5,016,999 pounds); and

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 102(3) of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, the President proclaimed the additional import restrictions set forth in part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (Proclamation No. 3548 of August 21, 1963, paragraph numbered 3; 28 F.R. 10853)⁴ in the erroneous belief that the aforementioned provisions of Proclamation No. 3019 with respect to allocation and licensing had been included, and that the quota specified therein for blue-mold cheese was the effective restriction on such cheese "proclaimed pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act" as provided in section 102(3) of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962; and

WHEREAS the United States Tariff Commission has advised me that in the preparation of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States pursuant to title I of Public Law 768, 83d Congress,

³ For background, see *ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 779.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1963, p. 478.

and the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, it inadvertently overlooked the aforementioned provisions of Proclamation No. 3019 with respect to the allocation and licensing of the quota quantities and the change made by Proclamation No. 3460; and

WHEREAS it would be contrary to the intent and purpose of, and the procedures prescribed by, section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 to permit these errors to remain uncorrected:

Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President, and in conformity with the provisions of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, do hereby proclaim that—

(a) headnote 3(a) of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States is hereby amended by inserting at the end thereof the following:

Such licenses shall be issued under regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture which he determines will, to the fullest extent practicable, result in (1) the equitable distribution of the respective quotas for such articles among importers or users and (2) the allocation of shares of the respective quotas for such articles among supplying countries, based upon the proportion supplied by such countries during previous representative periods, taking due account of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the


articles concerned. No licenses shall be issued which will permit any of the cheeses or substitutes for cheese (items 950.07-10) to be entered during the first 4 months and the first 8 months of the quota year in excess of one-third and two-thirds, respectively, of the quantities specified for such articles in the column entitled "Quota Quantity".

and

(b) the quota quantity amount specified in item No. 950.07 of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States is hereby amended by deleting "4,167,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "5,016,999".

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and cause the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 26th day of November in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During November 1963

ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference	Geneva	Oct. 7-Nov. 8
CAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 3d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 28-Nov. 16
Inter-American Economic and Social Council: 2d Annual Meeting at the Expert Level.	São Paulo	Oct. 29-Nov. 9
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 15th Meeting.	Bangkok	Oct. 30-Nov. 15
International Sugar Council: 16th Session	London	Oct. 31-Nov. 7
ECGO Governing Body: 157th Session (and its committees)	Geneva	Nov. 1-15

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Dec. 3, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: IIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Growth).	Paris	Nov. 4-5
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments).	Paris	Nov. 4-5
IMCO Expert Group on Facilitation of Travel and Transport: Subgroup on Customs.	London	Nov. 4-8
U.N./FAO Intergovernmental Committee on the World Food Program: 4th Session.	Rome	Nov. 4-9
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Committee on Biology and Research.	Vancouver	Nov. 4-14
International Coffee Council: Executive Board	London	Nov. 4-15
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Nov. 4-15
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Groundfish Scientists Subcommittee.	Vancouver	Nov. 4-16
OECD Energy Committee: Working Group of the Special Committee on Oil.	Paris	Nov. 5-6
UNESCO Executive Committee for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments.	Cairo	Nov. 5-7
OECD Economic Policy Committee	Paris	Nov. 6-7
OECD Energy Committee	Paris	Nov. 7-8
GATT Panel on Poultry	Geneva	Nov. 11-12
FAO Council: 41st Session	Rome	Nov. 11-14
IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals: 4th Session.	London	Nov. 11-15
GATT Tariff Negotiations Committee: Cereals Group	Geneva	Nov. 11-15
Inter-American Economic and Social Council: 2d Regular Annual Meeting at the Ministerial Level.	São Paulo	Nov. 11-16
OECD Industry Committee	Paris	Nov. 12-13
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 12-13
OECD Agriculture Committee: Working Party I (Agricultural Policies).	Paris	Nov. 12-15
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Group on Disparities.	Geneva	Nov. 13 (1 day)
NATO Annual Review Committee	Paris	Nov. 13 (1 day)
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee: Subcommittee on Non-tariff Barriers.	Geneva	Nov. 13-15
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 14-15
BIRPI Committee of Experts on Copyright Matters	Geneva	Nov. 18-19
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee: Subcommittee on Tariff Negotiating Plan.	Geneva	Nov. 18-22
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: Special Committee on Civil Liability.	Washington	Nov. 18-22
IMCO Working Group on Tonnage Measurement: 4th Session .	London	Nov. 18-22
International Coffee Council: Special Session	London	Nov. 18-22
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 10th Meeting .	Vancouver	Nov. 18-23
NATO Medical Committee	Paris	Nov. 19-20
OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 19-20
International Wheat Council: 38th Session	London	Nov. 19-26
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . .	Paris	Nov. 21 (1 day)
Central American Ministers of Interior: 2d Meeting	San Salvador	Nov. 25-26
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party IV	Paris	Nov. 25-26
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee: Group on Meat	Geneva	Nov. 25-29
OECD Pulp and Paper Committee	Paris	Nov. 26-27
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 26-28
BIRPI Interunion Coordination Committee: 1st Meeting . . .	Geneva	Nov. 26-29

In Session as of November 30, 1963

U.N. General Assembly: 18th Session	New York	Sept. 17-
GATT Negotiations on United States Tariff Reclassification . .	Geneva	Oct. 15-
FAO Conference: 12th Session	Rome	Nov. 16-
U.N. ECAFE Conference on Development of the Fertilizer Industry.	Bombay	Nov. 18-
ICAO Panel of Teletypewriter Specialists: 5th Meeting	Montreal	Nov. 18-
ITU CCITT/CCIR Plan Committee for the Development of Telecommunications Networks.	Rome	Nov. 25-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: 12th Session.	Bangkok	Nov. 27-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 5th Session of Working Group on Censuses of Population and Housing.	Geneva	Nov. 28-

In Recess as of November 30, 1963

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed Aug. 29, 1963).	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962-
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Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States: Threat or Use of Force

*Statement by Francis T. P. Plimpton
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The delegation of the United States welcomes this committee's "Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." In the view of the United States that consideration should be thorough, careful, and objective. Toward that end my delegation intends to speak on this item in the following fashion.

We shall speak separately, in the course of the current debate, on each of the four principles covered by the present agenda item. The statements of the United States delegation will, of course, be tentative and in no sense will undertake to be definitive. They may raise more questions than answers. For the principles before us are large and complex. They are too large and too complex to be dealt with summarily or superficially.

We shall begin with the first principle listed: the international threat or use of force. Before doing so, I should like to say this much more about the approach of my delegation to the present item.

Resolution 1815 of the 17th General Assembly records that the Assembly is:

Convinced of the paramount importance of the Charter in the progressive development of international law and in the promotion of the rule of law among nations....

It states that:

... the great political, economic, social and scientific changes that have occurred in the world since the

¹ Made in Committee VI (Legal) on Nov. 11 (U.S. delegation press release 4294).

adoption of the Charter have further emphasized the vital importance of the purposes and principles of the United Nations and of their application to present-day conditions.

In the light of these and allied considerations the Assembly,

Recalling its authority to consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security and to make recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification. . . .

adopted the four operative paragraphs of Resolution 1815, three of which are of immediate relevance.

The first operative paragraph recognizes

... the paramount importance, in the progressive development of international law and in the promotion of the rule of law among nations, of the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States and the duties deriving therefrom, embodied in the Charter of the United Nations which is the fundamental statement of those principles. . . .

The resolution then proceeds to list seven principles.

By the second operative paragraph the Assembly resolved

... to undertake, pursuant to Article 13 of the Charter, a study of the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States . . . with a view to their progressive development and codification, so as to secure their more effective application. . . .

By the third operative paragraph of Resolution 1815 the Assembly accordingly decided to

place the current item on our agenda "in order to study" four principles and to decide "what other principles are to be given . . . consideration" subsequently.

In the view of the United States delegation the passages of Resolution 1815 which I have cited make the following points clear:

First, when Resolution 1815 speaks of "the progressive development of international law" and at the same time speaks of the paramount importance of the charter and its principles to that development, it does not employ the phrase "the progressive development of international law" in the technical sense in which it is used in article 15 of the Statute of the International Law Commission. Plainly, in describing the charter and its principles as of paramount importance in the progressive development of international law and in deciding to study certain of those principles, the Assembly did not, as the ILC Statute provides, call for "the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States." Rather, the Assembly spoke of the progressive development of international law in a broader sense.

Second, in the light of what I have just said, when the Assembly, in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution, resolved to "undertake . . . a study" of the principles of friendly relations "with a view to their progressive development and codification, so as to secure their more effective application," the Assembly did not employ the term "codification" in the same technical sense as does the statute of the Commission. The statute speaks of "the more precise formulation and systematization of rules of international law in fields where there already has been extensive state practice, precedent and doctrine."

The four principles before us are principles embodied in the charter. These principles cannot be more precisely formulated in a fashion which would be binding upon us as members except by their amendment; that is to say, amendment of the charter. Amendment of the charter can be accomplished only as prescribed by chapter XVIII. To be sure, the Assembly and other United Nations organs, by action

within their competence, can authoritatively interpret the charter. In practice United Nations organs have repeatedly done so. That practice is highly relevant to the study of the principles of friendly relations which we have undertaken.

The United States delegation looks forward to making such contribution as it can to the examination of that practice and to the interpretation of the principles in question. But we do not regard Resolution 1815 as a mandate for the reformulation of the charter's principles. We are committed, by the terms of operative paragraph 3, to the "study" of the principles there listed and to the "further consideration" of other principles. That study is to be conducted "with a view to" the progressive development and codification of the principles of friendly relations "so as to secure their more effective application." As noted, we construe "progressive development and codification" broadly and certainly in a fashion which will promote, and not impair, the "more effective application" of those principles.

Mr. Chairman, if our study is conducted, as Document A/C.6/L.531 suggests, "fully and in depth," if it is "conducted in a professional manner and in a progressive spirit," it will indeed make not only a positive contribution to international understanding but a significant contribution to the progressive development of international law. Such a study need not entail the preparation of new codes or declarations relating to the four principles before us. The analysis of these principles and their undoubted interrelationship must be approached in the framework of the charter, embodied as these principles are in the charter. We have in the charter a code of principles, set forth as binding international obligations of states. What is needed, in our view, is not an attempt to rewrite or restate the charter's provisions—to restate, by way of recommendation, what the charter contains by way of obligation. Rather, we can make our optimum contribution by illuminating the subjects under study with a careful exposition of government views and a thorough examination of the practice underlying those views. This would be no mere academic exercise. If our study is properly conducted, it should lead us all to a greater

understanding and more perfect application of the law of the charter: an achievement of great importance.

Mr. Chairman, we have in the charter a constitution which has responded resiliently to changing demands. Any attempt to codify its growing law might result more in ossification than in codification and progressive development, more in the acceptance of the least common denominator of the recent past than in the development of a law fit to cope with the flux of the future. As the Government of Tanganyika indicated in its pungent comment on the item before us, contained in Document A/5470, what is required is that the principles of friendly relations be put into practice. What is needed is not manifestoes but a greater will on the part of states to give full effect to the obligations they have accepted in the charter.

The charter, of course, affords an array of institutions and methods through which states can give practical effect to the charter's substantive obligations. My delegation believes that it would be desirable to give particular attention, in the study of friendly relations, to procedures and agencies for the pacific settlement of disputes. A thorough study of existing procedures and agencies would shed light on the institutions which now exist and the practices which states have followed. Such a study might also evolve suggestions for the development of additional means for future use. The United States delegation welcomes the initiative of the Netherlands delegation toward this end and will give their and any other constructive suggestions the most earnest consideration.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I should like now to turn to "The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." My remarks will concentrate on two areas. First, I shall comment on the text of article 2, paragraph 4, of the charter. Second, I shall advert to the practice of the United Nations in the application of the principle which that paragraph embodies.

Limitation on Use of Force

It is at once a demonstration of how far we have come, and yet how far we must go, in human relations and in international relations, that the first notable, if narrow, limitation in international law on the use of force was as recent as 1907. In that year the Hague Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts committed its signatories "... not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract claims" unless the debtor state refused arbitration. At the same time the Convention for Pacific Settlement of Disputes was concluded "with a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between States. . . ."

The Covenant of the League of Nations a decade later was much more far-reaching, both in its limitations on the use of force and in the institutions which the covenant established in order to implement the principles it set forth. Resort to war was carefully limited. But it was not altogether excluded. Moreover, resort to war and resort to force are not the same thing. War could be prohibited while the use of force in international relations was permitted. Thus in the *Corfu Channel* case the League Council did not treat the use of force as an act of war, because the bombardment and occupation of Corfu were undertaken as measures of reprisal, without a declaration of war.

The authors of the Pact of Paris of 1928 sought to go beyond the limitations placed by the covenant on resort to war. The states parties to the Pact of Paris declared "that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." But the pact was not clear in respect of the use of force not regarded as war; it merely obligated the parties not to seek settlement of disputes "except by pacific means."

These profoundly important precursors to article 2, paragraph 4, of the charter circumscribed international resort to force; they did not, in law or, certainly, in fact, adequately contain or control it. Over these provisions article 2, paragraph 4, constitutes a significant ad-

vance. Yet the true defect both of the covenant of the League and the Pact of Paris was not textual but contextual. Too many states, too many of them powerful, were unwilling to fulfill the obligations these instruments set forth.

Article 2, paragraph 4, provides:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

It will immediately be seen that, instead of drawing restrictions upon the right to wage war, the charter goes further than the covenant and concerns itself with the use of force. And it impinges not only on the use of force but also on "the threat" of force. Taken together with the positive obligations of article 2, paragraph 3, the prohibition of article 2, paragraph 4, is comprehensive and compelling.

While this much is certain, the sweeping terms of article 2, paragraph 4, nevertheless raise questions, some of which have been noted in the course of the committee's discussion. What, for example, does the article mean by the term "force"? The late Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht holds that:²

The expression "force" is used in its ordinary connotation as referring to *armed* force as distinguished from economic or political pressure. In fact the Preamble to the Charter refers to the acceptance of the principle that "armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest".

The General Assembly, at its notable fifth session, when it adopted a series of resolutions which are landmarks in the history of international peacekeeping, appears to have arrived at a like interpretation. Resolution 378 (V), on the duties of states in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, reaffirms:

... the Principles embodied in the Charter, which require that the force of arms shall not be resorted to except in the common interest, and shall not be used against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

However, at the same session, the Assembly, in Resolution 380 (V), on peace through deeds, condemned

² Oppenheim, *International Law* (7th ed., Lauterpacht), 1952, vol. II, p. 153.

... the intervention of a State in the internal affairs of another State for the purpose of changing its legally established government by the threat or use of force.

It solemnly reaffirmed that:

... whatever the weapons used, any aggression, whether committed openly, or by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world.

The Assembly's holding that the fomenting of civil strife in the interest of a foreign power constitutes aggression suggests that such action may constitute a threat or use of force.

If the prohibition on the threat or use of force does go beyond the threat or use of armed force directly and openly applied, how much beyond that relatively clear line does it go? Armed, physical force represents one extreme in coercion. What lesser measures of coercion may "force" be deemed to include? It has been suggested in the course of our debate that it includes economic pressure. In this regard it is pertinent to note that, at the San Francisco Conference, Brazil submitted an amendment to article 2, paragraph 4, which would have had that paragraph's prohibition expressly refer to *mésures d'ordre économique*.³ The Brazilian amendment was rejected by a large majority.⁴

If armed force represents one extreme in coercion, perhaps the distinguished delegate of Afghanistan suggested the opposite extreme: refusal of a border state to accord a landlocked state access to the sea. The matter of access to the sea is, of course, one of great importance. Whether denial of access is a use of force in contravention of article 2, paragraph 4, however, is another question.

In summary, it is plain that the meaning of the term "force" is not altogether free from doubt. The comments I have made on the matter import no commitment by my Government to one or another construction of the term. Rather, they suggest that the question is one for the continuing study of this committee and the continued practice of United Nations organs.

³ United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents*, vol. 6, pp. 334-35, 339-40.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

Meaning of "International Relations"

A second question raised by the text of article 2, paragraph 4, is the meaning of the phrase "in their international relations." The prohibition of the threat or use of force "in their international relations" imports that article 2, paragraph 4, applies to disputes as between state and state. Thus a state is not prohibited by that provision from applying force in the prosecution of a civil war. It may put down by force a revolt which has broken out within its territory.

To say this, however, is not wholly to answer the question this phrase of article 2, paragraph 4, raises. For there may evidently be question about what is a state's territory. A group or community may, as Dr. [Derek] Bowett points out,⁵ claim international personality or statehood, with the consequent claim that any threat or use of force against that community would be "international" and thus subject to article 2, paragraph 4. This problem, in turn, is linked with the prevailing system of determination, under international law, of whether "international relations" exist between communities. Recognition of statehood is not a centralized process, determined, for example, by the United Nations. The process is decentralized. As long as this is the case, one community may claim statehood, the protection of article 2, paragraph 4, and the right of self-defense, while its opponent denies to the community both statehood and the shield of article 2, paragraph 4. This too is a problem with which the United Nations has grappled in practice and with some success, for example, in 1947 in the case of Indonesia.

Extent of the Prohibition

A third question which the text of article 2, paragraph 4, poses is whether the prohibition of the threat or use of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence" of any state qualifies the extent of the prohibition. That is to say, is the use of force which is *not* directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state permitted?

The proceedings at San Francisco and the analyses of some jurists suggest that these words do not limit the prohibition of the paragraph. The phrase in question was inserted at San Francisco in order to give smaller states an express guarantee of their territorial integrity and political independence. The phrase clearly was not designed to afford states the argument that they can use force against other states as long as the former, in their own view, are not using force against the territorial integrity and political independence of the latter.

If state *A* could penetrate the territory of state *B* and be heard to make the claim that its penetration is lawful under article 2, paragraph 4, since it is not meant permanently to interfere with state *B*'s territorial integrity and political independence, the value of article 2, paragraph 4, would be in doubt. Yet this too is not a question susceptible of facile treatment. The point has been made that action which is genuinely in self-defense cannot, by definition, be directed against the territorial integrity and political independence of another state.⁶

What is clear is that the injunction that all members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against "any state" applies to "any state" and not merely to states members. Thus states which are not members but nevertheless are governed by the provisions of article 2, paragraph 6, receive the protection of article 2, paragraph 4. This poses a further question: Are nonmember states bound by, as well as beneficiaries of, article 2, paragraph 4? In the view of my Government they are.

Nonmember states are, in view of their enjoyment of its protection, bound not to contravene article 2, paragraph 4, because of the principle of reciprocity. They are further so bound because of the status in general international law which the principles of article 2, paragraph 4, have by now achieved, because of the import of article 2, paragraph 6, which provides that the organization shall insure that states not members shall act in accordance with the charter's principles "so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and secu-

⁵ Bowett, *Self-Defense in International Law* (1958), pp. 149-50.

⁶ Bowett, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-52; but see Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States* (1963), pp. 265-68.

city," and because the international interest in the maintenance of international peace and security clearly requires that nonmember states be so bound. The acute remarks of the distinguished delegate of Mexico are of particular interest in this regard. It should be added that the United Nations has, in practice, treated nonmembers as bound by the provisions of article 2, paragraph 4.

The paragraph's specification of "any state" relates to the question I addressed myself to a moment ago in discussing the phrase "in their international relations": What is a state? Can one state, by denying the statehood of another entity, be free to attack it? The history of the United Nations demonstrates that, in practice, the international community will, as one learned commentator has put it,⁷

... not interpret statehood too literally and limit the obligation of Article 2 (4) to cases of attack against the recognized State; more particularly, they will not allow the attacker, by withholding recognition from its victim, to evade the prohibition.

Scope of "Effective Collective Measures"

I turn now to the final phrase of article 2, paragraph 4, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, "or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." The purposes of the United Nations described in paragraph 1 of article 1 are particularly pertinent:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

This final phrase of article 2, paragraph 4, thus emphasizes the legality of force as an element of "effective collective measures" adopted in accordance with the charter.

The "effective collective measures" within the charter's scope are those which the Security Council may take under chapter VII, particu-

larly article 42; those which the General Assembly may recommend under articles 10 and 11; and those which regional agencies may take under chapter VIII. Moreover, by the terms of article 51, nothing in the charter, including article 2, paragraph 4, shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack.

Mr. Chairman, I do not propose now to discuss these articles and chapters, though they are interlocked with article 2, paragraph 4. May I simply say, in this regard, that my delegation heard with much interest the careful and discerning discussion of the distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom. In my delegation's view no amount of attempted distortion—and we have had a dose—can detract from the clarity and thoughtfulness of that statement.

I do not propose to analyze the proposed formulations of the distinguished delegate of Czechoslovakia with respect to article 2, paragraph 4. Were I to specify all that my delegation finds to be redundant, erroneous, unnecessary, or otherwise unacceptable in that draft, this statement would be unduly extended. At this stage I shall confine myself to noting that the Czech draft confirms our skepticism about the desirability and practicality of so-called codification and progressive development of the law of article 2, paragraph 4.

Applying the Charter's Peacekeeping Powers

Now, Mr. Chairman, if we are to understand the law governing the use of force among states, we must understand its actual application to the turbulent world in which the organization's peacekeeping mission is carried out. To this end, we think it useful to examine, for illustrative purposes, several important classes of situations in which this rule may be brought into play. In so doing we have available a rich store of experience which has accumulated as the peacekeeping powers of the charter have been applied to particular problems.

It is clear that the movement of an invading military force across an international frontier, the naval or aerial bombardment of a city, or an armed attack by border raiders—that any of these is a use of force in international relations. We need not be concerned with such cases, not

⁷ Bowett, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-54.

because they have not occurred since 1945 but because of their very obviousness as *prima facie* violations of the charter.

Consider, however, the situation in which a military force has ensconced itself on the territory of another state, not as an invader but with the consent and perhaps at the invitation of another state. What occurs, legally, when that consent is withdrawn? It may well be that the continued presence, without other legal justification, in the face of a request or demand for withdrawal, would constitute a threat of force in violation of article 2, paragraph 4. What is the meaning and impact of continued stay by a military force that has become unwelcome if it is not coercive? Is there not a threat against territorial integrity and political independence? It would seem immaterial that the foreign military presence was not part of a plan of action aimed at supplanting the constituted government or undertaken in support of territorial claims advanced by the foreign power.

The experience of the United Nations has tended to confirm these conclusions. A situation similar in some respects was presented by the complaint of Iran before the Security Council in 1946, in which the Council initially took no action other than to note and encourage the continuance of negotiations in progress between the two governments involved. This problem, happily, was eventually resolved through these negotiations.

Illegal Presence of Foreign Forces

Let me turn now to a second type of case. The presence on the territory of a state, without lawful justification, of any foreign armed force not recognizing and submitting to the legal authority of that state would presumably constitute a threat of force against that state's political independence and territorial integrity. It may not always be clear, however, that this is a threat of force in "international relations" within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 4. There must be some basis in the facts of the situation for characterizing the intruders as legally agents of a foreign state or for otherwise imputing responsibility for their acts to a foreign government.

The committee will recall, for example, the

equivocal legal position of the Chinese irregular troops of whose presence Burma complained in the General Assembly in 1953. The nucleus of this group was a force of some 1,700 Chinese troops which had retreated into Burma at the time when the Government of China had withdrawn to Taiwan. The Republic of China exercised only a limited control over even this original group and expressed its intention not to permit the support of these forces from Taiwan and to disavow those who would not participate in a program of evacuation.

Nevertheless, the presence and acts of these forces were found by the General Assembly to constitute an infringement of the territorial integrity of Burma. Implicit in this finding was the view that, at least until the irregulars had unequivocally repudiated any agency relationship with the foreign government—as a number of them eventually did through a refusal to be evacuated in accordance with the expressed will of the Government of the Republic of China—the latter retained a residue of responsibility for their acts. The matter thus was one of international rather than merely internal significance. By mid-1954, it will be recalled, all who would submit to evacuation had been removed from Burma through the activities of the Joint Military Committee constituted by the General Assembly for that purpose.

Responsibility for Aid to Local Insurgents

The foregoing kinds of cases involve the illegal presence of foreign forces. In the case where there are armed groups wholly or substantially comprised of local insurgents, carrying on a program of forcible action aimed at supplanting the government, a foreign state sympathetic with the insurgency may be tempted to assist it. It may, for example, provide haven to guerrilla bands by allowing them to pass freely across an international frontier and remain on the assisting state's territory for purposes of refuge or training or both. It may provide personnel to accompany the insurgents for the purpose of training, political indoctrination, or technical assistance. It may provide combat "volunteers" to function under the insurgent command.

Such acts as these can constitute a use of

force within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 4. A fortiori, any combination of such acts, or the whole gamut, could amount to a systematic program of illegal force on the part of the foreign power. This is not because the insurgents are the agents or hirelings of the foreign power; they need not be. They may retain full freedom of action. Such a foreign state would be in violation of the charter simply because of the elementary truth that the commission of an act, and consequently the responsibility for it, are shared in by all who knowingly participate in the scheme of its execution.

The United Nations has confronted situations of this type on a number of occasions, and its practice confirms the foregoing conclusions. Greece, to cite only one example, found itself in 1946 threatened by the activities of guerrilla bands aimed at the overthrow of the constituted government. External support for and assistance to those bands on the part of certain of Greece's northern neighbors became of such magnitude as to compel Greece, late in 1946, to apprise the Security Council of the manner in which the insurgents were being armed, trained, and given refuge. The Security Council, it will be recalled, established a Commission of Investigation, whose findings confirmed the allegations of the Greek Government, but the Council then found itself unable to act under chapter VII because of the requirement of unanimity among the permanent members.

The matter was then placed before the General Assembly. In the resulting resolution that body recorded its judgment that the acts complained of constituted a threat against the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece and called on the states involved to do nothing to aid the Greek guerrillas. The resolution also established the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, with its mission of mediation, observation, and assistance in compliance with the Assembly's recommendations.

Armistice and Cease-Fire Lines

May I mention another sphere of the organization's practice. The proliferation during the lifetime of the charter of armistice and cease-fire lines drawn under United Nations auspices attests both to the turbulence of those years and

to the energy with which men have striven during our time to vindicate a concept of international order in situations of local violence: It marks both successes and failures of the organization.

The 1948 hostilities in Kashmir and the Palestine war marked the beginning, so far as the United Nations is concerned, of the development of what we might call the international law of the cease-fire line. The establishment of such a line superimposes, on the basic obligations of the disputing states to refrain from the threat or use of force, an additional legal regime springing from the exercise of the organization's peacekeeping powers. In this connection I will mention only one of a number of legal issues which these experiences have brought to light.

We can readily suppose a situation in which a cease-fire order by a United Nations organ will be initially observed, only to be followed by a resumption of hostilities. The claim may be made on either side that the other had resumed the attack first. As the practice of the organization in the Middle East and elsewhere shows, the United Nations has no alternative in such situations but to live with the recurring problem of contradictory claims, which are difficult to substantiate, while striving to ameliorate this difficulty by improvement in the devices of observation and factfinding. This is not to deny that in such a state of armistice or cease-fire the United Nations has competence to judge the correctness of any such claim. It has exercised that competence with undoubted effect.

Injunction Against Threat of Force

Mr. Chairman, we earlier emphasized that article 2, paragraph 4, proscribes the *threat* as well as the *use* of force. It is well to be reminded that if a state chooses a policy of force in pursuit of its national objectives, it may run afoul of the charter in advance of the actual—or even the attempted—use of force in the process of executing this policy.

When does this occur? In the realm of individual conduct the clearest case of a threat is a declaration, by word of mouth or otherwise, made under circumstances calculated to insure

that its point will not be lost on the one threatened. It would be agreed, however, that one may threaten another simply by a course of conduct which unequivocally communicates his intent. Furthermore, our conviction that one has communicated a threat—and not, for example, merely an innocent prediction—is reinforced if what he has done appears to be a part of an effort to achieve some self-interested objective, through stimulating or forestalling action on the part of the one to whom it is addressed. Similarly, whether one has genuinely threatened another will depend to some extent on the apparent seriousness of his intention and his likely capacity to carry it out.

The actions of states, which are of course the concern of the charter, are likely to be much more weighty and complicated affairs than those of an individual. Nevertheless the foregoing general considerations are relevant and will need to be taken into account in determining the scope of the charter's injunction. It is true, for example, that the evidences of a state's intention are many: What is its past record of international conduct? Is it basically committed to a program of remaking the world in its own image? Is there good reason to think that inflammatory statements are produced purely for domestic consumption? And the like. Nevertheless we are capable in particular circumstances of arriving at a considered judgment as to what a state's intentions are and, more generally, a judgment as to whether a state has gone beyond tolerable limits and thus become guilty of making a threat of force within the meaning of the charter.

Mr. Chairman, if this injunction is fairly and properly applied in particular cases in the future, it is not too much to hope and expect that it will do more than govern the conduct of states in the immediate situation. We may hope that it will serve as a vehicle for the gradual refinement of our legal standards of international practice, as the world community becomes increasingly more willing to apply general precepts of civilized conduct for the relations of states. It is possible that what we would now regard as only a harsh and imprudent prognostication will have become—a generation from now—an impermissible threat.

Before further elaborating international practice under the injunction against threat of force, may I illustrate my point by reference to another class of situations. I have already suggested that the capacity to carry through on a threat is a relevant consideration in applying article 2, paragraph 4. For example, the existence of a threat of force might be strongly substantiated by the fact of a purely local power position on the part of a foreign state, which can be exploited against a weaker neighbor to achieve internal political and social objectives by means more subtle than military occupation. The proximity of an overwhelming foreign military force, even though beyond the international frontier, might well be employed to strengthen the hands of representatives of the foreign state seeking to effect political change by circumventing constitutional processes. It might similarly be used to benefit a power-seeking minority group which would otherwise be incapable of upsetting constitutional processes. Such a presence could well be used to forestall the normal process of law enforcement against acts of violence committed upon individual political opponents or used in other ways to disrupt the normal functioning of a government in order to achieve its destruction.

Such activity in such circumstances involves a threat of force against political independence. The Security Council on occasion has had the chance to express its views on matters of this sort. The complaint of Czechoslovakia in 1948 was in some respects similar. After the coup in that country which occurred in February 1948, it was alleged before the Security Council that an internal minority group had been able to seize power, and suspend the operation of constitutional and parliamentary institutions, only through the actual and promised assistance of representatives of a foreign government within Czechoslovakia. The capitulation of the Czechoslovak Government was thus claimed to have been brought about by a threat of force against political independence and territorial integrity in contravention of article 2, paragraph 4. In the face of this claim, an investigation under article 34 was warranted.

The history of the Council's inability to act,

because of the exercise of a double veto, is, of course, well known. What is important for purposes of the present discussion is that the majority of the Council clearly were of the view that the allegations made out a *prima facie* case of violation of the obligation not to threaten force in international relations and that therefore the Council should immediately exercise its investigative authority.

Basic Standard of Conduct

Mr. Chairman, I have endeavored to give only a suggestion of the great variety of the experience of the United Nations with the question of the illicit threat or use of force in international relations. This account has necessarily carried with it some suggestion of the great variety of response on the part of the organization which that experience has evoked. I have not, of course, purported to give an exhaustive history or an exhaustive legal analysis of article 2, paragraph 4, and certainly not of related articles, much less of the peacekeeping procedures under the charter which the violation of this paragraph may bring into play. I have hoped, however, to bring home the fact that the whole history of the threat and use of force in the actual affairs of states since 1945, especially as these actions have concerned the United Nations, offers invaluable instruction to this committee for the purposes of its present task.

In the first place, just as the broad terms of article 2, paragraph 4, in principle cover a widely variegated range of prohibited acts, the actions of states which have in fact brought this provision into play have exhibited a variety beyond what the framers of the charter could have specified.

Further, the response of the United Nations, in the encouraging number of cases in which it has been able to act effectively, has inevitably been tailored to fit the particular problem. The decisive element has often been the pragmatic ingenuity with which the procedures available to United Nations organs under the charter have been applied in a novel situation.

We may conclude also, Mr. Chairman, that failures of the international organization or of international law have rarely, if ever, been for

lack of clarity of the legal obligations of the parties under article 2, paragraph 4. Where there have been close cases, or efforts to stretch or distort the terms of the charter, the practice of the United Nations in most cases provides clarifying guidelines. Failure has been due rather to a weakness, often a momentary lapse, of the resolve of particular states, in particular circumstances, to support *any* system of law among states. No more explicit code of international behavior, seeking to make some limited set of acts definitive of the obligation laid down in article 2, paragraph 4, would have made the obligation in the particular case clearer.

On the other hand we may conclude that, had any elaborately detailed code been written into the charter in 1945, it would very likely have failed to provide for those unanticipated situations which article 2, paragraph 4, as it stands can now be seen to cover quite adequately. It is no idle truism that we live in a rapidly changing world. More particularly, ours is a world in which the modes and methods of using force in international relations are constantly changing with sometimes alarming speed. The framers of the charter wisely saw that little was to be gained from the promulgation of rules which would be rendered irrelevant by next month's issue of a scientific journal or next year's scheme for coercing a lawful government—if indeed agreement on such rules could be achieved. What they rather gave us is a basic standard of conduct, whose concepts may be enriched through experience but which are stable enough to be applicable over many generations.

We have no stronger grounds today for imputing an omniscience to ourselves than did the framers of the charter in 1945.

In short, Mr. Chairman, the limits of the usefulness of tinkering with the principle laid down in article 2, paragraph 4, are narrow indeed. We are all aware of what is really required for a workable world legal order: a continuing, vigorous, and astute application, to each new disruptive situation, of the peacekeeping powers which under the charter are placed in the hands of the world organization. This, together with a stronger resolve on the part of states to honor in good faith the standards of the charter in their individual actions,

is what has been required and what will be needed in the future.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, while I have spent much time analyzing the text of a principal provision of our charter, I cannot close without pointing out that, important as this and other treaty obligations are, the real innovation of 20th-century international relations is not so much in treaty obligations as in the fact that we had in the League of Nations, and have in the United Nations, international institutions which may implement those obligations. It is the practice of those institutions in implementing the basic obligations of international law and life that is vital, both for the effectiveness of those obligations and our study of them. Our study can best illuminate the complexities, difficulties—and opportunities—of applying the principles of the charter, the principles of friendly relations and cooperation among states, by a careful, dispassionate examination of not only what the charter says but what the practice under the charter has been. The expression by all of us of our views on the obligations of states and the practice of states and of international organizations consequently is, as the distinguished delegates of Belgium and Sweden have emphasized, of great importance.

Mr. Chairman, we have in this organization machinery through which states may not only implement their treaty obligations but, through practice, define, refine, and adjust their relationships. It is this living organization that gives the charter life. It is to the preservation and promotion of this organization that our best efforts should be dedicated.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

General Assembly

Report of the Secretary-General on special training program for territories under Portuguese administration. A/5531. September 19, 1963. 23 pp.

- Exchange of correspondence between the Secretary-General and the President of the Republic of Vietnam. A/5542. September 23, 1963. 3 pp.
- Economic development of underdeveloped countries. A/5532. September 24, 1963. 4 pp.
- Report of the Secretary-General on offers by member states of study and training facilities for inhabitants of non-self-governing territories. A/5548. September 24, 1963. 12 pp.
- Comments received from governments (Pakistan and Sweden) on consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. A/5470/Add. 2. September 25, 1963. 9 pp.
- Report of the Secretary-General on manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance. A/5473/Add. 1. September 25, 1963. 65 pp.
- Report of the Secretary-General on collection of financial contributions to the U.N. as at September 16. A/C.5/985. September 27, 1963. 12 pp.
- Note verbale dated September 17 from the permanent representative of Chad addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the Governments of Portugal and South Africa. A/5554. September 27, 1963. 2 pp.
- Report of the Preparatory Committee on the International Cooperation Year. A/5561. October 2, 1963. 10 pp.
- Preliminary report by the Secretary-General on development plans and projects for an economic program for disarmament. A/5538. October 4, 1963. 13 pp.
- Comments received from governments and international organizations and institutions regarding technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination, and wider appreciation of international law (Cyprus and Ireland). A/5455/Add. 4. October 4, 1963. 11 pp.
- Economic development of underdeveloped countries: activities of the U.N. in the field of industrial development. Summary of the activities of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency and their comments on the report of the Advisory Committee of Experts (E/C.5/29), A/5535, October 4, 1963, 50 pp.; Add. 1, October 4, 1963, 10 pp.; Add. 2, October 4, 1963, 8 pp.; Add. 3, October 7, 1963, 15 pp.; Add. 4, October 7, 1963, 16 pp.
- Letter dated October 3 from the permanent representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the *apartheid* policies of the Republic of South Africa. A/5563. October 7, 1963. 2 pp.
- Question of Oman. A/5562. October 8, 1963. 63 pp.
- Report of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Aden). A/5446/Add. 4. October 8, 1963. 219 pp.
- Report of the Fourth Committee on the question of Southern Rhodesia. Part I. A/5564. October 9, 1963. 5 pp.
- Report of the Secretary-General on technical assistance to Burundi and Rwanda. A/5547. October 10, 1963. 14 pp.
- Report of the Special Political Committee on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. A/5565. October 10, 1963. 4 pp.
- Report of the Fifth Committee on cost estimates for U.N. operations in the Congo. A/5567. October 14, 1963. 9 pp.
- Letter dated October 10 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic addressed to the President of the General Assembly concerning the limited test ban treaty. A/5568. October 15, 1963. 2 pp.

Letter dated October 11 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the limited test ban treaty. A/5569. October 15, 1963. 2 pp.

Economic and Social Council

United Nations Children's Fund:

Digest of UNICEF-aided projects in Africa. E/ICEF/445/Amend. 1. September 10, 1963. 42 pp.

Digest of UNICEF-aided projects in Asia. E/ICEF/464/Add. 1. September 12, 1963. 23 pp.

Digest of UNICEF-aided projects in the Americas. E/ICEF/445/Add. 4/Amend. 1. September 16, 1963. 35 pp.

Economic and demographic situation in Asia and the Far East. E/ICEF/472. September 17, 1963. 29 pp.

Final Report of the United Nations Conference on International Travel and Tourism. E/3830. September 26, 1963. 63 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Algeria, October 31, 1963.

Narcotics

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, and protocol of signature. Concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. TS 863.

Accession deposited: Algeria, October 31, 1963.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.¹

Ratification deposited: Norway, December 3, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratification deposited: Thailand, November 29, 1963.

¹ Not in force.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

Acceptance deposited: Philippines, November 19, 1963.

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

Accession deposited: Algeria, October 31, 1963.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement on the visit of the NS *Savannah* to Belgian ports, with annex. Signed at Brussels April 19, 1963.

Entered into force: November 27, 1963.

Chile

Agreement supplementing the agreement of July 29, 1960, so as to provide for investment guaranties under new U.S. legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 3, 1963. Entered into force December 3, 1963.

Guatemala

Agreement relating to the construction of the Inter-American Highway in Guatemala. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala May 19, 1943. Entered into force May 19, 1943. EAS 345.

Terminated: October 3, 1963 (superseded by agreement of October 3, 1963).

Agreement supplementing the agreement relating to the construction of the Inter-American Highway in Guatemala signed at Guatemala May 19, 1943. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala May 18, 1948. Entered into force May 18, 1948. TIAS 2001.

Terminated: October 3, 1963 (superseded by agreement of October 3, 1963).

Agreement amending agreement of May 19, 1943 (EAS 345), to provide for completion of construction of the Inter-American Highway in Guatemala. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 28 and August 28, 1954. Entered into force August 28, 1954. TIAS 3084.

Terminated: October 3, 1963 (superseded by agreement of October 3, 1963).

Panama

Agreement providing for the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Panama. Effected by exchange of notes at Panamá October 30, 1963. Enters into force upon ratification by Panama.

Syrian Arab Republic

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Damascus November 18, 1963. Entered into force November 18, 1963.

THE CONGRESS

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Antitrust Developments in the European Common Market. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary pursuant to S. Res. 56. Part 2. Appendix: Summary of Conferences in Europe April 15 Through 22, 1963. 24 pp.

Cuban Refugee Problem. Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part 1. May 22-23, 1963. 183 pp.

United States Contributions to International Organizations for the Fiscal Year 1962. H. Doc. 131. June 27, 1963. 127 pp. and tables.

The United States Balance of Payments. Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee. Part 2. Outlook for United States Balance of Payments. July 29-30, 1963. 117 pp.

Forty-fourth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations. Message from the President transmitting a report for the year ending December 31, 1962. H. Doc. 114. August 5, 1963. 39 pp.

Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program. Report, together with minority views, to accompany S. 1703. S. Rept. 391. August 6, 1963. 17 pp.

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Message from the President transmitting the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. S. Ex. M. August 8, 1963. 10 pp.

Increase in Authorized Capital Stock of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Report to accompany H.R. 7405. H. Rept. 651. August 12, 1963. 11 pp.

Increased U.S. Participation in the Inter-American Development Bank. Report to accompany H.R. 7406. H. Rept. 652. August 12, 1963. 9 pp.

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive M, 88th Congress, 1st Session: the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. August 12-27, 1963. 1,028 pp.

Export-Import Bank Act Extension. Conference report to accompany H.R. 3872. H. Rept. 688. August 15, 1963. 4 pp.

Pulp, Paper, and Board Supply-Demand. Report of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Submitted by Representative Harley O. Staggers. H. Rept. 693. August 21, 1963. 120 pp.

Extend the Mexican Farm Labor Program. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of the House Committee on Agriculture on H.R. 7185, H.R. 7191, and S. 1703. Serial U. August 21, 1963. 41 pp.

Eighteenth Semiannual Report on Activities Carried on Under Public Law 480, 83d Congress. H. Doc. 149. August 21, 1963. 123 pp.

International Air Transportation Rates. Report to accompany S. 1540. S. Rept. 473. August 28, 1963. 26 pp.

Report to the Congress on the Foreign Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1962. H. Doc. 146. August 28, 1963. 89 pp.

To Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 3299, H.R. 6082, H.R. 6294, H.R. 7340, H.R. 7531, S. 777, bills to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees. August 29-September 19, 1963. 203 pp.

PUBLICATIONS

Second Foreign Relations Volume for 1943 Published

Press release 586 dated November 15, for release November 23

The Department of State released on November 23 another volume of diplomatic papers relating to World War II: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume III, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East*. This is the second volume to be issued in the regular *Foreign Relations* series for 1943. *Volume I, General* was released in October.¹ Four other regular *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1943 are in preparation. Special volumes on China, 1943,² and the conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943,³ have already been published.

The section on the British Commonwealth includes the record on relations with the United Kingdom and other member states except India, documentation on which will be printed in *Volume IV, The Near East and Africa*.

The section on Eastern Europe, comprising well over half of this volume, gives the documentation on relations with Finland, Poland, and the Soviet Union. The section on the Far

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 28, 1963, p. 690.

² Department of State publication 6459.

³ Department of State publication 7187.

East contains the record for Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume III, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East* (vii, 1,151 pp.; Department of State publication 7601) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$3.50.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Greece, amending the agreement of August 4, 1955, as amended. Signed at Washington April 3, 1962. Entered into force provisionally August 4, 1962. Entered into force definitively October 25, 1962. TIAS 5250. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesia, amending the agreement of February 19, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Djakarta December 10, 1962. Entered into force December 10, 1962. TIAS 5254. 3 pp. 5¢.

Taxation—Relief from Double Taxation on Earnings from Operation of Ships and Aircraft. Agreement with Iceland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 21 and 27, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1962. TIAS 5255. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam. Signed at Saigon November 21, 1962. Entered into force November 21, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5256. 7 pp. 10¢.

Relief Supplies and Equipment—Inland Transportation Charges. Agreement with Republic of Korea, amending the agreement of April 22 and May 2, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul November 9 and December 28, 1962. Entered into force December 28, 1962. Operative retroactively August 15, 1962. TIAS 5257. 4 pp. 5¢.

Visas—Issuance of Re-entry Visas to Diplomatic Personnel. Agreement with Czechoslovakia. Exchange of notes dated at Prague December 18 and 21, 1962. Entered into force December 21, 1962. TIAS 5258. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia. Signed at La Paz December 17, 1962. Entered into force December 17, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5259. 14 pp. 10¢.

Meteorological Satellite System. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa December 28, 1962. Entered into force December 28, 1962. TIAS 5260. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with the Dominican Republic. Signed at Santo Domingo November 30, 1962. With exchange of notes—Signed at Santo Domingo November 30 and December 5, 1962. TIAS 5261. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Paraguay. Signed at Asunción November 24, 1962. With exchanges of notes. TIAS 5263. 16 pp. 10¢.

Education—Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Iceland, amending the agreement of February 23, 1957, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Reykjavik February 19 and April 5, 1963. Entered into force April 5, 1963. TIAS 5341. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Chile, amending the exchange of notes of October 3 and 4, 1962, relating to the agreement of August 7, 1962. Exchange of notes—Dated at Santiago March 1 and 27, 1963. Entered into force March 27, 1963. TIAS 5342. 2 pp. 5¢.

Army Mission. Agreement with El Salvador extending the agreement of September 23, 1954, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador March 27 and May 3, 1963. Entered into force May 3, 1963. Operative retroactively November 17, 1962. TIAS 5345. 3 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 2-8

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to December 2 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 586 of November 15 and 608 of November 30.

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605	12/2	Rusk: opening transmission on Commonwealth Pacific Cable.
*606	12/5	Timmons sworn in as Ambassador to Haiti (biographic details).
*607	12/2	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*609	12/4	Harriman: "Problems of the Developing Nations" (excerpts).
*610	12/5	Harriman: death of Herbert H. Lehman.
*611	12/6	Ball and Wilder: Medal of Freedom luncheon.
612	12/6	Battle: conference on educational television, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
613	12/6	Martin: 14th annual Conference on the Caribbean.

*Not printed.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

U.S. Participation in the UN

Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1962

This is the seventeenth annual report covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies for the year 1962.

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation therein are fully described under the following sections: Part I—Maintenance of Peace and Security; Part II—Cooperation in the Economic, Social, Scientific, and Human Rights Fields; Part III—Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories; Part IV—Legal and Constitutional Developments; and Part V—Budgetary, Financial, and Administrative Matters.

The appendixes to the report contain U.N. charts, information on the organizational structure, and availability of publications and documentation of the Organization.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. XLIX, No. 1279



December 30, 1963

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Foreign Policy and the American Citizen

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

I come in a period of national mourning because the nation lives and must get on with its appointed tasks. President Kennedy would have had it no other way.

I shall not try to put into words the personal grief shared with us here by hundreds of millions of ordinary men and women throughout the world. We have been diminished by the loss of so much gallantry, so much energy and vision, so much dedication and common sense. We are benumbed and shamed by the cost of senseless violence, but lifted up and inspired by the rediscovery, in the midst of our sorrow, of the power of the hopes and aspirations of man and the strength of decency and moderation in our relations with the rest of the world.

In these days of sadness and shock we have found new sources of confidence. We have found them in the resilience of our constitu-

tional system, in the capacity of our country to unite behind the man who now carries the awesome and lonely burden, in the sure hand and the clear head with which he has taken up his task, and in the confidence which those beyond our borders have given us in these critical days. I should like to ask you therefore to recall once more the words of President Johnson to the Congress, words which expressed the deepest conviction of one who is intimately in touch with the world about us and the policies which guide our foreign relations:²

This nation will keep its commitments from South Viet-Nam to West Berlin. We will be unceasing in the search for peace; resourceful in our pursuit of areas of agreement, even with those with whom we differ; and generous and loyal to those who join with us in common cause.

In this age when there can be no losers in peace and no victors in war, we must recognize the obligation to match national strength with national restraint. We must be prepared at one and the same time for both the confrontation of power and the limitation of power.

¹ Made before the Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association at St. Paul, Minn., on Dec. 10 (press release 614; as-delivered text).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1963, p. 910.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1279 PUBLICATION 7636 DECEMBER 30, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

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We must be ready to defend the national interest and to negotiate the common interest. This is the path that we shall continue to pursue. Those who test our courage will find it strong, and those who seek our friendship will find it honorable. We will demonstrate anew that the strong can be just in the use of strength—and the just can be strong in the defense of justice.

"Foreign Policy Is About You"

As your Secretary of State I wish to talk to you about our foreign relations. Let me start with a simple remark which I earnestly hope you will never forget: Foreign policy is about you. It is about your home, your community, your safety, your well-being, your chance to live a decent life and to prepare a better world for your children. Foreign policy is not a game played by "those people in Washington" with other players from far-off distant places. It is as close to you as the member of your family, or the neighbor's boy, in uniform—and there are almost a million of them outside the continental United States—as close as the taxes you pay to sustain the struggle for freedom, as close as the prices and the markets for what you produce. Even more personal, it is as close as your highest hopes, your puzzled concern that man can be both so good and yet so evil, your own impulse to do something to build a better world, your own private and personal search for the answer to the ageless question: "What is the chief end of man?"

There are those who say that the Department of State has no constituency, but I know better. How we dispose of our affairs at home can decide elections; but how we dispose of our relations with the rest of the world can decide the survival of mankind. So we have our constituency—every man, woman, and child across our great nation.

The Miracle of American Agriculture

Our time has seen some breathtaking changes. Technology has advanced on a thousand fronts and at accelerating speeds. The atom has been unlocked, and man has begun to reach out from his earthly home toward the moon and the planets. But to me, one of the most wondrous miracles of all is the rise in farm productivity.

As Mr. Thatcher [M. W. Thatcher, general manager of the Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association] mentioned, I was born on a small farm in Cherokee County, Georgia. It wasn't much of a farm by your standards—just a few acres of red clay. Today, when I read the statistics on increased yield per acre and output per man-hour, I can hardly believe them. And the miracle of rising agricultural production continues to unfold.

The abundance of food and fiber that you produce is a powerful element in our national strength. It is a powerful asset in the defense of our national interests and our national life, and in promoting peace and freedom throughout the world.

The miracle of American agriculture has not merely produced more and more food for a still hungry world. It has turned men's hopes toward science and technology and their appetites away from plunder and conquest. It has opened the historical possibility of meeting by peaceful means the elementary daily needs of the whole human race.

Have you paused to consider that for the first time in history there is no nation—no nation—regardless of social system, that today is asserting a right to invade its neighbor in behalf of food? Have you paused to realize that you personally have had something to do with that historic transformation in one of the elementary causes of war?

Our agricultural exports of approximately \$6 billion a year—more than \$4 billion for hard currency—are crucial to our balance of payments. Without them we would be hard pressed to meet the costs of guarding the ramparts of freedom and of helping other peoples to preserve their independence and raise their living standards.

Our Food for Peace programs are a mighty instrument of security, good will, and peace. They are saving human lives every day. Under one of them, for example, more than 40 million children in 91 countries get a square meal once a day—at school. And tens of millions of other people are getting supplemental feedings.

Food for Peace programs are not only saving lives. They are serving economic development. They have had a growing role in our programs of assistance to the less developed nations of the

world. Our interest in helping these nations to move forward into the modern world is not humanitarian alone. We want them to move forward because we want a peaceful world. Communism feeds on hunger and frustration; it encourages disruption and exploits chaos. We want orderly progress in freedom—not for ourselves alone but for all men.

Food for Peace also serves to develop future markets for American farm products.

And so, as Secretary of State I find it very reassuring to have in support the great resources of American farm production. From my viewpoint, our agricultural abundance may be regarded as strategic reserves. In certain crises it can be as valuable as our military reserve forces.

Not the least of the contributions which you farmers make to freedom and peace is to demonstrate so dramatically that a revolution in agricultural abundance has taken place in a free society. No Communist country has made a success of food production. Communist China has sunk into misery. East Germany has been converted from an area with a food surplus to one with a food deficit. The smaller Eastern European Communist states have been plagued by difficulties in farm production. But it is significant that Poland and Yugoslavia, where most of the farming is done by families on small farms, have generally fared better than the countries which have enforced collectivization. Shortfalls in farm production in the Soviet Union have been aggravated by climatic handicaps and the vagaries of the weather. And by applying more fertilizer and up-to-date methods, the Communist states doubtless will increase in the years ahead their agricultural output. But I am convinced that a large part of their trouble in agricultural production is inherent in the Communist system which they try to sustain.

The central purpose of our foreign policy, as of our military forces, is to maintain an environment in which we can "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." When we were children we felt safe in our continental home behind ocean barriers. Today we cannot find security apart from the rest of our planet. In these days of intercontinental missiles and thermonuclear warheads we can be safe only if

our total environment is safe. By "total environment" we now mean not only the land and the waters and the air of the earth but the adjoining areas of space as far out as man can project himself and his instruments.

In political terms, we seek a peaceful world of independent nations, each free to choose its own institutions so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others and all free to cooperate in their common interests and in the welfare of mankind. That is the kind of world described in the Charter of the United Nations. And that is the kind of world to which we committed ourselves in those days when we had been purified by the sacrifices of a terrible war and we were thinking long and hard about the purposes of man.

Basic Elements of U.S. Foreign Policy

In working toward our goals we have five basic policies. First—and indispensably—we seek to protect the free world against aggression. We possess a nuclear deterrent of unimaginable power. We maintain large conventional forces, and these are modernized and increasingly mobile. And we have been increasing the capacity of ourselves, and that of our allies, to deal with guerrilla warfare, the form of aggression to which, for example, South Viet-Nam is presently being subjected. We have demonstrated our will and capacity to make resort to force by our adversaries unprofitable and dangerous—and, at the higher levels, prohibitively destructive.

While we, with our allies, seek to check aggression, we are also building the strength of the free world.

We seek to enlarge and improve our partnerships with the other economically advanced nations of the free world—with Western Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and others. Our partnerships with these nations embrace defense. They also embrace political problems and trade and economics. We seek the most intimate cooperation in lowering the barriers of world trade, in managing the international balance of payments, and in assisting the less developed nations.

A third major element in our policy is assistance to the less developed nations in advancing

economically, socially, and politically. We have welcomed with open arms the nearly 50 nations which have emerged in Asia and Africa since the Second World War. National independence does not automatically lead to economic progress. Yet the peoples of all the less developed countries—new and old—know that man need not live on the edge of starvation, that modern technology makes possible a decent life for all.

I would emphasize that the phrase "modern technology" includes modern methods of producing food and fiber. And in passing I would note that the Peace Corps needs more people who can teach modern farm methods. You don't have to be young to join the Peace Corps, by the way. Some of our volunteers are 60 and 70 years of age.

Helping the less developed countries to move into the modern world will be a continuing task, for a decade or so—in some cases perhaps longer. But many of them are making real and steady progress. And as each moves forward to self-sustaining growth and political stability, it adds to the total strength of the free world. Our aid to the less developed countries is helping to create new markets. But most important of all, it is helping to build the kind of world in which we and our children will want to live.

Are there moments when you get frustrated with the attitude and policies of a particular country? Of course. So do I. But we are dealing with a world which we can influence but not control. And wherever we find a genuinely independent country trying to live at peace with its neighbors, we find a country, whether allied or neutral, that is doing its part in building that world community in which we can be safe and prosperous.

A fourth element in our policy is to improve and strengthen the organizations and institutions which enable the nations of the world to work together more effectively. Some of these are regional, some are specialized. Others are of broader scope. And above them all stands the United Nations. We are striving unceasingly to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for making and keeping peace and serving the welfare of mankind.

On every working day throughout the year the United States attends some 15 or 20 conferences somewhere in the world on some subject. There are those who would be skeptical or cynical about this activity. But this is where the work of the world is going on, to build for peace. Whether in allocating frequencies, or protecting life in the air or in the sea, or protecting against epidemics—whatever that daily work is—there is where the future of peace is being built. Our part in these international organizations gives us the chance to let other people find out what the American people are really all about.

Let us note that this is Human Rights Day—the 15th anniversary of the approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly. We in the United States have special reasons to rejoice in this anniversary.

A century and a half ago Thomas Jefferson summed up this nation's position in the world in these memorable words:

The station we occupy among the regions of the earth is honorable but awful: Trusted with the destinies of this solitary republic of the world, the only monument of human rights and the sole repository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government, from whence it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions of the earth ever become susceptible of its genial influence.

Now on this Human Rights Day of 1963 we can still agree with Jefferson that our station is both "honorable" and "awful." But no longer are we the "*sole* repository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government." No longer are we the "*solitary* republic of the world," for Jefferson's fire has indeed kindled the earth. No longer are we the "*only* monument of human rights," because the chief precepts of our Bill of Rights have emerged in many lands, have been expressed in the constitutions of most of the new republics, and have been reaffirmed for the world in the U.N. Charter and in its Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Charter of the United Nations properly links the rights of individuals with the rights of nations, and tolerance with peace. President Kennedy made the same vital connection last June when he said: "And is not peace,

in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights . . . ?" ³

Many nations have yet to insure equal rights for all of their citizens, and the struggle to obtain these fundamental rights will color the future course of world affairs.

Personal independence depends not alone on equal rights but, more importantly, upon mutual respect. There is no more urgent task before us as a people than to secure for every individual the rights and respect due him as a human being.

As President Johnson said in his address to Congress on November 27:

We have talked long enough in this country about equal rights. We have talked for 100 years or more. It is time now to write the next chapter—and to write it in the books of law. . . . There could be no greater source of strength to this nation both at home and abroad . . . [than] to eliminate . . . every trace of discrimination and oppression that is based upon race or color.

And may I add that the greatest burden we bear in the conduct of our foreign relations around the world—the greatest single burden—is our as-yet-unfilled promise to make good on our own commitments in our own society to the great concepts of freedom. And when we meet those commitments we shall find allies in every corner of the earth.

The Search for Areas of Common Interest

I turn now to a fifth element in our foreign policy. While we seek to protect and build the free world, we search earnestly and untiringly for areas of common interest with our adversaries—and especially for measures to reduce the danger of a great war.

Thermonuclear war is no tea-table conversation; it is the most serious question in front of the human race. And when someone says that we should not keep in contact, especially with our adversaries, he is not in touch with reality.

Recently we have reached a few limited agreements with the Soviet Union. The first was on a "hot wire" or direct line of communication between the President and the head of the Soviet Government—for use at moments of crisis. ⁴

As a matter of fact, there was a very minor crisis some time ago. One of our technicians

was testing that hot line. He sent a message saying, "The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog," and the Russians on the other end didn't know what in the world was happening!

We achieved the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. ⁵ We are pleased that this has now been signed by 107 governments.

The Soviets and we both supported the United Nations declaration against placing in orbit weapons of mass destruction. ⁶ And they and we have reached a broad agreement on principles of law for outer space.

These are perhaps limited but significant steps toward peace. But—let me say this frankly—these steps do not yet constitute a *détente*. The Soviets have not abandoned their aims of world revolution—and neither has Peiping. Chairman Khrushchev has stated on several occasions that the ideological struggle will continue.

There can be no full and lasting *détente* between the chief Communist states and the free world without settlement of critical and dangerous political issues, such as the division of Berlin and Germany, the aggressions against Laos and South Viet-Nam, and the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activity in Latin America.

Moreover, this world will remain a very dangerous place until progress is made in controlling armaments and in reducing the dangers of war from surprise or miscalculation.

President Johnson, like President Kennedy, is determined to explore most earnestly and patiently every possibility of reaching agreements on further steps toward a more stable peace. But as yet we are not in the slightest justified in relaxing our vigilance or in reducing our effort.

There are some significant developments within the Communist world which you should recall. There is the Sino-Soviet quarrel, which involves both ideology and state relations. It is serious but not yet an absolute break. And, as dictatorships can change direction overnight, it might be at some stage patched up.

³ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 753.

There are growing signs of nationalism throughout the Soviet bloc. The smaller Communist states of Europe are finding a little more autonomy and seeking to increase their trade and other relations with the nations of Western Europe, and indeed with the United States. And not only in these smaller Communist states but in the Soviet Union itself there are signs of growing interest in more personal freedom.

The Communist states have problems in allocating their economic resources among the competing demands of armaments, industrialization, consumer satisfaction, and the promotion of the Communist world revolution.

The Power of the Ideas of Freedom

Processes of change are clearly evident behind the Iron Curtain. It would be a mistake to expect these changes to produce new answers rapidly. But it would be a mistake to underestimate the power of historic nationalism and of the ideas of freedom.

For these ideas of freedom, which gave birth to our nation and which we have nurtured and fought to defend, have spread over the earth. They are, I believe, inherent in the nature of man. They are shared today by men everywhere, including behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. They are our most priceless possession; they are our mightiest asset.

But we cannot win this worldwide struggle between coercion and freedom by standing at ease. We cannot make the world safe for freedom by retreating. There are those who would have us quit the struggle—by slashing our defenses, our foreign aid, by abandoning our alliances, by leaving the United Nations. I mentioned almost a million Americans in uniform outside the continental United States all over the world. Our defense budget is running at the rate of about \$50 billion a year. Can we Americans not afford to spend something less than 10 percent of our defense budget to get this job done without committing those men to combat, if possible? Is there any one of you who is not prepared to pay 4 percent of your Federal taxes to get this job of freedom done by peaceful means, if possible?

This is no time to quit. That is a prescription for defeat and disaster. I believe that the American people are determined to win this struggle—and to win it by achieving a stable peace in which we and others can live in freedom.

In closing I should like to address a very informal word to each one of you, perhaps as though we were sitting in your living room in a private talk. And I hope that our friends from other countries who may be here this evening will forgive me the presumption of just a little family talk among us Americans.

Lord Acton once spoke about power and the corruption that goes with power. I dare say that Lord Acton now has to be reviewed—perhaps revisited—because the American people came out of World War II with power beyond imagination. Was it corrupted for the selfish and national purposes of the American people themselves? I don't think so. I think that power was committed to the decent purposes of all mankind.

Now, this is what makes our greatest strength: what you as individuals think in your heart about what is worth doing and worth living for. And this is what gives us our contact with ordinary men and women in every country right around the globe. You are a part of that great story of freedom which continues to be written, which has been in the telling for 2,000 years, and which is not going to be sidetracked by the imaginings of a man in an attic in London in the middle of the 19th century, writing something called the *Communist Manifesto*.

So I would just suggest in closing that we keep our eyes lifted and chart our course by the light of the distant stars, and not be set off our course by the lights of each passing ship.

You know what this country is all about, and you know the respect and the confidence which other people have in what this country is all about. There is no one on either side of any curtain who has the slightest idea that the American people are trying to take away from them something that belongs to them.

In moments of crisis, as in Korea or the missiles in Cuba, or a moment of tragedy through which we have lived in the last few weeks, this basic unity of the human race, of which we are

a part, manifests itself. And we know it, regardless of who are called allies and who are called unaligned. We know that the words written into the Charter of the United Nations do indeed, as declared by the Senate almost unanimously, represent the foreign policy of the American people and the foreign policy of the ordinary men and women of the rest of the world as well. There is the source of our strength; there is the nature of our hope.

And so, let's don't quit. Let's get on with this job—because history tells us that men will be free; and that is our commitment.

President Johnson Receives Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions

President Johnson received the chiefs of diplomatic missions at the White House on December 13. Following are texts of the President's remarks and a reply made by Ambassador Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa, dean of the diplomatic corps.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated December 13

As you know, the President of the United States bears, under our Constitution, a direct and immediate responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. I speak to you, therefore, as a working colleague.

We live at a time when foreign affairs go beyond their traditional scope; they now have strong new ties with the domestic life of each of our countries. These new ties come:

—from modern communications which bring instantly to the homes of citizens in every country events from round the world;

—from modern weapons which can make the threat of war anywhere a life-and-death issue for every nation;

—and from the fact that we are all engaged in vast historical changes which are reshaping the political life of the planet.

I have in mind the change from the colonial

era to an era when scores of new, free nations claim new responsibilities on the world scene;

The change from traditional ways to modern societies which can bring to their peoples all the advantages of modern science and technology;

The change in Western Europe, Japan, and elsewhere from a heavy postwar dependence upon the United States to one of partnership in the great affairs of the planet—a role which their traditions and history demand and their resources permit;

And a change, we hope, from dangerous cold war to a more stable and peaceful world.

None of these changes is automatic. All will take time. All can be upset. All can bring threats to the peace.

None will succeed if we do not accept the fact of our profound interdependence—an interdependence made tragically and humanly real to us all by the death of President Kennedy.

And right here I want to tell you all, on behalf of the American people, how deeply touched we have been by the flood of expressions of sympathy which have poured in on us—from Kings and Presidents, from Parliaments and citizens everywhere.

It is clear that President Kennedy, by his work and acts, became a symbol of hope and a promise of progress for freedom, peace, and a better life for all. As we face the day-to-day tasks before us, this outpouring of sympathy will be a challenge to renewed dedication.

All of us have parts to play to make these great historical changes take place in a setting of peace:

We must talk to one another with candor;

We must try to understand what the other man's problems are—and communicate that understanding to each other with integrity;

We must be alert to points of danger, but equally alert for points of common interest;

In great matters and small we must move forward together. There is no other way for us all, on this small planet.

So I am delighted to greet you all, as messengers of understanding, and to tell you that we in this country will go our full share of the way toward peace, good will, and progress.

REPLY BY AMBASSADOR SEVILLA-SACASA

White House press release dated December 13

On behalf of the chiefs of the diplomatic missions, it is an honor and a privilege for me to tell you how pleased we were to receive your kind invitation to meet here this afternoon. We are deeply grateful for your hospitality. We are honored by your cordial welcome, and our duties are enhanced by the fact that you refer to yourself as our colleague.

In allying your own work with ours, you not only exemplify modern statesmanship but you also make evident your high ideals and the excellent capabilities you possess, thus justifying the high concept in which you are held in your country and all over the world.

The position that you take gratifies us, because we know that fellowship gives rise to the most satisfactory relations and that through this fellowship we shall be able to reach our common goals.

Indeed, history has changed the nature of foreign relations, and they are now an integral part of the domestic life of our countries. That you yourself have noted this change is to your credit. We understand the way in which diplomacy has evolved over centuries; and the principles of international peace and harmony are based on that understanding. Modern diplomacy does not deprive the diplomat of his personal heritage as a man of integrity. The newness of yesteryear has now been replaced by good faith and gentlemanly behavior. The diplomat knows that the essential object of his ministry is to cultivate harmony between nations, to conciliate their opposing interests, to prevent conflicts, and to work for the security of universal freedom and peace.

In the past, diplomatic law was based on the concept of divine right; today it is based on the principle of the sovereignty of the people. The modern diplomat must facilitate international relations and, without neglecting the interests of his own country, contribute to the progress of humanity.

The old-fashioned diplomat was perhaps a fawning courtier; present-day circumstances and the evolution of diplomacy require that the modern diplomat be an honorable person who

represents the culture of the state that accredits him abroad.

I am sure that the nations here represented share the ideal that you expressed in your warm message this historic afternoon. Just as we shall be alert to dangerous situations, we shall join you in the aim to bring about understanding of the problems of our people. We commend you for the significance of your message. We applaud the clear meaning of your reasoning. Time will surely confirm it. Your words are sure to have the support of the people who love peace and venerate freedom.

This meeting, taking place under the same roof that sheltered the noble figure of President Kennedy, is, even in this atmosphere of sorrow and mourning caused by his departure, an important occasion, because it sets the guidelines for an enduring venture.

In thanking you once again for your invitation, we extend our heartfelt wishes for your personal happiness and that of your worthy spouse, Mrs. Johnson, your faithful companion, who loyally shares your generous endeavors; for the well-being of your children, who are your pride and joy; sincere wishes, Mr. President, for the increasing prosperity of your great country, for the continued success of your illustrious Government, and that your good intentions may always find an echo in the farthest reaches of the world.

U.S. Recognizes Dominican and Honduran Governments

Department Statement

Press release 625 dated December 14

The United States on December 14 recognized the Governments of the Dominican Republic and Honduras, after consultation with other hemisphere governments.

Both the Honduran and the Dominican regimes have issued decrees setting forth election timetables for return to representative and constitutional governments. Both regimes have given public assurances of respect for civil liberties, freedom of action for political parties, and that international obligations will be fulfilled.

In Honduras a decree law was issued November 22 creating an electoral commission representing major parties and civic sectors. It calls for preparation of a new electoral law by March 1, 1964, and revision of voter registrations by January 1, 1965. A constituent assembly election will be held February 16, 1965, and the assembly will be installed on March 16, 1965, at which time the supreme power of the government passes to the assembly. The electoral commission was sworn in on December 2 and has held several meetings.

In the Dominican Republic, a decree law was issued on November 26 setting forth a schedule for five elections, the first to be held between September 1 and November 30 next year for minor local officials and to serve also as a voter census. Municipal elections will follow on January 15, 1965, a constituent assembly election on March 1, 1965, and congressional elections on June 24, 1965. Presidential elections are scheduled for July 15, 1965, and the elected government will assume office on August 16, 1965.

A new Central Electoral Board was established November 8 to preside over the electoral process. On December 6 a decree was issued requiring legally recognized parties to submit draft constitutions at least 90 days before the constitutional assembly elections are held in order to qualify for participating in these elections.

Assistance Offered to Bolivia in Effort To Free U.S. Officials

White House Statement

White House press release dated December 8

The President, immediately upon his return from New York, discussed with Secretary of State Rusk the indefensible seizure of four United States officials in Catavi-Siglo Veinte, Bolivia. They were seized along with the local management of the mines there, which included a Dutch and a German engineer, by local miners enraged by the arrest by the Bolivian Government of three of their leaders on criminal charges.

The United States officials had received assurances for their safety from the mining company

and a union leader before departing on the kind of humanitarian mission United States citizens are engaged in around the globe.

The President has been assured through our Ambassador in Bolivia [Douglas Henderson] by the President of Bolivia [Victor Paz Estenssoro] that every effort is being made to secure the prompt release of these United States officials who have in no way been involved in the dispute between the Government of Bolivia and certain mine union leaders. In line with his determination to protect United States citizens everywhere, President Johnson has offered full assistance to President Paz in his action on behalf of United States and other foreign citizens.

NATO Announces 1964-65 Research Fellowships

Press release 616 dated December 11

NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has announced the offering of a number of fellowships in the humanities and social sciences for the academic year 1964-65. These will be granted to scholars of established reputation who are citizens of NATO countries. They cover periods of from 2 to 4 months and, in special cases, are sometimes extended to 6 months.

The purpose of the NATO research fellowships is to promote study and research leading to publication on various aspects of the common interests, traditions, and outlook of the North Atlantic alliance in order to explore the history, present status, and future development of the Atlantic community and the problems which confront it.

Each NATO fellow will be awarded a grant of 2,300 new French francs per month, or the equivalent, plus travel expenses. The relevant research must be undertaken in one or more of the NATO countries.

Application forms are available in the United States from the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, 2101 Constitution Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. Applications for the 1964-65 academic year must be received by the NATO secretariat in Paris by January 15, 1964.

President Johnson and Secretary Rusk Urge Full Appropriations for Foreign Aid

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, DECEMBER 14

White House press release dated December 14

The drastic reduction in foreign aid funds proposed in the House, if sustained, would be a severe setback to American leadership and to U.S. interests in many parts of the world. The \$2.8 billion recommended to the House is \$1.7 billion below the figure requested by President Kennedy.

The proposed reductions in foreign aid funds would put our foreign policy in a straitjacket. For example:

The amount proposed for the Alliance for Progress would be sharply less than was appropriated last year. This would represent a failure on our part to carry out the undertakings of President Eisenhower in the Act of Bogotá and of President Kennedy in the Charter of Punta del Este. It would mean that the United States would be providing for all of Latin America less than the Soviet Union is putting into Cuba alone. This is no way to combat communism in Latin America!

The amount proposed for contributions to international organizations would mean that the U.S. could not keep its commitments and pledges. This is a startling proposal. It would undercut our efforts in the United Nations to ensure that the Soviet Union and other reluctant nations live up to their pledges to the United Nations.

The amount proposed for development loans would not even be enough to meet clear existing program commitments to five countries whose

independence and progress is vital to the success of freedom in Asia and Africa—India, Pakistan, Turkey, Nigeria, and Tunisia—to say nothing of the other countries in Asia and Africa that we plan to assist.

The amount proposed for supporting economic assistance would not suffice to cover program plans and commitments in several of the countries where U.S. political and security interests are most seriously threatened—including Viet-Nam, Laos, Korea, Jordan, and the Congo.

The amount proposed for the technical assistance programs, under which the U.S. conducts people-to-people assistance in less developed countries, would be severely restricted.

I cannot believe that the Congress intends to require the United States of America to follow policies of weakness and retreat.

I urge the Congress, therefore, to appropriate the funds essential to conduct strong and forward-looking foreign assistance programs in the U.S. national interest.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK, DECEMBER 12¹

I welcome this opportunity of appearing before you to discuss the funding requests for the foreign assistance program during the current fiscal year.

This committee has been dealing with the aid program for many years. You have been gen-

¹ Made before the Senate Appropriations Committee.

erous in your support and frank in your advice. The experienced judgment of the committee has been and will continue to be of great assistance to us in making the program more effective.

The bill before you is one of the last to be considered in the current session but is certainly one of the most important. For, as the members of the committee well know, foreign aid is a basic instrument of national policy.

Our goal is simple, and bears repeating: to give assistance and encouragement to nations so that they can grow in independence and freedom. We seek no satellites; we seek no domination; nor are we trying to buy friends. In other words, America is working to make the world safe for freedom. For as all people grow in freedom and independence, so the security of the U.S. is strengthened. And as others grow in economic strength, so the U.S. will continue to prosper.

Foreign aid can only do a small part of the job. American free enterprise must bear a heavier burden of investment in the underdeveloped world; our prospering allies must do more; and most of all, the recipient nations themselves must do their share—in terms of reform and reinvestment in their own economies.

But without the infusion of knowledge and needed foreign exchange provided by the U.S. aid program—without the extra encouragement and lift provided by American skills, personnel, and dollars—these efforts would not be successful. Just as this country needed an infusion of capital from abroad during the early period of industrial growth, so do others.

Our aid program is not large in terms of the overall effort, but it can make the vital difference. The appropriation request now before you—a total of \$3.6 billion—is one-fifteenth of what we spend on military preparedness and only three-fifths of 1 percent of our gross national product.

We often hear talk about what we are doing to future generations of Americans, about the burdens being placed on our grandchildren. I would certainly not want mine to grow up in a world where the richest nation—having nearly half the world's wealth—ignored for decades the needs of the two-thirds of the people who lived in poverty, disease, and hunger. It would

surely not be a very safe or stable world. And even more, it would not be a great heritage or tradition to pass on. As President Kennedy said earlier this year:²

The United States—the richest and most powerful of all peoples, a nation committed to the independence of nations and to a better life for all peoples—can no more stand aside in this climactic age of decision than we can withdraw from the community of free nations.

Aims of U.S. Aid Policy

The recent debate in the Senate, however, underscored the need for clarification of the aims of U.S. aid policy and the need for a reemphasis of the role of aid in promoting U.S. interests.

I have touched on the aim of our policy—the growth of independence and freedom. This is the common core of our assistance program—from the emergency grants for disaster relief, through military assistance to resist internal subversion, to long-term development loans which promote economic growth.

Perhaps some of the confusion has occurred because we use a variety of types of aid—to achieve the common aim. But as Mr. Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development] and the regional witnesses have shown, aid fits into a carefully planned pattern, based on a study of each country and an analysis of U.S. interests. The kind of assistance extended is designed to meet the needs of the recipient nation—and the United States. This last factor—U.S. interest—cannot be overemphasized.

Let me assure this committee that the aid program of the 1960's—as it was in the 1940's and 1950's—is planned and administered to serve the aims of the United States. It is a prime instrument of U.S. foreign policy and helps to carry out that policy. And let us make no mistake—U.S. foreign policy and U.S. security would be in great jeopardy without the aid program.

In the 1940's the major role of U.S. assistance was in healing the scars of war.

In the 1950's the prime purpose of our aid was to check Communist aggression.

In the 1960's it is designed to provide long-

² BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.

term economic assistance to developing nations—in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Earlier this week Administrator Bell and representatives from AID and the State Department outlined some of the major features of our present foreign assistance program: the high degree of concentration, which means that 80 percent of our assistance goes to 20 countries; the high degree of selectivity, which assures that the major programs are directed to those countries where U.S. interests will best be served and where U.S. funds will have the greatest impact; the improved planning process, which assures that each project is part of an overall, well-conceived strategy; the increased emphasis on efforts in the private sector, so vital to the economic growth of the developing nation; and our continuing and increasingly successful work in stepping up the contributions of our prosperous allies.

From my personal knowledge of the program and my close association with Mr. Bell, I can assure the committee of the high quality of the job that is being done. The year since he took command—in one of the most difficult jobs in Washington—has seen a reemphasis of the principles of good management, tight budget control, and prudent use of the taxpayer's dollar. The changes and reforms which he has instituted will result in a better program. This is already apparent, and these efforts will come to full fruition in the fiscal year 1965 program.

I should like to comment further on three aspects—the efforts of our allies, our support of multilateral efforts, and this year's aid program in the context of American foreign policy.

The Efforts of Allies

First, the efforts of our allies. A major drive is now under way, in bilateral discussions and through multilateral organizations such as the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], to increase the contributions of the prosperous nations of the free world to our common responsibility to the underdeveloped world.

These efforts have met with good initial response. We still have a long way to go. Most of the prospering nations of the free world still

do not lend on terms comparable to ours, nor have they made comparable proportions of their gross national product available. Among recent important actions have been a 50-percent increase in the size of the Canadian assistance program and the issuance of the British white paper on aid. The latter is particularly significant, for it means that one of the world's major donors will make assistance available on terms closer to our own. Other countries have been extending credit on easier terms. We will make every effort to see that these efforts continue.

Multilateral Efforts

Second, our multilateral efforts. We are making increasing use of multilateral organizations and agreements as channels for our foreign assistance. This committee has already heard requests for our contributions to the International Development Association, a subsidiary of the World Bank, and is well aware of our participation in similar international groups. The bill now before you contains \$136 million for our annual contributions to the specialized agencies of the United Nations and \$180 million for a replenishment of the Social Progress Trust Fund for Latin America. In addition, a major portion of our development lending—that for India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Nigeria—will be made available as our contribution to an international consortium arrangement, providing multilateral assistance to these nations.

We will continue to make use of such multilateral mechanisms as a means of assuring greater participation by and coordination with our allies.

Aid and American Foreign Policy

Third, the aid program in relation to U.S. foreign policy.

Perhaps the best way to examine the role of foreign assistance in U.S. policy is to go down the list of appropriation requests before the committee.

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara has already ably dealt with the role of our military assistance program. I can only add my strong support for appropriation of the full \$1 billion for MAP. As the Secretary in-

licated, if he had had his choice he would have taken the reduction in the regular defense budget rather than in military assistance.

Development Loans

The major funding request for fiscal year 1964 is \$925 million for development loans. This request, along with the Alliance for Progress loans, constitutes more than 50 percent of the economic aid program in the present fiscal year.

These figures underscore what we are doing. In short, nearly two-thirds of the new appropriations will be used as loans, repayable in dollars, to nations which are in need and are willing to help themselves.

Our policy is clear: to assist the developing nations to achieve self-sustaining economic growth—growth that will assure their strength and independence. We are providing this assistance in a way that will do just that and will encourage fiscal responsibility while discouraging continued dependence on U.S. resources, for as gross national product climbs—as in the case of Taiwan, Israel, Venezuela, Iran, Mexico, Thailand, and Greece—so our loan terms harden. Loans are tied to reforms. For example, in Chile we are extending assistance step by step on the fulfillment of a promise to balance the budget; in Brazil we are withholding substantial assistance for a failure to stop the inflationary spiral.

There is no more important task facing the United States in the world today that assures that the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America can look to the future with hope. For without hope—without tangible evidence that there can be a better life—they will turn in their frustration to the seemingly quick totalitarian route.

Our aid program and the programs of other free nations offer an alternative. The most effective weapon in support of this policy of providing hope and assuring independence and diversity is our development loan funds. They provide a vital infusion of capital at a time when a relatively small sum of money—in most cases it is 1 to 3 percent of the gross national product of the recipient nation—can make the difference between growth or stagnation. This

is what happened in Western Europe and Japan. This is what is beginning to happen in the underdeveloped world.

I should like to add a word here about the charge that, no matter how much money we spend, there is no hope, the problems are insoluble, and it will wreck us.

There are two observations that might be made.

First let me quote a few statements made in the Congress:

"It is the road to bankruptcy, and not a very long road at that."

"If I believed the expenditure of this amount of money would stop the spread of communism, I would support it. . . . But in the light of history, in the light of facts, how can anyone rise on this floor and say it will stop communism . . . ?"

These were made in 1948 during the Marshall Plan debate.

Second, let us recall some of our own history.

How much wisdom and foresight would we now attribute to a British investor in 1870 who put his money into the United States, as many of them did, and said, "I'll give them 5 or 10 years to become an industrial nation or I'll get out"? And what of the foresight of the investor, viewing the great losses of some of his colleagues who put money into U.S. canals just before the railroad era, who said, "Those people don't know how to run an economy; I'm not putting any more money into a disorganized country like the U.S."?

But the Marshall Plan succeeded, and we succeeded—in time and in spite of our mistakes. It might be well in viewing the progress of other nations—many of which lack the resources, the trained manpower, and the domestic tranquillity of 19th-century America—to remember some of our own history.

Development Grants and Technical Assistance

The second appropriation request for fiscal year 1964 is \$220 million for development grants and technical assistance. These funds serve the same policy ends as our loans. But the program, almost exclusively in the form of technical assistance, has its greatest impact at the predevelopment stage. This assistance—tech-

ical assistance—is given to countries or sectors within a country which have not reached the stage of development where capital loans are needed. These are countries and situations where the prime need is for development of human resources—better skills, education, improved health conditions.

In my travels throughout the world I have seen no expenditures of U.S. funds which bring greater results—in terms of influence and good will, as well as a better life for millions of people. The mobile health units, the educational programs, and the agricultural specialists are doing a job of which all Americans can be proud.

Through the prudent use of technical assistance, development can be accelerated. This is "primer money," so to speak. Its results may wait the graduation of a class of students, or the harvests of a more skilled and healthy people in a mountain province. But the results are no less real, and the contribution to reaching U.S. policy goals no less important.

The Alliance for Progress

The third major appropriation category is the Alliance for Progress, for which we are requesting a total of \$525 million. Of this sum, \$400 million may be made available in grants. In addition we are requesting \$180 million for replenishment of the Social Progress Trust Fund, an integral part of the alliance, to be administered by the Inter-American Development Bank. With the combination of tools—loans and grants—we will embark upon the third year of the historic joint effort at development among all the peoples of the Americas.

Members of this committee and the Congress were among the first to recognize the importance of Latin America and the need to provide the skills and capital to assure the growth and independence of this crucial area. I have already described the role of development loans and grants. Under the alliance our funds serve the same purpose. The Alliance for Progress loans and grants play a key role in implementing U.S. policy, which is to assure that the Western Hemisphere is free from outside domination and that its people have the chance for a better way of life. Without the alliance—and

the joint efforts of the North and South Americans—the future would indeed be dim.

To be sure, we have had setbacks. But in the past few months we have established a means of assuring greater participation by the Latin Americans in the planning process; we have seen the success of the democratic process in Peru and Venezuela, and we have seen further progress toward Central American economic integration.

When the alliance was announced, we pledged long-term support; we saw that it would take many years. We have taken only a few steps down the road; this is no time to turn back. Full support and appropriations both for the alliance and the Trust Fund are needed during the current fiscal year.

Supporting Assistance

The fourth major funding request is \$380 million for supporting assistance.

The highly concentrated supporting assistance program serves short- and long-term policy aims. For the short term we are providing emergency support to meet the imminent threat of Sino-Soviet penetration or to stave off economic chaos on which communism would feed. Supporting assistance will largely be provided to a few key nations on the borders of the Communist bloc—Korea, Viet-Nam, Laos, and to Jordan, the Congo, and Bolivia. If we do not provide support, these nations would soon be subverted or overrun, with severe repercussions for our own security. Two examples are Viet-Nam or Thailand—vital to our position in Southeast Asia.

Wherever possible this type of assistance is phased down and out. Since 1961 our requests have been cut by more than half; the number of countries receiving this type of aid has also been cut by more than half. Whenever possible, countries are moved from supporting to development status. Perhaps the most notable example is Taiwan, where our short- and long-term policy aims have been achieved. Free China, once a major recipient of support funds, no longer receives any, and, as a result of our development loan program, it has achieved remarkable economic growth.

We will continue our efforts to reduce sup-

porting assistance wherever possible. But full funding for supporting assistance is needed during the current fiscal year, for its emergency role is vital to U.S. policy.

Contingency Fund

A further source of emergency funds is the fifth appropriation category, the contingency fund.

The original request of \$300 million has been cut nearly in half, to \$160 million.

We cannot predict exactly where or how much of this money will be used. But we can predict that some or all will be needed in the months ahead. And in these months, when crises can flare up at any point, it is essential that the President have the ability and the resources to move swiftly. The contingency fund provides both the flexibility and the funds.

There is no more important instrument of policy, and I can assure this committee that the fund will only be used where necessary to protect U.S. security.

I should also like to express my strong support for full appropriations in the remaining categories:

- \$131 million for international organizations;
- \$19 million for American schools and hospitals abroad;
- \$54 million for AID administration;
- \$3 million for State administration.

Secretary Cleveland [Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State] has stated the need for meeting in full our commitments to the variety of United Nations agencies which we strongly support. I add my own endorsement of what he has said.

Witnesses from the Agency for International Development and the Department of State have discussed administration expenses. I should only like to emphasize that administrative requests represent a small percentage of the total. But as this committee so well recognized in its recent report,³ there is no more vital element to a successful aid program than efficiency in per-

³ Personnel Administration and Operations of the Agency for International Development. Report of Senator Gale W. McGee to the Committee on Appropriations. Nov. 29, 1963. [Committee print.]

sonnel and management. Full appropriation of these funds will enable the executive branch to carry out the program in the manner directed by the Congress, and to continue to institute necessary changes and reforms.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to conclude by thanking this committee for its continued support of the foreign assistance program and for its recognition of the sober fact that this will be a long struggle.

There are no easy answers; the foreign aid program certainly will not solve all our problems. But it does play a vital role. Without foreign assistance, the field would be left to our adversaries, not only the 20th-century communism but the age-old enemies of man—ignorance, disease, and poverty.

We are beginning to see results. Victories are being won.

This is a time to continue.

As President Kennedy said in his message to the Congress in April:⁴

"... it is not the eloquence of our slogans, but the quality of our endurance, which will determine whether this generation of Americans deserves the leadership which history has thrust upon us."

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Authorizing the President To Proclaim Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Report to accompany H.R. 6012. S. Rept. 477. August 30, 1963. 12 pp.

Invitation To Hold the 1968 Olympic Games in the United States. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 72. H. Rept. 720. August 30, 1963. 3 pp.

One-Year Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program. Report, together with minority views, to accompany H.R. 8195. H. Rept. 722. September 6, 1963. 34 pp.

Violation of Foreign Travel Restrictions (Sec. 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act; 8 U.S.C. 1185). Hearing before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Serial No. 5. September 9, 1963. 42 pp.

The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination. A study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations to the Senate Committee on Government Operations. S. Doc. 36. September 13, 1963. 162 pp.

Prohibition of Foreign Fishing Vessels Within the Territorial Waters of the United States. Report to accompany S. 1988. S. Rept. 500. September 13, 1963. 13 pp.

⁴ BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.

U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Cooperation in Outer Space; U.S. Reaffirms Offer To Work With Soviet Union on Manned Lunar Landing

Following is a statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) on December 2 by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, together with texts of resolutions adopted in plenary session on December 13.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

U.S. delegation press release 4323

In a world kept taut by constant danger, in an organization often kept busy by dispute, it is heartening at any time to be able to speak of progress—any progress—toward freedom, or peace, or law, or international cooperation in any field of human endeavor. I take great satisfaction, therefore, in coming before you today to comment upon our progress toward freedom, peace, law, and cooperation in the field of outer space.

Common sense and harsh experience combine to teach us not to predict tomorrow by extrapolating from today—especially if today is one of those days on which some progress has been made toward a safer and saner world. Instead we have seen enough of disappointment to half suspect that today's zig automatically will be offset by tomorrow's zag. But I cannot suppress altogether the tempting notion that perhaps the habit of international cooperation may catch on first in remote outer space and then fall, contagiously, back to earth.

In any event we can draw some comfort from the historical analogy between this great age of discovery, symbolized by the pioneer astronauts

Gagarin and Glenn, and that earlier great age of discovery, symbolized by Ericsson and Columbus. In those long gone days the rulers of Europe failed to match the geographic vision of Columbus with a corresponding vision of law and statecraft. Within 2 short years after the New World had been discovered, the two great nautical powers agreed to divide the spoils. On June 7, 1494, ambassadors from Spain and Portugal met in the small town of Tordesillas in Spain and signed an agreement carving up the New World between them.

What followed is well known: nationalist competition and imperialist wars. So for centuries a voyage of exploration and discovery was a voyage of conquest and expansion.

This is only Year Seven of the Age of Space, and we have only one foot over the threshold of this new age of discovery. Yet already the members of this organization—not by secret agreement reached behind closed doors but by public debate on a floodlit stage—have agreed that the two leading space powers of today's world will never carve up the moon between them, nor will they or any nation make any sovereign claim in outer space or on any celestial body. Discovery is no longer the prelude to conquest.

Mr. Chairman, we often warn—and with good reason—that the pace of scientific invention may so outstrip social invention that the world's affairs will race out of control and leave us in chaos behind. But it may be worth noting that it took man tens of thousands of years to figure out how to escape his earthly environment; and in the half dozen years following there has been

enough social invention to sustain the hope that outer space will not be chaotic.

That hope is based on the progress that has been made so far toward freedom, peace, law, and cooperation in outer space, which, if pursued, could make this the first age of exploration not in the name of national glory but in the name of man himself. I therefore propose, Mr. Chairman, to review briefly this march of social invention which suggests that we may not, after all, be lagging disastrously behind the pace of technological advance, at least in outer space.

Limiting the Arms Race in Outer Space

The essential freedoms of outer space are set forth in General Assembly Resolution 1721¹ approved nearly 2 years ago. That resolution asserts that outer space and celestial bodies are free from national appropriation. It asserts that all nations are free to explore and to use outer space. This is the doctrine of freedom in outer space unanimously proclaimed by the members of this Assembly.

In addition to the freedoms embodied in General Assembly Resolution 1721 two important steps have recently been taken to limit the arms race in outer space. One was the treaty signed by over a hundred nations prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, in the atmosphere, and under water.² This is a significant step toward a regime of peace in outer space. The other was the step taken by this Assembly on October 17, when the members by acclamation welcomed the expressions by the United States and the Soviet Union of their intention not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction and solemnly called upon all states to refrain from stationing such weapons in outer space.³

Observance of this resolution and of the partial test ban by all nations will do more than limit the arms race in outer space. It should help to create the confidence needed here on earth for greater progress in disarmament and cooperation in all areas.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

³ For text of Resolution 1884 (XVIII), see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.

Need for an International Legal Order

The structure for this cooperation, and for the activities of all nations in space, must be an international legal order. This need becomes more imperative as the number of nations active in space increases and as the range of their activities grows.

This growth of custom and usage must be present to provide the basis of sound law. Resolution 1721 made a beginning when it declared that freedom to explore and use outer space means freedom to do so "in conformity with international law. . . ." And more specifically, "international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies."

This general proposition was not enough. In the same resolution the General Assembly asked the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to study legal problems arising out of the exploration of space. So the Committee established a Legal Subcommittee to begin to put flesh on the bones of outer space law.

From an early stage members of the Committee realized that any attempts at a comprehensive codification of legal rules for outer space would be premature. The world's experience in the exploration of outer space has been entirely too brief. In conformity with this experience the Committee finally agreed to try simultaneously to elaborate basic legal principles and to draw up rules for handling two specific legal problems which already pressed for solution: liability for outer space vehicle accidents and assistance to, and return of, astronauts and their vehicles which might come down on the territory of another state.⁴

After almost 2 years a part of this work has now borne fruit. We have before us a draft declaration of legal principles⁵ which the Outer Space Committee has unanimously decided to submit to the General Assembly. It is the out-

⁴ For an address by the Legal Adviser, Abram Chayes, on "International Organization and Space Law," see *ibid.*, May 27, 1963, p. 835; for a statement made before the Legal Subcommittee on May 3 by U.S. Representative Leonard C. Meeker, see *ibid.*, June 10, 1963, p. 923; for an address by Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard N. Gardner on "Outer Space: Problems of Law and Power," see *ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1963, p. 367.

⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L. 331 and Corr. 1.

me of a long process of international debate and international consultation, of numerous drafts, of clarifications, compromises, and modifications. This fall, at the request of the Outer Space Committee, these consultations were intensified in order to produce a text which could be generally agreed and supported.

I should like to say a few words about the character and status which the United States considers the principles contained in this declaration will have, once the draft resolution has been adopted by the General Assembly, as we hope, without any dissent. In the view of the United States the operative paragraphs of the resolution contain legal principles which the General Assembly, in adopting the resolution, should declare should guide states in the exploration and use of outer space. We believe these legal principles reflect international law as it is accepted by the members of the United Nations. The United States, for its part, intends to respect these principles. We hope that the content which the resolution commends to nations for the exploration of outer space will become the practice of all nations.

In adopting the resolution now before us the General Assembly will be only beginning its work on the development of law for outer space. The declaration is not the last word; it is one of the first. In the future, as experience accumulates, the United Nations may want to formulate additional principles.

In addition—and we believe there is wide agreement on this—the Outer Space Committee should now give first priority to the task of preparing international agreements on the subjects of (1) liability for space vehicle accidents and (2) assistance to, and return of, astronauts and space vehicles. We believe that the General Assembly should ask the Outer Space Committee to arrange its work program accordingly.

Moreover, the General Assembly will want to provide for a continuing study of the whole field of outer space law as the activities of states develop in this new environment. We believe the Outer Space Committee and its Legal Subcommittee should continue to survey the whole field of outer space exploration from the legal point of view so that the United Nations may make an informed and effective contribution in building a new international legal order for outer space.

Cooperative Arrangements for Space Research

Freedom, peace, and law—these are the goals of the Assembly in space. But the Assembly and the United Nations have yet a fourth significant goal—international cooperation.

Such cooperation begins with direct cooperation among nations. It has been the consistent policy of my Government, from the beginning of the Age of Space, to extend our hand in cooperation, to share knowledge with other nations, and to obtain, in return, the benefits of common enterprise—much needed help and the good will of involvement in common tasks.

As President Johnson stated as early as January 7, 1958, when he was a Senator of the United States:⁶

The goals now within reach of the human race are too great to be divided as spoils, too great for the world to waste its effort in a blind race between competitive nations.

Cooperative arrangements—both bilateral and multilateral—with other nations now cover virtually the entire range of the United States research and application for peaceful development of outer space.

Our Weather Bureau and space agency have participated in the coordinated acquisition of satellite and ground-based weather data with 40 other national weather services.

Through our International Ground Station Committee, 11 other nations are cooperating in experimental space communications and gaining experience in reading out signals from communication satellites.

We have sounding rocket agreements with 12 other nations and cooperative arrangements with 26 other nations in ionospheric research.

We have participated in establishing 27 overseas facilities in 19 different jurisdictions, including tracking stations, deep space instrumentation facilities, and a manned space flight network.

We have also gained valuable experience in cooperative space launchings. The Alouette satellite is the tangible fruit of our continuing cooperation with Canada. The Ariel satellite

⁶ Statement made before a meeting of the Democratic Conference, summarizing the findings of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, of which Senator Johnson was chairman.

is the first step in a continuing joint venture with Great Britain. In the near future we plan to join Italy and France in the placing of other scientific satellites into orbit.

All in all, more than 60 countries have worked cooperatively with the United States in actual flight experiments, in ground-based activities in direct support of orbiting experiments, or in cooperative training programs.

Based upon this wide and mutually fruitful experience in bilateral cooperation, the United States entered into a cooperative agreement with the Soviet Union. On August 16 the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences announced the approval of a first Memorandum of Understanding to carry out this agreement.⁷ Cooperation in three fields is envisaged.

First, the United States and the Soviet Union will exchange data gathered by national experimental weather satellites and will coordinate launchings of their respective weather vehicles in space. The data coming in from these satellites will be open to all nations and will reinforce the projected World Weather Watch being developed under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization.

Second, we will exchange data from satellites equipped with magnetometers, as part of the World Magnetic Survey.

Third, we will perform joint experiments in space communications with passive United States satellites.

This is at least a start, and we hope it is a prophetic one. My Government is ready to get on with this program at any time, and we hope that we may soon begin its implementation.

Cooperation Within World Scientific Community

Mr. Chairman, bilateral cooperation in outer space and cooperation at the United Nations level and multilaterally through organizations of the world's scientific community are mutually reinforcing; and one tends to lead to the other. Experience gained in cooperating on a narrow base tends to lead to cooperation on a broader base.

⁷ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 9, 1963, p. 405.

Through the International Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions, 24 nations share scientific research on space. COSPAR has sought with a large measure of success to extend in the space science field the remarkable cooperation that characterized the International Geophysical Year, which, among its other accomplishments, ushered in the Age of Space.

COSPAR's World Data Centers for Rockets and Satellites, maintained at Washington, Moscow, and Slough, England, are the world's major repositories for analyzed data on outer space.

COSPAR has pioneered in maintaining a registry of satellite launchings and has sponsored Spacewarn, a system in which launching nations communicate around the world essential information within a few hours after the successful firing of a scientific satellite or space probe.

The United States scientific community takes a fully active part in these and other important functions of COSPAR.

We also intend to take an active role in the International Year of the Quiet Sun, an important successor to the IGY, under the auspices of the International Council of Scientific Unions—an effort in which some 60 nations will take part.

These cooperative arrangements within the world scientific community are a healthy phenomenon. They are indicative of a community of interest which transcends national boundaries and binds men and nations together.

In the world as a whole this community of interests is perhaps epitomized by the United Nations. Already the United Nations and its family of agencies are deeply involved in the exciting potentials of outer space to focus cooperation and help make possible the centralization of vital information.

The Secretary-General now maintains a registry of information on space launchings, in which the United States, for its part, has registered all its launchings from mid-February 1962.

The Secretary-General has now built up an expert outer space staff to assist him in this important field, a development warmly welcomed by the United States. We hope, in im-

plementing the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, that this staff might draw up constructive proposals to define further the scope of the Committee's recommendations and its future program.

The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, working with the Secretary-General, is already collecting, and will soon be publishing, information on national and cooperative programs and on the resources of the United Nations, specialized agencies, and other international bodies related to the peaceful uses of outer space; it is preparing reviews of training and educational opportunities; it is preparing a list of available bibliographic and abstracting services covering the scientific and technical results and publications in space and space-related areas; and the United Nations, as such, is also considering endorsement of specific activities and facilities which offer unusual opportunities for broad international participation—this year the rocket launching station at Thumba, India.

These and other activities are being carried on directly by the United Nations Space Committee in cooperation with the Secretary-General, and I am proud to note in passing that my Government was one of the original founders of this Committee and has worked actively to help establish its program on a sound basis.

Indeed it was President Johnson himself who, as a Member of the Senate, came before this committee of the General Assembly in this very room on November 17, 1958, to speak in support of the resolution creating the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. At that time President Johnson stated:⁸

To keep space as man has found it and to harvest the yield of peace which it promises, we of the United States see one course—and only one—which the nations of earth may intelligently pursue. That is the course of full and complete and immediate cooperation to make the exploration of outer space a joint adventure.

Beyond the activities of the U.N. Space Committee, some of the technical agencies are becoming deeply involved in the space venture, and it is here that we see why, in some instances, international organization and international cooperation are not only desirable but a plain

necessity. The most obvious instance of necessity is the problem of allocating radio frequencies to meet the needs for communication, weather, and navigational satellites; for space research; for radio astronomy; and for other uses.

The only alternative to international agreement is chaos in outer space communication. We therefore applaud the recently completed work of the space radio conference of the International Telecommunication Union, which provided sufficient allocation of frequency bands for space communication for the next 10 or 15 years and which adopted procedures relating to the use of these allocations.⁹ This, as I say, was a plain necessity.

Weather Reporting and Forecasting

There also is compelling reason for international organization and cooperation in weather reporting and forecasting. The atmosphere envelops the globe—not just a single state; so no nation can achieve weather forecasting adequate to its needs from observations made solely within its territory.

As matters stand, inadequate or inaccurate prediction of storms, rainfall, floods, and drought cost the people of the world each year the loss of human life and billions of dollars. Our new-found capacity to orbit meteorological satellites, coupled with other exciting developments in meteorological science and computer technology, holds the promise of a drastic reduction in such losses, which have plagued men of all nations through history.

To illustrate the point, our satellite Tiros VI, in the course of a record 13 months of continuous operation, transmitted nearly 60,000 cloud-cover photographs which enabled us to issue 360 warnings of severe storms and over 2,000 analyses of global cloud cover. This work is being carried on by Tiros VII, now in orbit above us.

And to stress the point that this development can be of direct benefit to all nations in the here and now, let me state that the next Tiros satellite, to be launched shortly, will carry aloft an experimental development—the

⁸ For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 25, 1963, p. 835, and Dec. 9, 1963, p. 904.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Dec. 15, 1958, p. 977.

automatic picture transmission system. This will transmit automatically to ground receiver stations, without command from the ground, cloud photographic coverage of an area about 1,600 kilometers in radius surrounding the ground station. The receiving equipment can be procured for less than \$50,000, bringing this service within the reach of all nations.

This is what science and technology are bringing to the field of meteorology. And the international community is hard on the heels of scientific progress with a matching rate of progress in institutional development.

At its Fourth Congress, the WMO [World Meteorological Organization] initiated the financial and organizational basis for a world weather system to make the most of both conventional and satellite weather data. We should applaud this move and urge members to play their part in the world weather system and take the necessary steps to be in a position to get the greatest benefits from it. My Government is only too pleased to support this program, and the WMO in general, as it has from the beginning.

Space Communications

In the field of space communications, too, the technology does not lie in the distant future but has been coming rapidly into use this very year.

The first Relay satellite, placed into orbit December 13, 1962, provided successful transmission of voice between North and South America and of black and white and color television between the United States and Europe. The second Telstar satellite, launched on May 7th of this year, has in addition carried telephone calls, teletype messages, and data and facsimile transmission.

The first public demonstration of a synchronous satellite—Syncom II—was conducted on August 4, 1963, between Nigeria and the United States. We were fortunate in having as a participant in that program the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Moreover, the opening of the General Assembly was transmitted by both medium-altitude and synchronous satellites in television and voices.

Here, too—in space communications, as in

weather—technology, economics, and common sense all impel us toward the establishment of a single universal system.

As we have said before, our purpose is to help develop a single, global commercial system of communication via satellites—a system in which all countries will have an opportunity to participate in its ownership, management, and use. The United States Communications Satellite Corporation is now well under way with its planning. As President Kennedy said on November 20:¹⁰

This Government and the United States Communications Satellite Corporation can now take practical steps, in cooperation with other governments and foreign business entities, to develop a single global commercial space communications system.

The United States Government and the Communications Satellite Corporation look forward to exchanging views in the months ahead with other governments and communications entities on next steps toward such a global system.

Communication by satellite is in process of imminent realization. The voice, message, and picture will leap the barriers of distance. We will come ever closer together in time and space. But use of this new means of communication for international understanding will depend, as always, on our deeds. And in the creation of the global communication system itself there is no rational alternative to international cooperation.

Doctrine of Freedom in Outer Space

Mr. Chairman, what does all this add up to?

In the name of the world community we have promulgated the doctrine of freedom in outer space, declared that it shall be for human betterment and taken first steps toward assuring it, decided that space shall be ruled by international law and begun to spell out what we mean by that.

In the name of technology, efficiency, maximum benefit, and plain good sense we are engaged in an elaborate network of international cooperation at bilateral, multilateral, and United Nations levels, which, taken together, can well be described as an international program to extend dramatically man's knowledge

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1963, p. 904.

and mastery of the outer environment which wraps all nations and all peoples in a common embrace.

In short, we have rejected the political philosophy which made the last age of discovery an age of national conquest and conflict—and projected a political philosophy which promises to make this new age of discovery one of cooperation and benefit for all mankind. In outer space, if you please, our sense of social responsibility and our capacity for social invention are not doing too badly in response to the challenge laid down by the inventions of our scientists.

Manned Flight to the Moon

I have left to the last any reference to a manned flight to the moon.

Let me make it clear that exploration of the moon is not a stunt, distinct from the outer space program as a whole; nor is it the exclusive concern of only two nations. This project, spectacular though it may be, is understood best as a single step in man's mastery of space. It is a stage in a sequence which has a background and foreground.

In the background of manned flight to the moon is the vast program of research and the varied series of experiments which will make it possible—thoroughly justified in and of themselves. Indeed, not more than about 10 percent of our total expenditures on outer space can be attributed directly to manned lunar flight.

This program is being carried forward with significant international cooperation. Many nations, not one, are contributing to the moon project. The tracking and data stations in Mexico, Bermuda, the Canary Islands of Spain, Nigeria, Zanzibar, and Australia have been central to the success of the orbital flights in our Mercury program. These stations, along with additional facilities, are vital to the program for the manned lunar landing. This applies as well to the scientific investigations to be carried out through cooperative satellite and sounding rocket programs.

We are proud of these associations in a common task, Mr. Chairman. We hope that they will grow.

Beyond the manned landing on the moon lies

the whole uncharted and unpredictable adventure of interplanetary exploration. So exploration of the moon is seen properly as the culmination of one stage of a process and the opening of another—as both an end and a beginning.

I repeat that the preponderant part of the United States space program is made up of projects which we would want to carry out even if we did not plan at this stage to land men on the moon. The plans for a manned landing and return from the moon are thus one part of a space program whose larger purpose is to carry into outer space man's unending adventure of discovery.

As I have been saying here today, we have welcomed, and in fact fostered, the highest possible degree of international cooperation. As you also know, President Kennedy proposed before the General Assembly last September to explore with the Soviet Union opportunities for working together in the conquest of space, including the sending of men to the moon as representatives of all of our countries.¹¹ President Johnson has instructed me to reaffirm that offer today.

If giant strides cannot be taken at once, we hope that shorter steps can. We believe there are areas of work, short of integrating the two national programs, from which all could benefit. We should explore the opportunities for practical cooperation, beginning with small steps and hopefully leading to larger ones.

In any event our policy of engaging in mutually beneficial and mutually supporting cooperation in outer space, with the Soviet Union as with all nations, does not begin or end with a manned moon landing. There is plenty of work yet to come before that, and there will be even more afterward.

Mr. Chairman, one of the legal principles in the resolution before us states that "In the exploration and use of outer space, States shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance. . . ." My Government is so guided—by preference and by deed.

Another principle in the same resolution declares that "States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space. . . ." We are

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

prepared so to regard our astronauts and all astronauts.

Finally, we wish to consider our own national effort to realize man's dream of a voyage to the moon as part of a larger design to add to the store of man's knowledge. We hope that all nations will take part in this great venture in the same spirit.

Mr. Chairman, we are well started, in this seventh year of the Age of Space, in the direction of freedom, peace, law, and cooperation in outer space. Every relevant pressure here on earth impels us to stay on that track. If we can acquire the habit of cooperation in outer space, we shall not only learn more about man's relation to his environment but about man's relation to man. And thus may world statesmanship match achievement with science.

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space¹²

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be for the betterment of mankind and for the benefit of States irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development,

Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as in the legal aspects of exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between nations and peoples,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable to outer space,

Taking into consideration General Assembly resolutions 1721 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 and 1802

¹² U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.331 and Corr. 1; adopted unanimously in plenary session on Dec. 13.

(XVII) of 14 December 1962, approved unanimously by the States Members of the United Nations,

Solemnly declares that in the exploration and use of outer space States should be guided by the following principles:

1. The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind.

2. Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law.

3. Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

4. The activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on in accordance with international law including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

5. States bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, whether carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried on in conformity with the principles set forth in this Declaration. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the State concerned. When activities are carried on in outer space by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with the principles set forth in this Declaration shall be borne by the international organization and by the States participating in it.

6. In the exploration and use of outer space, States shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space with due regard for the corresponding interests of other States. If a State has reason to believe that an outer space activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State which has reason to believe that an outer space activity or experiment planned by another State would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

7. The State on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and any personnel thereon, while in outer space. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, and of their component parts, is not affected by their passage through outer space or by their return to the earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the State of registry shall be returned to that State, which shall furnish identifying data upon request prior to return.

8. Each State which launches or procures the

launching of an object into outer space, and each State from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to a foreign State or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the earth, in air space, or in outer space.

9. States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space, and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of a foreign State or on the high seas. Astronauts who make such a landing shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.

International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space¹³

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1721 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 and 1802 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, on international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space,

Having considered the Report (A/5549 and A/5549/Add.1) submitted by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,

Mindful of the benefits which all Member States would enjoy by participation in international programmes of co-operation in this field,

I

1. *Recommends* that consideration should be given to incorporating in international agreement form, in the future as appropriate, legal principles governing the activities of the States in the exploration and use of outer space;

2. *Requests* the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to continue to study and report on legal problems which may arise in the exploration and use of outer space, and in particular to arrange for the prompt preparation of draft international agreements on liability for damage caused by objects launched into outer space and on assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles;

3. *Further requests* the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session on the results achieved in preparing these two agreements;

II

1. *Endorses* the recommendations of the Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space concerning exchange of information, encouragement of international programmes, international sounding rocket facilities, education and training and potentially harmful effects of space experiments;

2. *Welcomes* the decision of the Committee, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and making full

¹³ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.332/Rev. 1; adopted unanimously at plenary session on Dec. 13.

use of the functions and resources of the Secretariat, to undertake the following:

(a) Preparation of a working paper on the activities and resources of the United Nations, of its specialized agencies, and of other competent international bodies relating to the peaceful uses of outer space;

(b) Preparation of a summary of national and of co-operative international space activities;

(c) Preparation of a list of available bibliographic and abstracting services covering the scientific and technical results and publications in space and space-related areas;

(d) Compilation in co-operation with UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] of reviews of information on facilities for education and training in basic subjects related to the peaceful uses of outer space in universities and other places of learning;

(e) Establishment, at the request of the Government of India, of a group of six scientists to visit the sounding rocket launching facility at Thumba and to advise the Committee on its eligibility for United Nations sponsorship in accordance with the basic principles endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 1802 (XVII).

3. *Notes with appreciation* that, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI), the Secretary-General is maintaining a public registry of objects launched into orbit or beyond on the basis of information being furnished by States Members of the United Nations;

4. *Notes with appreciation* that certain Member States have, on a voluntary basis, provided information on their national space programmes and invites other Member States to do so;

5. *Invites* Member States to give favourable consideration to requests of countries desirous of participating in the peaceful exploration of outer space for appropriate training and technical assistance on a bilateral basis or on any other basis they see fit;

6. *Notes* the considerable measure of co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space under way among Member States;

7. *Notes* that the United States and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement looking toward co-operation in the fields of satellite meteorology, communications and magnetic field mapping;

8. *Encourages* Member States to continue and extend co-operative arrangements so that all Members can benefit from the peaceful exploration and use of outer space;

9. *Believes* that international co-operation can be beneficial in furthering the exploration of the solar system;

III

1. *Notes with appreciation* (a) the Second Report of the World Meteorological Organization on the advancement of atmospheric sciences and their application in the light of developments in outer space and (b) the organizational and financial steps taken by the Fourth Congress of the World Meteorological Or-

ganization in response to resolutions 1721 C (XVI) and 1802 III (XVII);

2. *Endorses* efforts toward the establishment of a World Weather Watch under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization to include the use of satellite as well as conventional data with data centres to facilitate the effectiveness of the system;

3. *Urges* that Member States (a) extend their national and regional meteorological efforts to implement the expanded programme of the World Meteorological Organization, (b) co-operate in the establishment of the World Weather Watch, and (c) increase research and training in the atmospheric sciences;

4. *Invites* the World Meteorological Organization to make a progress report to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1964 relating to its activities in this field;

IV

1. *Notes with appreciation* the Second Report of the International Telecommunication Union on Telecommunication and the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space;

2. *Welcomes* the decisions of the October–November

1963 Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference convened by the International Telecommunication Union on the allocation of frequency bands for space communication and procedures for their use as a step in the development of space radio communications;

3. *Invites* the International Telecommunication Union to make a progress report to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1964 relating to its activities in this field;

4. *Recognizes* the potential contribution of communications satellites in the expansion of global telecommunications facilities and the possibilities this offers for increasing the flow of information and for furthering the objectives of the United Nations and its agencies;

V

Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to continue its work as set forth in General Assembly resolutions 1472 (XIV), 1721 (XVI), 1802 (XVII), and in this resolution, and to report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session on the activities of the Committee.

Cartography in Africa

UNITED NATIONS REGIONAL CARTOGRAPHIC CONFERENCE FOR AFRICA NAIROBI, KENYA, JULY 1-13, 1963

by G. Etzel Percy

The extensive ramifications of the science of cartography were effectively demonstrated at the recent United Nations Cartographic Conference for Africa, which met at Nairobi, Kenya, July 1–13.

In its narrowest interpretation the word “cartography” refers to the art or business of drawing maps. We may well picture a cartographer as one who bends over a drawing board, pen and India ink in hand, tracing out geographical patterns. Such a definition, however,

while not totally false, grossly underplays the role of cartographers in the modern world. In a broad, realistic sense we must also include as cartographers the great army of technicians who perform a wide range of tasks essential to the production of the increasing millions of maps and charts mandatory to current civilization. Technicians who measure distance electronically are eligible to be classed as cartographers, as are laboratory specialists who interpret aerial photographs, or operators who set geographic names in type on half-ton pieces of equipment, or government officials responsible for national mapping programs.

It was clear to all present at the Nairobi conference that before Africa can begin to realize its vast potential for development, it will have to have accurate maps to identify and inventory

• *Dr. Percy, Geographer of the Department of State, was vice chairman of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa.*

its colossal resources. The making of these maps will require the broadest possible application of the science of cartography.

The Economic Commission for Africa, a regional organization of the United Nations, sponsored the cartographic conference, first of its kind for the continent. Representatives came from 21 independent African countries: Chad, Congo (Léopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, and Upper Volta. There were delegates also from Kenya, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Southern Rhodesia, from 1 non-African countries, and from 8 international organizations and agencies, including observers.

Altogether more than 200 officials and technicians attended. Of these, 11 were from the United States, representing the major mapping agencies of the Federal Government. Each one was selected as an expert on one or more items of the conference agenda, which included such fields as geodesy, hydrography, aerial photography, and map reproduction. The U.S. team was led by Rear Adm. Arnold Karo, Director of the Coast and Geodetic Survey. His organization has long been a cartographic showplace for technicians from all over the world, who come there to spend anywhere from a part of a day on a fast orientation tour to many months of practical training.

The United States is not a member of the Economic Commission for Africa; consequently the U.S. delegation consisted of observers without voting rights. Nevertheless, the delegation actively participated in the conference proceedings, including the technical discussions on the floor of both plenary and committee sessions. Many of the technical accomplishments of American cartography have practical application on the African landscape and proved to be of interest.

The agenda of the conference ranged through many facets of cartographic science. Some of the agenda items were highly technical, involving such complicated procedures as the establishment of a sound geodetic network over

Africa and the interpretation of aerial photographs. Other items related to the status of various projects and programs actually in progress, such as international maps, hydrographic charts, aeronautical charts, and national atlases. The greatest interest, however, was in those general items on the agenda which promised to furnish know-how and assistance to the African nations. Four specific topics fell within this latter category: development of cartographic services, training of personnel, technical assistance, and organization of international cooperation.

Surveying and Mapping Agencies in Africa

To appreciate how closely these agenda items are tied in with the great needs in African cartography one must understand the rather paradoxical position of the national surveying and mapping agencies in the different countries. As British or French colonies, most of the African states formerly had the benefit of excellent cartographic facilities. The Directorate of Overseas Survey in the United Kingdom and the *Institut géographique national* in France each seriously programed mapping activities for its country's African territories. In fact each colony had a survey which amounted to a branch of the national agency in the metropole country. To a degree each country had some published map sheets, though in view of the problems of difficult terrain and great distances the coverage sometimes left much to be desired.

Now, after independence, the individual countries must assume at least a share of their mapping activities despite the continuing technical ties with the former metropolises through Commonwealth or French Union relations. Thus there is dire need for funds with which to finance the heavy expense of maintaining and improving domestic mapping programs. Unfortunately for a new, struggling country, mapping yearly grows more costly. Equipment becomes more elaborate, even running into computer-type electronics as budget figures run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars or even higher.

Of parallel importance to the cost factor is the need for adequately trained personnel. The

former metropolises continue to staff the new national survey agencies, but only in the upper echelons and even here at a decreasing rate, for the new countries want to employ as many nationals as possible. So the problem becomes one of establishing training programs for African technicians. As discussed in the plenary sessions numerous variables exist in attempting to work out a solution. First of all, levels of skill must be established—from the training of top-flight survey administrators down to field surveyors and draftsmen. In turn, questions of training techniques for the various levels revolve around the alternatives of on-the-spot training in each country, establishing a regional center or centers in Africa, or schooling trainees at recognized training centers in Europe and the United States. The *Institut géographique national* in Paris already serves in this latter capacity, working very closely with the former French areas. The conference decided on no immediate program but did open the way for expanding existing training facilities and introducing new centers.

Problems in technical assistance followed much the same pattern. Most if not all of the African countries are in need of technical assistance of one type or another. In this instance the executive secretary of the conference enumerated three types of assistance for implementing aid: (1) assignment of experts to help governments in planning and carrying out programs, (2) grants for study abroad, and (3) provision of equipment.

The matter of international cooperation cuts across virtually every problem facing the African survey organizations. But it is especially in the field of technical competence that the new countries can benefit mutually by exchanging technical data and by synchronizing their programs for regional cartographic projects. Although formal committees may serve as a means to implement exchange arrangements between governments, much can be done informally at the working level. For example, two countries may exchange technical data and examine each other's proof in mapping the zone of their common boundary. It augurs well that the delegates voiced a lively interest in such cooperation.

The principal elements coming to the fore in the agenda resulted in the adoption of 22 resolutions. No less than 15 related to general subjects such as the training of personnel, regional cooperation, and the organization of cartographic services. In every instance constructive recommendations encourage followup action, usually contingent upon some degree of participation by the Economic Commission for Africa as well as the individual countries themselves. Another five resolutions pinpointed attention on specific technical aspects of cartography; two of these sought to advance the field of geodesy in Africa. The final two resolutions were expressions of thanks to the Government of Kenya and the Economic Commission for Africa as host and sponsor respectively.

Mapping and Development

Mapping and economic development go hand in hand. The entire world recognizes that the new nations of Africa are facing a portentous challenge to elevate their standard of living, which they wish to do rapidly. In many instances the improvements in construction, industrial techniques, transportation facilities, and other aspects of material advance bypass the intermediate stages once necessary in the more developed countries in the world. For example, air transportation can follow the oxcart without an intervening era of mechanized surface travel; or a modern factory utilizing the latest manufacturing techniques may be erected, skipping the evolutionary processes through the water-wheel and coal-shoveling stages.

However, performance of these modern-day miracles in the realm of domestic economies demands precise blueprinting or mapping. There must be detailed knowledge of the terrain and a cartographic portrayal of resource distribution before developmental projects can be programed on a realistic scale. Such requirements are a far cry from the information found on the small-scale maps one peruses in identifying African place names or studying the broad relationships of African geography. The building of roads, railroads, and airports demands large-scale topographic maps. Irrigation, development of water power, and projects

involving detailed utilization of the land require maps of cadastral proportions, at scales as large as 1:5,000 or 1:10,000 (approximately 12 and 6 inches to the mile respectively).

The African countries have scarcely begun to look closely at their offshore resource potential. Here again cartography enters the picture, this time as submarine charting. Hydrographic mapping will reveal more and more accurately the configuration of the ocean floor for purposes of navigation, fishing, and quite possibly exploration and exploitation of subsurface resources such as petroleum and mineral nodules. In the case of undersea charting the International Hydrographic Bureau, with headquarters at Monaco, already has the technical competence to be tapped by those new nations giving a seacoast.¹

In addition to economic and social problems, especially heavy costs, and the need to train personnel, the raw environment of the vast African continent throws up other barriers to the many intensive cartographic programs in progress or under consideration. Space and distance alone tax the imagination. For example, to cover Africa's 11 million square miles with maps at a scale of 1:1,000,000 (16 miles to the inch) would require 141 sheets. In turn, one sheet at this scale may be broken down into 1,600 sheets at a scale of 1:25,000, the standard for showing topography in sufficient detail for general planning and operations. However, for constructive purposes, as in building dams or redefining property, larger scales are mandatory. One sheet at a scale of 1:25,000 equates in area to 6 1/4 sheets at 1:10,000 or 25 sheets at 1:5,000.²

This two-dimensioned geometric piling up of requirements to areal mapping should illustrate the enormity of the task at hand. Couple this complexity with the fact that mapping needs

¹ Of the 35 independent states in Africa, 27 have seacoasts, ranging from Madagascar with 2,605 nautical miles to the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville) with only 29 nautical miles.

² In the United Kingdom the Ordnance Survey is mapping the entire island of Great Britain at a scale of 6 1/4 inches to the mile (1:2,438), which to complete would require some 236,000 sheets.

in themselves are multiple. To set the pace properly for development Africans need not only topographic maps showing relief but also those which plot such phenomena as natural vegetation, soils, geological structure, drainage, distribution of mineral resources, and various types of climatic data. For planning purposes maps must also depict a record of human achievement: lines of transportation, agricultural utilization of land, distribution of population, and so on.

African mapmakers are also handicapped by inhospitable surface conditions. Dense vegetation in some regions defies the surveyor. If he is on the ground, he finds the going slow and tedious. If he is in the air, his photographs show the foliage of a vegetation coverage but do not tell him whether it is 100 feet above the ground or only 10. Many areas also have continuous periods of cloud cover that limit the effectiveness of aerial photography programs. Desert areas may be void of conspicuous features on the landscape, and therefore identification of location from map to ground presents difficulties.

Any mapping program is actually a series of programs, starting with establishing points, or "fixes," with which to tie cartography into a definite position on the surface of the earth. The sequence of processes continues until finished multicolor maps roll off the press.

Important divisions of any African country's official mapping organizations will likely include geodesy, aerial survey, and land consolidation (or allocation, or relocation). By briefly throwing the spotlight on these particular segments of African cartography it is possible to see in better perspective some of the practical applications of mapping techniques.

Toward a Geodetic Network

One of the prime accomplishments of the conference involved agreement to build up a geodetic network to cover the continent of Africa. Many of the individual countries have been earnestly producing maps of their own territory with minimum attention to the cartography of adjacent areas. While such industry may be commendable in the short run, experts pointed out that programming the establishment of geo-

detic points in accordance with a regional rather than a national pattern would in the long run result in more accurate maps of the entire continent as well as of any single country. In addition, the representatives of the African countries learned of some of the new techniques in providing widespread geodetic control. For example, one of the American delegates explained how space vehicles could be used to advance geodesy.

Aerial Survey

Aerial photography has come to the fore in recent years as the ideal way to map large areas fast and efficiently. Such methods are well known in Africa. In addition to the problems of heavy vegetation and unpredictable cloud cover, certain other difficulties persist. For example, modern equipment, especially aircraft for taking aerial photographs and the elaborate photogrammetric apparatus essential for plotting contours and other data on maps, lies beyond the financial reach of the new countries of Africa. Investigation of these problems, and an effort to resolve them, proved challenging to the delegates at the conference, and they agreed that by pooling their needs they would be in much better shape to benefit from United Nations aid, from the expertise of more developed countries, and from cooperation among themselves.

Land Consolidation

In many parts of Africa, Kenya among them, farm holdings are fragmented to the extent that agricultural economies over wide areas suffer from stifling social customs and traditions. An individual farmer must often scratch a living from small, scattered, vaguely marked patches of land without benefit of modern equipment.

The Government of Kenya, in order to reallocate agricultural holdings for more efficient use, has inaugurated a program of land consolidation which has met with success in many parts of the country. The Survey of Kenya played an important role in the early stages of this project, providing large-scale maps upon which holdings were plotted. Once the plots

were identified on the map, land could be redistributed so that each farmer would have his entire holdings in a larger, single plot. Boundaries, determined on the map, were marked on the ground by the planting of hedges as insurance against future disputes. To accomplish this redistribution of land entailed many problems, and some segments of the rural population would have no part of it. Nevertheless, the overall effort has paid off handsomely in those communities where the program has been adopted.

Prior to consolidation, ownership of land rested with the clan rather than the individual. Farmers at best "owned" the right to cultivate a particular plot. With reallocation, however, outright ownership with registered title has been assured by the Government. Such a step is proving to have a remarkable effect on the economy, as well as on the appearance of the landscape. Farmers are now able to borrow money on the land for improvements, something not previously possible. Marketing facilities, such as stores in the small agricultural communities, have normally been tumbledown shacks or sheds because of insufficient incentive or capital. Now, with loans available, merchants can build attractive shops and marketing stalls and a small town can put on the dress of modern urbanization. On one afternoon the conference delegates were taken to Kiambu, a few miles north of Nairobi, to see for themselves such an agricultural community in action.

Success Story

Throughout Africa there are numerous signs of cartographic projects in progress. The recent conference served as a catalyst to stimulate and augment these mapping efforts. Personal contacts made among the delegates supplemented the formal opportunities offered by the conference for furthering technical cartography. When this group next meets—probably in 1966—there should be much to report on work accomplished and many fine new programs should be under way. In fact the success of cartography in Africa will be indicative of success in economic development—unquestionably a high-priority goal of any new nation.

President Johnson Reasserts U.S. Support for IAEA

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated December 8

Ten years ago today President Eisenhower appeared before the General Assembly of the United Nations and made the following pledge:¹

The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. . . . To the making of these fateful decisions the United States pledges before you—and therefore before the world—its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

In his address President Eisenhower also proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency which would help channel into peaceful pursuits the scientific and material resources which had been created primarily for military purposes and noted that such an agency could serve as a vehicle to advance the use of the atom for the peaceful pursuits of mankind.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has assumed an essential and natural role in the international development of atomic energy. In each year of his administration, President Kennedy supported the International Atomic Energy Agency and on three separate occasions sent AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg to the General Conferences in Vienna, Austria, as his personal representative.

In the past 10 years the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world has grown steadily. The United States has led the efforts to bring the benefits of atomic energy to the world—shared its knowledge, its skills, and its materials with other nations in every continent.

Today I reassert our continued belief in the importance of cooperation among nations in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and our belief in the International Atomic Energy Agency as an important instrument in carrying out this co-

operation. I can think of no more appropriate way in which to convey to free men everywhere our intention to bring the benefits of the peaceful atom to mankind than in the words of President Kennedy in his message to the President of the Fifth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria, on September 27, 1961:

The General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency is a welcome event to all peoples who value peace. Your meeting accentuates the enormous potential of the atom for improving man's well-being. We already know the atom can help place more food on our tables, provide more light in our homes, fight disease and better our health, and give us new technical and scientific tools. The exploitation of this force for human welfare is just beginning. The International Atomic Energy Agency can assume a position of leadership in bringing the peaceful uses of atomic energy to the people of the world.

Moreover, the intangible benefits of your work are no less than the material rewards. When people from different countries work together in a common cause, they help to maintain a bridge of understanding between nations during times of tension and build firmer foundations for a more stable and peaceful world of the future. I applaud your efforts and assure you that they have the full support of the United States.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

President, United States of America

United States Favors Extension of IAEA Safeguards System

Statement by Henry D. Smyth¹

Ever since the first controlled nuclear reaction nearly 21 years ago, the world has been plagued by a peculiar fact of nature. Any or almost any peaceful use of nuclear energy results in the creation of plutonium, a substance which can be used to make the most destructive weapons that mankind has ever known. Therefore any nuclear power plant is a potential source of atomic explosives. For this reason it has long been the policy of my Government to

¹ Made in the Administrative and Legal Committee of the Seventh General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna, Austria, on Sept. 27, 1963. Ambassador Smyth is U.S. Representative to the IAEA.

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

support the application of international controls to all nuclear facilities around the world in order to safeguard against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Since the formation of this Agency many of us have worked long and hard to develop an international system of control which is as simple as possible consistent with effectiveness. In January of 1961 a system of reports and inspections for application to reactors with rating of 100 thermal megawatts or less was approved by the Board of Governors of this Agency. Now, with more than 2 years' experience of this safeguards system behind us and with an increasing number of nuclear power programs in the offing, it is our belief that it is time to extend this system to cover large power reactors.

As most delegates to this Conference are aware, such an extension of the system was provisionally approved by a unanimous vote in the June 1963 Board of Governors meeting. There were three abstentions on that vote. One of these abstentions was based upon the fact that the country in question had not yet had time to study the new system as completely as they wished. Another government abstained, making it clear that they fully favored safeguards in all respects but believed that a case-by-case approach to the problem was better than the establishment of a broad general system such as the one that is now before this committee. The third government that abstained did so, not because they disapproved of safeguards, but because they felt that certain aspects of this system were not exactly what they would have wished.

It was the formal recommendation of the Board that the General Conference note the proposed extension of the safeguard system and refer it back to the Board for implementation. In view of the support in the Board which I have described, it is my hope and expectation that this recommendation of the Board will be unanimously or nearly unanimously approved here.

Ever since my Government initiated its Atoms for Peace program in December 1953 it has insisted that full safeguards, including in-

spection, be applied to all materials and equipment that are furnished by the United States to foreign governments. Initially all of the agreements covering such transfers were bilateral and the safeguards applied were bilateral. With the formation of this Agency, however, we included in our bilateral agreements an article which provided for the transfer of the implementation of those bilateral safeguards to the IAEA at an appropriate time.

It was not until January 1961 that the Agency formally adopted a safeguards system covering small reactors. Since that time the United States Government has had conversations with many of its bilateral partners with a view to transferring the safeguards implementation to the Agency. The first of these transfers was recently made by means of a trilateral agreement between the Government of Japan, this Agency, and the United States Government. We anticipate that in coming months many more similar transfers will be made, and we are currently engaged in conversations with a view to accomplishing this end as quickly as possible.

Our reasons for believing that international safeguards implementation by this Agency are better than bilateral safeguards are numerous. I intend here to mention only a few of those reasons.

First of all, we believe that international safeguards may be viewed as more credible than bilateral safeguards. That is, if the United States Government, or any other government, for that matter, is conducting safeguards inspections in the nuclear installations of a very close ally, some question might arise in the minds of people at large as to the thoroughness and efficacy of such inspections. If, on the other hand, those same inspections are conducted by an international inspectorate in which a variety of countries is represented, no one in the world can doubt their thoroughness and objectivity.

Second, we believe that it is important that the safeguards applied to various countries be uniform. If 10, 11, or more countries set up their own individual inspection systems, it may well turn out that one country has a rigorous system and that another country has a lenient

one. If transferred materials and equipment, whatever their source, are subjected to the same inspection under an international organization, there will be complete uniformity of safeguards standards.

Third, we believe it is far more expensive for many different countries to establish inspection systems than if one international secretariat representing the governments both of the supplying countries and the receiving countries undertakes this whole job.

Pending the full and widespread acceptance of the Agency system by all of our bilateral partners, the United States Government of course intends to continue its bilateral safeguards inspections. We intend moreover that the techniques and principles involved in those bilateral inspections will continue to be precisely the same as those provided for in the Agency inspection system. In this way the transfer of U.S. bilateral safeguards to the Agency for implementation will not be a major change but rather a continuation by a different organization of precisely the same system of inspections.

During the past few months representatives of several governments have told me that they favor safeguards but they fear that the system might well be onerous. I think there is a very simple answer to this problem. The records and measuring devices that are required for adequate safeguards systems are precisely the same records and measuring devices which would be needed for prudent management of a nuclear installation both to protect the health and safety of the operators of that installation and to protect the financial investment in that installation.

Our view of the Agency safeguards system is that the records that will be required by the Agency inspectorate are records which are necessary to keep track of the very valuable material used and produced in nuclear reactors. The safeguards accounting for this material is precisely the same accounting as bookkeepers will require to protect the investment. When we are dealing with material that has a value of from \$10 to \$100 per gram or more, prudence and economy require absolutely precise records of the amount originally supplied, the amount

produced, and the amount transferred from area to area. These are precisely the kind of records that the Agency safeguards system requires.

In the safeguarding that the Agency has undertaken on the four U.S. reactors, the United States has not been required to prepare special reports for the Agency. We have merely sent the Agency on a monthly basis the copies of the regular reports on those reactors which have always been prepared for the internal use of the reactor operators.

For this reason we are puzzled by the concern of some countries that Agency safeguards will be onerous. We anticipate that the Agency inspections and the records completed for those inspections will involve only such records as would be absolutely essential for the safe and economic operation of the reactors.

In conclusion I should like to urge all members of this committee to vote in favor of the safeguards extension. As you have seen, the resolution before us was unanimously approved in the Board and is sponsored by 17 different countries from many areas of the world. It is my belief that a unanimous vote on this resolution would be of great benefit to us all in this important step toward eliminating the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.²

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Germany

Agreement on external debts. Signed at London February 27, 1953. Entered into force September 16, 1953. TIAS 2792.
Accession deposited: Chile, October 15, 1963.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at

² The resolution under discussion was approved by the General Conference on Sept. 30 by a vote of 57 to 4, with 6 abstentions.

Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratifications deposited: Rumania, December 12, 1963; Sweden, December 9, 1963.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratification deposited: Philippines, November 6, 1963.¹

BILATERAL

Colombia

Agreement relating to radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá November 16 and 29, 1963. Entered into force December 29, 1963.
Investment guaranty agreement. Signed at Bogotá December 2, 1963. Enters into force on date of notification of approval of agreement by Colombia.

Israel

Convention on extradition. Signed at Washington December 10, 1962.
Ratified by the President: October 29, 1963.
Entered into force: December 5, 1963.

Sierra Leone

Agreement supplementing the agreement of May 16 and 19, 1961 (TIAS 4759), so as to provide for additional investment guaranties authorized by new United States legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Freetown December 28, 1962, and November 13, 1963. Entered into force November 13, 1963.

Sweden

Convention on extradition, with protocol. Signed at Washington October 24, 1961.
Ratified by the President: October 29, 1963.
Entered into force: December 3, 1963.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Anthony M. Solomon as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and Deputy Assistant Administrator for Economic Coordination, Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development, effective November 21. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 619 dated December 12.)

¹ With reservation made at time of signing.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

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Fact Sheets. Pamphlets containing information on the land, people, government, politics, economy, and foreign policy of newly independent countries:

Congo (Léopoldville): Pub. 7571. African Series 36. 15 pp. 10¢.
Ghana. Pub. 7556. African Series 35. 12 pp. 10¢.
Israel. Pub. 7574. Near and Middle Eastern Series 71. 8 pp. 10¢.
Jordan. Pub. 7591. Near and Middle Eastern Series 73. 10 pp. 10¢.
Korea. Pub. 7559. Far Eastern Series 114. 11 pp. 10¢.
Malaya. Pub. 7475. Far Eastern Series 120. 14 pp. 10¢.
Morocco. Pub. 7583. African Series 38. 14 pp. 10¢.
Nigeria. Pub. 7572. African Series 337. 12 pp. 10¢.
Tunisia. Pub. 7589. African Series 39. 6 pp. 10¢.

The following booklets were prepared for young men and women interested in careers in the Department of State both at home and abroad. They contain information on employment opportunities, the necessary qualifications and examinations, salary schedules, and other pertinent data:

A Career in the U.S. Department of State: The Foreign Service Officer. Pub. 7533. Department and Foreign Service Series 113. 37 pp. 30¢.

A Career in the U.S. Department of State: The Foreign Service Staff. Pub. 7535. Department and Foreign Service Series 114. 29 pp. 25¢.

A Career in Washington, D.C.: The Department of State. Pub. 7536. Department and Foreign Service Series 115. 21 pp. 20¢.

Status of World's Nations. *Geographical Bulletin No. 2.* Reference guide prepared by The Geographer to meet the needs of Government agencies and individuals concerned with international matters. Contains information on the official nomenclature of many countries and explains the exceptions found in the complex pattern of sovereignties throughout the world. Pub. 7537. 20 pp. 20¢.

Implementing the Trade Expansion Act. *Foreign Affairs Outlines No. 4.* Excerpts from speeches: "Readjusting United States Foreign Trade," by Leonard Weiss, and "To the Detriment of None," by Christian A. Herter. Also included is an article "Summary of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962," prepared by the Office of International Trade, Department of State. Pub. 7554. Commercial Policy Series 198. 16 pp. 10¢.

You and Your Passport (Revised). Passport information folder. Pub. 7564. Department and Foreign Service Series 119. 10 pp. 10¢; \$5.00 per 100 copies.

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No.	Date	Subject
614	12/10	Rusk: Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association, St. Paul, Minn. (as-delivered text).
*615	12/9	U.S. participation in international conferences.
616	12/11	NATO 1964-65 research fellowships.
†617	12/11	Delegation to NATO ministerial meeting (rewrite).
†618	12/12	Hillsman: "United States Policy Toward Communist China."
*619	12/12	Solomon appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs and Deputy Assistant Administrator for Economic Coordination, Bureau for Latin America, AID (biographic details).
†620	12/12	U.S.-Israel cotton textile agreement.
†621	12/12	U.S.-U.A.R. cotton textile agreement.
†622	12/13	Burundi credentials (rewrite).
*623	12/12	Cleveland: "The Genial Influence of Freedom."
625	12/14	Recognition of Governments of Dominican Republic and Honduras.
*626	12/14	Jefferson portrait presented to Department.

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†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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
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
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
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
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
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


















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